Larry S. Monroe, PhD.Chief Environmental Officer

Alfafra SOUTHERP4 Mae- COMPANYECO 1&” Street Nat

Mal Bin 14N-8 195Birmingham, Alabama 35203

Tel 2052575789smcnroe@southernto.com

April 24, 2015

Sent Via Federal eRulemaking Portal

Department of TransportationFederal Aviation Administration1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,Room W12-140, West Building Ground FloorWashington, D.C. 20590-0001

COMMENTS OF SOUTHERN COMPANY ON THE “OPERATION ANDCERTIFICATION OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS; PROPOSEDRULE”; DOCKET NUMBER FAA-2015-0150

Dear Sir or Madam:

Attached are comments of Southern Company on the Federal Aviation Administration’s Noticeof Proposed Rulemaking published in the Federal Register on February 23, 2015, under docketFAA-2014-0150. We appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments and look forward toseeing these important issues addressed.

Because Southern Company will be a user of Unmanned Aircraft Systems—Southern Companysubmits the following comments on the proposed rule. Southern Company thanks you for theopportunity to submit these comments and appreciates the Federal Aviation Administration’sconsideration of them.

Please contact me or Mr. Dexter Lewis at (205) 257-6854 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

thLarry Monroe, Ph.D.

BEFORE THEFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Docket No. FAA-2015-0150

Operation and Certification of Small UnmannedAircraft Systems

Comments ofSouthern Company

Dexter LewisSenior Research Engineer

Amy M. HazeltonAttorney

Griff WatersManaging Attorney

SOUTHERN COMPANY600 North 18th Street, 14N-8195Birmingham, AL 35203

By Its Attorneys

G. Brent ConnorJason D. TutroneTHOMPSON HINE LLP1919 M St., N.W., Suite 700Washington, D.C. 20036(202) 331-8800

Dated: April 24, 2015

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Southern Company ................................................................................................ 1

II. Comments on the Proposed Operating Rules....................................................... 1

A. Subdivision of Operating Rules ....................................................................... 1

B. Micro UAS......................................................................................................... 2

C. Beyond Line of Sight Operations..................................................................... 4

D. External-Load and Towing Operations ........................................................... 5

E. Operator Rules ................................................................................................. 6

1. Operator Terminology................................................................................. 6

2. Emergency Powers...................................................................................... 6

F. Visual-Observer Position ................................................................................. 7

G. See-and-Avoid................................................................................................... 7

H. Right-of-Way Rule ............................................................................................ 8

I. Visibility Requirements ................................................................................... 8

1. Daylight Limitation .................................................................................... 8

2. Visibility and Cloud Clearance Requirements .......................................... 9

3. Line of Sight .............................................................................................. 10

J. Containment and Loss of Positive Control.................................................... 11

1. Flight-Termination Systems..................................................................... 11

2. Operation from Moving Land Vehicles .................................................... 11

3. 500-foot Ceiling ......................................................................................... 12

4. Operations over Persons........................................................................... 12

K. Airspace Limitations ...................................................................................... 13

1. Equipment for Operation within Controlled Airspace ............................ 13

2. Restriction for Operations in Vicinity of Power Generation andTransmission Facilities............................................................................. 14

3. Operation in Proximity to Certain Areas Designated by Notice toAirmen....................................................................................................... 14

III. Airworthiness, Inspection, Maintenance, and Airworthiness Directives.......... 15

IV. Operator Certification ......................................................................................... 15

A. Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate...................................................... 15

B. Knowledge-Test Requirements...................................................................... 16

C. Recurrent Testing for COA Pilots.................................................................. 17

ii

D. Expiration of Operator Certificates............................................................... 17

E. Applications for Certification before Rule Effective Date ............................ 17

F. Airman Medical Certification ........................................................................ 18

V. Aircraft Registration............................................................................................ 18

VI. Accident Reporting .............................................................................................. 18

VII. Conclusion............................................................................................................ 19

1

Southern Company submits these comments to the Notice of ProposedRulemaking that the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) published in theFederal Register on February 23, 2015, under docket FAA-2014-0150.

Southern Company applauds the proposed rule as a reasonable approach toenabling commercial use of small unmanned-aircraft systems (“UAS”) in theNational Airspace System (“NAS”). Southern Company also welcomes thisopportunity to comment on the rule from the perspective of an electric utility. Thepublic has a strong interest in clean, safe, reliable, and affordable energy systems,because they are critical to national security, commerce, and modern life. Small-UAS applications provide electric utilities exciting new capabilities that candramatically enhance the safety and reliability of energy systems by reducingexposure to electric-infrastructure hazards, accelerating restoration and repair ofdamaged electric infrastructure, increasing system reliability, and bolsteringsecurity of power-generation and transmission facilities. With minor modifications,the proposed rule will enable Southern Company to benefit the public by harnessingthese small-UAS capabilities with little or no additional risk to air traffic andpersons and property on the ground.

I. Southern Company

Southern Company is a leading energy supplier in the Southeastern UnitedStates, serving more than 4.5 million customers through its subsidiaries with clean,safe, reliable, and affordable electricity generated from a full portfolio of energyresources: new nuclear, 21st century coal, natural gas, renewables, and energyefficiency. Southern Company’s subsidiaries include four vertically integratedelectric utilities—Alabama Power, Georgia Power, Gulf Power, and MississippiPower—as well as Southern Power, which owns generation assets in nine statesand sells electricity in the wholesale market to municipalities, electric cooperatives,and investor-owned utilities. Southern Company is an industry leader when itcomes to researching, developing, and applying new technologies to our business.Southern Company has invested more than $2 billion in robust, proprietaryresearch and development since 1970, helping improve the way it produces anddelivers electricity to its customers.

