Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Commanders’ Responsibilities in the Operations Process during the 1864 Red River Expedition

A Monograph

by

MAJ Michael J. Herbek United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2015-01

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE COMMANDERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS DURING THE 1864 RED RIVER EXPEDITION

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Major Michael J. Herbek, United States Army

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Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT A commander has the responsibility to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess his forces during the operations process. Failure to abide by any one of these responsibilities may lead to a disruption in operations. Failure to abide by every single one will lead to complete mission failure. In 1864, Union Major General Nathaniel P. Banks led his Army of the Gulf and all attachments to a political and military defeat in the Red River Valley. Ordered by President Abraham Lincoln to secure cotton and votes in Louisiana, Banks led his men on a two-month, ill-planned, and poorly executed campaign between Alexandria, Louisiana and Little Rock, Arkansas. Despite operating with a numerically superior force, Banks’s inability to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess his forces led to a major Union defeat, resulting in the unnecessary loss of men and equipment while setting back the Union Army’s entire campaign to defeat the South.

15. SUBJECT TERMS Red River Campaign, Red River expedition, American Civil War, 1864, understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, assess, ADRP 5-0. 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION

OF ABSTRACT

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Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Michael J. Herbek

Monograph Title: Commander’s Responsibilities in the Operations Process during the 1864 Red River Expedition

Approved by:

__________________________________, Monograph Director Ricardo A. Herrera, PhD

__________________________________, Seminar Leader Craig Berryman, COL

___________________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies Henry A. Arnold III, COL, IN

Accepted this 23nd day of May 2015 by:

___________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

iii

Abstract

Commanders’ Responsibilities in the Operations Process During The 1864 Red River Expedition, by MAJ Michael J. Herbek, United States Army, 60 pages.

A commander has the responsibility to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess his forces during the operations process. Failure to abide by any one of these responsibilities may lead to a disruption in operations. Failure to abide by every single one will lead to complete mission failure. In 1864, Union Major General Nathaniel P. Banks led his Army of the Gulf and all attachments to a political and military defeat in the Red River Valley. Ordered by President Abraham Lincoln to secure cotton and votes in Louisiana, Banks led his men on a two-month, ill-planned, and poorly executed campaign between Alexandria, Louisiana and Little Rock, Arkansas. Despite operating with a numerically superior force, Banks’s inability to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess his forces led to a major Union defeat, resulting in the unnecessary loss of men and equipment while setting back the Union Army’s entire campaign to defeat the South.

iv

Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v

Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................... vi

Figures ........................................................................................................................................... vii

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Understand..................................................................................................................................... 12

Visualize ........................................................................................................................................ 17

Describe ......................................................................................................................................... 22

Direct ............................................................................................................................................. 27

Lead ............................................................................................................................................... 34

Assess ............................................................................................................................................ 42

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 46

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 52

v

Acknowledgements

I must first thank Dr. Ricardo Herrera, historian, teacher, and local Leavenworth legend.

His enthusiasm for “reading dead people’s mail” as well as his unique sense of humor and world

perspective made this topic not only bearable, but also enjoyable. His familiarity with the Red

River expedition made it possible to look at the subject from multiple angles and provide well-

thought feedback. I would like to thank the staff at the Combat Studies Institute and Combined

Arms Research Library at Ft. Leavenworth for providing the additional resources used throughout

this monograph. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Jennifer. There is no disputing, I made this

“experience” far from enjoyable, yet she provided the much needed love and support from the

home front to help me see this through to the end. Thanks Momma Llama.

vi

Acronyms

ADRP Army Doctrine Reference Publication

JCCW Joint Report on the Committee on the Conduct of the War

OR Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies

ORN Official Record of the Union and Confederate Navies

UVDDLA Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, and Assess

CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information

vii

Figures

1. Fort De Russy, 14 March 1864………………………………………………………... 7

2. Battle of Mansfield (Sabine Crossroads), 8 April 1864……………………………….. 9

3. Battle of Pleasant Hill, 9 April 1864………………………………………………….10

4. Bailey's Dam across the Red River…………………………………………………... 26

1

Introduction

Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.

–ADRP 5-0

Commanders of military organizations, from battalion through corps, are critical parts of

the operations process. Commanders have the responsibility not only to understand the

environment in which they and their forces operate, but also to provide guidance that takes into

account the operational environment. Failure to provide contextual guidance based upon a correct

understanding of operational environment can lead to wasted resources, unnecessary loss of life,

and mission failure. As per chapter one of ADRP 5-0 The Operations Process, the first principle

of the operations process requires that the commander be the driving force behind the operations

process.1 The commander drives the operations process through six steps, the first four occurring

sequentially (understand, visualize, describe, and direct) and the remaining two (lead and assess)

occurring throughout the operations process.2 Following these six steps, the commander places

himself in a position to provide guidance and orders that pertain specifically to the operational

environment in which he operates.

Throughout history, commanders who failed to adhere to these basic concepts placed

their units in a position where expected victory often turned to unexpected defeat. An example of

this occurred in the spring of 1864 for Union commanders fighting in Louisiana. Under the

command of Major General Nathanial P. Banks, Union ground forces, working in concert with

the navy, embarked on a seventy-day campaign to seize Shreveport, Louisiana and secure access

1 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 17 May 2012), 1-3. 2 Ibid.

2

to cotton in the region. The genesis of the campaign came from political pressure from New

England politicians and textile mill owners on President Abraham Lincoln regarding the waning

cotton supplies feeding northeastern mills.3 Owners of textile factories looked to Lincoln to

provide some form of military-backed government intervention to secure access to the substantial

supply of cotton found in Louisiana and the Lone Star state. These factory owners had significant

political sway not only in New England but also within Washington, DC, and Lincoln needed all

the support he could gather for the upcoming presidential elections in the fall of 1864. An

additional source of pressure came from the recent occupation of Mexico City by French forces in

June 1863. This act of aggression stirred fears that France, led by Britain, might recognize the

Confederacy.4

In a note to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, Lincoln made his opinion on the issue final

when he asked, “Can we not renew the effort to organize a force to go to Western Texas?” with

the injunction to “Please consult the General-in-Chief on the subject.”5 With this, Lincoln

unknowingly set in motion a sequence of events that led to a major Union setback in the trans-

Mississippi West.

Receiving Lincoln’s request via the secretary of war, Major General Henry Halleck sent

word to Banks in July 1863, that “While your army is engaged in cleaning out Southwestern

Louisiana, every preparation should be made for an expedition into Texas.”6 Banks, assigned as

commander of the Department of the Gulf and headquartered in New Orleans since 1862,

3 Ludwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics & Cotton in the Civil War (Kent,

OH: Kent State University Press, 1993), 34. 4 Gary D. Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of

1864 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 8. 5 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official

Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, ser. 1, vol. 26, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1889), 659. (Hereafter cited as O.R.)

6 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 26, pt. 1, 653.

3

received specific guidance from Lincoln to secure the Mississippi River and ascend the Red River

in order to secure an outlet for sugar and cotton from Louisiana.7 Banks embraced his role as a

military officer whenever possible, especially when it enhanced his ability to serve political

agendas. Good transition

Banks was a politician in an officer’s uniforms. Prior to the war, Banks served as the

Massachusetts Speaker of the House, Speaker of U.S. House of Representative in 1858, and as a

contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1860, running against Lincoln.8 He knew

politics and understood the importance of having the support of the people. As such, Banks

focused much of his efforts on encouraging neutral and loyal Southern citizens to swear an oath

of allegiance to the Union, serving to bolster Lincoln’s attempt to begin a pro-Union movement

from the South.9 In an open letter to the people of Louisiana, Banks extended an invitation to hold

open elections for not only a state governor but also positions such as lieutenant-governor,

secretary of state, treasurer, attorney general, and superintendent of public instruction.10 Banks

understood the role that politics played within the execution of war, and put his full effort behind

any politically related event.

Prior to the Red River Campaign in 1864, Banks had twice attempted to enter Texas

through its coastline. In late August 1863, Banks had sent orders to Major General William

Franklin to mobilize his forces and attack at Sabine Pass, Texas and continue through to

Beaumont and then to Houston.11 Franklin took with him one brigade from his First Division

7 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 15, 590. 8 James G. Hollandsworth, Jr., Pretense of Glory: The Life of General Nathaniel P. Banks

(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 13-41. 9 Hollandsworth, Pretense of Glory, 95. 10 O.R., ser. 3, vol. 4, 22. 11 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 26, pt. 1, 287-288.

4

along with his Third Division, both from the XIX Corps.12 Unfortunately, the attack failed before

it even began, as two of the gunboats grounded in the coastal mudflats and the small Confederate

defending force repelled the remaining Union forces from making the required landing.13

Discouraged by the return of his attacking force to New Orleans, Banks ordered Franklin to make

a second attempt at landing along the coast. This second attempt succeeded when Union forces

landed at Brownsville, Matagorda Bay, Aransas Pass, and Rio Grande City. 14 Despite the paltry

number of troops who successfully made the landing, Banks proudly announced to Halleck “on

November 2, at meridian, the flag of the Union was raised on Brazos Island, which is now in our

possession.”15 Brazos Island, even in contemporary times, was nothing more than sand dunes and

seaweed covered beaches and so provided no military or political advantage to the Union. Despite

this small victory along the uninhabited Texas coastline, Halleck expressed a passive displeasure

at having not been notified of the second attack prior to commencement, going so far as to tell

Banks not to expect any re-enforcements in this endeavor.16 So was the stage at the onset of the

Red River Campaign.

The basic concept of the campaign sought to use the Red River and its surrounding area

as an avenue of approach into Shreveport. Unfortunately, victory did not lie within the hands of

the numerically superior Union. The campaign resulted in a disgraced Banks returning south,

fleeing central Louisiana amidst the charred ruins of the pro-Union town of Alexandria, set ablaze

by his own forces.17 Major General William T. Sherman, though not involved personally in the

12 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 37. 13 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 26, pt. 1, 290. 14 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 9-10. 15 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 26, pt. 1, 397. 16 Ibid., 834-835. 17 Lawrence Van Alstyne, Diary of an Enlisted Man (New Haven, CT: Tuttle,

Morehouse, and Taylor, 1910), 321.

