Chapter II(Due Process)

Chapter II(Due Process)

El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca [1918]FACTS:Original Defendant Engracion Palanca Tanguinyen y Limquingco executed a mortgage upon various real property situated in Manila as security for a debt owing by him to Plaintiff El Banco Espaol-Filipino. After executing the same, he returned to China, his native country, and died there without returning to the Philippines.As the Defendant was a non-resident at the time of the institution of the foreclosure of said mortgage, it was necessary for the Plaintiff therein to give notice to the former by publication pursuant to Section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An Order for Publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the City of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the Summons and Complaint directed to the Defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the City of Amoy, in the Empire of China.Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. An Affidavit, however, was signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, the banks attorney, showing that he had deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila, containing copies of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs Affidavit, the Summons, and the aforesaid Order for Publication. It appears from the postmasters receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerks office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter emanated from the office.The Defendant not having appeared,Judgment by Default was then taken againsthim before the trial court and a Decision rendered in favor of Plaintiff. In this Decision, it was recited that publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about notice having been given by mail.Foreclosure of the subject property proceeded and sale was confirmed by the court thereafter.Seven years after the confirmation sale, Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the Defendants estate, moved that the Order of Default and the above Judgment rendered thereonbedeclared void. Said Motion to Vacate Judgmentwas denied; hence, this Appeal.ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court acquired the necessary jurisdiction over the property to proceed with the foreclosure proceeding?ARGUMENT: Defendant-Appellant Vicente Palanca argues that the Order of Default and the Judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant or over the subject of the action.RULING: Yes. The action to foreclose a mortgage is quasi in rem. The property itself is the sole thing which is impleaded and which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. The jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses over the property. The jurisdiction over the person is non-essential.The Judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs against Defendant-Appellant.MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated:And HOMER T. SAQUILA Y AN,G.R. No. 203302

Subject/s: when is there denial of due process; picture images of the ballots as official ballots; ballot images not secondary evidence (brief title: Maliksi vs. Comelec et al.)

