Commentary on the Functional Creativity Model: ItsApplication to Understanding Innovative Deception

Jeffrey J. Walczyk and Diana A. Griffith-Ross

Louisiana Tech University

Cropley, Kaufman, and Cropley (this issue) provide an account of creativity and anti-social behavior, the Functional Creativity Model (FMC), which has utility in theongoing fight against creative acts of terrorism. Herein, their model is evaluatedthrough its application to understanding the malevolent creativity behind the antisocialuse of deception. In particular, malevolent lies that hoodwink victims or unwitting col-laborators are considered as part of the planning of terrorists of dastardly deeds. TheFMC is also applied to evaluating the counterterrorist prospects of Time RestrictedIntegrity Confirmation, an innovate method of lie detection that incorporates manyof the antiterrorist recommendations of Cropley et al., especially the element of surprise.Recommendations for expanding the FMC are offered.

Cropley, Kaufman, and Cropley (this issue) present aFunction Model of Creativity (FMC). This commentaryassesses the FMC in terms of its antiterrorism potential.The model is also applied to criminal and terrorist actsthat are supported by creative deception. Finally, TimeRestricted Integrity Confirmation (TRI-Con), an inno-vative method of lie detection, is evaluated accordingto the FMC for its anti-terrorist potential.

THE FMC

The FMC is an account of antisocial creativity withimplications for combating terrorism. Cropley et al.(this issue) acknowledge both benevolent and malevol-ent creativity. Benevolent creativity is prosocial, whereasmalevolent creativity is antisocial. The former is whatmost accept as genuine creativity: innovation that isproper, advantageous to the public, aimed at improvingsocial conditions, or at least not harming others. In con-trast, although malevolent creativity may be viewed byits creators as benefiting a group by fulfilling its aspira-tions, it has intended adverse consequences on others.We agree with Cropley et al. that acknowledging and

understanding malevolent creativity is extremely impor-tant scientifically for combating terrorism. James,Clark, and Cropanzano (1999) also noted that creativitycan be directed either toward positive or negative ends.They contended that, much to the detriment of thwart-ing creative antisocial acts, the analysis of malevolentcreativity has largely been overlooked by scientists.Thus, their and Cropley et al.’s focus on malevolentcreativity is timely for those concerned with developingantiterrorist technologies.

Cropley et al. (this issue) suggest that creative pro-ducts must be useful, novel, beneficial, surprising, effec-tive, and relevant. The latter two characteristics, inparticular, capture a product’s functional creativity.Cropley et al. analogize terrorists and counterterroriststo business competitors, each side trying to gain theupper hand in developing a new product, thereby catch-ing the other side off guard. Along these lines, theelement of surprise comes into play in a product’s suc-cess, especially when the competition has no inkling ofthe product’s existence. Highly innovative productscan dominate the competition for a time. Novelty orsome type of dissociation of the product with what hascome before is critical to functional creativity (Clark &James, 1999). A creative act of terror or crime, by defi-nition, is difficult to predict and defend against. Like-wise, a creative counterterrorist technology may bearduous for terrorists to overcome. Cropley et al. note

Address correspondence to Jeffrey Walczyk, Psychology &

Behavioral Sciences, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, LA 71272.

E-mail: Walczyk@latech.edu

CREATIVITY RESEARCH JOURNAL, 20(2), 130–133, 2008

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1040-0419 print=1532-6934 online

DOI: 10.1080/10400410802059770

that ‘‘counterterrorist agencies must, as a minimum,continually generate effective novelty in order to stayone step ahead of the terrorist competitor.’’ They warn,however, that overreliance on expertise can hinder crea-tivity by enticing its possessors to follow traditionalrules and procedures that have worked well in the past.High levels of training entail strong internalization ofexisting ideas and techniques that can assuage the devel-opment of new ideas and approaches (James, 1995;James, Chen, & Goldberg, 1992; Mumford & Gustafo-son, 1988). Routine extinguishes surprise, increasing acompetitor’s or terrorist’s chance for successful productsor attacks. We must point out, however, that to be at thecutting edge of creative innovation in most disciplines,innovators must have high levels of expertise (Simon,1982). This paradox must be resolved by the FMC.

As Cropley et al. (this issue) further note, purenovelty in the absence of a significant value to someoneis randomness, not creativity (see also Clark & James,1999). Without relevance and effectiveness, the valueof a novel solution is diminished. Moreover, a productor act must do what it is intended to do and perhapsachieve other desired ends.