5

campaign, but who provided 10,000 troops under the command of Brigadier General A. J. Smith,

best summarized the ordeal as “one damned blunder from beginning to end.”18 Banks laid blame

on the river, the separation of his ground forces, his movement formations, and the limited time in

which to execute the campaign as his reasons for failure.19 Union Rear-Admiral David D. Porter

placed the failure of the expedition squarely upon one of its driving motivators: cotton.20 The

lenses of Understanding, Visualizing, Describing, Directing, Leading, and Assessing (UVDDLA)

enable the student to address and analyze the processes through which senior Union leaders and

commanders approached the Red River Campaign, particularly the Red River expedition. While

UVDDLA did not exist in military doctrine such as it appears today, using the backdrop of the

Red River expedition helps to illustrate the consequences of neglecting the six responsibilities of

the commander in the operations process. Though multiple Union leaders fluctuated in their

ability to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess, it was Bank’s failure to do all

six successfully that led to the Union loss during the Red River Campaign.

A Summary of the Red River Expedition

The winter of 1863-64 was one of heady optimism for Union leaders. Their success following the great victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg in July 1863 fueled common opinion that the end of the war was near.

–Gary D. Joiner, One Damned Blunder from Beginning to End

The Red River Campaign, consisting of the Red River and Camden expeditions,

commenced in the first week of March 1864, and involved approximately 15,000 troops under

18 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, xix. 19 Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War: The Red River Expedition.

38th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 5 (repr., Wilmington, NC: Broadford Publishing, 1999), 340. (Hereafter referred to as J.C.C.W.).

20 J.C.C.W., 278.

6

Major General Frederick Steele, 17,000 troops from the Department of the Gulf under Franklin,

10,000 troops under A. J. Smith, for a total of nearly 42,000 ground and naval forces.21 The naval

element, the Mississippi River Squadron under the command of Porter, was a formidable floating

force: thirteen ironclads, four tinclads, six light-draft gunboats, and assorted supporting tugs and

supply vessels.22 Though a ground force, A. J. Smith and his men initially entered the campaign

aboard transports with Porter’s squadron.23 The original campaign plan called for two southern

legs to meet at Alexandria, Louisiana and then to travel north to Shreveport, Louisiana where it

would form a juncture with the third leg, which would arrive from Little Rock, Arkansas.24

Banks originally planned for these forces to meet in Alexandria on 7 March, but due to delays

from weather and terrain, the bulk of the Infantry, including Banks, did not arrive until 24-25

March.25 The first vessels arrived ten days prior on 15 March.26 The first battle between Union

and Confederate forces had occurred on 14 March at Fort De Russy along the Red River, where a

combination of forces under Smith and Porter successfully captured the small Confederate

garrison with minimal Union casualties.27

21 J.C.C.W., 321.

22 Robert U. Johnson, Clarence C. Buel, eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Way to Appomattox (New York: Castle Books, 1956), 362; Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 39-40.

23 J.C.C.W., 322. 24 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 39. 25 J.C.C.W. 321-322. 26 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 94. 27 Ibid., 93.

7

Figure 1. Fort De Russy, 14 March 186428

Source: O.R., series 1, vol. 34, part 1, 244.

From the time Union Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower ordered the charge of his Third

Division, XVI Corps, it took only twenty minutes to storm the defenses and take three hundred

nineteen prisoners and ten pieces of artillery.29 The following day, Porter and Smith continued to

Alexandria where A. J. Smith remained until 21 March, when he and four brigades traveled north

28 The map states that Union forces captured two hundred ninety prisoners, though A. J.

Smith recorded three hundred nineteen in his official record of the battle. 29 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 305.

8

to Henderson’s Hill, defeating Confederate Colonel William Vincent’s Second Louisiana

Cavalry, capturing four artillery pieces and over two hundred prisoners.30

Once all forces arrived in Alexandria, Banks staged there while the remainder of Porter’s

vessels made the passage through the shallow rapids just above the city and while Porter and

Banks worked through the issue of who owned and controlled the local cotton.31 On 27 March, A.

J. Smith and his command, aboard twenty-six transports, began travel to Grand Ecore, Louisiana.

The following day Franklin with the remaining XIX Corps and XIII Corps elements began his

march northwest to the same location, arriving at Natchitoches, four miles south from Grand

Ecore.32 Based upon a recommendation from a local river pilot, Wellington Withenbury, Banks

then decided to move his forces west from Grand Ecore, toward Pleasant Hill, where Union

forces would make their first significant contact with the Confederate Army.33

The Battle of Mansfield, also referred to as Sabine Crossroads, occurred 8 April and

served as a significant blow to Banks and his men.34 Franklin and his forces marched head-on, in

near column formation, into two Confederate divisions under the command of Brigadier General

Alfred Mouton and Major General John Walker.35 Walker and Mouton proceeded to push

Franklin’s forces back down the now congested road he had just traveled, resulting in an all-out

retreat by the Union.36 Franklin and his men retreated to Pleasant Grove, and then subsequently

30 J.C.C.W., 322; Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences

of the Late War, ed. Richard B. Harwell (New York: Longman’s, Green, and Co., 1955), 188. 31 Johnson, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War; 350; Johnson, Red River Campaign,

101-105. 32 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 110-112. 33 Ibid., 115. 34 J.C.C.W., 324. 35 Johnson, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 352-353. 36 J.C.C.W., 325.

9

Pleasant Hill, where the Union would finally make a stand, bloody as it was, against the attacking

Confederates.

Figure 2. Battle of Mansfield (Sabine Crossroads), 8 April 1864

Source: O.R. series 1, vol. 34, part 1, 227.

The Battle of Pleasant Hill occurred the following morning, 9 April.37 Union and

Confederate forces battled furiously, each side gaining and losing ground throughout the day. A.

37 J.C.C.W., 325.

10

J. Smith proved to be the saving-grace of the day, ordering a charge against the Confederate

forces late in the day, driving a wedge between the line and bringing a close to the day’s fighting,

resulting in neither great victory nor decisive defeat for either side.38 In total, the Union lost 1,065

killed, wounded, or captured.39 Despite holding the ground, Banks ordered his troops back to

Grand Ecore that night, and ultimately back to Alexandria ten days later.40

Figure 3. Battle of Pleasant Hill, 9 April 1864

Source: O.R., series 1, vol. 34, part 1, 230.

Once again, Banks, Porter and Franklin found themselves back in Alexandria, only

heading in the opposite direction from when they last convened there. Due to the continually

38 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 115. 39 Ibid., 116. 40 J.C.C.W., 328-330.

11

decreasing water level of the Red River, Porter and his vessels were unable to make the passage

through the Alexandria rapids. After sitting in defensive positions around Alexandria, Union

forces then proceeded to construct a temporary dam in order to raise the water level high enough

to allow Porter and his vessels to pass south.41 Following nearly two weeks of construction under

the guidance of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, all of Porter’s vessels successfully passed the

rapids and broke south on 12 May, never to head north along the Red River again.42 The

following day, Banks and the remaining forces in Alexandria resumed their retreat towards

Simmesport, Louisiana, along the Atchafalaya River.43 Though a pro-Union city, Alexandria bore

the same fate as many southern cities as the departing Union forces set ablaze many of the homes

and businesses, leaving the a large portion of the city destroyed.44 The last two major skirmish

between Union and Confederate forces occurred during the retreat, at Mansura and Yellow

Bayou, 16 and 18 May respectively.45 Neither battle proved significant in changing the fate of the

campaign. Despite the Confederate attempt to halt the Union retreat, Bank and his forces left the

Red River Valley and thus ended the campaign on 20 May 1864.

As a result of his failed campaign, Banks was relieved of command and replaced by

Major General Edward Canby on 19 May. Banks resigned from the army in June 1865, following

an extensive investigation by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War; despite the fact, neither

he nor any Union leaders had any negative action taken against them because of the failed

campaign.

41 J.C.C.W., 332-333. 42 Johnson, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 358-360. 43 J.C.C.W., 335. 44 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 169. 45 Ibid., 170-171.

12

Understand

Understanding is fundamental to the commander’s ability to establish a situation’s context. It is essential to effective decision making during planning and execution.

–ADRP 5-0

The greater the level of understanding that a commander has prior to executing any

operation, regardless of its size or complexity, the greater the likelihood of success. Commanders

need a certain level of understanding of the operational environment before they can adequately

dispense guidance to subordinates. Without adequate understanding, the commander may

misunderstand the influence that his actions have on the environment, or the environment on

operations, and may ultimately fail to meet his desired military endstate.

Many factors can impede the commander’s ability to gather the requisite data,

information, or intelligence needed to understand the operational environment. Time, resources,

and experience are all obstacles that may stand within the commander’s way of fully

understanding his environment. For Banks, his understanding of the Red River Valley applied

more to the political, rather than military aspects.

Banks was a politician first, and an officer second. His optimism at turning the political

affiliation of the local Louisiana population stood at the forefront of everything he did. As part of

his duty to increase the pro-Union sentiment in Louisiana, Banks arranged for an extravagant

inaugural ceremony in March 1864 for the newly elected Governor of Louisiana, Michael Hahn.46

Major General William T. Sherman, who traveled to New Orleans in early March to discuss troop

deployments in support of the campaign with Banks, noted in his memoirs,

Banks urged me to remain over the 4th of March, to participate in the ceremonies which he explained would include the performance of the “Anvil Chorus” by all the bands of his army, and during the performance the church-bells were to be rung, and cannons were to

46 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 83.

