COMMUNITY VALUE ABOVE INDIVIDUALISM: A COMMON …Suicide terrorism is growing in popularity as an...

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

COMMUNITY VALUE ABOVE INDIVIDUALISM: A COMMON

CULTURAL ELEMENT IN MODERN SUICIDE BOMBERS

by

Robert D. Davis, Maj, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Col Brett E. Morris, Ph.D., USAF

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2009

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Community Value Above Individualism: A Common Cultural Element inModern Suicide Bombers

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14. ABSTRACT Suicide terrorism is growing in popularity as an extremely violent tactic that many terrorist organizationsare using to advance their aims. The modern use of this tactic began in December 1981, has increased infrequency to over 600 attacks per year, and has spread to over 30 countries. Fifteen identifiable campaignsaccount for 98 percent of all suicide attacks. The relatively sudden increase in this lethal form of terrorismhas lead governments, leaders, scholars, and others to search for answers concerning the causes of thisphenomenon. While most research on suicide terrorism has focused on the organizational and individuallevel, the importance of culture and social systems has been underestimated. Culture influences people byhelping to program the mind of children prior to the age of 10. This programming includes shared valuesand norms of behavior. In a collectivist culture, one that promotes the interests of the group over theinterests of the individual, the values of loyalty, honor, avoidance of shame, and preferring the opinions ofthe group can have significant influence on individuals behavior. The presence of a collectivist culture is arequired element of suicide terrorism campaigns. Terrorist organizations that originated in countries witha collectivist culture are responsible for nearly 98 percent (2,149 of 2,202) of all suicide attacks from 1981through 2006. Although the degree to which a collectivist culture may cause suicide terrorism is unknown,there is enough evidence to conclude that collectivist cultures are a key input to the development ofcommunities that support suicide terrorism.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not

reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

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Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................................ II

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................ IV

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... V

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. VI

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ................................................................................................4 Definitions Related to Suicide Terrorism ..................................................................................5 History of Suicide Attacks .........................................................................................................7 Modern Suicide Terrorism .........................................................................................................8 Conventional Wisdom .............................................................................................................10

CULTURE MATTERS .................................................................................................................12 Dimensions of Culture .............................................................................................................14 Collectivism versus Individualism ..........................................................................................15

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN COLLECTIVISM AND SUICIDE TERRORISM ................20 Country and Regional Origins of Terrorist Organizations ......................................................21 The Importance of Values .......................................................................................................24 Altruistic Suicide .....................................................................................................................27 Martyrdom ...............................................................................................................................28

The Role of Religion and Nationalism ..............................................................................29 The Role of the Community ..............................................................................................32

Essential Element vs. Causal Factor ........................................................................................33

CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................36

SUICIDE BOMBINGS (1981-2006) .............................................................................................39

GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................91

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................................................98

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List of Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. Hofstede’s “Onion”: Manifestations of Culture .............................................................13

Figure 2. Nationality of Al-Qaeda Suicide Attackers, 1995-2003 .................................................23

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List of Tables

Page

Table 1. Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1981-2006 ..........................................................................9

Table 2. Individualism Index (IDV) Values for 74 Countries and Regions ..................................18

Table 3. National Origin and Individuality Scores for Suicide Terrorist Organizations ...............21

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Abstract

Suicide terrorism is growing in popularity as an extremely violent tactic that many terrorist

organizations are using to advance their aims. The modern use of this tactic began in December

1981, has increased in frequency to over 600 attacks per year, and has spread to over 30

countries. Fifteen identifiable campaigns account for 98 percent of all suicide attacks. The

relatively sudden increase in this lethal form of terrorism has lead governments, leaders,

scholars, and others to search for answers concerning the causes of this phenomenon.

While most research on suicide terrorism has focused on the organizational and individual

level, the importance of culture and social systems has been underestimated. Culture influences

people by helping to “program the mind” of children prior to the age of 10. This programming

includes shared values and norms of behavior. In a collectivist culture, one that promotes the

interests of the group over the interests of the individual, the values of loyalty, honor, avoidance

of shame, and preferring the opinions of the group can have significant influence on individuals’

behavior.

The presence of a collectivist culture is a required element of suicide terrorism campaigns.

Terrorist organizations that originated in countries with a collectivist culture are responsible for

nearly 98 percent (2,149 of 2,202) of all suicide attacks from 1981 through 2006. Although the

degree to which a collectivist culture may cause suicide terrorism is unknown, there is enough

evidence to conclude that collectivist cultures are a key input to the development of communities

that support suicide terrorism.

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Part 1

Introduction

The phenomenon of modern suicide terrorism began on 15 December 1981 when a Shiite

Islamic group committed a suicide terrorist attack on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut. Since then, the

world has witnessed an exponential increase in the number of suicide attacks each year. The

number of suicide attacks has risen from 315 total attacks in the 22-year period from 1981

through 2003, to an annual rate of 600 attacks during 2006. Suicide terrorism has also spread

geographically from Lebanon to countries in the Middle East, and then to other countries

including India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Somalia, Egypt, Morocco,

Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Indonesia, Columbia, Argentina, Panama, China, Russia, Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, Estonia, Croatia, Serbia, Turkey, Germany, Spain, England, the Philippines, and the

United States (US). Due to the alarming increase in this deadly form of terrorism, government

officials, military leaders, social scientists, and other researchers have attempted to gain a better

understanding of this phenomenon.

Many scholars have studied suicide terrorism in an attempt to explain its causes. Many of

these studies focus on the organization and their decision to use suicide tactics, while others

attempt to explain why individuals choose to become suicide terrorists. Some studies have

attempted to profile suicide terrorists by studying their demographics and personal history.

Although most demographic studies have failed to categorize suicide terrorists based on income,

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education, social status, religion, or ethnicity, this paper will show that the vast majority of

suicide bombers come from countries that have a particular type of culture. These cultures are

ones in which the interests of the community are generally exalted above the interests of the

individual. These group-centered cultures teach values that generally influence people to be

extremely loyal to their family, community, religion, and other friends. Individuals from these

cultures tend to focus less on individualism, and more on self-sacrifice for the benefit of the

group, family, or community. This paper contends that a group-centered, or collectivist culture is

a common and necessary element in suicide terrorism campaigns.

A collectivist culture is a required element of societies that tolerate, and in many cases

promote, suicide terrorism. Whether or not an individual comes from a culture that emphasizes

the interests of the community over the interests of individual members is a significant element

in determining if a person is more or less likely to become a suicide terrorist. Terrorist

organizations that originated in countries with a collectivist culture are responsible for nearly 98

percent (2,149 of 2,202) of all suicide attacks from December 1981 through December 2006.

Although the degree to which a collectivist culture may cause suicide terrorism is unknown,

there is enough evidence to conclude that collectivist cultures are a key input to the development

of communities that support suicide terrorism.

The study of suicide terrorism is important to US government and military leaders, and

anyone else who is attempting to protect their interests from this popular form of terrorism. A

critical part of planning for any conflict involves careful analysis of the adversary. In the fight

against suicide terrorism, leaders and planners will benefit from a thorough understanding of the

terrorists’ goals, motivations, and culture. This paper focuses on the social level and its

connection to the individual level. The goal of this paper is not to discuss what causes a

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collectivist culture to exist, but to show how this type of culture contributes to the social

environment that is necessary for suicide terrorism campaigns to take place. This paper will first

provide background information on the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and a summary of

suicide attacks from 1981 through 2006, followed by an explanation of the relevant elements of a

culture that impact suicide terrorism. This paper will then establish the connection between

collectivist cultures and suicide terrorism, and explain why a collectivist culture is required for

sustained suicide terrorism campaigns.

