Comparing Cultures Within Subjects

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Anthropological Theory

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2002 2: 98Anthropological TheoryRobert W. Schrauf

a framework for cross-cultural studyComparing cultures within-subjects : A cognitive account of acculturation as

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98

Anthropological Theory

Copyright © 2002 SAGE Publications(London, Thousand Oaks, CA

and New Delhi)Vol 2(1): 98–115

[1463-4996(200203)2:1;98–115;022290]

Comparing cultureswithin-subjectsA cognitive account of acculturation as aframework for cross-cultural study

Robert W. SchraufNorthwestern University Medical School, Chicago, USA

AbstractCross-culturally comparable ‘units of culture’ may be found in the experience ofimmigrants for whom certain experiential domains of meaning from the ‘first culture’are brought into comparison and contrast with corresponding domains in the ‘secondculture’. The notion of domains is here developed out of ‘semantic domain’ fromcognitive anthropology, ‘cognitive domain’ from cognitive linguistics, and ‘discoursedomain’ from second language acquisition. The clue to such domains is immigrants’coming to greater second language fluency in some areas of experience and less inother areas (communicative and cultural competence). These distinctions are used todevelop a cognitive theory of acculturation that focuses research on cultures within-subjects (within immigrants) in contrast to the traditional focus on comparisonbetween cultural groups (between subjects). This article is speculative and derivesfrom work in cognitive anthropology, ethnographic report, studies of second languageacquisition, and psycholinguistic studies of bilingual memory.

Key Wordsacculturation • bilingualism • cognitive anthropology • immigration • secondlanguage acquisition • units of culture

INTRODUCTIONFormal comparisons between two or more cultures require the definition and opera-tionalization of units of culture. At lower levels of magnification, comparison is madebetween cultural groups. The investigator looks at some cultural meaning system in onegroup (for instance, healing among the BaKongo in Lower Zaire) and compares it to thesame system in another group (say, healing among the Amish in the state of Ohio in theUnited States). Comparison is made between subjects (between cultural groups in thiscase) in terms of the topic of interest to the cross-culturalist. In this case, medicalmeaning systems are compared. This is made extraordinarily difficult, of course, by the

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fact that meanings and behaviors are not isolated entities but are embedded in localnetworks of meanings and behaviors. Furthermore, networks (unlike matrices, tables,charts, and maps) do not display obvious seams, edges, fault lines, or borders. Add adiachronic dimension – let networks transform over time – and the task becomesmind-boggling.

At a higher level of magnification, it is possible to address the cross-cultural project,not by comparing cultures at the level of the social group (the BaKongo vs. the Amish),but rather at the level of the bicultural individual (e.g. the Taiwanese immigrant in LosAngeles). Here, the investigator looks at cultural meaning systems as they meet – andcoexist or are transformed or deteriorate and disappear – within the experience of theimmigrant (e.g. kanpo and biomedicine vs. exclusive biomedicine). This comparison ismade within subjects – distinguishing two cultural meaning systems within-individuals:one from the culture of origin, the other from the culture of adoption. No doubt thistoo is made extraordinarily difficult by the networks-of-meaning-problem just mentioned– exacerbated tremendously by variability among persons (personality, developmentalhistory, emotional state, and so on). Additionally, whereas in comparing cultures at thelevel of the group, there is unquestionably two of something (one in Lower Zaire, theother in Amish Ohio), in the case of the immigrant, there may be only one of some-thing (something too syncretistic or too eclectic to be of much analytic use). After all,multiple cultural combinations within individuals are possible. For these reasons, thisapproach may not provide much more clarity a priori on the units of culture question.It may, however, provide a great deal of clarity a posteriori on such units.

CULTURE CONTACT: ‘BEFORE’ AND ‘AFTER’What critically distinguishes the ‘within-subjects approach’ is the fact that culturecontact causes change in the individual, and change is an observable process. The accul-turation of the immigrant offers a window onto two comparable cultural meaningsystems before and after culture contact. Particularly illuminating in this regard is theexperience of the individual who emigrates as an adult. Having been ‘enculturated’ in afirst culture via childhood socialization, the adult immigrant engages in a new ‘accul-turative’ project in a second culture that may differ markedly from the cognitive andaffective expectations of reality that he or she developed as a child and youth. Trackingsuch cultural adaptations within individuals who must negotiate these systems rendersthis approach more akin to clinical research where a treatment is made and outcomesmonitored – except in this case, and in true anthropological fashion, the treatment hasoccurred ‘in nature’: people emigrate.

