Compilation R39, S15-S50

7/29/2019 Compilation R39, S15-S50

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Dilag vs IAC

Facts:

Herminio Arellano died in a vehicular accident involving a truck owned by sps. Pablo and Socorro Dilag.

Marciano Arellano (Private Respondent), filed an action for quasi-delict (Civil Case 8714). Plaintiff won and the

decision became final. A writ of execution was issued on Feb. 16, 1979.

Sps. Dilag filed a petition for relief from judgment praying that the decision in CC#8714 be set aside (CC#12832).

A compromise agreement between the parties in CC#8714 was presented but was disapproved by the court forfailure of the Dilag spouses to sign it, although it was alleged by the plaintiff that the Dilag spouses made a partialpayment of P9,000 to plaintiff Marciano Arellano. CC#12832 was dismissed.

Pursuant to the writ of execution issued on Feb. 16, 1979, a Notice of Levy on Execution was annotated on TCT30137 on Feb. 21, 1979, covering a parcel of land in Iloilo (Lot#288 registered in the name of sps. Pablo andSocorro Dilag).

An adverse claim was inscribed in TCT 30137 filed by Suzette, Benito, Sussie and Susan all surnamed Dilag

(Petitioners) to protect their rights and interests as vendees evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in theirfavor by their parents Pablo and Socorro Dilag evidenced on Nov. 21, 1973. The adverse claim further stated thatthe owners duplicate certificate was in the possession of DBP to which the property had earlier been mortgaged.

Another inscription was included in the TCT which was a Contract of Lease executed on Feb. 9, 1979 by the sps.

Pablo and Socorro Dilag in favor of David and Erlinda Diancin who took possession of the property (lot 288)described in TCT as lessees.

After compliance with the legal requirements of notice and publication, Lot 288 under TCT 30137 and lot 1927(unregistered but declared in the name of the Dilag Spouses) were sold at public auction on Aug. 26, 1981 toMarciano Arellano.

On Aug. 27, 1981, the corresponding Certificate of Sale at public auction was inscribed on TCT 30137 subject tothe right of redemption as provided for by law. Another inscription appears, a Deed of Absolute Sale date Aug. 26,1981 executed by Pablo Dilag, in favor of their children.

TCT 30137 was cancelled and a new one TCT 104986 was issued in the name of Benito, Susette, Sussi and Susanon Aug. 14, 1981.

Aug. 30, 1982, after the Dilag spouses failed to exercise their right of redemption, a Definite Deed of Sale over lot288 was executed in favor of Marciano Arellano. A writ of possession was issued. Sheriffs Return of Serviceattested to the fact that delivery of possession of the subject lot was made to Marciano Arellano, who executed aDelivery Receipt acknowledging receipt of the material possession of Lot 288. Marciano Arellano sold Lot 288 toMarcelino Florete Jr. and Leon Coo.

David Dancin, the actual lessee of the property in question, executed a deed giving up his claim or interest as alesee over the leased property in favor of Marciano Arellano in consideration of P38,000 as payment for his fish fryplaced in the fishpond.

July 7, 1983, Sussie Dilag in behalf of her sisters and brother, executed a Notarial Recission of the Lease Contractdated July 7, 1974 entered into by Diancin and Dilag Sps.

Private Respondents filed CC#15085 for the annulment of decision in CC#8714 and all proceedings thereafter withprayer for injunction and temporary restraining order alleging that the levy on TCT 30137 was illegal since it wasmade on property no longer owned by judgment debtors and that the Dilag children are not parties in CC#8714.The court approved the restraining order. Also the preliminary prohibitory injunction was granted.

Marciano Arellano filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary mandatory injuctionand damages to invalidate the Orders issued by the trial court in CC#15085 with the IAC. The appellate court sidedwith the respondent that there was a simulated sale between the Sps. Dilag and their children. The court ruled thatthe deed of sale was simulated since it was executed in fraud of creditors.

The Dilag children filed a petition for certiorari

Issue:1. Whether or not petitioners are owners of Lot 288 at the time of the levy on execution in CC#8714?2. Whether or not the decision and the consequent writ of execution in CC#8714 are operative against petitioners who

admittedly were not parties to said civil case?

