Compiled Torts Digest

8/13/2019 Compiled Torts Digest

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GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and kids)

GR No.70493

NARVASA; May 18, 1989

NATURE

Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate

Court which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts.

FACTS

- Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned

by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from

the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the

afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI

sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the opposite

direction of Davao City and bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At

about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a

consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical

injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly

damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively

damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a

few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road.

- On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and

children of the late Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver

and owners of the cargo truck.

- Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for insufficiency of

evidence." The circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned:

1. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the

deceased Calibo was "zigzagging."

2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police, Calibo's

companions who suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so investigated or

give statements to the police officers. This, plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute

criminal proceedings against Zacarias, and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever

instituted in Court against Zacarias, were "telling indications that they did not attribute the

happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault."

3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was "not as clear and detailed as that of

Zacarias," and was "uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the policeinvestigators Dimaano and Esparcia."

4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and none by the jeep,

demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had

not; and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at

high speed.

5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias

shortly before the collision, in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the

left of the center of the road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident

because he still had ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply

have braked to a full stop.

- IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the basis of the following

circumstances, to wit:

1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision

occurred,' and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he "did

not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep . . .;"

what is worse, "the truck driver suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still

within the lane of the jeep;" had both vehicles stayed in their respective lanes, the collisionwould never have occurred, they would have passed "along side each other safely;"

2) Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed to Pfc. Esparcia, on the latter's

demand, was the 'driver's license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro;"

3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against

"plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right, under the law, to opt merely to bring a civil

suit.

ISSUES

WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision of trial court.

HELD

NO.

Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to

accident liability. (Picart v Smith)

Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other's

vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed

of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private respondents have admitted that the

truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to

deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought

to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From these facts the logical conclusion

emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the

last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the

truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had

sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those

circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a

supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave

him a clear path.

-Picart v Smith:

The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulledhis horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however guided his car

toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only few feet away. He then

turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped

around and was killed by the passing car. . . . .

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of

antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have

already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to

discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the

negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the

defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these

circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending


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harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior

negligence of the other party.

Dispositive WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is

hereby REVERSED, and the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of the

Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Voting Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL) VS. IAC (DIONISIO)

148 SCRA 353

FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987

NATURE

Petition for review

FACTS

-About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving home (he lived in Bangkal, Makati)

from cocktails/dinner meeting with his boss where he had taken a shot or two of liquor. He

had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Sts. At Bangkal,

Makati (not far from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street without

headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which

was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIOs lane). The dump truck

was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of

oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set

anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been

driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (CARBONEL), its regular driver, with the

permission of his employer PHOENIX, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the

following morning, DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to

the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the

collision, DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a

"nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

DIONISIOs claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in

which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix

PHOENIX + CARBONELs claim: the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own

recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,

without his headlights on and without a curfew pass; if there was negligence in the manner inwhich the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static

condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening,

efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.

TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of Dionisio

IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages awarded

ISSUES

Substantial Issues:

5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the

wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked

a. WON the drivers negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that

Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently

Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident

rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel

b. WON the court, based on the last clear chance doctrine, should hold Dionisio alone

responsible for his accident

6. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised due care in the selection andsupervision of the dump truck driver

7. WON the amount of damages awarded should be modified

HELD

SUBSTANTIAL

5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was a natural and foreseeable

consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was

"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the

truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover

damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts

a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under our jurisdiction and even in the United

States, the distinctions between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost entirely

discredited.

- the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an

indispensable and efficient cause; Dionisio's negligence,although later in point of time than

the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient

intervening or independent cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private

respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the

truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering

nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the

dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.

FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to

distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon

which that cause operated If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which

made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of

causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important

part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and

passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter am the result of otheractive forces which have gone before.The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises

creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a

spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the

spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not

escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition"

remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may

still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find

occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited

So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in

operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety. and some new

force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and


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"condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the

intervening cause."

