Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles

7/30/2019 Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles

1/85

Research Programme

EngineeringCommunication technology and functionality in passenger

vehicles


2/85

Rail Safety and Standards Boards (RSSB's) response to the report byInterfleet Technology, entitled Communicationtechnology and functionalityinpassenger vehicles.

1. Purpose

1.1. The purpose of this paper is to outline RSSBs response to theattached report.

1.2. The report, prepared by Interfleet Technology, reviews the design andoperation of existing train communication systems and assesses thebenefits that more modern technology would deliver. The reportrecommends changes to existing equipment and its operation thatwould improve response following an incident or accident. Therequirement to undertake the research stems from Recommendations

85, 86 and 87 of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry (Part 1).

1.3. The key objectives of the research were to review the feasibility andcost effectiveness of three types of communication:

Passenger to signaller communications; providing acommunication link between passengers and the signaller/controlcentre.

Roaming communications; such that train staff can readilycommunicate with each other or make broadcasts to passengers

from any part of the train.

Remote broadcasting; enabling the signaller or control centre tomake announcements to passengers on a train at a remotelocation. This feature is of principal use on driver only operatedtrains where there is a possibility that the driver may beincapacitated in certain accident scenarios and there are notnecessarily any other train crew on board.

2. RSSBs response

2.1. In addressing the above inquiry recommendations, this report makes anumber of recommendations pertaining to communications technologyto take matters further. Before doing this however, it is important to firstestablish what needs to be communicated, how and when.

2.2. On behalf of RSSB, Cranfield University are currently undertaking the'Evacuation andCommunication' project that is due to conclude in June2004. This broader work considers passenger reaction to incidentsand their perceived needs. It identifies the most appropriate methodsby which passengers and staff should communicate following an


3/85

accident/incident to promote survivability and reduce injury. It willconsider who needs to communicate with whom, what informationneeds to be passed on, timescales for communication, thecommunication media, how communication might affect workload, howcommunication requirements are likely to vary on the incident and the

operating scenario, and how communication strategies might vary indifferent situations.

2.3. RSSB will respond to the recommendations in the attached report oncethe outcome of Cranfields work is known.

3. Contact

3.1. For further information please contact:

Jim Lupton

Head of Engineering [email protected]


4/85

RRRRAILWAYAILWAYAILWAYAILWAY SSSSAFETYAFETYAFETYAFETYAAAACCIDENT ANDCCIDENT ANDCCIDENT ANDCCIDENT ANDSSSSURVIVABILITYURVIVABILITYURVIVABILITYURVIVABILITYPPPPROJECTROJECTROJECTROJECT 4444CCCCOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATION

TTTTECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGY

RRRREPORTEPORTEPORTEPORT NNNNOOOO :::: ITLR/T11272/002ITLR/T11272/002ITLR/T11272/002ITLR/T11272/002AAAAUTHORUTHORUTHORUTHOR :::: C.A.WC.A.WC.A.WC.A.WILSONILSONILSONILSONDDDDATEATEATEATE :::: 12121212THTHTHTH DDDDECEMBERECEMBERECEMBERECEMBER2002200220022002


5/85


6/85

RRRRAILWAYAILWAYAILWAYAILWAY SSSSAFETYAFETYAFETYAFETY - A- A- A- ACCIDENT ANDCCIDENT ANDCCIDENT ANDCCIDENT AND SSSSURVIVABILITYURVIVABILITYURVIVABILITYURVIVABILITYPPPPROJECTROJECTROJECTROJECT 4 - C4 - C4 - C4 - COMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONTTTTECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGY

ITLR/T11272ITLR/T11272ITLR/T11272ITLR/T11272/002/002/002/002PAGENO: 3 OF 81

CCCCONTENTSONTENTSONTENTSONTENTSPAGE NUMBERPAGE NUMBERPAGE NUMBERPAGE NUMBER

1.1.1.1. EEEEXECUTIVEXECUTIVEXECUTIVEXECUTIVE SSSSUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6666

1.1. Recommendation 85 - Passenger to Signaller Communication...................... 6

1.2. Recommendation 86 - Roaming Communication.......................................... 7

1.3. Recommendation 87 Remote Broadcasting................................................ 7

1.4. Common Issues........................................................................................... 8

2.2.2.2. IIIINTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9999

2.1. Research Programme................................................................................. 102.1.1. GSM-R Overview.........................................................................102.1.2. Implementation Methods.............................................................102.1.3. Possible Benefits..........................................................................112.1.4. Human Factors............................................................................112.1.5. Final Report................................................................................. 11

2.2. COMMUNE Communications for UK Train Environment.......................... 11

3.3.3.3. CCCCURRENTURRENTURRENTURRENT PPPPRACTICES ANDRACTICES ANDRACTICES ANDRACTICES ANDTTTTECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGY........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12121212

3.1. Methodology.............................................................................................123.2. UK, Former BR Operators.......................................................................... 12

3.3. UK non-BR operators................................................................................. 153.3.1. Heavy rail operators....................................................................153.3.2. Light rail operators......................................................................163.3.3. Summary....................................................................................19

3.4. European Operators..................................................................................20

3.5. Asia/Pacific Operators...............................................................................21

3.6. North American Operators......................................................................... 22

4.4.4.4. PPPPOTENTIALOTENTIALOTENTIALOTENTIAL MMMMETHODS TOETHODS TOETHODS TOETHODS TO AAAACHIEVECHIEVECHIEVECHIEVE CCCCOMPLIANCE WITH THEOMPLIANCE WITH THEOMPLIANCE WITH THEOMPLIANCE WITH THE RRRRECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 24242424

4.1. GSM-R......................................................................................................244.1.1. EIRENE (European Integrated Railway radio Enhanced NEtwork) ... 244.1.2. MORANE (MObile RAdio for railway Networks in Europe)............. 254.1.3. Railtrack......................................................................................254.1.4. Manufacturers.............................................................................264.1.5. Nortel .........................................................................................26

4.1.6. Siemens Transportation ............................................................... 284.1.7. Other Manufacturers...................................................................30


7/85



4.1.8. Industry Reports........................................................................... 304.1.9. GSM-R Summary.........................................................................31

4.2. Other Methods..........................................................................................324.2.1. Supplier A ...................................................................................324.2.2. Supplier B....................................................................................404.2.3. Supplier C ...................................................................................42

5.5.5.5. BBBBENEFITSENEFITSENEFITSENEFITS .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 45454545

5.1. Assessment Methods.................................................................................. 45

5.2. Recommendation 85: Passenger to Signaller Communications for DOO ..... 465.2.1. Safety Benefits and Disbenefits..................................................... 465.2.2. Quantitative Assessment..............................................................48

5.2.3. Other Benefits .............................................................................495.2.4. Disbenefits ..................................................................................495.2.5. Where Benefits Could be Achieved............................................... 50

5.3. Recommendation 86a: Roaming Communications (including PA access)..... 525.3.1. Safety Benefits.............................................................................525.3.2. Quantitative Assessment..............................................................545.3.3. Other Benefits .............................................................................545.3.4. Disbenefits and Limitations .......................................................... 55

5.4. Recommendation 86b: Collision Resistant PA Systems................................. 55

5.4.1. Safety Benefits.............................................................................555.4.2. Quantitative assessment.............................................................. 575.4.3. Other Benefits .............................................................................575.4.4. Where Benefits Could be Achieved............................................... 57

