Communist Celluar Org

8/3/2019 Communist Celluar Org

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FROM THE CELL TO .....Lieu t en a n t Colon e l Willia m M. Ha r tn e .s , United Staten Armg Re8erve, Retired

F ROM some accounts of the warin Vietnam, it may appear on thesurface m though we are fighting anenemy who is loosely organized andscattered. Yet it must be acknowl-edged that, in view of the large scaleof his efforts, he has an over-all or-ganization with the necessary leader-ship to implement and coordinate themultiple and diversified activities inwhich the insurgents are engaged. Iti~ 51s0 readily apparent that this or-ganization is quite ditferent from anyencountered previously in conven-tionul-type war where organi~d mil-Itnry forces hnve opposed ench otheropenly in accordance with the Iawaund customs of war.#

In subversive insurgency, Commu-nist+ consider organization s keyweapon. Communists hove long under.stood the vital significance of disci.plined, centralized organization, andhave continuously used it ae a dcvictnot only to seize power, but also tomaintnin control.

Based on trial and error over a wriod of years, they hnva developed Iformal, dhtcipIined organization, complex in structure yet flexible in opem.tion, which they strive to cntnbli~in any given insurgency. Althou@only in Vietnam has this organint[on reached fuil-scnle proportlotw, lbevolutionary growth in varying dn~may be noted in thono innurganci= IS

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CELLTO BATTLEFIELDGreece, Malaya, and the Philippine.An understanding of this organiza-tionis of critical importance, for onlyinattacking this weepon of the ineur-gent areenal can Iaeting victory bewhieved over Communist subversiveizeurgency.The Communist insurgent organi-zationis composed of three major ele-ments-party core, mass civil organi-mtion, and military forces. While theerect organizational relationship ofits elemente may vary from one insur-

gency to another, all will employ theinterlocking directorate arrangementthat insures absolute control by theparty over the entire organisation.An optimum-type Communiet ineur-gent etructure is shown in the chart.At the heart of every Communist-dominated insurgency may be founda tightly tilt, disciplined party or-ganization vertically structured toparallel the exieting governmental or-ganization in the country. This struc-ture may exist at national, interprO-

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CELLTOBAITIEFIE1.Ov~ncial, province, dktrict, and villagelevele. However, intermediate echelonsmay be deleted from the party struc-ture if the leadership believes that itcan adequately superviee and coordi-nate the activities of subordinate com-mittee from the national level.Iho cdlAt the base of the party commandstructure is the cell. The cellular struc-ture of any Communist organization,legal or illegal, is it9 most criticalqharactwistic. Communism as a wayof life and form of organization isnot realizable in the absence of thecell. A Communist PartY member nor-mally belongs to two or more cells:hie party cell in which the funda-mental dynamics of communism areto be found; and one or more func-tional cells which exiet in hie placeof daily employment, euch as the partycommittee, school, or factory. It isthe party cell which mo~de the re-cruit into a disciplined party eubjcct,while the functional cell servee as thebeeic organizational unit for the ac-complishment of some task or mission.In an insurgency, party cells nor-

mally contehr from three to sevenmembers. Where two or more partycells exist within a single functionalcommittee of an insurgent organi-

Lieutenant Colonel Witiiam M. Hart-nese, US ArmII Rewrve, Retired, iea Countevkrurge?wy Consultant wit hthe US Arrnv (%rnbat Devefopment8Command Sperial Warfarw Ageney atFort lhwgg, North Carolina. He woeChief, Cmmterlnargenq Committee,tLS Arrnv Intelligence School, FortHotab{rd, Afqiand, prior to hie re-tirement. Colonel Hartne88 receivedthe Central Intelligence Agerrqta 1$6Sannrd award for ontatmkfing contri-butioru to intetfigence thnrugh liter-ature for h& re.wrmch in twunterrn-uurgencp intelligence.82