"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human

experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to

anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other

reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only forthat reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and

customary wind arising later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and

therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible

or explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some

independent source. x x x In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with

the defendant's conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence

consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a

substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the

plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the

original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence.The courts are quite generally agreed

that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's

responsibility.

Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual weather of the

vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or

fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track

should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; x x x.

The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence

of others. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect

the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of

human life, and therefore to be anticipated.'Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and

forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy

traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is

negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is

not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it - - "

b. NO.The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction

by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its

way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common

law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has

itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

-The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent

acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more

fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the

character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the

community.

ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function of that doctrine in the common

law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of

contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any

recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was

relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The

common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who

had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the

casualty and failed to do so.

6. NO.The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its track driver to bring the dump truck tohis home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled

with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which

the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of

culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

7. YES. Taking into account the comparative negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners, the

demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80

ratio. As to the other awards of damages, sustain.

20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of

P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be home

by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 800% needs to be paid by petitioners

Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of

exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home exclusively by the

petitioners. Phoenix is of c ourse entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.

Disposition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by

reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and

moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs

against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SALEN V. BALCE

In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the defendant Balce was the father of a

minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him. Gumersindo was

found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court

rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the minor son of

defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of theRevised Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the decision,

this tribunal held:

It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly

liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane,

under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without

discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This

is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law

exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal

Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain

civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority

or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from


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> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with

the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY.

A101 RPC SAYS SO

> RULES:

+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or

who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY

= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but withoutdiscernment

= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE

PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR

= youth welfare code

= FC: responsibili ty of parents

+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182

Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of

Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)

209 SCRA 518

Feliciano, J; 1992

NATURE

Appeal for review of CA decision

FACTS

- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air

rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. He was charged with reckless imprudence

resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground

that he had acted without discernment. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a

civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc.

- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as

their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an adoption decree

granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed

the complaint.

- The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. The SC however

decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice.

ISSUE

- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of

the Civil Code.

HELD-

- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in

the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. The adopting parents had no

actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US

were they live. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and

unconscionable.

Reasoning-

- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him under Article

2176. However, because of his minority, the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable.

Article 2180 reads the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones

own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible The father

and, incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages caused by

the children who live in their company The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease

when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good

father of a family to prevent damage.

- The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of

imputed liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under this doctrine, a person is not

only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a

certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural

or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the

instructing, controlling, and disciplining of the child. The presumption under law is that when

a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the

performance of these duties and responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented

to overcome this presumption.

Disposition

Petition granted. Decision set aside.

FILAMER V IAC

212 SCRA 637

GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992

NATURE

Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS

- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a janitor. The president of FCI is Agustin

Masa. Agustin has a son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. Allan lives with

his dad. Funtecha also lives in the presidents house free of charge while a student at FCI.

- It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home, then go back to the

school, then go home in the school jeep. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the

morning hes supposed to fetchthe kids and bring them to school.


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- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a student license. After a dangerous

curb, and seeing that the road was clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast

moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the

pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic

(I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep had only one functioning

headlight that night.

- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed, saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries

caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose

acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable.

ISSUE

WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable

HELD

YES

- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and

Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school . Allan's job

demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning

of the next school day.

- It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the

jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the

school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license

and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.

- In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,

Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his

enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was

intended by the petitioner school. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was

one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny

any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The

clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of

liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests

of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury

or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the

act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the

question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in

furtherance of his master's business.- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need not have an official appointment for a

driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent

act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of

the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with

the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the

presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a

servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof

of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees

Funtecha and Allan. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school

jeep by persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over

its employees with regard to the use of the jeep.

- The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled

manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner

had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees,

the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The

liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer

shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the

heirs of the plaintiff.

DUAVIT v COURT OF APPEALS

May 18, 1989

FACTS:

The jeep being driven by defendant Sabiniano collided with another jeep, which had then 2

passengers on it. As a result of the collision the passengers of the other jeep suffered injury

and the automobile itself had to be repaired because of the extensive damage.