FACTS: Emmanuel L. Maliksi (Maliksi) and Homer T. Saquilayan (Saquilayan) were both mayoralty candidates for the Municipality of Imus, Cavite during the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Saquilayan as the duly elected municipal mayor garnering a total of 48,181 votes as against Maliksis 39,682 votes. Thus, based on the MBCs canvass, Saquilayan won over Maliksi by 8,499 votes.Maliksi filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Maliksi filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 (trial court), questioning the results of the elections in 209 clustered precincts. The case was docketed as Election Protest No. 009-10. In its 15 November 2011 Decision, the trial court declared Maliksi as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite. The trial court ruled that Maliksi garnered 41,088 votes as against Saquilayans 40,423 votes. Thus, based on the trial courts recount, Maliksi won over Saquilayan by a margin of 665 votes.On 2 December 2011, Saquilayan also filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order or status quo order with prayer for early consideration,SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings.29 It is settled that opportunity to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings.30 Thus, the fact that a party was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due process.31 The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically generated and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into the PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce the original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. As pointed out by the COMELEC, [t]he digital images of the physical ballots are electronically and instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines once the physical ballots are fed into and read by the machines.37 Hence, the ballot images are not secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots.FACTS and DECISION : RulingThe Court grants Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.4As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Divisions unwarranted deviation from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELECs power to "take such measures as the Presiding Commissioner may deem proper," and even citing the Courts minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the "COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims."Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.I.Due process requirementsThe picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.6 In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,7 the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."That the two documentsthe official ballot and its picture imageare considered "original documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.The COMELEC (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go over the digital images of the appealed ballots.Even the COMELEC En Banc did not indicate in its decision dated September 14, 2012 that the First Division merely resolved Saquilayans motion for the printing of the ballot images; instead, it reinforced the First Divisions finding that there was tampering of the ballots. The non-mention of Saquilayans motion was a clear indication of the COMELECs intention to act motu proprio; and also revealed its interpretation of its very own rules, that there must be justifiable reason, i.e. tampering, before the ballot images could be resorted to.II.Remand to the COMELECWe are mindful of the urgent need to speedily resolve the election protest because the term of the position involved is about to end. Thus, we overlook pro hac vice the lack of factual basis for the COMELECs decision to use the digital images of the ballots and sustain its decision thereon. Although a remand of the election protest to the RTC would have been the appropriate procedure, we direct the COMELEC En Banc instead to conduct the decryption and printing of the digital images of the ballots and to hold recount proceedings, with due notice to all the parties and opportunity for them to be present and to participate during such proceedings. Nothing less serves the ideal objective safeguarded by the Constitution.In the absence of particular rules to govern its proceedings in accordance with this disposition, the COMELEC is urged to follow and observe Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164.The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.11 After all, it is the Courts primary duty to protect the basic rights of the people vis--vis government actions, thus:It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.12WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; REVERSES the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013; and DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Bane to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC and HOMERT. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayanthe winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered thesecond highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inImus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clusteredprecincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of therevision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to ceaseand desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC.In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksis motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksiwas then installed as Mayor.In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties,decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CFcards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit theamount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decisionand declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor . Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified ofthe decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images,which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that theintegrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksis motion forreconsideration.Maliksi went to the Supreme Court reiterating his objections to the decryption,printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him in violation of hisconstitutional right to due process of law, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images inthe recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 8-7,dismissed Maliksis petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denieddue process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examinationof the ballot images by the First Division referring to the orders of the First Division directingSaquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballotimages; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion forreconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion indeciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of theballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the sameevidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the FirstDivisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fullyestablished by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi again raised the allegedviolation of his right to due process.Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedingsand to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he wasnot informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the FirstDivision; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did notsufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time, and venue of thedecryption and printing of the ballot images; and (d) that he was thus completely deprived of theopportunity to participate in the decryption proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court granted Maliksis Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, andreverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division ofthe COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on thedecryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recountproceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted theassailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to whichno existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recountproceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, asamended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of theirexclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (theautonomous regions), provincial and city officials.We should not ignore that the parties participation during the revision and recountproceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for theCOMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELECs proceedings attaincredibility as to the result. The parties presence would have ensured that the requisiteprocedures have been followed, including the required authentication and certification that theimages to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was less than candid, and waseven cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballotsand the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the guidelines thatthe First Division had followed in the appreciation of the ballots and the results of the recount. Inshort, there was vagueness as to what rule had been followed in the decryption and printingproceeding.The Supreme Court held that the Resolution does not intend to validate the victory ofany of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Courtsimply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, acornerstone of our legal system.

Dismissal of a criminal case based on aDemurrer to Evidence results in doublejeopardy and that no appeal, Motion forReconsideration nor petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 may be entertained, as a general rule. Private complainant may not, without the participation of the Solicitor General, question said dismissal before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998Imelda Marcos Vs. SandiganbayanPurisima, J.Facts:On June 8, 1984, Imelda Marcos and Jose Dans, as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years;On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez;After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan; After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario; On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario;On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:

a.as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; andb.the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.

Held:The petitioner is hereby acquitted.The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.

1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES. As such,the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitionerbeyond reasonable doubt.

2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as clarificatory questions. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court.

