Luis Jacob Retanan POLSC 144

2012-07920 Prof. Kraft

Seminar Paper: Norms (Revised) Nov 27, 2015

Collapse and Metamorphosis

(Rationalism and the Return of Norms)

Introduction

The end of cold war had dramatically changed the international political order. It

had brought hope for a better world but also challenges in building one. March and Olsen

(1999) summarizes the contemporary international political landscape into three key

observations, (1) reconstitutions of national boundaries through reintegration and

secession, (2) decentralization of the identities of nation-states due to the reemergence

and intensification of multi-ethnic solidarities, and (3) empowerment of international

institutions that substantively weakens the impermeability of the state to external

pressures (pg. 945-946). And these three observations boils down into one underlying

phenomenon that had made possible their realization – the return of norms into the

international arena.

After suffering a huge blow from E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, the ideational

normative study of international relations was cast aside and a materialist-egoistic

ontology of realism and liberalism replaced its dominion over the rationalist paradigm in

IR (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999). The fundamental principle of such positivist ontology

is utility maximization expressed in rational-choice approach towards international

politics. Rational-choice approach follows the logic of expected consequences – a

calculative mindset that analyzes the probable consequences of an action in terms of

gains and losses with respect to certain interests (March & Olsen, 1998) The supremacy

of this approach in IR stems from the fact that its explanatory power is austerely based on

the principle of parsimony.

However this parsimonious egoistic outlook on political reality has been and is

being challenged not only with the rise of international and transnational organizations

but also more importantly and dangerously with the rise of irrational conflicts driven by

multi-ethnic and religious hatreds. One of the paradigmatic examples is the Bosnian War

(1992-1995) that was characterized by a series of massacres in Bosnia. Simple rational-

choice approach cannot explain their unrestricted brutality. These immediate threats to

humanity reemphasize the relevance of norms along with identity and culture as an

important aspect in understanding international politics. Is the return of the norms in the

international political landscape signal the collapse of rationalism?

Definitions: Norms, Institutions, Identity and Worldview

Before this essay develop a critique to the paradigm of rationalism in IR, I think it

is prudent to define the concepts that the critique will be looking into first in order to

avoid misconceptualizations and unnecessary reiterations. The definitions that will be

used here is in line with the conceptualizations developed by the normative and

constructivist researches in IR. These are four concepts that this paper will be analyzing,

(a) norms, (b) institutions, (c) identity, and (d) worldview. Indeed they have a common

underlying essence but we need to differentiate them from one another for conceptual

clarity.

Norms are generally agreed as standard appropriate behavior for actors with a

given identity while institutions are the collections of interrelated norms (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 1999). But more than aggregation, the two are also different in terms of

formality and scope of influence (Schlüter & Theesfald, 2008). In terms of formality,

institutions are reflected often formally in jurisprudential language while norms can be

informally expressed in an ordinary everyday language. Thus institutions in order to be

such require the power of the state while norms only require the assent of the community.

While in terms of commonality, institutions must be widely recognized and most

importantly internalized in contrast norms can be such even it is only known in a personal

level. This implies that the interpretation of institutions must be rigidly objective while

the interpretations of norms must only have a more or less shared notion about them.

Nevertheless these mechanisms of societal order can only be built upon and sustained by

the collective identity of the community.

The concept of identity has been foremost a controversial philosophical issue –

the problem of self. What is the self? The three main schools of modern philosophy have

different contending views regarding this. The rationalists argue that the self is

constituted in the mind itself. The empiricists on the other hand argue that the self is

brought about by raw experiences While for the idealists, the self is brought about by the

interplay of inherent structures of the mind and the senses that constitutes the individual

perceptions of the world and of his self. The tone of the rationalist school resonates an

individualistic perspective towards identity. Identity, in this perspective, is viewed as

personal identity, which Fearon (1999) describes as “a set of attributes, beliefs, desire, or

principles of action that a person thinks distinguish her in socially relevant ways.” (pg.

