Columbia Space Disaster

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Columbia Space Disaster Samhita Nanduri Period 4

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Columbia Space Disaster. Samhita Nanduri Period 4. Columbia’s Long History. Columbia’s first space flight: 1981, 20 years after the first space flight To build Columbia was a long process: 1972 – 1981 was dedicated to testing and structural changes. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Columbia Space Disaster

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Columbia Space Disaster

Samhita Nanduri Period 4

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Columbia’s Long HistoryColumbia’s first space flight: 1981, 20 years

after the first space flightTo build Columbia was a long process: 1972 –

1981 was dedicated to testing and structural changes.

STS-107, the flight name of its last journey, was Columbia’s 28th flight

“The original Columbia was the first American vessel to circumnavigate the globe. The shuttle Columbia equaled the feat, only a little higher.” (Is the Shuttle, CNN)

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STS-107Columbia’s 28th flight was a 16-day journeyThe Crew:

Rick Husband William McCool Michael Anderson David Brown Kalpana Chawla Laurel Clark Ilan Ramon

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Historical Crew MembersKalpana Chawla was the first Indian woman to

go to space, and the second Indian person. Ilan Ramon was the first Israeli to go to space

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What Happened

On February 1, 2003, and 9 a.m., Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated and exploded on its re-enter into Earth’s atmosphere.

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What Technically Happened

When the ship launched, a small piece of foam broke away from insulation and blocked the “thermal protection system”, the system that prevents the ship from overheating when re-entering Earth’s atmosphere. The actual disaster occurred as the ship broke apart, due to internal heating.

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Source: National Geographic

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Interestingly Enough…NASA engineers are required to check the

engine and compartments of the plane before launch

During checking, engineers noticed that tiles, foam, and other debris had the possibility of breaking off

During Columbia’s journey, NASA supervisors reasoned that there would be little to do if any emergency occurred.

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Mission Control CenterAt 9 in the morning, Columbia lost connection

with the Mission Control Center, a few minutes before its crash

After realizing that they lost the shuttle, flight directors and members of the Control Center immediately started securing information related to the landing.

Flight Director LeRoy Cain, Johnson Space Center

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Thesis: The tragic Columbia Space disaster of 2003

reflected national progress not only in aeronautical advances, but also in hostile thinking.

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The Aftermath

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After Columbia exploded, debris covered Texas and parts of surrounding states

They included: parts of the ship, hazardous pure forms of hydrazine and ammonia, and crew remains (Astronaut Remains, FOXNews).

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Impact on NASA In an analysis of the safety in space shuttles,

Richard Blomberg stated that “The problem is that the boundary between safe and unsafe operations can seldom be quantitatively defined or accurately predicted. Even the most well meaning managers may not know when they cross it. This is particularly true for an ageing system” (Blomberg, 3).

Blomberg was the Former Chair of Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

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Impact on NASA Communications

This can be directly related to Columbia, who’s first flight happened in 1981. According to Randy Avera, a former engineer of NASA, NASA did not have a straight-forward safety procedure for emergencies such as Columbia (Randy Avera, CNN). As a result, NASA was forced to update their communication within their various specializations.

NASA brought in consultants to bridge communication gaps between different levels of superiority.

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Physical ChangesNASA updated their ship structure, especially

with the tanks and pads (NASA powerpoint, 32).

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President Bush“Many political analysts believe Bush found his

voice as a national leader in the days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.” (Is the Shuttle, CNN).

Addressed the disaster as an act of comfort

Source: National Public Radio

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Blast from the Past

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Challenger Disaster January 28, 1986The flight lasted 73 seconds, and all 7

members of crew were killed

Source: CNN

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Similarities 1. Communication: Just as NASA brought in

consultants to aid communication between various fields, Challenger’s disaster was blamed for lacking in a Decision Support System

“In short, NASA was operating in a phase of semi-uncontrolled decision making while trying to serve the military, industry and international research organizations with a space vehicle that had been declared operational before completion of the developmental stage [4].” (Forrest, 12).

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Similarities2. Presidential Involvement: Just as Bush had addressed Columbia’s

disaster, Ronald Reagan spoke to the country almost immediately after the disaster

He even postponed his State of the Union Address, to be given that night, for a week.

Many believed he was a comfort

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Similarities3. InvestigationsThe Reagan Administration created the Rogers

Commission to investigate the cause of Challenger’s destruction. Worked for 32 months, gave Reagan the report of

causeThe Bush Administration created the Columbia

Accident Investigation Board Worked to make safety options in times of

disaster, such as space walk escapes and escape shuttles

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How USA adapted from Challenger

In 1986, NASA was considered to be controlled solely by the President: “Its organizational boundary was highly political and open for manipulation by any entity that could exert political power. Upon declaring the Shuttle "operational," the Reagan Administration removed the motivation of NASA employees to manage and left them with the impression that decision making would be made by directive from political sources.” (Forrest, 13).