5.5. Recommendation 87: Remote Broadcast .................................................... 575.5.1. Safety Benefits.............................................................................585.5.2. Quantitative Assessment..............................................................585.5.3. Other Benefits .............................................................................585.5.4. Where Benefits Could be Achieved............................................... 59

6.6.6.6. IIIINDICATIVE COSTSNDICATIVE COSTSNDICATIVE COSTSNDICATIVE COSTS........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 606060606.1. Assessment Method ................................................................................... 60

6.2. Recommendation 85: Passenger to Signaller Communication ..................... 626.2.1. GSM-R Based System Using Existing Voice Based PCA .................. 626.2.2. Trainwire Based GSM System Using New PCA.............................. 626.2.3. Fully Independent GSM Based System..........................................63

6.3. Recommendation 86 Roaming Communications...................................... 646.3.1. Basic System Non Collision Resistant......................................... 646.3.2. Compliant System........................................................................ 64

6.4. Recommendation 87 Remote Broadcast................................................... 656.4.1. GSM-R Based System................................................................... 65


8/85



6.4.2. GSM-Based System......................................................................65

7.7.7.7. DDDDISCUSSIONISCUSSIONISCUSSIONISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 66666666

7.1. Recommendation 85: Passenger to Signaller Communication ..................... 66

7.2. Recommendation 86A: Roaming Communications..................................... 69

7.3. Recommendation 86B: Collision Resistant PA.............................................. 70

7.4. Recommendation 87: Remote Broadcast .................................................... 71

8.8.8.8. CCCCONCLUSIONS ANDONCLUSIONS ANDONCLUSIONS ANDONCLUSIONS AND RRRRECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................................................................ 73737373

8.1. Passenger to Signaller Communication....................................................... 73

8.2. Roaming Communication System............................................................... 74

8.2.1. Roaming Communications........................................................... 748.2.2. Collision Resistant PA...................................................................75

8.3. Remote Broadcasting................................................................................. 76

8.4. Human Factors Study................................................................................. 76

9.9.9.9. AAAAPPENDIXPPENDIXPPENDIXPPENDIX A GA GA GA GLOSSARY OFLOSSARY OFLOSSARY OFLOSSARY OFTTTTERMSERMSERMSERMS................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 78787878

Copyrigh t 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board

This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internalcirculation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accuratelyand not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyrightof Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any

other use of the material please apply to RSSB's Head of Research and Development forpermission. Any additional queries can be directed to [email protected]. This publication can

be accessed via the RSSB websitewww.rssb.co.uk


9/85



1.1.1.1. EEEEXECUTIVEXECUTIVEXECUTIVEXECUTIVE SSSSUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYOn the 5th October 1999 two trains operated by Thames Trains and First GreatWestern collided at Ladbroke Grove junction. Part 1 of the resultant publicinquiry (LGRI/1) made recommendations to improve rail safety in the future.Interfleet Technology Limited was commissioned by Railway Safety to research thefeasibility of three communication recommendations (85, 86, 87), and this reportpresents the findings.

The research was broken down into defined areas and information sought fromvarious parties including Train Operators (both in the UK and globally),equipment suppliers and Railtrack. Once an adequate sample of data had beenobtained a high level analysis was undertaken to determine; the level of safety

benefits that would be obtained and to ascertain what future actions should betaken.

The recommendations have been considered in the context of the GSM-Rimplementation programme. GSM-R has been chosen to become the Europeanradio system and as such Railtrack will employ it as the national radio system.Railtrack were consulted to obtain their view on the recommendations and toobtain details of the national rollout for GSM-R. Currently the GSM-Rinfrastructure program is scheduled for completion at the end of 2006.

1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. RRRRECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATION 85 - P85 - P85 - P85 - PASSENGER TOASSENGER TOASSENGER TOASSENGER TO SSSSIGNALLERIGNALLERIGNALLERIGNALLERCCCCOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONPassenger to signaller communication systems are not commonly installed,but they are provided on some railways. Currently the automatic DSDalert system on Cab Secure Radio provides some of the desiredfunctionality of this recommendation. Full passenger to signallercommunication could be technically achieved through GSM-R. Aninterface unit would need to be designed to link the radio with passengercommunication alarm panels, and it would be necessary to ensure that theradio was adequately protected in a collision.

Safety benefits likely to be provided by a passenger to signallercommunication facility were found to be limited. In terms of equivalentfatalities prevented, a maximum figure of 0.075 fatalities per year wasestimated. A cost benefit analysis suggested a pay back time of 15 yearstherefore it is likely that such a facility would only be justifiable on newerfleets.

Design work should be commissioned into the interfacing of PassengerCommunication Alarm systems, so that emergency calls not dealt with

by drivers are routed via GSM-R to the signaller.


10/85



1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2. RRRRECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATION 86 - R86 - R86 - R86 - ROAMINGOAMINGOAMINGOAMING CCCCOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONOMMUNICATIONSome basic forms of roaming communication are already in use, but none

conform fully with the LRGI/1 recommendations. GSM-R allows the use ofhand held mobiles therefore it could be used to support a roamingcommunication system. However, as the capacity of GSM-R would haveto be greatly enhanced to accommodate such a facility other systems(DECT, GSM) that could be used in conjunction with GSM-R wereexplored.

Apart from the safety benefits provided by a roaming communicationsystem, there is also potential for significant benefit to efficiency, customerservice and staff safety. A first approximation of the likely safety benefits

estimated an upper limit of 0.49 fatalities per year with a pay back time ofapproximately 20 years, suggesting that such a system could be onlyjustifiable for new builds and retro fit to recent stock.

Train operators should be encouraged to investigate the existingoptions for roaming communications.

Subject to the result of a trial to determine the effectiveness of DECTand wireless LAN transmissions in and around trains, developmentwork should be carried out into the provision of roamingcommunication systems.

Recommendation 86 also envisaged that a roaming system shouldinterface with the public address system even when carriages become de-coupled, as such a collision resistant PA was considered. No examples ofthis type of technology were found although it is technically possible. Itwas estimated that the provision of a collision resistant PA would cost 50%over and above the cost of a basic roaming communication system givinga benefit of only 0.035 fatalities per year. It is therefore consideredimpracticable to implement this type of system.

1.3.1.3.1.3.1.3. RRRRECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATIONECOMMENDATION 87 R87 R87 R87 REMOTEEMOTEEMOTEEMOTE BBBBROADCASTINGROADCASTINGROADCASTINGROADCASTINGRemote broadcasting is already provided on DOO trains via Cab SecureRadio but is not widely used. GSM-R already has a functional addressallocated for remote broadcasting so can be used to provide this facility.

An initial consideration of the safety benefits suggests that remotebroadcasting is only likely to be useful in a limited number of situations onnon-DOO fleets.


11/85



Train operators who do not currently have remote broadcastingfacilities should consider whether it would have any benefits for theirparticular operations.

1.4.1.4.1.4.1.4. CCCCOMMONOMMONOMMONOMMON IIIISSUESSSUESSSUESSSUES The extent of the benefits that could be provided by the proposed

communication systems can only be truly evaluated following adetailed consideration of human factors issues. Human factorsresearch will be required to study passengers communicating withsignallers, the potential benefits of roaming communication andremote broadcasting. It is expected that this work would also confirm

the low level of benefits obtainable from collision resistant PA.