11). Thus in such kind of conception of identity, self-interest plays a crucial role. But

considering the recent events of our time, we must also examine what the empiricist and

idealist schools are saying. Experiences and our perceptions of these experiences shape

us intentionally and unintentionally. Identity is in these perspectives is viewed as social

identity and being so according to Fearon (1999), “identity is just a social category, a

group of people designated by a label that is commonly used either by the people

designated, others or both.” (pg. 10). This essay will look upon both of these definitions

in the development of its critique.

Finally the concept of worldview, which is defined by Vidal (2008) as an

overarching concept that encapsulates the six fundamental philosophical inquiries of

mankind, (a) ontology – model of reality as a whole, (b) explanation – model of the past,

(c) prediction – model of the future, (d) axiology – theory of values, (e) praxeology –

theory of actions, and (f) epistemology – theory of knowledge (pg. 4). It can be then

concluded that a worldview acts as a sphere of reality; norms, institutions and even

identities are ultimately rooted from it. Does this concept constitute a challenge towards

the rationalist individualistic view? Depends, if the worldview is brought about by the

individual then no but if the worldview is the one who brought in the individual the

conception of his self and of the world then it is a conceptual dissonant. That two

contending views shall be taken up later in the critique.

The Collapse of Rationalism?

The outbreak multi-ethnic and sectarian conflicts along with their brutal ethnic

violence give us the justification to question the ontological authority of the rationalist

paradigm in the field of international relations.

The Bosnian War (1992-1995) is a conflict primarily between the Republic of

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Republic of Srpska after the disintegration of Tito’s

Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Tito’s Yugoslavia paved the way for the rise of

nationalistic sentiments among the ethnic groups in the region primarily the Serbs,

Croats, and Albanians. Their identities are further complicated by the fact that these

ethnicities are divided by religion, Orthodox, Catholic and Muslims. The only underlying

commonality is that all of them vied to establish their own independent republics. But

what had started to be a war for territorial control turned into a bloody ethnic conflict.

Their paramilitaries violently disperse, oppress or ‘cleansed’ subjugated communities that

do not ‘share’ their identity in order to create homogenize states (Kalyvas & Sambanis;

2005). The 1995 Srebrenica massacre where 1000 Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered by

Serb forces was a horrific testament of this ethnic brutality. How can supposedly rational

people horrifyingly mutilate one another in the name of something intangible?

Rationalist paradigm attempts to provide a parsimonious explanation of these

ideational aspects of international reality by inculcating norms to its materialist-

consequentialist rational-choice approach. As discussed by Finnemore and Sikkink

(1999) in the perspective of rational-choice, norms are social constructs that are

strategically created by individuals in order to gain what they want. And the persistence

of norms stems only from the continuous conformity of individuals to them because of

their utility to their common interests. Being interests as the central motivating factor;

persuasion, bargaining and negotiation are then the mechanisms in which these norms are

institutionalized or discarded (pg. 909-915). This implies that norms are mere instruments

and expressions of an egocentric-materialist identity. Yet ‘moderate’ rationalist tries to

accommodate instead of absorbing norms into the paradigm by raising the idea that

norms – as they are gradually internalized and institutionalized by individuals – can also

act against self-interests and constrain available choices (March & Olsen, 1998;

Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999). But nevertheless there are still choices in which rationality

can be exercised upon.

Considering the rational-choice model for the case of ethnic violence of the

Bosnian War, it can be then argued that the very cause of this violence is none other than

economic and political, specifically the interest of territorial gain of the involved actors.

Identities and norms in this case are then used as mere decorative justifications.

However, before consigning with such parsimonious conclusion, we must first look

critically on two things, (a) the logicality of its parsimony; theoretical structure, and (b)

its view concerning human interests; ontological source of agency.

Uncertain Logic

Rational-choice as a decision-making approach is essentially a hypothetico-

deductive method centered on utility maximization. This means that it always deals with

the problem in an if-then statement built upon the criterion of utility. Given problem A, if

we do B then we deduce to a conclusive outcome C that will be able to effectively solve

problem A. It is simple and efficient for decision-making that makes it a powerful

approach in international relations – it saves both time and energy. But there are

loopholes in this approach in terms of its objectivity that needed to be brought into the

light, (1) its inductive methodology (2) its epistemic credibility, and (3) its ‘omniscient’

logic.

