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ONE

Strengthen the AIPR mechanism for settling disputes.

Build Institutions and Infrastructure which Support Peace/ASEANs political and

security blueprint has recommended the establishment of an ASEAN centre for peaceand reconciliation which could focus upon research about social crises in the region

and provide recommendations for conflict mediation activities and internal

mechanisms

for managing and preventing conflict.

Fifth, to activate/operationalise the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

(AIPR) to generate the necessary information on the roots of this conflict and

potential options for resolution;

The mandate for the establishment of AIPR is stipulated in the action line ASEAN

Political Security Blueprint B.2.2- which would promote research activities on peace,conflict management and conflict resolution in the region.

One of the first tasks for the AIPR could be to document lessons learned in ASEAN

good offices, mediation, facilitation etc. with a view to producing a lessons learned

module. Collaboration between ASEAN and UN on such an exercise could be

considered. The institute could also look beyond research and advisory roles and be

involved in more policy-making and implementation. It should not ambitiously focus

on conflict resolution, but on creating suitable conditions for resolution. One area that

the AIPR can work on conflict management is by promoting socio-economic

development in conflict areas, which are most economically underdeveloped. The

AIPR could initiate s trust fund from ASEAN members and donors that would be

used to direct financing to infrastructure projects. Joint investment promotion,

empowerment of small and medium enterprises, capacity building and development

of centres of excellence in those regions could also be seriously considered.

Focus on research, capacity building, drawing up pool of experts, developing

networks, dissemination of information. Will comprise of think tanks or second-track

institutions across the southeast asia region.

The establishment of the AIPR should be seen as another entry point for engagement

and participation from non-governmental elements in ASEAN mechanisms.

Looking at the evolutionary process which has become a common practice in ASEAN

and also considering the strict adherence to non- interference principles, a first step to

establish a more research-oriented institution is appreciated. It i

TWO

confidence and security building measures (CSBMs).

the recent outbreak of the Sabah conflict and the 2015 deadline for the

establishment of an ASEAN Political-Security Community fast approaching, thesediscussions should take on a renewed sense of urgency and more ambitious

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proposals should be considered. At the heart of these previous discussions, as well

as envisioned future talks, have been confidence and security building measures

(CSBMs).

CSBMs can take a variety of forms. These can range from information sharing

and verification regarding military budgets and unit locations, military baseinspections, invitations for neighbouring countries to observe military exercises and

prior notification of said exercises, and even the designation of demilitarized zones

in sensitive border areas. Many of these measures were pioneered in the 1999

Vienna Document, an agreement integral to the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the current makeup of European security.

Person to person contacts have also emerged as an effective CSBM in a number

of security communities around the world. These can include joint military

exercises, exchanges between national militaries or other administrative bodies, and

frequent meetings or conferences at various levels.

ASEAN already extensively employs person to person contacts as a CSBM. The

ASEAN Summits, East Asian Summits, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

are all forms of high level person to person contacts and can be understood as

CSBMs for the ASEAN members themselves and for partners elsewhere in the

international community with an interest in the affairs of Southeast Asia. But there

are also grassroots elements of these person to person contacts in the region, mostly

chiefly involving sports. The Southeast Asian Games, the ASEAN Para Games, the

ASEAN Football Championship, and even the boxing championship which

Malaysia boycotted in 2013 all constitute person to person contacts that can

contribute to feelings of amity within a region. A number of other CSBMs are also

enumerated in the Blueprint, such as conducting joint research projects on defence

issues and bilateral exchanges between defence institutions in ASEAN member

states.

But, in light of the recent conflict in Sabah and considering the tight timetable

under which ASEAN expects to establish a Political-Security Community, what

might be most needed now in the region is a spectacular breakthrough. If this is

the case, then more ambitious CSBMs than the proposed ASEAN Security Outlook

must be given due consideration by ASEAN member states. Rather than simply

transplanting European regional practices though, there is an opportunity for

ASEAN to adopt measures unique to Southeast Asia that would likely generate agreat degree of amity among actors.

ASEAN could go further than the OSCE or perhaps any other security community

in the world by allowing for bilateral observation. Under such a system, any

member state conducting active military operations near the territory of another

member state would be obliged to invite that other member state to observe the

operations. This departs considerably from the European model of CSBMs in two

important ways. First of all, the principle of force majeure is significantly

compromised, since the invitation is extended in the midst of strife or even war.

Secondly, the state conducting the operations is proactive in issuing the invitation

instead of waiting for neighbouring states to issue requests of their own.

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Having a system already in place that allows for ASEAN and its member states to

resort to desperate measures at desperate times that is to say, the invitation for

interested parties to observe active military operations can avoid this sudden

trend toward enmity and instead generate further amity.

(http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-04/26/content_5908749.htm)

Bilateral meetings especially face to face meetings between leaders are important in

building trust.

Increased ASEAN and UN engagements/initiatives/ dialogue

Increased ASEAN and UN engagements/initiatives/ dialogue

THREE

(refer to the high council)Malaysia and Phillippines can be encourages to seek advice from the High Council

Make the High Council under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the ASEAN

Troika more useful

(http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/rules-

of-procedure-of-the-high-council-of-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-

southeast-asia-2)

The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) was signed in

conjunction with the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord. It is a landmark

agreement as it sets out peaceful settlement of disputes as a fundamental principle of

ASEAN, commits member states to refrain from the threat or use of force and settle

any disputes through friendly negotiations. To address unresolved disputes in the

region, the TAC establishes a High Council comprising ministerial representatives of

all contracting parties. Provided that all parties to the dispute agree to apply the TAC

to their case, the High Councils role is to recommend appropriate means of dispute

settlement to the disputing parties, which could include the High Council offering its

good offices, or constituting a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The

TAC does not preclude recourse to modes of dispute settlement contained in Article

33(1) of the United Nations Charter. Rules of procedure for the High Council wereagreed upon in 2001. (Note: As the TAC has now taken on non-ASEAN signatories,

the 2001 rules of procedure for the High Council state that it shall comprise of

representatives from all ASEAN member states and one representative from only the

non-ASEAN states who are involved in the dispute. See 2001 Rules of Procedure of

the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, rule 3.)

(http://cil.nus.edu.sg/dispute-settlement-in-asean/)

http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-04/26/content_5908749.htmhttp://cil.nus.edu.sg/1976/1976-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-signed-on-24-february-1976-in-bali-indonesia-by-the-heads-of-stategovernment/http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1976/1976-declaration-of-asean-concord-signed-on-24-february-1976-in-bali-indonesia-by-the-heads-of-stategovernment/http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2001/2001-rules-of-procedure-of-the-high-council-of-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-adopted-on-23-july-2001-in-ha-noi-viet-nam-by-the-foreign-ministers/http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2001/2001-rules-of-procedure-of-the-high-council-of-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-adopted-on-23-july-2001-in-ha-noi-viet-nam-by-the-foreign-ministers/http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-04/26/content_5908749.htmhttp://cil.nus.edu.sg/1976/1976-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-signed-on-24-february-1976-in-bali-indonesia-by-the-heads-of-stategovernment/http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1976/1976-declaration-of-asean-concord-signed-on-24-february-1976-in-bali-indonesia-by-the-heads-of-stategovernment/http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2001/2001-rules-of-procedure-of-the-high-council-of-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-adopted-on-23-july-2001-in-ha-noi-viet-nam-by-the-foreign-ministers/http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2001/2001-rules-of-procedure-of-the-high-council-of-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-adopted-on-23-july-2001-in-ha-noi-viet-nam-by-the-foreign-ministers/