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cation, party groups are normallycreated to control and coardinata theiractbitias. Party groups, in turn, areresponsible to yet another higher bodythat exists at each echelon of the pa~hierarchy. This body, the intarpartycommittee, is the supreme Communistorgan at its prdcular level of organi.zction, and ia responsible only to itecounterpart omce at the next higherechelon.CommitteeSystemAlthough all authority within aCommuniet insurgency movementstems from the hard-core intmpartj

committee system, a counterpart furwtional body ie required to carry outthe partys day-to-day activities ateach level of organicetion. The pri.mary organicetion used for this pur-pose ie the party executive cqmmit~commonly referred to in times of in.surgency as the party revolutions~committee. The revolutionary commi~tee may develop into a highly sopbluticated structure under the dircctiooof a secretary, an assiMrmt, and mexecutive otfker.Under tbeee officials will function

a permanent shnding or current zf-faire committ?e composed of, perha~four to 10 persona. Subordinate tothis body, a number of subcommittwor eectione wi ll function. The revolu.tiomwy committee, wblch receives lborders from t he hrterperty committeamay be termed the directing orgnn ofthe insurgency.The party youth organirmtion Is@third body within the party core strvr-ture, and is an indispeneeble atlllixtrof any Commurdnt Party, The youthqranhtion h m halfwpy h-into whictr Mkely future partY m=here may be dram in their ewly YV@before they rwuh the raQulred etefor carrdidata membership in tfm pm@

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CELLTO BATTLEFIEU

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CELLTO BATfLEFIELDproper. This age varies between 1Sand 26 years.A party yonth organization existsat each operational level of party or-ganization, and the junior body isstructured in a manner eimilar to itsparent cellular organization at eachechelon. Party youth members engagein meet of the activities conducted byactual party members since tide youthorganization is considered a school oftraining and preparation for the as-sumption of inner-party responsibili-ties at a later date.Mass OrganisationCommunists have never aimed atthe conversion of great masses of peo-ple to communism. Their concept ie! that of a compact, mobile, disciplined,and dedicated party consisting largelyof an intellectual elite. It is the taskof this smaI1 group to use scientifi-cally the social forces that move anddirest the masses so that the Commu-nist Part y may come to power overthem and forcibly impose the Com-muniet program. Their aim is to re-cruit into the service of the partygreat numbers of individuals, most ofwhom are unaware that they are serv-ing the Communist cause.Mass organizations serve the partyin at least five distinct waye in thatthey:. Provide the party with a seem-ingly legitimate front which by out-ward appearances represents the in-

tereet of the population.q Establish a cover which divertsattention from tbe party and its op-erations.

q Help divert the allegiance of thepopulation from the legal governmentand mobilize its support in behalf ofthe insurgency movement.

q Constitute a means of secialcontrol.84

q Provide the apparatus for estzb.lisbkg a shadow or actual govern.ment competing with or replacing thaiof the legal government.Methods of ControlCommunist employ two prineipdmethods to gain control over and tcmanipulate the masses. These are thepenetration of existing nOn-Commu.nist organisations and the creation offronts. Principal objectives in pens.trating existing mase organizationsare to neutralize agencies which enp.port the government, jnstif y and legitimatize causes which can be ex.ploited by the insurgents, and mo.bilize and manipulate mass support.Front organizations are normallycreated when the party is unable topenetrate existing organizations, ordesires to conceal its role in the ac-tivity. In general, fronts are used teestablish access to and control over

unorganized sectors of the popula-tion. In creating such organizationalweapons, the Communist seek to cre.ate a useful mass by transforming munstructured segment of the popula-tion-such as youth, the unemployedand the intelligentsiainto one whichhaz an established leadership and ef-fective channels of communication andmanipulation.In most instances, fronte employ

organizational titles and promotecauses which appeal to the populationand are not commonly associated withcommunism. In many instancee, thesefronts may be headed or endorsed byrespected citizens who are unwittinglyaiding the Communist movement.Individual organizations and groupfalling under Communist dominationor intluence are brought together IUI.der a United Front. The term refersessentially to the alignment of dpopular mass organizations against

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m enemy, although a more accuratedefinition would be an organizationalrwrangement whereby Communistsandnon-Communiztz work together tocontrol an organization, agency, orgovernment.FederatedFrontIn an insurgency, an organizationalmetamorphoziz occurs witidn the masscivil organization when the UnitedFrbnt is tranzforrned into the Fed-erated Front, commonly referred toby such titles as National LiberationFront, Peoples Front, or PopularFront. In effect, this organization re-places the United Front and becomesa formally structured body with lib-erationcommittees or similarly namedbodies at each operational echelon.These liberation committees, com-posedmainly of non-Communist mem-bers, preempt local government ad-ministration at village, district, andprovince level, replacing legal admin-istration with actual insurgent con-t ro l .The Federated Front normally ap-pears when the party has achievedsomedegree of military predominanceandcontrols a majority of the popu-lationwithin a given area. Communistdoctrineprescribes three prerequisitesfor activation of a liberation commit-tee in any given area. Firzt, insur-gentmilitary forces muet be strongerthanthose of government forces. Sec-ond,mass work haa enjoyed success toadegree leading to popular disregardof enemy laws. Third, the party or-ganization has reeolved the problemsOfits first major e~panziOn of mem-bership and has been able to establisha viable cellular committee structureat the village level.The village militia should not bethought of as inferior military forcesWhichwork only part time, but asM 1907

CELLTO FJATTLEFIELelite formations drawn from and exist-ing within the mazs civil structure.Three distinct paramilitary elementsaPpear tO exist in the village militia.These are self-defense forces, combatguerrilla units (liberation troopa),and seeret guerrilla unita. All three ofthese elements fall under the contrO],of their local party secretary.The zelfdefense forces are normaliy

organized for and trained in ,the de-fense of villages and other insurgentfacilities, whereas the guerrilla unitsconstitute the local instrument forboth inflicting damage on the enemyand gaining and maintaining popula-tion control. The combat guerrillaunits of the village militia are usedby the party in the support of regu-lar insurgent military gorces in thearea or are employed in small inde-pendent operations. The secret guer-rilla units, on the other hand, are usedprimarily in enforcing the wili of theparty in a given area and are com-posed, to a large extent, of party mem-bers.Military ForcesAccording to Communist doctrine,the military forces are but one of sev-eral instruments through which theparty seeks to establish its power. Ac-tually, they are considered the leastimportant of the three principal orga-nizational elements. Communist plan-ning provides for the possible neceesityfor retrenchment, restructuring, oreven temporarily disbanding its armedforces should enemy strength proveoverwhelming. Party strategy is basedupon the assumption that as long asthe party core and the mase civil or-ganization remain intact, the militaryarm of the insurgent movement canbe reactivated or replenished. How-evqr, without the mass civil base, themovement cannot succeed.

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tEIL TO BATXEFIELBCommunist insurgent military

forces feIl into the categories of mainand regional forces. Together, theeetwo forces constitute whet may he re-ferred to as the regular forces es d i s -t i n gu i sh ed from the viilage militiawhich, although paramilitary, doesnot falI, within the miIitary chain ofcommand.The main force is normally a bodyof well.trained soldiers, many of whommay have been infiltrated into thecountry from the outside. A highlymotiva~d, professions] fighti]ng group,many of its personnel are full or can-didate membem of the CommunistParty. Although deployable whereneeded, the main force is usually con-trolled at interprovincial level.The regional force, on the otherhand, is made up mostly of local per-

eonne} recruited directly from themass civil organisation or promotedfrom the ranks of the village militia.Units of this type operate in regionsof no more than provincial size, Onlyin South Vletnarn has the militaryarm of the Communiet organizationreecbed the stage of developmentwhere main forces could be effectivelyempIoyed. In Malaya and the Philip-pines, military unite rarely exceeded200 men in size and most of the timeoperated in emaller groups.Within the headquarters, staff sec-

tirma, and operational unite of themain force, totdy distinct but par-aIleI channels of control exist-thstraditional military chain of commandand the party channels of control. bfii.itery command channels stern from themajor commander and mmcecd drmothrough h~e etrdf to suberdlnate sW%and operational units. The party in-sures complete domination over thismilitary structure by use of its ownparaIleI organization that includes, inaddition te those party elements al-ready dlscueeed, a special control bodythe interparty committee of tbe mil-itary. As an additional control, partycells operate witbin each @aff ssotionand operational unit.Regional forces operate under thecdntrol of the partys provincial ordistrict apparatus. Normally consish

ing of units no larger than a battid-ion, the regional forces conduct mostof tbe activities thought of as guer-rilla warfare.It ie evident that any progrrtm de.signed to defeat insurgency must in-clude not only the defeat of inmr-gent military forces, but also thedestruction of the party core. Elimi-

nating tbe guerrilla may be a necm-sary temporary measure, but it willremain temporary unless action istaken to destroy the apparatus whichspawns tbe guerrilla-the party cora

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Communist Celluar Org

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