13

be fired by electricity. I regarded all such ceremonies out of place at a time when it seemed to me every hour and every minutes were due to war.47

Banks’s flair for the dramatic played to the population. He understood the strategic value

of the support of the Louisiana governor and his constituents. He knew Lincoln needed the

support of Louisiana, if not for the fact that geographically it controlled a great deal of the

Mississippi River, but also constricted the base of support for the Confederacy. Banks also

understood the significance of securing the local cotton. Nicknamed the “Bobbin Boy,” Banks

grew up among the cotton mills of Waltham, Massachusetts, and understood the great

significance that cotton had to the economy of not only New England, but the Union as a whole.48

Banks estimated there to be over 100,000 bales of cotton in Louisiana, and so by securing them

from the “rebel government” he recognized the potential for fuller employment in the Northeast,

a significant influx of gold, not only into the Department of Treasury, but from European

investors as well.49 Banks may have understood the larger political picture, but his understanding

of the military actions required for victory fell far short.

Banks was late for his own campaign by nearly two weeks. Movement of troops to

Alexandria, Louisiana began on 10 March 1864, when Sherman authorized the release of

Brigadier General A.J. Smith and his ten thousand troops of his XVI and XVII Corps, to support

Banks.50 In his orders to Smith, Sherman gave him explicit instructions to proceed no farther than

Shreveport and to remain with Banks no longer than thirty days following Smith’s arrival at

Alexandria.51 This timeline would become significant in the campaign, as it served as a forcing

47 William Tecumseh Sherman. Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, ed. Michael Fellman

(New York: Penguin, 2000), 367. 48 Hollandsworth, Pretense of Glory, 3-7. 49 J.C.C.W., 355. 50 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 34; Sherman, Memoirs, 372. 51 Sherman, Memoirs, 373.

14

function for Banks to decide whether to continue north to Shreveport or to retreat to Alexandria.

Banks did not arrive until 24 March, due to his extended stay with Governor Hahn following the

elaborate inauguration ceremony.52 Banks did not understand the importance that his presence

would have maintaining order and discipline within his ranks. Though Banks understood the

bigger political picture, he failed to understand the influence that Admiral David Porter and men

had upon the town of Alexandria when they arrived nearly ten days before Banks.

Porter’s first vessel arrived in Alexandria on 15 March, whereupon he and his men

immediately set upon securing the openly available cotton.53 Porter’s men spread out along a six

to ten mile stretch on either side of the river near Alexandria, collecting and bailing all available

cotton.54 In an effort to legitimize the seizure of the cotton by claiming it as Confederate Army

property, rather than civilian, sailors stenciled CSA on the bails, which later came to mean

“Cotton Stealing Association” among those in the town.55 Banks was unaware of Porter’s

implementation of the Naval Prize Law and how this seemingly took priority over the larger

political strategy from Washington regarding cotton in Alexandria. According to this law, the

navy could seize war prizes, in this case cotton, and turn them over to an admiralty court, which

would condemn, and then sell the cotton, and return some of the proceeds to the captors.56 Porter

defended the navy’s procurement of the cotton stating “the naval officer acted by direct authority

of the Navy and Treasury Department; besides the laws of war authorized them to take possession

of all contraband goods and make a return thereof to the Government.”57 Banks failed to take this

52 J.C.C.W., 322. 53 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 59. 54 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 18. 55 J.C.C.W., 81. 56 Ibid., 18, 71, 74, 224-225. 57 David D. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War (New York: Sherman Publishing,

1886), 534.

15

into consideration prior to entering Alexandria, and so upon his arrival into the city could do

nothing but recommend that the local population bring the cotton to him for transport to New

Orleans.58 In a letter written to the chief quartermaster of the Department of the Gulf, Assistant

Quartermaster Captain D .N. Welch noted “the navy is seizing all that cotton they can get hold of.

Every gun-boat is loaded with cotton and the officer are taking it without regard…of the owner. It

looks to me like a big steal.”59 Between the two senior leaders, Porter understood the situation he

faced in Alexandria better than Banks, and as a result, exploited the opportunity to the fullest.

Admiral Porter understood the military aspects of the campaign far better than Banks,

though he still recognized the role that politics played. To him, the politics of the matter, more

specifically the issue regarding cotton, was the reason that the campaign failed.60 Porter noted to

the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, “There was too much attention paid to getting

cotton. The army should not have gone into that business at all; they should have pushed on at

once…. Instead of that, days and days were spent by teams hauling cotton into town.”61 At his

core, Porter was a military man. He had grown up in the shadow of his commodore father,

serving for a time in the Mexican Navy as a teenager, fighting pirates in the Caribbean, and even

procuring camels from Turkey under the direction of then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in

order to study their use in desert environments.62 Familiar with the Mississippi as well as the Red

River from years spent traversing its waters, Porter knew that the conditions of the river were not

the most ideal for him and his over one hundred support vessels. In a general report made in

58 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 18. 59 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 2, 655. 60 J.C.C.W., 277. 61 Ibid. 62 Chester G. Hearn, Admiral David Dixon Porter: The Civil War Years (Annapolis, MD:

Naval Institute Press, 1996).

16

September of 1863, Porter noted, “I have just returned from the mouth of the Red River, where I

went to see what could be done to cooperate with General Banks. As I knew before hand, the

river was quite dry in places, and a dry bar formed across the head of the Old River.”63 In his

testimony to Congress, Porter said that he had protested multiple times to Banks regarding taking

his vessels north up the Red River for fear of getting them caught in the shallow waters.64 Porter

knew his vessels, he knew their ability to maneuver in the brown waters of the Red River, and he

knew what to expect. It was only after Banks convinced him that the success of the campaign

rested upon the shoulders of the navy, did Porter finally give in to Bank’s requests.65

The waters of the Red River in 1864 were far lower than what normally occurred during

the spring.66 Because of this, Porter understood the vulnerable position his vessels were in and

that the possibility of running aground at any point between Alexandria and Shreveport was very

likely. Porter also recognized the fact that Banks was perhaps in over his head with the campaign

and that there was a very real possibility that Banks would retreat south, leaving Porter stranded

on the Red River with no support.67 Porter communicated often with Major General Sherman,

reaffirming the gratitude he had for the 10,000 additional men provided, more to support Porter,

than Banks, in the campaign. Despite his initial eagerness to support Banks, Porter understood the

weak positions he and his vessels were in due to the low river waters and repeated defeats of

63 United States War Department, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies

in the War of the Rebellion, ser. 1, vol. 25 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912), 413. (Hereafter cited as O.R.N.).

64 J.C.C.W., 275. 65 Ibid., 275. 66 O.R.N., ser. 1, vol. 26, 62. 67 Ibid.

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Union forces on land. As a result, he recalled his ships to Alexandria, approximately forty-five

days after attacking north from the very same city.68

Both Banks and Porter understood the operational environment in which their forces

operated, but not the complete picture. Banks knew the political implications of securing the

additional voters, as well as the cotton in the area. He recognized how his actions could further

the Lincoln’s political goals of success in the west. Porter saw the value of the cotton, more so in

what it meant to him financially, rather than to Lincoln and US government. Porter could also see

how the physical environment, as well as the lack of support from Banks, prevented him from

going any further north up the Red River. Porter’s understanding of the environment focused

more on the actual fighting between the Union and Confederate forces in the immediate area,

rather than how the success of the campaign furthered the Union’s cause.

Visualize

As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the problem, they start to visualize a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the problem. Collectively, this is known as commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired endstate, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve the end state.

–ADRP 5-0

Visualization is the next step a commander takes in the operations process. Once he

understands the operational environment in which he finds himself, he then proceeds to develop

an endstate to this his operation. This endstate describes a set of future conditions, which can be

either military or political, that when reached constitute success in the eyes of the commander. A

higher military or political authority may dictate or influence the desired endstate, or it may come

entirely from the individual commander himself. Regardless, it is essential that the endstate take

68 O.R.N., ser. 1, vol. 26, 67-68.

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into consideration the operational environment or risk a misalignment or waste of time and

resources. In addition to the endstate, the commander will begin to visualize the operational

approach he will take to achieve his endstate.69 As with understanding the operational

environment, it may be difficult to determine the level and depth of the commander’s

visualization as it occurs predominantly in the cognitive realm. A commander may choose to

depict graphically his endstate and operational approach, thus transferring his visualization into

something he and his subordinate can actually see. Otherwise, as was the case with Union leaders

during the Red River expedition, one can only infer from their actions and correspondence

between one another how successful they were at visualizing their endstate and approach prior to

execution.

Banks, despite his failure to achieve success in the campaign, did put considerable

thought into its execution before embarking on the Red River. In his testimony to Congress

following the failure of the campaign, Banks spoke of the five conditions he believed were crucial

to the success of the campaign, which in many ways resembled an operational approach.70 First,

the campaign required simple organization of troops in order to avoid delay in movements during

the campaign. Second was establishing an additional line of operation along a ground route,

separate from the Mississippi. Third, Banks expected a force under the command of General

Sherman operate to the west of the Mississippi to divert Confederate forces from northern

Louisiana and Arkansas. Fourth, all corps had to operate in concert throughout the entire area of

operation to prevent the enemy from massing against any one unit. Fifth, all forces were to

remain under the command of one general thereby adhering to the concept of unity of

command.71 According to Banks however “not one of these suggestions, so necessary in

69 ADRP 5-0, 1-4. 70 J.C.C.W., 320. 71 Ibid.

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conquering the inherent difficulties of the expedition, was carried into execution nor was it in my

power to establish them.”72 Despite demonstrating some awareness of what he understood

success to entail, Bank had a number of obstacles in his way preventing his envisioned approach.

As is apparent in his testimony, Banks was aware of the potential problems that he might

face during the campaign. It appeared that at some level, he took the time to visualize how he

wanted to approach the Red River and his movement to Shreveport. He knew that simplicity,

synchronization, and unity of command were essential to his victory, for it were these issues that

added to the difficulty faced by Banks, his peers, and subordinates over the duration of the

campaign. Though he may have given thought to his actions prior to the campaign, his actual

operational approach proved less detailed.