A case was filed against Sabiniano as driver and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.

Duavit admitted ownership of the jeep but denied that Sabiniano was his employee.

Sabiniano himself admitted that he took Duavits jeep from the garage without consent or

authority of the owner. He testified further that Duavit even filed charges against him for

theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did not push through as the parents of Sabiniano

apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

TC found Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but absolved Duavit on the ground that

there was no employer-employee relationship between them, and that former took the

vehicle without consent or authority of the latter.

CA held the two of them jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE: Won the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable

under Article 2180 of the CC when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the

owner nor taken with the consent of the latter.

HELD: NO

In Duquillo v Bayot(1939), SC ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an

accident involving a vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and

by a person not employed by him.

This ruling is still relevant and applicable, and hence, must be upheld.

CAsreliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte and Vargas v Langcay is misplaced and cannot

be sustained.


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In Erezo v Jepte case, defendant Jepte was held liable for the death of Erezo even if he was

not really the owner of the truck that killed the latter because he represented himself as its

owner to the Motor Vehicles Office and had it registered under his name; he was thus

estopped from later on denying such representation.

In Vargas, Vargas sold her jeepney to a 3rd person, but she did not surrender to the Motor

Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates. So when the jeepney later on figured in an

accident, she was held liable by the court. holding that the operator of record continues to

be the operator of vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and 3rd persons.

The circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case.

Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of vehicle but denies having employed or

authorized the driver Sabiniano. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioners garage.

Decision and resolution annulled and set aside.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz)

194 SCRA 340

Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991

NATURE

Petition for review of the decision of the CA

FACTS

-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at

Talaan Beach, Quezon. His parents didnt allow him to go due to short notice but directed him

to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. However, he was persuaded

by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.

-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS, represented by its principal, Illumin, and

several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son, contending that it

occurred due to petitioners failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family.

The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the

waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. Also, the male teachers who were

to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. The TC dismissedthe case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to

the picnic which was not school sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class to supervise

then and was not actually invited.

-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the liability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin,

the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4

th, and 5

th

paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnt an extra -

curricular activity of the HS. From the evidence, it was shown that the principal had known

of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. As

such, under Article 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages

incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of

negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners

contend that the victims parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnt give their son

consent to join the picnic. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the

existence of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were

absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be

said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. Hence this

petition.

ISSUE

(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants

(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable

(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper

HELD

(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people

under them. At the outset, it should be noted that the victims parents allowed their son to

join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination.

-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or

consent to it. If the CAs findings are to be upheld, employers will be forever exposed to the

risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their

employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the

performance of their duties.

-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof

that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers were

invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. Life savers

were brought in the event of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers

did all that was humanly possible to save the victim.

(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly par 4. For an employer to be held

liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or

prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task.

In the case at bar, the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic

was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity.

(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of

them, no moral or exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in favor of

respondent spouses.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is SET ASIDE

AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS)

160 SCRA 315

CRUZ; April 15, 1988

Facts:

It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-

Recoletes. Alfredo went to the school to submit his Report in Physic. While they were in

the auditorium of their school, hewas shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon.

ISSUE:


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WON Art 2180 is applicable.

Held:

Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or non-academic. Teachers are liable for

acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade

establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable.

There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic

schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is

expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision, whatever

the nature of the school where he is teaching. x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at

present. x x x

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and

influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not ended, or has

ended or has not yet begun. The term custody signifies that the student is within the

control and influence of the school authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by

the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or

students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that

at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it.

Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held

responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its

authority could be validly exercised over him.

In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof

under the general principle of respondent superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability by

proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they had

taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated

from liability imposed by Art 2180.

Basis of teachers vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of

parents). However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as

that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. x x x The

parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher

and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tortcommitted by the child.

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the

discharged of their duties, they were exonerated of liability.

(Note the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to

injuries, in or out of the school premises J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said many student x x x

view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on

behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively

rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of

negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could

be no in loco parentis relationship.