The philosopher of science Carl Hempel pointed out that the validity of a

hypothesis is based on the method of induction. If we do B then we should lead to C and

when the observation of certain relevant facts points that indeed C occurs, thus it can be

already serve as confirmatory evidence that B is true. But it is like saying that if all swans

are white then every swan that I will see is white. That hypothesis remains valid if every

other day I observe that indeed every swan is white but what if one day I see a black

swan? The objectivity of the hypothesis collapses into a fallacy. Rational-choice

approach by being consequentialist and utility driven sees outcomes as the primary

confirmatory evidences of the objectivity of its hypotheses thus as long as their

predictions comes true their hypotheses are right. The problem in this inductive character

of rational-choice approach is the possibility of being habituated into thinking that its

strategies, being successful in the past, will always be and must be right but of course we

cannot always be certain of that. Thus norms, being accommodated as constructive

strategies by the rationalist paradigm, can be unreflectively standardized into dogmatic

solutions by the very logic of the rational-choice approach thereby compromising their

instrumentality.

Rationalist hardliners may go around the problem of induction by using the

Popperian view – positing that their rational-choice theory can be falsified because it has

clear and simple objective conceptual parameters. Thus an attack on its inductive

characteristic has no effect in its epistemic credibility. But the recent recognition of

power of norms and identities and their accommodation into the rationalist paradigm as

constraining mechanism of individual choices show an eclectic attitude of the rational-

choice adherents. This eclecticism within the paradigm may have improved its

explanatory power in making sense of the contemporary international reality but it also

compromises the clarity of its conceptual boundaries due to the necessity of incorporating

new assumptions. Addition of new assumptions as corroborations to the theory, deducing

from Putnam, compromise the falsifiability of the theory itself as it increases logically

the probability that what is being tested for falsifiability are auxiliary assumptions only.

And being only corroborations, their falsification does not falsify the theory itself. And

Popper emphasizes that if a theory can no longer be tested whether it is falsifiable or not

then its epistemic credibility as a legitimate science can be put into question. Eclecticism

as it tries to enable the theory to produce parsimonious explanations, it also at the same

time compromise the credibility of the theory of being parsimonious leading to a

paradoxical theoretical framework.

But ultimately what makes the logicality of rational-choice theory and

consequently the whole rationalist paradigm questionable is its ‘omniscient’

presuppositions. All of its assumptions and inductions are based on the faith that the

future is knowable – there is some underlying order in reality that can be grasped by

human reason. The theory of bounded rationality challenges that ‘omniscient’ essence of

the rationalist paradigm. Bounded rationality says that the human rationality is limited

due to the facts that, (1) the information of the decision-maker will always be limited

because of the cost and energy required in procuring them, (2) the decision-makers have

their own cognitive and emotive biases that lead to the framing of choices, and (3) the

external environment is inherently complex and ambiguous (Jones, 1999) These external

and internal limitations imply that an individual cannot and will not be able to fully

maximize or optimize the available choices to him.

Thereby the rational-choice model, hailed as a parsimonious way of predicting

human choices, is in reality based on an uncertain logical thinking.

Presupposition of Interests

Where do interests emanate? In investigating the rationalist paradigm of

international relations, it is systematically misleading and naively simplistic to think that

the source of agency is the sovereign state only because it appears to have the power to

be the ultimate actor consistently driving global politics. Such thinking rests on a state-

centric presupposition that treats the state as a Leviathan on its own right as if it is devoid

of any human elements and influence. But nevertheless the very concept of sovereign

state traces back to Thomas Hobbes, who emphasizes that it is the interaction of

individuals’ rational psyche that fundamentally architect the existence of the state.

Therefore, it can be said that the state acts only as an extension of individuals’ collective

interests.

Thus the interest of the individual is the primary source of agency of the

rationalist approach. The individual has his own interests that he wants to be maximized

despite the given internal and external constrains of his rationality. He is willing to

gamble despite of the underlying uncertainty of the logic that he will be using in the

hopes of fulfilling his own interests. The ownness of interests is the most powerful card

of the rationalist paradigm – it is still the individual that acts. But do we really own our

interests or is it just also a mere presupposition?