EMMA DELGADOvs.HON. COURT OF APPEALSEmma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States.All the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by her counselde parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On December 13, 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision. The trial court renders a judgement of conviction.Accused Gloria C. Tortona did not appeal from the aforesaid decision. Accused Celia Capistrano and petitioner Emma R. Delgado appealed to the Court of AppealsBelieving that there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as petitioner was not informed or notified of said decision by her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, herein petitioner filed on February 17, 1977 with respondent Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allw the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision.This motion was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its Resolution.OnMay 11, 1977an Order was issued by respondent Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on May 11, 1977.On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the newly discovered fact that petitioner came to know for the first time only on May 19, 1977 that Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel.Issue: whether or not due process was observedHeld: The petition impressed with merit. This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.G.R. No. 179462 February 12, 2009PEDRO C. CONSULTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESFacts:At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar (Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia.Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelias 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which, was of 18k gold, and which was worthP3,500, kicked the tricycle and left.Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised to undergo medical examination. They repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest.Nine days after the incident, Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator.Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family in light of the following antecedent facts:He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelias house in Pateros. Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelias parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelias father even filed a case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted. Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia, she would track his whereabouts and cause scandal.Appellants witness Darius Pacaa testified that on the date of the alleged robbery, Nelia, together with her two companions, approached him while he was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy Sembrano, and asked him (Pacaa) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. As he replied in the affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to appellants house, to which he acceded. As soon as the group reached appellants house, appellant, on his (Pacaas) call, emerged and on seeing the group, told them to go away so as not to cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia uttered "Mga hayop kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan." Thelma Vuesa corroborated Pacaas account.The Trial Court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia Silvestre the amount of P3,500.00 representing the value of her necklace taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit.The appellate court affirmed appellants conviction with modification on the penalty.Issues:(1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned;(2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution;(3)Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which he was charged (4)Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.Held:Supreme Court does not find the appellant denied of due process having been represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution.On the matter of accused-appellants claim of having been denied due process, an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who "seems not a lawyer," during the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000. Thereafter, accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defenders (Attorneys) Office of Makati City.Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain about having been denied of due process.That appellants first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys Office during the presentation by the prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence.People v. Elesterio4enlightens:"As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and thathis representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate,he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition forhabeas corpusand the appellants brief."The Court finds that by appellants employment of threats, intimidation and violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination.WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the challenged Court of Appeals Decision and another is rendered finding appellant, Pedro C. Consulta, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt ofGraveCoercionand sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium as maximum.G.R. No. L-46272 June 13, 1986PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ALBERTO OPIDA y QUIAMBAO and VIRGILIO MARCELO,accused-appellants.CRUZ,J.:FACTS :This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder.Unlike the victim in this case, who died from only one stab wound, the decision under review suffers from several fatal flaws, all equally deadly. It suffices to discuss only one of them.On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del Mundo.3Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death.4The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession.5What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense.Opida is a police character, admittedly a member of the Commando gang and with a string of convictions for robbery, theft and vagrancy.6It is worth noting that the judge took special interest in his tattoos, required him to remove his shirt so they could be examined, and even described them in detail for the record.7Besides belaboring Opida's criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge asked him if he had "ever been convicted at the National Mental Hospital with what else but malice and suggested to him that his claim of manhandling by the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they torture a suspect.8This was a point that could have been validly