The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The court cannot

make law, it can only apply the law with its imperfections. However the court can suggest that

such a law should be amended or repealed.

AFIALDA V HISOLE

85 Phil 67

REYES; November 29, 1949

NATURE

Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo

FACTS

- This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. Loreto Afialda was the

caretaker of the carabaos of spouses Hisole. While tending the animals, he was gored by one

of them and later died as consequence of his injuries. The action was filed by the sister of

Loreto, and contended that the mishap was due neither to Loretos own fault nor to force

majeure.

- She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.21831) as ground for the liability:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it

may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise fromforce majeureor from

the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

- Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of cause of action, which the CFI granted. Hence, the

appeal.

ISSUE

WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker (as

opposed to a stranger)

HELD

1. NO

Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or

damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those

circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed andfor which he must take the consequences.

Reasoning

- The lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the CC, the owner of

an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused

to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he

had been negligent or at the same code.

1Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, althoughit may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of theperson who has suffered damage.


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- Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff contends that art. 1905 does not

distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and

makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.

- The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is important. For the statute names the

possessor or user of the animal as the person liabl e for any damages it may cause and this

for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal

and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.

- In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker,

who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent

the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by

the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had

voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

- On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art. 1902, it is essential that there be fault or

negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage.

But the complaint contains no allegation on those points.

- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa, the death of an employee who was bitten

by a feline which his master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said tribunal

declared to be a veritable accident of labor which should come under the labor laws rather

than under article 1905, CC. The present action, however, is not brought under labor laws in

effect, but under Art.1905.

Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.

Lambert v Fox John R. Edgar & Co, stationery and book store, its creditors, including L & F,

agreed to take over the business & accept stocks as payment of debt. L & F became the

largest stockholder. They made an agreement not to sell the stocks until after 1 year, failure

to observe such, the party will pay 1k as liquidated damages. After 9 mons, Fox sold it to E.C.

Mc Cullough, its strong competitor.

RTC claims agreement it only good until the corporation reached a sound financial

basis.

GR: Parties who are competent to contract may make such agreements within the

limitations of the law and public policy as they desire, and that the courts will enforce them

according to their terms.

Exceptions: court is authorized to intervene for the purpose of reducing a penalty

stipulated in the contract to the extent of benefits - when the principal obligation has been

partly or irregularly fulfilled and the court can see that the person demanding the penaltyhas received the benefit of such or irregular performance.

There is no difference between a penalty and liquidated damages, so far as legal

results are concerned. Whatever differences exists between them as a matter of language,

they are treated the same legally. Primary purpose: to avoid proving the damages to recover

sum stipulated.

Not an illegal stipulation nor restraint of trade since it protects the corporation

and has a reasonable length of time.

GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN

171 SCRA 382

SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989

Nature:

Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA

Facts:

- on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell into a manholewhile she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg

was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated on, and confined.

- She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty inlocomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of

complaint) and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former

jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other

activities which she used to do prior to the incident.

- Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by a concreteflower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75

cm long by 150 cm deep.

- City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by theNational Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also

owned by the National Government. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said

manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by

his subordinates.- Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus

attorneys fees. CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground that no evidence was

presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd.

- City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervisionof the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.

Issue

WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect

binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC.

Held

YES

- The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered bypedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the

death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of

roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control

or supervision.

- It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city ormunicipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or

supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and isexercised through the City Engineer.


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- The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the otherhand, article 2189 applies in particularto the liability arising from defective streets, public

buildings and other public works.

On Damages awarded

- Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The trial court shouldnot have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on speculation, conjecture or

guess work as to the amount.

- Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatcos handicap wasnot permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year.

- Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000.- Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450 bonus remain the same- P3000 as attorneys fees remain the sameDisposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial court

reinstated with modification.

JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was

flooded with ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an

uncovered opening w/c could not be seen because of dirty rainwater.

A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left

leg to a depth of 1 inches. His left leg swelled and he developed fever. He was confined for

20 days, walked w/crutches for 15 days and could not operate his school buses.

