Committee on NFPA 730

Committee on NFPA 730

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: NFPA Technical Committee on Premises Security

FROM: Jeanne Moreau

DATE: May 7, 2010

SUBJECT: NFPA 730 F10 ROC Letter Ballot

The ROC letter ballot for NFPA 730 is attached. The ballot is for formally voting on

whether or not you concur with the committee’s actions on the comments. Reasons must

accompany all negative and abstention ballots.

Please do not vote negatively because of editorial errors. However, please bring such

errors to my attention for action.

Please complete and return your ballot as soon as possible but no later than Friday, May

21, 2010. As noted on the ballot form, please submit the ballot to Jeanne Moreau, e-mail

to [email protected] or fax to 617-984-7110.

The return of ballots is required by the Regulations Governing Committee Projects.

Attachment: Comments

mailto:[email protected]

Report on Comments – November 2010 NFPA 730_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-1 Log #3

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael D. DeVore, State Farm Insurance / Rep. Industrial Fire Protection Section of NFPA

730-2Revise text as follows:

Existing buildings or installations that do not comply with the provisions of the guides referenced in thisdocuments (see Chapter 2) should be permitted to be continued in service. provided that the lack of conformity withthese guide s does not present a serious threat to the occupants as determined by the authority having jurisdiction

Delete “guide” in two places and “in this”. This section is meant to be an exception for existingbuildings or installations in complying with the referenced documents in Chapter 2. Deleting the word “guide” in thisinstance clears up the meaning and points to the Chapter 2 documents.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-2 Log #6

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Bob Eugene, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.


Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.ANSI/UL 294, , 1999, revised 2005 2009.ANSI/UL 305, , 1997, revised 2007.ANSI/UL 437, , 2000, revised 2008.ANSI/UL 768, , 2006, revised 2007.ANSI/UL 1034, , 2000, revised 2008.UL 2058, , 2005.

Update ANSI/UL 294 to most recent revision.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-3 Log #4


730-2Revise as follows:

Reject the changes shown to Section 3.2 in ROP 730-2. Keep the wording of Section 3.2 the same as printed in NFPA730-2008.

The NFPA 730 task group made some changes to section 3.2 in preparing the proposals forcommittee action. The task group proposal to change the document to a standard was rejected by the committee.Therefore the changes to Section 3.2 are not required.

1Printed on 5/6/2010


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Marcelo M. Hirschler, GBH International

730-4Revise text to read as follows:

A room, office, building, or facility to which access is strictly and tightly controlled.Retain the NFPA 730 definition of “restricted area” but ask Standards Council to assign the committee

the responsibility for this definition to be a secondary definition and not a “second preferred”, which is not one of theaccepted terms for the Glossary of Terms. Alternately the technical committee may want to amend the term defined, forexample by stating “Restricted area (as related to premises security)” and this would become a preferred definitionbecause it would be unique.Please note that the NFPA Advisory Technical Committee on Glossary of Terminology did not submit this proposal.I am the chair of the NFPA Advisory Technical Committee on Glossary of Terminology but this comment is not

submitted on their behalf because we have not had the opportunity to discuss it.

The committee will ask the Council to make Restricted Area a secondary definition.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Marcelo M. Hirschler, GBH International

730-6Revise text to read as follows:

A windowless enclosure of heavy, reinforced construction with walls,floor, roof, and door(s) designed and constructed to delay penetration sufficiently to enable the timely arrival of responseforces.

The committee should choose one of three options:1. Retain the NFPA 730 definition of “vault” but ask Standards Council to assign the committee the responsibility for

this definition to be a secondary definition and not a “second preferred”, which is not one of the accepted terms for theGlossary of Terms.2. Adopt the NFPA 731 definition of “vault”, which reads as follows: “A room constructed of iron, steel, brick, concrete,

stone, tile, or similar masonry units permanently built into or assembled on the premises and having an iron, steel, orequivalent door and frame with a combination lock.” This definition would be suitable for NFPA 730 and moreappropriate than the definition from NFPA 40 contained in the proposal. I also made a comment to NFPA 731recommending that they adopt the NFPA 730 definition of “vault”. The definition of “vault” in NFPA 731 is less genericthan the one in NFPA 730 but it addresses the same concepts. The two documents are under the responsibility of thesame committee, so that consistency within the committee is very important.3. Alternately the technical committee may want to amend the term defined, for example by stating “Vault (as related to

premises security)” and this would become a preferred definition because it would be unique. This would be myrecommendation for the preferred action. The same recommendation was sent in a comment to NFPA 731.Please note that the NFPA Glossary of Terms Technical Advisory Committee did not submit this proposal.I am the chair of the NFPA Glossary of Terms Technical Advisory Committee but this comment is not submitted on

their behalf because we have not had the opportunity to discuss it.