raised by the prosecution but certainly not by the court. The judge also made it of record that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs of hostility, that he was uneasy and that he was restless. "Now, whom do you want to fool the judge asked, "the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court?9In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo, the other accused, was conducted almost wholly by the judge who started cross-examining the witness even before the defense counsel could ask his first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of impeaching Marcelo's credibility.10The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his membership in the Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities, his criminal record all when he was supposed to be under direct examination by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word edgewise because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions.11The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not adversary, they were irrelevant, and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the judge drew from the witness the statement that his mother was living with another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his father. But the judge was to save the best or worst of his spite for the third witness, Lilian Layug, a waitress in the restaurant where the appellant Opida was working as a cook. Noting at the outset that she spoke English, he wanted to know where she had learned it and asked in ill-concealed insinuation if she had worked in Angeles City or Olongapo or Sangley.13Because she was gesturing nervously, he asked, "Are you a conductor?14Of the two accused, he asked her, "They are very proud of belonging to the Commando gang to which the witness answered, putting him in his place, "That I do not know, Your Honor."15On direct examination, Opida challenged his extrajudicial confession, claiming it had been obtained without observance of the rights available under Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, particularly the right to counsel.17Parenthetically, the extrajudicial confession of Marcelo was also made without assistance of counsel.18Opida also testified, under questioning from his counsel, that he had been repeatedly hit with a "dos por dos" by a police officer while he was being investigated.19We have consistently held that the rights guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect, especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and renders it inadmissible in evidence against him.20Those principles were given mere lip service by the judge, who did not bother to look deeper into the validity of the challenged confessions.Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused.The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even proud of their membership in the Commando gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of notoriety.21Nevertheless, they were entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.22The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?"23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be formalized.The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad taste perhaps, but not of crime.In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice.Accused-appellants Opida and Marcelo, who have been imprisoned since 1976, have sent separate letters pleading for the resolution of their death sentences one way or the other once and for all. ISSUE : WON the right of the accused to due process of law and impartial trial were violated.HELD: The Supreme Court held that the right of the accused to due process of law and impartial trial were violated when it was the judge who conducted the cross-examination of the accused and his witness instead of the Prosecutor coupled with his sarcastic and insulting remarks and ended with the question,Do you want me to dictate the decision now?The judge likewise required theaccused to remove his shirt and described for the record all the tattoos found on his body. Clearly, the judge had allied himself with the prosecutionPeople v. Mortera (April 23, 2010)PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee,vs.BENANCIO MORTERA y BELARMINO,Appellant.Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:Benancio Mortera y Belarmino was accused to have killed with a knife Robelyn Rojas y Mallari by means of treachery. The witnesses Ramil Gregorio and Jovel Veales testified that while drinking, they saw the victim and the accused shook hands and when the former was already walking away, Mortera stabbed him at the back. On the other hand, accused then admitted during the trial that he killed the victim for self defense even if he pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. According to the accused, Robelyn got angry to him when he was not able to give money for the victims liquor; the victim attacked him with a spray gun (for painting) which caused the accused to fall down. When Robelyn was attempting to hurt him again, the accused stabbed him and then immediately ran. During the cross examination, the accused kept on changing his statements and narrations that is why the Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr. uttered some of the following towards the accused: You were not even telling the truth to Atty. Mendoza, You killed him, Just making a story". Since the trial court did not believe that Mortera killed the victim for self defense because the victims wound was located at back contrary to statement of the accused that he stabbed him infront, Mortera was convicted guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.Mortera appealed the decision in the Court of Appeals raising the issue of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liability of the accused. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory." The claim of self-defense was rejected for failure to prove the element of unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence. Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the Supreme Court invoking that there was a denial of his right to due process and his right to have an impartial trial. The accused argues that Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr. displayed his hostility towards him and condemned him even before the defense could rest its presentation of evidence. By saying that he was "just making a story," and the like, the judge already concluded his guilt during trial.ISSUE: Whether or not the sarcastic remarks of Judge Carbon, Jr. towards Mortera during the cross examination denied the accused of his right to due process.

