~ Prudential James J. Sullivan ~

Senior Managing Director Head of Fixed Income

Prudential Fixed Income Management Two Gateway Center. 3rd Floor. Newark NJ 07102-5096 Tel 973 802-4560 Fax 973 367-8668 james.sullivan@prudential.com

2 August 2010

BY EMAIL: rule-comments@sec.gov

Elizabeth M. Murphy

Secretary

Securities and Exchange Commission

100 F Street, NE

Washington, DC 20549-1090

Re: File Number 57-08--10

17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 230 et al. Asset-Backed Securities; Proposed Rule

Release Nos. 33-9117; 34-61858; File No. 57-08-10 - RlN 3235-AK37

Dear Ms. Murphy,

Prudential Investment Management, Inc. (PIM) sincerely thanks the U.s. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for addressing the practices of the structured products marketplace through its proposed revisions to Regulation AB. Your request for comment has initiated an important debate among a wide range of market participants on many significant issues that affect the future of the asset-backed securities (ABS) market.

PIM, the largest investment advisory business within Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential) with $472 billion (as of 31 March 2010) in assets under management, was among the earliest institutional investors to embrace structured products in the late 1980s. Our primary public fixed income asset management business, Prudential Fixed Income, is one of the largest fixed income managers in the United States1 with $225 billion (as of 31 March 2010) of assets under management. In 1991, Prudential Fixed Income formed a dedicated group of analysts to focus solely on the structured products market, and we continue to maintain this specialized approach today. We have been a lead investor in many structured transactions, with approximately $57 billion (as of 31 March 2010) under management in mortgage-backed and

1 Source: Institutional Investor. July/August 2010. based on domestic fixed income securities held as of

12/31/09.

Registered Principal Prudential Investment Management Services LLC A Prudential Financial company Three Gateway Center. 14th Floor Newark NJ 071024077 Tel 973 8028624 .~-

mailto:rule-comments@sec.govmailto:james.sullivan@prudential.com

structured products securities for both affiliated and third party institutional clients as well as for retail investors. Our structured product holdings contain public and private investments across the capital structure of ABS transactions, including commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), commodity consumer sectors (e.g. autos, credit cards, student loans) and smaller "esoteric" ABS sectors (e.g. containers, franchise, timeshare).

PIM also maintains a dedicated collateralized debt obligation (CDO) asset management platform, and a PIM affiliate was involved in the issuance of CMBS for many years. We believe our decades of active involvement with structured securities, as both investor and issuer, results in a seasoned and unique perspective that could be valuable to the SEC. We have worked closely with the American Securitization Forum (ASF) and the Commercial Real-Estate Finance Council (CREFC) to have our views heard and expressed in broader market responses. While we support aspects of each organization's response, we are submitting this letter to offer our specific commentary on ways to strengthen the disclosure, reporting and offering process for ABS.

Our document is divided into two parts. In Part I, we provide commentary on topics we believe will produce significant improvements to the asset-backed securities market by expanding disclosure, better aligning the incentives of sponsors and originators through risk retention and strengthening investor protections. In Part II, we provide our thoughts on the requests for comment that meaningfully affect an investment advisor's ability to invest on behalf of clients.

PIM's continued interest in the structured finance market as an investor and potential issuer will be directly affected by the reforms ultimately adopted by the SEC and the resulting best practices adopted by all market participants. We thank the SEC for giving consideration to our comments. Please contact us for any follow-up .

...J

James J. Sullivan Senior Managing Director and Head of Prudential Fixed Income

2 Gateway Center, 3rd Floor Newark, New Jersey 07102 Telephone: 973-802-4560 james.sullivanprudential.com

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http:james.sullivanprudential.com

PARTI

In reviewing theRegulationABproposal, the following topics are of greatest importance toPIM:I. RiskRetentionII. RepurchaseObligationsRepresentations&WarrantiesIII. TransactionDocuments&ReportingIV. PoolLevelInformation(RiskLayering&Materiality)V. PrivatelyIssuedStructuredFinanceProductsVI. WaterfallComputerProgramWhilewerecognizethatyourrequestforcommentprecededtherecentlyenactedDoddFrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), it seems likely that thesecuritization reform provisions and the related joint rulemaking requirements included inDoddFrankwill influenceany finaldecisionsonRegulationAB.Assuch,wehavesought toaddresscertainpertinentaspectsofDoddFrankinthisdocument.I. RISKRETENTIONProposal:We support the SECs proposal for vertical risk retention to properly align the interests ofmarketparticipants,andbelievethatsystemicriskssimilartothosethataroseinthepastdecadearelikelytorepeatthemselvesifmarketforcesarelefttoselfregulatealignmentofinterests.Inordertoquicklyreturnconfidencetostructuredproductsmarkets,wesupport(i)a5%riskretention calculationbasedon the totalproceeds from the saleof each tranche; (ii) retentionbeingretainedforthe lifeofthesecuritization;(iii)riskretentionrequirementsapplyingtoallstructuredassetclassesandtypesofstructuredsecurities;and(iv)requiringthesponsoranditsaffiliatestoregularlyreporttheircurrentnetriskretentionrelatedholdings.While the RegulationAB proposal contemplates aminimum 5% risk retention for all assetclasses,DoddFrankmandatesthatagroupofcertainregulators,includingtheSEC,reviewandconsiderwhethertheamountofriskretentionandthepartyorpartiesrequiredtoretainsuchrisk shouldbedifferent for certainasset classes.Webelieve that the risk retention shouldbetailored to theuniquecharacteristicsofeachassetclass,such thatcertainassetclassesshouldrequirehigherriskretention,whileothersmayrequirelowerriskretention.Any risk retention requirement should consider existing accounting rules to determine thatuponthetransferofassetstoastructuredproductstrust,thesponsorsandloanoriginatorsaregenerally able to realize sales treatment and avoid consolidation of the collateral onto theirbalancesheets.

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Rationale:Longterm skin in the game is the best approach to align a sponsors economic interestswith theperformance of its asset originations. Retention of risk by a sponsor (i) fundamentally addresses theoriginate to distributemodel where an assetmay be underwritten or aggregated with a focus onwhetherornottheassetcanbesoldintoasecuritization,ratherthanonitslikelylongtermperformance;and (ii) motivates the sponsor to thoughtfully originate assets and ensure proper servicing of thecollateralforthebenefitofallinvestorsinasecuritization.Verticalriskretentionbetteralignsthesponsorsinterestswitheachinvestorinthecapitalstructurethanhorizontalriskretention.WeagreewiththeSECscommentthathorizontalriskretentionintheformofretentionof theequityorresidual interestcould lead toskewed incentivestructures.1Ahorizontalslicemay engender classwarfarewithin a securitization. Sponsors can influence the servicing of thecollateraltomaximizetheiroverallcashproceedsandmitigatetheirexposuretotheretainedsubordinatedhorizontalslice.When evaluating a transaction for appropriate sponsor risk retention, particular attention should begiven to theamount of capital the sponsorhas committed to the transaction and theamountof funds(servicing fees,principaland interest fromretainedholdingsandresidual interestsatthebottomofthewaterfall)thatflowbacktothesponsorfromthesecuritization.Theeffectivenessofriskretentionandtheintended alignment of interests between sponsors and investors is substantially diminished if thecombinedpaymentsreceivedbythesponsorfromallsourcessignificantlyrepaysthecapitalthesponsorcontributedtoatransactionpriortoinvestorsbeingrepaid.Inordertomaintainasponsorsskininthegame,riskretentionshouldconsiderthesizeandtimingofasponsorstotalproceedsfromatransaction.Weofferthefollowingthoughtstospecificquestionsyouraiseonriskretentionandeconomicinterests:

WesupporttheSECspositionthatinretainingriskthroughtheretentionofrandomlyselectedexposures,itwouldbebothdifficultandpotentiallycostlyforinvestorsandregulatorstoverifythat exposures were indeed selected randomly, rather than in a manner that favored thesponsor.2

Whilewe acknowledge thatDoddFrank requires certain regulators to develop a definition of

qualifiedmortgage,thequalifiedmortgagedefinitionshouldbeverynarrowinscope,andweareopposed to theconceptofdesignatingaqualifiedassetwithinanyotherstructuredassetclass.Once criteria forqualified assets are established, and securitization of these assets aregranted preferential capital treatment, loan originators could be incented to originate thecheapesttodelivercollateralfordistributiontoasecuritization.

1 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 84 / Monday, May 3, 2010 / Proposed Rules Page 23339

2 Ibid

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Third partypurchasers, like the Bpiece buyer inCMBS, shouldnot be allowed to retain aportionofthesecuritizationtofulfillthesponsorsshelfeligibilitycondition.RecenthistoryhasshownthatthispracticedidnotinsulatetheCMBSmarketfromunderwritingexcesses.

Toprovidethegreatesttransparencytothemarket,thesponsoranditsaffiliatesshouldregularly

report theircurrentriskretentionrelatedholdingsby trancheofasecuritization,aswebelievethatanychangeinriskretentionholdingsismaterialandshouldbedisclosed.Furthermore,thesponsorshouldalsodiscloseanyhedge(securityspecificorportfolio)thatwasenteredintobythesponsoror,totheextentithasactualknowledgeofsuchahedge,anaffiliateinanefforttooffsetanyriskretentionpositionheldbythesponsororanaffiliate.

II. REPURCHASEOBLIGATIONSREPRESENTATIONS&WARRANTIESProposal:TheSECcorrectlyarticulatesinitscommentaryinSectionII.B.3(b)thedifficultiestrusteesfaceinattempting tomakebona fiderepresentationandwarrantyclaims,whichwehaverecentlyfound tobe thecase inRMBS.Weareunawareofsuchabroadrepresentationandwarrantyissueinotherassetclasses,whetherthisisbecauseoftherelativelyinfrequentclaimsofbreachthat arise, the lack of an effectivemechanism for trustees to initiate claims, or because thestructureswere sufficiently enhanced to absorb the then realized losses. In any event, it isimportanttoprovideamechanismtotimelyidentifybreachesofrepresentationsandwarrantieswithrespecttounderlyingcollateral.PIMproposesthefollowingmechanism.1. An independent collateral agent, or similar independent entity, should be required to

reviewandcertifytheassetleveltapeforaccuracyandcertifythatallrequiredassetrelateddocumentshavebeenprovided.For structured transactions involving homogenous collateral pools of more than 1,000assets,wepropose thatanonaffiliatedand independent thirdparty,hiredby the trusteeand compensated by the sponsor or transaction, should perform a detailed review of astatistically significant random sampling of each collateral agents asset files, prior topricing, to determine adherencewith the transaction documents and the representationsandwarrantiesoftheseller.Iftheresultsfailthesamplingtest:

a) thesponsorshouldberequiredtodiscloseitfailedarandomsamplingtest;b) all assetswill be reviewed, at the sellers expense, and all ineligible assets should be

removed;andc) any asset thatwas previously identified as breaching a representation andwarranty

shouldbe required tobedisclosed and cannotbe added to any subsequent collateral

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pool unless it has been cured and certified as meeting all the representations andwarrantiesofthetransaction.