The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher, provides a direct

challenge on the individualistic view of rationalism on human interests. Schopenhauer

points out that it is irrationality and not rationality, which forms the fundamental essence

of our being. He conceptualizes this irrational essence of man into what he calls as the

“Will” – the inner urges, instincts and feelings within us. By being the fundamental core

of our being, the irrational Will constitutes and directs our rationality. Thereby the

interests that we consciously construe in our minds are ultimately driven by passions

emanating from the Will. But can the mind check the power of the Will? Being irrational,

it is then beyond the comprehension and control of the mind. The mind is a mere

instrument of realizing the Will. This implies three things, (1) interest being based on the

erratic character of the Will cannot be the core element in norm-building process, (2)

interest is the extension of the Will and (3) interest is ultimately not the product of

rationality of the mind but only the product of its rationalization of the Will. The second

and third implications raise a controversial point. Can it be radically concluded that our

interests is not really our own?

In line with Kant’s philosophy, Schopenhauer affirms that indeed the mind and its

cognitive structures enable us to constitute our own representations of the world but

ultimately for him these representations are manifestations of the feelings within us – the

Will. Thus by characterizing it as the Will instead of a will it can be implied from

Schopenhauer that it is something not in the possession of the individual’s rationality but

a metaphysical thing that is independent of it but innate in the being of an individual.

From this argument, it is then only a mere presupposition that one’s interest is essentially

his own.

Sociologists of knowledge indeed affirm also that the individual’s interests is not

really his own. But it is not exactly Schopenhauer’s metaphysical/psychological concept

of the Will that constitutes and drives human interests but it is ultimately the dominant

worldview – the total ideology – of the community where the individual finds himself in.

Individuals are trapped within the worldviews of their communities due to the fact that

ideologies, being total in characteristic, have all the answers to all ‘valid’ questions

(Popper, 1966) This enables them to impose themselves in all aspects of life, framing our

perceptions of reality and behaviors in accordance with their dogmatic principles. Thus it

can be radically deduced that everything is determined by total ideologies including

human behavior itself. Instinctive behaviors are either continually conditioned to be

suppressed or amplified by the community depending on what their hegemonic

worldview dictates. This ideological conditioning consequently (transforms) the Will –

the irrational feelings, urges and instincts within our being –into a mere reflection of the

ideology.

This seemingly Orwellian tendencies of total ideologies implies three things, (1)

interest will always be reflective only of the dominant worldview of the community thus

incommensurable, (2) interest being a product of a total ideology cannot be used as a

mechanism for establishing cooperative norms as there is no way of objectively

evaluating it, and (3) interest becomes inherently dominating as it advances the

worldview, leading to the creation and imposition of hegemonic norms and institutions

that will keep it in line with the worldview.

Bosnian Civil War: Rationalism Collapses

If we reexamine the context of the Bosnian War, it can be argued that to conclude

that the conflict along with its horrific genocides is primarily due to political and

economic interests of the involved ethnic groups is inadequate, unreceptive and even

fallacious due to (a) the uncertain logic of parsimonious strategies, and (b) rationalist

presupposition of the nature of human interests.

In the theoretical level, the effort of the rationalist paradigm to improve the

parsimonious explanatory power of its rational-choice approach by incorporating

ideational elements (norms, identity and culture) as variables to be considered

compromises its own parsimony. Moreover the inductive character of the approach gives

false certainty that their hypotheses are always right and cultivates the habit of insisting

that their hypotheses are always right. This leads to the dogmatization of norms that

compromise their very instrumentality as constructive strategies.

In the ontological level, the very root of the rationalist paradigm, the view that

individuals have their own interests that they intend to pursue and optimize has been

disclosed by the notions of irrationality and ideology as a mere presupposition. The

rationalist thesis claims that the civil war and the radicalization of ethnic solidarity have

been brought about by socio-economic factors such as poverty and wealth inequality. But

why individuals of those ethnic groups resort to a bloody war instead of ethnic

cooperation as a means of alleviating these socio-economic ills? Utility-maximization

could be argued but nonetheless it is weak due to the fact that it can also be argued for

ethnic-cooperation depending on how scholars perceive what values worth utilizing and

how these are utilized thus conceptually does not provide clear explanation why war

instead of cooperation. Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005) considered in their analysis the

“ancient hatred” discourse. It argues that the ultimate cause of the civil war is the pursuit

of ethnic domination in an ethnically fragmented region that leads to marginalization,

inequality and feelings of injustice. Ethnic domination highlights the totalizing tendencies

of cultures that create a hostile perception of the differences of others and the irrational

‘necessity’ to keep them at bay. This ultimately hinders dialogue and cooperation, and

leaves war as the only ‘rational’ action to solve their problems.