Held:1. No2. Yes


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Ratio:Sps. Dilag were still the registered owners of Lot 288 at the time of the levy on execution in CC#8714. It is not refuted thatthe title in the name of respondents was issued on Aug. 14, 1981, several days ahead of the deed of sale, dated Aug 26, 1981on which the new title in the name of the petitioners was based, and inscribed on Aug. 27, 1981. Clearly the Deed ofAbsolute Sale was a simulated and fictitious transaction to defraud Arellano who obtained a money judgment against theparents of petitioners.The Sps. Dilag continued exercising acts of ownership over Lot 288 by leasing the same to David Diancin. When the deed

of sale in favor of Arellano was executed, by failure of the Sps. Dilag to redeem the property, the actual possessor wasDavid Diancin.There was no factual and legal basis for the restraining order of the lower court ordering Arellano and/or his agents to desistfrom entering Lot 288. Thus Rule 39 Sec. 13 does not apply in this case.


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Campillo vs. C.A.G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984

FACTS:Tomas de Vera and his wife Felisa Serafico sold two (2) parcels of land to Simplicio Santos. Said sale was however neverpresented for registration in the office of the Registry of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title covering the property.Petitioner Sostenes Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against Tomas de Vera in a Civil Case No. 49060 inthe CFI. That judgment became final and executory, and petitioner obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of execution.

The City Sheriff levied on three (3) parcels of land, including the two (2) parcels of land which the latter previously sold toSimplicio Santos.Claiming to be the owner of the two parcels of land by reason of the previous sale to him by Tomas de Vera, SimplicioSantos filed an action to annul the levy, notice of sale, sale at public auction and final deed of sale of Lots 1 and 2 in favorof petitioner. After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment sustaining the validity of the levy and sale at public auctionprimarily because at the time of the levy and sale, the disputed properties were still registered in the name of the judgmentdebtor, Tomas de Vera. On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent, the respondent appellate court modifiedthe decision of the lower court

ISSUES:

Whether Petitioner who subsequently purchased them at an execution sale and obtained a certificate of title is thevalid owner?

HELD:Yes. A sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale,

becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Consequently, and considering that theproperties subject matter hereof were actually attached and levied upon at a time when said properties stood in the officialrecords of the Registry of Deeds as still owned by and registered in the name of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera, theattachment, levy and subsequent sale of said properties are proper and legal. The net result is that the execution sale made infavor of the herein petitioner transferred to him all the rights, interest and participation of the judgment debtor in theaforestated properties as actually appearing in the certificate of title, unaffected by any transfer or encumbrance not sorecorded therein.While it may be true that purchasers at execution sales should bear in mind that the rule of caveat emptor applies to suchsales, that the sheriff does not warrant the title to real property sold by him as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent on him toplace the purchaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered land is not

required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property and he is merely charged with notice of theburdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. Hence, the petitioner herein, asthe purchaser in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the certificateof title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy andconclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.


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G.R. No. L-48689 August 31, 1987

CIRIACO PACHECO, ESTRELLA RAZO-REY and BENVENUTO ABITRIA,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL HERNANDEZ and ANASTACIO RANESES, respondents.FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari

Emiliano Pacheco owned unregistered land.o A portion of the land was sold to Rafael Pacheco.

o It was mortgaged by Rafael to PNB, sold at public auction upon foreclosure of mortgage, and then later

repurchased by Rafael.o Rafael sold land to Ciriaco, who sold a portion thereof to his co-petitioner Estrella Razo-Rey.

In a civil case Hernandez vs. Pacheco, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

o To enforce the decision, certain properties, including the subject land, were levied upon and sold at a

public auction. Private respondent Hernandez was the purchaser.

Hernandez filed a complaint against petitioners, alleging that the lands the latter were occupying and which theyrefused to vacate were part of the property which he acquired in the judgment sale.