For structured transactions involving smaller and lumpier asset pools, such samplingtechniquesmay not be appropriate, and othermeans of assessing the collateral qualityshouldbeadopted.

Rationale:

In an effort to identify potential data errors and to assurenecessary documentation is received, acollateral agent or similar party can review the assetlevel tape for accuracy, verify that all assetdocumentsrequiredtobedeliveredatclosinghavebeenreceived,andassurethataworkableprocessis in place to obtain all postclosing documentation.This review is reasonable and beneficial to atransaction.Theresultsofacollateralassessmentcompletedpriortodealclosingcanprovide furthercomforttoinvestors that the assets areunderwritten anddocumented in an appropriatemanner and complywithrepresentationsandwarranties.The impactonasponsorwhich failsarandomsamplingneeds tobematerialenoughtoensure thesponsorsufficientlyreviewsthecollateralpriortoitsinclusioninatransaction.Thecostandeffortnecessarytoconductafullpoolreviewandthesubsequentdisclosuresshouldbeasufficientincentivetoasponsor.

2. EachABS asset class should apply an objective and consistent standard for identifying

breachesof representations andwarranties, and triggering apostclosing assetdocumentreview.Theuseofsuchacarefullytailoredobjectivestandard,coupledwithaclearprocessfor pursuing any resulting claims, should help ensure the effectiveness of the investorscontractualremedies,whilesatisfyingallpartiesdesireforfairness.As an example, in transactions that have employed upfront statistical sampling, theappropriate time to reviewadefaultedassetmaybewhena transactions requiredcreditenhancement(e.g.overcollateralization,reserveaccount)isbelowthetargetlevelasdefinedbythetransaction.Whenenhancementisbelowrequiredlevels,anydefaultedassetwouldbe reviewed by a nonaffiliated third party, hired by the trustee, for compliance withrepresentationsandwarranties.Thetrusteeandservicershouldhaveaspecifiedamountoftimeafteranassetbecomesdefaulted toprovideallassetdocuments to the thirdparty tofacilitateitsreview.

Rationale:

Onlyassets thatmeet the specified standards for the relevantasset class shouldbe included in anABScollateralpool.Investorswanttoknowthatarigorousassetrevieworanotheracceptableprocess

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hasestablishedsuchcompliancepriortoclosing,andthatareliablemechanismhasbeenprovidedtoaddressmaterialassetdeficienciesthatareidentifiedpostclosing.

3. Thesponsorshouldhaveaspecifiedamountoftimetochallengeanythirdpartyclaim,andifsuch timepasseswithoutachallenge, thesponsorshouldberequired torepurchase theassetatthecontractuallyestablishedrepurchaseprice(typicallyparplusaccruedinteresttothedateofrepurchase).

Anysponsorchallengedclaimsshouldbesettledbyanindependentthirdpartyarbitrator,selectedbythetrustee,whosedecisionisbinding.

Rationale:

Investorsandissuersshouldbothbenefitfromaprocessthatfacilitatesthetimelyresolutionofclaimswhilealsoprovidingareasonablelevelofdueprocess.

ThisprocessalsoaddressesanissueinthecurrentSECproposalregardingwhatshouldoccurinthecasewhereasponsorrejectsaclaimandthethirdpartyopiniondoesnotsupportthesponsor.

4. Claimsmadeagainsta sponsorby the thirdparty shouldbe regularly reported, together

withdetailthatclarifiesthenumberofsuchclaimsthatwereacceptedbythesponsorandthenumberofclaimsthatwereandwerenotapprovedbythearbitrator.Thisinformationshouldbeprovidedaspartoftheofferingmaterialforallissuancesofthesponsor.

Rationale:

This information is important inevaluating theeffectivenessof theprocessand thesponsorspriordiligenceinconfirmingthatitscollateralmeetstheeligibilityrequirements.

III. TRANSACTIONDOCUMENTS&REPORTINGProposal:WeareverysupportiveoftheSECsdecisionandapproachtoaddresstheissueofregistrationmaterialsandongoingreporting.WewouldliketosuggestaddingfurtherdetailtothepointsalreadyintheSECsproposal:1. Final operative documents (particularly the Indenture and Pooling and/or Servicing

Agreement) should be made available to investors, by providing access to them on aspecifiedwebsite,at leastthree(3)businessdayspriortoclosingforanypublicorprivate

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transaction.Anychangesaftertheavailabilitythree(3)businessdayspriortoclosingshouldbehandledbytheamendmentprovisionsdescribedintheoperativedocuments.

Rationale:

We are in conceptual agreement with the SECs proposal that a minimum period of time beestablished toreviewABSprospectuses.Werecommendbroadening theproposal to includeprivateABS offeringdocuments.Manyprivate transactionswere announced andpricedwithpublic levelalacrity.A speed bump needs to be incorporated into the issuance process to allow investors tocompletetheirdiligenceinacommerciallyreasonableperiodoftime.

Given the importance of the final operative documents in structured transactions (e.g.Indenture/Pooling & Serving Agreement, swap confirmations, administrative agreements) to aninvestorsunderstandingoftheactualcontractualprovisions,thefinaldocumentsshouldbedeliveredtoprospectivepurchasersthree(3)businessdayspriortoclosing.

Anychangestotheoperativedocumentsaftertheavailabilitythree(3)businessdayspriortoclosingshouldbehandledby theamendmentprovisionsdescribed in theoperativedocuments.Lastminutefinancial engineering in structured transactions contributes to poor understanding, and in someinstancesmisunderstanding,ofthetransaction.

Thisstandardaffordsinvestorstheopportunitytodiligenceexecutioncopiesofallcontractspriortoclosing,especiallyinformationthatmaynotbesetuntilpricing.

2. AllSECfilingsforatransactionshouldbeidentifiedintheongoingservicerreports,along

withtheproperElectronicDataGathering,AnalysisandRetrievalsystem(EDGAR)linktofilingsforthespecificsecuritization.

Rationale:

Given theproposedexpandedreporting for issuers,astandardmechanismneeds tobedeveloped toinforminvestorsthatafilinghasbeenaddedtoEDGAR.WithalargenumberofstructuredproductCUSIPs to monitor, it is not practical for any investor to routinely monitor EDGAR for newstructuredfilings.Investorsneedastandardmechanismtobeinformedofpublicfilings.

3. Forpublicandprivatesecurities,thetrustee,uponrequestfromacurrentholder,shouldbe

required tomake available, on a securewebsite, all operativedocuments, including anyamendments to the original operative documents, servicing reports (other than specialservicing reports that may be material and confidential) and SEC filings. In order tofacilitatemarketmaking activities inRule 144A securities, broker dealers should also beabletoobtainthesameinformationfromthetrusteeswebsite.

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Rationale:

Acurrentholderofasecurityshouldalwaysbeabletoobtaincopiesofthefulloperativedocumentsandtheprescribedperiodicservicerreportsfromthetrusteeuponrequest,regardlessofwhethertheoperativedocumentsexplicitlyprovideforitsrelease.

4. Aninvestororgroupofinvestorswhorepresenta10%holdinginasecuritizationshouldbe

able todirect the trustee topassalongcommunications tootherholders in thesecurityortrust.

Rationale:

Giventhecomplexityofsecuritizationstructures,includingcollateralconsiderations,itisimportantfor investorswhohave identified concernswith the collateral or any structural issue tobe able toeffectivelycommunicatewithother investors inthetransaction,toeitherpromptthetrusteetotakeactionorsolicit furtherdirection from investors.A10% threshold isasignificant levelof investorinteresttoinitiatecommunicationthroughthetrustee.

IV. POOLLEVELINFORMATION(RISKLAYERING&MATERIALITY)Proposal:WeareverysupportiveoftheSECsdecisionandapproachtoaddressthequalityofcollateraldataprovided to investors at issuance andduring the life of a structured security. In creditcardsmastertruststructures,wesupportamonthlygroupedaccountdataapproach.Forotherassetclasses,wewouldliketosuggestaddingfurtherdetailtothepointsalreadyintheSECsproposal:

1. Inany transaction,anassetlevel tape,ascontemplatedbyScheduleL,shouldbe filedwith each Rule 424(h), the red herring, and Rule 424(b), the black, filing and amonthlyassetleveltape,ascontemplatedbyScheduleLD,shouldberequired.

2. Instaticpool transactions, thereshouldbenoadditions to thecollateralpoolafter the

filingoftheblack.AnassetleveltapewiththecompleteScheduleLdisclosureshouldbefiledwiththeblack,explicitlynotingtheassetsthatwereaddedoreliminatedfromthecollateralpoolafterthe424(h)filing.Substitutionsfordefaultedassets,afterclosing,areacceptable.

3. In securitieswith prefunding periods or revolving transactions,monthly disclosures

should include commentary on anymaterial changes to underwriting criteria or the

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collateralcompositionduringtheperiodwhennewassetsareaddedorremoved.AnewScheduleLshouldbefiledmonthlywhennewcollateralisadded.

Rationale:Westronglysupport theSECscomments inSection IIIof itsproposalconcerning investorsneeds forassetleveldata thatprovidesacomprehensivepictureof theobligor, thecollateral,and thecontractualcollateral terms,whilealwaysprotecting the identificationofanobligor.Given thecomplexitiesofrisklayering, investors need to be provided with detailed ongoing assetlevel data, such as described inScheduleLandScheduleLD,toevaluateintheircollateralmodels,providedthatsuchdataisreasonablyavailabletoanissuer.Thestandardizationofthedatafieldsandtheirdefinitionswithinanassetclasswillprovidegreatereffectivenessandtransparencyforinvestors.Onedimensional statisticaldisclosures in the offering circular, such as range ofFICO score bands orgrouping theassets into representativehomogenous collateralpoolsarenot sufficient toappreciate thelinkages between collateral characteristics.When investors have access to assetlevel data, they canevaluatemultiple collateral variables like FICO, LoanToValue,DebtToIncome and location of thecollateral(State)alongwithbroadeconomicvariableslikeunemployment,currentpropertycapitalizationratesandassetcorrelations.Giventhesystemsandcomputingpoweravailabletoday,issuershavethemeanstoprovidethedataandinvestorshavetheabilitytoprocess largeassetlevel filesonamonthlybasis.Analyticsbasedonassetlevel analysisproducesmore insightful results thanmodelsbased on the limited information typicallysummarizedintheofferingcircularorservicerreport.Inanumberofareas, theproposal requests commentsonmateriality thresholds, suchaswhat levelofchangeincollateralcompositionconstitutesmaterialityandshouldinitiateareportingevent.Materialityinastructuredcollateralpoolcontext,giventheeffectsoftherisklayering,cannotbeaddressedbyjustevaluating weighted averages of any individual characteristic of the pool without consideration of atransactionsstructureorasecuritiescreditenhancement.Regulardisclosuresofcollateralinformationlike the Schedule L andmonthly Schedule LD assetlevel files allow investors to perform their owncollateralandstructuralanalysis,todeterminetheimpactontheirinvestmentofanycollateralchange.V. PRIVATELYISSUEDSTRUCTUREDFINANCEPRODUCTSProposal:Sinceitsinception,theRule144Amarketforstructuredsecuritieshasdevelopedintoapublicstyle execution market for many sponsors, accordingly we support the SECs proposal torequire issuers to provide, upon investor request, the same disclosure as is required for aregisteredABStransactionsforanyRule144Astructuredsecurity.