In April 1865, the inspector general for Major General William B. Franklin’s XIX Corps,

Colonel Charles C. Dwight, gave his testimony to Congress on what he believed Bank’s plan for

the campaign actually was. According to Dwight, and speaking on behalf of Franklin’s

understanding of the campaign, “the only announcement of the plan of the campaign which

[Franklin] ever heard from [Banks] was…‘One bound to Alexandria, one bound to Shreveport,

one bound to the Gulf.’”73 Franklin, with whom Banks entrusted all infantry forces for the

campaign, apparently had very little detailed information off which to operate. Again, an

interpretation of the commander’s ability to visualize his endstate and operational approach is

understood best in the context of his actions. Franklin’s claim that Banks gave him only three

actions in a very limited line of operation, leads one to interpret that Banks’s plan was ill-thought

and lacking any depth of understanding or visualization. Cognitively, Banks may have known

what he wanted, but when his senior ground commander summed up the entire campaign

72 J.C.C.W., 320. 73 Ibid., 400.

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guidance in one sentence, it pointed to the contrary. Franklin, however, was not without fault in

his ability to visualize his situation.

The first major loss of Union life occurred during the Battle of Mansfield on 8 April

1864, approximately ninety miles north of Alexandria. Choosing to take the inland route

northwest, rather than following along the river road north directly to Shreveport at the behest of

local guide Wellington Withenbury, Banks and his men marched directly into their first battle.74

Franklin’s failure to properly visualize, or understand for that matter, the situation before him led

to his defeat. According to Brigadier General A. L. Lee, the cavalry division commander in

Franklin’s XIX Corps, Franklin did not expect to fight the enemy until he reached Shreveport.75

Franklin overlooked the possibility that contact was likely along the single lane road that he and

his men followed, and so enforced an order of march set by Banks, which not only congested the

road, but prevented the possibility of his two infantry divisions rapidly supporting Lee’s division

in the lead.76 The two trailing infantry divisions marched behind a nearly one thousand-wagon

train, leaving Lee and his cavalry division first in the order of march and vulnerable to attack,

which is exactly what happened.77

Brigadier General Lee’s cavalry division, with a brigade of infantry brought forward by

Brigadier General Thomas Ransom’s XIII Corps, first made contact with Confederate Lieutenant

General Richard Taylor’s forces, which then precipitated an increasing withdrawal, turned into an

all-out rout, of the Union forces as “Guns, knapsacks, blankets—everything was thrown away by

the frantic soldiers.”78 The route continued through to the town of Pleasant Hill, where despite a

74 J.C.C.W., 287. 75 J.C.C.W., 64. 76 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 117. 77 Ibid. 78 J.C.C.W., 60; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 136-137.

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victory on 9 April against the Confederates, Banks ordered a retreat further south to Grand

Ecore.79 Grand Ecore provided Banks, Franklin, and their men the opportunity to consolidate and

reorganize following the two major engagements at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. Banks admitted

that at this point he had formed no particular opinion on whether or not his forces would be able

to return form Shreveport even if able to continue north to the city.80 The one Union leader whose

actions did indicate both an understanding and visualization of the operational environment was

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant.

Grant had assumed command of the armies of the United States on 17 March 1864, and

with it responsibility to provide guidance to Banks on his Red River Campaign.81 From the very

beginning of the campaign, Grant had his focus on Mobile, rather than Shreveport, and made sure

that Banks understood that as well.82 Grant understood the drain on resources that Banks’s

campaign had on the Union, and when visualizing a campaign against Mobile, Grant saw no

place for Banks in Louisiana. In his order to Banks on 31 March, Grant illustrated his

visualization of what success would be in that region. First, upon reaching Shreveport, Banks was

to turn over control to Brigadier General Frederick Steele. Second, Banks was to keep only a

small footprint in Texas along the portion of the Rio Grande which he already controlled. Third,

Banks should prepare for movement toward Mobile, in conjunction with ironclad support from

the navy.83 In the same order, Grant also went so far as to recommend where Banks should

establish his headquarters, though he deferred to Banks as he was more familiar with the region

79 J.C.C.W., 12-13. 80 Ibid., 13. 81 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 32, pt. 3, 83. 82 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 11. 83 Ibid.

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than Grant.84 Subsequent communications between Grant and Banks further demonstrated

Grant’s frustration with the campaign. Grant clearly articulated his expectations to Banks that,

If you [Banks] do not accomplish the object of your expedition…you will return to New Orleans, even if you have to abandon entirely the expedition…and if it takes you beyond the 1st of May to return to New Orleans, I shall regret that you ever started upon the expedition at all.85

Despite Lincoln’s preference for military action in the region, Grant recognized where the Union

focus should be, and cotton along the Red River was not it.

It is not easy to determine how well a commander can visualize his endstate and

operational approach without conferring directly with that commander. When no record exists of

a commander explicitly describing how he visualized his operational environment, observing a

commander’s actions within a particular environment can help illuminate to an extent, what

visualization possibly occurred. Observing the actions taken by both Banks and Franklin help to

illustrate how a lack of proper visualization can lead to defeat. Grant, conversely, appeared to

look far past the Red River Campaign and into the future. In this process, his visualization

manifested into orders to Banks, which emphasized where Shreveport stood in priority to other

Union plans in the East.

Describe

After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staff and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose.

–ADRP 5-0

Communication between the commander and his subordinates, particularly in regard to

communicating understanding and the product of his visualization, is critical for mission success.

ADRP 5-0 states that the commander expresses his visualization through four components;

84 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 11. 85 J.C.C.W., 14.

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commander’s intent, planning guidance to include an operational approach, commander’s critical

information requirements (CCIR), and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).86 The

commander must be able to articulate to those who will either write an order or execute one,

exactly how it is he understands the environment or how he visualizes his endstate or operational

approach. Any misunderstanding between the commander and his subordinates risks a

misinterpretation and potential mission failure. A commander may verbally describe to his

subordinates how he sees the operational environment, or he may choose to put the understanding

into words, such as with a mission order. The subordinate is reliant upon the commander’s ability

to express clearly and articulate what it is that he wants from his soldiers. Different Union leaders

during the Red River expedition had varying levels of success describing to their subordinates

their understanding and visualization of the operational environment.

Banks may not have been directly in charge of the infantry under his command; this

responsibility fell upon Franklin’s shoulders, but his orders still influenced Union actions. During

the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, Banks demonstrated his how his lack of understanding

and visualization hindered his ability to describe what he wanted his forces to do. Just as he had

done earlier in New Orleans and Alexandria, Banks set out to hold another set of elections to

secure the loyalty and cotton from the people of Grand Ecore.87 This temporary sideshow

disrupted Banks from understanding the enemy and the terrain, leaving Franklin to handle all

preparations to move north.88 As a result, during some of the most intense fighting between

Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, Banks sent word through his assistant adjutant general, Lieutenant

Colonel George Drake, telling Franklin “you had better send back and push up the trains, as

86 ADRP 5-0, 1-5. 87 J.C.C.W., 281. 88 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 79.

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manifestly we shall be able to rest here.”89 “Here” referred to the area just south of Mansfield.

Franklin admitted in his testimony to Congress, that he interpreted this statement to mean that

Banks did not expect any significant battle.90 Nothing could have been further from this estimate.

Eight hours after Banks sent word to Franklin that he did not expect a fight, Union forces

executed a full retreat from Mansfield, losing fifteen artillery pieces and another one hundred and

fifty six wagons belonging to Lee’s cavalry division.91 Banks’s description of what he thought he

wanted, based upon the poor understanding he had of the situation, led to the embarrassing Union

defeat at Mansfield, which Porter claimed in a letter to Sherman, bore resemblance to the same

chaos seen at Bull Run.92

In his defense, Banks was not entirely incapable of expressing his visualization, in what

is referred to in current doctrine as the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

Though never specifically published as a critical information requirement, the lowering water

level of the Red River served as a significant point of concern to Banks. Not a nautical man,

Banks still understood that if the Red River continued to drop, the vessels under Porter’s

command would be unable to follow and support his infantry as they attempted to move to

Shreveport. In a situation report sent to Grant following his retreat to Alexandria in April, Banks

stated, “from the condition of the river, it became apparent that neither the army nor the fleet

could move to Shreveport with any reasonable prospect of return.”93 In his testimony to

Congress, Banks discussed his concern that he had for the level of the river even before originally

departing from Alexandria in March. Banks acknowledged to Congress that, “It was hazardous to

89 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 473. 90 J.C.C.W., 30. 91 Ibid., 12. 92 O.R.N., ser. 1, vol. 26, 59. 93 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 190.

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undertake naval operation upon the Red river in that condition of things…unless there was

enough water to float the boats.”94 Banks stated that, despite expressing concerns about the

river’s condition every thirty minutes with Porter and the other generals in Alexandria, Porter

assured him that “wherever the sand was damp he could run the boats.”95 Not explicitly stated in

any order given, Banks still demonstrated that he indeed had some form, loose as it may have

been, of CCIR, in this case river conditions, for his campaign.

The retreat to Alexandria in late April proved Porter’s claim of running the boats in the

damp sand patently false. The low waters and rapids near Alexandria stranded Porter’s entire

fleet, leaving his brown water force vulnerable to enemy destruction. One officer though,

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, successfully understood, visualized, and described a plan to

free the boats from their would-be sandy captor. Bailey’s experience as a logger in Wisconsin of

building temporary dams to float logs downstream provided the experience to help him describe a

solution to the problem.96 Porter initially scoffed at the idea, saying “if damming would get the

fleet off [we] would have been afloat long before.”97 Porter eventually came around after Franklin

and Banks both agreed that the plan seemed feasible and Banks gave the order to proceed.98 With

the support of the idle troops in Alexandria, Bailey constructed a damn spanning 758 feet made

from brick, stone, barges and available furniture, which ultimately provided enough blockage to

raise the Red River sufficiently to allow Porter’s vessels to pass through the falls at the city.99

Though Bailey did not issue the order to build the dam, his ability to articulate the benefits of

94 J.C.C.W., 8. 95 J.C.C.W., 8 96 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 164. 97 J.C.C.W., 15. 98 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 403. 99 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 165-168.

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building a dam led to one of the only true Union success stories of the entire expedition, and

campaign.

Figure 4. Bailey's Dam across the Red River

Source: O.R.N., series 1, vol. 26, 130A.