CFI ruled for the petitioner. They said that petitioner acquired title over subject land by acquisitive prescription,except to Abitria who had bought his lot from Emiliano Pacheco, but the CA reversed CFI decision upon appeal.

CA held that the petitioners claim of acquisitive prescription was untenable because their possession of the

property in dispute was interrupted when the Philippine National Bank acquired it at the foreclosure sale and heldit for one year before it was repurchased by Rafael Pacheco.o The ten-year period for prescription had not been completed.

o It also held that, not having registered his opposition to the attachment and execution sale of the lots he

was claiming as his own, petitioner Abitria was now barred from asserting ownership over the saidproperties.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners acquired the property by acquisitive prescription:

RULING:

10 years of such possession, acquisitive prescriptive title was vested in Rafael Pacheco. Consequently, when he mortgaged

the land to the PNB, he did so not as a mere possessor but as an owner by virtue of prescription under Article 1134 of theCivil Code.The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires no higher or better right than what the execution debtor hasin the property levied upon. If the judgment debtor had no interest in the property, the execution purchaser acquires nointerest therein.The judgment sale in favor of private respondent Hernandez did not and could not cover the lands claimedby the petitioners as these lots no longer belonged to the judgment debtor when they were levied upon and sold. That salecovered only the lands stin under the ownership of the judgment debtor and did not affect the ownership of the propertytitled in the name of the herein petitioners. None of them was a party to the civil case brought by the private respondentagainst Emiliano Pacheco.

Finally, as to the effect of Abitria's failure to oppose the sale of this land in 1963 to enforce the judgment against EmilianoPacheco, it suffices to point out that under Rule 39, Section 17, of the Rules of Court, the claimant who does not file a third-party claim to the property being levied upon is not prevented "from vindicating his claims to the property by any otheraction." Hence, Abitria is not precluded now from asserting in the present petition his claim of ownership over the disputedproperty.


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G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8, DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED

CONTROL & ELECTRIC CORPORATION (ACEC), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.Facts:ACEC filed an action to recover a sum of money from Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The judgmentordered BBGMI to pay ACEC. The judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court at ACEC's instance

on December 18, 1987.Attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August 19, 1988 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor ofJudgment Debtor," alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC) was a debtor of BBGMI and praying that certainofficials of the NPC be required to appear before the Court and examined regarding its debt to BBGMI.- GRANTED. TheManager of NPC, Vinoya, appeared in response to subpoena and duly testified that NPC needed to reimburse BBGMIcertain amount.RTC direct the NPC to pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in October 8,1987 out of the remaining credit NPC holds infavor of defendant," and ordered his deputy sheriff (respondent Adriano) "to garnish and attach the said credit due BatongBuhay Gold Mines, Inc." In justification His Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizing thesheriff charged with execution of a money judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" in addition to "real property, stocks,shares, .. and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that the NPCofficial, had later admitted that "this amount of P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant BBGMI. Sheriff garnished such of thefunds of the NPC on deposit at the PNB, Escolta, Manila, as were "sufficient to cover the sum" required to be paid by

respondent Judge's Decision of October 8, 1987.ISSUE: WON respondent Judge was guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction inordering NPC (as BBGMIs debtor) to pay ACECHELD: YES.It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination of a judgment debtor. This is clear from Section 39 of therule:SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an execution against the property of a judgment debtor has beenreturned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and upon proof, by affidavit of a party or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge,that a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property of such judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may,by an order, require such person, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer or member thereof, to appear before thejudge, or a commissioner appointed by him, at a time a place within the province in which the order is served, to answerconcerning the same. The service of an order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and all money and property ofthe judgment debtor in the possession or in the control of such person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of service;

and the judgment may also require notice of such proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as hemay deem proper.It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require the appearance, by subpoena, of officials of the NPC toappear and be questioned regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, itwas not within His Honor's power to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the judgment debtor to pay the