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The traditional private ABS market, one where the disclosure requirements are activelynegotiated by the participating parties rather than prescribed by regulation, should bepreserved.Apureprivatemarketishelpfulforcertainissuers,encouragesfinancialinnovation,andpermitscapitaltoflowtoemergingassetclassesandbusinesses.WeproposethenonRule144Aprivateexemptions(i.e.Reg.D),wouldbeareasonableareatoexempttheuponrequestpublicstyledisclosure.Inaddition,weagreethatthequalifiedinstitutionalbuyer(QIB)definitionshouldberevisedtorequire a higher suitability threshold for investment in private structured products. WeencouragetheSECtodevelopamoreworkablemechanismtoallowaninvestortoqualifyforinvestmentinprivatestructuredproductseitheronitsownorbyattributionofaninvestmentadvisorsqualificationsasaQIB.Rationale:1. ThesuitabilitytoinvestinprivateABSshouldprimarilybeestablishedbythesophisticationofthe

party making the investment decision. Individuals and institutions routinely hire investmentadvisors for investmentmandates inspecializedassetclasses,suchasABS.Theseentitiesevaluateandengageinvestmentadvisorsbasedupontheircapabilityinmanagingthespecificassetstrategy.ItistheexperienceandassetmanagementinfrastructureoftheinvestmentadvisorthatisthevitalmeasureindeterminingsuitabilityofABSsecurities,includingspecificABSassetclasses.

2. The evolution of theRule 144Amarket has substantially reduced investors ability to privately

negotiate issuance terms.As a result,Rule144A transactions have taken on amorepublicstyleprocessandexecutionthanthetraditionalprivateplacement.

3. Giventhebreadthoftheproposedpublicshelfeligibilityrequirements,manycurrentpublicissuers,

whohavetheresourcesandabilitytomeettheproposedpublicshelfregistrationrequirements,wouldbe incented tomigrate to theRule144Amarket ifpublicstyledisclosure isnotavailable inRule144A transactions.We are strongly supportive of an investors right to request, in aRule144Aissuance,theinformationthatwouldbeavailableifthetransactionweredoneinthepublicmarket.

4. Private placements, other than Rule 144A issuances, should not require publicstyle disclosure

uponrequestasrecommendedforRule144Aplacements.ThetraditionalprivatemarketallowsforavibrantprivateABSmarketopentoissuersofallsizes.

5. Theremaybea subset of sponsors thatwarrant consideration foran exemption frompublicstyle

disclosure in connectionwith aRule 144A transaction.We support preventing the creation of aloophole for issuers who have the resources and ability to meet the proposed public disclosurerequirements,therebyenablingthemtoexploitanyexceptionthatiscreated.ApotentialsolutionistoplacelimitationsonRule144Aplacementsbasedoncertaincriteria(e.g.thatlimitthesizeofanissuance,thenumberofissuancesasponsorcoulddoperyear,theamountofoutstandingsecuritiesissuedbyasponsor,thenumberofinvestors,andthesizeoftheassetclass).Smallersponsorsmight

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Page12

not have the resources to meet the public disclosure standards, but after an issuance volumethreshold has been reached, the ability to meet publicstyle disclosure should be expected andachievable.

6. Inour experience,wehavebeenable toobtainbetterdisclosure in theprivatemarket than in the

publicmarket.IthasbeenourmorerecentexperiencethattheRule144Amarketplacehasbecomesopubliclikethatwenolongerhavetheabilitytomeaningfullynegotiatetermsorreceiveinformationgreater thanwhatwould be available in a public transaction.We are concerned that the privatemarket will adopt the proposed public disclosure requirements as the maximum amount ofinformationneededtoprovideaspartofaprivateissuance.

In the introduction to SectionVI, PrivatelyIssued Structured FinanceProducts,we note thecommentstheSECmadewithrespecttoCDOsandtheirsalethroughprivateplacements.ThereareimportantdistinctionsamongthevarioustypesofCDOsthattheSECmaywishtoconsider.On the one hand areABSCDOs andCDOSquareds backed by subprimemortgagebackedsecurities that may have been created under the failed originate to distribute model tofacilitatetheissuanceofRMBSandwhichsignificantlycontributedtotherecentmarketcrisis.On theotherhand, thereareassetmanagementvehicles likeCollateralizedLoanObligations(CLO), which hold corporate loans that generally are purchased in an arms lengthtransaction andwhose performance through this economic cycle has beenmaterially better.CLO investorshave greater transparency to theunderlying corporationswithin aCLO thanABSCDOinvestorshadtotheindividualunderlyingborrowers.Thedistinctionsbetweentheseassetclassesmaywarrantacloserexamination,andwewouldbehappytodiscussourviewsonthistopic.VI. WATERFALLCOMPUTERPROGRAMProposal:Totheextentthattheproposedwaterfallcomputerprogram isadopted,thereshouldbeclearlanguage in the offering circular that the Indenture/Pooling & Serving Agreement is thecontrolling contract, and the remedies for inaccuracies in the waterfall computer programshouldalsobeclearlyelaborated.Rationale:Given that theremaybeheavy relianceon thewaterfall computerprogramby investors, and toavoidconfusionamonginvestorsastotheadjudicationofconflictsbetweenthewaterfallcomputerprogramandthe Indenture/Pooling&ServingAgreement, the risk section of the offering circular should include adescriptionofthelegalrightsandobligationscreatedundertheIndenture/Pooling&ServingAgreementandhowtheyareaffectedbyrelianceonthewaterfallcomputerprogram.

PARTII

InPartIIweprovideourthoughtsonthoserequestsforcommentthatmeaningfullyaffectaninvestment advisors ability to invest on behalf of clients, including cross referencing Part Iresponses.WewouldbehappytofurtherdiscussanyrequestforcommentwiththeSECstaff.In order to facilitate identifying and locating responses, the following Table of Contents isprovided.ThefivedigitpagenumbersrefertothepagetherequestforcommentbeginsintheMonday,May3,2010FederalRegister.

TABLEOFCONTENTS

II.SECURITIESACTREGISTRATION.........................................................................15

B.NewRegistrationProceduresandFormsforAssetBackedSecurities...........................................151.NewShelfRegistrationProcedurespage23336..........................................................................................153.ShelfEligibilityforDelayedOfferings..........................................................................................................19

(a)RiskRetentionpage23341....................................................................................................................19(b)ThirdPartyReviewofRepurchaseObligationspage23344...............................................................21(d)UndertakingToFileOngoingReportspage23347............................................................................25(e)OtherProposedFormSF3Requirementspage23349......................................................................26

D.IncludingInformationintheFormofProspectusintheRegistrationStatement.......................262.AddingNewStructuralFeaturesorCreditEnhancementspage23353...................................................26

III.DISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTS...........................................................................26

A.PoolAssets.......................................................................................................................................261.AssetLevelInformationinProspectuspage23356...................................................................................27

(a)WhenAssetLevelDataWouldBeRequiredintheProspectuspage23356.....................................284.AssetDataFileandXMLpage23376.........................................................................................................285.PoolLevelInformationpage23377............................................................................................................29

B.FlowofFunds...................................................................................................................................301.WaterfallComputerProgrampage23380..................................................................................................30

C.TransactionParties..........................................................................................................................311.IdentificationofOriginatorpage23381.......................................................................................................312.ObligationToRepurchaseAssetspage23382............................................................................................313.EconomicInterestintheTransactionpage23383.....................................................................................31

D.ProspectusSummarypage23384...................................................................................................31

E.StaticPoolInformationpage23386...............................................................................................324.FilingStaticPoolDatapage23387.............................................................................................................32

F.ExhibitFilingRequirementspage23388........................................................................................33

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IV.DEFINITIONOFANASSETBACKEDSECURITYPAGE23390...........................33

V.EXCHANGEACTREPORTINGPROPOSALS..........................................................36

A.DistributionReportsonForm10Dpage23391............................................................................36

B.ServicersAssessmentofComplianceWithServicingCriteriapage23392..................................36

C.Form8K..........................................................................................................................................361.Item6.05page23393...................................................................................................................................362.ChangeinSponsorsInterestintheSecuritiespage23393......................................................................37

D.CentralIndexKeyNumbersforDepositor,SponsorandIssuingEntitypage23393...................37

VI.PRIVATELYISSUEDSTRUCTUREDFINANCEPRODUCTSPAGE23397...........37

VII.CODIFICATIONOFSTAFFINTERPRETATIONSRELATINGTOSECURITIESACTREGISTRATIONPAGE23400...........................................................................39

VIII.TRANSITIONPERIODPAGE23400................................................................40

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II.SECURITIESACTREGISTRATION

B.NEWREGISTRATIONPROCEDURESANDFORMSFORASSETBACKEDSECURITIES

1.NEWSHELFREGISTRATIONPROCEDURESPAGE23336IncludedbelowisourTopicIII,TransactionDocumentation&Reporting,responsefromPartI:

Proposal:WeareverysupportiveoftheSECsdecisionandapproachtoaddresstheissueofregistrationmaterialsandongoingreporting.WewouldliketosuggestaddingfurtherdetailtothepointsalreadyintheSECsproposal:

1. Final operative documents (particularly the Indenture and Pooling and/orServicingAgreement)shouldbemadeavailabletoinvestors,byprovidingaccesstothemonaspecifiedwebsite,atleastthree(3)businessdayspriortoclosingforany public or private transaction.Any changes after the availability three (3)businessdayspriortoclosingshouldbehandledbytheamendmentprovisionsdescribedintheoperativedocuments.Rationale:WeareinconceptualagreementwiththeSECsproposalthataminimumperiodoftimebe established to reviewABSprospectuses.We recommendbroadening theproposal toincludeprivateABSofferingdocuments.Manyprivatetransactionswereannouncedandpricedwithpubliclevelalacrity.Aspeedbumpneedstobeincorporatedintotheissuanceprocesstoallowinvestorstocompletetheirdiligenceinacommerciallyreasonableperiodoftime.Given the importance of the final operativedocuments in structured transactions (e.g.Indenture/Pooling & Serving Agreement, swap confirmations, administrativeagreements)toaninvestorsunderstandingoftheactualcontractualprovisions,thefinaldocumentsshouldbedeliveredtoprospectivepurchasersthree(3)businessdayspriortoclosing.Any changes to the operative documents after the availability three (3) business daysprior to closing should be handled by the amendment provisions described in theoperative documents. Last minute financial engineering in structured transactionscontributes to poor understanding, and in some instances misunderstanding, of thetransaction.