Revise text to read as follows:An windowless enclosure of heavy, reinforced construction with walls,

floor, roof, and door(s) designed and constructed to delay penetration. sufficiently to enable the timely arrival ofresponse forces.A.3.3.49 Vault. Penetration delay requirements should be based on the associated alarm system and response.A vault can also consist of a door and modular panels constructed in compliance with the requirements in ANSI/UL

608, Standard for Burglary-Resistant Vault Doors and Modular Panels.Annex material was added to describe the type of vault in premises security.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-6 Log #1


730-8Add new section, 7.1.3* The primary security perimeter should include the total area in the security

plan.Renumber the existing 7.1.3 and subsequent sections of 7.1 and change A.7.1.2 to be A.7.1.3.

In the Committee Action on Section 7.1.2, the primary security perimeter was deleted. Thus thesubsequent Section 7.1.3 and the Annex for 7.1.2 is not clear without introducing the concept of primary securityperimeter.

This is not new material as it was in the ROP.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Association of Education Facility Officers

730-8Add the following language to the rewrite of Chapter 11:

11.4.3.2+ (NEW) The extent of campus exterior lighting must be set against the competing requirements of energyconservation and a desire to limit light pollution. Students, faculty and visitors bear the responsibility for avoidingsparsely-lit areas on, or in the vicinity of, campus.

To its credit, this committee recognizes the behavioral component in security as demonstrated in thefollowing reserved sections for future NFPA 730 revisions:8.3 Human Behavior. Reserved.14.4.2 Human Behavior. Reserved15.4.2 Human Behavior. Reserved16.4.2 Human Behavior. Reserved17.4.2 Human Behavior. Reserved19.4.2 Human Behavior. ReservedThe Chapter 11 language on human behavior contains language useful to the education facilities industry. Because

educational campuses present a unique risk aggregation, we would like to add to it as reflected in our comment.Damage claims against property owners that are based on exterior lighting may arise for several reasons, including

failure to provide adequate lighting and negligence in physical placement with respect to vehicular traffic or by causingan electrical shock due to improper wiring. This comment focuses on legal duties of owners regarding exterior lightinglevel.NFPA should not be among the authorities that conclude that increased lighting correlates with decreases in crime

without credible evidence that this conventional wisdom is correct. The cautious approach we advocate can assistowners, including private and public higher education facilities, in avoiding baseless legal claims of third parties who arethe victims of crime on those properties.Please refer to the attachment that contains an executive summary of a scientific study by Astronomical Society of

Victoria, Inc., Australia, titled, "Outdoor lighting and Crime: Part 2", and authored by BA Clark, (Version of 2003-05-23).This proposal has been prepared in a joint effort by APPA.ORG's code advisory committee, with Michael A. Anthony

P.E. and Richard Davis P.E., J.D. as issue specialistsNote: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

This is new material and can not be added at the ROC.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-8 Log #2



Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), the extent of an employer’s obligation to addressworkplace violence is governed by the General Duty clause, which states the following: “Each employer should shallfurnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards thatare causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”

This is a direct quotation from the OSH Act and was inadvertently changed in committee action on theROP. The change restores the quotation.




730-8Add new text to read as follows:

There are many night sky activists among APPA.ORG member institutions, among them the variousastronomy departments, and this comment is submitted as an annex item on their behalf. There is no shortage ofresearch on night sky issues. Two links appear below but there are many other papers written on this subject:-- "Outdoor Lighting and Crime: Is There a Connection?" SELENE-NY.ORGhttp://www.selene-ny.org/downloads/lightingandcrime.pdf-- "Unnecessary Light Pollution is Blotting Out the Night Sky". Australian Astronomical Society.

http://www.asv.org.au/index.php?Itemid=76&id=33&option=com_content&task=viewSee related comment for new language in 11.4.3.2.