Methodologically, this simplifies the issue of defining and operationalizing units ofcomparison. While it is true that networks of meaning ‘within subjects’ do not showseams, borders, or edges any more than they do within whole societies, nevertheless, insituation after situation, the immigrant is faced with finding out whether the culturalmeaning systems of his or her culture of origin will match the cultural meaning systemsof the culture of adoption. Thus, for example, there is growing immigration fromMexico to the Piedmont area of North Carolina. Not surprisingly in this situation,young Mexican women and men sometimes fall in love with Anglo women and men,and the cultural meaning systems of romantic love and gender relations (e.g. ruralMexican vs. urban US) are placed in comparison, contrast, and sometimes conflict.

SCHRAUF Comparing cultures within-subjects

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Monitoring these experiences of contrast, conflict, and resolution will tell us what therelevant categories (‘cultural units’) are. These are cultural domains (Borgatti, 1994)which may then serve as comparable units for cross-cultural research. As such they areuseful for ‘cutting up’ real life for purposes of analysis (with no accompanying commit-ment to their ontological status).

ONE CULTURE IS UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF ANOTHERThis approach capitalizes on the fact that observation and theory construction are alwayslimited to the insights generated by a comparison of two or more cultures at one time.Contrastive analysis in studies of second-language acquisition provides the model describ-ing this problem. Contrastive analysis (Gass, 1996; Lado, 1957; Selinker, 1992) arguesthat learning a second language is made difficult by interferences from elements in thefirst language. That is, familiar phonetic, morphemic, and syntactic elements from thefirst language are transferred by learners into their productions of the second language.For example, the English speaker learning French might put direct and indirect pronounobjects after the verb instead of before it. In theory, the specific differences between thenative language and the target language (as linguistic systems) could be identified, andthese differences would predict the kinds of mistakes learners would make.

Contrastive analysis proved problematic for second language acquisition because theanalysis of differences between languages as systematic wholes did not successfullypredict actual difficulties experienced by second language learners as individuals. Never-theless, the original insight of contrastive analysis and the critique of it are instructivefor the approach I have advocated for studying acculturation. It is in fact the interferencefrom immigrants’ culture of origin, in their attempt to adapt to the culture of adoption,that brings the experience of acculturation into awareness so that it can be reflectedupon. This interference must be studied on the ground, as it were, in the actual experi-ence of immigrant adaptation.

The implication of a ‘within-subjects’ approach to ethnography is that what we knowabout any two cultures is shaped by (and limited to) the particular contrasts that emergeas a result of the encounter between them. That is, if we study the Moroccan immigrantto Andalucía, then what we know of the culture of Andalucía and the culture of north-ern Morocco will be limited by the contrasts between the two cultures in the experienceof the immigrant. A different immigrant would foreground different contrasts. Thus, afocus on the Breton who migrated to Andalucía could very well give us a somewhatdifferent picture of Andalusian culture. The dimensions of contrast would differ.

I suggest that this is a fundamental epistemological conundrum of cultural anthro-pology. Common sense argues that research in both social science and human inter-cultural experience is predicated on some common, if not universal, analytic categories(else the conversation simply cannot continue). Yet in its most fundamental and con-crete sense primary fieldwork data in anthropology can only be gathered by comparingone culture with another culture. Whether the comparison is between the anthropol-ogist’s own culture and the culture of his or her fieldwork, or between two cultures inthe immigrant’s process of acculturation, the anthropological project is inherently dyadicand cross-cultural. The study of acculturation – measuring cultural variability within-subjects – has the advantage of making immigrants’ experience of this duality the focusof research.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 2(1)

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DOMAIN-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ACQUISITIONThis article outlines a systematic approach to acculturation based on (1) the idea ofdistinct experiential domains and (2) an extended analogy between acculturation andsecond language acquisition. As I use it, the notion of domain refers to a particular areaof human experience for which we possess a specific ‘language’: for example, we have aspecific way of talking about family relations and obligations, a specific way of talkingabout work and occupation, a specific way of talking about sickness and health care,about politics and laws, about games and sports, and so on. In this article I argue that(1) the adult immigrant engages the new culture not all at once (indeed, such cognitiveoverload would be paralyzing) but domain by domain, and (2) language shifts in experi-ential domains provide the clues to patterns of acculturation.

This approach is by no means new in studies of immigration. The social sciencemeasurement of acculturation in the United States relies largely on the measurement oflanguage shift (for review, see Dana, 1996). A quick review of ‘acculturation scales’reveals that most include a subset of questions that require self-report about languageuse and comprehension in particular domains. Questions focus on language use and/orpreference by domain: e.g. home, school, and work (Szapocznik et al., 1978). Questionsin the domain of media typically ask about language preference for movies, television,books, newspapers (e.g. Cortes et al., 1994; Cuellar et al., 1995; Mendoza, 1989;Szapocznik et al., 1978). Questions in the social domain ask about language-use withnuclear family members, extended family members, friends, workmates, neighbors(Mendoza, 1989; Schrauf and Rubin, 1998). Some scales ask for self-report of languageproficiency across domains (Marin and Gamba, 1996; Schrauf and Rubin, 1998). Accul-turation scales aggregate responses across domains to assess the level of acculturation forindividuals. My focus on individual domains provides a more fine-grained analysis ofacculturation patterns while simultaneously placing in relief shifts in cultural meaningsystems, thus making them more visible and easier to compare.