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This standard affords investors the opportunity to diligence execution copies of allcontractspriortoclosing,especiallyinformationthatmaynotbesetuntilpricing.

2. All SEC filings for a transaction should be identified in the ongoing servicerreports,alongwiththeproperElectronicDataGathering,AnalysisandRetrievalsystem(EDGAR)linktofilingsforthespecificsecuritization.Rationale:Given theproposed expanded reporting for issuers, a standardmechanismneeds to bedeveloped to inform investors that a filing has been added to EDGAR.With a largenumberofstructuredproductCUSIPstomonitor,itisnotpracticalforanyinvestortoroutinely monitor EDGAR for new structured filings. Investors need a standardmechanismtobeinformedofpublicfilings.

3. Forpublicandprivatesecurities,thetrustee,uponrequestfromacurrentholder,should be required to make available, on a secure website, all operativedocuments, including any amendments to the original operative documents,servicingreports (other thanspecialservicingreports thatmaybematerialandconfidential) and SEC filings. In order to facilitatemarketmaking activities inRule 144A securities, broker dealers should also be able to obtain the sameinformationfromthetrusteeswebsite.Rationale:Acurrentholderofasecurityshouldalwaysbeabletoobtaincopiesofthefulloperativedocuments and the prescribed periodic servicer reports from the trusteeupon request,regardlessofwhethertheoperativedocumentsexplicitlyprovideforitsrelease.

4. An investor or group of investors who represent a 10% holding in asecuritizationshouldbeabletodirectthetrusteetopassalongcommunicationstootherholdersinthesecurityortrust.Rationale:Giventhecomplexityofsecuritizationstructures, includingcollateralconsiderations, itis important for investors who have identified concerns with the collateral or anystructural issue to be able to effectively communicate with other investors in thetransaction, to eitherprompt the trustee to takeactionor solicit furtherdirection frominvestors. A 10% threshold is a significant level of investor interest to initiatecommunicationthroughthetrustee.

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Includedbelowareresponsestospecificrequestforcomment:

Q: Under our proposal, the Rule 424(h) filing would not be required to includeinformationdependentonpricing.Is thatappropriate?Ifnot,what informationshouldberequiredtobeincludedandhowwouldanissuerhaveaccesstotheinformationinthetimeframethatweareproposing?

TheRule424(h)filingshouldhaveasectionthatspecificallydiscussesanyaspectofthe

transaction that istobedeterminedat the timeof theRule424(h) filing.ThetobedeterminedinformationshouldbefinalizedbytheRule424(b),theblack,filing.

Q: Under our proposal, if a material change to the disclosure other than to pricinginformationoccurs, the issuerwouldbe required to file anewRule 424(h)prospectuswithupdatedinformation.Isthisrequirementspecificenough?Shouldwe,insteadorinaddition,specifyparticularchangesthatwouldtriggerafiling,orconversely,thatwouldnottriggerafiling?Shouldwe,forexample,providethatanewRule424(h)filingwouldbe required if theassetpoolhaschangedbyacertainamount? Ifso,whatshould thatamountbe (e.g.,1%,5%,or10%of the finalassetpool)?Howwouldotherchangesbedescribed,suchaschangestothewaterfall?Woulditbeappropriatetoallowamaterialchangewithout requiringanewRule424(h) filingandanew fivedaywaitingperiod?Should the newRule 424(h) filing be required as proposed to reflect the change andcontain substantially all the information required to be in the prospectus, except forpricing information? Should we only require that the change be reflected in asupplement?

We support the proposed rule requiring a new Rule 424(h) filing for anymaterial

change,otherthaninformationthatisfinalizedatpricing.Giventhepotentialnegativeimpactofrisk layering in transactions,changes to theassetpoolshouldrequireanewScheduleLattheRule424(b)theblackfilingandafilethathighlightstheassetsaddedandredacted.

Investors would benefit if the EDGAR system was enhanced to accept red lined

filings.Itwouldbeefficientfor investorstoseeanysubsequentRule424(h)filingredlinedagainst theoriginaland/or immediatelypriorfiling.Thiswouldallow investorstoefficientlyandaccuratelydeterminewhat informationhasbeenupdated intheRule424(h) filing. For the same reason, sponsors should also provide a red lined Rule424(b) the black filing against the last Rule 424(h) filing. In current practice, theunderwriterverballysummarizesthechanges.

Q: The requirement to file a new Rule 424(h) filing would trigger another fivedaywaitingperiodbefore the first sale. Is this approach appropriate andworkable? If theissuerisrequiredtorefilethepreliminaryprospectus,asproposed,shouldtheissuerbe

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requiredtowaitanotherfivebusinessdaysbeforethefirstsale,asproposed?Ifnot,howlongshouldtheissuerberequiredtowait?

TheprocessshouldbequickerthantheinitialRule424(h)review,asaninvestorshould

havehadtheopportunitytobecomefamiliarwiththetransactiondocumentsduringtheinitialmarketingperiod.Anyrefilingwaitingperiodshouldbeincrementaltime.

Q: Are there any aspects of the Rule 424(h) filing that we should specify must besubstantiallysetatthetimeitisrequiredtobefiled?

Forstaticpooltransactions,thecollateralpoolshouldbesubstantiallysetwiththeRule

424(h)filing.Asanofferingbookbuilds,thetransactionsizeandthecollateralpoolmayincreasetoreflecttheincreasedinterestinthetransaction.TheRule424(b)filingshouldincludeanewScheduleL.

Q:WehavedesignedtheproposedprocessforABSshelfregistrationtostrikeabalancebetween facilitating registered ABS offerings and providing investors a meaningfulopportunitytoanalyzethesecurities.WouldourproposaltorequirethattheRule424(h)prospectusbefiledatleastfivebusinessdaysbeforethefirstsalemakeshelfregistrationsufficiently lessattractive to issuers that theywouldavoid theregisteredmarket?Ifso,are there ways to address this concern? Below, we are proposing to require moredisclosureforprivateofferingsofassetbackedsecuritiesthatrelyontheCommissionssafe harbors that allow issuers to rely on an exemption from registration. Shouldweimposeevenmorerestrictionsonprivateofferingsofassetbackedsecuritiesthanwhatisproposedbelow?Forexample,shouldweconditionrelianceonRule506ofRegulationDonalimitationofthetotalnumberofpurchasersinanABSoffering,evenforofferingstoaccredited investorsorqualified institutionalbuyers?Alternatively, shouldwe imposefewerrestrictionsonprivateofferingsofassetbackedsecurities?

Please refer to our response under Section VI, PrivatelyIssued Structured Finance

Products,forcommentsrelatedtoprivateofferingsofassetbackedsecurities.

Q:Shouldwealsorequire,orrequireinstead,thattheinitialpurchaserorinvestorholdthe securities for a period of time prior to resales in reliance onRule 144A to betterensure that such resales of assetbacked securities are not a distribution?Could thatbetterensure that thepublicregisteredABSmarketoperatesappropriatelyand that theexistingsafeharborsdonotinappropriatelyerodethepublicmarkets?Ifweweretoaddthese additional restrictions on private offerings, what would be the impact on thebroadermarket for structured securities?Would requiringaholdingperioddiscourageinvestorsfrompurchasingABSinexemptprivateplacements?Wouldtheseofferingsallbedoneaspublicdeals,orwouldtheseofferingsceasetobeconductedatall?Shouldweprovide for fewer restrictionsfor example, shouldwe require a subset of loanleveldisclosuresinthecontextofanexemptprivateoffering?Shouldissuersorsponsorshave

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the option of providing only certain information? Or would these rules reduce theaggregateamountoftransactions?Whatwouldbetheeconomiceffect?

Thelowerliquidityofaholdingperiodrulewouldlikelyeliminatecertainclientsfrom

investing inRule144Asecurities.Clientshavespecific investmentmandates thatmayrequireasecuritybesolduponadowngradeoruponarequesttoliquidatetheportfolio.

3.SHELFELIGIBILITYFORDELAYEDOFFERINGS

(A)RISKRETENTIONPAGE23341IncludedbelowisourTopicI,RiskRetention,responsefromPartI:

Proposal:We support theSECsproposal forvertical risk retention toproperlyalign theinterestsofmarketparticipants,andbelieve thatsystemicriskssimilar to thosethataroseinthepastdecadearelikelytorepeatthemselvesifmarketforcesarelefttoselfregulatealignmentofinterests.

Inordertoquicklyreturnconfidencetostructuredproductsmarkets,wesupport(i)a5% risk retention calculationbasedon the totalproceeds from the saleofeachtranche;(ii)retentionbeingretainedforthelifeofthesecuritization;(iii)riskretention requirements applying to all structured asset classes and types ofstructuredsecurities;and(iv)requiringthesponsoranditsaffiliatestoregularlyreporttheircurrentnetriskretentionrelatedholdings.WhiletheRegulationABproposalcontemplatesaminimum5%riskretentionforall asset classes, DoddFrank mandates that a group of certain regulators,includingtheSEC,reviewandconsiderwhethertheamountofriskretentionandthepartyorparties required to retain such risk shouldbedifferent for certainassetclasses.Webelievethattheriskretentionshouldbetailoredtotheuniquecharacteristicsofeachassetclass,such thatcertainassetclassesshould requirehigherriskretention,whileothersmayrequirelowerriskretention.Any risk retention requirement should consider existing accounting rules todetermine that upon the transfer of assets to a structured products trust, thesponsorsand loanoriginatorsaregenerallyable to realize sales treatmentandavoidconsolidationofthecollateralontotheirbalancesheets.

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Rationale:Longtermskininthegameisthebestapproachtoalignasponsorseconomicinterestswith the performance of its asset originations. Retention of risk by a sponsor (i)fundamentally addresses the originate to distribute model where an asset may beunderwrittenoraggregatedwitha focusonwhetherornot theassetcanbesold intoasecuritization, rather than on its likely longterm performance; and (ii)motivates thesponsortothoughtfullyoriginateassetsandensureproperservicingofthecollateralforthebenefitofallinvestorsinasecuritization.Vertical risk retention better aligns the sponsors interestswith each investor in thecapitalstructurethanhorizontalriskretention.WeagreewiththeSECscommentthathorizontal risk retention in the form of retention of the equity or residual interestcould lead to skewed incentive structures.3 A horizontal slice may engender classwarfarewithinasecuritization.Sponsorscaninfluencetheservicingofthecollateraltomaximize their overall cash proceeds and mitigate their exposure to the retainedsubordinatedhorizontalslice.When evaluating a transaction for appropriate sponsor risk retention, particularattention should be given to the amount of capital the sponsor has committed to thetransactionandtheamountoffunds(servicingfees,principalandinterestfromretainedholdings and residual interests at the bottom of the waterfall) that flow back to thesponsor from the securitization. The effectiveness of risk retention and the intendedalignmentof interestsbetweensponsorsandinvestorsissubstantiallydiminishedifthecombined payments received by the sponsor from all sources significantly repays thecapitalthesponsorcontributedtoatransactionpriortoinvestorsbeingrepaid.Inordertomaintainasponsorsskin inthegame,riskretentionshouldconsiderthesizeandtimingofasponsorstotalproceedsfromatransaction.We offer the following thoughts to specific questions you raise on risk retention andeconomicinterests:

WesupporttheSECspositionthatinretainingriskthroughtheretentionofrandomlyselected exposures, itwould be both difficult and potentially costly for investors andregulators to verify that exposures were indeed selected randomly, rather than in amannerthatfavoredthesponsor.4

While we acknowledge that DoddFrank requires certain regulators to develop adefinition of qualifiedmortgage, the qualifiedmortgage definition should be very

3 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 84 / Monday, May 3, 2010 / Proposed Rules Page 23339

4 Ibid

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narrow in scope, andwe are opposed to the concept ofdesignating aqualified assetwithin any other structured asset class. Once criteria for qualified assets areestablished,andsecuritizationof theseassetsaregrantedpreferentialcapital treatment,loan originators could be incented to originate the cheapest to deliver collateral fordistributiontoasecuritization.

Third party purchasers, like the Bpiece buyer inCMBS, should not be allowed toretain a portion of the securitization to fulfill the sponsors shelf eligibility condition.Recent history has shown that this practice did not insulate theCMBSmarket fromunderwritingexcesses.

Toprovidethegreatesttransparencytothemarket,thesponsoranditsaffiliatesshouldregularly report their current risk retention related holdings by tranche of asecuritization,aswebelieve thatanychange inriskretentionholdings ismaterialandshould bedisclosed.Furthermore, the sponsor should alsodisclose anyhedge (securityspecificorportfolio)thatwasentered intobythesponsoror,totheextent ithasactualknowledgeofsuchahedge,anaffiliate inan effort tooffsetany risk retentionpositionheldbythesponsororanaffiliate.

(B)THIRDPARTYREVIEWOFREPURCHASEOBLIGATIONSPAGE23344Included below is our Topic II, Repurchase Obligations Representations &Warranties,responsefromPartI:

Proposal:TheSECcorrectlyarticulatesinitscommentaryinSectionII.B.3(b)thedifficultiestrustees face in attempting to make bona fide representation and warrantyclaims,whichwehaverecentlyfoundtobethecaseinRMBS.Weareunawareofsuchabroad representationandwarranty issue inotherassetclasses,whetherthisisbecauseoftherelativelyinfrequentclaimsofbreachthatarise,thelackofaneffectivemechanism for trustees to initiateclaims,orbecause thestructuresweresufficientlyenhancedtoabsorbthethenrealized losses.Inanyevent, it isimportanttoprovideamechanismtotimelyidentifybreachesofrepresentationsandwarrantieswithrespecttounderlyingcollateral.PIMproposesthefollowingmechanism.

1. An independent collateral agent, or similar independent entity, should berequiredtoreviewandcertifytheassetleveltapeforaccuracyandcertifythatallrequiredassetrelateddocumentshavebeenprovided.

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Forstructuredtransactionsinvolvinghomogenouscollateralpoolsofmorethan1,000assets,weproposethatanonaffiliatedandindependentthirdparty,hiredbythetrusteeandcompensatedbythesponsorortransaction,shouldperformadetailed reviewofastatisticallysignificant randomsamplingofeachcollateralagentsasset files,prior topricing, todetermineadherencewith the transactiondocumentsandtherepresentationsandwarrantiesoftheseller.Iftheresultsfailthesamplingtest:a) thesponsorshouldberequiredtodiscloseitfailedarandomsamplingtest;b) all assetswill be reviewed, at the sellers expense, and all ineligible assets

shouldberemoved;andc) any asset thatwaspreviously identified asbreaching a representation and

warranty should be required to be disclosed and cannot be added to anysubsequentcollateralpoolunless ithasbeencuredandcertifiedasmeetingalltherepresentationsandwarrantiesofthetransaction.

For structured transactions involving smaller and lumpier asset pools, suchsampling techniquesmaynotbeappropriate,andothermeansofassessing thecollateralqualityshouldbeadopted.Rationale:In an effort to identifypotentialdata errors and to assurenecessarydocumentation isreceived,acollateralagentorsimilarpartycanreviewtheassetleveltapeforaccuracy,verifythatallassetdocumentsrequiredtobedeliveredatclosinghavebeenreceived,andassurethataworkableprocessisinplacetoobtainallpostclosingdocumentation.Thisreviewisreasonableandbeneficialtoatransaction.Theresultsofacollateralassessmentcompletedpriortodealclosingcanprovidefurthercomforttoinvestorsthattheassetsareunderwrittenanddocumentedinanappropriatemannerandcomplywithrepresentationsandwarranties.Theimpactonasponsorwhichfailsarandomsamplingneedstobematerialenoughtoensure the sponsor sufficiently reviews the collateral prior to its inclusion in atransaction. The cost and effort necessary to conduct a full pool review and thesubsequentdisclosuresshouldbeasufficientincentivetoasponsor.

2. Each ABS asset class should apply an objective and consistent standard foridentifying breaches of representations andwarranties, and triggering a postclosing asset document review. The use of such a carefully tailored objectivestandard,coupledwithaclearprocessforpursuinganyresultingclaims,shouldhelp ensure the effectiveness of the investors contractual remedies, whilesatisfyingallpartiesdesireforfairness.

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Asanexample,intransactionsthathaveemployedupfrontstatisticalsampling,the appropriate time to review adefaulted assetmay bewhen a transactionsrequiredcreditenhancement(e.g.overcollateralization,reserveaccount)isbelowthe target level as defined by the transaction.When enhancement is belowrequiredlevels,anydefaultedassetwouldbereviewedbyanonaffiliatedthirdparty,hiredbythetrustee,forcompliancewithrepresentationsandwarranties.The trusteeand servicer shouldhaveaspecifiedamountof timeafteranassetbecomesdefaultedtoprovideallassetdocumentstothethirdpartytofacilitateitsreview.Rationale:Only assets that meet the specified standards for the relevant asset class should beincludedinanABScollateralpool.Investorswanttoknowthatarigorousassetrevieworanotheracceptableprocesshasestablishedsuchcompliancepriortoclosing,andthatareliable mechanism has been provided to address material asset deficiencies that areidentifiedpostclosing.

3. Thesponsorshouldhaveaspecifiedamountoftimetochallengeanythirdpartyclaim, and if such time passes without a challenge, the sponsor should berequiredtorepurchasetheassetatthecontractuallyestablishedrepurchaseprice(typicallyparplusaccruedinteresttothedateofrepurchase).Anysponsorchallengedclaimsshouldbesettledbyanindependentthirdpartyarbitrator,selectedbythetrustee,whosedecisionisbinding.Rationale:Investors and issuers should both benefit from a process that facilitates the timelyresolutionofclaimswhilealsoprovidingareasonablelevelofdueprocess.ThisprocessalsoaddressesanissueinthecurrentSECproposalregardingwhatshouldoccur in the casewherea sponsor rejectsa claimand the thirdpartyopiniondoesnotsupportthesponsor.

4. Claimsmadeagainstasponsorbythethirdpartyshouldberegularlyreported,togetherwithdetailthatclarifiesthenumberofsuchclaims thatwereacceptedby thesponsorand thenumberofclaims thatwereandwerenotapprovedbythe arbitrator. This information should be provided as part of the offeringmaterialforallissuancesofthesponsor.

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Rationale:This information is important in evaluating the effectiveness of the process and thesponsors prior diligence in confirming that its collateral meets the eligibilityrequirements.

Includedbelowareresponsestospecificrequestforcomment:

Q:Would thisproposedcondition,whichwouldonly requireanundertaking from theissuer,haveameasurablebenefit to investors?Shouldwe requiremoreassurance thatthirdpartyopinionshavebeenprovided to investorsasacondition toshelfeligibility?Forexample,shouldweinsteadconditioneligibilityonreceiptofacertificationfromthetrustee inofferingsof thesameassetclassby thedepositoror itsaffiliates to theeffectthat all required opinions have been obtained? Shouldwe condition eligibility on arequirement that the trustee provide notice if required third party opinions are notobtained,alongwithanabsenceofanoticefromthetrusteetotheeffectthattherewasafailuretoproviderequiredopinions?

EachABSassetclassshouldapplyanobjectiveandconsistentstandardfor identifying

breaches of representations and warranties, and triggering a postclosing assetdocumentreview,aswehaveproposed.

Q:Shouldweprovidemoreguidelines in this shelfeligibility condition regarding thespecifics of the provision thatwould be required to be included in the pooling andservicingorotheragreement?Ifso,whatshouldbedetailed?

The agreements should clearly specify the obligations of the issuer and servicer to

facilitate thediligenceofpotentialbreachesof representationsandwarranties throughthereleaseofasset information,and it is thedutyof the trustee toactively fulfill theirobligationtoreviewcollateralforpotentialrepresentationandwarrantybreaches.

Q:Should theproposedconditionprovideanyfurtherspecificationof the termsof thethirdpartyopinionprovision?

Investorsneedaremedyagainstthesponsorifthethirdpartyopinionisnotsupportive

ofthesponsorsrejectionoftheclaim.

Q:Is itappropriate torequire,asproposed, the thirdparty tobenonaffiliatedwith theobligatedparty?Shouldwespecifyfurtheranyrequirementsrelatingtoprovidersofthethirdpartyopinion?Shouldwespecifythatthethirdpartyopinionprovidermustbeanindependent expert, similar to what is required in Section 314(d)(1) of the TrustIndentureActof1939?

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We support the proposed rule requiring the third party to be nonaffiliatedwith theobligatedparty.The thirdparty shouldbehiredby the trustee,not the sponsor.Therequirementwillhelpensureagainstconflictsofinterest.

Q:Shouldwespecifywhoshouldprovidethethirdpartyopinionorwhoshouldnotbepermitted toprovide theopinion?Shoulddiligence firms thatprovide thirdpartypresecuritizationreviewofarandomsampleofassetsbeallowed toprovide thisopinion?Shouldwe specify that itmust be a legal opinion?Would attorneys or law firms bewilling toprovide thisopinion?Whyorwhynot?Would itbe appropriate to allow asponsors inhousecounsel toprovide theopinion? Ifa law firmprovides theopinion,shouldwe prohibit the law firm that assisted in the offering fromproviding such anopinion?