730-12Add the following language to the Chapter 11 Annex covering Educational Facilties, Colleges and

Universities

Community lighting systems were the first major application for electrical power. Since the inception ofcommunity lighting systems in the late 1800's, these systems have grown and become increasingly complex. Theenvironmental issues are highly nuanced given the competing requirements of dark sky activists, energy conservationactivists, and the campus safety profession. So has the size of college and university campuses nested withinmunicipalities. This annex material addresses particular issues of using exterior illumination as a security resource.Members of the technical committee should not be shy about wordsmithing this section so that the prose harmonizes

better with the stylistic preference of the committee and NFPA staff. In this case, something written about the complexityof lighting systems on college and university campuses is better than nothing.




_______________________________________________________________________________________________Louis Chavez, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

730-25ANSI/UL 972 provides performance testing

requirements for burglary-resisting glazing materials. These materials are intended for use indoors and outdoors,principally as a substitute for plate (or float) glass show windows and showcase panels. They are designed to resist thehit-and-run (smash-and-grab) type of burglary.

Electronic cylinders are useful in applications where there is a high user turnover and aneed to collect access data and to limit access to particular periods. They are often used in conjunction with cardreaders, biometrics, and so on. Electronic cylinders should meet the requirements of ANSI/BHMA A156.30 in theappropriate grade for the application. Electronic Cylinders for burglary resistance should be listed to ANSI/UL 1034.

These lock designs provide convenient installation along with moderate security.Different locking functions are offered to meet access needs, such as non-keyed locking (for bathrooms) and keyedentry. For enhanced resistance to forced entry, doors with these locks can have a separate deadbolt mounted on thedoor; however, local codes should be consulted, since the second lock requires two actions for egress. Recent productdevelopments have greatly increased the strength and durability of these locks in order to retrofit existing installationswith more secure locking solutions. These locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.2 and ANSI/UL 437 in the appropriategrade for the application.

These lock designs combine cylindrical locks and deadbolts and are used inresidential occupancy where one motion is required to open the door. They include independently installed cylindricaland deadbolt locks that contain a linkage that allows instant retraction of the deadbolt with movement of the interior leverhandle or knob. They combine the security and safety of a latching device with the security of a deadbolt. These locksshould meet ANSI/BHMA A156.12 and ANSI/UL 437 in the appropriate grade for the application.

These lock designs are typically used in institutional and high-rise residential applications.They can incorporate both a latch and a deadbolt in the same body. Mortise locks allow a deadbolt with latch in a path ofegress because the latch and deadbolt are retracted in a single motion. Mortise locks can be designed with a low-costfailure point, shear pin, spindle, and so forth, making their application attractive for locations that are apt to receive a lotof abuse. Mortise locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.13 and ANSI/UL 437 in the appropriate grade for the application.

Electromechanical door locks are primarily used to control entry into an area.They can be opened via key (mechanically activated) or electrically by receiving power from a power supply after thevalid presentation of a code to a secure encrypted electronic credential (e.g., magnetic/stripe card, proximity card, smartcard, digital keypad). They can also be remotely activated by a simple pushbutton or intercom system. Some of theadvantages of using these locks are code compliant operation, low cost, easy installation, simple operation, andintegration with access control systems. Electromechanical locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.25 in the appropriategrade for the application. Electrified locking devices should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.25 in the appropriate grade for theapplication. Electrified locking devices should also meet the performance requirements as defined by the applicableANSI/BHMA A156 series of guides for the product and grade specified by the manufacturer and be listed to ANSI/UL1034.

These lock designs provide reasonably high levels of force resistance in high-trafficaccess-controlled areas. The use of electromagnetic locks must not alter the requirement for fire-rated hardware orsingle-motion egress. Electromagnetic locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.23 in the appropriate grade for theapplication and be listed to ANSI/UL 1034 for burglary-resistant electric locks.