Stated succinctly the argument is as follows: most immigrants come to linguistic andcommunicative competence in some second-language domains but not others. System-atic study of the particular domains in which adjustments are made provides a clue tounits of cultural comparison and contrast. Central to this formulation are the conceptsof domain, competence, mental representation of bilingual discourse abilities, and theactor’s goals and networks.

COGNITIVE, SEMANTIC, AND DISCOURSE DIMENSIONSThe first key concept of this study is the notion of domain. It is developed more tech-nically here out of three related bodies of theory: cognitive linguistics (cognitivedomain), cognitive anthropology (semantic domain), and studies in second languageacquisition (discourse domain). Generally speaking, the notion of experiential domaindeveloped in this article is cognitive and the level of analysis is the level of mental rep-resentation in terms of schemas, mental models, prototypes, and symbols. ‘Mental rep-resentation’ in this sense is not restricted to ideational content but is meant to includeboth motivational and emotional representation as well.

It is the province of cognitive anthropology to explore how cultural knowledge is rep-resented in individual minds and across populations. Methods and theory include: con-sensus analysis (Romney, 1994, 1999; Romney and Moore, 1998; Romney et al., 1986,


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1996, 1997), culture model theory (D’Andrade and Strauss, 1992; Holland and Quinn,1987; Shore, 1996) and notions of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1996; Lave, 1988;Lave and Wenger, 1991). This approach differs from others that stress the emergence ofmeanings in socio-cultural interaction (in psychology: Wertsch, 1998; in culturalanthropology: Dilley, 1999; and in linguistic anthropology: Tedlock and Mannheim,1995). As I shall argue later, however, mental representations carry with them thehistory of their emergence in socio-cultural contexts (see also Schrauf and Rubin, inpress).

Cognitive domainIn cognitive linguistics, the notion of cognitive domain describes not some slice ofobservable human experience to which language refers but rather to a psychologicalcontext. Cognitive domains are ‘mental experiences, representational spaces, conceptsor conceptual complexes’ (Langacker, 1987: 147). As we interactively acquire socio-culturally mediated concepts, we develop the cognitive domains that are their internal,mental contexts.

Cognitive domains arise from our mental experiences in the process of concept for-mation, which in turn comes as the result of perception. While sensuous dimensionof perceptual processes should most probably be considered universal (‘global’), thephysical, psychological, and sociological dimensions which constitute the basis forconcept formation emerge as a network of sociocultural factors and personal predis-positions of language users, such as intelligence, education, emotions, beliefs, values,attitudes, motivations, etc.; in short, they are idiosyncratic and/or culture-specific (or‘local’). Ultimately, cognitive domains emerge as products of cognition conditionedby culture. (Tabakowska, 1999: 82)

Semantic domainIn cognitive anthropology, consensus analysis focuses on the representation of culturalknowledge in semantic domains. In one sense, a semantic domain is a lexical-referentialorganization of knowledge. A semantic domain ‘may be defined as an organized set ofwords, all on the same level of contrast, that refer to a single conceptual category, suchas kinship terms, animal names, color terms, or emotion terms’ (Romney et al., 2000:518). Within a semantic domain, the ‘meaning of a term is defined by its location rela-tive to all the other terms’ (Romney et al., 2000: 518; for a review of ‘semantic domain’in cognitive anthropology, see D’Andrade, 1995). In an extended sense, a culturaldomain is made up of ‘items’ which members of a culture recognize as belongingtogether in a particular category. Operationally, such a domain may be established byasking members of a culture to free-list as many items as possible that belong in thedomain. ‘Items’ constituting a cultural domain need not be simply names, but may beany of a number of relations (see Spradley, 1979, 1980; Werner and Schoepfle, 1987).Garcia Alba de Alba et al. (1998) asked members of a Mexican barrio, ‘What causes highblood pressure?’ and found that individuals of different age groups and educational levelproduced very similar lists. Similarly, Caulkins (1998) asked Scottish entrepreneurs tolist kinds of business success and found considerable agreement among his informantsin the terms they used to depict success.