The thirdparty shouldbehiredby the trustee.To ensureno conflict of interest, any

partyoranaffiliateinvolvedinthetransactionshouldbeineligiblefromprovidingtheopinion.Thethirdpartyshouldhavetomakearepresentationthatnoconflictofinterestexists.

Q:Weareawareofsomeinsuranceprovidersthathaveofferedtoinsureinthecontextofmergers and acquisitions any breach of the representations and warranties in thetransaction agreement. As an alternative to conditioning ABS shelf eligibility on anundertakinginthetransactionagreementthattheissuerfurnishathirdpartyopiniononassetsnotrepurchased(orinsteadoftheproposedcondition),shouldweallowtheissuerto purchase insurance to insure aminimum amount or percentage of the sponsor ororiginatorsobligationsunder the transactionagreement?Ifso,whatkindofdisclosureshouldwerequireabouttheinsuranceprovider?Howcanweensurethatthisalternativemethod ofmeeting shelf eligibility adequately improves the incentive structure andthereforethequalityofthesecurities?

Insurance is a risk transfer mechanism, and the issuer should remain financially

accountableforallbreachesofrepresentationandwarranties,ratherthanathirdpartycompany.Ifinsuranceisdeemedacceptable,anyinsurancepaymentsshouldflowtothetrust, and if the insurer is not able tomake a claim payment to the trust, then thesponsor should still remain liable for thepayment.Consequently, the sponsor shouldremain focused on ensuring all collateral contributed to a transaction meets theeligibilitycriteria.

(D)UNDERTAKINGTOFILEONGOINGREPORTSPAGE23347

Q:Whatistheaggregateeffectoftheproposedrevisionstoshelfeligibilitycriteriaandthe shelf registrationprocess forABSofferings? If these revisions are adopted,wouldthismakeusingnonshelfregistration(FormSF1)moreattractivetoanABSissuer?How

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would this change the costs andbenefits analysis forusing shelf registration forABSissuers? Would this change cause shelf registration to be less attractive or becomeuneconomic?

All public ABS offerings (Proposed Forms SF1 and SF3) should follow the same

disclosureandeligibilitystandards.

(E)OTHERPROPOSEDFORMSF3REQUIREMENTSPAGE23349The proposed risk retention requirements and continued monitoring is appropriate andbeneficial for investors. The requirement tomaintain risk retention should be a continuousrequirement. Please refer to our response under Section II.B.3.(a), Risk Retention, formorecommentary.

D.INCLUDINGINFORMATIONINTHEFORMOFPROSPECTUSINTHEREGISTRATIONSTATEMENT

2.ADDINGNEW STRUCTURAL FEATURES ORCREDIT ENHANCEMENTS PAGE23353

Q: Isourproposal to require issuers to file aposteffective amendment to reflectnewstructural features or credit enhancements and provide a related undertakingappropriate?

Yes. All market participants would benefit from the enhanced understanding of a

transactionthatresultsfromthisproposal.

III.DISCLOSUREREQUIREMENTS

A.POOLASSETSWe are very supportive of the SECs approach to address the issue of assetleveldisclosurerequirementsandexemptionsatofferingandongoingthroughthelifeofasecuritization.Withtheexceptionofsizeablemastertruststructures,likecreditcards,weareaproponentofassetleveldisclosurethatiscommerciallyreasonableforanissuertoprovideanddoesnotallowtheidentificationof theobligor.The contentofSection IIIand theScheduleLandScheduleLDtablesisthoughtful,andtheproposedassetlevelinformationalitemsaregenerallybeneficialinunderstanding the riskprofile of the obligors, the value of the collateral and the actual and

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expected amortizationof the collateral.We find the standardizationofdefinitions associatedwith each informational item tobe important inunderstanding themeaningof thedataandensuringconsistencyofreportingacrossissuers.Someproposeditemsmaynotberequiredforanassetclassorapplicableforasubsetofissuerswithinanassetclass.Ifyouconsidereliminatinganyitemrequirement,weproposetheitembemovedtoaSupplementalInformationSchedule,sincetheitemmaybe(orbecome)relevantfor an issuer. No issuer would be required to provide a response to any item on theSupplemental Information Schedule. If an issuer believes a particular item is beneficial toprovide to investors, the item would be defined and available in the general Scheduleframework. For a private ABS transition, it is helpful to maintain a larger set of definedScheduleitems.When considering investor needs in the development of the assetlevel files, assetlevelinformationdesigned specifically for an investor in the senior timetranchedAAA class in aprime collateralpoolwith standard loan termswillnotmeet theneedsofan investor in thesameassetclassbutinadeeplysubordinatedorequitypositionofasecuritizationofsubprimecollateralwithnonstandardloanterms.Astherecurrentlyisonlyoneassetlevelfileperassetclass,thatassetlevelfilewillneedtomeettheneedsofallinvestors.Thefollowingcollateralissuesshouldalsobeconsidered:

Theriskprofileoftheobligor(e.g.prime,nearprimeandsubprimeobligorsAAAtoCCCcorporations)

The collateral and its stated terms (e.g. detailed collateral description and value,scheduledprincipalandinterest,defaults,extensions,modifications,repurchases)

Themonthly proceeds received by the trust (e.g. scheduled and prepaid principal,interest,recoveries,serviceradvances)

The impactof therecent issuesexperiencedby thesecuritizationmarkethasmadeallmarketparticipantsreviewbestpracticesforassetleveldata.Thevalueoftheassetlevelinformationisnotonlyforinvestorstobeabletoperformmorerobustcreditworkatissuanceandthroughthelifeofatransaction,butalsotoprovideenhancedtransparencyforallinterestedpartiesintothemechanicsofasecuritizedtransaction.

1.ASSETLEVELINFORMATIONINPROSPECTUSPAGE23356

Q: Is a different approach to assetlevel disclosure preferable, such as requiring itgenerally,but relying on industry to set standardsor requirements? If so,howwoulddatabedisclosed for all the asset classes forwhichno industry standard existsor forwhichmultiplestandardsmayexist?Totheextentmultiplestandardsexist,howwouldinvestorsbeabletocomparepools?Pleasebedetailedinyourresponse.

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Under theauspicesofaSEC ledprocess, it isbeneficial for sponsorsand investors tojointlydevelopstandardsorrequirementsforanyassetclass.Toensurestandardizationandutilizationoftheworkproduct,anyagreementmustbeincorporatedintotheSECsdisclosure requirements. If two sponsors within the same asset class can provideinformation on different standards, it will be impossible for investors to efficientlycompareassetlevelfiles.

Q:We note that there are several different standards underwhich assetlevel data isalreadyrequired.WouldourrequirementsimposeundueburdensonABSissuers?

Oneuniformstandardperassetclasswouldbebeneficialforsponsorsandinvestors.

(A)WHENASSETLEVELDATAWOULDBEREQUIREDINTHEPROSPECTUSPAGE23356

Q:IstheproposedrequirementtoprovideScheduleLdatawiththeproposedRule424(h)prospectus,thefinalprospectusunder424(b)andforchangesunderItem6.05ofForm8Kappropriate?ShouldScheduleLdataberequiredatanyothertime?Ifso,pleasetelluswhenandwhy.

Securitizationsthataddnewassetsafterthefinalprospectus(e.g.revolvingtransactions

andtransactionswithaprefundingperiod)andrequireaScheduleLfilingatissuance,should file a complete ScheduleL eachmonthnew assets are added to the collateralpool. Thiswill allow investors to evaluate the risk layering introduced by any newcollateralthatisaddedtothetransaction.

Q: Are the proposedmeasurement dates appropriate? Are there any data fields thatwouldbe inappropriateor tooburdensome tosupplyasof twodifferentmeasurementdates(i.e.,themeasurementdateandthecutoffdate)?Ifso,pleasespecifythedatafieldandprovideadetailedexplanation.

Theproposedmeasurementdatesareappropriate.InvestorsshouldreceiveScheduleL

datawiththeRule424(h)prospectusandthefinalprospectusunderRule424(b).

4.ASSETDATAFILEANDXMLPAGE23376

Q:Aretheproposedblankdatatagsappropriate?Istenblankdatatagstheappropriatenumber?Shouldthenumberbemoreorless?Wouldmoreblankdatatagscreateunduecomplexityforinvestors?Arethereotherwayswecouldprovideforadditionaldisclosureandhavethatdisclosurebestandardized?

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Aslongastheinformationintheblankdatatagisclearlydescribed,neitherthenumberofblankdatatagsnortheinformationwouldaddcomplexity.

Q: Shouldwe provide a transition period prior to the required compliance date thatwouldallowfilerstosubmitonlytestfilings?Pleasebespecificinyourresponse.

Regardlessoftheimplementationperiod,giventhebreadthanddepthofchangesinthe

proposal, itwouldbehelpful (especiallywith regards toassetlevel filesandwaterfallcomputer programs) that sponsors proactively commence preparing beta versions ofnewinformationalreleasessoinvestorscanbeginretoolingtheirsystemsinadvanceoftheproposalbecomingeffective.

5.POOLLEVELINFORMATIONPAGE23377

Q:Abovewenoted thatdisclosure regarding risk layeringpractices is requiredunderexistingItem1111.IstheapplicationofItem1111torisklayeringpracticesclear?IstheresomewaywecanmakeItem1111clearerinthatregard?Shouldwereviseanyotherruleinthatregard?

PleaserefertoSectionIV,DefinitionofanAssetBackedSecurity,forgeneralcomments

onrisklayering.

Q:Shouldwerequire,asproposed,disclosureonassets thatdeviatefrom thedisclosedoriginationunderwritingstandards thatmustbeaccompaniedbydisclosureofspecificdataabouttheamountandcharacteristicsofthoseassetsthatdidnotmeetthestandards?Shouldwerequire,asproposed,thatifdisclosureisprovidedregardingcompensatingorotherfactors,ifany,thatwereusedtodeterminethattheassetsshouldbeincludedinthepool,despitenothavingmetthedisclosedunderwritingstandards,disclosureisrequiredthatwoulddescribe thosefactorsandprovidedataon theamountofassets in thepoolthatarerepresentedasmeetingthosefactorsand theamountofassets thatdonotmeetthose factors?Shouldwe require anyotherdisclosurewith respect to exceptions toordeviations from disclosed origination underwriting standards? Should issuers berequiredtoidentifyeachexceptionloanbyaloanidentifierthatwillbedisclosedintheproposedScheduleLdiscussedabove?

Anyassetthatdeviatesfromthedisclosedoriginationunderwritingstandardsshouldbe

deemed an exception. Exceptions are a normal part of the asset origination process.Although theexceptionprocessmaybe codified inan issuers standardunderwritingprocedures, it is important toknowhowmanyassetswerenotapproved through thedisclosedoriginationunderwriting standards.This information shouldbe included inthegeneralitemsonScheduleL.