He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose administration the

Sta. Ana had been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.

TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of

Manila.

ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec

HELD: YES

RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which Cityof Manila is invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of

Manila while Art 2189 CC governs the liability due to defective streets, public buildings and

other public works inparticular and is therefore decisive in this case.

It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, controland supervisionby

the province, city or municipality over the defective public building in question is enough. It is

not necessary that such belongs to such province, city or municipality.

In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market remained under

the control of the City as evidenced by:

1. the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that prior approvalof the City is still needed in the operations.

2. Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such control and supervision in hisletter to Finance Sec. Virata (The City retains the power of supervision and

control over its public markets)

3. City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primaryduty is to take direct supervision and control of that particular public market

4. Sec. 30 of Tax Code The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediatesupervision, administration and control over public markets

It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market

reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary

precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb.

The drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls rather than the passageways. The

City should have seen to it that the openings were covered.

It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5 months after

this incident it was still uncovered. There were also findings that during floods, vendors would

remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor

penalized by the City. No warning sign of impending danger was evident.

Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the

passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner

would not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the

injury suffered.

Asiatec and Cityy are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.

ONG vs METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

FACTS: Metropolitan Water District owns and operates 3 swimming pools in Balara, QC.

In July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, 14, went with his bros to the pool. Between 4:40-

4:45, some boys noticed him swimming underwater for a long time. The lifeguard Manuel

Abao was then informed and he immediately jumped and retrieved the apparently lifeless

body of Ong from the bottom. They exerted efforts to revive him but the boy died.

ISSUE: WON the death of the Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its

employees so as to entitle plaintiff to recover damages.

HELD: NO

RATIO: The spouses Ong who were claiming for damages had the burden of proving that the

damage is caused by the fault or negligence of MWD or one of its employees and were not

able to do so.

The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or death

of a patron if said operator had exercised due diligence in the selection of and supervis ion

over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the

circumstances - in that it had taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its

patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.

In this case, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD had taken all necessary

precautions:


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1. Swimming pools are equipped with ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygenresuscitator and first aid medicine kit.

2. Bottom of pool is painted w/ black colors to insure clear visibility.3. Rules and regulations governing use of pools are on display at conspicuous

places.

4. 6 trained and proficient lifeguards were employed and are on duty two at atime.

5. A male nurse and sanitary inspector were employed.6. There is a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator.7. Security guards are always available.The employees of MWD also did everything possible to bring the boy to life. Abao

gave him manual artificial respirator, the nurse and sanitary inspector injected camphorated

oil and applied oxygen resuscitator, a doctor was sent for.

All of these show that MWD has done what is humanly possible under the

circumstances to restore life to Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his

death.

Lastly, the Doctrine of last clear chance can never apply where the party charged is

required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all

means at hand after the peril is and should have been discovered.

VESTIL V IAC (UY)179 SCRA 47

CRUZ; December 6, 1989

NATURE

Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court.

FACTS

- July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the

petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was

rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds

on the forehead. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later

due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause

of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.

- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, andsecond, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a

complication of rabies

- Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them

as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.

- Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC

found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be

responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog.

- On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog

bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established.

Petitioners Claim

The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that bit her.

Respondents Comments

The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in

any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.

ISSUE

WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.

HELD

Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence

or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the

damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who

possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such

animal may cause.

Reasoning

ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible

for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall

cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the

person who has suffered damage.

- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente

Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time

of the incident in question.- There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or

twice weekly.

- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and

second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a

complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified

cause of death has been satisfactorily established.

- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting

her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they

cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only

three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she

might have done to the animal.

- Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the

presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is

based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animalsfor his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

DISPOSITION

The Court approves the time.

E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.

28 Phil 122

MORELAND; October 1, 1914

NATURE


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An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident

FACTS

- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway

- Plaintiffs residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendants tracks run. To

enter his premises from the street, plaintiff must cross defendants tracks.