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Where lists are too diverse, and where there is little agreement on the structure of thedomain, one may suspect that no ‘unified cultural domain’ exists. Cultural domains,then, are discovered empirically. Knowledge of cultural domains is not distributed uni-formly in the population. Even apart from immigrants, some knowledge domains arewidely shared (e.g. how to get food in a restaurant) while others are narrowly shared(how to fix a car). For all people, and for immigrants, there is a tendency to learn andinternalize knowledge domains according to one’s needs and goals and in culturally pre-scribed ways.

Discourse domainIn second language acquisition studies, ‘Discourse Domain Theory’ describes a discoursedomain as a topical area in which an individual feels knowledgeable and especiallyinvested. The theory predicts that for such domains, learners will ‘produce second-language talk that is more complex, more independent, and more coherent’ (Young,1999: 110). They will also perceive themselves as more competent and invested in thatdomain than in areas where they have not acquired a similar discourse competency(Whyte, 1992, 1995). Domain and competence interact.

In this article, I use this composite notion of domain (cognitive, semantic, and dis-course) to explain how the immigrant becomes selectively knowledgeable and linguisti-cally competent in those second language/second culture domains in which he or she ispersonally invested. Relative communicative competence signals patterns of accultura-tion and highlights points of cultural comparison and contrast.

LINGUISTIC, COMMUNICATIVE, AND CULTURAL COMPETENCEA second key concept in this study is competence. The notion developed here draws onthree further areas of research: in formal linguistics (linguistic competence), the ethnog-raphy of speaking (communicative competence), and cognitive anthropology (culturalcompetence).

Linguistic competenceA person with linguistic competence, in the Chomskyan understanding of the term(Chomsky, 1965), is a person capable of forming all and only those sentences admiss-ible in a given language. Such knowledge is comprised of ‘the tacit knowledge under-lying the grammatical structure of clauses and sentences’ (Ochs, 1988: 33).

Communicative competenceA person with communicative competence, in the tradition of the ethnography of speak-ing (Hymes, 1972), is one who knows how language (e.g. specific genres and registers)is used in particular speech situations. Native speakers of a language are those who attainboth linguistic and communicative competence via childhood language socialization.Immigrants learning a second language in the culture of adoption can develop both lin-guistic and communicative competence via ‘everyday learning’ in their ‘second culture.’Alternately, in the case where the exception proves the rule, persons acquiring a secondlanguage in a classroom in their own country far from the cultural context in which thatlanguage is naturally spoken may acquire linguistic but not communicative competence(for distinctions between spontaneous and guided learning, see Klein, 1986).


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Cultural competenceAs an analog to linguistic and communicative competence, anthropologists have sug-gested the notion of cultural competence (Agar, 1991). The process of acculturation intoa culture results in knowing ‘whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operatein a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for anyone of themselves’ (Goodenough, 1964). Acculturation involves ‘competence in theideational realm that constitutes a culture – schemata, scripts, models, frames . . . thatare culturally constituted, socially distributed, and personally construed’ (Poole, 1994:833). In the tradition of consensus analysis (Romney, 1994, 1999; Romney et al., 1986)anthropologists also speak of cultural competence as the degree to which an individualshares the knowledge (representations) held collectively by the group.

In this article, ‘competence’ implies all three forms insofar as they are mutually related.Obviously, some measure of linguistic competence undergirds communicative com-petence, and attaining communicative competence implies knowledge of and practicalsensitivity to cultural nuances.

BECOMING BILINGUAL: COMPETENCE BY DOMAINImmigrants attain competence – linguistic, communicative, and cultural – domain bydomain, and not globally. One way of highlighting this fact is by way of contrast toearlier formulations. In early psycholinguistic studies of bilingualism, Weinrich (1953)and Ervin and Osgood (1954) distinguished between ‘compound’ and ‘coordinate’ bi-linguals. Compound bilinguals are those who learn their two languages in one context.This is the individual who grows up speaking two languages from birth, often in a multi-lingual society. Coordinate bilinguals are those who learn one language in one (cultural)context and a second language in another (cultural) context. This is the situation of theprototypical adult immigrant envisioned in this article.

The compound–coordinate distinction has not fared well for a number of reasons.First, even compound bilinguals tend to develop variable linguistic and communicativecompetence by domain. So, for example, in the multilingual society of Luxembourg

German is the language of elementary education, religion, and journalism; French isthe language of secondary education, official usage, government bureaucracy, streetsignage, and a few others, while Letzebuergesch, though functioning only in the L(low)-variety (i.e. as the language of the home, street, workplace, etc.) is also anadmissible variety for addressing Parliament. (Schiffman, 1993: 136)

In addition, numerous studies of bilingualism by linguistic anthropologists haveexplored how the use of one or the other language in multilingual societies may be gen-dered (Burton et al., 1994; Harvey, 1999). Participants in these studies are ‘compoundbilinguals’ who develop linguistic and communicative competence in different languagesfor different domains. The reason is quite practical: acquiring equivalent lexical entries,syntactic forms, and idiomatic fluency for every domain of life is simply unnecessary.The need to develop linguistic and communicative competence is situationally driven.