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Q:Are theproposedamendmentsrelating todisclosureconcerningrepresentationsandwarrantiesandmodificationprovisionsinthetransactionagreementsappropriate?

PleaserefertoSectionII.B.3.(b),ThirdPartyReviewofRepurchaseObligations.

Q:Are there other kinds of disclosure relating to representations andwarranties andenforcementmechanismsofthoserepresentationsandwarrantiesthatshouldberequiredtobeprovided?Ifso,pleasedescribeindetail.

PleaserefertoSectionII.B.3.(b),ThirdPartyReviewofRepurchaseObligations.

Q:Arepurchaseobligationalsomaybeimposedunderothercircumstances.Shouldtherulesrequireprospectusdisclosureofothertypesofrepurchaseobligations?

Theprospectusshoulddisclosealltypesofrepurchaseobligations.

Q:Weareproposingtorequiredisclosureofwhetherthetransactionagreementsincludeafraudrepresentation.Isthisappropriate?Are thereother typesofrepresentationsandwarrantiesthattheprospectusshouldhighlight?

We support the proposed rule to include a fraud representation. Fraud related

disclosure ishelpful to investors.Theprospectus shouldhighlight all representationsandwarrantiesmadebyallpartiesaffiliatedwiththetransaction.

B.FLOWOFFUNDS

1.WATERFALLCOMPUTERPROGRAMPAGE23380IncludedbelowisourTopicVI,WaterfallComputerProgram,responsefromPartI:

Proposal:To the extent that theproposedwaterfall computerprogram is adopted, thereshouldbe clear language in the offering circular that the Indenture/Pooling&ServingAgreementisthecontrollingcontract,andtheremediesforinaccuraciesinthewaterfallcomputerprogramshouldalsobeclearlyelaborated.Rationale:Giventhattheremaybeheavyrelianceonthewaterfallcomputerprogrambyinvestors,and toavoid confusionamong investorsas to theadjudicationof conflictsbetween the

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waterfallcomputerprogramand the Indenture/Pooling&ServingAgreement, the risksection of the offering circular should include a description of the legal rights andobligationscreatedundertheIndenture/Pooling&ServingAgreementandhowtheyareaffectedbyrelianceonthewaterfallcomputerprogram.

C.TRANSACTIONPARTIES

1.IDENTIFICATIONOFORIGINATORPAGE23381

Q:ShouldweamendItem1110torequireidentificationoforiginatorsevenifnosingleoriginatorcomprises10%ormoreofthepool?Isitappropriatetorequireidentificationoforiginators,asproposed,ifthecumulativeamountoforiginatedassetsbypartiesotherthanthesponsor(oritsaffiliates)comprises10%ormoreofthetotalpoolasset?

Q:Aretheproposedrevisedthresholdsfororiginatoridentificationappropriate?Shouldtheybedifferent(e.g.,5%)?

ScheduleL should specify theoriginatorofeachasset.By including theoriginatoron

ScheduleL, investorswillhave theability to identifyanddifferentiateoriginators thatareprovidingriskiercollateraltostructuredproducttransactions.

2.OBLIGATIONTOREPURCHASEASSETSPAGE23382Please refer to Section II.B.3.(b), Third Party Review of Repurchase Obligations, for PIMsrepurchaseobligationproposal.

TheScheduleLDfileshouldindicateifanassetwasrepurchasedbythesponsor.

3.ECONOMICINTERESTINTHETRANSACTIONPAGE23383Please refer to Section II.B.3.(a), Risk Retention, for general comments on the reporting ofeconomicinterests.

D.PROSPECTUSSUMMARYPAGE23384

Q:Isourproposed instruction torequiresummarystatistical informationregarding thetypes of underwriting or origination programs, exceptions to underwriting and

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origination criteria and, if applicable, modifications made to the pool assets afteroriginationappropriate?

Yes,thedisclosurerequiredundertheproposalwouldbehelpfultoinvestors.

E.STATICPOOLINFORMATIONPAGE23386Poolconstructionriskisaprimaryriskininvestinginstructuredproducts.Lossandcollateralamortization expectations are based on a review of historical static pool data. For historicalperformancetohaveanyrelevancetoanewissue,thecurrentcollateralpoolshouldhavebeenoriginated in a similarmanner as the historical pools. The prospectus should highlight theextent to which the current collateral pool was originated with the same or differingunderwritingcriteria,loantermsand/orrisktolerancesthanthestaticpooldata.

Q:Shouldwe adopt the changes to Item 1105 for all types of issuers (instead of onlyamortizing asset pools, as proposed) to require narrative disclosure of the static poolinformationpresented,require themethodologyused indeterminingorcalculating thecharacteristics, and terms, and adescription ofhow the assets in the staticpooldifferfromthepoolassetsunderlyingthesecuritiesbeingoffered?Wouldthesechangeshelpinvestorsevaluatestaticpooldata?

Webelievethenarrativedisclosureandmethodologydisclosurewouldbehelpfulinnot

only understanding an issuers static pool information, but also comparing theinformationacrossissuerswithinthesameassetclass.

4.FILINGSTATICPOOLDATAPAGE23387Itwouldbehelpful to investors if the staticpooldata isprovided ina format that is readilyimportableintoExceloradatabase.

Q:Weareproposingtoallow,butnotrequire,registrantstofilestaticpoolinformationonForm8Kandincorporateitbyreferenceintotheprospectus,inlieuoffilingitintheprospectus.Isthisaccommodationappropriate?Shouldweinsteadrequirethatallstaticpooldisclosurebefiledintheprospectus?

Foranyinformationthatisincorporatedbyreferenceintheprospectus,itwouldbevery

helpfuliftherewerealinktotherelevantinformation.

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F.EXHIBITFILINGREQUIREMENTSPAGE23388PleaserefertoourresponseunderSectionII.B.1,NewShelfRegistrationProcedures,forgeneralcommentsontransactiondocuments.

IV.DEFINITIONOFANASSETBACKEDSECURITYPAGE23390Included below is our Topic IV, PoolLevel Information (Risk Layering & Materiality),responsefromPartI:

Proposal:We are very supportive of the SECs decision and approach to address thequalityofcollateraldataprovidedtoinvestorsatissuanceandduringthelifeofastructuredsecurity.Increditcardsmastertruststructures,wesupportamonthlygroupedaccountdataapproach.Forotherassetclasses,wewouldliketosuggestaddingfurtherdetailtothepointsalreadyintheSECsproposal:

1. Inanytransaction,anassetleveltape,ascontemplatedbyScheduleL,shouldbefiledwitheachRule424(h),theredherring,andRule424(b),theblack,filingand amonthly assetlevel tape, as contemplated by Schedule LD, should berequired.

2. In static pool transactions, there should be no additions to the collateral poolafterthefilingoftheblack.AnassetleveltapewiththecompleteScheduleLdisclosureshouldbefiledwiththeblack,explicitlynotingtheassetsthatwereaddedoreliminatedfromthecollateralpoolafterthe424(h)filing.Substitutionsfordefaultedassets,afterclosing,areacceptable.

3. In securities with prefunding periods or revolving transactions, monthlydisclosuresshouldincludecommentaryonanymaterialchangestounderwritingcriteria or the collateral composition during the periodwhen new assets areadded or removed. A new Schedule L should be filed monthly when newcollateralisadded.Rationale:We strongly support the SECs comments in Section III of its proposal concerninginvestorsneedsforassetleveldatathatprovidesacomprehensivepictureoftheobligor,the collateral, and the contractual collateral terms, while always protecting theidentificationofanobligor.Giventhecomplexitiesofrisk layering,investorsneedtobeprovidedwith detailed ongoing assetlevel data, such as described in Schedule L and

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ScheduleLD,toevaluateintheircollateralmodels,providedthatsuchdataisreasonablyavailabletoanissuer.Thestandardizationofthedatafieldsandtheirdefinitionswithinanassetclasswillprovidegreatereffectivenessandtransparencyforinvestors.Onedimensional statisticaldisclosures in theoffering circular, suchas rangeofFICOscorebands orgrouping the assets into representativehomogenous collateralpools arenotsufficienttoappreciatethelinkagesbetweencollateralcharacteristics.Wheninvestorshaveaccesstoassetleveldata,theycanevaluatemultiplecollateralvariableslikeFICO,LoanToValue,DebtToIncomeand locationof the collateral (State)alongwithbroadeconomic variables likeunemployment, current property capitalization rates and assetcorrelations.Given the systems and computing power available today, issuers have themeans toprovide the data and investors have the ability to process large assetlevel files on amonthlybasis.Analyticsbasedonassetlevelanalysisproducesmore insightfulresultsthan models based on the limited information typically summarized in the offeringcircularorservicerreport.Inanumberofareas,theproposalrequestscommentsonmaterialitythresholds,suchaswhatlevelofchangeincollateralcompositionconstitutesmaterialityandshouldinitiateareportingevent.Materialityinastructuredcollateralpoolcontext,giventheeffectsofthe risk layering, cannot be addressed by just evaluating weighted averages of anyindividualcharacteristicofthepoolwithoutconsiderationofatransactionsstructureora securities credit enhancement.Regular disclosures of collateral information like theScheduleLandmonthlyScheduleLDassetlevel filesallow investors toperform theirown collateral and structural analysis, todetermine the impact on their investment ofanycollateralchange.

Includedbelowareresponsestospecificrequestforcomment:

Q: Is the proposed revision relating tomaster trusts not backed by revolving accountassets appropriate?Are there any asset classes or types ofABS issuers thatwould beexcludedfromthereviseddefinitionofanassetbackedsecuritythatshouldnotbe?

Exceptasnotedbelow,anyassettypethatfollowsatraditionalamortizationscheduleor

withouttheabilitytoredrawontheloangenerallyshouldnotbeincludedinapubliclyissuedmastertruststructure.

Master trust structures are appropriate for sponsorswith recurringvariable collateral

fundingneeds (e.g. credit cards, fleet lease, floorplan, rental car).The flexibility andefficiencyamastertruststructureprovidesisappropriateforthesetypesofassets.

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Q:IsitappropriateforABSstructuredasmastertruststhatarebackedbynonrevolvingaccounts to register onS1?Howwould existing andprospective investorsbe able toanalyzethepoolifitisconstantlychanging?Pleasebespecificinyourresponse.

The SEC raises an important risk consideration for investors, the ability tomonitor a

collateralpoolifitisconstantlychanging.Thebestmonitoringmechanismforinvestorsismonthlytransparencyintothecurrentcollateralpool.

Q:Is10%theappropriateceilingfortheamountofpermissibleprefunding?Shouldthatamountbehigher(e.g.,20%,30%,40%),lower(e.g.,fivepercent),ordisallowedaltogetherunder the definition of an assetbacked security? Under the existing definition, thedurationoftheprefundingperiodislimitedtooneyearfromthedateofissuanceoftheassetbackedsecurities.Shouldtheoneyearlimitationbeshortened?