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Part 2

Background Information

Debates about the causes of suicide terrorism have taken place since the tactic became

popular in the early 1980s. Much of the early research focused on character traits of the suicide

bombers while others simply dismissed the tactic as an irrational behavior that is difficult to

predict. In more recent years other approaches to the study of suicide terrorism have appeared

which include investigating the organizational decision-making processes that leads to the use of

suicide attacks, particularly in Robert Pape’s book: Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide

Terrorism.

Both the organizational approach and individual character trait analysis lack sufficient

emphasis on the possible influence of the society in which terrorist organizations and suicide

bombers come from. Suicide attacks have an obvious negative aspect in that it guarantees at least

one person in the organization will die. From an individual point of view, what would cause

someone to give their life in exchange for advancing their organization’s objectives? Why are

individuals who are not normally considered suicidal attracted to martyrdom? These decisions go

beyond character traits and organizational logic, and point to the unmistakable influence of

culture on individuals and organizations.

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Definitions Related to Suicide Terrorism

Before any discussion of suicide terrorism can take place, there needs to be an understanding

of key terms. Although there are many definitions of terrorism, even within the executive branch

of the US Government, this paper will rely on published Department of Defense (DOD)

definitions whenever possible. The DOD definition of terrorism is “the calculated use of

unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies

in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”1 Similarly, DOD

defines a terrorist as “an individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence

in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.”2 DOD also identifies a terrorist group

as “any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are

organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in

pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives.”3

It is important to distinguish suicide terrorism from other forms of terrorism. Modern

suicide terrorism has certain characteristics that set it apart from ordinary, nonsuicide terrorism.

Terrorist organizations that resort to suicide attacks are generally weaker than their opponents,

have a significant amount of support from their local communities, and use a system of rituals

and ceremonies that foster a deep sense of loyalty and commitment to the organization, its

leaders, and the community. On the other hand, smaller organizations typically use nonsuicide

terrorism for a wider variety of objectives and under a more diverse set of circumstances.4

Two additional reasons that justify the distinction of suicide terrorism are its increased

frequency and lethality. Pape notes that while general terrorist attacks have decreased by almost

50 percent from 666 in 1987 down to 348 in 2001, the number of suicide attacks has increased at

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an alarming rate.5 Suicide terrorist attacks have risen from an annual average of three in the

1980s, to approximately 10 in the 1990s, to over 40 per year in the early 2000s, to almost 50 in

2003, and over 600 suicide attacks in 2006. In Iraq alone, the number of suicide attacks increased

from just a few during the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), to 217 suicide attacks

during 2004, up to 646 bombings in 2005, and 423 attacks in 2006. Afghanistan has also seen a

similar increase in suicide attacks with only one to five incidents each year from 2001 to 2004,

and then 27 attacks in 2005, and 133 in 2006.

Suicide terrorism has evolved as an extremely lethal form of terrorism. The goal of modern

suicide attackers is not only to die, but also to kill the maximum amount of people in the process.

Pape notes that from the period of 1980 to 2003, suicide attacks accounted for three percent of all

terrorist attacks but were responsible for 48 percent of the deaths resulting from those attacks.6 A

detailed listing of these attacks, as well as all suicide attacks from Dec 1981 through Dec 2006 is

included in appendix A.

Given its important distinctions from ordinary terrorist attacks, it seems odd that the DOD

has not clearly defined suicide terrorism. Several experts in the field of suicide terrorism have

published their own definitions in an attempt to draw a clear line between suicide terrorism and

other forms of terrorist attacks. The most basic of these definitions describe suicide terrorism as

an action that requires the death of the terrorist in order to ensure success.7 Mia Bloom expands

on this definition by adding that the purpose of the terrorist’s action is to achieve a political

objective, and that the bomber blows him, or herself, up with the victims.8 In order to remain

consistent with the current DOD definition of terrorism and incorporate these concepts, this

paper defines suicide terrorism as “the calculated use or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate

fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political,

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religious or ideological goals, where the method of attack requires the death of the terrorist as a

precondition for success.” This definition is similar to LCDR Philip Kapusta’s definition in his

monograph, Suicide Bombers in CONUS, which he wrote at the School of Advanced Military

Studies in 2007.9 Likewise, this paper defines a suicide terrorist as “an individual who commits

an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological

objectives, where the death of the perpetrator is a precondition for success.”

History of Suicide Attacks

Although the modern use of suicide terrorism started in the early 1980s, the use of suicide to

inflict damage on the enemy has historical roots dating back over 3,000 years. Perhaps the first

recorded suicide mission involves the Biblical character of Samson. The Old Testament book of

Judges describes the circumstances surrounding Samson’s betrayal by Delilah and imprisonment

by the Philistines. Samson used a large gathering of Philistine men, women and leaders as an

opportunity to avenge the gouging of his eyes by causing the building to collapse, resulting in the

death of Samson along with thousands of Philistines.10

Although Samson’s actions were not part

of an organized campaign of suicide attacks, his death was a precondition for success.

Since Biblical times, many religions have used attacks that involve suicide at some time or

another. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Ismaili Assassins created an effective

organization devoted to spreading the Ismaili version of Shia Islam. The Assassins considered

themselves messengers of God and used a systematic tactic of political murder that depended on

suicide missions in order to succeed.11

According to Bernard Lewis, “The Assassin is almost

always caught, and usually indeed makes no attempt to escape; there is even a suggestion that to

survive a mission was shameful.”12

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Prior to the modern use of suicide terrorism, the most well known use of suicide attacks

were the Japanese kamikaze raids. The Japanese conducted over 3,000 aerial suicide attacks in

an organized manner during World War II with varying degrees of success.13

Since a recognized

national government authorized and directed these attacks, they are not suicide terrorism by this

paper’s definition. The kamikaze missions show that suicide missions do not require justification

by religious means alone. Japanese culture morally justifies suicide when facing an impossible

situation. Most Japanese are followers of the Buddhist and Shinto religions, which teach the

Confucian values of dutiful respect and submission to authority. Although their religion may

play a large role in defining their core values, Peter Hill argues that the motivating factor for

kamikaze pilots was their desire to protect their families and country rather than blind devotion

to the Emperor or any religious leader.14

Modern Suicide Terrorism

After disappearing from 1945 to 1980, suicide attacks reemerged in their modern form in

December of 1981 when al-Dawa, a militant Shiite Islamic group at the time, committed a

suicide terrorist attack on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut.15

In October of 1983, the terrorist

organization Hezbollah committed a deadly suicide attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in

Lebanon by detonating a car bomb. The attack killed 241 soldiers and was coordinated with a

separate suicide attack that killed 58 French troops. During the 1980s, Hezbollah committed 36

successful suicide attacks against Israeli, French, and American targets that resulted in the deaths

of 746 people, not including the suicide attackers.

During the 1990s, many more countries experienced this relatively new form of terrorism.

The early 1990s saw the spread of suicide terrorism to Sri Lanka, where the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE) began a campaign of attacks aimed at gaining liberation from Sinhalese

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occupation. The Palestinian terrorist groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) began

using suicide terrorism in 1994 against Israel. Al-Qaeda began suicide attacks against American

targets in the Persian Gulf in 1995, and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) began two suicide

campaigns against Turkey in 1996 and 1999 respectively.