For his contributions, Bailey received official recognition from the War Department “for

distinguished service in the recent campaign on the Red River, by which the gun-boat flotilla

under Rear-Admiral David D. Porter was rescued from imminent peril.”100

Describing an endstate and approach requires that a leader first understand and visualize

the environment in which he operates. The greater the leader’s understanding and visualization,

the more appropriate his description of an endstate and operational approach, or in Bailey’s case a

100 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 406.

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solution to a problem, will be to the operational environment. Most telling of all though lies

within a response that Franklin gave during his questioning by Congress after the campaign.

When asked what objectives Banks intended to accomplish during the expedition, Franklin

responded, “I know nothing more than the impression I received from General Banks that he

intended to march into Texas by that [Red River] route.”101 This comment succinctly illustrates

the significant short-sighted faults behind Banks’s visualization and description of the entire

campaign.

Direct

Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units.

–ADRP 5-0

ADRP 5-0 gives seven examples of how a commander directs in the operations process:

prepare and approve plans and orders, establish command and support relationships, assign tasks

and control measures, positions units to maximize combat power, position key leaders, allocate

resources to exploit opportunity, and commit the reserve as required.102 Though this list is not all-

inclusive, as any former commander can attest, it does provide a view into a number of the

commander’s responsibilities. These responsibilities are all predicated on the fact that before any

form of direction can begin, the commander must have a clear understanding and visualization of

the operational environment and can clearly describe what it is he wants from his subordinates.

Due to the inconsistent ability of the Union commanders to do all three successfully, commanders

and subordinates alike faced unnecessary difficulty before and during the Red River expedition.

101 J.C.C.W., 31. 102 ADRP 5-0, 1-6.

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The first example of poor direction occurred before the expedition even began. From the

onset, Halleck provided no clear or specific guidance to Banks; rather he gave loosely veiled

orders presented more in the form of recommendations than anything else. Shortly after the new

year in 1864, Halleck told Banks “The best thing, it would seem, to be done under the

circumstances is for you to communicate with them [Sherman and Steele], and also with Admiral

Porter, in regard to some general co-operation, and all agree upon what is the best plan.”103 In

response, Banks sent correspondence to Halleck in an attempt to glean further guidance on what

exactly he should do in the upcoming Red River Campaign. In the letter, Banks stated “Anxiously

waiting information and instructions as to the operations on Red River.”104 Approximately two

weeks later, Banks sent another second letter to Halleck again seeking guidance regarding the

campaign stating, “I hope the mail will bring me in regard to the operations you contemplate on

the Red River country.”105 Finally pushed to provide answers to Banks’s questions, Halleck

provided a less than detailed response two weeks later, again placing the burden on Banks to

make the decision on the campaign:

Your dispatches of January 29 and February 2 are received. In the former you speak of awaiting orders and instructions in regard to operations on Red River. If by this it is meant that you are waiting orders from Washington, there must be some misapprehension. The substance of my dispatches to you on this subject was communicated to the President and the Secretary of War, and it was understood that while stating my own views in regard to operations, I should leave you free to adopt such lines and plans of campaign as you might, after a full consideration of the subject, deem best.106

Banks expressed his frustration in the matter during his testimony to Congress during its

investigation of the campaign. When asked if he had received orders from Halleck prior to

103 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 2, 16. 104 Ibid., 179. 105 Ibid., 266. 106 Ibid., 293.

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initiation of the campaign, he responded, “Yes, sir; but they were not positive orders, but rather

suggestions. The difficulty in regards to this expedition was that nobody assumed to give orders;

each commander acted for himself.”107 As it was, Halleck left all necessary coordination between

the Department of the Gulf, the Department of Arkansas, and the Department of Tennessee to the

politician-general who to that point did not have a reputation for military victories.

Halleck’s second failure in preparation for the campaign was not assigning one

commander over all forces involved. Although Banks was the Commander of the Department of

the Gulf, he had no authority over the other generals involved.108 Halleck’s failure to provide a

clear line of authority only added to the confusion that Banks had coordinating between Steele,

located at Little Rock to the north, Porter on the river, or Franklin, and A. J. Smith who belonged

to Sherman throughout the duration of the campaign.109 Of note, in a letter to Sherman toward the

end of the campaign, Halleck made reference to the fact that there should be one commander but

that there was no one suitable for the position, going so far as to say “General Banks is not

competent…it would be useless to ask the President to do it [assign one].”110 The question then

remains, if Halleck had so little confidence in Banks, why did he allow him to oversee the

campaign? Perhaps, as historian Ludwell Johnson claimed “he was trying to avoid responsibility

involved in giving orders.”111

Whereas Halleck’s guidance provided few specifics on how to execute the campaign,

Lieutenant General Grant made very clear to Banks what he expected of him. Recently promoted

and assigned as commander of the armies, Grant had not yet formulated his plans for his spring

107 J.C.C.W., 19. 108 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 81. 109 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 2, 16. 110 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 32, pt. 3, 289. 111 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 82.

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campaign that year, but he recognized that he would need all available forces, to include those

under Bank’s command.112 To shore up forces, Grant sent his specific guidance to Banks upon

Banks’s initial arrival to Alexandria.

It is important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible. This done, send Brig. Gen. A.J. Smith with his command back to Memphis as soon as possible. This force will be necessary for movement east of the Mississippi. Should you find that taking Shreveport will occupy ten to fifteen days more time than General Sherman gave his troops…, you will send them back at the time specified in his note…even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition.113

Grant went on further to tell Banks that if he did secure Shreveport, that he should do so only

with the as much force as he deemed necessary, but to return the remainder of the troops to New

Orleans.114 Additionally, Grant ordered Banks not to abandon, but also not to attempt to gain any

additional territory west of the Mississippi, as the focus must remain on a possible move against

Mobile, Alabama in the near future.115 In the conclusion of the letter to Banks, Grant heavily

emphasized heavily that Banks must supply his forces off the occupied country, alluding to the

fact that Banks should not expect any additional logistical support than that which he already had

with him.116

Grant’s order to Banks stood in stark contrast to Halleck’s. He clearly defined his intent

for Banks’s forces, what to do in the event of both success and failure, and how to supply his

forces. Grant did not provide loose recommendations or leave to Banks how to decide to pursue

his campaign. Of all orders given from senior levels, Grant’s clarity and precision far surpassed

any up to that point. Despite the clear guidance from above, Banks still had difficulty enabling

112 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 610. 113 Ibid. 114 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 2, 611. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid.

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victory on the ground. With a defeat at Mansfield and a partial victory at Pleasant Hill, the

momentum of the campaign shifted with a single order from Banks.

Upon the conclusion of the Battle at Pleasant Hill on 9 April 1864, Banks ordered

Franklin to return his forces to Grand Ecore, a small town along the Red River, approximately

forty miles straight-line distance southeast.117 The area around Mansfield and Pleasant Hill was

the furthest north Franklin’s ground forces would go during the campaign. Banks justified to

Grant his order to retreat based upon a belief that Shreveport would be far more difficult to take

than originally expected, coupled with the lack of support from Steele to the north and the

decreasing water level of the Red.118 What was most concerning about Banks’s ability to lead his

forces at this time was the disjointed nature in which he disseminated the order to retreat.

Franklin and A. J. Smith both received their orders from Banks to withdraw to Grand Ecore on 9

April. Smith did not take the order well, as it meant leaving his dead unburied. He disliked the

order so much so that he requested Franklin arrest Banks and assume control of campaign.119

Unlike Franklin and Smith, Porter did not receive the order for the army to retreat.

Admiral Porter and his vessels had previously departed from Grand Ecore on 7 April,

heading upstream to Loggy Bayou, approximately 100 miles.120 Reaching near his destination,

Porter had to halt his vessels as Confederate forces had placed the steamer New Falls City across

a narrow portion of the river, and blocked further progress. Porter later noted that some

Confederate wit had left a hand written invitation to Porter on the New Fall City, inviting him “to

attend a ball in Shreveport.”121 It was while delayed at this point in the river that a courier, a

117 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 100. 118 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 187-188. 119 Ibid, 309. 120 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 207. 121 O.R.N., ser. 1, vol. 26, 60.

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Captain Andrews, came with a verbal order for Smith to retreat, with no guidance to inform

Porter of the same.122 Had Porter not been with Smith it is difficult to tell how that would have

delayed the retreat. It was only after conferring with Porter and taking into consideration their

distance from Banks and the river condition that the two men decided to return to Grand Ecore.123

To add insult to injury, Banks left Porter out of the loop a second time when he failed to inform

him upon the second retreat, this time from Grand Ecore back to Alexandria.

Banks knew he could go no further, “When, from the condition of the river, it became

apparent that neither the army nor the fleet could move to Shreveport… I directed that the army

should fall back to Alexandria.”124 Porter was under a much different impression, as one of his

subordinates, Lieutenant Commander Thomas Selfridge, had received word from Banks directly

that “I [Banks] shall entertain no thought of retrograde movement, certainly not if it leaves the

navy in danger. No such purpose is contemplated now.”125 However, while in Grand Ecore,

Porter recalled in his congressional testimony a slightly different set of conditions.

General Franklin came to me at one time, and asked me if I had been informed that General Banks was going to retreat to Alexandria. I said “No, sir; on the contrary, General Banks has just informed me that it was his intention to hold the country.” General Franklin said, “I assure you there is no such intention; orders have already been issued for the army to retire, and I have received an order to conduct a retreat." I thought that was very singular, and sent Captain Selfridge to see General Banks. He assured Captain Selfridge that he had not the faintest idea of leaving.126

Though Porter’s confusion may have simply been a result of timing and cross communication, it

still points to the fact that Banks had difficulty ensuring that he kept his subordinates or fellow

122 J.C.C.W., 203. 123 J.C.C.W., 203. 124 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 190. 125 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 26, pt. 1, 64. 126 J.C.C.W., 278.

33

commander properly informed of his directions. Banks would add one last black mark to his

character before the campaign ended; failure to follow Grant’s orders.