Even when malevolent creative products or acts areachieved, their novelty and effectiveness begins to decaythe more they become public. The wider the dissemi-nation of information, the more they decay. Decayunderscores the need to develop new products and keepthe technology behind their success a secret as long aspossible. Cropley et al. (this issue) apply the constructof decay to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Theyargue that, although the initial 9=11 attacks of planeshitting buildings were malevolently creative, theirnovelty immediately decayed when the brave passengersof United Flight 93 learned of these crashes, a contin-gency made possible by cell phones and clearly notanticipated by the terrorists. Passengers immediatelydevised and executed a novel counterattack thatthwarted the terrorists’ ultimate plans. Acts of passen-gers thus decreased the effectiveness of the terrorists’innovation. However, if the nature of the terrorists’attacks had remained hidden, it is likely that their initialeffectiveness would have been sustained and anotherbuilding hit.

Evaluation of the FMC

Cropley et al. (this issue) also note that functionally cre-ative products or solutions are generalizable. In otherwords, they not only solve recognized problems, butoften solve other problems or illuminate those pre-viously unnoticed, perhaps redefining them. Moreover,the solutions should be elegant: logically consistentand simple. As an example of a generalizable solution,Cropley et al., proposed placing guns in the hands of

all airplane passengers to prevent hijacking. We under-stand that such a restructuring of the problem of terror-ist hijacking to a preventative reformatting would createmore problems in practice than it would solve. Notwith-standing, Cropley et al.’s insight that redefining a prob-lem in a new way occasionally solves or prevents it hasmuch merit.

We agree with Cropley et al. (this issue) that thenovelty of the 9=11 terrorists’ attacks immediatelydecayed when news of the attacks became known. Inbusiness, when a company introduces a product thatits competitors learned of in advance, the latter willoften begin to develop similar products. Ultimatelydeveloping technologies that can read minds might beseminal, elegant, and generalizable ways of reformattingthe problem of terrorism, a la Cropley et al. Developinga valid method of lie detection may be the most feasibleapproximation of this in the near future. The FMCunderscores the importance of protecting informationon the part of antiterrorist agencies and, more impor-tant, the urgency of obtaining timely, accurate intelli-gence of terrorist innovation. This point is illustratedby the successful counterattack on United Flight 93.Thus, we feel more strongly than do Cropley et al. that,as important as functional creativity is, gaining timely,accurate intelligence of the functional creativity of ter-rorists is more important for antiterrorist agencies todo their job, a point developed next.

Application of the FMC to Deception

Verbal deception falls within the scope of the FMC,often involving extreme creativity with antisocial intent(DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, 2004). More-over, as with innovative terrorist acts, the creativity oflies is underresearched by scientists. Examples of cre-ative, malevolent, and successful (at least in the shortterm) lies from history include those of Richard Nixon,Adolph Hitler (Ekman, 2001), Enron executives Ken-neth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling (Selvarajan, 2006), andmaster thief Frank Abagnale (Charles, 2001). Also sup-porting it’s applicability to the FMC, creative lies oftenare more effective in achieving their goals than conven-tional ones (Ekman, 2001).

Along the lines recommended by Cropley et al. (thisissue), and as noted above, in addition to countering theinnovation of terrorists with more advanced creativity,we believe that new antiterrorist technologies should bedeveloped that can capture and verify information con-cerning terrorist intentions, their associates, and so forth.Technology should also make secure the innovation ofcounterterrorists. Lies, in particular, are used by terroristsas tactical disinformation for controlling individuals orcommunities (Masse, 2002). The deceptions of the 9=11attackers illuminate the need to expose the creative lies

COMMENTARY ON MALEVOLENT CREATIVITY 131

of those within the nation’s borders engaged in suspiciousacts. Unquestionably, the 9=11 terrorists were creative liarswhose deceptions were accepted by their targets as cred-ible. One lie building on another allowed them to spin websthat culminated in success. For instance, when asked whythey only sought to learn to turn jets in flight and not howto take off or land, the terrorists lied to flight instructorsconvincingly (Bernton, Carter, Heath, & Neff, 2002; VanZandt, 2005). Had their lies not been functionally creative,terrorists might have aroused suspicion that might havethwarted these attacks.

The most widely used lie detector, the polygraph,relies upon physiological cues to uncover deception.However, the instrument’s validity has been questioned.Calls for research on alternative technologies have beenmade as well (e.g, DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, &Epstein, 1996; DePaulo et al., 2003; Klienmuntz &Sczuko, 1984; Locono & Lykken, 1997). The Committeeto Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph(CRSEP, 2003), a panel of scientists convened by theNational Research Council, recently concluded thatphysiological arousal is not reliably indicative of decep-tion. Moreover, the physiological indicators of the poly-graph can be manipulated through physical orpsychological means (i.e., countermeasures can be usedto foil it). Consistent with the FMC, decay in itseffectiveness has resulted from wide dissemination ofinformation concerning how the polygraph works(Lykken, 1998). Therefore, committee members foundthe polygraph to be insufficient for use in federalagencies for national security screening or in the fightagainst terror. The committee, too, called for developmentof a reliable, valid, and portable alternative. As noted,terrorists’ effectiveness could be significantly reduced ifthe accuracy of answers that suspected terrorists gave toquestions could be verified via a lie detector. As notedpreviously, their intentions and associates might cometo light.