The spread of suicide terrorism continued as the world entered the twenty-first century. Not

only did attacks continue in Israel, Sri Lanka, and the Persian Gulf, but they also spread to

Russia where rebel groups from Chechnya committed suicide attacks. Rebel groups in Kashmir

also began attacking Indian targets. Al-Qaeda increased their operations and committed the most

memorable suicide bombing in history with their attack in the United Stated on 11 September

2001. From 2004 through 2006, Iraq and Afghanistan alone have experienced 1,451 suicide

attacks. This is a significant increase from the 315 attacks worldwide between 1981 and 2003.

The organization of coercive suicide terrorist campaigns is a key feature of modern suicide

terrorism. These campaigns are defined as a series of suicide attacks with the stated purpose of

coercing or gaining concessions from a particular government. Fifteen identifiable campaigns

account for 98 percent of all suicide attacks from 1981 to 2006 (2,157 of 2,202), thirteen of

which are still ongoing. Table 1 summarizes these campaigns and includes the country affected,

the secular or religious ideology of the organization, the number of attacks, and the number of

people killed including the suicide terrorists.

Table 1. Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1981-2006

Terrorists Ideology Target Country # Attacks # Killed Ongoing

Hezbollah Islam US/France 5 389 No

Hezbollah Islam Israel 49 497 No

LTTE Secular Sri Lanka 120 1,431 Yes

Hamas/PIJ/Fatah Islam/Secular Israel 237 739 Yes

Egyptian militants Islam Egypt 11 110 Yes

Chechen militants Secular Russia 59 603 Yes

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Al-Qaeda network Islam US/Allies 62 3,750 Yes

PKK Secular Turkey 27 31 Yes

Kashmiri separatists Islam India 26 115 Yes

Pakistani militants Islam Pakistan 28 469 Yes

Taliban Islam US/Afghan/Allies 170 391 Yes

Iraqi militants Islam/Secular US/Iraq/Allies 1,344 7,825 Yes

Uzbek militants Islam Uzbekistan 8 20 Yes

JMB Islam Bangladesh 7 46 Yes

Islamic Courts Union Islam Somalia 4 8 Yes

Attacks part of an unorganized campaign or unknown 45 315

Total 2,202 16,739

Conventional Wisdom

Many studies have attempted to answer the questions that surround the phenomenon of

suicide terrorism. Pape focused his research at the organizational level and on the strategic logic

of why a terrorist group chooses the tactic of suicide terrorism.16

Many have presumed a close

connection between suicide terrorism and radical Islamic fundamentalism, while others point to

suspected suicidal inclinations of the individual suicide attackers.17

However, the demographic

profile of individuals who commit suicide terrorism does not match that of a typical suicidal

person. Rex Hudson shows that the demographic characteristics of suicide attackers include both

married and single, men and women, college educated and uneducated, isolated and socially

integrated, and ranging from 15 to 52 years of age.18

Despite popular opinion, scholars have also

shown that poverty does not increase the likelihood for individuals to commit suicide terrorism.19

Given the high amount of attention that Western media gives to Islamic groups such as al-

Qaeda and Hamas, it may surprise many that Islamic fundamentalism is not the only source of

modern suicide terrorism. The terrorist organizations in Table 1 include several secular groups

such as the LTTE, PKK, and Chechen militant groups. Nonetheless, one cannot deny the

religious overtones of al-Qaeda and other religious groups as they use their radical ideology to

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justify their actions and recruit new members. Although they may not be a direct cause of suicide

terrorism, religious motives are important. Religion can play a powerful role in creating values

that form the foundation of a culture and deserves consideration when studying the behavior of

suicide terrorists.

Notes

1 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 552.

2 Ibid., 553.

3 Ibid.

4 Pape, “Dying to Win”, 9.

5 Ibid., 6.

6 Ibid.

7 Pedahzur, “Suicide Terrorism”, 10.

8 Bloom, “Dying to Kill”, 76.

9 Kapusta, “Suicide Bombers in CONUS”, 2.

10 Judges 16: 23-30

11 Moghadam, “The Globalization of Martyrdom”, 10.

12 Lewis, “The Assassins”, 134.

13 Moghadam, “The Globalization of Martyrdom”, 14.

14 Hill, “Kamikaze”, 5.


16 Ibid., 4

17 Ibid., 16

18 Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism”, 60-65.


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Part 3

Culture Matters

When studying the behavior of individuals, one should not underestimate the importance of

culture. The human mind is analogous to a computer that is born with minimal programming and

must learn through interaction with its social environment. This learning, or transfer of collective

mental programs, takes place throughout one’s life, although most of it takes place before the age

of 10.1 According to Geert Hofstede, culture is defined as “the collective programming of the

mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.”2 Culture

manifests itself in several important ways, such as in values, symbols, heroes, and rituals. Within

the context of this paper, the above definition of culture refers to a country’s culture, not

necessarily an organization’s culture. The value system within a population is the foundation of

culture and causes it to remain relatively constant over long periods. Therefore, analysis of a

suicide attacker’s behavior requires a solid understanding of the social values and cultural

dimensions that influence the “the programming of the mind”.

Differences between cultures are visible in several ways. Hofstede uses the concept of an

onion to describe the different layers of culture and how cultural differences are made visible.3

These different layers, or manifestations, are values, rituals, heroes, and symbols. As shown in

Figure 1, symbols represent the outer layer of culture and are the most superficial of the

manifestations. Symbols are pictures, objects, words, or gestures that imply a certain meaning

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recognizable by those of a common culture. Heroes are people who possess certain

characteristics that are highly desired in a culture and serve as role models for behavior. Heroes

can be alive, dead, real, or imaginary.4 Rituals are group activities that are considered socially

essential, although they are unnecessary for the achievement of a desired goal. They are carried

out for their own sake and work to keep an individual restricted to the norms of the group.5

Religious and social ceremonies, as well as the way in which people greet one another are

examples of rituals.

Figure 1. Hofstede’s “Onion”: Manifestations of Culture6

Values are at the core of culture and are defined by Hofstede as “broad tendencies to prefer

certain states of affairs over others.”7 According to Hofstede and other researchers, people

acquire their values early in life, which act as an invisible force that defines and guides

behavior.8 Symbols, heroes, and rituals differ from values in that they are visible to the outside

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observer through an individual’s practices, as shown in Figure 1. Change may occur quickly for

the visible layers, but the core values of a culture may take hundreds of years to change.9

Societies can learn new practices over time, such as the emergence of new heroes and people

learning to communicate over the Internet. However, Hofstede argues that since a person

typically learns their values within the first ten years of life, they become a powerful stabilizing

force in a nation’s culture as people pass them down from one generation to the next.10

The

following sections will show the significance of values and how they can influence the behavior

of individuals.

Dimensions of Culture

Measurable attributes that characterize cultures are useful in describing the major differences

between them. Social anthropologists agree that societies face a basic set of problems, and that

the difference between societies is in the way in which they answer those problems.11

Hofstede

identified four basic problem areas that deal with social inequality, the relationship between the

individual and the group, concepts of masculinity and femininity, and ways to handle ambiguity

and uncertainty. Studies by sociologist Alex Inkeles and psychologist Daniel Levinson produced

similar results that overlap the findings of Hofstede.12

These basic problem areas represent

dimensions of a culture that can be measured and compared to other cultures. This paper will

investigate one of the five Hofstede dimensions, collectivism versus individualism, and its impact

on the behavior of suicide terrorists.13

Although this paper focuses on the role of a country’s culture on suicide terrorism, some may

argue that organizational culture is more important. Hofstede acknowledges that organizational

culture does have an impact on member behavior, although he contends that a country’s culture

is more important.14

He argues that, as a social system, organizations are much different from

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nations and states. Furthermore, since organizations are a collection of individuals, the values

transferred to the individual at an early age will have an impact on the values and culture of the

organization. Similarly, most people do not grow up in an organization, and are influenced to

join a particular organization by a set of previously held values. Further analysis of

organizational influences on behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, and therefore is not

discussed in detail.