Banks knew from the beginning of the campaign that Sherman’s men, under the

command of A. J. Smith, were only on temporary loan. The difficulties he faced at Mansfield,

Pleasant Hill, and the river conditions all slowed his original timeline. As a result, the thirty-day

timeline that Grant gave to Banks came and went. Sherman sent Brigadier General John Corse to

inform Banks of the expired due date, informing Banks of his intention to have Smith and his

men move on Decatur, Alabama by way of the Yazoo River.127 In response Banks informed

Sherman, “I cannot conceive that your order would have been given had you known the

circumstance, and therefore I have been compelled to say to General Smith that I could not

approve it at this moment.”128 Grant had had enough. Upon being informed by Halleck of this

state of affairs, Grant replied,

A.J. Smith will have to stay with General Banks until the gunboats are out of difficulty. General Banks ought to be ordered to New Orleans and have all further execution on the Red River in other hands. I have just recently received two letters…giving deplorable accounts of General Banks’ mismanagement. His own reports and these letters clearly show that all his disasters to be attributed to his incompetency. Send troops for General Sherman where he wants them.129

With that, Halleck sent official word to Banks on 27 April that his services were no longer

required in the Red River Valley, and that upon receipt of the letter he was to return to New

Orleans and have either Major General Steele, still in Little Rock, or another officer of equal rank

127 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 24. 128 Ibid., 266. 129 Ibid., 279.

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with him, take command.130 Luckily for Banks, the order never made it to him, as it most likely

was aboard the transport ship City Belle, sunk by Confederate forces near Fort De Russy.131

Regardless, Banks no longer had the confidence of either his subordinates, or superiors.

Direction from commanders provides the necessary guidance that subordinates need and

deserve in order to succeed on the battlefield. Failure to understand, visualize, and describe the

operational environment leads to either poor direction, or no direction at all. Halleck

demonstrated how vague orders from the highest command leads to confusion and disorder

among subordinates. Banks demonstrated how no orders at all leads to a loss of confidence from

subordinates and superiors alike.

Lead

Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staff, and Soldiers.

–ADRP 5-0

The purpose, motivation, and direction provided by the leader are very often the

difference between victory and defeat, living and dying. Current US doctrine states that, “Purpose

gives subordinates the reason to achieve a desired outcome…direction involves communicating

what to do to accomplish a mission…[and] motivation provides the will and initiative to do what

is necessary to accomplish the mission.”132 Whether leading from the front of a cavalry charge, or

behind a desk overlooking an array of maps and battle plans, it is the sense of purpose, direction,

and motivation that serves as a commonality between the two ends of the spectrum. As the fifth in

the series of responsibilities of the commander in the operations process, effective direction by

130 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 307. 131 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 474. 132 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington,

DC: Government Printing Office, 1 August 2012), 1-1, 1-2.

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the commander is predicated on the fact that he can adequately understand, visualize, and

describe, his operational environment. Though the words “direct” and “lead” may seem similar

and are even synonyms for one another, “lead” serves more as a follow-up to the “direct.” A

commander will “direct” with a written or verbal order, but then insert the necessary energy to

drive forward the plan by leading. The commander does not wait until achieving success in the

first four steps of the operations process before he begins to lead. Leading, and leadership, occurs

at all times in an operation, as success builds upon success and failure builds upon failure. The

commander’s success, or failure, in leading depends upon his ability to build a proper foundation

of understanding, visualizing, describing, and directing up to that point. The ability of Union

officers to lead their forces during the Red River expedition varied between great success and

borderline incompetence.

The Battle of Mansfield had been anything but a victory for the Union. Confusion, chaos,

and an all-out retreat marked the first major engagement of the campaign. A number of Union

officers performed in an exemplary fashion in the face of such adversity. One such officer was

Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom, commander of XIII Corps. Ransom successfully understood,

quickly visualized, and swiftly directed his men in an attempt to counter Taylor’s forces barreling

towards him. As the corps commander, Ransom personally moved forward with his skirmishers

to reconnoiter the enemy before him, finding “two batteries and a large force of infantry in the

line of battle in the edge of the woods…and also considerable bodies of infantry moving down

the road.”133 Understanding the enemy situation before him as well as the disposition of his

supporting artillery and cavalry, Ransom believed that his men were in position to withstand the

initial enemy attack as it commenced. Ransom ordered his forces to advance their right flank

based upon his earlier reconnaissance and having observed their movement toward his front.134

133 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 265. 134 J.C.C.W., 37.

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Unfortunately, upon the commencement of combat by Confederate Brigadier General Alfred

Mouton’s forces, Ransom lead division, led by Colonel William Landrum, collapsed, and was

soon surrounded on two flanks.135 According to Ransom though “Colonel Landrum…was

conspicuous, and ever present encouraging all by his own gallant conduct and judicious

dispositions of his men.”136 During the retreat, Confederate shot struck Ransom in the knee and

forced his departure from the battlefield. Despite his early withdrawal, Ransom demonstrated his

ability to direct his men based upon his personal involvement and understanding of the conditions

before him.

The next example of Union leadership is Banks, the most visible officer during the

campaign. Banks demonstrated on multiple occasions both successful and unsuccessful traits of

leadership, though the cumulative result led to an overall impression by superiors and

subordinates that he was vastly incapable of successfully executing his job. As he maneuvered in

and out of political and military realms throughout the campaign, Banks saw greater success with

what it was he was knew best, politics. Banks arrived in Alexandria nearly ten days after the bulk

of his forces, due primarily to specific guidance from Lincoln. Lincoln placed his initial

confidence in Banks, telling him, “I now distinctly tell you that you are master of all, and that I

wish you to take the case as you find it, and give us a free-state reorganization of Louisiana, in

the shortest possible time.”137 This equated to Banks taking personal ownership of the Louisiana

state election for governor, lieutenant governor, and other elected state officials.138 Of three

candidates for governor, J. Q. A. Fellows, Michael Hahn, and Benjamin Flanders, Banks put his

135 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 134-136. 136 J.C.C.W., 38. 137 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 7, ed. Roy P. Basler

(Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 90. 138 Hollandsworth, Pretense of Glory, 169.

37

entire support behind Hahn.139 Hahn and Flanders both previously served terms as congressional

representatives from Louisiana and so, were familiar with the significance the state played with

loyalty to the Union.140 With his direction from Lincoln, Banks saw Hahn as the most likely

candidate to succeed in the 1864 election, and so used his political sway to back Hahn.141 In an

attempt to cast a wide net as to who was eligible to vote, Banks authorized “Citizens of the State

who have volunteered for the defense of the country in the Army and Navy” as well as “Citizens

of the State who have been expelled from the homes…on account of their devotion to the

Union.”142 With his efforts, Banks aided in the successful election of Hahn who received 90

percent of the soldiers’ votes and was well ahead of Flanders and Fellows.143 Proud of his

accomplishments, Banks wrote to Halleck regarding the overall election proceedings saying, “I

never witnessed such a spectacle elsewhere…that in this State a popular demonstration of such

magnitude and friendly spirit to the Government could be attained. It is impossible to describe it

with truth.”144 Though successful in leading a political campaign, Banks’s military campaign was

anything but effective.

Banks did not adequately understand his environment nor did he give sufficient direction

to his subordinates and so his leadership abilities suffered as a result. Though Banks himself

understood the purpose of his campaign, he did not always convey his understanding to his

subordinates. Banks failed to give ample or even proper direction to his subordinates. His senior

commander, Franklin, perceived no sense of purpose for the expedition, other than an

139 Hollandsworth, Pretense of Glory, 169. 140 Ibid., 162. 141 Hollandsworth, Pretense of Glory, 169. 142 O.R., ser. 3, vol. 4, 171. 143 Hollandsworth, Pretense of Glory, 170. 144 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 2, 512-513.

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“impression…to march into Texas.”145 Banks’s efforts to motivate his men in the face of enemy

fire also proved ineffective, particularly during the battle of Mansfield.

James Ewer of the Third Massachusetts Cavalry recalled a scene during some of the most

intense fighting when Banks, who at one point made his way to the front of the fighting, took off

his hat yelling “Form a line here. I know you will not desert me.”146 Banks’s attempt at

motivation fell upon deaf and scared ears, as not only the Third Massachusetts, but all of his

forces retreated at Mansfield. Ewer’s criticism of Bank’s decision to withdraw was also apparent

in his comment that “Had Grant been present, it can easily be imagined that he would have said

what he did say at the close of the first day’s Battle of Shiloh,” and the he would have reformed

his line and attacked at daybreak.147 Ewer’s low opinion of Banks, something apparently shared

by the men within earshot of his plea, prevented any chance of the general rallying his troops at

that particular moment on the battlefield. A.J. Smith, however, proved far more capable than

Banks as a battlefield commander.

Smith belonged to Sherman, and as such carried with him the reputation of Sherman’s

men. Hailing from the northwestern parts of the then United States, A.J. Smith and his men were

of a rougher cut than Franklin’s, referring to Franklin’s men as soldiers on holiday and in return

being called gorillas by the Easterners.148 In fact, Banks himself inadvertently created this

nickname for the Smith’s men, when upon their arrival to Alexandria he commented to Porter,

“What in the name of Heaven did Sherman send me these ragged guerillas for?”149 Whether a

145 J.C.C.W., 31. 146 James K. Ewer, The Third Massachusetts Cavalry in the War for the Union

(Maplewood, MA: Historical Committee of the Regimental Association, 1903), 149. 147 Ewer, The Third Massachusetts, 157. 148 Michael J. Forsyth, The Red River Campaign of 1864 and the Loss by the Confederacy

of the Civil War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2002), 58-59. 149 Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War, 501.

39

gorilla or guerilla, there was a marked different between A. J. Smith’s and Franklin’s men.