With an established Decision committee, NASA exerted more power

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Changes in Thinking

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Terrorist AccusationsFollowing September 11, 2001, it was clear that

the USA was affected by the Terrorist Attacks Ilan Ramon was an Israeli astronaut, and was

speculated to be a target of terrorismThe Bush Administration found no evidence of

terrorism, and immediately answered speculation: "We have no information at this time that indicates that this was a terrorism incident,” (Johndroe, No Evidence).

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ConclusionWith 9/11 attacks, and wars in the Middle East,

the Columbia space shuttle reminded America of tragedy. To have been terrorized on American soil not since Pearl Harbor, was a huge factor for Americans. This reflected the significant changes of American perspective, from 1986 to 2003. Overall, Columbia’s tragedy caused new development and progress, a characteristic second-nature to America.

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Question #1 (Critical Thinking)

How did Reagan’s address on the day of the Challenger reflect on Bush’s address?

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Answer #1Both addressed the country immediately, and

Reagan’s care to comfort citizens, by postponing the State of the Union Address, reflected on Bush’s address.

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Question #2 (Factual) In what ways has NASA decided to improve

itself?

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Answer #2 It improved its shuttle/engine parts, improved

communication between levels of control, and created organization groups to investigate problems.

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Question #3 (Critical Thinking)

How did the responses of people in 2003 reflect the time period?

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Answer #3Thoughts of terrorism indicate the impact of

the fear of terrorism on the country. The fact that an Israeli astronaut was on board caused many to blame the crash on foreign countries’ doing.

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Question #4 (Factual)How did NASA officials and the crew handle

knowing that something was wrong? What happened in the Mission Control Center?

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Answer #4They realized something was wrong while

Columbia was in orbit, but worried little. After Columbia crashed, LeRoy Cain, Flight Director, said “Lock all Doors”, meaning that Mission Control Center had to secure all information on the landing.

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Sources Primary Sources “Statement of Richard Blomberg, Former Chair,

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, before the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics” with Richard Blomberg is a valuable primary source, because it described the safety measures NASA took from a direct authority. I used this source to help me explain the impact of Colbumbia’s crash, and its effects on prior safety regulations on NASA.

“NASA Press Conference Announced” by Robert Mirelson is a primary source used to give details of what happened with Columbia and the steps Mission Control Center took after destruction.

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Works Cited“Astronaut Remains Found on Ground.” FOX News. N.p., 3 Feb. 2003. Web. 16 May

2011. <http://www.foxnews.com/ story/ 0,2933,77351,00.html>.

Blomberg, Richard D. Letter to Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 18 Apr. 2002. Statement of Richard D. Blomgberg. N.p.: n.p., 2002. 2-4. NASA . Web. 13 May 2011. <http://www.nasa.gov/ pdf/ 9090main_blomberg5.1.03.pdf>.

Challenger Disaster Live. CNN. 28 Jan. 1986. CNN.com. Web. Transcript. 16 May 2011. <http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=j4JOjcDFtBE>.

Forrest, Jeff. “The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster.” Metropolitan State College. alexander P. Power and Daniel Power, 2011. Web. 16 May 2011. <http://dssresources.com/ cases/ spaceshuttlechallenger/ index.html>.

“Like Reagan Before Him, Bush Mourns Shuttle Loss.” Challenger and Columbia, U.S. Presidents’ Remarks. National Public Radio. 1 Feb. 2003. National Public Radio. Web. Transcript. 16 May 2011. <http://www.npr.org/ news/ specials/ shuttle/ reagan_bush/ index.html>.

“Lost: Space Shuttle Columbia.” Cable News Network. Time Warner Company, 2005. Web. 13 May 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/ SPECIALS/ 2003/ shuttle/>.

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Works Cited Continued Mirelson, Robert. “NASA Press Conference Announced.” Nasa. N.p., 31 Mar.

2003. Web. 13 May 2011. <http://history.nasa.gov/ columbia/ Troxell/ Columbia%20Web%20Site/ Documents/ NASA/ Press%20Releases/ FEBRUA%7E2.TXT>.

O’Brien, Miles. “Ex-NASA Engineer: Shuttle Report Finds Safety Program Lacking.” Cable News Network. Time Warner Company, 26 Aug. 2003. Web. 13 May 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/ 2003/ TECH/ space/ 08/ 26/ cnna.colu.avera/ index.html>.

“Officials: No Evidence of Terrorism.” Cable News Network. Time Warner Company, 2005. Web. 13 May 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/ 2003/ US/ 02/ 01/ security.shuttle/ index.html>.

Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster. BBC.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 16 May 2011. <http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=6R4ctaCBapM>.

Stenger, Robert. “Is the Shuttle Worth It?” Cable News Network. Time Warner, 5 Feb. 2003. Web. 16 May 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/ 2003/ TECH/ space/ 02/ 05/ sprj.colu.shuttle.future/ index.html>.

**Pictures from Google Images