Thus what brought about the territorial interest of the Serbs, Albanians and

Bosnians is ultimately their pursuit of ethnic domination masked by the romanticism of

solidarity. The feelings of oneness and of belongingness that had been established into

the norms and identities of their cultures compelled their individuality to take and pursue

an interest of territorial gain that had led into a bloody inter-ethnic conflict.

With the loss of individuality and the resignification of cultural norms and

identities in the contemporary global political arena, the dominance of rationalism

collapses.

Metamorphosis of Rationalism

The rationalist paradigm collapses with the resignification of norms and identity

but collapses into what? It is somehow “intuitive” to think that the collapse means

collapse into nothingness – total insignification – but it may also be the case that its

collapse paves into a metamorphosis – disclosure of latent character. This part of the

essay shall discuss the deeper kind of individuality disclosed by Husserl’s renewal of

rationalism in his phenomenological philosophy, and its apparent emergence and gradual

realization through the return of norms in the international political arena.

Husserlian Rationalism

The return of norms challenges the very core principle of rationalism and that is

individualism – the ownness of one’s actions. And the most powerful critics of the

rationalist paradigm in international relations ground their arguments on the susceptibility

of the self to be absorbed by socio-psychological forces beyond its control and its

apprehension. This causes the problem of ownness – how then do we know that we own

our own awareness?

The problem of ownness, in my view, has been decisively settled by Descartes’

discovery of the cogito. His methodological skepticism showed that by questioning the

world we live in we become more aware of our individuality. Total ideologies lose their

totality in our consciousness the moment their ontologies are put into question. The

cogito therefore enables us to transcend from the dominant norms of the community and

to introspect what have we become. However by transcending the structures of the world,

we consequently retreat to a solipsistic consciousness, in which we can be aware of is

only ourselves that leads to the so-called “problem of other minds”. In a solipsistic

consciousness, our interests are then indeed our own. But the price of being our own is

the inability to optimize those interests, as our knowledge is strictly limited only to our

own awareness of our selves. By not being able to definitely understand others and the

world itself, the interests that we are able to construe will be utterly constrained, useless

and directionless. Thus it is necessary to deal also with the problem of other minds.

The problem of other minds has always been a dreaded issue in philosophy and

international politics. Thanks to Descartes, what we can only now be sure of is our own

being. But our interests can only be of use when we are able to understand other human

beings as well. And the only way to do that is to have an intersubjective communication.

The concept of intersubjectivity started as Husserl’s enterprise of renewing a kind of

rationalism free from egoistic solipsism. Intersubjectivity is being able not only to

recognize the existence of other persons but also at the same time being able to

understand what they are experiencing. Husserl’s Fifth Meditation laid down the

operational criteria of intersubjectivity:

(1) Each subject must be self-constituted.

(2) Each subject must be constituted as such in each other subject or it will result will

be a completely monadological universe where communication is impossible.

(3) Each must constitute a world of objectivity, which in some identical with the

world constituted by the others or there will be no common ground for

communication.

(4) The world, which each one constitutes, must be a world comprising one’s self and

others, or else the unity of the world will be destroyed; many conceptions of the

world destroy what the world really is.

The first two are the criteria for realizing intersubjective relationships while the last two

are for maintaining them. Thus the operationalization of these criteria must necessarily be

successive. The first criterion expresses individuality – the awareness of one’s self – as

the primary condition for intersubjectivity because without it then there will be no

subjects to relate with. The second criterion is receptivity, which is the most crucial

criterion for it establishes how we are able to relate with one another.