To preserve the operation of the train borne radio in the event ofcollision, and hence maintain the safety benefits available, the radioequipment should ideally be fitted in protected locations with localemergency power provision.


12/85



2.2.2.2. IIIINTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTIONFollowing on from an initial review performed on behalf of ATOC, Interfleet werecommissioned by Railway Safety to progress a research project addressing thetechnical feasibility and potential safety benefits that could be obtained from theimplementation of recommendations 85, 86 and 87 made by Lord Cullen in Part1 of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry (LGRI/1).

Recommendation 85 states;The possibili ty of installing on driver-only trains a telephone by which passengers

can communicate with the signa ller in the event of the driver being killed or

incapacitated should be studied (para 14 .65).

Paragraph 14.65 states;There should a lso, in my view be a study of the possibil ity of installing on driver-

only tra ins a telephone by which passengers can communicate wi th the signaller

in the event of the driver being killed of incapacitated, so as to enable them to

obta in advice and in formation in such an emergency.

Recommendation 86 states;The feasibil ity of a roaming communication system for tra in staff should be

examined (para 14.68).

Paragraph 14.68 states;Professor Galea and Dr Weyman suggested that the feasibility of introducing a

roaming communication system used by train staf f should be examined. They

said that ideally it should interface with the public address system and a lso al low

crew to communicate amongst themselves. It should be capable of operating

despite de-coupling of carriages. Counsel for RMT submitted that a modern

communication link should be available between the guard and the driver so that

the guard was able to obtain access to the public address from any of the

coaches and not merely his own compartment or the buffet car. I agree with the

substance of that submission and, in addition, the submission made on behalf of

the Rail Users Committees. But the possibil ity of remote broadcasting f romoutside the train, where it is not al ready available, should be investigated.

Recommendation 87 states;The possibil ity of remote broadcasting f rom outside the train, where it is not

already available, should be investigated (para 14 .68).

Paragraph 14.68 states; See recommendation 86.


13/85


ITLR/T11272ITLR/T11272ITLR/T11272ITLR/T11272/002/002/002/002PAGE NO: 10 OF 81

Another LGRI/1 recommendation relates to radio communication.

Recommendation 51; There should be a national system of direct radio

communication between trains and signallers.

Recommendation 51 will be satisfied by the implementation of the Global Systemfor Mobile Communications Railways (GSM-R) and as such is not a main topicof this research project. However as GSM-R will be the national Radio systememployed, its ability to provide recommendations 85, 86 and 87 had to beconsidered.

2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1. RRRRESEARCHESEARCHESEARCHESEARCH PPPPROGRAMMEROGRAMMEROGRAMMEROGRAMMEThe research program was initially broken down into defined areasallowing a project plan to be created and time scales to be determined.Other associated projects/reports were reviewed to ensure that work wasnot being duplicated and that any information previously documented wasconsidered. Information was sought from various parties both in the UKand globally. Once an adequate sample of data had been obtained ahigh level analysis was made to determine the level of safety benefit thatcould be achieved.

2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.2.1.1.GSM-R OGSM-R OGSM-R OGSM-R OVERVIEWVERVIEWVERVIEWVERVIEWA full understanding of the timescales projected (to date) weresought along with details of migration issues associated with railzones and vehicle types. Manufacturers were contacted todetermine their involvement with GSM-R, to obtain more currentinformation on the rollout situation in Great Britain and tounderstand the capabilities of the technology.

2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.IIIIMPLEMENTATIONMPLEMENTATIONMPLEMENTATIONMPLEMENTATION MMMMETHODSETHODSETHODSETHODSThis research activity considers GSM-Rs ability to performLGRI/1 recommendations 85, 86 and 87 and the possible

impact on its program, should the recommendations beimplemented.

To ensure that the optimum level of benefit would be gainedother systems, that could be interfaced with GSM-R wereconsidered, ensuring that the most appropriate solutions wereidentified. This involved identifying best practices employedinside and external to the confines of the UK rail industry, andsupplier liaison to determine the possibility/cost of developingsuitable systems.


14/85



2.1.3.2.1.3.2.1.3.2.1.3.PPPPOSSIBLEOSSIBLEOSSIBLEOSSIBLEBBBBENEFITSENEFITSENEFITSENEFITSPredominantly the research considered safety benefits, howeverany additional (non-safety) benefits that could be obtained werealso documented. The approach taken was to assess thebenefits in a qualitative rather than quantitative perspective.

To ascertain the true benefits that could be gained an overviewcost analysis was performed. This provided an approximate (i.e.50%) figure along with details of the main factors which wouldinfluence the final cost.

UK operators (formerly BR) were consulted to establish where theimplementation of the LGRI/1 recommendations, and hence the

potential safety benefits would be best employed, i.e. roamingcommunication on a driver only train may be consideredunnecessary.

2.1.4.2.1.4.2.1.4.2.1.4.HHHHUMANUMANUMANUMAN FFFFACTORSACTORSACTORSACTORSThe original project plan included a section to address the topicof human factors. However during a project review meetingheld with Railway Safety, 20th May 2002, it was decided that thisissue will be picked up under the main Accident Survivabilityseries of projects and as such was excluded from this project.

2.1.5.2.1.5.2.1.5.2.1.5.FFFFINALINALINALINAL RRRREPORTEPORTEPORTEPORTThis final report details the findings of the research projectconcluding with recommendations to enable Railway Safety tosuitably respond to LGRI/1 recommendations 85, 86 and 87.

2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. COMMUNE CCOMMUNE CCOMMUNE CCOMMUNE COMMUNICATIONS FOROMMUNICATIONS FOROMMUNICATIONS FOROMMUNICATIONS FOR UK TUK TUK TUK TRAINRAINRAINRAIN EEEENVIRONMENTNVIRONMENTNVIRONMENTNVIRONMENTRailway Safety had recently instigated another research project associatedwith communications, Project COMMUNE. To prevent duplication the

scope of this project was reviewed. Primarily, its objective was toinvestigate the potential for developments in satellite basedcommunications to contribute to the cost-effective safe operation of trains.Although this project considers GSM-R as a communication technology,no immediate concerns were highlighted that would influence thecommunication research generated from the Ladbroke Grove Rail Enquiry.Consequently this research program has been performed independent toProject COMMUNE.


15/85



3.3.3.3. CCCCURRENTURRENTURRENTURRENT PPPPRACTICES ANDRACTICES ANDRACTICES ANDRACTICES ANDTTTTECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGYECHNOLOGY3.1.3.1.3.1.3.1. MMMMETHODOLOGYETHODOLOGYETHODOLOGYETHODOLOGY

The method used to carry out this research was to compile a questionnairebased around the three LGRI/1 recommendations. The questionnaireprincipally asked respondents about the systems which are currently fitted,but it also sought to find out about the operational background of thesystems, the experience gained with existing equipment, proposed trialsetc. In this way the aim was to put the information into its proper contextand gain a full picture of the current and planned emergencycommunication systems in use with each operator.

The research was divided up as follows:

UK, former British Rail (BR) operators

UK, non BR operators (e.g. light rail and Eurostar etc)

Europe

Asia/Pacific

North America

Other regions were intentionally omitted due to an anticipated low level oftechnology use and perceived difficulty in obtaining contacts.

Where a respondent was found to have an interesting system, thequestionnaire was followed up with a detailed discussion or, in somecases, a site visit.