claimed debt without indubitable admission or conclusive proof that the debt existed and was demandable. Theapplicable provision is not, as was respondent Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule 39, which merely states theprocedure that the sheriff should follow in the enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment debtor himself, i.e.,to levy on property of the judgment debtor, including "debts" or "credits," and sell the same, etc., but which obviously doesnot at all treat of the propriety and requisites for collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons.Therelevant provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule 39. Section 42 reads as follows:SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction of judgement.- The judge may order any property ofthe judgment debtor, or money due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands of either himself or other person, or of acorporation or other legal entity, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, subject to any prior rights over suchproperty, ....Section 45, on the other hand, states the following:SEC. 45.Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person claims the property. - If it appears that a person orcorporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him claims an interest in the propertyadverse to him or denies the debt, the court or judge may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment creditor toinstitute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer or otherdisposition of such interest or debt until an action can be commenced and prosecuted to judgment, and may punishdisobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated by the judge granting the same, or bythe court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms as may be just.After summary examination of a person or entity alleged to be a debtor of the judgment debtor or holding property


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belonging to the latter, in accordance with Section 39, Rule 39,supra execution may issue against such person or entity onlyupon an incontrovertible showing that the person or entity in fact holds property belonging to the judgment debtor or isindeed a debtor of said judgment debtor, i.e., that such holding of property, or the indebtedness, is not denied. In the eventof such a denial, it is NOT, within the judge's power to order delivery of property allegedly belonging to the judgmentdebtor or the payment of the alleged debt.The indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI was denied not only by the representative of NPC, but also by its lawyers. Of course,the respondent Judge's Order makes a general reference to later admissions supposedly made by Vinoya, the NPCrepresentative. The categorical admission of liability on the part of the NPC, cannot operate to invest the respondent Court

with jurisdiction to order NPC to pay its alleged indebtedness to BBGMI. The only disposition that said Court couldlegitimately have made in the premises, was that indicated in Section 46 of Rule 39, above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC,as judgment creditor, to bring a separate action against NPC, as alleged debtor of BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for

establishment by satisfactory proof of the postulated indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and consequent payment to it

ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds to the amount of its judgment.


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G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC.petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.Facts:On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest and defendant Sharp entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant inJapan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.

Several attempts to serve summons to Sharp in Japan had failed so it was effected through diplomatic channels at itsprincipal office in Manila.

Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffthe sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages.On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Judgment became final andexecutory. On May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the RTC.

RTC - The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over theperson of the defendant considering that this is an action in personamCA - sustained the trial court. It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorialboundaries of Japan was null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP;hence, its decision was void.Issue: WON Japanese court judgment is valid and binding to Sharp?Held: YES

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It isalso proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign

country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and

their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want ofjurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, acourt, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise ofjurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Itwas incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, theassailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of theservice of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a

corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation.In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time thecollection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident ofJapan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the saidcourts' lawful methods of serving process.Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processualpresumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.


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G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.Facts:Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Courtof Pasig, which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad for the enforcement of themoney of the judgment of the High Court of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur against private respondent Philippine National

Construction Corporation.Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and DevelopmentCorporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur.Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guaranteethe completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for thecompletion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the privaterespondent which is also designated therein as the "2nd Defendant. "Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated acomplaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of theHigh Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction,want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was,

however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismissunder Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.Private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and therein raised the grounds it brought up in itsmotion to dismiss. In its Reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the Personof private respondent by its voluntary submission the court's jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee.Furthermore, private respondent's counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court's jurisdiction in a pleading filedbefore the court.The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court ofAppeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.Ruling:A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, onthe basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section50(b),Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the

trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdictionto pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by asubsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, acourt, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of itsjurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, istasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya bythe evidence it offered. Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan, presented as petitioner's sole witness, testified to the effect that he is inactive practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued byhis client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17,1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer ofprivate respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates andSolicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearancefor private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the samewhen it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defensewithin two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentaryevidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dateswhere private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgmentsought to be enforced.Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreignjudgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein privaterespondent, to prove otherwise.


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The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of theMalaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to thesuit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is notnecessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differsfrom that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure suchas those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear andrepresent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum,i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.