Collectivism versus Individualism

One of the characteristics that distinguish one culture from another is whether the interests of

the group prevail over the interests of the individual. A society that values the group above the

individual is defined as collectivist.15

In a collectivist society, the group has significant power

over the individual and is able to shape a person’s behavior. The first group that a person belongs

to is the family in which one was born. Individuals in collective societies usually grow up under

the influence of large extended families that include parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts,

uncles, servants, and others that may live in one’s home. Hofstede explains that children think of

themselves as members of a “we” group, or in-group. The group membership is not by choice,

but rather it is given to them.16

The extended family is typically the first of these groups that

provides identity as well as security in life. The result is a strong bond of loyalty that develops

between the child and family, and leads to both a practical and psychological interdependence.

In a collectivist society, betraying this loyalty is one of the worst offenses that one can commit.17

This high level of loyalty and sense of duty to protect the interests of the group has a powerful

effect on the behavior of group members and the choices that they make.

Many people live in societies that value the interests of the individual over that of the group,

and are called individualist. Just as in collectivist societies, the family has a strong influence in

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the early years of a child’s life. However, in an individualist society, children are typically born

into smaller families that do not include the ever-present extended family. Additionally, many of

these societies have an increasing number of homes with only one parent. Rather than the “we”

group described above, children from these families typically learn to view themselves as “I”.

Hofstede explains that their “I” becomes a personal identity, and “is distinct from other people’s

“I”s, and these others are classified not to their group membership but according to individual

characteristics.”18

Many individuals in this type of culture use education to become less

dependent upon others, and live on their own once they reach early adulthood. Furthermore, this

type of society views dependence on a group as a practical and psychological weakness.19

Through the example of their parents and other adult influences, children in these societies learn

that commitment to a relationship, or membership in a group, need not exist if it no longer serves

the interests of the individual.

In measuring individualism within a society, extreme individualism and extreme

collectivism are opposite ends of the spectrum in this dimension of a country’s culture. Each

country in Hofstede’s study is assigned a factor score based on the results of statistical analysis.

The factor score was then multiplied by 25 and a constant of 50 points was added in order create

the individualism index (IDV) score.20

The IDV scores range from close to zero to close to one

hundred. A high IDV corresponds to an individualist society and a low IDV indicates a

collectivist society. Hofstede defines individualism as “societies in which the ties between

individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her

immediate family.”21

He also defines collectivism as “societies in which people from birth

onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetimes

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continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.”22

Table 2 shows the IDV values

of 74 countries and regions taken from Hofstede’s 2005 book.

Besides the IDV index score, there are other interesting findings from this study of the IDV

dimension. First, the majority of the world’s population comes from collectivist societies.

Second, the Arab countries in the study include Egypt, Iraq (prior to 2003), Kuwait, Lebanon,

Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to Hofstede, the Arab

countries differ slightly among themselves and the Saudis tend to be more collectivist than other

Arab countries.23

Third, although the Arab countries rank 39-40, many other countries are more

collectivist than the Arab average. The worldwide average IDV score is 64.24

The following

sections will discuss the significance of these and other findings.

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Table 2. Individualism Index (IDV) Values for 74 Countries and Regions

Country/Region Score Rank Country/Region Score Rank

United States 91 1 Russia 39 37-38

Australia 90 2 Arab Countries 38 39-40

Great Britain 89 3 Brazil 38 39-40

Canada total 80 4-6 Turkey 37 41

Hungary 80 4-6 Uruguay 36 42

Netherlands 80 4-6 Greece 35 43

New Zealand 79 7 Croatia 33 44

Belgium Flemish 78 8 Philippines 32 45

Italy 76 9 Bulgaria 30 46-48

Denmark 74 10 Mexico 30 46-48

Canada Quebec 73 11 Romania 30 46-48

Belgium Walloon 72 12 East Africa 27 49-51

France 71 13-14 Portugal 27 49-1

Sweden 71 13-14 Slovenia 27 49-51

Ireland 70 15 Malaysia 26 52

Norway 69 16-17 Hong Kong 25 53-4

Switzerland German 69 16-17 Serbia 25 53-54

Germany 67 18 Chile 23 55

South Africa 65 19 Bangladesh 20 56-61

Switzerland French 64 20 China 20 56-61

Finland 63 21 Singapore 20 56-61

Estonia 60 22-24 Thailand 20 56-61

Luxembourg 60 22-24 Vietnam 20 56-61

Poland 60 22-25 West Africa 20 56-61

Malta 59 25 Salvador 19 62

Czech Republic 58 26 South Korea 18 63

Austria 55 27 Taiwan 17 64

Israel 54 28 Peru 16 65-66

Slovakia 52 29 Trinidad 16 65-66

Spain 51 30 Costa Rica 15 67

India 48 31 Indonesia 14 68-69

Suriname 47 32 Pakistan 14 68-69

Argentina 46 33-35 Colombia 13 70

Japan 46 33-35 Venezuela 12 71

Morocco 46 33-35 Panama 11 72

Iran 41 36 Ecuador 8 73

Jamaica 39 37-38 Guatemala 6 74

Countries in bold indicate the origin of organizations that executed suicide terrorism campaigns.

Arab countries include Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Source: Hofstede, Geert, and Gert Jan Hofstede. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the

Mind. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 78-79.

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Notes

1 Hofstede, “Culture’s Consequences”, 4.

2 Ibid., 9.

3 Hofstede, “Cultures and Organizations”, 6.

4 Ibid, 7.



7 Ibid., 8.



10 Ibid., 13.

11 Ibid., 22.

12 Ibid., 22-23.

13 The dimensions in the Hofstede study were measured through a large body of survey data

in which people from over 70 countries were interviewed about their values. Statistical analysis

determined patterns of differences and similarities. Since 1973, replications and extensions of the

original study were accomplished and the results published in Hostede’s 2005 edition of Cultures

and Organizations: Software of the Mind. 14

Hofstede, “Cultures and Organizations”, 35. 15

Hofstede, “Culture’s Consequences”, 209. 16


Ibid. 18

Ibid. 19

Hofstede, “Culture’s Consequences”, 210. 20


Ibid., 76. 22

Ibid. 23

Ibid., 79 24

Geert Hofstede. “Cultural Dimensions: Arab World.” http://www.geert-

hofstede.com/hofstede_arab_world.shtml.

http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_arab_world.shtmlhttp://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_arab_world.shtml

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Part 4

The Connection between Collectivism and Suicide Terrorism

Analysis of suicide bombings from December 1981 through December 2006 yields

significant results concerning the role that culture plays in the behavior of suicide terrorists. Of

the 2,202 suicide attacks that occurred during this period, 2,157 of them, or 98 percent are linked

to one of the 15 suicide terrorism campaigns. Given these 15 campaigns, organizations that

originated in countries with a collectivist culture committed 99.63 percent (2,149 of 2,157) of the

suicide terrorist attacks. All but one of the terrorist organizations responsible for the fifteen

campaigns listed in Table 1 is associated with a collectivist country or region in Hofstede’s

study. The remaining 0.37 percent represents the eight attacks committed by Uzbek militants.