Husserl is fully aware of the problem of other minds so he set out to disprove it

with these proofs: (a) body, (b) sphere of ownness, (c) association, and (d) empathy. The

first three proofs essentially say that if the other is doing what you, a being with a mind,

are doing like movement and being resilient in difficult times therefore that other has also

a mind. However it is his fourth proof that proves to be the most powerful. Empathy is

what constitutes an intersubjective experience because it is in this intentional act of the

consciousness that we see the other as an image of ourselves. It is a conscious relation of

one’s own experiences to others’ experiences by attributing others’ experiences as if they

are our own. It this analogical apprehension that paves the way for the recognition of

each other as fellow human beings (Ferrarello, 2012)

Having hurdled the problem of other minds, the third criterion can now be

operationalized, which is mutuality. By being able to comprehend one another’s

intentions, we are able to construe interests that will be of value to us and at the same

time to others as well. Our interests if it is to be of any utility must be then in mutual

relation with others’ interests. Intersubjectivity implies not only of the interconnection of

consciousness but also the interdependence of interests. Norms and institutions that are

built by this interdependence will not only act as constructive strategies of our interests

but consequently also as sustaining mechanisms of intersubjective communication that

foster trust and cooperation.

The fourth criterion, which is unity, can be viewed as the internationalization of

intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity because of its emphatic character is inherently

inclusive, reflective and progressive. The cultivation of intersubjective understanding in

the domestic level inevitably expands communal receptiveness into cosmopolitan

awareness. It realizes its fullest actuality as it achieves a cosmopolitan character. And the

complete manifestation of that realization is the establishment of international society

where norms and institutions are (a) receptive of the common needs of humanity, and (b)

proactive in building trust and cooperation.

UN Peace Building in Bosnia: New Rationalism

The kind of rationalism that Husserl developed emerges on the onset of the

collapse of the purely egoistic and simplistic rationalism in the face of rising totalizing

cultures. This then shows that the return of norms and identity in the contemporary global

arena has two faces – a face that expresses irrational radicalization, and a face that

expresses a new form of rationalism based on intersubjective understanding – the latter

signals the metamorphosis of rationalism. One exemplary phenomenal manifestation is

the norm-building organization of the United Nations, more specifically its ongoing

peace-building projects in the war torn Bosnia-Herzegovina region.

The United Nations is continuously exerting the effort of building peace in the

Bosnia-Herzegovina region. Last June 2014, three UN organizations, UNDP, UNICEF

and UNESCO, in cooperation with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina launch a

joint peace-building project, Dialogue for the Future: Promoting Coexistence and

Diversity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which aims to foster (a) spaces for inter-cultural

dialogues, (b) trust building, (c) increase participation, awareness and influence of the

youth in policy dialogues in impacting the region’s development and reform agenda, (d)

ensure that education supports greater social cohesion, and (e) communities advance

common peacebuilding goals through culture. And slowly this norm-building enterprise

is laying the groundwork for a more cooperative perception in the region – and it begins

with the youth. Last April 2015, the first youth conferences in Sarajevo were held. One

hundred and seventeen youth delegates convened and share their constructive ideas that

will help in promoting peace and community development, environmental protection and

gender equality. UN hopes that through the youth of Bosnia-Herzegovina its efforts will

establish norms that will cultivate and sustain cooperative intersubjectivity in the region.

(undp.org, 2014)

Nevertheless the continuous operation of intersubjectivity in the global level

ultimately relies on the constant effort of individuals to consciously direct their selves

into an emphatic awareness of other people if they want to make the most out of their

interests. Therefore the realization of humanity of intersubjective understanding is not

mere utopian naivety but the positive consequence of individual rationality.

Conclusion

The return of norms in the landscape of international politics has put the

epistemological authority of the dominant rationalist paradigm in the field of

international relations in a very uncertain position. The uncertainty of its position stems

from the fact that the challenges posited to it see the individuality of the person as the

very core of the rationalist paradigm and at the same time the source of its problem. They

are partly correct. Individuality is indeed the essence and at the same time problem of

rationalism but it is also where the solution to its problem lies. Awareness of our selves

ultimately leads to our emphatic interconnection with other people. This empathy

cultivates intersubjective understanding and culminates in the establishment of

international norms deeply receptive of the needs of humanity. Therefore the return of

norms signals the collapse of rationalism’s egoistic-materialist character but at the same

time the emergence of its emphatic nature.

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