In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the serviceof court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is,remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any otherfact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an officialpublication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to presentevidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon afinancial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity andregularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Decision of theRegional Trial Court of Pasig, denying the enforcement of the Judgment of the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur isREVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent PhilippineNational Construction Corporation to pay petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad the amounts adjudged in thesaid foreign Judgment, subject of the said case.

Costs against the private respondent.SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, andBuena, JJ. , concur.


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G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,petitioner,vs.REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.Facts:

Respondent Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal in 1987.

They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.

In 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

In 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued bythe Australian government.

Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married in 1994 in Cabanatuan City.

In theirapplication for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of theirmarriage.

In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground ofbigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994.

She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage andits

subsequent dissolution.

He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree

obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity waspending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid andrecognized in the Philippines.

Hence, this Petition for Review under Rule 45.Issue: Whetherthedivorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to respondents civil statusbased on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.Held: No.

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But

divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce ora vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce ora mensa et thoro.

The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.

It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapseof the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrictremarriage.

Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which wasgranted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again.

The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commitsthe offence of bigamy."

This quotation bolsters SCs contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted.

It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.

Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso

facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

SC rejects the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence

as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof hasbeen presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Hence, SC believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if


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any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner.

Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there

being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one inMalabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.


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Roehr v RodriguezFACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent CarmenRodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified onFebruary 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristineon November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RegionalTrial Court

petitioner filed a motion to dismiss

but it was denied by the trial court in its order dated May 28, 1997.

petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied.

On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated onDecember 16, 1997

The parental custody for the children was granted to the father

petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdictionover the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving themarriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioners motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of

determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and privaterespondent.

an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there isnothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr andrespondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Courtof First Instance of Hamburg, Germany

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order for the purposeof tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judgeISSUES:1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which

partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over thepresent case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her previousorder and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil ProcedurePertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order andgrant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages havebeen awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or finalorder accordingly.Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the

issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, thecourt may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment orfinal order upon the rest.HELD:the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who hasparental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra KristineRoehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. Nopronouncement as to costs.

1. It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attainedfinality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period,


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2. In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged byeither of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to bevalid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversymainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legaleffects thereof on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.

a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, assuch, is subject to proof to the contrary

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of theGerman court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to haveparental custody of their two children.

The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent isunfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue ofparental custody,On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction whenshe claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent.Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judgehas no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

We find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of theunion between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle thematter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.


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Bayot vs. C.A.G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:

Vicente and Rebecca were married in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca to be anAmerican citizen. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometimein 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial

District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22,1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leavingthem to remarry after completing the legal requirements.

Rebecca filed a petition, this time before the RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground ofVicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause ofaction and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on herFilipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ, and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by Vicente. Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. The CA issuedthe desired TRO. The CA, by a Decision effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders theRTC issued in relation to the case

ISSUES:

Whether the judgment of divorce is valid?

HELD:

Yes. A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid underthe national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when shesecured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union. The presentation of a copyof foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. Andneither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground ofcollusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation byBureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebeccaas an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorcesecured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is thecitizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained


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G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,vs.DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen, acquired A Canadian citizenship.o He married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.

Because of work Gerbert left for Canada after the wedding.

He returned to the Philippine in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn. However he was shocked to discover that she washaving an affair with another man.

o Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.

The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8,2005.

o The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.

Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil RegistryOffice and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.

o Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage

between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable; the foreign divorcedecree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No.

4. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with

the RTC.

Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarizedletter/manifestation.

o She requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

RTC denied Gerberts petition.

RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreigndivorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.

It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

From the RTC ruling, Gerbert filed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce decree issued by Canadian court is binding in the Philippines?

RULING:

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for itsrecognition in this jurisdiction. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliensnational law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor ofGerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisiteinterest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we havedeclared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce isvalid according to his or her national law.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity toobtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes intoplay. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificatesproving its authenticity,but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.Under this situation, we can, at thispoint, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remandthe case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgmentsbetween nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicialrecognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for


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the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.