Delayed egress locks were designed for use in retail applications and are valuable inmany applications to provide reasonable security by operating on a delay with an alarm in nonemergency situations.They can be installed only where permitted by code and must be released instantly (without delay) by the fire alarmsystem in the event of emergency. They should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.24 in the appropriate grade for the applicationand be listed as--Special Locking Arrangements, per ANSI/UL 294 and ANSI/NFPA 101.

Electric strikes provide electric release via access control or pushbutton interface for usewith bored/cylindrical locks, mortise locks, or exit devices. Models are available for use in both fail-safe and fail-securesituations. Fail-safe models cannot be used in high-rise stairwell applications where codes require re-entry to everyfourth floor in the event of a fire, because the doors are fire-rated and the positive latching is lost in this mode. Fail-safemodels can be used on non-fire-rated traffic control doors. There are many varieties of electric strikes offering varyinglevels of protection against forced entry. Electric strikes should be used only where the door frame or the surrounding


Report on Comments – November 2010 NFPA 730wall structure is sufficient to prohibit access to strike components or wiring. Electric strikes should meet ANSI/BHMAA156.31 in the appropriate grade for the application and should be listed to ANSI/UL 1034 for burglary resistant electricdoor strikes.

Hinges or pivots are required for all swinging doors. Hinges other than continuous hinges should beinstalled at intervals of every 30 in. (76.2 cm). Nonremovable pins (NRP) should be used on hinges accessible from theoutside (out-swinging doors). Various types of security studs are available to prevent attack. They should meetANSI/BHMA A156.1 or ANSI/BHMA A156.26 in the appropriate grade for the application. Hinges for use in burglar alarmsystems should be listed to ANSI/UL 634.

The most common points for perimeter sensing devices are doors, windows, vents,and skylights. These openings can be protected, with devices intended to sense their position, forcing, or breaking. Ifintrusion occurs through unprotected walls or ceilings, these devices can be ineffective. Perimeter sensors should belisted to ANSI/UL 639.

These devices are usually magnetic operated switches affixed to a door or window insuch a way that opening the door or window beyond a specific gap breaks a magnetic field, causing the switch to trip(an alarm). High-security switches are normally balanced or biased magnetic switches. Connectors and switches usedin burglar alarms systems should be listed to ANSI/UL 634.

Openings such as vents, ducts, skylights, and similar openings can be alarmed by thin wirefilaments that signal an alarm if the screen is cut or broken. Often the wire filaments are placed in a frame of woodenrods and require little maintenance. Linings and screens for use with burglar alarm systems should be listed to UL 606.

This device is attached to a window or frame and can detectglass breakage from single or multiple glass panels. This device requires shock,? which is that specific frequencies begenerated during intrusion, to activate the alarm system, thereby opening the normally closed circuit of the protectiveloop on the security system. Some shock sensors require a separate analyzer to function or utilize the alarm system’sprotective loop voltage for power. Glass break detectors should be listed to ANSI/UL 639.

Lacing can protect walls, doors, and safes against penetration. Lacing is a closely woven patternof metallic foil or fine brittle wire on the surface of the protected area. An intruder can enter only by breaking the foil orwire. A panel over the lacing protects it from accidental damage. Lacing equipment should be listed to UL 606.

A passive infrared detector is designed to detect the difference between airtemperature and mass temperature when an intruder enters its protected field of detection range. This differentialactivates the initiating device. Passive infrared detectors should be listed to ANSI/UL 639.

Ultrasonic motion detectors generate a high frequency of sound that is out of thenormal range of human hearing. An intruder disrupting the ultrasonic wave pattern initiates the alarm. Becauseultrasonic devices are prone to false alarms due to excessive air currents or ultrasonic noise from mechanicalequipment, their use in buildings is discouraged. Ultrasonic detectors should be listed to ANSI/UL 639.

Microwave detectors use high-frequency radio waves to detect movement.Because microwave energy penetrates materials such as glass, and metal objects reflect them, they can detect motionoutside the protection area, causing false alarms if not properly installed. Microwave detectors should be listed toANSI/UL 639.

Photoelectric devices transmit a beam across a protected area. When anintruder interrupts this beam, the circuit is disrupted, causing an alarm. Photoelectric devices use diodes that emit aninvisible infrared light and usually pulses rapidly to prevent compromise by substitution. Consideration should be givento the fact that the detection beams are narrow and can be discovered or avoided by an intruder. Photoelectric detectorsshould be listed to ANSI/UL 639.