Despite the opinion held by Banks and Franklin of the Westerners, A.J. Smith could lead and his

men could fight. During the Battle of Pleasant Hill, seeing that his fellow commanders were close

to collapse, Smith led the charge with infantry in a momentum-shifting counterattack against the

rebels with no guidance or input from Banks.150 This action was significant. It allowed Union

forces to gain a foothold in the area. Later that night, Banks rode to Smith to personally shake his

hand and say “God bless you, general; you have saved the army.”151 Unlike Banks, whose

presence with the 3rd Massachusetts had made little impact, Smith motivated his men to charge

against the rebels, despite the growing likelihood of being outflanked. Smith demonstrated the

reciprocal nature of the relationship between him and his men when told to retreat from Pleasant

Hill by Banks. In a letter Porter wrote to Sherman praising the actions of A.J. Smith at Pleasant

Hill, he recalled Smith’s reaction to being told to retreat and thus having to leave behind his dead,

unburied: “The general will never get over it as long as he lives; he cried like a child having to

leave his poor fellows on the field.”152 Smith cared for his men passionately; his purpose,

motivation, and direction came not simply from a place of obligation, but from an emotional bond

with his men. Though serving as the most senior naval officer in the campaign, Porter had his

opportunities to demonstrate his ability to lead at the tactical level.

While withdrawing under orders to Alexandria for the last time, Porter faced difficulty

keeping one of his vessels, the Eastport, afloat and off sand bars. After the Eastport ran aground

for the final time and the crew could not recover it, Porter decided to destroy the vessel lest it fall

into Confederate hands. Porter recalled that, “One ton of power was placed in her in various

positions…and at 1:45 p.m., April 26, the Eastport was blown up…The vessel was completely

150 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 160-162. 151 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 309. 152 O.R., ser. 3, vol. 34, pt. 3, 170.

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destroyed.”153 The explosion attracted nearby Confederate infantry who then followed the

remaining vessels as they traveled down the Red. Ambushed by both infantry and artillery further

down the river, Porter demonstrated great courage under intense enemy fire. While aboard his

flagship, the Cricket, Porter and the crew received a “pelting shower of shot and shell, which the

enemy poured into us—every shot going through and through.”154 Porter immediately took

charge of the gun deck after all crew members were either killed or wounded, ordering and

directing freed slaves who were aboard the ship to operate the guns and return fire.155 Porter then

made his way to the engine room, finding a similar situation of death and damaged equipment.

Again, Porter personally redirected crewmembers to assume duty in the engine room, while

Porter made his way to the pilothouse and took over the vessel himself from the wounded pilot.156

After the rebel fire subsided and Porter broke free from the ambush, he counted thirty-eight solid

shot impacts on the Cricket with half of the fifty-man crew either killed or wounded.157 Despite

the significant damage and loss of life among his ranks, Porter’s personal involvement on his

flagship motivated not only the remaining crew to continue fighting, but also the remaining

vessels in his fleet. Bloodied but not defeated, Porter and his men arrived in Alexandria only to

fight rapids and dwindling water levels preventing any further movement south.

Lieutenant Colonel Bailey’s dam unquestionably saved Porter’s fleet, but what may be

more important was how Banks served as a major driving force behind the dam’s construction.

The procurement of cotton and the seizure of Shreveport fell far short of the original plan. Banks

knew he must salvage what he could of the campaign. After ordering the construction of the dam

153 O.R.N., ser. 1, vol. 26, 74. 154 O.R.N., series 1, vol. 26, 74. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid., 75. 157 Ibid., 76.

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at the recommendation of Bailey and Franklin, Banks became near obsessive about its

completion. Porter himself recognized Banks’s determination in the endeavor,

To General Banks personally I am much indebted for the happy manner in which he forwarded this enterprise, giving it his whole attention day and night, scarcely sleeping while the work was going on, tending personally to see that all the requirements of Colonel Bailey were complied with on the instant.158

Banks continually asked for and sent updates on the river’s height during the dam construction,

waiting for the moment when conditions would support a breakout by the gunboats. During one

such personal inspection of the dam, Banks observed the dam close to bursting and so went to

notify the vessels upriver.159 When he then rode upstream to inform the boat pilots, “Scarcely a

man or light was to be seen. It was perfectly apparent that the boats were not in condition to take

advantage of the completion of the dam.”160 Banks quickly wrote to Porter to ask his men to stand

ready and be prepared should they need to act suddenly, which he replied, “Don’t suppose

because the vessels seem quiet that nothing is being done; everything is being done that can

be.”161 Despite his claim to readiness, when the dam temporarily ruptured in the early morning

darkness of 9 April, only one ship, which stood above the rapids at Alexandria, the Lexington,

took advantage of the opportunity as the crew stood prepared at that time while all remaining

boats stood idle and missed a critical opportunity to move downstream.162 Banks stood by his

claim that the navy provided no help with the dam, as the “construction of the dam was

exclusively the work of the army.” Porter completely disagreed with Banks’s claim of who put

more effort into the dam, stating, “No men worked harder in constructing the dam than did the

158 O.R.N., series 1, vol. 26, 133. 159 J.C.C.W., 333. 160 Ibid. 161 O.R.N., ser. 1, vol. 26, 140. 162 J.C.C.W., 333.

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men of the navy, for they were up to their middle night and day in the water…doing all that they

could.”163 After troops repaired the original dam and added smaller wing dams to further constrict

water flow, water levels reached suitable heights for travel, and by 13 May 1864, Porter and his

vessels moved past Alexandria and out of the Red River expedition.164 Had Banks not made a

personal effort to oversee the dam construction, the retreat from Alexandria would have lasted far

longer than it originally did.

Most Union leaders had equal moments of greatness and weakness as leaders. Some,

such as Banks, performed better under the pressure of knowing they knelt before the chopping

block. Others, like A.J. Smith, led not for recognition or personal gain, but for his men. Though

present at isolated points across the battlefields and throughout the campaign in limited quantities,

Union generals lacked the cumulative leadership needed to defeat the rebels strung between

Alexandria and Shreveport.

Assess

Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances.

–ADRP 5-0

Once a commander sets in motion an operation, in order to ensure subordinates meet his

intent, he must constantly assess the progress of his men and their actions. A commander does not

have the luxury to remove himself from the operation only to assume that all goes as planned in

his absence. This assessment enhances the commander’s original understanding of the operational

environment, and so then changes his visualization, description, and direction given to

subordinate within the environment. Proper assessment of the operational environment can lead

163 J.C.C.W., 280. 164 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 266.

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to a new, or better understanding, of the environment. However, the failure to assess, and

reassess, may result in the commander operating under a false set of assumptions or an

incomplete understanding of the problem. Even if a commander does constantly assess the

situation and make decisions based upon the changing environment, there is no guarantee that

those new decision are indeed the best ones. Union officers, all in varying positions of authority

during the campaign, demonstrated the results of both making good and bad assessments of the

operational environment.

In Banks’s defense, he constantly reassessed his operational environment from the first

day he set foot in Alexandria. Unfortunately, his assessments of the situations were incorrect and

he did little change his understanding. The most significant example of this was Banks’s decision

to travel west, inland and away from the Red River, after his forces reached Grand Ecore for the

first time. While at Grand Ecore, Banks and his chief of staff Brigadier General Charles Stone

conferred with a local riverboat pilot, Wellington Withenbury, regarding the road network

between Grand Ecore and Shreveport.165 Withenbury recalled the discussion that he and Stone

had regarding discrepancies between his and Stone’s map, specifically as to the location of

Pleasant Hill.166 Additionally, Withenbury informed Banks that by crossing the river and going

north, he would reach Shreveport in three days, and that by heading west towards Mansfield and

Pleasant Hill, he would not see the Red River until Shreveport.167 A simple solution for Banks to

help him reassess his situation would have been to send cavalry reconnaissance elements to

confirm the river-crossing route to Shreveport. Franklin directly told Banks himself that he should

send an element north to look for roads that might run closer to the Red River and thus provide

the option for naval support; however, Banks feared there was not enough time to complete the

165 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 113. 166 J.C.C.W., 286. 167 Ibid.

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necessary reconnaissance and thus arranged for none.168 The pressure from Grant and Sherman to

reach Shreveport and return A. J. Smith east within the thirty-day window added a constant

reminder to the limited tactical timeline. Withenbury may also have attempted to protect his own

personal supply of cotton held along the west bank of the river when he failed to inform Banks of

the known route that paralleled the river, which would take the Union forces directly by his

cotton and subject his crop to seizure.169 Regardless, because of Banks’s failure to seek an

enhanced understanding of his situation at the time, he set in motion the end for the Union forces.

The remaining major decisions Banks made, whether to stay or retreat, did come however, from

his constant reassessment of the operational environment.

The first assessment made to retreat came the night after the Battle of Pleasant Hill.

Banks did not pursue Taylor west, based upon a number of factors he took into consideration:

lack of food and water, a single line dirt road upon which his entire force moved, lack of

communication with Porter along the river, and the likelihood of the boats getting stranded on the

river.170 This reassessment caused Banks to believe that the conditions before him were not

conducive to victory, even though his decision to retreat disgusted his men and left Porter north

along the Red River without land support.171 Once again in Grande Ecore following the retreat

from Pleasant Hill, Banks convinced himself the enemy and river conditions were not favorable

to victory, and ordered the second retreat, this time to Alexandria.172 A.J. Smith was one of many

subordinates who felt slighted by this decision, and acted out by torching structures and killing

168 J.C.C.W., 35. 169 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 76. 170 J.C.C.W., 326. 171 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, 119. 172 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 190.

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livestock on a trail of destruction returning through to Alexandria.173 Regardless, Banks’s

assessment of the environment at he saw it, led him to believe that retreat was his only remaining

option. From a distance, Grant made his own assessment of the campaign.