II. Comments on the Proposed Operating Rules

A. Subdivision of Operating Rules

Southern Company supports subdivision of the operating rules wherenecessary to support low-risk electric-utility operations or other low-risk operationsthat are in the public interest. Appropriate subdivisions enable the rule to embracesmall-UAS operations that pose the same low risk as those the FAA embraced inthe rule. In many cases, these operations may not comply with certain rules thatthe FAA proposes, but can be conducted with an equivalent level of safety under

2

alternative rules. Throughout these comments, Southern Company identifies wheresubdivisions are appropriate.

B. Micro UAS

Southern Company supports the inclusion of a micro-UAS exemption in thefinal rule. Due to their small size and low weight, micro UAS pose very low risk toNAS users, the public, and national security, even when compared to small UAS.Additionally, they provide unique benefits, because they are easily deployed andlikely to cost less.

Southern Company generally agrees with the FAA’s proposed micro-UASexemption provisions and proposes adjustments to accommodate additional micro-UAS applications with little or no added risk.

First, Southern Company recommends increasing the maximum altitude to500 feet. As the FAA observes, “most manned-aircraft operations transit theairspace above the 500-foot level.”1 Indeed, the minimum-altitude requirementsapplicable to aircraft, except helicopters, powered parachutes, and weight-shift-control aircraft, require operation at least 500 feet from any person, vessel, orstructure.2 Also, the low proposed weight of micro UAS and the ability of theoperator to see-and-avoid other aircraft reduces the midair collision hazard.Additionally, establishing uniform maximum altitude levels would promotecompliance and awareness of potential hazards.

Second, the maximum altitude should be measured from ground structures.Potential micro-UAS applications include inspection of tall structures, which mayexceed 500 feet above ground level (“AGL”). Since most aircraft must stay 500 feetfrom tall structures3 and tall structures pose a collision hazard, are easy to see fromthe air, and are often depicted on aeronautical charts, the risk of collision between amicro UAS and aircraft within 500 feet of a structure, regardless of altitude, is lowand comparable to the risk of collision below 500 feet AGL.

Third, the FAA should permit autonomy that can be overridden by theoperator. Autonomy dramatically increases safety. It enables the operator to focusattention on collision avoidance and provides for more accurate flight control.Additionally, the Canadian micro-UAS rules permit autonomous aircraft, if theoperator can intervene.

1 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9563 (proposed Feb. 23,2015) [hereinafter NPRM].

2 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(c).

3 Id.

3

Fourth, the FAA should eliminate the Class G limit and apply proposed 14C.F.R. § 107.41 to micro-UAS operations. Proposed §107.41 requires air trafficcontrol (“ATC”) authorization to enter Class B, C, or D airspace or within the lateralboundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport.Coordinated activity with ATC poses low risk to instrument-flight-rules operations,which receive traffic alerts from ATC. In addition, aircraft operating under visualflight rules (“VFR”) and receiving flight following may receive traffic alerts fromATC, and the ability of the micro-UAS operator to see-and-avoid aircraft furthermitigates collision risk.

Fifth, operation should be permitted at least within the line of sight of theoperator. The FAA proposes a 1500-foot distance limitation for see-and-avoidpurposes. But, a 1500-foot distance limitation is unnecessary to see-and-avoid otheraircraft, especially manned aircraft. If the operator can see the UAS, the operatorshould be able to avoid a collision, regardless how far the UAS is from the operator.Additionally, the FAA should not apply a line-of-sight restriction to operationswithin close proximity to ground structures, such as transmission lines. AsSouthern Company explains in Part II.C, the collision risk in close proximity toground structures is very low, because few, if any, aircraft operate within thehazard profile of ground structures.

Sixth, the FAA should evaluate whether a similar degree of safety can bemaintained under the micro UAS provisions with a higher gross takeoff weightlimit. Aircraft commonly strike various-weight birds, including geese, which canweigh 14 pounds, without incident. In addition, the United Kingdom has adoptedsimilar micro-UAS rules that apply to aircraft with a seven-pound gross takeoffweight.

Seventh, the FAA should reduce or eliminate the proposed airport-distancerequirement. Model UAS operations are often conducted on or near airports at thesame time as manned flight operations and with an adequate level of safety. Thisdecades-long experience with model UAS operations indicates that reduction orelimination of the proposed airport-distance requirement would not have an adversesafety impact.

In addition, Southern Company requests that the FAA clarify certain aspectsof the proposed micro-UAS provisions.

First, the FAA should clarify the frangibility requirement for micro UAS. It isunclear what degree of frangibility is acceptable. For example, the proposal does notindicate whether a Styrofoam fixed-wing micro UAS may also have metal or hard-plastic propellers, motors, or supporting rods.

4

Second, the FAA should clarify whether a person who holds an operatingcertificate with a small-UAS rating may operate a micro UAS under the micro-UASrules.

C. Beyond Line of Sight Operations

The final rule should allow beyond line of sight operations (BLOS) in areaswhere the risk of collision with other aircraft, non-participating persons, anduninvolved property is low. The fundamental rationale for prohibiting BLOS is tomitigate the risk of collisions with other aircraft, people on the ground, and groundobjects during normal operations and in loss of positive control situations.4 But thiscollision risk is not present in many areas where small UAS could perform usefulmissions for electric utilities, such as in close proximity to utility infrastructure,power lines, easements, rights of way, and other property owned or controlled bythe utility. Confined to these areas, where manned aircraft generally do not operateand non-participating persons and third-party property are not usually present,BLOS poses little or no additional risk and should be permitted.