These seismic sensing devices use a piezoelectric crystal or microphone to detecta sound pattern, such as a hammer-like impact on a rigid surface. These devices are attached directly to safes and filingcabinets or to the walls, ceiling, and floor of vaults. False alarms can occur with these devices by external factors suchas passing vehicles or falling objects. Vibration detectors should be listed to ANSI/UL 639.

As a result of increased security awareness, there has been a move away from the traditional key and locksystems to more sophisticated access control systems. The technology used in access control systems ranges fromsimple push-button locks to computerized access control systems integrated with video surveillance systems.Regardless of the technology used, all access control systems have one primary objective—to screen or identify peopleprior to allowing entry. Since identification is the foundation of all access control systems, they generally require that theuser be in possession of a machine readable credential. Electronic access control equipment should be listed toANSI/UL 294.

The teller’s holdup alarm in a bank is a common example of an emergency alarm. Based on a risk analysis,


Report on Comments – November 2010 NFPA 730emergency alert alarms should be considered for use at medical treatment facilities, personnel counseling or interviewoffices, credit unions, cash-handling activities, and other high-risk areas. The type and location of the device should beselected carefully to ensure the device is readily available for surreptitious activation in an emergency. If there is abuilding security force, a silent alarm should annunciate at the dispatch point. If not, the alarms can be transmitteddirectly to a central station monitoring location or directly connected to local police. Hold up alarm units should be listedto ANSI/UL 636.

The ANSI/UL classification system for burglary-resistant modular vault panels isbased on the length of time the vault will resist the efforts of skilled technicians, using tools and torches, to make asignificant penetration. The four classifications are: Class M, 1/4 hour; Class 1, 1/2 hour; Class 2, 1 hour; Class 3, 2 hours.The classifications indicate that a vault, constructed with a UL-listed door and modular panels, will resist attempts atentry, using the tools and techniques specified in the guide, for attack times varying from 15 minutes to 2 hours. Entry isdefined as opening the door or making a 96 in.2 (619.4 cm2) opening entirely through the door or door frame, themodular panel, or a scam joining two or more modular panels. The smallest dimension of the opening must be at least 6in. (15.2 cm). Vaults doors and modular panels should be listed to ANSI/UL 608.

The UL 608 Standard for burglary-resistant vaults is performance basedand allows for alternative construction materials. Over the years, many types of vault construction have been used, withthe type chosen for a particular situation determined by the construction and load capacity of the building. For example,in a high-rise building designed for a maximum floor live load of 100 lb/ft2 (450 kg/m2), a conventional vault withreinforced concrete walls would not be chosen, unless extensive structural reinforcement of the building was possible.

The majority of vaults built in the past had walls made of reinforced concrete. Vault walls of this type areusually referred to as generic vault walls. Such walls are very heavy, limiting their use to locations that can accept heavyfloor loads, such as a basement or a ground floor that has been structurally reinforced. Where floor loading is not aconcern, such as in basement or grade locations, reinforced concrete can be used for the vault walls, floor, and ceiling.Protection equivalent to an ANSI/UL 608-listed modular vault panel can be obtained using reinforced concrete.

The ANSI/UL 608 classification system for burglary-resistant vault doors is based on the length oftime the vault will resist the efforts of skilled technicians, using tools and torches, to make a significant penetration. Thefour classifications are directly related to vault constructions and should meet or exceed that of the overall vault modularpanels rating: Class M, 1/4 hour; Clas 1, 1/2 hour; Class 2, 1 hour; Class 3, 2 hours.

The same testing requirements and tool complement that apply to the TRTL-30x6 safe apply to this safeexcept the attack time on the safe is 60 minutes. The safe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have acombination lock complying with UL 768 of Group 1 or 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.

These types of locks are classified by UL as Group 1, Group 1R, Group 2, Group 2M according to the degree ofprotection afforded against unauthorized opening. Combination locks should be listed to ANSI/UL 768.

Group 1R combination locks afford a choice of a least 1,000,000 combinations and are highlyresistant to expert manipulation for a period of 20 minutes. In addition to resisting unauthorized opening by expertmanipulation, theses locks are secure against radiological attack.

