Comments on "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical ...

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Comments on “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India” by R. Madhumathi, M. Ranganatham, and R. Kannan Shyam Sunder Conference on Shifting Capital Markets and Corporate Performance The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance, Yale School of Management November 7-8, 2008

Transcript of Comments on "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical ...

Comments on“Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: 

Empirical Evidence from India”by  R. Madhumathi, M. Ranganatham, and R. Kannan

Shyam SunderConference on Shifting Capital Markets and Corporate

PerformanceThe Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and

Performance, Yale School of ManagementNovember 7-8, 2008

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An Overview• It is encouraging to see research on corporate governance in India:

exploring the alternatives to Kokilaben model• However, need care in design and interpretation of empirical studies

on statistical correlations• What, Why and How of good governance?• What should be empirically observable consequences of good

governance?• Should we expect small shareholders to earn higher returns from

investing in well-governed firms?• In addition to financial capital markets, there are labor and physical

capital markets to consider• Anglo-Saxon governance is no different in its economic

fundamentals• A brief glance at history

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What, Why and How of Good Governance?

– Good governance: balance or match between the culture (mutual expectations) and self-interest of the participants

– Why Good Governance? To make all participants better off

– Elements of Good Governance: balance among regulation, market forces, and social norms

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Interpreting Correlations

• Suppose a promoter governs the company well (i.e., does not steal and/or utilizes resources of the firm efficiently to generate more wealth)

• Who should we expect will get this extra wealth? The promoter (managers) or small shareholder?

• What would be the capital market consequences?

• Which firms are more likely to allow independents to serve on the board or chair the company?

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An Old Problem

• Governance problems are as old as human civilization

• The greatest corporation in the history of the world had serious governance problems throughout 258 years of its existence: Trial of Warren Hastings

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Westminster HallTrial of Warren Hastings

London: Published for the Proprietor by J. Mead, 10, Gough Square, Fleet Street

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

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Warren Hastings Controversy - Fox, North and Burke Assailing 'The Savior of India'

Warren Hastings Controversy - Fox, North and Burke Assailing 'The Savior of India'

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And a Modern Problem

• “Corporate governance is another area where practices may change as the Ambani brothers attempt to bury the hatchet.

• While the dispute raged during the past few months, allegations arose of investments being made without board consultation, and of share allotments at discounted values.

• The Ambani dispute and its resolution also demonstrate the need for family-owned businesses to set up effective processes for communication and conflict management.

• Knowledge Wharton

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Mother of All Deals

“With the blessings of Srinathji, I have today amicably resolved the issues between my two sons keeping in mind the proud legacy of my husband. I am confident that Mukesh and Anil will uphold the values of their father and work towards protecting and enhancing value of over 3 million shareholders of the Reliance group....Mukesh will have responsibility for Reliance Industries and IPCL while Anil will have responsibility for Reliance Infocomm, Reliance Energy and Reliance Capital."

Kokilaben D. Ambani, June 18, 2005

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Perfect Permanent Solution Unlikely

• Just because we have no easy or permanent solutions, it does not mean we can give up trying to address the governance problem

• Constant striving and vigilance is the price all of us must pay for the great benefits organizations enable us to reap

• Democracy does not function well without combination of citizen docility and vigilance

• Also true of corporate governance; it requires the participants, especially the minority shareholders to exercise intelligent watch for the system to function efficiently

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Thank You!

[email protected]

www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder