Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

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Commentary on Lau David Chalmers

Transcript of Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Page 1: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Commentary on Lau

David Chalmers

Page 2: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Halloween 2009:HOT Strikes Back

David Chalmers

Page 3: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Or:The New York Chainsaw Massacre

Page 4: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Four Distinctions

Access Consciousness Phenomenal consciousness

Attention Visibility

D’ (Discrimination) Perceptual Certainty

First-Order Representation Higher-Order Representation

Page 5: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Access Consciousness

Access consciousness = discrimination or attention?

Many degrees of access:

accessed vs accessible

accessible to what?

accessible for what?

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Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness = visibility or

perceptual certainty?

Visibility = discrimination: objective threshold

Perceptual certainty = confidence: subjective threshold?

Cf. unconscious perception literature: subjective threshold a better criterion for consciousness

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What is Perceptual Certainty?

Perceptual certainty: perceptual representation with high probability

p(red object there) > 0.95: conscious

p(red object there) < 0.95: unconscious

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Perceptual Certainty and ConsciousnessBut: perceptual representation can be certain without being conscious

Unconscious representation [e.g. in dorsal stream] may have p(red object there) > 0.95

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Perceptual Certainty and

HOTAlso: perceptual certainty dissociates from HOT

Certainty without HOT: Unconscious representations, weather-forecasting systems, animals.

HOT without perceptual certainty: I have a perceptual representation of red object there with p = 0.6

Page 10: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Certain HOTs?Alternative: HOT about perceptual certainty

I’m perceptually representing with 0.96 confidence that there’s a red object?

Or: a certain HOT about perception

I’m 0.96 confident that I’m perceptually representing a red object.

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Introspective Confidence

Construed the last way, what matters isn’t perceptual confidence but introspective confidence.

Introspective confidence is the standard guide to phenomenal consciousness

But doesn’t entail HOT: just requires reliable introspective access to conscious states.

Page 12: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Models of Phenomenal

ConsciousnessWhat distinguishes (phenomenally) conscious vs unconscious representation in the brain?

First-order vs higher-order?

Two streams?

Two substrates?

My view: Accessibility/availability

Page 13: Commentary on Lau David Chalmers. Halloween 2009: HOT Strikes Back David Chalmers.

Access ConsciousnessWhat of the phenomenal vs access consciousness distinction?

The conceptual distinction remains

But phenomenology may correlate with a certain sort of access/accessibility?

Which sort?

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Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness?Low-capacity system (prefrontal): access, attention

High-capacity system (occipital): accessibility, availability to attention

Which correlates with phenomenal consciousness?

My view: the latter.