Q:Istheoneyearpermissiblelengthoftherevolvingperiodfornonrevolvingassets,asproposed,theappropriateamountoftime?Shouldthepermissiblelengthbeadifferentamountoftime(e.g.,twoyears)?Shouldanyotheramendmentsbemadetotheallowanceforrevolvingperiods?

Concernwiththeceilingforpermissibleprefundingandthedurationoftheprefunding

periodorrevolvingperiodfornonrevolvingassetsismitigatediftheissuerisrequiredto fileaScheduleLat issuanceandeachmonthnewassetsareadded to thecollateralpool.The transparencyprovidedby theassetlevelfilewillallow investors toevaluatethechangingnatureoftherisklayeringintroducedbythenewassets.

Whileeachstructuredtransactionhasabroaddescriptionofcollateraleligibility,issuers

generallycommunicateatargetedunderwritingfocusduringatransactionsmarketingperiod.Overaprefundingor revolvingperiod,an issuersunderwriting criteria, loanterms and/or risk tolerancesmay change. The resulting collateral,whilemeeting thebroad collateral eligibility requirementsof the transaction,maybedifferently focusedthenwhatwascommunicatedduringthemarketingperiod.

TotheextenttheupdatedScheduleLand/ormonthlyScheduleLD information isnot

required to be produced and investors cannot properly access the changes in risklayering,alowceilingandashortprefundingorrevolvingperiodshouldbeadopted.

There should not be any blind collateral pools as part of any publicABS disclosure

scheme. If the issuer desires the benefits of public issuance, one of the requirementsshould be transparency into the collateral pool at issuance and for the life of thetransaction.

Webelievedifferentrequirementswillbeneeded foractivelymanaged (asopposed to

prefunded or revolving) securitizations. In the case of an actively managed

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securitization, limitations on amounts of prefunding, or a specified time limit for arevolvingperiod,arenotasrelevantasassetlevelandpoollevelrequirements for thesecuritizationandgooddisclosureregardingtheinvestmentphilosophyandpracticesofthe investmentmanager.These inputscanallow investors togauge their tolerance foruncertaintyinthefinalcompositionoftheassetpool.

V.EXCHANGEACTREPORTINGPROPOSALS

A.DISTRIBUTIONREPORTSONFORM10DPAGE23391

Q:Shouldweamend,asproposed,Item1121torequiredisclosureregardingtheamountof repurchasedemandsmade of the obligatedpartyduring theperiod coveredby thereportfortheassetsinthepoolofsecuritiescoveredbythereport?Shouldwerequire,asproposed, disclosure regarding the percentage of those assets that were subject to arepurchase demand thatwere not repurchased? Shouldwe also require, as proposed,disclosurewhetheranopinionofathirdpartynotaffiliatedwiththeobligatedpartyhadbeenfurnished to the trustee thatconfirms that theassets thatwerenotrepurchasedorreplaceddidnotviolatearepresentationorwarranty.

PleaserefertoourresponseunderSectionII.B.3.(b),ThirdPartyReviewofRepurchase

Obligations,forPIMsrepurchaseobligationproposal.

B. SERVICERSASSESSMENTOFCOMPLIANCEWITH SERVICINGCRITERIA PAGE23392

Q: Shouldwe codify prior staff interpretations relating to the scope of Item 1122 byadding the proposed instruction? Does the proposed instruction to Item 1122 reflectcurrent servicerspractices?Do servicers conduct servicing in anywaysdifferent fromwhatiscontemplatedintheproposedinstruction?

Codifyingstaffinterpretationsisabenefitforallmarketparticipants.

C.FORM8K

1.ITEM6.05PAGE23393

Q:ShouldwereviseItem6.05ofForm8Kasproposed?Is1%anappropriatethresholdtotriggerdisclosureonForm8K?Shoulditbehigherorlowersuchas0.5%or2%?

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PleaserefertoourresponseunderSectionII.B.1,NewShelfRegistrationProcedures,forgeneralcommentsonmateriality.

Q:Shouldwealsorequire,asproposed,adescriptionofthechangestotheassetpool?

Yes, a description of changeswould be helpful. Investors should also be provided a

listingoftheineligiblecollateralandareasonastowhythecollateralbecameineligible.

2.CHANGEINSPONSORSINTERESTINTHESECURITIESPAGE23393Please refer toour responseunderSection II.B.3.(a),RiskRetention, forgeneralcommentsonriskretentionandrelatedreporting.

D.CENTRALINDEXKEYNUMBERSFORDEPOSITOR,SPONSORANDISSUINGENTITYPAGE23393

Q:ArethereanyotherchangesweshouldmaketotheformstomakeiteasiertolocatematerialsrelatedtoanABSofferingorABSissuer?

PleaserefertoourresponseunderSectionII.B.1,NewShelfRegistrationProcedures,for

generalcommentsonassistingmarketparticipantslocatingSECfilings.

Theability toperformacompany search inEDGARbyCUSIP,orother standardizedassetID,wouldbehelpful.

VI.PRIVATELYISSUEDSTRUCTUREDFINANCEPRODUCTSPAGE23397IncludedbelowisourTopicV,PrivateIssuedStructuredFinanceProducts,responsefromPartI:

Proposal:Sinceitsinception,theRule144Amarketforstructuredsecuritieshasdevelopedintoapublicstyleexecutionmarketformanysponsors,accordinglywesupporttheSECsproposaltorequireissuerstoprovide,uponinvestorrequest,thesamedisclosure as is required for a registeredABS transactions for anyRule 144Astructuredsecurity.

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The traditionalprivateABSmarket,onewhere thedisclosurerequirementsareactively negotiated by the participating parties rather than prescribed byregulation, should be preserved.A pure privatemarket is helpful for certainissuers,encouragesfinancialinnovation,andpermitscapitaltoflowtoemergingassetclassesandbusinesses.WeproposethenonRule144Aprivateexemptions(i.e.Reg.D),wouldbea reasonablearea toexempt theupon requestpublicstyledisclosure.In addition, we agree that the qualified institutional buyer (QIB) definitionshould be revised to require a higher suitability threshold for investment inprivatestructuredproducts.WeencouragetheSECtodevelopamoreworkablemechanism toallowan investor toqualify for investment inprivatestructuredproducts either on its own or by attribution of an investment advisorsqualificationsasaQIB.Rationale:

1. The suitability to invest in private ABS should primarily be established by thesophisticationofthepartymakingtheinvestmentdecision.Individualsandinstitutionsroutinelyhire investmentadvisors for investmentmandates inspecializedassetclasses,suchasABS.Theseentitiesevaluateandengage investmentadvisorsbasedupon theircapability in managing the specific asset strategy. It is the experience and assetmanagement infrastructure of the investment advisor that is the vital measure indeterminingsuitabilityofABSsecurities,includingspecificABSassetclasses.

2. The evolution of theRule 144Amarket has substantially reduced investors ability toprivatelynegotiateissuanceterms.Asaresult,Rule144Atransactionshavetakenonamorepublicstyleprocessandexecutionthanthetraditionalprivateplacement.

3. Given the breadth of the proposed public shelf eligibility requirements,many currentpublic issuers, who have the resources and ability tomeet the proposed public shelfregistration requirements, would be incented tomigrate to the Rule 144Amarket ifpublicstyle disclosure is not available in Rule 144A transactions.We are stronglysupportive of an investors right to request, in aRule144A issuance, the informationthatwouldbeavailableifthetransactionweredoneinthepublicmarket.

4. Private placements, other than Rule 144A issuances, should not require publicstyledisclosureupon request as recommended forRule144Aplacements.The traditionalprivatemarketallowsforavibrantprivateABSmarketopentoissuersofallsizes.

5. Theremay be a subset of sponsors thatwarrant consideration for an exemption frompublicstyle disclosure in connection with a Rule 144A transaction. We supportpreventing the creation of a loophole for issuerswhohave the resources and ability to

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meet theproposedpublicdisclosurerequirements, therebyenabling them toexploitanyexception that is created. A potential solution is to place limitations on Rule 144Aplacementsbasedoncertaincriteria(e.g.thatlimitthesizeofanissuance,thenumberofissuancesasponsorcoulddoperyear,theamountofoutstandingsecuritiesissuedbyasponsor,thenumberofinvestors,andthesizeoftheassetclass).Smallersponsorsmightnot have the resources tomeet the public disclosure standards, but after an issuancevolume thresholdhasbeenreached, theability tomeetpublicstyledisclosureshouldbeexpectedandachievable.

6. Inourexperience,wehavebeenabletoobtainbetterdisclosureintheprivatemarketthanin the public market. It has been our more recent experience that the Rule 144Amarketplacehasbecomesopubliclikethatwenolongerhavetheabilitytomeaningfullynegotiatetermsorreceive informationgreaterthanwhatwouldbeavailable inapublictransaction.We are concerned that the privatemarketwill adopt the proposed publicdisclosure requirements as themaximum amount of informationneeded to provide aspartofaprivateissuance.In the introduction toSectionVI,PrivatelyIssuedStructuredFinanceProducts,we note the comments the SEC made with respect to CDOs and their salethroughprivateplacements.Thereareimportantdistinctionsamongthevarioustypes ofCDOs that the SECmaywish to consider.On the onehand areABSCDOsandCDOSquaredsbackedbysubprimemortgagebackedsecurities thatmay have been created under the failed originate to distribute model tofacilitatetheissuanceofRMBSandwhichsignificantlycontributedtotherecentmarket crisis. On the other hand, there are asset management vehicles likeCollateralized Loan Obligations (CLO), which hold corporate loans thatgenerally are purchased in an arms length transaction and whoseperformance through this economic cycle has been materially better. CLOinvestorshavegreatertransparencytotheunderlyingcorporationswithinaCLOthan ABS CDO investors had to the individual underlying borrowers. Thedistinctionsbetween theseassetclassesmaywarrantacloserexamination,andwewouldbehappytodiscussourviewsonthistopic.

VII. CODIFICATION OF STAFF INTERPRETATIONS RELATING TOSECURITIESACTREGISTRATIONPAGE23400Codifyingstaffinterpretationsisabenefitforallmarketparticipants.

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VIII.TRANSITIONPERIODPAGE23400Regardless of the implementation period, given the breadth and depth of changes in theproposal,itwouldbehelpful(especiallywithregardstoassetlevelfilesandwaterfallcomputerprograms) thatsponsorsproactivelycommencepreparingbetaversionsofnew informationalreleases so investors can begin retooling their systems in advance of theproposal becomingeffective.

PIM Regulation AB Response File Number S7-08-10 CoverPIM Regulation AB Response File Number S7-08-10 BodyII. Securities Act RegistrationB. New Registration Procedures and Forms for Asset-Backed Securities1. New Shelf Registration Procedures page 233363. Shelf Eligibility for Delayed Offerings(a) Risk Retention page