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G.R. No. 129788 December 3, 2002

OROPEZA MARKETING CORPORATION, ROGACIANO OROPEZA and IMELDA S. OROPEZA, petitioners,vs.ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.Facts: Allied Bank extended a loan ofP780,000 to petitioners Oropeza Marketing Corporation (OMC) and the spousesRogaciano and Imelda Oropeza. To secure this obligation, petitioners executed a Promissory Note and a REM over theirproperties.Petitioners failed to pay thus, Allied Bank filed a collection suit with an application for a writ of preliminary

attachment before the RTC Branch 15 (1st case.)While the writ of attachment was pending, Allied Bank discovered that the Oropeza spouses had executed an Absolute Deedof Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Solid Gold Commercial Corporation, covering the real propertiesmortgaged to respondent. Allied Bank filed a complaint for the annulment of said Deed of Sale RTC Branch 9 (2nd

Case.)

RTC Branch 9, declared the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage VALIDRTC Br. 15 -dismissed respondent's complaint on the ground oflitis pendentiaCA (1st case) - reversed the order of dismissal issued by RTC Branch 15CA (2nd case) upheld RTC branch 9s decisionIssue: WON CA, in rendering the judgment Declaring the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage valid, constitutes resjudicata insofar as the collection suit is concerned?Held: YES, BUT only as to the CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT.The principle of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (a) "bar by prior judgment" as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49

(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) "conclusiveness of judgment" which is contained in Rule 39, Section 47(c).There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the 1st case where the judgment was rendered and the 2nd case that issought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The judgment in the 1st case constitutesan absolute bar to the 2nd action.The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must havebeen rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be ajudgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,and causes of action. The existence here of the first three requisites is not disputed.In both of the cases, it is clearly established that both parties are the same parties in the collection suit and declaration ofnullity of the Deed of Sale. With respect to identity of subject matter, the conclusiveness of judgment shall be onlywith regard to the questions directly and actually put in issue and decided in the first case.The test to determine the identity of causes of action is to consider whether the same evidence would sustain both causes

of action. In the 1st case, Allied Bank will have to present evidence showing the existence of the loan and petitioners'failure to comply with their bounden duty to pay such loan. However, in 2nd case, respondent's evidence must establish that:(a) petitioners secured a loan from it; (b) said loan was secured by a promissory note and a mortgage over properties ownedby the Oropezas; (c) petitioners failed to pay their debt; and (d) petitioners sold the mortgaged properties with intent todefraud respondent bank.Accordingly, we find that the evidence to sustain the respective causes of action in the two cases is not exactly the same.Hence, there is no identity between the causes of action in the 1st and 2nd case.There being substantial identity of parties but no identity of causes of action, the applicable aspect of res judicata in theinstant case is "conclusiveness of judgment."Res judicata is founded on the principle that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once.Hence, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and established by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunityfor such trial has been given, the judgment of the court - - so long as it remains unreversed - - is conclusive upon the partiesand those in privity with them in law or estate. It having been determined with finality that the debt of the Oropezas hasbeen settled, respondent's cause of action in the collection suit must be deemed extinguished.


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G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006

ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., petitioner,vs.GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondent.

Facts: Petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus Aircraft ".Petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on respondent's aircraft.Respondent failed to pay costs for the maintenance of its aircrafts. Petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of

Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18 against respondent. The court issued a Writ of Summons to be servedextraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effectservice of the summons upon respondent. Despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim. TheSingapore High Court rendered a judgment by default against respondent.On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment. Respondent filed a Motion toDismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2) theforeign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due process. RTC deniedrespondent's motion to dismiss. MR was denied.CA reversed RTC and dismissed the caseIssue: WON the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of summonsupon its office in the PhilippinesHeld: YES, hence Singapore High Courts judgment is validThe conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are contained in Section 48,

Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:SEC. 48.Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, havingjurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to thething; and(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right asbetween the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as betweenthe parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to theparty against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption ofits validity.

Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons is voidand that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governedby the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leaveof court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the SingaporeHigh Court granted "leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized bythe law of the Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building,136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City,or elsewhere in the Philippines." This service of summons outsideSingapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 19966of Singapore, which provides.(2) Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to be served on a defendant in any country with respectto which there does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for service in that country of process of the HighCourt, the originating process may be served a) through the government of that country, where that government is willing to effect service;b) through a Singapore Consular authority in that country, except where service through such an authority is contrary to thelaw of the country; orc) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service of any originating process issued by that

country.

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other propercourt officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service.Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquiredby the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against respondent isvalid.


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G.R. No. 167330 September 18, 2009PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC., Petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.Facts:For resolution are a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration, respectively, filed by petitionerPhilippine Health Care Providers, Inc.Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue [CIR] sent petitioner a formal demand letter and the corresponding

assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996and 1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18.The deficiency [documentary stamp tax (DST)] assessment was imposed on petitioners health care agreement with themembers of its health care program pursuant to Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code.Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter. As respondent did not act on the protest, petitioner filed a petition for reviewin the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments.The CTA rendered a decision: PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to PAY the deficiency VAT untilfully paid for the 1997 VAT deficiency.Respondent appealed the CTA decision to the [Court of Appeals (CA)] insofar as it cancelled the DST assessment. Heclaimed that petitioners health care agreement was a contract of insurance subject to DST under Section 185 of the 1997Tax Code.The CA rendered its decision. It held that petitioners health care agreement was in the nature of a non-life insurancecontract subject to DST: GRANTED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, petitioner filed this case.The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CAs decision. We held that petitioners health care agreement during the

pertinent period was in the nature of non-life insurance which is a contract of indemnity. We also ruled that petitionerscontention that it is a health maintenance organization (HMO) and not an insurance company is irrelevant because contractsbetween companies like petitioner and the beneficiaries under their plans are treated as insurance contracts. Moreover, DSTis not a tax on the business transacted but an excise on the privilege, opportunity or facility offered at exchanges for thetransaction of the business.Unable to accept our verdict, petitioner filed the present motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion forreconsideration.Oral arguments were held in Baguio City. The parties submitted their memoranda.In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner reveals for the first time that it availed of a tax amnesty under RA 9480 (alsoknown as the "Tax Amnesty Act of 2007") by fully paying the amount of P5,127,149.08 representing 5% of its net worth asof the year ending December 31, 2005.

Ruling:Petitioner raises another interesting issue in its motion for reconsideration: whether this Court is bound by the ruling of theCA in CIR v. Philippine National Bankthat a health care agreement of Philamcare Health Systems is not an insurancecontract for purposes of the DST.In support of its argument, petitioner cites minute resolution of this Court dismissing the appeal inPhilippine National Bank(G.R. No. 148680). Petitioner argues that the dismissal of G.R. No. 148680 by minute resolution was a judgment on themerits; hence, the Court should apply the CA ruling there that a health care agreement is not an insurance contract.It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of thecase. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in thatcase has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formaland substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemedsustained. But what is its effect on other cases?With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata.

However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolutionis not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickelinvolvingthe same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution sustaining theruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because thetwo cases involved different subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutionalrequirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which thejudgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minuteresolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require thecertification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or


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principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified bythe Chief Justice.Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioners liability for DST on its health careagreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution inthat case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor. Nonetheless, in view of the reasons already discussed, this doesnot detract in any way from the fact that petitioners health care agreements are not subject to DST.WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The 1996 and 1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent is ordered to desist from collecting the said tax.No costs.SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN,

SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840,

United States District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner,vs.HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court,

Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in

Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos,

Jr., Respondents.Background of the Case:

The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations.

The Philippine trial court required the petitioners to pay a filing fee of P472,000,000.00 (Million) in order that theybe able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court.

Facts:

In 1991, a complaint was filed with the US District Court, District of Hawaii, against the Estate of formerPhilippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate).

These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military orparamilitary groups.

Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages infavor of the plaintiff class.

Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding theplaintiff class a total of $1,964,005,859.90 (Billion Dollars).

TheFinal Judgmentwas eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decisionrendered on 17 December 1996.

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaintwith the RTC, for the enforcement of the FinalJudgment.

o They argued that the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should

be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

then in force.