Annex E contains missing ANSI references and useful technical information. The above edits improvethe technical accuracy of the document. The above edits are consistent with my ROP affirmative with exceptions ballot.

Change E.5.3.2.9.1 and E.5.5 as follows:The same testing requirements and tool complement that apply to the TRTL-30x6 safe apply to this safe

except the attack time on the safe is 60 minutes. The safe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have acombination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 1 or 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.

These types of locks are classified by ANSI/UL 768 as Group 1, Group 1R, Group 2, Group 2M according to thedegree of protection afforded against unauthorized opening. Combination locks should be listed to ANSI/UL 768.

These are ANSI documents and that designation was added.





ANSI/UL 972 provides performance testing requirements forburglary-resisting glazing materials. These materials are intended for use indoors and outdoors, principally as asubstitute for plate (or float) glass show windows and showcase panels. They are designed to resist the hit-and-run(smash-and-grab) type of burglary.

Add ANSI approval designation to ANSI/UL 972.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-13 Log #8



ANSI/UL 752 provides test criteria for glazing materials used to formbullet-resisting barriers that are designed to protect against robbery and holdups. The guide also includes test criteria forthe devices and fixtures used in bullet-resisting enclosures. ASTM F 1233 provides test criteria to evaluate the level ofresistance of security glazing materials and systems to forced entry due to ballistic impact.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-14 Log #9



These lock designs provide convenient installation along with moderate security.Different locking functions are offered to meet access needs, such as non-keyed locking (for bathrooms) and keyedentry. For enhanced resistance to forced entry, doors with these locks can have a separate deadbolt mounted on thedoor; however, local codes should be consulted, since the second lock requires two actions for egress. Recent productdevelopments have greatly increased the strength and durability of these locks in order to retrofit existing installationswith more secure locking solutions. These locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.2 and ANSI/UL 437 in the appropriategrade for the application.






These lock designs are typically used in institutional and high-rise residential applications.They can incorporate both a latch and a deadbolt in the same body. Mortise locks allow a deadbolt with latch in a path ofegress because the latch and deadbolt are retracted in a single motion. Mortise locks can be designed with a low-costfailure point, shear pin, spindle, and so forth, making their application attractive for locations that are apt to receive a lotof abuse. Mortise locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.13 and ANSI/UL 437 in the appropriate grade for the application.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-16 Log #11



Electromechanical door locks are primarily used to control entry into an area.They can be opened via key (mechanically activated) or electrically by receiving power from a power supply after thevalid presentation of a code to a secure encrypted electronic credential (e.g., magnetic/stripe card, proximity card, smartcard, digital keypad). They can also be remotely activated by a simple pushbutton or intercom system. Some of theadvantages of using these locks are code-compliant operation, low cost, easy installation, simple operation, andintegration with access control systems. Electromechanical locks should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.25 in the appropriategrade for the application. Electrified locking devices should also meet the performance requirements as defined by theapplicable ANSI/BHMA A156 series of guides for the product and grade specified by the manufacturer and be listed toANSI/UL 1034.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-17 Log #12



These lock designs provide reasonably high levels of force resistance in high-trafficaccess-controlled areas. The use of electromagnetic locks must not alter the requirement for fire-rated hardware orsingle-motion egress. Electromagnetic locks should meet ANSI/BHMA. A156.23 in the appropriate grade for theapplication and be listed to ANSI/UL 1034 for burglary-resistant electric locks.






Electric strikes provide electric release via access control or pushbutton interface for usewith bored/cylindrical locks, mortise locks, or exit devices. Models are available for use in both fail-safe and fail-securesituations. Fail-safe models cannot be used in high-rise stairwell applications where codes require re-entry to everyfourth floor in the event of a fire, because the doors are fire-rated and the positive latching is lost in this mode. Fail-safemodels can be used on non-fire-rated traffic control doors. There are many varieties of electric strikes offering varyinglevels of protection against forced entry. Electric strikes should be used only where the door frame or the surroundingwall structure is sufficient to prohibit access to strike components or wiring. Electric strikes should meet ANSI/BHMAA156.31 in the appropriate grade for the application and should be listed to ANSI/UL 1034 for burglary-resistant electricdoor strikes.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-19 Log #14