- One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in crossing the tracks to enter his premises,

the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and

causing injuries

- At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the rails were above-gruond, and the ties

upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the

ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.

- It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but defendant

claims the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and such intoxication was

the primary cause of the accident

- Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiffs negligence was not as

great as defendants, awarded plaintiff P1,000.

ISSUE

WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the principal occurrence or only to his own

injury. (If the former, he cannot recover; if the latter, the trial court was correct in

apportioning damages)

HELD

NO

Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with

the other evidence tending to prove negligence.

Reasoning

- Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts, other than the fact that Wright was

intoxicated, are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The

conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the

facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle

under the conditions described.

- A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties

themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehiclecrashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a

person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such

circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a

conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.

DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff.

Corliss vs Manila Railroad Company

Nature: Direct Appeal from a decision of the CFI, Pampanga

Facts:

Ralph Corliss, Jr., 21, was driving a jeep on his way back to Clark Air Force Base.

The jeep collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company.

The crossing bars were not put down and no guard was at the gatehouse when the

accident happened.

Issue: WON there was negligence

Held: Yes, on plaintiffs part

Ratio:

Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. Even if crossbars were not put down and that there was no guard, plaintiff still had

the duty to stop his jeep to avoid collision and that the main witness of the

defendant-appellee, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time

of the accident.

Plaintiff was sufficiently warned (locomotive had blown its siren or whistle)

CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO

38 Phil 768

FISHER; October 14, 1918

NATURE

An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance disallowing the claim of the plaintiff

for P1,000 against the estate of the deceased James P. McElroy.

FACTS

- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo,

Rizal, located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to

the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the

company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.

- January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the

train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door,

took his position upon the steps of the coach.

- On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement

platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the

company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the

length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also an

employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point wherethe platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off, one

or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet

slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the

platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and

lacerated. After the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters

before it came to a full stop.

- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train station was lit dimly by a single light

located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were

difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was the customary season for harvesting

these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market. This


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negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.

Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the accident

was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if

the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely

contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to

ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.

- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed

in Thompson's work on Negligence:

"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in

attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to

be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the

passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by

the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by

the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under

similar circumstances, to avoid injury."

- In considering the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the

following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a

level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the

steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the

platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement

platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. The

plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means sorisky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an

aged or feeble person. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily

custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be no uncertainty in his mind

with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of

the platform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that the conduct of the

plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not

characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered

plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

MALCOLM, [dissent]- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be

admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the

particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a

passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to

alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, we have

the logical result - the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and

judgment affirmed.

Astudillo vs Manila Electric CO, 55 Phil 427

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Manila

Facts:

Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire

connected with an electric pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros.

Issue: WON there was breach of legal duty

Held: YES

Ratio:

Pole was located close enough to public place so that a person, by reaching hisarm out the full length, would be able to take hold of one of the wires

City Engineer: even if wire was triple braid weather proof type, if touched by aperson, would endanger life of that person by electrocution

Compliance with a franchise, ordinance, or a statute is not conclusive proof thatthere was no negligence. The fulfillment of the conditions does not render

unnecessary other precautions required by ordinary care.

BATACLAN V MEDINA

102 PHIL 181

MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957

FACTS

- Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly aftermidnight. While the bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst. The

bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four passengers could not get out, including Bataclan.

It appeared that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came to help. One

of them carried a torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the

four passengers trapped inside.

- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not

the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his

co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though

he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were

awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.

ISSUES

What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers?

HELD

The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.

- see definition of proximate cause under A1

- It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger,

merely causing him physical injuries, "If through some event, unexpected and extraordinary,

the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the

vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the

proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the

present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold

that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the

reason that when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on its back, the


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leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the

men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the

passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because

it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and

coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they

had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said

rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the

rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be

expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of

its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in

part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor.

According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and

forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which

the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and

soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,

specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected -even from a distance, and yet neither

the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the

rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

-(I guess this case says, if not for the overturning of the bus then the leak and the fire

wouldnt have happened)

Compiled Torts Digest

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