The case is even more obvious for ‘coordinate bilinguals’. For immigrants, acquisitionof communicative competence in the domain of work is usually vital, and therefore maylong precede communicative competence in domains such as kinship or politics.


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Further, for some domains, persons may never develop communicative competence forthe simple reason that it would be superfluous. Why should the El Salvadoran immi-grant living in Washington, DC learn the appropriate English for Catholic practice (inthe domain of religion) if the relevant worshipping community is entirely Spanish,rituals are conducted in Spanish, devotional materials are distributed in Spanish, andSpanish speaking priests and nuns are readily available? In this sense, all bilinguals are‘coordinate bilinguals.’

MENTALLY REPRESENTED DISCOURSE HISTORIESThis anthropological notion of linguistic-communicative-cultural competence stands indirect contrast to the narrower understanding of language fluency as it is often portrayedin psycholinguistic studies of bilingualism. In these studies, the governing metaphor forlanguage is that ‘language is a code.’ The code metaphor implies that (a) there areobjects-in-the-world, (b) there are names for those objects, and (c) the bilingual has twosets of names for these objects (whereas the monolingual has just one set of names).

The code metaphor reduces language to its ostensive function and therefore offers anextremely simplistic mode for semantic reference. From this perspective, language, at thelevel of semantics, consists of a set of linguistic labels for non-linguistic things. This islanguage as Wittgenstein understood it in Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein,1961[1922]): word-elements must be hooked up with world-elements. Oftentimes incognitive studies of bilingualism, the ‘objects-in-the-world’ are substituted by ‘concepts’or ‘images’ in the mind for which, again, the bilingual has two sets of labels. Butthis does no more than drag the code metaphor inside the mind and substitutes non-linguistic, mental referents for non-linguistic ‘objects-in-the-world.’

To Wittgenstein, sustained reflection suggested that things were otherwise, and in thePhilosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953) he developed the notion that languageplays a wide variety of functions other than the ‘ostensive.’ Thus, the meaning of anyutterance is constituted only within the particular language ‘game’ that is being played.At issue are ‘meanings’, not ‘objects’ (and one need not be a symbolic anthropologist orphilosophical idealist to appreciate this point). To speak of ‘language games’ is to speakof cultural contexts, and ‘meanings’ are thoroughly socio-cultural in the sense that theyare shaped by the context in which they emerge and are employed. Further, these con-texts are essentially dialogic (Goodwin and Duranti, 1992; Tedlock and Mannheim,1995).

Meaning, then, emerges in discourse. ‘Meanings are negotiated, challenged, arguedabout, imposed, altered or reinterpreted to reflect changed circumstances or changedgoals and aspirations of individuals and groups. In brief, meanings are subjected tomanipulations’ (Holy, 1999: 53). Meanings are constituted in the discourse contexts inwhich they are invoked. This is the force of pragmatics and indexicality in studies of lan-guage-in-use (Hanks, 1996; Silverstein, 1976, 1987). Among the resources immigrantslearn to manipulate are the language registers, genres, idioms, and special vocabulariesthat signal social belonging and facilitate goal attainment (Koven, 1998; Woolard,1997). Moving from one network and domain to others, people can use linguisticresources flexibly to position themselves and others (Zentella, 1997). Language usereflects both a contextual strategy within local networks and the internalization of cul-tural meaning systems. Thus, meanings are created anew in culturally-specific discourse


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contexts. In sum, the bilingual is not an individual with ‘alternate codes’ for some com-monly available set of ‘objects-in-the-world’, but a person whose linguistic and com-municative competence in a particular domain (from a history of discourse involvementin that domain) enables him or her to engage in the ‘ongoing’ conversation of otherpersons also involved in that domain. Meanings are encoded in memory as the residueof conversational dialogues and social uses of language through which they have comeabout.

The notion that meaning is an achievement-in-discourse is not news to anthropolo-gists, but what needs to be established anew is the notion that meaning does not emergeex nihilo (‘out of nothingness’, as medieval theologians might have it) between two socio-cultural agents interacting in a particular domain. The linguistic and communicativecompetence of the cultural actors reflects a discourse history of previous involvement in thedomain in which they interact. Cognitively, this discourse history is a series of mentalrepresentations at lexical, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic levels that undergirdcompetence in the domain (similar to the ‘contextual representation’ necessary for thedetermination of word meaning; Miller, 1999: 13). These are part and parcel of thesocio-culturally constituted ‘meanings’ at issue. Thus, where cognitive studies of bi-lingualism tend to reduce language to the mental ‘coding’ of concepts and images,anthropologists tend to locate the achievement of meaning in social interaction andignore the reality of the history of mental representations that actors bring to theencounter. Both perspectives are critical: mental concepts and images are encodednetworks (histories) of meanings.

According to the foregoing, then, discourse histories are encoded in memory asmental representations. Speakers access these representations when speaking. They mayalso access them in response to experimental stimulation. Studies in cognitive psychol-ogy of bilingual memory are now beginning to focus on how the semantic represen-tations of bilinguals (the ‘meanings-in-the-head’) are in fact thoroughly ‘cultural’concepts with intimate links to their appropriate lexical entries (Pavlenko, 1999; Schraufand Rubin, in press). This is the cognitive correlate to the work described earlier inlinguistic anthropology. The bilingual is the person who possesses these competenciesgrounded in domain-specific discourse histories. Both the competence and discourse his-tories are rooted in mental representations corresponding to a particular domain. Theseexperiences are the result of needing and developing competence in certain areas but notothers. Acculturation and second-language learning foster the development of a ‘bilin-gual mind’ as well as a bilingual speaker (Schrauf, 2000).

VARIABLE COMPETENCE IN DIFFERENT DOMAINSTypically, therefore, the bilingual’s two languages are used in particular and differentdomains. This has several consequences. First, fluency in either the first or secondlanguage will vary with the domain. For some domains, a person may be a ‘balancedbilingual’, equally competent speaking either language, while for other domains he orshe may be adept in one language but limited (or wholly incapable) in the other. Forpurposes of characterizing bilingual competence, it is important to determine relativecompetence in key second-language domains (Schrauf and Rubin, 1998). Secondly,communicative competence in any given domain is not constant, but varies over time.Given second-language acquisition for a particular domain, a person may acquire fluency


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in that domain, fossilize at some point in that domain, or become linguistically and com-municatively functional (but not fluent) in that domain. Thirdly, sustained use of thesecond language may cause first language attrition in that domain (Schrauf, 1999). Overtime, the second language comes to replace the first (Kenny, 1996), though in this lattercase it is probably more accurate to say that the first language becomes inaccessible ratherthan ‘lost’ (Seliger, 1996).

By extension, given the close connection (though not identification) of communi-cative and cultural competence, it is more accurate to say that cultural competence isdomain specific as well. As with second language acquisition, acculturation by domainis situationally driven and occurs in some domains but not others. Moreover, accultur-ation in any domain is by degree and varies over time. Finally, very advanced accultur-ation in a given domain may result in a corresponding ‘deculturation’ in the culturalschemata of the culture of origin. Any psychological theory of acculturation must berecalibrated to explain, not acculturation as a wholesale change in socio-cultural iden-tity, but rather, acculturation as a process applying to individual cultural domains.

STRATEGIZING CULTURAL ADAPTION BY DOMAINFor the monocultural individual who speaks only one language, cultural domains haveonly one language associated with them. In contrast, for the bicultural/bilingual, anygiven cultural domain may have two, or more, associated meaning systems and two lan-guages. In this regard, it is important to note that acculturation is not a unilinear processwhere acquisition of the cultural meanings, behaviors, and values of the adopted culturenecessarily implies a process of ‘culture shedding’ (Berry, 1992) of those from the cultureof origin. Of course, for some individuals there is a loss of some cultural experience andthe replacement by another. Pavlenko (1998) has gathered the first person accounts ofbilingual authors, all adult second language learners, and chronicled the stages of loss ofthe first language (and first language identity) and subsequent gain and reconstruction.Instructive in this regard are the reflections of author Jan Novak:

My Czech had begun to deteriorate. There were times now when I could not recallan everyday word, such as ‘carrot’, ‘filer’, or ‘sloth.’ I would waste the day probingthe labyrinthine recesses of my memory because to get help from a dictionary seemedonly to legitimize the loss. . . . Computers, graft, football, and other things werebecoming easier to talk about in English. (Novak, 1994: 265; quoted in Pavlenko,1998)

Most often a person retains and cultivates his or her ethnic identity and, at the sametime, engages the ideology and practices of the culture of adoption. LaFromboise et al.(1993) refer to this as ‘biculturalism’. Furthermore, this process of assuming the newcultural schemata and retaining or adjusting old ones is both an active and passiveprocess. That is, a person may make attitudinal and behavioral changes quite consciously,while also acquiring new attitudes and patterns of action without awareness of thechange.