Southern Company proposes that the FAA permit BLOS operations by or foran electric utility over or in close proximity to its infrastructure that poses a hazardto aircraft, like power-generation and transmission facilities, with reasonablerestrictions. First, manned aircraft are unlikely to operate in close proximity to thisinfrastructure because it poses a hazard to the aircraft. And a current NOTAMalready advises pilots to avoid overflight of power-generation facilities, includingnuclear power plants.5 Second, manned aircraft can see and avoid most electric-utility infrastructure easily, thereby avoiding any small UAS operating BLOS inclose proximity to such infrastructure. For example, transmission lines and power-generation facilities are often depicted on VFR charts and can be easily spottedfrom the air. Third, non-participating persons and their property usually are notpresent in or around utility infrastructure. Many of Southern Company’stransmission lines are located in rural areas and constructed over a clearing, whichSouthern Company has a right to keep clear. Also, Southern Company’s facilitiesare generally restricted to authorized personnel only. Although Southern Companydoes not believe additional mitigation of loss of positive control risk is necessary,geo-fencing or similar technology could be employed.6

Because small UAS can be deployed quicker than manned assets and withfewer limitations, BLOS infrastructure inspection can result in higher reliability,faster power restoration, reduced infrastructure hazards, and can benefit the public

4 NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9548-49 (noting the two safety concerns are mid-air collisions and loss of positivecontrol).

5 FDC NOTAM 4/0811.

6 Southern Company recommends that any technological requirement for confining operations in a lost linksituation be performance based.

5

and commerce in general. Also, BLOS capability can reduce reliance on existinginspection techniques, which pose risk for inspection crews.

A line of sight constraint substantially reduces the benefit and increases thecost of small UAS for infrastructure inspection. The FAA’s proposed line of sight(“LOS”) requirement makes deploying small UAS resource intensive, requiringconstant repositioning of the operator. In addition, it may require the operator to benear downed or damaged power lines and traverse storm debris and rough terrain.

With appropriate conditions and limitations, small UAS can operate BLOSsafely and without significant risk to the aviation community or the general public.BLOS operations can provide significant benefits for Southern Company in terms ofincreased human safety, reduced inspection cost, and higher customer satisfaction.And they can benefit the public through increased reliability, faster restoration, anda safer utility infrastructure. Accordingly, the FAA should consider permittingBLOS operations, at least for utilities, in close proximity to structures that pose ahazard to aircraft.

D. External-Load and Towing Operations

The ability of small UAS to carry property and tow lines is significant to theelectric-utility industry, having many potential applications. For example, smallUAS with this capability can be used to set climbing protection and fall ropes toprotect workers on elevated surfaces. They can also be used for conductor stringing,which is normally conducted across treacherous terrain and bodies of water.Another application is carrying tools to workers on transmission towers or around anatural disaster area. These applications increase safety and efficiency. They alsobenefit the public through increased power reliability and faster recovery fromdisasters and outages.

Southern Company seeks clarification on whether the prohibition on towingand external load operations would apply to the stringing of a conductor, the riggingof climbing protection, or the carriage of any line or cable that is tied to the groundor held by a person. These tethered small-UAS operations pose lower risk thanexternal-load and towing operations involving objects that are not tied to theground, because objects not tied down are more likely to exert destabilizing forceson the small UAS. Moreover, tethering reduces the physical operating range of thesmall UAS if control is lost. Also, the safety and improved efficiency benefits ofthese tethered operations over traditional methods far outweigh their risk.

If tethered operations are permitted, Southern Company requests that theFAA also clarify whether the weight of the tether counts toward the small UASgross-weight limitation. As mentioned above, Southern Company believes that thetether provides sufficient risk mitigation, such that it should not be considered partof the aircraft for the purpose of determining gross weight.

6

Southern Company also seeks clarification on whether the prohibition onexternal loads includes the attachment of sensors to the airframe of a small UAS.Southern Company believes that the sensor should be deemed part of the airframeand not subject to the provisions of the external-load prohibition, even though itcould alter the flight characteristics of the aircraft. Given the low weight of theaircraft and the proposed operational restrictions, allowing the operator to affix asensor in a manner that does not substantially degrade the aircraft’s flightcharacteristics should be permitted.

Southern Company urges the FAA to reconsider its decision to categoricallyprohibit external-load and towing operations. As mentioned above, electric utilitiescan use small UAS to carry tools to workers on elevated platforms, acrosstreacherous terrain, and in disaster areas, producing efficiency benefits and, moreimportantly, safety benefits for workers. Southern Company recognizes thatexternal loads and towed objects may exert destabilizing forces on a small UAS andalter their flight handling characteristics. But the low weight of the aircraft, whichstill must not exceed 55 pounds gross weight, significantly mitigates crash risk.Additionally, weight and balance could be performed to address any balance issues.Also, the attachment of a tool to a small UAS should be treated no differently thanthe attachment of a camera or other sensor to the airframe. Thus, the FAA shouldpermit the attachment of fixed objects to the airframe in a manner that does notsubstantially degrade flight characteristics and stability.