Grant communicated with Banks throughout the campaign through situation reports and

direct orders. Grant, kept abreast of the situation by letters sent to him by Banks and Halleck,

expressed his initial concerns with the timing of the campaign before it ever began. His first letter

to Banks made clear his expectations that he must take Shreveport as soon as possible, not give

up any ground west of the Mississippi already gained, and that Banks should expect involvement

in an upcoming spring campaign, “even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your

campaign.”174 As news of Banks’s difficulties began to reach Grant, his assessment of the

campaign changed and his guidance to Banks became more specific. Grant’s second letter to

Banks was far more specific, telling Banks to turn over control of the Red River to Steele upon

successfully seizing Shreveport and to abandon all but a few locations in Texas along the Rio

Grande. Grant also gave Banks recommendations on the exact number of troops needed to

participate in the upcoming Mobile campaign.175 Seeing that Banks’s campaign was all but lost,

Grant sent orders both through Major General David Hunter and directly from his hand to Banks,

telling him that had he, “commenced to move from Shreveport to the interior of Texas, or away

from the Red River in any direction, retrace your steps on receipt of this [order]. No matter what

you [Banks] have in contemplation, commence your concentration to be followed without delay

by your advance to Mobile.”176 Upon receipt of this order, Banks responded that he was hesitant

to call his campaign short, as “it will be difficult to concentrate any considerable force from the

173 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 224-225. 174 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 610-611. 175 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 11. 176 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 192.

46

army on the Mississippi for operations against Mobile with such and active and powerful enemy

in the rear.”177 Nearly two weeks later, however, Banks ordered the retreat of his forces to

Alexandria.178

Grant and Halleck both pursued the removal of Banks from the campaign. Halleck had

warned Grant of the political implications of removing such a well-connected officer like Banks,

but that if the word came to Lincoln from Grant himself, Halleck would likely have supported

Grant.179 No record exists of any such official request reaching Lincoln, though on 7 May 1864,

Major General E. R. S. Canby replaced Banks as the commander of the Department of the Gulf,

“invested with all the power and authority which the President can confer upon you.”180 Grant’s

assessment, and reassessments of Banks’ performance proved vital to removing the primary cause

of the campaign’s failure; Major General Nathanial P. Banks.

Conclusion

Bank’s operations in the West are about what should have been expected from a general so utterly destitute of military education and military capacity. It seems but little better than murder to give important commands to such men as Banks.

– O.R., series 1, vol. 34, part 3

The ashes of Alexandria, Louisiana hung in the warm spring air as a silent observer to a

failed campaign and the weary Union soldiers below. Pro-Union Louisianans who had previously

sworn oaths of allegiance to the Union just weeks earlier, stood next to the charred remnants of

their homes and cursed and wailed alongside the eastbound formation of troops who receded like

177 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 1, 189. 178 Ibid., 190. 179 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 409-410. 180 Ibid., 491-492.

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the waters of the Red River itself.181 Locals later swore under oath that A. J. Smith gave the order

to burn the homes.182 Grant delayed his attempt to capture Mobile by ten months due to the

serious disruptions in his timeline, caused by the ineffective Red River Campaign.183 By 20 May

1864, the last few Union soldiers had withdrawn across another of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey’s

aquatic creations, an ad hoc pontoon bridge over the Atchafalaya River near Simmesport,

Louisiana.184 This crossing marked the end of a seventy-odd day “damn blunder from beginning

to end.”185 Despite the senior involvement of Lincoln, Halleck, and Grant, Banks and his

subordinates had failed to secure the much-needed cotton. After Canby came to relieve Banks, he

addressed the remaining soldiers of the campaign, criticizing the campaign openly in response to

cheers from soldiers shouting “We want to see Gen. Banks punished; we want to see him hung”

with some refusing to fight until proof of Banks’s punishment.186

As is most often the case with military losses, either large or small, those involved look to

distribute the weight of responsibility as unevenly as possible, while trying to maintain their

names and characters despite being christened the source of failure, either legitimately or

perceived. For those senior commanders who participated in the Red River Campaign of 1864,

assignment of blame passed between one another even before the campaign’s conclusion. All

senior commanders involved had their own opinions as to why the campaign failed and who to

181 Lawrence Van Alstyne, Diary of an Enlisted Man (New Haven, CT: Tuttle,

Morehouse, and Taylor, 1910), 321. 182 The Conduct of Federal Troops in Western Louisiana During The Invasion of 1863

and 1864. Compiled from Sworn Testimony under Direction of Governor Henry W. Allen. Shreveport, April 1865 (Shreveport, LA: News Printing Establishment, 1866), 189.

183 Johnson, Red River Campaign, 279.

184 Ibid., 276. 185 Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, xix. 186 The Conduct of Federal Troops in Western Louisiana, 89.

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hold responsible. Ultimately though, the defeat manifested through a failure of senior Union

leadership to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess.

During his congressional testimony in March 1865, Banks attributed his defeat to “The

difficulties in navigation, the imperfect concentration of forces, the incautious march of the 8th of

April [Franklin], and the limited time allotted to the expedition.”187 Banks believed that Union

forces were their own worst enemy, and that the enemy played little if any part the defeat.188

Banks also took the opportunity to place a hefty dose of blame on Porter and his navy, confessing

“that every position of difficulty in which the army was placed in [the] campaign was the

immediate and direct consequence of delay in the operation of the navy.”189 In his closing words

to Congress, Banks attempted to maintain his honor admitting that “A commanding officer is of

course responsible for all that occurs to his command, whatever may have been the cause. I do

not shrink from the responsibility.”190 Ultimately, Banks was unprepared for the campaign in

every sense of the word.

Banks did not understand the military aspects of the campaign nearly as well as he did the

political. His personal background in northern textile mills and robust political career prior to the

war more than qualified him to speak as somewhat of an authority on both issues. What he lacked

personally, and to the detriment of every soldier under his authority, was a military understanding

of the campaign. Banks’s military career began with the war. He was not a product of any

military academy and he had no prior military experience. His understanding of military tactics

and operations developed in the face of the enemy, through baptisms by fire. As such, he relied

upon others to do his heavy tactical and operational lifting for him. He knew the overarching

187 J.C.C.W., 340. 188 Ibid., 340. 189 J.C.C.W., 338. 190 Ibid., 339.

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strategic objective, but he lacked the ability to assume the role of a capable planner and

commander in order to effectively connect tactical actions on the ground to meet his and

Lincoln’s endstate. During the Red River expedition, that responsibility lay in the hands of

Franklin, Ransom, Lee, A. J. Smith, and Porter, to name a few. Because Banks did not adequately

understand the environment, every subsequent recommendation or order he gave sent his men

further from the desired endstate. In the case of taking the road to Mansfield from Grand Ecore,

this literally took his men physically further away from the cotton and Shreveport. Colonel

William Shaw of the XVI Corps summarized it best in a letter regarding Banks and Pleasant Hill,

in which he wrote, “I might refer to Gen. Banks’ reports, but it shows such a total want of

knowledge of the location of his forces and the operations of the day, or such a total disregard of

truth as to place it beneath criticism.”191

Had Banks had a greater level of military understanding, he might have made decisions

more appropriate to the conditions of his environment. To postulate what exact actions Banks

should have taken to ensure victory must also take into account every possible enemy reaction.

To do this, however, is far beyond the scope of historical analysis. However, there are a few

major decisions that Banks made in the campaign that a better-prepared general might have

possibly approached differently. First, rather than focus on Alexandria and arriving there with the

bulk of his men, Banks had instead focused on organizing Hahn’s election ceremony, and so

arrived nearly two weeks late. Banks did not account for the impact that his presence might have

had on the navy’s decision to set about securing cotton. Banks’s understanding of the situation in

Alexandria was two weeks behind every other leader in town. Second, Banks neglected to send a

reconnaissance force out from Grand Ecore to confirm or deny the presence of a road that

paralleled the Red River. Because he did not, Banks’s soldiers blundered into Confederate forces

191 John Scott, Story of the Thirty-Second Iowa Infantry Volunteers (Nevada, IA: John

Scott, 1896), 186.

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leading to a defeat at Mansfield and retreat from Pleasant Hill. This is not to say that the Union

forces would have avoided contact with Taylor and his men altogether, but the circumstance

under which they met might have been far different. Third, Banks did not stand firm in his

original decision, and instead withdrew from Pleasant Hill, which sank the morale of his men. As

many soldiers and their leaders knew very little as to why they had even embarked on the

campaign, morale was all that some had motivating them. Even if Banks had chosen not stay at

Pleasant Hill, then at least he could have retired to the river twenty miles to the east, rather than

Grand Ecore, forty miles to the southeast. This action would have given him access to his

transport ships and additional infantry under the command of Brigadier General Kilby Smith. In

the end, Mansfield and Pleasant Hill stood as the high-water mark for Banks’s forces and the

success of the campaign. Standing so low in the opinion of his subordinates, peers, and superiors,

Banks had become a pariah in blue wool. In the absence of orders or coordination from Banks,

Franklin, Smith, and Porter acted independently, as they saw fit, sometime for their own favor,

sometimes for their men’s. Regardless, because Banks could not understand or visualize the

operational environment, he lacked the ability to consistently describe, direct, and lead his men.

To place equal responsibility on the shoulders of Franklin and his division commanders,

or on Porter and his subordinates is unfair to the lot. Though not technically in Banks’s chain of

command, as neither Halleck nor Grant had created a single command headquarters for the

campaign, these men still took their direction from Banks. They relied on his understanding of the

greater picture and trusted, at least initially, that his requests and recommendations were in the

best interest of the campaign. As the campaign progressed, their trust eroded in Banks’s ability to

act in the best interests of the Union Army. Franklin became less impressed with the overall

ability of Banks to lead, testifying to Congress, “from what I had seen of General Banks’s ability

to command in the field, I was certain than an operation dependent upon plenty of troops, rather

than upon skill in handling them, was the only one which would have probability to success in his

51

hands.”192 By the end, A. J. Smith wanted nothing more to do with Banks and the campaign,

telling Banks’s chief of staff, Brigadier General William Dwight, “This army knows full well that

I am not responsible for any mishaps that have occurred during this campaign.”193

Every Union leader had both exceptional and reprehensible moments on the battlefield.

Some of these moments occurred in the face of the enemy while others occurred in the relative

safety of a headquarters away from contact. No matter where a commander located himself,

because he could not successfully understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess his

subordinates, he would fail, leading to the debacle known now as the Red River Campaign.

192 J.C.C.W., 35. 193 O.R., ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 3, 535.

52

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