These products provide an added degree of security due to their longerthrow and positive deadlocking. Auxiliary deadbolts are used to protect perimeter doors where not prohibited by codesrequiring single-motion egress and are also used on interior doors for forced-entry resistance. The use of auxiliarydeadbolts is often prohibited in conjunction with another lock when in a path of egress, because that would require twoseparate motions and could be confusing to a person during an emergency. Double-cylinder auxiliary deadbolts providea high level of security, particularly when there are glass panels in the vicinity of the lock, but local codes should bechecked for allowable applications. Deadbolt exit locks and deadbolt exit devices provide a higher degree of resistanceto forced entry and can be used on doors requiring single-motion egress. The only deadbolts permitted on fire-rated exitdoors are those that are self-relocking. Mortise locksets that contain both a latch and a deadbolt can containsingle-motion release for use on doors in the path of egress and fire-rated doors. Multipoint deadbolt locks are availablein a wide variety of functions and types (surface-mounted, mortise, exit device) and provide the highest level ofresistance to forced-entry attempts. Auxiliary deadbolts should meet ANSI/BHMA A156.5, “Deadbolt Section,” andANSI/UL 437, “Door Locks,” in the appropriate grade for the application.






The ANSI/UL 608 guide standard for burglary-resistant vaults isperformance based and allows for alternative construction materials. Over the years, many types of vault constructionhave been used, with the type chosen for a particular situation determined by the construction and load capacity of thebuilding. For example, in a high-rise building designed for a maximum floor live load of 100 lb/ft 2 (450 kg/m2), aconventional vault with reinforced concrete walls would not be chosen, unless extensive structural reinforcement of thebuilding was possible.

Add ANSI approval designation to ANSI/UL 608. Change the term from ‘guide’ to ‘standard’ to be morereflective of the ANSI/UL publication.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-21 Log #16



ANSI/UL 687 classifies burglary-resistant safes according to thelength of time the safe will resist various methods of expert burglary attack.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-22 Log #17



The door of the safe is usually of steel at least 1 in. (3.81 cm) thick with hardened steel plate on the insideof the door to protect the locking mechanism. Composite materials (i.e., metal alloys) can be substituted for the steel iftheir attack resistance is equal to or better than that for steel. The safe is required to have a combination lock, complyingwith ANSI/UL 768 of Group 2M, 1, 1R; or UL 2058.






This safe is similar in design to the TL-15 safe, except that it isprovided with a mechanism for making money deposits. Because the safe is designed to receive envelope and depositbags, UL performs fishing and trapping tests to determine its resistance to these methods of attack. The safe is requiredto weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 2M, 1, 1R; or UL2058, Type 1.


Revise text to read as follows:This safe is similar in design to the TL-15 safe, except that it is

provided with a mechanism for making money deposits. Because the safe is designed to receive envelope and depositbags, UL performs fishing and trapping tests are performed to determine its resistance to these methods of attack. Thesafe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group2M, 1, 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.

A specific laboratory was called out. This was made more generic.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-24 Log #19



The body and door of this safe are very similar in design to those ofthe TL-15 safe, with the exception that the hardened steel plate, used to protect the lock mechanism, usually extendsover the entire face of the door. This safe is required to resist entry, defined as opening the door or making a 6 in.2 (38.7cm2) opening entirely through the door or front face, for 30 minutes using the same tools specified for the TL-15 safeand abrasive cutting wheels and power saws. The safe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have acombination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 2M, 1, 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1. The same limitations in the useof the TL-15 safe apply to this safe, since the safe's body is vulnerable to attack. Encasing the safe in reinforcedconcrete improves its performance.