HELD:NO. Although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. The remarks of the Judge were not reflective of his partiality since those were within the context. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense.The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should have been hisMost probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge had taken the cudgels for the prosecution.There was no denial of due process, the sarcastic conduct of the Judge was substantially clarificatory. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.Rodriguez vs. Judge Blancaflor, GR No. 190171March 14, 2011Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case. On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson. Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among others. On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflors continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated. After the submission of petitioners respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.

Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflors disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali.

Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.

In the same vein, the petitioners alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x x x

(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

x x x.

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.

In the case at bench, there was also no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process.

Likewise, Judge Blancaflors suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.

Tubula vs. Sandiganbayan, April 21, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 175991 August 31, 2011DEL CASTILLO,J.:

FACTS:That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his official duties, refuse to implement the promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors. Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.The RTC disposed of the case finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.On appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.ISSUE: Whether the [petitioners] constitutional right[s] to due process and equal protection of [the] law were violated [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court of Appeals] Decision dated April 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled "Jose R. Catacutan, petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents."RESOLUTION:Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process."Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard."24"Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy."25"Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process."26Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter.Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.Chan-Tan vs. ChanG.R. no. 167139 (February 25, 2010)Facts:June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the Manila Cathedral. They had sons Justin (born in Canada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in 1993).Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, then filed acase of annulment under FC36 (psychological incapacity) against Jesse Tan. Theparties, thereafter, submitted a compromise agreement.July 31, 2003: trialcourt issued a partial judgment ofapproval of the saidcompromise agreement.March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and void, under FC 36, on the ground ofpsychological incapacity of the parties. TC incorporated thecompromise agreement it previously approved in said decision. Petitioner then cancelled the offer to purchase theCorinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12,Block 2 property, and authorized Mega world Corp. to offer it toother interested buyers. It also appeared that thepetitioner left the country with the children. Respondent then filedan omnibus motion, seeking the maincustody of the children claiming that petitioner brought the kids out ofthe country w/o his knowledge; that saidpetitioner failed to settle the balancefor the Mega world property, w/c, if forfeited, would prejudice the interest ofthe children; and that petitioner failedto turn overto him documents and titles in his name.May 17, 2004: TCawarded respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner toturn over to respondent documents and titles in his name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC.June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed amotion for reconsideration, claiming that she was denieddue process, was notable to properly present evidence due to negligence from her counsel, and said that she was forced out of the country due to beating shereceived from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for anincrease in the respondent's monthly support obligation.October 12, 2004: TC deniedpetitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it was filedbeyond the 15-day reglementary period. TC also declared petitioner incontempt of court for non-compliance with the July 31,2003 partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution. TC also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly support obligation, since petitioner was able toenroll the children toanother school by herself without respondent's knowledge.November 4, 2004: Petitioner filed amotion to dismiss and amotion for reconsideration of the October 12,2004 resolution, claiming that she was no longer interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the case would be in the best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated her from all prior orders, and leave the parties at a status quo ante the filing of the suit, or re-instating the parties to their conditions prior the filings.December 28, 2004: TC denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that the March 30, 2004 and May17, 2004 decisions hadbecome final and executory upon lapse ofthe 15-day reglementary period..February 15, 2005: TC again denied another motion for reconsideration of the December 28, 2004 decision. TC then issued a Certificate of Finality of the March 30 and May 17, 2004 decisions.Issue: W/Nthe March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory despite allegations of denial of due process.Held:Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the15-day reglementary period.Alleged negligence of counsel to informthe petitioner resulting in loss of petitioner's right to appeal is not a ground forsetting aside a judgment that is valid and regular.Petitioner cannot claim she was denieddue process, since records showed that shewas very active in court. Shealso cannot claim negligence on the part of her counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3, 2004, saying that said counsel made attempts to call thepetitioner, but failed.