Uzbekistan is the only origin of a suicide terrorism campaign that does not closely match any of

the countries in the Hofstede study. Since the IDV score of Uzbekistan cannot be determined

through Hofstede’s statistical analysis, it is not included as part of the supporting evidence in this

paper. The fact that nearly 98 percent of all suicide bombings from 1981 to 2006 were part of

organized campaigns that originated in countries or regions with a collectivist culture is

significant. This paper contends that a collectivist culture is a required element of societies that

tolerate and support suicide terrorism.

Table 3 includes each of the terrorist organizations involved in suicide terrorism campaigns,

their country or region of origin, the number of suicide attacks committed, and their IDV score.

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The table also shows which country or region from the Hofstede study represents each of the

terrorist organization, and is organized from the highest IDV score to the lowest. According to

Hofstede, the worldwide average IDV score is 64, which indicates that all of the national cultures

listed in Table 3 are collectivist.1 When a country or region of origin in Table 3 is not

specifically mentioned in the Hofstede study, a neighboring country or region with a similar

culture is used to represent its IDV score. The following paragraphs will describe how the

terrorist organizations in Table 3 link to a particular IDV score.

Table 3. National Origin and Individuality Scores for Suicide Terrorist Organizations

Suicide Terrorist Country or IDV Score (Survey

Organization Region of Origin Ideology # Attacks Country/Region)

LTTE Sri Lanka Secular 120 48 (India)

Kashmiri separatists India/Kashmir Islam 26 48 (India)

Chechen militants Russia/N. Caucasus Secular 59 39 (Russia)

Hezbollah Lebanon Islam 54 38 (Arab Countries)

Hamas/PIJ/Fatah Palestine Islam/Secular 237 38 (Arab Countries)

Egyptian militants Egypt Islam 11 38 (Arab Countries)

Al-Qaeda network multiple (mainly Saudi) Islam 62 38 (Arab Countries)

Iraqi militants Iraq Islam/Secular 1,344 38 (Arab Countries)

PKK Turkey/northern Iraq Secular 27 37 (Turkey)

Islamic Courts Union Somalia Islam 4 27 (East Africa)

JMB Bangladesh Islam 7 20 (Bangladesh)

Pakistani militants Pakistan Islam 28 14 (Pakistan)

Taliban Afghanistan/Pakistan Islam 170 14 (Pakistan)

Uzbek militants Uzbekistan Islam 8 None

Arab countries include Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

East Africa includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Country and Regional Origins of Terrorist Organizations

One of the problems with understanding the motivations of terrorism is that the knowledge

of terrorist organization membership is incomplete. There are multiple databases that catalog

terrorist events, to include suicide bombings. However, there are almost no databases that catalog

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individual terrorists’ names, nationality, and other demographic information. Marc Sageman has

increased the body knowledge concerning the members of al-Qaeda by collecting the names and

demographic data of 172 al-Qaeda terrorists.2 However, Sageman’s data is not very useful for

assessing patterns of nationality because the true size of al-Qaeda is still unknown. The Chicago

Project on Suicide Terrorism, which did extensive research on suicide bombers from al-Qaeda

and other suicide terrorist organizations, performed a more useful study. Due to extensive media

coverage of suicide attacks, the Chicago Project was able to account for all al-Qaeda suicide

terrorists with a high level of confidence. Although the full database is not publicly available,

key demographics for al-Qaeda suicide bombers are available in Pape’s book Dying to Win.

Al-Qaeda stands out from the other terrorist organizations in Table 3 because it is the only

one that draws its members from several different countries. Since this paper focuses specifically

on suicide terrorists rather than those who simply join a terrorist organization, the data from the

Chicago Project is very useful. Their research found 71 members of al-Qaeda who successfully

killed themselves as part of a suicide terrorist attack from 1995 to 2003. Of these 71 suicide

bombers, researchers were able to determine nationalities of 67. The results show that the

majority of the 67 bombers came from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states.3 Figure 2

shows a summary of nationalities for these 67 suicide terrorists. Based on this information, the

Hofstede region of Arab Countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and

Libya) represents the origin of al-Qaeda. Additionally, the Hofstede study represents four of the

remaining al-Qaeda countries shown in Figure 2. Those include Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia,

and Pakistan, all of which have IDV scores that indicate a collectivist culture.4 In the end, even

though al-Qaeda is a transnational organization, there is plenty of evidence to conclude that

nearly all of its known suicide bombers have come from countries with collectivist cultures.

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0

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10

15

20

25

30

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Figure 2. Nationality of Al-Qaeda Suicide Attackers, 1995-20035

Another case that requires further explanation is the use of East Africa to represent the

Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the culture of Somalia. In the Hofstede study, the region of East

Africa includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia. None of the regions in the Hofstede

study represents Somalia. Even though Somalia is geographically close to the East African

countries, there are some differences. One of the differences is that Somalia is an Arab nation

with nearly all of its population professing Islam as their religion.6 The nations within East

Africa are not Arab, and the majority of the population is not Muslim.7 However, one cultural

aspect that they do have in common is that all of the nations in that area of the world have a

tribal element to their history, which tends to foster the core values that lead to a collectivist

culture. It would also be acceptable to use the Arab Countries to represent Somalia given that it

shares many cultural aspects with those nations as well. Regardless, choosing to represent

Somalia with Arab Countries or East Africa is appropriate and accurately reflects Somalia’s

collectivist culture.

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Five other organizations from Table 3 deserve a short explanation about which country

represents their culture. The LTTE is a Tamil nationalist organization fighting for independence

in the northern area of Sri Lanka. The Tamil people have many similarities in religion and

culture to the people of India, which is one of the Hofstede survey nations. India also represents

Kashmiri separatists who have committed 26 suicide bombings in India. Pakistan can also

represent Kashmir although it will have no impact on the conclusions in this paper since both

India and Pakistan have collectivist national cultures. The Arab Counties represent the

Palestinian territories where Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operate, since

they are also Arab people and share many cultural similarities with other Arab countries in the

Persian Gulf. The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) is a secular terrorist organization that

operates in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Choosing either Turkey or the Arab Countries will

lead to the same conclusion since both are collectivist. Lastly, the country of Pakistan represents

the Taliban even though they are known for their presence in Afghanistan. However, most

members of the Taliban are of Pashtun ethnicity, which is a large part of both Afghanistan and

Pakistan.8 The significance of these relationships is that groups that originated in a collectivist

culture committed 99.63 percent (2,149 of 2,157) of all suicide attacks that were part of

organized suicide terrorism campaigns. This represents nearly 98 percent (2,149 of 2,202) of all

modern suicide terrorist attacks.

The Importance of Values

Given that nearly all suicide terrorism campaigns appear to originate from collectivist

cultures, the next logical step is to explain how this dimension of culture contributes to an

individual’s decision to take part in suicide terrorism and a community’s support of such action.

The core values learned through interaction with a collectivist social environment tend to

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motivate individuals to prefer the interests of the community above their own interests and

desires. Individuals show this behavior as they interact with their family, school, workplace,

government, and other organizations. Terrorist organizations that use suicide as a tactic generally

depend on individuals who have these values and are motivated by altruistic principles.