This upgraded version of the “door only” TL-15 safe providesequivalent protection on all six sides, thus the “x6” nomenclature. The body and door of these safes usually are built ofcomposite materials that can resist attack from common hand tools, abrasive cutting wheels, and power saws. Entry isdefined as opening the door or making a 6 in.2 (38.7 cm2) opening entirely through the door or body of the safe,compared to through just the door and front face for the TL-15 and TL-30 safes. The safe is required to weigh at least750 lb (340 kg) and have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 2M, 1, 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-26 Log #21



Like the TL-15x6 safe, this is an upgraded version of the “door-only”TL-30 safe. This safe provides a moderate degree of burglary protection on all six sides. Entry is defined as opening thedoor or making a 6 in.2 (38.7 cm2) opening entirely through the door or body of the safe. The safe is required to weigh atleast 750 lb (340 kg) and have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 2M, 1, 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________730-27 Log #22



Entry into this safe is defined as opening the door or making a 2 in.2 (12.9 cm2) opening (compared to a 6in.2 (38.7 cm2) opening for tool-resistant safes), entirely through the door or front face. This size opening is designed toresist a “fishing-type” burglary attack, in which a small hole is drilled in the safe and an attempt is made to “fish” out thevaluables. The safe is required to have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 1 or 1R; or UL 2058,Type 1.






This is the lowest rated safe that provides six-sided protection from tool and torch attack. This safeprovides better protection in the walls than safes with the TRTL-30 label. Besides the tools permitted for testing theTRTL-30 safes, UL also allows the use of impact tools (such as an impact hammer, which is very effective in penetratingconcrete). Entry into this safe is defined as opening the door or making a 2 in.2 (12.9 cm2) opening entirely through thedoor or body. The safe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have a combination lock complying withANSI/UL 768 of Group 1 or 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.


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Safes with this label are intended for high-risksituations with substantial inventory levels. The construction of this safe is similar to that of the TRTL-15x6, except that itis required to provide twice the protection in terms of length of time. The tools used in the test are the same as thoseused on the TRTL-15x6, as is the definition of “entry.” The safe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have acombination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 1 or 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.






Prior to the introduction of the TRTL-30x6 in 1980,this was the lowest rated of the UL safes that provided six-sided protection, even though UL classified it as TRTL-60. Inthe 1995 edition of UL 687, the classification was changed to TRTL-60x6. This means that only safes manufacturedafter 1995 will bear the TRTL-60x6 label; all older safes will have the TRTL-60 label.

The same testing requirements and tool complement that apply to the TRTL-30x6 safe apply to this safe.The safe is required to weigh at least 750 lb (340 kg) and have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 ofGroup 1 or 1R; or UL 2058, Type 1.

This safe finds application in high-risk situations; however, because of its high cost, it has essentially beenreplaced by the TRTL-30x6 safe, which is less costly.


Revise text to read as follows:Prior to the introduction of the TRTL-30x6 in 1980,

this was the lowest rated of the ANSI/UL 687 safes that provided six-sided protection, even though ANSI/ULclassified it as TRTL-60. In the 1995 edition of ANSI/UL 687, the classification was changed to TRTL-60x6. This meansthat only safes manufactured after 1995 will bear the TRTL-60x6 label; all older safes will have the TRTL-60 label.Accept all the other changes.

Editorial change.

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This safe also did not have the “x6”designation until 1995, so safes manufactured prior to 1995 will have a TXTL-60 label. This safe is intended for the veryhighest risks and is designed to offer six-sided protection against entry from explosives, torches, and tools for 60minutes, with the explosive charge limited to 4 oz (113 g) of nitroglycerine or its equivalent. UL requires that the safeweigh at least 1000 lb (454 kg) and have a combination lock complying with ANSI/UL 768 of Group 1 or 1R; or UL 2058,Type 1.






Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, IL 60062-2096.ANSI/UL 437, , 2000, revised 2004 2008.ANSI/UL 608, , 2004, Revised 2009.UL 681, , 2001.ANSI/UL 687, , 2005, Revised 2010.ANSI/UL 752, , 2005, revised 2006.ANSI/UL 768, , 2006, Revised 2007.ANSI/UL 972, , 2006.ANSI/UL 1034, , 2000, revised 2008.UL2050, . Fourth Edition dated September 10, 2003.UL 2058, , 2005.UL Burglary Protection Equipment Directory, http://database.ul.com/cgibin/XYV/template/LISEXT/1FRAME/index.htmUL Security Equipment Directory, http://database.ul.com/cgibin/XYV/template/LISEXT/1FRAME/index.htm

Update referenced standards to the most recent revision.


Committee on NFPA 730

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Transcript of Committee on NFPA 730