E. Operator Rules

1. Operator Terminology

The FAA should avoid defining a new UAS-crewmember position as“operator” to avoid confusion with the term “commercial operator.” Although theproposed rule specifies that Part 107 definitions supersede conflicting definitions inPart 1 for purposes of Part 107, the “commercial operator” definition under Part 1would still apply to small-UAS operations under Part 119. Indeed, the proposedrules do not include a modification limiting the applicability of Part 119, like theydo for Part 91. To avoid this conflict and maintain uniformity with manned-aviationrules, Southern Company proposes that the FAA use a term like “UAS pilot”instead of “operator.”

2. Emergency Powers

UAS operators should be permitted to deviate from FAA regulations inemergencies to mitigate injury, damage, or risk. The FAA’s rationale for notproviding emergency deviation power similar to 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b) is that small-UAS operators should always be able to land small UAS in compliance withregulations, because small UAS are highly maneuverable and easy to land. Thisoverlooks that an emergency may result in reduced maneuverability or unstable

7

flight characteristics. Also, implicit in the FAA’s rationale is the incorrectassumption that no situations will arise for which deviation from FAA regulationsis necessary. Although these situations are not likely to occur, they are possible. Forexample, a situation could arise where, to avoid a manned aircraft or avoid possibledamage to persons or property, the safest course of action is to maneuver a smallUAS over people not involved in the operation.

Moreover, by not extending emergency deviation authority to UAS operators,the FAA could be forcing a UAS operator to choose between deviating from FAAregulations and ensuring safety. Concern over possible rule violations may cause anoperator to forego the safest, least-risk resolution of an emergency or hesitate intaking timely action.

F. Visual-Observer Position

Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to not require a visualobserver to be stationed next to the operator. As the FAA notes, effective oralcommunication through a communication-assisting device such as a radio ispossible. Indeed, manned-aircraft pilots, who generally are subject to higherworkloads than small-UAS operators, communicate effectively with ATC and otheraircraft by radio. Thus, by leveraging radio communication, a visual observer wouldnot need to be stationed next to the operator.

G. See-and-Avoid

Southern Company supports the use of the see-and-avoid concept for collisionavoidance. For manned aircraft, this concept is fundamental to avoiding midaircollisions, and it has been effective.

Southern Company also understands the position that technology has notsufficiently matured to enable it to substitute for human vision in the see-and-avoidconcept. But a full technological substitute for human vision is unnecessary forsmall-UAS operations in locations where there are no aircraft to see and avoid. Asexplained in Part II.C, above, operations within the hazard profile of existinghazards to aircraft, like transmission lines, generation stacks, and cooling towers,are very unlikely to encounter other aircraft. Thus, the FAA should allow theseoperations without a line-of-sight requirement. Although Southern Company doesnot believe a first-person-view camera or any other vision-enabling device isnecessary for all BLOS operations in close proximity to existing aircraft hazards, acombination of altitude and/or hazard-proximity limitations and a first-person-viewdevice could provide significant collision risk mitigation for certain BLOSoperations, especially those within close proximity to people.

8

H. Right-of-Way Rule

Southern Company supports the proposed right-of-way rule, but suggeststhat it address right of way between small UAS. The FAA could accomplish this byapplying the existing right-of-way rules for manned aircraft and treating conflictsbetween small UAS as conflicts between aircraft of the same category.

I. Visibility Requirements

1. Daylight Limitation

Southern Company proposes that the FAA permit nighttime operation ofsmall UAS equipped with sufficient lighting to be identified by the operator andvisual observers.

First, the concern with other aircraft being able to see small UAS at night ismisplaced. Even during the day, when most midair collisions occur,7 a pilot in amanned aircraft is not likely to see a small UAS, which is very small and operatedclose to the ground.

Second, the lighting and airworthiness standards that apply to mannedaircraft for night flight are unnecessary for small UAS. These standards promotevisibility of manned aircraft at night for collision-avoidance purposes. But, asexplained above, even during daylight, small UAS are unlikely to be seen bymanned aircraft. Instead, the see-and-avoid concept for small UAS relies upon theoperator or visual observer being able to see the manned aircraft. Thus, lighting ofsmall UAS is necessary to the extent it enables the operator or visual observer toascertain the position of the small UAS relative to other hazards. Also, many smallUAS have, or can be outfitted easily with, appropriate lighting to enable operatorsand visual observers to locate the aircraft during nighttime operations and, in somecases, identify its attitude and orientation.

If the FAA permits BLOS operations pursuant to Southern Company’ssuggestions, it should not also apply a daytime limit to them for many of the samereasons. The need for manned aircraft to see these operations is minimal, becausethey would pose a trivial collision risk to those aircraft. Also, these operations willtake place over areas that are usually clear of non-participating persons anduninvolved property. Additionally, the small UAS used in the proposed BLOSoperations do not require lighting, because they pose a very low collision risk tomanned aircraft.

The ability to conduct nighttime small-UAS operations is especiallyimportant to Southern Company. Small-UAS operations at night can assist lineworkers in identifying damaged assets faster while reducing worker exposure to

7 Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA-H-8083-9A, Aviation Instructor’s Handbook 8-11 (2008).

9

environmental and electrical hazards. This can result in faster power restoration toaffected communities and reduced public exposure to electrical hazards.

2. Visibility and Cloud Clearance Requirements

Southern Company recognizes that, for non-BLOS operations, certainvisibility is necessary to see and avoid other aircraft. But the proposed visibility andcloud-clearance requirements are excessive, based on manned-aircraft standards,and effectively prohibit many otherwise safe operations that have substantial publicbenefit. Indeed, they would prevent Southern Company from using small UAS toinspect utility infrastructure while a storm is dissipating, but visibility and cloudceilings remain low, but not low enough to prevent manned VFR operations. Rapidinfrastructure inspection, as soon as a storm begins to dissipate, is critical torestoring power to communities.