Time Restricted Integrity Confirmation (TRI-Con;Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, inpress; Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphreys, 2003;Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha, 2005)is an example of a new approach to lie detection thatutilizes cognitive cues (e.g., response time, answer consist-ency across interrelated questions). TRI-Con maximizesthe cognitive load on liars, minimizes it on truth tellers,and thwarts attempts by liars to rehearse or use otherload-reducing countermeasures by retaining the elementof surprise. Because of its focus on cognitive cues, itnegates the use of popular techniques for controllingphysiological responses that have decayed the polygraph’seffectiveness.

Numerous studies have revealed response time to be acue to deception (e.g., Baker, Stern, & Goldstein, 1990;Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 2000; Spence

et al., 2001), particularly when answering questions(Walczyk et al., 2003, 2005, in press). TRI-Con mea-sures response times to the millisecond level of precisionthrough the use of a microphone-headset worn by exam-inees and connected to a laptop computer. Under TRI-Con, examinees are directed to answer truthfully and asquickly as possible after hearing the last word of a ques-tion. To maximize cognitive load on liars, examinees arenot permitted to preview questions, a departure fromthe polygraph (Lykken, 1998), thus maintaining theelement of surprise and helping to prevent decay ofTRI-Con’s novelty. If technology keeps surprise as anintegral component (e.g., in a psychological testing pro-cedure), decay may be reduced as a problem. Regardingits novelty, nothing like TRI-Con has been proposedbefore (CRSEP, 2003).

Concerning national security, personality researchershave noted that the ideas of creative individuals flourishunder high levels of independence (Barron & Harrington,1981). In addition to lie detection, non-obtrusive surveil-lance of potential spies or terrorists could reduce the effec-tiveness of their innovation. Moreover, a lie detectiontechnology capable of uncovering actual acts of espionageor terror would be of tremendous value in preventingaccess to highly sensitive industries (e.g., nuclear power,defense) to foreign spies and terrorists.

If instant decay of terrorists’ verbal lies could occurwhen deceptive answers are given via a valid lie detec-tor, intended acts of suspected terrorists could bethwarted. As noted previously, the 9=11 attacks wereplanned well in advance. Accordingly, we suggest add-ing another defining feature to functional creativity,timeliness, without which the effectiveness of counter-terrorist solutions will be low. In other words, the func-tional creativity of an antiterrorist product requireshaving it at the right time and place. After all, propertiming is a formidable advantage in all conflict (Helms& Ettkin, 2000).

Information helps to speed the process of developinginnovative products (Hall & Jackson, 1992) and hastensthe response of competitors (Helms & Ettkin, 2000).Timely information regarding rivals’ products puts riv-als at a disadvantage (Zahra & Chaples, 1993), whereasblind spots are created when views of competitors (e.g.,terrorists) are incorrect or incomplete. Blind spots canalso occur by misjudging the intents of terrorists or bymisidentifying them. Informational blind spots, in parti-cular, limit counterterrorist agencies’ abilities to recog-nize the significance of ambiguous events (Zahra &Charles, 1993). TRI-Con or comparable technologiescurrently under development (e.g., brain imagers; seeCRESP, 2003) can help to expose such blind spotsquickly by providing counterterrorist agencies withinformation they need of suspected terrorists, doubleagents, and so forth.

132 WALCZYK AND GRIFFITH-ROSS

CONCLUSIONS

Technologies such as TRI-Con have the potential toexpose terrorists at the right place and time by detectingtheir lies before they can provide a basis for massdestruction. In business, waiting for competitors to gainenough power through small, incremental successes maycost billions of dollars. In the case of terrorism, the samemistake could cost lives. Therefore, TRI-Con or othertechnologies that act to thwart terrorists at their weakestpoint, during their early stages of planning, can decaythese smaller acts of creativity, such as lies told toachieve long-term destructive goals. This early decayof terrorists’ creativity and corresponding triumph forantiterrorist agencies would leave few resources for ter-rorists to carry out dire acts, like those of 9=11. Inessence, we recommend that the FMC be expanded toinclude the importance of gathering timely, accurateinformation to combat terrorism. Such timely infor-mation can, for instance, be used to instantly decaythe creativity of suspected terrorists’ lies, and therebyweaken their ability to launch future attacks.