3.2.3.2.3.2.3.2. UK, FUK, FUK, FUK, FORMERORMERORMERORMERBR OBR OBR OBR OPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSTrain Operating Companies (TOCs) that were formerly part of BR wereapproached and asked to complete the questionnaire described above.This was achieved either through written or verbal communication.Responses were obtained from many, but not all companies.

The responses obtained indicated that most train operators have madelittle change to the communication systems inherited from BR, and whilstaware of the LGRI/1 recommendations have not taken any steps toinvestigate the feasibility of introducing such systems on their fleets. In viewof the likely complexity of such systems, the need to interface withRailtrack, and the fact that most operators do not own their rolling stock,this is perhaps not surprising.


16/85



The general picture is summarised in the sections below:

3.2.1.3.2.1.3.2.1.3.2.1.PPPPASSENGER TOASSENGER TOASSENGER TOASSENGER TO SSSSIGNALLERIGNALLERIGNALLERIGNALLERCCCCOMMUNICATION FOROMMUNICATION FOROMMUNICATION FOROMMUNICATION FORDOO TDOO TDOO TDOO TRAINSRAINSRAINSRAINS! No train operators currently provide this facility.! Vehicles built since approximately 1990 are generally fitted

with voice-based Passenger Communication Alarms (PCAs)that allow the passengers to communicate with the driveronly. This type of equipment is fitted irrespective of whetherthe vehicles are intended for Driver Only Operation (DOO)use. Earlier vehicles have a simpler system that makes apartial brake application.

! No known trials or investigations have been carried out withpassenger-signaller equipment.

! In discussion with certain train operators, a view wasexpressed that the existing communication systems aresubject to a significant amount of abuse, and that this wouldneed to be taken into account in designing a passenger tosignaller communication facility.

Trains operating over Cab Secure Radio (CSR) equipped routeshave a facility that provides a limited subset of the functionalityof this type of system. Activation of the Drivers Safety Device(DSD) automatically sends an alert to the control centre,

notifying the signaller that the driver has become incapacitated.The DSD alert device therefore provides some of the benefits ofa passenger to signaller system.

It is not clear how often the DSD alert facility is being tested.Some train operators have introduced a very thorough testingregime and are able to demonstrate that the whole system isworking on all their units. However, this is believed not to be thecase for all train operators, and may be worth furtherinvestigation.

3.2.2.3.2.2.3.2.2.3.2.2.RRRROAMINGOAMINGOAMINGOAMING CCCCOMMUNICATIONS ANDOMMUNICATIONS ANDOMMUNICATIONS ANDOMMUNICATIONS AND CCCCOLLISIONOLLISIONOLLISIONOLLISION RRRRESISTANTESISTANTESISTANTESISTANT PA SPA SPA SPA SYSTEMSYSTEMSYSTEMSYSTEMS! All vehicles are equipped with a train-wire based PA system

but none would be resistant to the parting of vehicles. Thereare no plans at present to introduce systems that would beand as such no trials have been carried out.

! Some newer vehicle types (such as Mark 4 coaches andMultiple Unit classes 373, 220 and 221 have a PAcommunication panel/transmitter in every vehicle. Olderrolling stock has a number of transmitters distributed along a

train. As a minimum, all driving cabs contain transmitters,


17/85



whilst staff compartments and buffet areas may also beequipped.

! Some train operators provide mobile phones for the use of

train crew.! Great North Eastern Railway (GNER) and First Great Western

(FGW) have carried out studies into the use of roamingcommunications. FGW investigated the possibility ofproviding a system that would provide full roaming access tothe PA, but failed to find any suitable technology. GNERinvestigated the use of roaming crew-to-crewcommunication, and selected commercially-available VHFhandsets. GNERs experience with this system is discussedfurther below.

! Wales and Borders expressed support for the concept of

roaming communications, but have not conducted any trialsor investigations.

The use by GNER of commercially available VHF radios partiallyfulfils recommendation 86. The solution chosen by this operatoris simple, practical, low cost and does not require modificationof vehicles. However it does not fully comply with therecommendation made in the LGRI/1 and consequently has anumber of disadvantages:

! Public Address (PA) announcements are not possible.! Discrete ("one to one") crew communication is not possible

any conversation via the handsets will be broadcastto/overheard by all users of the system.

! The handsets are bulky.! There can be cross-talk between adjacent trains.! Licensing issues exist.

Despite these limitations, the experience gained has beenpositive. In the case of GNER the adoption of the system was

motivated by a need to protect lone workers, and the system hasbeen successful in that respect. Its use has been extended tohelp improve customer service. These experiences demonstratethe potential benefits, even for a system that has limitedfunctionality.

3.2.3.3.2.3.3.2.3.3.2.3.RRRREMOTEEMOTEEMOTEEMOTEBBBBROADCASTINGROADCASTINGROADCASTINGROADCASTING! All DOO operators are able to provide this facility via the

existing Cab Secure Radio (CSR) system.! The facility is only used in exceptional circumstances.


18/85



! Non-DOO operators are not generally able to provide thefacility. The significant exception to this is Chiltern Railways,who have installed a Public GSM-based remote broadcast

facility on their Class 168 units.

Some operators expressed concerns about the extent of CSRcoverage, highlighting the possibility that the system might notalways be available on all parts of the network.

Another concern over CSR is the extent to which the remotebroadcasting facility is tested. Some train operators haveintroduced a very thorough testing regime and are able todemonstrate that the whole system is working on all their units.

However, this is believed not to be the case for all trainoperators, and may be worth further investigation.

The Chiltern Railways system is an example of a newdevelopment in remote broadcasting. It allows public GSMaccess to the trains PA. Unauthorised access is prevented by therequirement to send an SMS (Short Messaging Service) messageprior to making the call. The system could be adapted toprovide roaming PA access by guards and other train staff,although it is not used for this at present.

3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3. UKUKUKUKNONNONNONNON-BR O-BR O-BR O-BR OPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSIt was considered worthwhile to approach UK passenger operators whohave come into existence independently of the former BR network. This isbecause their facilities have generally been planned from new and includefewer legacy systems. The opportunity may therefore have been takento adopt new communication systems not considered by the nationalrailway.

Details for these operators are summarised below.

3.3.1.3.3.1.3.3.1.3.3.1.HHHHEAVYEAVYEAVYEAVY RRRRAILAILAILAILOOOOPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSThe three mainline heavy rail passenger operators, which haverisen independently of BR, are Heathrow Express, Eurostar andEurotunnel. The operational characteristics are substantiallydifferent between these three railways but, from the point of viewof communication systems, they do have some similarities:

All three employ voice-based Passenger Communication

Alarms (PCAs). These allow the passenger to speak to thedriver, but no connection is available directly to the signaller.


19/85



All three have limited roaming communication systems basedon VHF radios. In the case of Eurotunnel the signal is carriedon a leaky feeder cable running along the train, and is hence

vulnerable to vehicle separation. PA announcements can bemade on this system. On Heathrow Express the signal iscarried in a similar cable laid in the Heathrow tunnel, andhence the system only works on that portion of the route.

Remote broadcast is possible on all three routes. However, itis not operational on Eurostar vehicles due to the transmittersalong their route not being equipped with suitable hardware.

Eurostar have taken steps to ensure that their VHF radio system

is properly licensed in the UK. They have used the system fortrain evacuations in the Channel Tunnel and following a high-speed derailment in France. During these events it was found tobe both effective and useful. The bulk of the use of the roamingcommunications is, however, centred on customer service.