Southern Company suggests that the visibility and cloud-clearancelimitations on small-UAS operations mirror the VFR weather minimums formanned-helicopter flight. Additionally, the Special VFR minimums under 14 C.F.R.§ 91.157 should also apply to small-UAS operations to the extent available forhelicopters. All small-UAS operations would satisfy the requirements for SpecialVFR flight, because only ATC authorization is necessary before Special VFR flightand all small UAS must receive an ATC clearance when operating in controlledairspace. Use of helicopter minimums are appropriate because, like helicopters, asmall UAS is highly maneuverable and easier to land than fixed-wing aircraft.8

The more restrictive cloud-clearance and visibility levels that the FAAproposes are unnecessary. The FAA’s rationale for the added restrictions is twofold:small-UAS operators need additional time over manned aircraft to avoid a collisionwith manned aircraft; and small-UAS operators do not have less see-and-avoidcapability than manned-aircraft pilots. Both claims are incorrect.

Small-UAS operators do not need more time than manned-aircraft operatorsto see and avoid traffic. The manned-aircraft visibility and cloud-clearancerequirements were promulgated to enable manned aircraft to see and avoid eachother. Certainly, if the manned-aircraft visibility and cloud-clearance requirementsprovide manned aircraft, many of which operate at the same, if not greater,airspeeds than small UAS, enough time to avoid each other, they also provide asmall UAS, which is speed limited at 100 knots, enough time to avoid mannedaircraft. Also, as explained below, small-UAS operators are in a better position thanmanned-aircraft pilots to see traffic. Moreover, the FAA recognizes that small UASare “highly maneuverable.” Their maneuverability probably exceeds that of mostmanned aircraft.

8 See NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9958 (stating that small UAS are highly maneuverable and much easier to landthan a manned aircraft).

10

Small-UAS operators have the same, if not better, see-and-avoid capabilitythan manned-aircraft pilots. Unlike pilots, whose vision is substantially obstructedby their aircraft’s airframe, operators and visual observers on the ground are likelyto have a 360-degree view of the sky. Also, operators and visual observers are notsubject to many of the same visual challenges as pilots in an aircraft. For example,they do not have to contend with ground clutter. They are less likely to suffer fromaccommodation, which is the delay in refocusing from close objects (e.g., aninstrument panel) to far objects, because many UAS do not require as much “headsdown” monitoring and activity as manned aircraft. Moreover, in small-UASoperations, all traffic is above the operator and visual observer, whereas it can beabove, below, or at the same altitude in manned flight. And aircraft are easier tospot from below than from the same altitude, because their visual profile is largestfrom above and below and they are not against ground clutter. Additionally, fromthe air, an aircraft on a collision course will appear stationary, making it hard todetect until at very close range.9 This is not a concern for UAS operations, becauseaircraft on a collision course with the UAS will not appear stationary to theoperator or visual observer, since they are not collocated with the aircraft.

Southern Company supports the FAA’s position that the line-of-sightrequirement does not require a small-UAS operator to maintain constant visualcontact with the small UAS. Prohibiting momentary losses of visual contact wouldbe both burdensome and unsafe. As the FAA observes, momentary losses of visualcontact are necessary to perform critical safety functions, such as making controlinputs, scanning instrumentation (e.g., altimeter and airspeed indicators), andscanning for other aircraft and people and property on the ground. Additionally, itallows small UAS to fly behind objects without requiring the operator to reposition,which could draw the operator’s attention from the small UAS and surroundingairspace. Also, while a small UAS flies momentarily behind an object, the operatorwill still be able to scan the surrounding airspace for other aircraft.

Southern Company requests that the FAA clarify proposed § 107.31 to clearlyindicate that momentary loss of visual contact is acceptable. This clarification willprovide certainty for small-UAS operators regarding their compliance obligationsunder § 107.31. Also, it would be consistent with the see-and-avoid provision formanned aircraft, which merely requires “vigilance.”10

3. Line of Sight

Southern Company supports the FAA’s rationale for not proposing anumerical limit on line-of-sight operations. The FAA’s proposed line-of-sight rules

9 An aircraft on a collision course will appear motionless and be difficult to detect because the eyes need motionor contrast to draw their attention. Fed. Aviation Admin., P-8740-51, How to Avoid a Mid Air Collision,http://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/libview_normal.aspx?id=6851 (last visited April 22, 2015). Once the aircraftis at very close range, its size rapidly increases in the field of vision, drawing attention. Id.

10 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b).

11

require an operator to know the small UAS’s position; be able to determine thesmall UAS’s attitude, altitude, and direction; observe the airspace for traffic; andascertain danger to person and property. A numerical limit on line-of-sightoperations does not relate to whether an operator can satisfy these requirements.The operator should be able to accomplish these tasks if the operator can see thesmall UAS, regardless how far the operator is from the small UAS.

J. Containment and Loss of Positive Control

1. Flight-Termination Systems

Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to permit small-UASoperations without flight-termination systems. As the FAA notes, alternativeoperational measures, such as confinement to defined areas, adequately mitigateloss of control risk. Additionally, given that the small size and weight of small UASsubstantially mitigate risk to other aircraft and persons and property on theground, the FAA should entrust operators to use their discretion in selecting aconfinement method.