A child that grows up in a collectivist family learns at an early age that personal opinions

have little value. Instead, the group predetermines opinions and children show loyalty to the

group by adopting the same opinions. If a problem arises where there is no established opinion,

the family convenes a meeting in order to arrive at a solution. U.S. psychologist Solomon Asch

created an experiment to study whether or not individuals would maintain their own judgments

when they were at odds with the majority. In his experiment, individuals from collectivist

societies were more likely to conform to the judgment of the majority, even when the majority

was clearly wrong.9 This concept creates a predictable level of harmony within the family, and

children who deviate from this expected behavior are considered to have significant character

flaws.10

This value may cause an individual to accept the opinions and rationalizations of suicide

terror groups, even if the individual disagrees or lacks understanding.

Loyalty is one of the most important values taught in a collectivist family. Not only should

one be loyal to the opinions of the group, but one should also share their resources for the benefit

of the group. It is common for one member of the family to share their income with the rest of

the group. Many families collectively provide for the expenses required for one of the members

to attend college, with the expectation that the college graduate will share their future income.11

Rituals also teach loyalty to family members. Participation in family gatherings such as

weddings, baptisms, and particularly funerals are mandatory and attendance is expected. Intense

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loyalty can create a willingness for an individual to offer deep sacrifices, even to the point of

death, in order to defend their family, community, or loved ones.

Another important concept in the collectivist family is shame. Members of a collectivist

society feel ashamed when they break the rules of society and do not live up their expected

obligations. Because shame is social in nature, it depends on others in the community being

made aware of an individual’s infractions. On the contrary, the concept of guilt is individual in

nature and can be felt even if no one else is aware of the infraction. Because collectivist societies

place more emphasis on shame than guilt, the knowledge of one’s violation becomes more

important than the violation itself.12

The desire to avoid shame is a significant source of motivation for

many people in collectivist cultures, and frequently leads to acts of vengeance in an effort to restore

honor.13

The values of loyalty, preferring the opinions and interests of others, and avoiding shame are

important characteristics of collectivist cultures that allow organized suicide terrorism campaigns

to take place. According to numerous recorded statements made before an attack, loyalty to one’s

family, organization, religion, ethnic group, or country is a significant motivating factor for most

suicide bombers.14

Many also see their actions as a dutiful response to perceived shame or

dishonor that they believed the targeted organization caused. Within terrorist organizations,

members form strong bonds with one another through personal relationships. Individuals often

surrender their own opinions and accept those of the collective group, particularly when dealing

with the moral justification for suicide attacks. Sustained suicide terrorism campaigns also

require the support of the local community. As such, the values described here must not only be

held by the individuals who commit suicide attacks, but also by the majority of individuals in the

community. The section on martyrdom will give a detailed explanation of suicide terrorism’s

need for community support.

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Altruistic Suicide

What are the motivations behind an individual’s decision to become a suicide terrorist? A

common misconception about suicide terrorism is the idea that all suicides have similar causes.

Many argue that everyone who commits suicide is killing himself or herself in order to escape

emotional despair caused by poverty, social rejection, or some sort of psychological trauma.

Although these factors may motivate some who commit suicide, research into the lives of suicide

terrorists reveals another set of altruistic motivations that have a powerful influence on their

decisions and actions.15

There are three main categories of suicides. Egoistic suicide is the most common form and is

when a person chooses to die in order to escape a painful existence. Altruistic suicide is less

common and fundamentally different from egoistic suicide, in that a strong sense of duty to the

community and a high level of respect for common values motivate it.16

These individuals are

highly integrated into the social society and are considered normal and successful by community

standards. The last form, fatalistic suicide, is very rare and occurs when individuals are

“brainwashed” to commit suicide through extreme conditions of regulation, discipline, and

seclusion for society.17

Many fatalistic suicides are part of suicide pacts where individuals with

exclusive bonds to each other are blindly following the direction of their leaders.

Altruistic suicide originates from significant integration of the individual into society.

Unlike fatalistic suicide, altruistic suicide depends on public approval rather than domineering

control. In altruistic suicide, society honors those who commit acts of self-sacrifice as martyrs

and people worth imitating. In fatalistic suicide, society rejects the individuals and condemns the

behavior as detestable.18

Suicide terrorism is a type of altruistic suicide that goes beyond the

heroic act of a parent who sacrifices their life to save their child or a Secret Service agent who

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jumps in front of a bullet to save the President. In many suicide terrorism situations, the society

places extreme pressure on individuals to make personal sacrifices to achieve collective goals.19

Social prestige and the moral duty to protect their community are powerful motivations for these

individuals. For this reason, altruistic suicides are likely to be a public act, as opposed to egoistic

suicides that are usually private.20

Martyrdom

A common element among most suicide terrorists is a belief that their actions will cause

them to become a martyr.21

This belief in martyrdom is a significant factor that influences the

decision to become a suicide bomber. Martyrdom falls in the category of altruistic suicide, and

almost all suicide terrorists leave behind a video or letter explaining how their actions will

advance the cause of their community and organization. Suicide terrorists display a deep level of

commitment to a cause greater than themselves.22

In order to appreciate the connection between

martyrdom and suicide terrorism, one must recognize how suicide bombers view their own

actions, as well as the value that society places on their sacrifice. Suicide bombers typically view

their actions as justifiable symbols of self-sacrifice. As a result, most suicide terrorist

organizations and their members refrain from describing their suicide attacks as such. Instead,

they refer to these attacks as martyrdom operations since Islam and other religions strictly

prohibit suicide.23

The definition of a martyr according to the Oxford English Dictionary is “a person who

undergoes death or great suffering on behalf of any religious or other cause, or as a consequence

of devotion to some object.”24

Martyrdom, or self-sacrifice for a sacred cause, has strong

religious roots, particularly in the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In

religious writings, it is associated with bearing witness and standing firm for a cause, even to the

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point of death.25

Given this definition, one can easily identify two of the fundamental elements of

martyrdom. First, it is necessary to have a cause worthy of self-sacrifice to the point of death,

and second, it is necessary to have a person who is willing to sacrifice their life in order to

defend or advance the cause. A less obvious element is the requirement for a social organization

to declare certain sacrifices worthy of martyrdom. Historically, defending one’s faith or religion

was the cause, and religious leaders declared an individual a martyr based on their heroic acts of

self-sacrifice. In the context of modern suicide terrorism, or martyrdom operations, religion often

plays the important role of providing the cause and legitimizing the actions of the bomber.

However, modern suicide terrorism also shows that secular causes and organizations, such as

nationalism and local communities, can also provide these necessary elements for martyrdom.

The following paragraphs in this section will explain the roles that religion, nationalism, and the

community play in modern martyrdom. Emphasis is also placed on the connection between

values taught in collectivist cultures and the behavior of both the individual suicide attackers and

the communities that support them.

The Role of Religion and Nationalism

In many cases of martyrdom, religion provides two of the three basic elements, which are

the cause and the justification. Many believe that their religion leads to a superior life on earth

and is the path to redemption. Religion is also a source of personal identity for many people.26

This religious exceptionalism and personal identification with religion can cause powerful

motivations for individuals when their religion and beliefs become threatened. Christianity,

Islam, Buddhism and other religions have examples of martyrs who bore witness of their beliefs

and struggled against unrighteousness and oppression.27

Likewise, religions have historically

legitimized sacred death in defense of one’s faith and resistance to injustice.

