Communication Networks A Second Course Rahul Jain (Guest Lecture) Department of EECS University of...
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Communication Networks A Second Course hul Jain (Guest Lecture) partment of EECS iversity of California at Berkeley
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Transcript of Communication Networks A Second Course Rahul Jain (Guest Lecture) Department of EECS University of...
Communication NetworksA Second Course
Rahul Jain (Guest Lecture)Department of EECSUniversity of California at Berkeley
Network Bandwidth Exchange
Jain and Varaiya, “The Combinatorial Seller’s Bid Double Auction: An Asymptotically Efficient Market Mechanism”, JET submission, 2006
The Framework
A Mechanism for Indivisible Goods
An Example
Basics of Mechanism Design
Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Back to Example
ak=min {ck+1,vk }
Every Nash Equilibrium is efficient
The Network Case
Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium
Step 1
Step 2
Step 2, contd.
Putting it together