2. Operation from Moving Land Vehicles

The FAA should permit operation from moving land vehicles, especially onand along a utility’s easements, rights of way, and property. Like operations fromwater-borne vehicles, operations from land vehicles would substantially increasethe societal benefits of the proposed rule without sacrificing safety. Given the FAA’sproposed line-of-sight restriction, operations from moving land vehicles make smallUAS viable for long-distance power-line inspections11 and other utility maintenanceand operations activities. As explained in Part II.C, these small-UAS applicationscan result in significant public benefit. Operation from moving land vehicles alsomakes small UAS viable for power-plant security surveillance, which protects thenation’s power supply and mitigates risk to electric-generation facilities.

With reasonable limitations, operations from land vehicles pose similar orless safety risk than operations from water-borne vehicles. Many transmission linesare in rural areas and have rights of way that a vehicle may traverse. These rightsof way are generally clear of non-utility personnel and are not areas where peoplewould generally congregate. Also, many utility facilities, such as generation plants,are not readily accessible to the public. Allowing operations from land vehicles alongtransmission-line rights of way and within restricted-access facilities would pose asimilar level of risk to non-participants and their property as operations fromwater-borne vehicles.

11 Power line rights-of-way often include a path or roadway along which a land vehicle can travel.

12

3. 500-foot Ceiling

Southern Company proposes that the FAA extend the proposed 500-footceiling by enabling operations of small UAS by or for an electric utility to operatewithin 500 feet of any utility infrastructure. The FAA established the 500-footceiling because “most manned-aircraft operations transit the airspace above the 500foot level.”12 Permitting small-UAS operations above 500 feet AGL, but within closeproximity to utility infrastructure, such as a generation stack, cooling tower, ortransmission structure, is consistent with this rationale. Specifically, most mannedaircraft do not operate within 500 feet of utility infrastructure, because it poses ahazard to aircraft. Indeed, the FAA’s minimum safe altitude regulations directairplane pilots to stay at least 500 feet from any structure. Thus, a small UASoperating within a 500-foot radius of utility infrastructure poses no additional riskover a small UAS operating below 500 feet AGL. Moreover, Southern Company’sproposed expansion of the 500-foot ceiling would increase the benefits of theproposed rule by enabling additional small UAS inspections and further reduce theexposure of inspection crews to inspection hazards.

4. Operations over Persons

Southern Company understands the FAA’s concern for operations overpersons. But the proposed restriction on operations over persons is too vague andtoo broad, requiring clarification. Additionally, the FAA should create a rulecategory that would enable low-altitude small-UAS operations in close proximity topeople. This category would expand the benefit of this rule to small-UASapplications for natural-disaster recovery.

First, the FAA should clarify the lateral distance that an overhead small UAScan be from a person before the FAA will consider it to be over a person for thepurpose of proposed § 107.39. Under a strict reading of proposed § 107.39, operationover a person would mean operation directly overhead, within the lateral profile of aperson. Under an equally plausible reading, operation over a person would includeoperation above and within a short lateral distance of the person. Clarificationwould enable operators to be certain of their compliance with § 107.39.

Second, the FAA should expand the scope of persons over whom a small UASmay be flown to: any person who is located on the property, easement, or right ofway of the person or entity for whom the small UAS is operated; and any personwho is participating in the activity for which the small UAS is being operated.Persons in these areas can be easily made aware of hazards in those areas,including through the posting of signs. Also, persons involved in the same activityas the small UAS are likely to be aware of the small UAS.

12 NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9563.

13

Moreover, the FAA’s rationale that a pre-flight briefing is necessary tomitigate the risk of overflying a person is incorrect. Under the proposed rules, theFAA will allow small-UAS flight over persons directly engaged in the small-UASoperation, because the FAA’s proposed rules require these persons to receive a pre-flight briefing, making them aware of the small UAS’s location and enabling themto avoid the small UAS’s flight path if the operator loses control.13 Certainly,knowing the proposed flight path of a small UAS will not help a person avoid anout-of-control small UAS that deviates from the path. A safer approach would be torely on general awareness of the small-UAS operations, which promotes constantvigilance regardless of proximity to an intended small-UAS flight path.

Third, Southern Company proposes that the FAA create a rule category thatenables operations over uninvolved persons and property. Operations under thisrule category would be subject to additional restrictions that mitigate the risk topersons and property on the ground. Examples of potential restrictions include alower operating ceiling, lateral-distance limits, a lower speed restriction, and aprohibition on operations over large gatherings of people. This rule category wouldsubstantially increase the public benefit of this rule, because it would enable smallUAS to be used in response to natural disasters for critical-infrastructureinspection, identifying downed power lines, and reaching people in distress. In areasaffected by natural disasters, awareness of non-participating people may be limited.Also, avoiding overflight of them may be difficult and, in some cases, contrary to thepurpose of the small-UAS activity.

K. Airspace Limitations

1. Equipment for Operation within Controlled Airspace

Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to not establish equipmentrequirements, such as radios or transponders, for small UAS operating in controlledairspace. As the FAA recognizes, receiving local ATC approval and working closelywith the FAA can result in a safer and more efficient operating environment atminimal cost to the operator. ATC can impose reasonable operating restrictions toeliminate traffic conflicts and approve or deny aircraft operations based on trafficdensity, controller workload, communication issues, or any other safety-relatedreason. To ensure that small-UAS operations are not unnecessarily denied access tocontrolled airspace, Southern Company urges the FAA to adopt an ATC policy ofaccommodation upon reasonable request.