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Most instances of modern religious martyrdom involve the Muslim religion and differ from

Christian and other forms of martyrdom. One difference is that Islamic martyrdom, particularly

in modern times, is more offensive rather than defensive. The goal of defensive martyrdom is not

to lead a violent campaign against oppressors, but to bear witness and resist oppression.28

Offensive martyrdom advocates an active struggle against heretics and oppressors, even to the

point of violence. In this type of martyrdom, self-sacrifice assumes a willingness to kill the

enemy in the process of dying.29

Another major characteristic of modern Islamic martyrdom is the notion of jihad or holy

war, which provides the primary cause for which so many Muslims are willing to be martyred. In

Islam, jihad has several meanings, most of which are nonviolent. However, Islam does permit a

declaration of jihad in order to defend Islam from non-Muslim attackers. In this case, every

Muslim would have an obligation to join the fight.30

Osama bin Laden and several other Islamic

leaders have issued fatwas, or legal opinions issues by Islamic scholars, and have declared a holy

war against the US and its Western allies.31

Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic organizations

have propagated this notion and teach their followers to embrace martyrdom in order to seek

vengeance, end injustice, and fulfill their duty to God and country. 32

In many cases, religion also acts as the social organization with the authority to legitimize

suicide attacks as martyrdom operations. For example, Hamas and PIJ have linked self-sacrifice

to Islamic identity in order to justify a suicide bomber’s actions. First, they claim that the Jews

stole Islamic land and that the magnitude of this injustice requires every Muslim, both inside and

outside of Palestine, to fight a jihad of national liberation. Second, they use Islamic texts

concerning jihad and martyrdom to emphasize that God will reward those killed in battle. Third,

they frame their cause as one that parallels the story of Muhammad and his victory against the

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Meccan army. This story speaks to divine intervention and God’s blessing upon the faithful.

Fourth, they interpret Islamic texts in such a way that defines suicide as martyrdom and justifies

the killing of innocent civilians and other Muslims by defining them as enemies of God and

heretics. Lastly, they rely on rituals and ceremonies to increase the value of martyrdom in

society.33

Even some secular organizations, such as Fatah and LTTE, promote their tactics as an

extension of historical traditions and accepted practices. These secular organizations attempt to

link the morality of religious redemption with national salvation or other worldly goals in order

to legitimize suicide and label it martyrdom.34

Similar to religion, nationalism can also provide a powerful cause for self-sacrifice and

martyrdom. Pape argues that nationalism is the root of all suicide terrorism and is the main

reason that communities fight against foreign occupation.35

Nationalism is the belief within a

community that its members have a right to govern their homeland without foreign interference.

Secular organizations such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AMB), the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and LTTE are able to draw on feelings of nationalism to inspire

their members to die for their cause. Mohammed Hafez explains that both religious and

nationalist appeals are critical in generating volunteers for suicide terrorism by associating self-

sacrifice with martyrdom and national salvation. 36

Although nationalism and religion may provide the cause and justification for martyrdom,

these are only two of the three basic elements. The third element, the individual who chooses to

give their life for the cause, is influenced by their internal values and culture. The Social

organizations within one’s culture communicate the values of loyalty, preferring the opinions

and interests of others, and avoiding shame, which are common traits among most suicide

terrorists.

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The Role of the Community

Communities are critical to the establishment of suicide terrorism campaigns for two main

reasons. The first reason is that the community acts as the social mechanism that transmits

cultural values from one generation to the next. One’s community includes family, friends,

school, religion, and other social organizations. As explained in part three of this paper, most

people acquire their personal values from their social surroundings prior to age 10. These values

tend to have a profound impact on the way individuals define their environment and act as an

unseen force that can influence their behavior. Communities in collectivist cultures tend to

transmit values that influence individuals to sacrifice their own interests in order to benefit the

community. The second reason that the local community is so important to the success of suicide

terrorism campaigns is because suicide terrorist organizations require significant public support

in order to have long-term success.

Community support aids terrorist organizations in three different ways. First, suicide

terrorist groups need community support to recruit new members. Due to the nature of their

attacks, suicide terrorist organizations must find new members who are willing to sacrifice their

life. In order to do this, terrorist groups create a relatively high public profile and embed

themselves into social institutions such as religious organizations and schools.37

The second way

that terrorist organizations use community support is to avoid detection by security or military

forces. Because recruiting efforts necessitate a high profile, terrorist groups may become

vulnerable to infiltration and the spread of information concerning group membership, tactics,

and planned attacks. In order to protect these vulnerabilities, the organization requires a high

level of sympathy and support from the local population.38

The third and most important way that communities support suicide terrorist organizations is

by promoting the ideas of martyrdom. This is significant because individuals are more likely to

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commit acts of violence and self-sacrifice if they expect the community to reward them with a

lofty status after their deaths. Hafez describes this as the “culture of martyrdom” and considers it

a critical enabler that allows suicide campaigns to continue.39

Other scholars agree that

martyrdom is a social construct and that the community determines the qualifications for this

superior status. According to Pape, “An individual can die. Only a community can make a

martyr.”40

Although religious leaders may disagree with Pape’s opinion concerning the authority

of society to determine the qualifications for martyrdom, the claims of Pape and Hafez are

particularly valid in the context of secular terrorist organizations. Furthermore, one of Marc

Sageman’s conclusions in his book, Understanding Terror Networks, is that “social bonds play a

more important role in the emergence of the global Salafi jihad than ideology.”41

The conclusion

is that both religious and secular terrorist organizations benefit from the idea of a heroic martyr

that is able to fulfill his commitment to God, country, and community.

Essential Element vs. Causal Factor

Although a collectivist culture is essential for suicide terrorism campaigns to exist, there is

not enough evidence to establish a cause and effect relationship between culture and suicide

terrorism. Research suggests that other elements must also be present in order for sustained

suicide terrorism to take place. These elements may include religious differences, nationalism,

occupation of sacred land by a foreign government, radical ideology, and others. Even so, there

is no consensus among scholars as to the exact combination of factors that will lead to suicide

terrorism. Furthermore, there are many examples of conflicts that took place in countries with a

collectivist culture that did not involve suicide terrorism. These include well-know conflicts such

as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnam War. Table 2 shows that Vietnam has a

collectivist culture with an IDV score of 20, and Table 3 shows that Afghanistan has an IDV of

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14. Other conflicts that did not involve suicide terrorism include the fight for Nagas

independence in India from 1947 to 1999, the war between Moro separatists and the government

of the Philippines from 1972 to present, the Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand from 1968 to

present, and Amazonian Indians guerrilla war in Brazil over land rights from 1988 to 1995.42

According to Table 2, India, the Philippines, Thailand, and Brazil all have collectivist cultures

with IDV scores of 48, 32, 20, and 38 respectively. Interestingly, there is no evidence that

suggests suicide terrorism campaigns have ever originated in countries with individualistic

cultures.

Given the strong association of collectivist cultures with suicide terrorism campaigns, it is

reasonable to conclude that this type of culture is a necessary requirement for these campaigns to

take place. Nearly 98 percent of all suicide attacks involve individuals that come from a country

with a collectivist culture. Nevertheless, there is insufficient information to establish precise

relationships of cause and effect. Although the need for a collectivist culture is logical, the

degree to which collectivist cultures may cause suicide terrorism has not been determined and

warrants further study.

Notes

1 Geert Hofstede. “Cultural Dimensions: Arab World.” http://www.geert-

hofstede.com/hofstede_arab_world.shtml. 2 Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks”, 185.




6 CIA World Factbook, “Somalia”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/so.html. 7 CIA World Factbook, “Kenya”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/ke.html. 8 CIA World Factbook, “Pakistan”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/pk.html. 9 Hofstede, “Cultures and Organizations”, 93.