Chan-Tan vs. Chan G.R. no. 167139 (February 25, 2010)Facts:June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the Manila Cathedral. They had sons Justin (born in Canada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in 1993).Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, then filed acase of annulment under FC36 (psychological incapacity) against Jesse Tan. Theparties, thereafter, submitted a compromise agreement.July 31, 2003: trialcourt issued a partial judgment ofapproval of the saidcompromise agreement.March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and void, under FC 36, on the ground ofpsychological incapacity of the parties. TC incorporated thecompromise agreement it previously approved in said decision. Petitioner then cancelled the offer to purchase theCorinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12,Block 2 property, and authorized Mega world Corp. to offer it toother interested buyers. It also appeared that thepetitioner left the country with the children. Respondent then filedan omnibus motion, seeking the maincustody of the children claiming that petitioner brought the kids out ofthe country w/o his knowledge; that saidpetitioner failed to settle the balancefor the Mega world property, w/c, if forfeited, would prejudice the interest ofthe children; and that petitioner failedto turn overto him documents and titles in his name.May 17, 2004: TCawarded respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner toturn over to respondent documents and titles in his name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC.June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed amotion for reconsideration, claiming that she was denieddue process, was notable to properly present evidence due to negligence from her counsel, and said that she was forced out of the country due to beating shereceived from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for anincrease in the respondent's monthly support obligation.October 12, 2004: TC deniedpetitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it was filedbeyond the 15-day reglementary period. TC also declared petitioner incontempt of court for non-compliance with the July 31,2003 partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution. TC also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly support obligation, since petitioner was able toenroll the children toanother school by herself without respondent's knowledge.November 4, 2004: Petitioner filed amotion to dismiss and amotion for reconsideration of the October 12,2004 resolution, claiming that she was no longer interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the case would be in the best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated her from all prior orders, and leave the parties at a status quo ante the filing of the suit, or re-instating the parties to their conditions prior the filings.December 28, 2004: TC denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that the March 30, 2004 and May17, 2004 decisions hadbecome final and executory upon lapse ofthe 15-day reglementary period..February 15, 2005: TC again denied another motion for reconsideration of the December 28, 2004 decision. TC then issued a Certificate of Finality of the March 30 and May 17, 2004 decisions.Issue: W/Nthe March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory despite allegations of denial of due process.Held:Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the15-day reglementary period.Alleged negligence of counsel to informthe petitioner resulting in loss of petitioner's right to appeal is not a ground forsetting aside a judgment that is valid and regular.Petitioner cannot claim she was denieddue process, since records showed that shewas very active in court. Shealso cannot claim negligence on the part of her counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3, 2004, saying that said counsel made attempts to call thepetitioner, but failed._____Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion, 343 SCRA 377Facts:Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez (for violations of US tax and election laws) to the United States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.Issue: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.Held:Petition dismissed.The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.G.R. No. 119712January 29, 1999DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.MARTINEZ, J.:FACTS:On November 18, 1985, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government owned and controlled corporation, filed with the Office of the Sheriff of Malolos an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of real and personal properties situated at San Jose del Monte and Norzagaray, Bulacan involving several real and/or chattel mortgages executed by Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, engaged mainly in the manufacture of cement.On December 11, 1985, Continental Cement filed a complaint with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The suit principally sought to enjoin the then defendants DBP and the Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan from commencing the foreclosure proceedings on CCC's mortgages and praying that its loan terms by DBP be restructured that its interest in DBPs promissory notes as null and void. On January 17, 1986, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued and also a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.December 1986, Proclamation No. 502 was promulgated by then President Corazon C. Aquino pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14. The proclamation established the privatization program of the National Government and created the Committee on Privatization and herein petitioner ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT) as the privatization arm for the government. Among the non-performing assets identified and transferred to the APT was the account of CCC. DBP filed a petition to dismiss the pending case as it CCC could no longer deal with DBP but rather with APT. The trial court denied the petition and has instead allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant to PP 502 as amended. The RTC designated J.C. Laya as Commissioner to resolve the main issue in the case. He was given 60 days to come up with a report and he was given another 45 days for extension. After several extensions given, the Commissioner failed to do his part.After several months, he was able to come up with the report. The parties then filed their reactions to the report and during the trial they were given a chance to cross examine each others witnesses. After cross examination, they were ordered to submit their position papers as to their calculation of the amount of indebtedness. CCCs computation is at P43.6M, the Commissioners computation is at P61.6M while DBP/APTs calculation is at P2.6B. On July 23, 1992, 3 of CCCs witnesses were scheduled to be cross examined by APTs counsel as DBPs counsel had already done so. APTs counsel was not able to do so raising the issue that he just took over the case and needs time to prepare. The counsel for CCC also failed to appear as he was allegedly ill. On that same date, the court issued an order resetting the cross-examination for CCC's witnesses on August 24, 25 and 26, 1992 Again, the counsel for APT was not able to attend due to an alleged serious illness Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever). Also absent during the hearing was DBP's counsel and DBP/APT's lone witness, Mr. Jaime V. Cruz.On Aug 25th, the RTC ordered that due to the foregoing the case is deemed submitted for decision. APT filed for a motion for reconsideration. It was denied and the RTC ruled that the indebtedness to be paid by CCC is the calculation came up with by the Commissioner. APT appealed before the CA averring that it was denied due process when it was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses of CCC nor was it allowed to present further witnesses. CCC averred that by the failure of APTs counsel to appear APT has waived such right. The CA sustained the RTCs decision.ISSUE:Whether or not APT was denied of due process.HELD:The Court of Appeals did not commit error in its decision, when it declared that petitioner waived its right to cross-examine the respondent's witnesses. The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. Furthermore, the parties were also given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APTs case, they were deemed to have waived their right. Petitioner APT was not denied its right to due process when it failed to cross-examine respondent's witnesses as this was due to its own counsel's failure and negligence. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side.The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.

MATUGUIN V. CA

In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLEs petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCORs timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPIs constitutional rights under thedue processclause.

ISSUE:Whether or not MIWPIs right todue processhas been violated.

HELD:The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Ministers decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic tenets ofdue processandelementaryfairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24People vs. CAFacts:After the CA affirmed the enjoining of the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutors Office in the case of private respondent Jane S. Go by the Respondent Judge Espina of Tacloban City, the petitioner through the Solicitor General filed a petition for review on certiorari praying the annulment of the decision and enjoin the respondent judge from conducting proceeding of the criminal case filed against another respondent Jane S. GO.The petitioner contends that the respondent judge is not clothe with cold neutrality of an impartial judge as required by due process.

Issue:Was the contention with merit?Held:Yes.One of the essential requirements of procedural due process is the presence of an impartial court or tribunal clothe with judicial power to hear and determine matter filed before it. Thus, every party in a judicial process is entitled to an impartial judge to assure him or herself that the judgment rendered is just and their rights are carefully considered and protected.In the case at bar based on the evidences presented before a Special Civil action to the respondent judge wherein he enjoined the authorities for further investigation and favored the accused Go, it is enough to doubt the impartiality as required by due process, of the respondent judge in handling cases.The petition is affirmed.