REFERENCES

Baker, L., Stern, J. A., & Goldstein, R. (1990). The gaze control system

and the detection of deception (Rep. No. 90-F131400). Fort Jackson,

SC: Department of Defense Polygraph Institute.

Barron, F., & Harrington, D. (1981). Creativity, intelligence, and

personality. In M. Rosenzweig & L. Porter (Eds.), Annual review

of psychology, (Vol. 32, pp. 439–476). Palo Alto, CA: Annual

Reviews.

Bernton, H., Carter, M., Heath, D., & Neff, J. (2002). The terrorists within:

The story behind one man’s holy war against America. The Seattle Times.

Retrieved February 22, 2006, from http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/

news/nationworld/terroristwithin/chapter17.html.

Charles, H. (2001). The art of the steal. Library Journal, 126, 123–124.

Clark, K., & James, K. (1999). Justice and positive and negative crea-

tivity. Creativity Research Journal, 12, 311–320.

Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph. (2003).

The polygraph and lie detection. Washington, DC: National

Academy Press.

Cropley, D. H., Kaufman, J. C., & Cropley, A. J. (2008). Malevolent

creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 20, 105–115.

DePaulo, B. M., Ansfield, M. E., Kirkendol, S. E., & Boden, J. M.

(2004). Serious lies. Basic & Applied Psychology, 26, 147–167.

DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., &

Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 70, 979–995.

DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L.,

Charlton, K., & Harris, C. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological

Bulletin, 129, 74–112.

Ekman, P. (2001). Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, poli-

tics, and marriage. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Hall, D., & Jackson, T. (1992). Speeding up new production develop-

ment. Management Accounting, 74, 32–36.

Helms, M. M., & Ettkin, L. P. (2000). Time-based competitiveness: A

strategic perspective. Competitiveness Review, 10, 2–15.

James, K. (1995). Goal conflict and individual creativity. Creativity

Research Journal, 8, 285–290.

James, K., Chen, J., & Goldberg, C. (1992). Organizational conflict

and individual creativity. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22,

545–566.

James, K., Clark, K., & Cropanzano, R. (1999). Positive and negative

creativity in groups, institutions, and organizations: A model and

theoretical extension. Creativity Research Journal, 12, 211–226.

Kleinmuntz, B., & Sczuko, J. J. (1984). Lie detection in ancient and

modern times. American Psychologist, 29, 725–739.

Locono, W. G., & Lykken, D. T. (1997). The validity of the lie detec-

tor: Two surveys of scientific opinion. Journal of Applied

Psychology, 82, 426–433.

Lykken, D. T. (1998). A tremor in the blood: Uses and abuses of the lie

detector. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Masse, R. (2002). Gade’ deceptions and lies told by the ill: The Carib-

bean sociocultural construction of truth in patient-healer encoun-

ters. Anthropology & Medicine, 9, 175–188.

Mumford, M. D., & Gustafson, S. B. (1988). Creativity syndrome:

Integration, application, and innovation. Psychological Bulletin,

103, 27–43.

Selvarajan, T. T. (2006). A cognitive processing model for assessing

ethical behavior of employees. Journal of American Academy of Busi-

ness, Cambridge, 9, 86–92.

Seymour, T. L, Seifert, C. M., Shafto, M. G., & Mosmann, A. L.

(2000). Using response time measures to assess ‘‘guilty knowledge.’’

Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 30–37.

Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality (Vols. 1–2).

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F. D., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D.,

Zheng, Y., & Woodruff, P. W. R. (2001). Behavioural and func-

tional anatomical correlates of deception in humans. Neuroreport:

For Rapid Communication of Neuroscience Research, 12, 2849–2853.

Van Zandt, C. V. (2005). Pirate attack: This is not a drill. MSNBC.

Retrieved February 22, 2006 from http://www.msnbc.com/id/

9958939.

Walczyk, J. J., Mahoney, K. T., Doverspike, D., & Griffith-Ross, D.

A. (in press). Cognitive lie detection: Response time and consistency

of answers as cues to deception. Journal of Business and Psychology.

Walczyk, J. J., Roper, K. S., Seeman, E., & Humphreys, A. M. (2003).

Cognitive mechanisms underlying lying to questions: Response time

as a cue to deception. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 755–774.

Walczyk, J. J., Schwartz, J. P., Clifton, R., Adams, B., Wei, M., &

Zha, P. (2005) Lying person to person about life events: A cognitive

framework for lie detection. Personnel Psychology, 58, 141–170.

Zahra, S. A., & Chaples S. S. (1993). Blind spots in competitive analy-

sis. Academy of Management Executive, 7, 7–22.

COMMENTARY ON MALEVOLENT CREATIVITY 133