Insofar as adaptation to the larger culture is left to the individual (and not a forcedchoice), the experience of acculturation may be characterized in four ways. Berry and hiscolleagues (Berry, 1984; Berry et al., 1989, 1992) have identified four such acculturation


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‘strategies’ (a 2x2 model) based on two variables: (a) the degree to which one’s identityin and the characteristics of the culture of origin are to be maintained (what I will call‘ethnic maintenance’), and (b) the degree to which the ideology and practices of thewider culture are to be incorporated (what I will call ‘cultural incorporation’). Integrationdescribes high ethnic maintenance and high cultural incorporation (this is LaFromboise’sbiculturalism). Assimilation describes low ethnic maintenance and high culturalincorporation. This is the unilineal strategy: adopting one culture means ‘shedding’ theother. Separation describes high ethnic maintenance and low cultural incorporation. Thisis refusal to acculturate. Marginalization describes both low ethnic maintenance and lowcultural incorporation. This is self-alienation from both the culture of origin and theculture of adoption.

In the following I adopt Berry’s ‘strategy’ language with the caveat that not all adap-tation or resistance is conscious and intentional. While the strategies just described maybe understood to apply to an individual’s overall orientation toward their cultural experi-ence, I suggest that individuals choose strategies for each domain according to their goalsand/or needs that may be met through acquiring competency in that domain. In anycultural domain, one may have a variety of experiences and strategies of adaptation. Thisreflects the pluriformity of motives and needs that a person possesses in relation to aspecific domain. This notion articulates with the current anthropological wisdom thatindividuals negotiate cultural ideologies and practices according to context. A domainsuch as ‘getting a university education’ is not just one site of meaning and activity andtherefore may require multiple strategies of adaptation, depending both on what isrequired to act competently at the various sites and the goals and needs of the individualactors.

As an example of linguistic and cultural preservation of some first cultural domainsand adaptation to a second-culture domain, Diane Hoffman (1989a, 1989b) presentsethnographic data on Iranian immigrants to the San Francisco Bay Area.

In any given linguistic community, when a language choice exists, certain domainswill be associated with preferential use of one language over another. For Iranians,English was the language of the workplace, and its use connoted the values of techno-logical expertise, efficiency, and clear information exchange. (Farsi, on the otherhand, was associated with art, emotional expression, friendship, and social refine-ment.) (Hoffman, 1989b: 127)

That the workplace domain required a language shift is not remarkable. Iranians will-ingly negotiated the various requirements for competency in that domain: language,technological skills, valuing efficiency and ‘clear information exchange.’ Hoffman notesthat Iranians adopted a strategy of blending both American professional values and theEnglish vocabulary associated with them into an Iranian cultural framework. This sug-gests not the replacement but the integration of meaning systems. On the other hand,in domains such as art and the ethnopsychology of emotion and friendship, Iranianimmigrants to San Francisco seemed to have little interest in adopting second-culturemeaning systems. This resistance is indicative of the cultural separation strategydescribed earlier.

To talk of strategies and choices in acculturation to particular domains is to talk about


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the actor’s intentions and indeed, as indicated in this article, much of the variability inthe degree of acculturation is explained by reference to the individual’s intentions (con-scious and unconscious). Just how much the immigrant wants to adopt the customs andways of thinking of the culture of adoption and how much she wants to preserve theculture of origin is related to her needs and aims in a particular domain.

In both enculturation in the first culture and acculturation in the second, onelearns the schemas of the new culture, and as psychological anthropologists have shown(D’Andrade and Strauss, 1992), schemas carry with them embedded goals. As Straussnotes,

. . . cultural models (i.e. culturally formed cognitive schemas, Quinn & Holland,1987) can have motivational force because these models not only label and describethe world but also set forth goals (both conscious and unconscious) and elicit orinclude desires (D’Andrade, 1981, 1984, 1990). (Strauss 1992: 3, italics in original)

Whether an individual comes to feel the (emotive) evocation of a particular schema or actin accord with its directives (motive force) is partly due to personal decision and shapedby goals at higher levels (Strauss, 1992). And, again, acting out of either the first cultureor the second culture framework becomes a way of realizing these overarching goals.

Again in Hoffman’s study of Iranian immigrants (1989b), there is evidence that indi-viduals choose different strategies of adaptation. Some negotiate adaptation to Americancultural meanings via a kind of ‘cultural eclecticism, in which the learner consciouslypicks and chooses what he or she perceives to be the self-consonant values present in theother culture, adding them on to form a new and ideally improved version of the self ’(Hoffman, 1989b: 42). For others, however, there is resistance to acculturation, andwhatever adaptations are necessary seem to entail either alienation or loss of self. In theformer case, the individual consciously and purposively takes up acculturation in par-ticular domains. In the latter case, the individual struggles with adaptation as a threatto identity. Some of the individual differences in acculturation are explained by actors’goals, both conscious and unconscious.