The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees.

o It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410.00 as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that

they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of US$2.25 Billion.

Respondent Judge Ranada dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

o He opined that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it

involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money,allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.

o On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the

RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two MillionPesos, which obviously had not been paid.

Petitioners MR was denied.

From this denial, petitioners filed aPetition for Certiorari under Rule 65.Petitioners contentions:

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the

enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery ofdamages.

They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay P472,000,000.00 in filing fees would negate and renderinutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules ofCivil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have paid the correct filing fees.Held: Yes.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam.

For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in

personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their


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successors in interest by a subsequent title.

However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on thegrounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision inthe local forum.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in thisjurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of aforeign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment.

They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that aresought to be vindicated.

For example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of theright of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent.

On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the sametortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of action derives notfrom the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.

More importantly, the matters for proof are different.

Using the above example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omissioncommitted by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuatingcircumstances.

Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment

itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of theforeign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law.

The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitivelitigation on claims and issues.

Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the

complaintthe enforcement of a foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in allpractical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent.

As to the filing fees:

SC holds that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation.

But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit ofSection 7(a) of Rule 141.

SC finds that the instant case is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving

property."

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of

pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not involving property."

The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent

judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that theFinal Judgmentis not conclusive yet, butpresumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate.

Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice tothe party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on theenforceability of theFinal Judgmentbefore the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matterany other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court.

Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down inSection 48, Rule 39.

On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay ofthe decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.


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POLICARPIO vs. ACTIVE BANK

FACTS:Sps. Ricaza are registered owners of a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang.

October 6, 1996 they mortgaged the property to Active Bank. They failed to settle obligation. Property foreclosed. Sps.Ricaza failed to redeem the property during the period. The bank consolidated its ownership over the property.

Active Bank filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession with RTC in Muntinlupa. Petitioner Policarpio opposed itand submitted a Deed of Sale of the subject property in her favor, executed by one of the Sps. Ricaza, sometime 1998.

TC set opposition for hearing but neither Policarpio nor the counsel appeared.

January 2002 TC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession because it appears that the Deed of Sale is void since onlythe husband Ricaza signed it and it was not shown that he was allowed by the wife to sell the conjugal property.

January 18, 2002 resolution was served to Policarpio along with the Notice to Vacate.

February 2002, the sheriff with Banks employees entered the property and removed Policarpios personal belongings. TheBank was only able to occupy a portion of the property due to the timely intervention of the Muntinlupa Police and AyalaAlabang Security personnel.

Policarpio filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA seeking to nullify the TCs resolution, Writ ofPossession and Notice to Vacate property.

Policarpio argued that TC could not issue the Writ of Possession in favor of the Bank since she was a 3rd party in possessionof the property.

The Bank countered that the Deed of sale in petitioners favor was void since it was executed without the wifes consent andthe sale has not been registered.

CA denied the petition. It ruled that the validity of the sale was questionable sine only the husband signed the deed, and thatthe deed has not been registered. Also, she never pursued or prosecuted her claim against the Writ of Possession. Lachesmay have worked against her by then.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not he petitioner is a 3rd party in possession of the property contemplated in R39, S33 such as to preclude the TCfrom issuing the Writ of Possession in favor of the Bank?

HELD:NO.

RATIO:

A purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of property. Whenever the purchaserprays for a Writ of Possession, TC has to issue it as a matter of course. The obligation ceases to be ministerial once a 3rd

party in possession of the property claiming an adverse right over it as that of a debtor/mortgagor. Where such 3rd partyexists, TC should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession.

In the case at bar, TC conducted the required hearing but neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared. Thus, the TC is not atfault for evaluating the only documentary evidence submitted by Policarpio, which are the Deed of Sale and Certified truecopy of the TCT.

The case should be dismissed since only one of the Sps. Ricaza signed the Deed of Sale. Even if both spouses signed the


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deed, it was not registered, so, a fatal defect exists.

Compilation R39, S15-S50

Documents

Transcript of Compilation R39, S15-S50