The other major heavy rail operator is London Underground.Underground trains do not have any train crew and so roamingcommunications are not relevant. However, the trains are fittedwith Passenger Communication Alarms that allow thepassengers to speak with the driver.

Remote broadcasting by the line controllers is possible on allLondon Underground lines with the exception of sub-surfaceroutes and the Victoria Line. It is available at all times on theJubilee and Northern Lines (as per BR Cab Secure Radio), buton the other lines it is only accessible when the vigilance systemhas timed out (i.e. the driver is incapacitated).

London Underground is beginning the process of integrating allof its separate radio systems into a new Digital Trunked Radio

System (TETRA) based network called Connect. With respect toemergency communications this will provide the samefunctionality as the older systems.

3.3.2.3.3.2.3.3.2.3.3.2.LLLLIGHTIGHTIGHTIGHT RRRRAILAILAILAILOOOOPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSLight rail system operators rely heavily on communicationsystems to maintain the integrity of their service operation.Incidents happen at a relatively high frequency owing to theproblems associated with on-street running and mingling withroad traffic. This has led to the operators gaining valuable

experience regarding the usefulness of different communicationssystems.


20/85



The tramway operators were found to all have similar systemsbased on analogue radio technology, but with capabilities

varying significantly between operators. A basic system, such asthat used on Croydon Tramlink, offers functionality similar to thenational rail network:

Passengers can contact the driver (via the passengeremergency alarm), but not the signalman.

No roaming communication systems are generally available(although Croydon does have a TETRA system covering partof its route, it is carried as a backup and is reportedly neverused).

PA announcements are only possible from the cab.

Remote broadcasting is not possible.

These simple arrangements can be justified because of a widevariety of risk mitigation factors, which would not necessarily bepresent on a heavy railway. These include the relative ease ofdisembarkation from low-floor vehicles, the safe nature of thetram tracks themselves, the constant monitoring of vehiclepositions by the control centre, the use of closed circuit television

(CCTV) and the presence of help points at stations.

However, some light rail operators have very comprehensivefacilities over and above the basic system described above.Examples of technologies in current use are as follows:

Passenger to signaller voice communication (Midland Metro).

Passenger to signaller text alert (Docklands).

Roaming communication handsets (Manchester Metrolink and

Docklands). Remote broadcasting to the PA (Midland Metro, Docklands).

Text message broadcasting to drivers (Manchester Metrolink).

Status code advice from the driver to the control centre(Sheffield Supertram).

The system that has most functionality is that used by MidlandMetro. This incorporates recommendation 85 (Passenger toSignaller communication) and recommendation 87 (remotebroadcasting). However it was found that problems existed with


21/85



the passenger-to-signaller communication system and thatcontrollers had mixed views regarding its usefulness.

The passenger-to-signaller call points are integrated with thetrams PCA system in a simple interface, which is illustrated infigure 1.

Figure 1:Figure 1:Figure 1:Figure 1: Midland Metro passenger call point

The call points are subjected to a relatively high level of abuse(or accidental activation). Whilst the calls are routed via thedriver first, in practice it has proved not always possible for thedriver to answer within the required 10 seconds. This leads tocalls being diverted to the control centre, and a number of

spurious calls (approximately one per day) causing distraction tothe line controllers. Note that this number of calls is generatedby a total of 12 trams in service at any given time.

This level of spurious use must be contrasted with only twoinstances of genuine use in four years. These relate topassenger falls.

The control centre has a sophisticated call queuing system andis well equipped to deal with spurious calls and multiple alertsfrom passenger call points as well as ordinary radio traffic. Thesoftware places emergency calls at the top of the queue, colours


22/85



them red and makes an audible alert to the controller. Figure 2shows the system in use with a queue of two ordinary calls(shown in blue on the left of the screen).

Figure 2:Figure 2:Figure 2:Figure 2: Control centre screen at Midland Metro, showing the

call stack containing two non-emergency calls

The same interface is used to speak to drivers, make remotebroadcasts, to send text to Passenger Information Displays andto make ordinary telephone calls.

Experience of the remote broadcast feature is positive thissystem is used occasionally for passenger information updates.

None of the systems have ever needed to be used in a majoremergency, despite the tramway having had several levelcrossing collisions. The low speeds used on the tramwaycombined with the excellent braking characteristics of the tramsmake a major incident highly unlikely.

3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.3.SSSSUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYThe operators who have appeared in the post-BR period haveall taken steps to ensure that modern communication systemsare provided, and as a result have better overall facilities thanthe ex-BR operators.


23/85


24/85


25/85



crew to speak directly to the signaller. However, PA access from theportable units and direct passenger to signaller contact are not available.

The Singapore SMRT systems new driverless trains will incorporate apassenger to signaller communication system, but in common withMidland Metro in the UK, this operates in the context of a heavilysupervised network. The Singapore vehicles incorporate CCTV cameras ineach vehicle so that the controllers can immediately see who has activatedthe alarm and why.

The actual operation of the passenger to signaller alarm is based on aTETRA digital radio system.

3.6.3.6.3.6.3.6. NNNNORTHORTHORTHORTH AAAAMERICANMERICANMERICANMERICAN OOOOPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSPERATORSNorth American rail operators use an entirely different type of radiosystem to that common in Europe. Part of the VHF spectrum from160.215 MHz to 161.565 MHz has been allocated for railway voicecommunication. This spectrum has been divided up into 96 separatechannels, and these are allocated to operators within different areas of thecountry.

In any given area, a particular channel will be allocated as the roadchannel. This is used by the control centre and all drivers and guards in

the local area. The system is simplex; meaning that from an operationalpoint of view only one person can speak at once and all users can hearwhat is being said.

The open nature of the system has led to it being used in a different wayto the radio systems in Europe. In some respects, this pattern of use ismore appropriate to the sparse distribution of railways in the USA. Forexample, drivers are required to examine passing trains for defects andannounce any found over the radio. In addition, if a train is stopped at astation the driver will make an announcement over the radio, so that

approaching trains will be warned of the possibility of passengers on thetracks. Drivers will also announce whenever they pass a caution signal,and the guard is required to repeat this back as a confirmation.

It is argued that the open nature of the communication leads to greatersafety, as all the staff involved have a higher level of general awareness ofwhat is happening on the railway. However, it is difficult to see how thiswould be of benefit in the UK context of heavily trafficked lines. Itrepresents a significant divergence from established UK practice.

US passenger operators have not implemented any emergencycommunication systems along the lines recommended by Lord Cullen.


26/85



The deficiencies of the US system have been recognised by the railwayadministration, and a new digital radio system is being developed based

on the APOC project 25 standard. This continues to use VHF frequenciesbut reallocates the available bandwidth into 182 channels. These will bedivided up to provide 80 trunked duplex voice channel pairs, five non-trunked channel pairs, plus 11 simplex channels. The system will thereforeprovide both the established US functionality of open simplex channelsplus the duplex channels familiar in Europe.

The system is on trial on a freight railway in the Pacific Northwest, but ithas not yet been used on passenger operations. The only knownpassenger system using APOC project 25 technology is the Korean high

speed line, however the details of this system are not known at the presenttime.