10 Ibid., 87.

http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_arab_world.shtmlhttp://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_arab_world.shtmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html

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Notes

11 Ibid.

12 Baker, “Arabs, Islam, and the Middle East”, 21.

13 Ibid., 24.

14 Juergensmeyer, “Terror in the Mind of God”, 171.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 173.

18 Ibid, 176.

19 Ibid., 174.

20 Ibid., 175.

21 Aaron, “In Their Own Words”, 16-100.

22 Moghadam, “Globalization of Martyrdom”, 28.

23 Moghadam, “Defining Suicide Terrorism”, 16.

24 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6

th ed., s.v. “martyr.”

25 Khosrokhavar, “Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs”, 5.

26 Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs”, 55.

27 Khosrokhavar, “Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs”, 5.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 6.

30 Ibid., 13.

31 Aaron, “In Their Own Words”, 5. Under Islamic law, fatwas are not legally binding and

are meant as guidance. Osama bin Laden has declared that he is able to issue fatwas even though

he does not possess the necessary religious qualifications. 32

Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs”, 68. The majority of Muslims around the world do not

believe that they are involved in a violent holy war with non-Muslims. 33

Ibid., 63-67. 34

Ibid., 55. 35

Pape, “Dying to Win”, 79. 36

Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs”, 72. 37


Ibid. 39

Hafez, “Dying to be Martyrs”, 76. 40


Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks”, 178. 42

Pape, “Dying to Win”, 283. Pape lists 48 conflicts involving occupation by democratic

states that did not lead to suicide terrorism.

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Part 5

Conclusions

Suicide terrorism is growing in popularity as an extremely violent tactic that many terrorist

organizations are using to advance their aims. After its first use on 15 December 1981 in Beirut,

the modern form of suicide terrorism has spread to over 30 countries and has increased in

frequency to over 600 attacks per year. From December 1981 through December 2006, there

have been 2,202 suicide attacks worldwide. Suicide terrorism is also a very lethal form of

terrorism. Although suicide attacks accounted for only three percent of all terrorist attacks from

1981 to 2003, they were responsible for 48 percent of the deaths resulting from those attacks.

One of the distinctive features of suicide terrorism is that almost all attacks are part of an

organized campaign. Fifteen identifiable campaigns account for 98 percent of all suicide attacks

(2,157 of 2,202). The relatively sudden increase in this lethal form of terrorism has lead

governments, leaders, scholars, and others to search for answers concerning the causes of this

phenomenon.

Studying suicide terrorism is important for those that wish to protect their interests around

the world from this form of violence. Detailed knowledge about an adversary’s strengths,

weaknesses, and motivations are central to the fight against terrorism. Understanding the causes

and enabling factors that support suicide terrorism allows planners and leaders to “know their

enemy” and plan more effectively. Many scholars have focused on the strategic logic at the

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organizational level, while others have studied the demographics and possible motivations of

individual bombers.

The study of the social and cultural level of suicide terrorism leads to the conclusion that a

collectivist culture is a required element that enables suicide terrorism campaigns. A collectivist

culture is one that exalts the interests of the community over the interests of the individual

members. Terrorist organizations that originated in countries with a collectivist culture are

responsible for nearly 98 percent (2,149 or 2,202) of all suicide attacks from 1981 through 2006.

Furthermore, suicide terrorism campaigns have never originated in countries with an

individualistic culture. This conclusion is logical not only because of the close correlation

between the number of suicide terrorism campaigns and collectivist cultures, but also to the

nature of collectivist cultures and the impact they have on individual behavior.

A collectivist culture enables suicide terrorism campaigns in two primary ways. First, the

values, rituals, heroes, symbols, and practices generally accepted within cultures are taught to

subsequent generations through social organizations. These social groups include one’s family,

religion, friends, organizations, and local communities. One’s values, which are the most

important cultural element, are typically learned by age 10 and tend have a major influence in

one’s decisions and behavior. A common value within collectivist cultures is that the community

has more value than the individual does. Most people that grow up in this type of culture learn to

have deep loyalty to their family, religion, friends, and community. They typically accept the

opinion of the group, even if their own ideas do not agree. Collectivist cultures also promote the

value of honor and the avoidance of shame. The values typically learned in a collectivist culture

have a strong influence on individuals and tend to support the ideas of self-sacrifice and

martyrdom, which are central to suicide terrorism campaigns.

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Religion, Nationalism, and the community play significant roles within collectivist cultures.

Religious extremism and exceptionalism, as well as ideas of nationalism, can create a cause for

which many will sacrifice, even to the point of death. Combined with the cause, religious

organizations and communities provide legitimacy for suicide operations and honor the

individual attackers as martyrs. The community’s acceptance of suicide terrorism further

supports suicide terrorism campaigns by offering a source of new recruits who are willing to

become suicide bombers, and by helping suicide groups avoid detection from security forces.

Given the characteristics of collectivist cultures and the 98 percent correlation between

suicide terrorism campaigns and collectivist cultures, it is logical to conclude that a collectivist

culture is a required element of suicide terrorism campaigns. Although it is logical to conclude

that collectivist cultures are necessary for suicide terrorism campaigns to take place, there is not

enough supporting evidence to determine the degree to which a collectivist culture may cause

suicide terrorism. The body of knowledge on suicide terrorism continues to grow as scholars

study the logical causes at the strategic, organizational, social, cultural, and individual levels.

This paper offers critical insight into the social and cultural nature of suicide terrorism, yet more

research is needed in order to fully understand its causes. As leaders, researchers and scholars

continue to explore the possible causes of suicide terrorism campaigns, they should not forget to

include the presence of a collectivist culture as an essential element.

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Appendix A

Suicide Bombings (1981-2006)

This appendix contains all suicide bombings from December 1981 through December 2006.

The information for this database is from LCDR Philip Kapusta’s monograph, Suicide Bombers

in CONUS, which he wrote at the School of Advanced Military Studies in 2007.1 Both LCDR

Kapusta’s monograph and all references within the database are open source. In order to be

included in this database, the suicide bomber had to display the intent to die during the course of

the attack. Each explosive device that acted as a separate detonation is included as a separate

entry, even if they were part of the same attack. For example, if two suicide bombers created

separate detonations, this is considered two entries even if they occur in the same location and at

the same time. Similarly, a car bomb with two occupants is only one entry because there was

only one detonation. In attacks with multiple bombs, it may be difficult to assess an accurate

number of casualties to each bomb. In these cases, the total number of casualties are equally

divided among the number of bombs, and is noted by a caret symbol (^) in the target column. A

small number of attacks are considered “probable” suicide attacks. These are included in the

database and identifiable in the comment column. Attacks that are considered “possible” suicide

attacks are not included in the database.

There are some failed attacks included in the database. In such cases, the bomber possessed

a functional, armed bomb and was attempting to complete the attack. For example, a bomber

discovered and arrested at a security checkpoint enroute to the target location is included.

However, a person found in a building with complete bombs or suicide vests is not included,

even if the bomber had plans to commit a suicide attack in the future.

Description of data columns:

Date: The date of the attack.

Organization: The organization responsible for the attack (if known).

Location: The city, town, or region in which the attack occurred.

Country: The country in which the attack occurred.

Target: The main target of the attack (convoy, checkpoint, person, etc.).

Dead: The number of people killed in the attack (not including the bomber(s)).

Wound: The number of people wounded in

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