13 Id.

14

2. Restriction for Operations in Vicinity of PowerGeneration and Transmission Facilities

Southern Company proposes that the FAA prohibit small-UAS operationsover power generation and transmission facilities, except by the utility or thirdparties acting on behalf the utility. FDC NOTAM 4/0811—the current NOTAMadvising pilots to avoid overflight of power-generation facilities, including nuclearpower plants—does not adequately address the potential risk small UAS pose.Because of the small size, low-cost, great availability, and unmanned nature ofsmall UAS, little deters small-UAS operators, as opposed to their manned-aircraftcounterparts, from operating over power generation and transmission facilities.Moreover, although small UAS are capable of safe operation in close proximity tomost structures, operation next to power generation and transmission facilities maybe subject to invisible hazards, such as arc-flash hazards, that may be unfamiliar tonon-utility operators.

For the foregoing reasons, Southern Company believes that small UASoverflight of power generation and transmission facilities by non-utility operatorsposes a substantially greater public risk and national-security threat than theoperation of manned aircraft. Thus, pursuant to Congress’s directives that the FAAprescribe regulations necessary for national security and public safety,14 the FAAshould prohibit such overflights by persons other than the electric utility and thirdparties acting on behalf of the utility.

3. Operation in Proximity to Certain Areas Designated byNotice to Airmen

Southern Company appreciates the need to restrict small-UAS operations byNOTAM during events related to natural disasters, public safety, and nationalsecurity. However, Southern Company requests that electric-utility small-UASoperations be excluded from these restrictions.

Utility operators, like Southern Company, play important roles in disasterrecovery and hazard relief. After major storms and natural disasters, theexpeditious repair and restoration of damaged electric-utility infrastructure iscritical. The faster power is restored to affected communities, the faster they canrecover from the event. Moreover, damaged electric-utility infrastructure canpresent hazards to the public. Indeed, in disaster situations, electric utilities andlocal government often closely coordinate so affected communities do not languishwithout power.

Given the critical role that electric-utility operators play in areas affected bynatural disasters, exempting them from temporary flight restrictions (“TFRs”)

14 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, § 333, 126 Stat. 11, 75-76 (2012).

15

issued under 49 C.F.R. § 91.137(a)(2) (to provide a safe environment for theoperation of disaster relief aircraft) and (a)(3) (to prevent an unsafe congestion ofsightseeing and other aircraft above an incident or event which may generate a highdegree of public interest) is prudent. Indeed, an exemption to TFRs issued underthese provisions already exists for aircraft carrying members of the press. Certainly,if aircraft carrying members of the press to disaster areas possess an exemptionfrom these TFRs, small-UAS operations to inspect downed power lines anddamaged electric-utility infrastructure in these areas should be permitted. Thesesmall-UAS operations can enable electric utilities to better identify and assesshazards, avoid exposing workers to hazards, and expeditiously restore power.Moreover, they present little danger to other aircraft when operated close toexisting utility infrastructure, like transmission lines, or when operated within theoperator’s line of sight. They also present little additional risk to persons andproperty on the ground, especially given existing hazards on the ground and thatmuch of the property on the ground may be damaged or destroyed.

At the very least, the FAA should create a process for the expeditiousapplication and granting of requests to operate in disaster areas that TFRs maycover. As previously mentioned, the immediate commencement of power restorationactivities once conditions permit is imperative. Thus, providing an expeditiousmethod for applying and granting a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver for autility company to operate small UAS in disaster and hazard areas subject to a TFRwould be in the public interest.

III. Airworthiness, Inspection, Maintenance, and AirworthinessDirectives

Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to not require compliancewith 14 C.F.R. Part 43 or impose supplemental airworthiness requirements. As theFAA notes, the burdens that such requirements impose are excessive given the lowrisk that small UAS pose. The airworthiness requirements under Part 43 weredesigned for manned-aircraft, which are not confined to specific areas of operation,carry people, and can cause widespread injuries and damage to persons andproperty on the ground. In contrast, small UAS pose no risk to passengers, posesmall risk to persons and property on the ground due to their small size and weight,and are subject to confined operation areas.

IV. Operator Certification

A. Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certificate

Southern Company supports the creation of an unmanned-aircraft operatorcertificate. Existing airman certificates do not address the unique operationalcharacteristics of unmanned aircraft. Issuance of these certificates requiresdemonstration of flight proficiency and aeronautical knowledge related to manned

16

flight. Indeed, pilots are trained and tested on their ability to operate an aircraftfrom within the aircraft, not from the ground. The ability to fly an aircraft usingvisual references outside the aircraft is a fundamental airmanship skill that doesnot transfer to unmanned flight where the operator is making control inputs basedon observations of the unmanned aircraft.

Southern Company further supports the FAA’s proposal to issue unmanned-aircraft operator certificates in the small-UAS category without flight-proficiencytesting. Given the wide variations in small-UAS flight-control characteristics, flight-proficiency testing would not be a valid indicator of a person’s ability to fly anygiven small UAS. Also, airmanship is not a critical skill for small UAS operation.Flight-control automation is pervasive in small UAS, making them generally easyto control. And small UAS pose low crash hazards because their flight can beterminated easily, they are highly maneuverable, and they are light weight.

Additionally, Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to not require acommercial pilot certificate with a small-UAS endorsement. Commercial-pilotcertification standards have two aspects: flight proficiency; and aeronauticalknowledge. Commercial-pilot flight-proficiency standards have little relevance tosmall-UAS operations, as explained above, and would not be reliable, based onpotential variation in small-UAS flight characteristics. Also, aeronautical-knowledge requirements for commercial pilots are too broad. Required knowledge inaerodynamics, use of performance charts, pilotage and dead reckoning, air-navigation facilities other than GPS, aircraft systems, and high-altitude operationshave little relevance to small-UAS operations, which occur close to the ground inconfined areas, occur without reliance on legacy navigation skills and facilities, andemploy straightforward aircraft systems. The FAA’s proposal to requireaeronautical knowledge specifically related to small-UAS operations is a betterapproach.

B. Knowledge-Test Requirements

Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to require operators todemonstrate the aeronautical knowledge necessary to safely operate a small UAS.Like the FAA, Southern Company does not believe that completion of an FAA-approved training course is necessary. For many applicants, self-study is asufficient method for acquiring the required aeronautical knowledge. And theknowledge test will ensure that self-study produces an acceptable level ofunderstanding. Also, the low risk that small-UAS operations pose to the public doesnot justify requiring ground instruction, which can be costly and burdensome toundertake.

To reduce the time it will take to obtain operator certification once the finalrule is released, Southern Company recommends that the FAA begin to develop theknowledge test immediately and allow potential operators to take the test and

17

submit applications for certification after the final rule is published, but before itbecomes effective. This can help avoid unnecessary delay in the commencement ofcommercial operations under the new regulations.

C. Recurrent Testing for COA Pilots

Pilots who have experience operating a small UAS under a Certificate ofAuthorization or Waiver (“COA”) should be allowed to obtain an operator certificateupon successful passage of the recurrent knowledge test, instead of the initialknowledge test. Through their COA experience, these pilots will likely possessadequate knowledge of the subjects on the initial knowledge test, but not on therecurrent test, including loading, performance, and radio-communicationprocedures. In the case of physiological effects of drugs and alcohol, COA pilotsshould generally be aware of the fact that drugs and alcohol may degrade operatorperformance.

D. Expiration of Operator Certificates

Southern Company supports issuance of operator certificates withoutexpiration. Recurrent testing provides an adequate durational limitation. Also theinitial test topics that are not on the recurrent test—loading, performance, radiocommunications, and drug and alcohol effects—are not essential for testing.Because loading and performance is aircraft specific, general testing on these topicsis of limited utility. Radio communications will likely be rarely required for small-UAS operations, and the Airman’s Information Manual and Pilot ControllerGlossary, available through the FAA’s website, provide detailed guidance on radiocommunications. Also, general public knowledge includes the understanding thatdrugs affecting a person’s faculties and alcohol will inhibit safe aircraft operationsand operation of aircraft under their influence is prohibited.

E. Applications for Certification before Rule Effective Date

Southern Company recommends that the FAA, in conjunction with theTransportation Security Administration (“TSA”), develop a process to enableapplications for a security-threat assessment prior to the submission of anapplication for an operator certificate. Upon the effective date of the rule, SouthernCompany expects that applications for operator certificates will inundate the FAAand TSA, causing extremely long processing times. To mitigate processing delays,the FAA and TSA should allow potential applicants to request threat assessmentsin anticipation of certification.

If the FAA decides to issue operator certificates in the micro UAS categorybased upon self-certification of aeronautical knowledge, the FAA should permitsubmission of the applications after publication of the final rule, but before itseffective date. This will enable micro-UAS operations to begin upon the effectivedate of the rule and reduce potential processing delays.

18

F. Airman Medical Certification

Southern Company supports the FAA’s decision to not require small-UASoperators to possess medical certificates. As the FAA discussed throughout thepreamble to the proposed rule, the risk associated with small UAS is much lowerthan operations with manned aircraft. Furthermore, should an operator becomeincapacitated, the consequences are much less severe than those that may arisefrom incapacitation of a manned-aircraft pilot. Thus, medical certification of small-UAS operators is likely to have a minimal safety impact that does not justify thecost and burdens of certification.

V. Aircraft Registration

Southern Company urges the FAA to implement procedures that ensureexpedient processing of small-UAS registrations. Upon implementation of the rule,there will probably be a tidal wave of small-UAS registration. Also, due to the lowcost of small UAS in relation to manned aircraft, the small-UAS population likelywill exceed the manned-aircraft population, causing the FAA’s registrationworkload to increase dramatically. To avoid extensive processing delays from theregistration of small-UAS, the FAA should develop processes for handling a largenumber of small-UAS registrations. These processes should recognize the lowervalue of small UAS compared to manned aircraft.

VI. Accident Reporting

Southern Company agrees that the statistics the FAA obtains from small-UAS accident and incident reports may indicate whether the FAA’s oversight ofsmall UAS is appropriate. But the FAA’s proposal to require the reporting of anyinjury to any person and any damage to any property arising in connection withsmall-UAS operations is overbroad. First, it would seem to require the reporting ofbenign injuries, like minor scratches, and minor property damage, like small dentsand dings, that do not indicate oversight issues. Second, small-UAS operators wouldhave to incur the time and expense of filing a report for such benign incidents.Although the FAA estimates that the probability of an accident involving damage orinjury is very low, this estimate does not appear to account for all varieties of veryminor injuries.

Southern Company suggests that the FAA model the accident- and incident-reporting rules for small UAS on 49 C.F.R. Part 830. Part 830 appropriatelybalances the need for robust reporting with reporting burdens. For example, it doesnot require reporting of accidents or incidents involving minor injuries. In addition,it targets specific types of incidents characteristic of systemic- or elevated-risksafety issues, such as flight-control-system malfunctions.