CONCLUSIONThis article argues that units of culture can be empirically discovered by attending toadult immigrants’ experience of culture contact. That is, as the immigrant encounters‘what they do here’, those things that he or she has always ‘taken for granted’ are madeconscious and subject to reflection. This process of culture contact takes place over timeand in different experiential domains, as new challenges are met and new needs mademanifest. Language shift is a principal clue to identifying these domains. As immigrantsdevelop competence in a new domain, they generally acquire new abilities to com-municate with others about that domain. To some extent the ability to use this new‘language’ is internalized and mental representations of that domain become ‘bilingual’.These two insights – (1) that acculturation takes place domain by domain, and (2) thatlanguage shift is the clue to these changes – provide the foundation for a cognitive theoryof acculturation. The theoretical framework comprises three concepts: experientialdomain, linguistic-communicative-cultural competence, and the mental encoding ofdiscourse histories.


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The concept of ‘experiential domain’ is heir to three current but diverse uses of ‘domain’:cognitive (from cognitive linguistics); semantic (from cognitive anthropology); and asdiscourse (from second language acquisition). As noted, a domain is a series of mentalrepresentations – an imagistic and/or conceptual complex – represented at a symboliclevel by a set of linguistic contrasts and about which a person is linguistically articulateto some degree or another. For example, the domain of medical care (in the US) includesthe prototypical task of seeing a doctor. A person must know when and how to makean appointment with a doctor, how to register with the nurse upon arrival, how to actin the waiting room, how to carry on appropriate patient-doctor discourse about thesymptoms, how to arrange for payment with the insurance cards, how to get the pre-scription completed, and so forth.

Individuals come to variable competence in experiential domains. My use of theconcept of competence folds together linguistic knowledge (knowing what the words,syntax, and idioms are), communicative competence (knowing when to say what towhom), and cultural competence (knowing the beliefs and practices of the group).Such competence develops over time as the result of experience and social interactionwith many other people. Competence is therefore not a static capacity but rests on awhole discourse history of multiple engagements in that domain. For example, one learnsabout holidays from anticipating a free day with co-workers, by hearing advertisementsfor holiday entertainment, by going to parades or by watching television. Talk shapesexperiences and shapes one’s expectations about the experiences. In this critical sense,meaning is an achievement of discourse over time. These discourse histories areencoded in memory as mental representations. Each new engagement in the domaindepends on previously encoded mental representations and in turn reshapes the relevantrepresentations.

The immigrant, as a developing bilingual, arrives at new linguistic-communicative-cultural competence in some experiential domains and not others. This process is gov-erned in part by the exigencies of circumstance and in part by individual motivation andpersonal ideology. In any given domain, survival may depend on coming to competence,or, alternately, nothing may be lost by ignoring certain domains. Acculturation is inpart a matter of choice: an immigrant may abandon, resist, embrace, or mix culturalcompetencies.

As immigrants engage the ‘new’ culture in domain after domain, cognitive changestake place. Discourse histories are modified and networks of mental representations aretransformed. Because the mental representations of their culture-of-origin no longerwork or are at odds with the appropriate representations for behavior in the culture-of-adoption, the immigrant becomes conscious of the cognitive, semantic and discoursedomains that are now called into question. It is in the ongoing ‘collision’ that the ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions of the past now rise to the surface and are no longer taken forgranted. Through this process the immigrants themselves stand in a privileged positionto generate the content and form of these new domains and to reflect on those of theirculture-of-origin. The anthropologist takes advantage of immigrants’ coming to aware-ness of cultural beliefs and practices, now placed in question, and tracks the changes thatoccur as acculturation takes place. It is the argument of this article that the changesoccasioned by acculturation will mark the relevant ‘cultural units of analysis’ for theanthropologist.


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AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Victor de Munck, Robert Moore, and an anonymous reviewerof Anthropological Theory for reading and commenting on previous versions of thispaper. This research was supported by the National Institute of Aging Grant #R01AG16340-01A1.

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ROBERT W. SCHRAUF is a medical and psychological anthropologist at the Buehler Center on Aging at

Northwestern University Medical School and the Northwestern University Cognitive Neurology – Alzheimer’s

Disease Research Center. His major interests are in the cognitive psychology of bilingualism and processes of

encoding and retrieval in autobiographical memory. He works with healthy and cognitively impaired older

adults. Address: Buehler Center on Aging, Northwestern University Medical School, 750 North Lake Shore

Drive, Suite 601, Chicago, IL 60611-2611. [email: [email protected]]


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Comparing Cultures Within Subjects

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