27/85



4.4.4.4. PPPPOTENTIALOTENTIALOTENTIALOTENTIAL MMMMETHODS TOETHODS TOETHODS TOETHODS TO AAAACHIEVECHIEVECHIEVECHIEVE CCCCOMPLIANCE WITH THEOMPLIANCE WITH THEOMPLIANCE WITH THEOMPLIANCE WITH THERRRRECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONSECOMMENDATIONS

GSM-R has been chosen to become the European radio system and as such willsatisfy the requirement for a national train radio system specified in LGRI,recommendation 51. As part of this research program, consideration has beengiven to determine, not only to whether GSM-R as a system could deliver LGRIrecommendations 85, 86 and 87, but also whether GSM-R would be the mostappropriate implementation method. This section addresses the functionality ofGSM-R in relation to the possible delivery of the LGRI/1 recommendations andconsiders other methods that could be used in parallel to GSM-R to achieve thetechnical requirements recommended. Various available reports on traincommunications were also reviewed to determine the viewpoint of other Industrycommentators.

4.1.4.1.4.1.4.1. GSM-RGSM-RGSM-RGSM-RThe EU, through its various directives on interoperability, has ensured thatthe future European train cab radio system will be GSM-R. The UICthrough its member constituents and multi-party bodies, such as EIRENEand MORANE, has provided a set of specifications with which this systemmust comply. The purpose is to produce a pan-European train radiosystem that will allow trains to cross borders with an interoperable radio

system. Consequently GSM-R is to become the national radio system fortrains on the Railtrack network.

4.1.1.4.1.1.4.1.1.4.1.1.EIRENE (EEIRENE (EEIRENE (EEIRENE (EUROPEANUROPEANUROPEANUROPEAN IIIINTEGRATEDNTEGRATEDNTEGRATEDNTEGRATED RRRRAILWAY RADIOAILWAY RADIOAILWAY RADIOAILWAY RADIO EEEENHANCEDNHANCEDNHANCEDNHANCED NENENENETWORKTWORKTWORKTWORK))))This is the body set up by UIC (Union Internationale desChemins de fer), the international union of railways, to explorethe issues surrounding the choice of a pan European train radio.GSM-R was chosen from the possible candidates' e.g. TETRA, tobe the future train radio. Once GSM-R had been chosenEIRENE developed the Functional and System Specifications to

ensure that interoperability could be achieved.

Inspection of the EIRENE website revealed that little progress hasbeen made with rollout of the GSM-R system in Europe. Swedenalready has a major part of its network covered by GSM-R,although it is different to the requirement of the EIRENEspecifications as it uses hand portable radios rather than fixedcab radios. Germany has possibly progressed the furthest as itnow has one high-speed route converted. Several othercountries have test sections on their rail networks.


28/85



4.1.2.4.1.2.4.1.2.4.1.2.MORANE (MOMORANE (MOMORANE (MOMORANE (MOBILEBILEBILEBILE RARARARADIO FOR RAILWAYDIO FOR RAILWAYDIO FOR RAILWAYDIO FOR RAILWAY NNNNETWORKS INETWORKS INETWORKS INETWORKS IN EEEEUROPEUROPEUROPEUROPE))))This is the project set up to produce prototypes of the GSM trainradio and evaluate the system development, testing andvalidation. Three test sites were operated in France, Germanyand Italy to validate operation over different terrain andoperational situations. Their main objective is to:

validate various propagation conditions.

allow equipment interoperability tests.

allow different EMC testing situations (15 kV ac, 25 kV ac, 3kV dc).

4.1.3.4.1.3.4.1.3.4.1.3.RRRRAILTRACKAILTRACKAILTRACKAILTRACKThe key player in the rollout of GSM-R in Great Britain isRailtrack. Therefore decisions made by them on the installedcapability of the infrastructure will influence the level and varietyof services that the GSM-R system will be able to offer to the enduser.

The National GSM-R project, sponsored by Railtrack entails thereplacement of existing train radio systems, mainly CSR andNRN with GSM-R. The project comprises of a Delivery team,based at Fitzroy House and a Sponsor team, based at RailtrackHouse. The Delivery team is primarily responsible for buildingthe national GSM-R network comprising of some 2000 basestations plus switching stations etc. The Sponsor team isresponsible for stakeholder liaison (principally Train Operators),network change and strategic direction of the project.

The project is currently in the design/development phase andcurrent intention is to seek implementation authority. This willbefollowed by the issue of tenders for network provision withconstruction planned to start early next year.

The implementation date for the national fitment of RailtracksGSM-R infrastructure is the end of 2006. As NRN is expected toexpire in 2008 this then provides a 2 year period in which trainoperators must swap out the old radios (primarily NRN) for newones.

Railtracks remit is to install GSM-R (voice radio) as a nationalreplacement for existing radio systems and as such that is whatthey are budgeting for. Any enhancements/features abovethose already employed will require separate benefit analysis,

funding and risk management. Approximately 90% of aprovisional specification has now been written for GSM-R.


29/85



4.1.4.4.1.4.4.1.4.4.1.4.MMMMANUFACTURERSANUFACTURERSANUFACTURERSANUFACTURERSSeveral manufacturers were contacted to determine theirinvolvement with GSM-R. Information on each companysinvolvement with GSM-R being initially researched throughphone calls, e-mail and website content.

Two manufacturers; Nortel Networks and Siemens, were foundto be the major players in the rollout of GSM-R on the Railtracknetwork. This is essentially because they are suppliers ofinfrastructure equipment as well as being capable of supplyingthe various levels of operational equipment that is required.Most other companies only produce handset/mobile units andtherefore are reliant on the infrastructure suppliers to provide the

capability for any services supplied.

Meetings were arranged with both Nortel and Siemens, todetermine their views on GSM-Rs suitability for the requirementsof the recommendations. Their input into this project is valuablebecause the capabilities of the infrastructure will largelydetermine which of the EIRENE specification options will beavailable and therefore useable. The opportunity was alsotaken to canvass their opinions on GSM-R in general, and toobtain more current information on the rollout situation in Great

Britain.

4.1.5.4.1.5.4.1.5.4.1.5.NNNNORTELORTELORTELORTELNortel are one of the largest telecommunications companies inthe world. GSM-R is an enhanced sub set of the public GSMmobile phone technology, and it forms a fairly small part oftheir Telecommunications business. They manufactureequipment such as base stations and mobile units themselvesand other components are bought in and integrated with theirown products. They also produce and supply many of the

different mobile handset types available.

Nortel Networks involvement with the GSM-R program in the UKto date involves the supply of the infrastructure (base stationsetc) to the West Coast Main Line project. Apart from the TestLine at Old Dalby and possibly certain parts of the actual mainline, very little progress has been made with roll out of thesystem.

Nortel believe that GSM-R is capable of achieving the three

LRGI/1 recommendations provided that additional equipmentwas added to interface with the necessary peripherals.


30/85


31/85



4.1.6.4.1.6.4.1.6.4.1.6.SSSSIEMENSIEMENSIEMENSIEMENSTTTTRANSPORTATIONRANSPORTATIONRANSPORTATIONRANSPORTATIONSiemens involvement with GSM-R in Great Britain will beextensive. They are a supplier of the dispatcher controlcentres, which interface with the main GSM-R infrastructurewith train cab radios and they are also developing andproducing train borne equipment. Siemens are involved withGSM-R development projects in Europe. The Swedishinfrastructure is supplied by Siemens, which gives themoperational experience. They were also involved with the BritishRail DART project in the late 1980s/early 1990's. This was aforerunner for GSM-R, based on the public GSM service with railrelated add-ons.