Javier Vs. COMELEC[144 SCRA 194; G.R. Nos. L-68379-81; 22 Sept 1986]Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.Pedro Azul vs Judge Jose Castro & RosalindaTecsonDue Process Impartial and Competent CourtFACTS:Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the amount of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus leaving about P250k as a balance. She filed a petition for collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. On 27 Mar 79, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 79, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired and was temporarily substituted by J Aover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. But Azul only received the notice granting such on the 23rd of the same month way passed the 5 day period. On the 17th of April, Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss averring that Azuls 5 day extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the permanent judge to replace J Sarmiento took office and he ordered Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of evidence the next day and of course without Azuls evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default. On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the case appealed to remove his default status. On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th. Finally, J Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of September.ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued that when the Azuls counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first extension would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only to be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be considered submitted for resolution. Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Aover, who had not permanently taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to compound the Azuls problems, the order was sent by mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. Before the much publicized Project Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was declared in default. The motion to declare defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on April 18, 1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon City.

G.R. Nos. L-69640-45 April 30, 1985MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, AS CITY MAYOR OF GINGOOG CITY,petitioner,vs.HON. JUDGE CESAR R. AZURA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, 10th JUDICIAL REGION MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,respondent.City Mayor of Gingoog City, seeks to annul respondent Judge's Order denying the Motion for Inhibition which he (petitioner) had filed.The grounds advanced for the inhibition of respondent Judge from hearing, deciding and issuing Orders in any of the seven pending cases1in his Court wherein the City of Gingoog, its officials, including petitioner, are parties, may be summarized as follows:1. Loss of trust and confidence in the competence and impartiality of respondent Judge, particularly in view of the administrative complaints filed against him by petitioner and others before this Court.2. Entertaining suits assailing the validity of auction sales of tax delinquent properties by issuing restraining orders enjoining the City Treasurer of Gingoog City from proceeding with the auction sales of said properties when under Sec. 64 and 83 of P.D. 464, the remedy to stay execution of auction sales of tax delinquent properties is by paying the tax, pursuant to Sec. 74 of P.D. 464, supra, and not by issuance of restraining orders;3. Bias, oppressive dispensation of justice, and abuse of his power of contempt in ordering the arrest of petitioner and the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City and imposing upon them an excessive fine of P10,000.00 and an excessive bond of P50,000.00 when the claim for salary was only for P5,000.00, and by sensationalizing their arrest with the aid of the Provincial Commander at Campa Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, as if they were hardened criminals and fugitives from justice, for the purpose of embarrassing them before the public.4. Issuing of Orders against the interests of the City of Gingoog.Respondent Judge denied the Petition for Inhibition on the ground that loss of trust and confidence by petitioner in his neutrality is unfounded, notwithstanding the administrative charges filed against him, and that the plea for inhibition was prompted more because the "City Attorney (petitioner's counsel) appears to have persisted in his grotesque arguments and haughty conduct in his subsequent pleadings which already constitute direct contempt for which he may be cognizant of his inevitable punishment, and for which reason he now entertains the resultant fears from his own indiscretions, to appear before this presiding judge."Petitioner assails said Order denying inhibition for having been issued despotically, whimsically, and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondent Judge, in his Comment filed pursuant to this Court's requirement, states:1. He merely followed the provisions of Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, in resolving petitioner's Motion for Inhibition, there being no legal ground for him to inhibit himself from proceeding to hear any of the several cases therein enumerated;2. In regard to the tax cases, he submits that if, indeed, he has no jurisdiction, and the proper remedy is not a petition for inhibition but an action for prohibition in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 65.ISSUE:Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

HELD:The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case, All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore byway of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge

G.R. No. L-49360 December 14, 1979FILEMON DAVID,petitioner,vs.HON. GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, FELOMENO JUGAR and RICARDO JUGAR,respondents.Arturo P. Aponesto for petitioner.Dominador Mortera for private respondents.

FACTS:Earlier or on February 17, 1976, Felomeno and Ricardo Jugar brothers, filed against Feli