Siemens have already been involved with the cell and frequencyanalysis for the Railtrack network and were expecting contractsfor installation of infrastructure to be awarded soon, with apossible rollout early next year. They are actively pursuing thefuture sale of train borne equipment but, due to the currentemphasis being on the infrastructure installation, no actualequipment will be sold for some time. They are also currentlyinvolved in actively upgrading the CSR network (not merelyreplacing worn out items), this suggests that the demise of CSRis not likely to be imminent.

Siemens highlighted an issue concerning Railtrack operatingpractices differing significantly from those of the continentaloperators. This has several ramifications on the operation of theGSM-R system. The main problem is that the UK train runningnumbers are alphanumeric not pure numeric. The GSM-REIRENE specification has no facility for running numbers to bealphanumeric. What ramification this has on the principle ofinteroperability is currently indeterminate, any customisationaway from EIRENE standards would not be practicable without

heavy cost and time penalties.

Siemens are of the opinion that the current infrastructureresources are only sufficient to supply basic cab radio voicetraffic. When ERTMS is eventually added to the network, allspare capacity will be utilised and upgrades will be required tocope with system demand. This will particularly be the case incongested areas such as London Stations. There would appearto be little spare system capacity available for the many otherpotential GSM-R applications that have been touted around theindustry as future enhancements.


32/85



Siemens have designed their GSM-R Man Machine Interface(MMI) to be a direct replacement for the CSR MMI, which helpssimplify change over to the new system. The cab radio can also

interface with many other optional subsystems. Howeverwhether there is enough system capacity to use these options isopen to debate.

Remote Broadcasting from outside the train (recommendation87) is easily achieved, as it is part of the EIRENE specification(as previously discussed with other parties). The Siemens cabradio has the ability to connect to UK standard and UIC 568PA interfaces. Any other types of PA would need an interfaceto be designed to enable connection to the cab radio; some

vehicles may also require a PA system to be fitted.

Passenger to signaller communication (recommendation 85)could be achieved using the UIC intercom facility, whichcurrently allows the Train crew to call the driver or signallerthrough the GSM-R cab radio. The passenger call facilityhardware would need to be designed to interface with thisequipment and would need to take account of security andmisuse issues. It is thought that passenger call systems arenot in common use.

Roaming communication for train crew (recommendation 86)could potentially be the most complex issue to deal with.Siemens consider that the use of mobile handsets should bepossible to satisfy this requirement. However there areseveral potential problems in producing a coherent system.One of these is caused by Railtrack using alphanumeric trainrunning numbers as opposed to pure numeric. Train runningnumbers and crew functional numbers would need to beentered to ensure correlation between the train and crewradios. It is not possible to input alphanumeric codes on

standard EIRENE handsets and therefore they could not beused in this manner. It is considered by Siemens, that it isunlikely that the EIRENE compliant software for handsetswould be altered for such a small market as the UK, becauseit has been written to SIL2 standards and the costs would bedifficult to justify. Various other methods of entering therequired information would have to be investigated whichwould require technical modifications and changes toprocedures.

Other potential problems include poor reception for mobileswithin vehicles, particularly if they have metallised


33/85



windows. Experiments have shown that these can reduce thefield strength by 30-35 dB in some cases. This wouldappear to be a function of the physical system layout, which

requires the base stations to transmit in cells along the lengthof the track. This causes the transmissions to have aglancing incidence on the metal sides of the vehicle forlarge sections of the track. This is potentially the worst casescenario for mobile reception internal to the vehicle, and themetallisation of windows only makes this worse. Therefore itmay be necessary to investigate the use of signal boostingequipment to ensure a reasonable level of service.

One issue to be aware of is that not all mobile radios are

able to make emergency calls. The General-Purpose Radio(GPR) mobile specification only requires emergency calltransmit and receive to be optional in this class of mobile.Therefore care has to be taken when specifying the type ofmobile required for on board use.

4.1.7.4.1.7.4.1.7.4.1.7.OOOOTHERTHERTHERTHERMMMMANUFACTURERSANUFACTURERSANUFACTURERSANUFACTURERSThere are many other communication system manufacturers thatmay have an input to the GSM-R project, some already havingparticipated in GSM-R trials.

Nokia and Ericsson both manufacture mobile handsets, theseare basically enhanced mobile phones. The EIRENEspecification and manufacturing economies of scale dictate thatit is unlikely that the handsets would vary much in specificationand function. Sagem, a French company, also producehandsets and are suppliers for Swedish railways.

Kapsch are both manufacturers of GSM-R equipment and trainborne systems. They are also a company that Siemens use for

some of their on-train hardware requirements.

4.1.8.4.1.8.4.1.8.4.1.8.IIIINDUSTRYNDUSTRYNDUSTRYNDUSTRY RRRREPORTSEPORTSEPORTSEPORTSSeveral GSM-R related industry reports were reviewed todetermine whether they could supply any useful information onthe areas of interest with respect to the recommendations or,whether they would have an impact on their implementation.

Although the reports provided a broad spectrum of railcommunication study, ranging from the Railtrack DART project

in the late eighties to the new (as yet unpublished GE/RT 8080,


34/85



GE/RT8081) group standards, no major insights into the LRGI/1areas of interest were evident.

4.1.9.4.1.9.4.1.9.4.1.9.GSM-R SGSM-R SGSM-R SGSM-R SUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYUMMARYAll three LRGI/1 recommendations being considered could betechnically implemented via GSM-R.

Recommendation 87:Recommendation 87:Recommendation 87:Recommendation 87: Remote broadcasting is possible throughGSM-R as there will be a dedicated functional address reservedfor it, in line with the requirement of the EIRENE specifications.Basically this entails using the radios Functional Addressingfacility which can allow a PA system or individual mobiles to beconfigured as an extension to the cab radio. Provided that a

voice PA system already existed on a train, only an interfacebetween GSM-R and the PA system would need to be developed.

Recommendation 85:Recommendation 85:Recommendation 85:Recommendation 85: Passenger to signaller communicationcould be achieved via GSM-R by using either, a spare functionaladdress or the UIC intercom facility that would normally be usedfor communication between the guard (or other train crew) andthe driver. However, although GSM-R could be used as thebearer for this facility, research would be required to determinedetails of the actual passenger alarm/call system hardware.

Note the development of such hardware would be requiredirrespective of the technical solution/equipment chosen toimplement such a facility.

Recommendation 86:Recommendation 86:Recommendation 86:Recommendation 86: GSM-R mobiles can be used in a similarmanner to public GSM mobiles so the supply of a roamingcommunications system that could be used by the train crewshould be very simple. This system would even work whenvehicles are separated as the mobile units simply act as amobile phone either on the GSM-R network or, as a fall back,

on the public GSM network.

Unlike "remote broadcasting", "passenger to signaller" androaming communications are not facilities that are intended tobe transmitted via GSM-R. Other major concerns highlighted inrelation to "roaming" communication were the lack of RFcoverage and the difficulties that would be experiencedcorrelating mobile handsets to a specific train set.

For GSM-R to provide this facility a functional address may needto be allocated for it and major issues associated with

alphanumeric running numbers overcome.


35/85



4.2.4.2.4.2.4.2. OOOOTHERTHERTHERTHERMMMMETHODSETHODSETHODSETHODSAlthough GSM-R could potentially deliver recommendations 85, 86 and87, other systems that could be used in conjunction with GSM-R had to beexplored to ensure that the optimum level of benefit would be gained.

Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcasting) is already available fromGSM-R (without system enhancement) and as such does not warrantfurther direct research in relation to other methods. However, if thisfunction is found to be easily obtainable from another system thatprovided recommendations 85 and 86, it could be considered as anadditional feature, which would be useful in the event of an incident,

where the function of GSM-R is lost.

To document the requirement of a "roaming" communication and a"passenger to signaller" system a specification was produced. It should benoted here that Lord Cullens recommendation 85 specifically refers topassenger to signaller communication on driver only trains and thatroaming communications would have limited use on such vehicles.Consequently a single system providing both functions is unlikely to beused in its entirety. However as the technology used to create the twosystems would have similarities they were grouped in one specification forthe purpose of this study. Using this specification as a platform for

discussion a sample of three known railway accredited radio systemsuppliers were approached to determine the possibility and cost ofdeveloping suitable systems.

4.2.1.4.2.1.4.2.1.4.2.1.SSSSUPPLIERUPPLIERUPPLIERUPPLIERAAAASupplier A is an established communication systemmanufacturer focussing heavily on the provision of advancedaudio communications equipment. They also have considerableknowledge in safety systems having previously designed,manufactured and commissioned the PA system for the ChannelTunnel.

Currently they have no specific communication system thatsatisfies the LGRI recommendations. However whenapproached they were already actively reviewing all threerecommendations with a view of developing a suitable audiocommunication system based on existing equipment and theirextensive knowledge of GSM technologies.

Having reviewed the specification they produced a

comprehensive report, documenting their views on the Cullenrecommendations. In line with their own study, the report


36/85



actually reviews all three recommendations not just 85 and 86considered in our own specification.

Their report initially looks at current communication practicesused on rail vehicles within the UK with respect to therecommendations. It then documents various technical solutionsfor each recommendation as summarised below.

Recommendation 85 (Passenger to Signaller)Recommendation 85 (Passenger to Signaller)Recommendation 85 (Passenger to Signaller)Recommendation 85 (Passenger to Signaller)

A telephone (or hands free) device in each carriage, asrecommended by LGRI/1, can be achieved this will requirea "communications control unit" in each car.

Use of existing passenger communication devices may be

more logical and cost effective this will require a"communications control unit" in every cab (or every fewcoaches). This solution would not comply with the need tooperate un-coupled.

Passengers using their own telephone to call an "emergencynumber", the number to be at a national or TOC controlcentre. There is a strong case for this solution as thecommunications system is already available.

Recommendation 86 (Roaming)Recommendation 86 (Roaming)Recommendation 86 (Roaming)Recommendation 86 (Roaming)

It is assumed that this recommendation cannot be applied todriver only trains as the driver cannot "roam".

Licensed radio (higher power) will present problems inrespect of approvals, since a train is not a fixed site. Onlylow power (license exempt) systems are considered.

Traditional radio microphones have been considered, thistechnology is proven in a railway (platform environment), butis limited to PA operation only.

A specialised DECT talk-back system has been considered,an investigation is needed on radio propagation andinteraction between base-stations.

A DECT telephone system has been considered, but thereare concerns about the ongoing availability of thistechnology.

Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcast)Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcast)Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcast)Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcast)

Supplier A recognise that GSM-R will provide a "remotebroadcast" facility and although they consider existingcommercial GSM as an alternative solution it is notrecognised as a viable option and as such is not consideredfurther within this study.


37/85



Their report concludes with the proposal of two possible options.Option 1 is a fully compliant system and option 2 is aimed atdemonstrating how costs can be reduced if the requirement to

operate "de-coupled" is relaxed. Option two will permitoperation if there is a single break in the train wires, but itassumes that the power system will be maintained.

4.2.1.1.4.2.1.1.4.2.1.1.4.2.1.1.Option 1 (Communications control unit per car)Option 1 (Communications control unit per car)Option 1 (Communications control unit per car)Option 1 (Communications control unit per car)The proposals for option 1 are intended to provide fullcompliance, but this necessitates new equipment in eachcarriage. This proposal makes the assumption that it is notpractical to enhance the resilience of existing on-train powersupplies, and that there may be multiple failures of the train

wires due to uncoupling. This proposal is therefore anemergency communications package that, in an emergency, isindependent of existing on train equipment. However, it willinterface with the existing audio communication train wires,providing additional communications facilities for normaloperational use.

The system comprises of the following parts:

Communication Control Unit (CCU) housing theelectronics, horn loudspeaker and batteries.

GPS antennae (fitted to driver only trains). GSM antenna.

Remote loudspeaker a second loudspeaker to be installedat the other end of the car.

Passenger Emergency Communications Units (PECU) (fittedto Driver Only trains) one at each body end.

DECT base-station (not fitted on driver only trains)

DECT belt pack storage cabinet and charger system (thismay be on the train or in a crew office).

Option 1 is illustrated on the following page.


38/85



38

39

40

GSM

GPS

110V 0

V

Passenger

Emergency

Communication

Units

(PECU)

Remotehorn

loudspeaker(LS)

Communications

ControlUnit(CCU)

12V

12Ahr

DECTbase-

station

Throughtrainwires(wirenumbersareforanEMU)

CCU +LS

& DECT

Remote

LS

Planview

ofeachcarriagefor

Option1


39/85



Option 1 System DescriptionsOption 1 System DescriptionsOption 1 System DescriptionsOption 1 System Descriptions

The PECU (emergency telephone, rec. 85)The PECU (emergency telephone, rec. 85)The PECU (emergency telephone, rec. 85)The PECU (emergency telephone, rec. 85)

The PECU shall be a distinctive unit, with a standardised styleand colour thus recognisable by the public. Appropriatelabels shall be fitted, with instructions for use.

When the alarm button was pressed, the GSM modemimmediately sends an SMS (text) message Latitude, Longitude,Speed, Heading, time (UTC), PECU (1 or 2) and originatingnumber. Once the SMS has been sent (within a few seconds),the GSM modem is made to set up a voice call to the controlcentre. The control centre HMI shall associate the SMS data to a

map location; a drop down window allows the control centre tomanually acknowledge (causing the DTMF signal to be sent).The control centre can decide whether to communicate, or cansimply monitor audio activity from the carriage.

The call shall be cleared and the alarm reset under the followingconditions:

The control centre sends the appropriate command.

The GSM link is lost (a repeating confidence tone may berequired to validate the link).

Communication with the passenger shall be full duplex, withhigh stability due to application of adaptive echo cancellinghands-free technology.

DECT Communication System (Roaming Microphone, rec. 86)DECT Communication System (Roaming Microphone, rec. 86)DECT Communication System (Roaming Microphone, rec. 86)DECT Communication System (Roaming Microphone, rec. 86)The belt pack may be worn on the belt or within a jacket pocket(subject to size). The head/lapel microphone/earpiece isconnected to the belt pack.

There are three buttons on the belt pack, namely:

Crewcom Normal PA

Emergency PA

The Emergency PA button shall be distinct from the other buttonsto avoid accidental operation.

For the purpose of registration to a particular base-station, thebelt pack has an LED and flying lead connector (normallystowed). Registration is not required unless the unit is moved

from the train unit.


40/85

RRRRAILWAYAILWAYAILWAYAILWAY SSSSAFETYAFETYAFETYAFETY - A- A- A

Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles

Documents

Transcript of Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles