COIN OPS Into Practice

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ForewordOffensiveair power

has manystrengthsin modernwarfare,but itsutility incounter-insurgencywarfare is

not

wellunderstood.Manyofairpowerstraditional

strengths,suchasstrategicstrike,havelimited

usein a

counter-insurgencywarfareenvironment. In fact,employingoffensiveair powerin atraditionalmanner

may

evenunderminethe effectsbeingsought.Warfightersandplannersmustunderstand

thefundamentals of

counter-insurgencywarfare inorder toemployoffensiveair powereffectivelywithin its

context.To ignorethese

fundamentals is to place at risk the broader outcome of the campaign.

Thispaperexaminesthe rolesthatoffensiveair powercanconductin supportofcounter-insurgencywarfare

andexaminesthestrengthsandweaknessesof theseroles increating thenecessaryeffect. Thispaperanalyses

theemploymentofairpo

werfromanoperationalpersp

ectiveandbringsoutthepros

andconsofutilising

platforms,sensorsandweaponsto supporta counter-insurgencycampaign.Ultimately,theimpact ofthe air

ower contribution will relate to how well it supports the fundamentals of counter-insurgencyarfare.

Group Captain Tony Forestier

Director, Air Power Development Centre

About the Author

WingCommander GlenBeck iscurrentlytheDeputy

Director-Firepowerin theAerospaceDevelopment

Branch of Capability DevelopmentGroup.WingCommanderBeck is adistinguished graduateof theAustralianDefenceForceAcademy,havinggraduated

in 1990 witha Bachelorof ScienceDegree.Aftergraduatingfrom 158PilotsCourse, hecompletedintroductory

Fast Jettraining at25 andthen 76Squadronsprior tocompletingF-18Hornetoperationalconversionin 1995.

He hascompletedoperationalflying tourswith 3Squadron,77Squadronand 75Squadronas well asinstructing

at No 2 Operational Conversion Unit and No 2 Flying TrainingSchool.

WingCommanderBeck

hasservedas aFlightCommanderandExec

utiveOfficer inHornetoperational

squadrons.Hisoperationaldeploymentexperienceincludestime flyingF18s out ofDiego

Garcia forOperation

Slipper in 2001 as well as flying combat operations over Iraq in 2003 as part of OperationFalconer.

WingCommanderBeckgraduatedfrom theCanadianForces JointCommandand StaffProgram in2007 and

holds a Masters of Defence Studies degree from the Royal Military College, Kingston,Canada.

DisclaimerThis workingpaper was

originallypublished as anA5 booklet inAugust 2008(ISBN9781920800321)and is presentedhere as a re-formattedprinter friendlyversion.

This work iscopyright.Apart fromany use aspermittedunder the

CopyrightAct 1968,no partmay bereproducedby anyprocesswithoutpermissionfrom theublisher.

The viewsexpressedin this workare those ofthe authorand do not

necessarilyreflect theofficialpolicy orposition oftheDepartmentof Defence,the RoyalAustralianAir

Force or theGovernmentofAustralia.Thisdocument isapproved for

publicrelease;distributionunlimited.Portions ofthisdocumentmay bequoted orreproducedwithout

permission, provided a standard source credit is included. Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2008

Offensive Air Power in Counter-Insurgency

Operations:Putting Theory intoPracticeby Wing Commander Glen Beck

Working Paper

26ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE

AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE


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Air Power Development Centre

2 Working Paper26

Abbreviations

CAS Close Air SupportEO Electro-opticalFAS El Salvador Air Force (Fuerza Aerea El Salvador)GPS Global Positioning

SystemIO Information OperationsISR Intelligence, Surveillance and

ReconnaissanceIR Infra-redNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationPGM Precision GuidedMunitionsROE Rules of EngagementSAM Surface-to-Air MissilesSAR Synthetic Aperture RadarUAV Uninhabited [or Unmanned] Aerial VehicleUCAV Uninhabited [or Unmanned] Combat Aerial VehicleUS United States

USAF United States Air Force

Preface

The powerto hurt thesheerunaquisitive,unproductive power todestroythings thatsomebodytreasures, toinflict pain

and grief is a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but usedoften. Thomas C. Shelling

The earlytwenty-firstcentury hasseen aresurgenceininsurgenciesand incounter-insurgencywarfare.Despite

this, mostWesternmilitariesare primarilystructuredto fightconventionalwars.Modernoffensive airpower

with its far-reachingand decisivestrategiceffects iswell suitedtoconventionalwarfare, butthere is alack of

understandingof itscapabilitiesandlimitationswhen appliedto counter-insurgencywarfare.DuringOperation

Iraqi Freedom, air power delivered devastating battlefield effects leading to the swift defeat of Iraqsconventionalforces. When,

however, theenemytransitionedto insurgentwarfare, therewas a limited

understandingof how

air powercould bestcontribute.

This wasevident inthe

actions ofthe US 3rdInfantryDivisionwhoreleased

their airliaisonelementsoonafter the

captureofBaghdad,wronglybelievingthey hadnothingmore tooffer.

Airmenwerealsosent

homeby theUnitedStatesAirForce(USAF)because itwasnot

surehow airpowercould

contributeto thecounter-

insurgencycampaign.Theapplicationofoffensiveair powerneeds tobeexploredand

developed so that it can contribute more effectively to the counter-insurgencycampaign.

This paper

will arguethat it iscrucial tounderstandthoroughlythefundamentalsof counter-insurgencywarfare

beforeemployinglethalforce. Inexaminingthisnotion,this paperwill lookto answerthe

question,How does

the use ofoffensiveair powerbest alignwithcounter-insurgencytheory?

The paperwill

provide aframework

forunderstandinghow offensiveair power canbest beapplied insupport ofcounter-insurgency

operations. It

will show thatanappropriateoffensive airpowerstrategy canonly bedeveloped by

thoroughlyunderstanding

counter-insurgencyfundamentals.Further, it willexamine thestrengths,weaknesses

and risksresident inthe

applicationof each ofthe roles ofoffensive airpower. Thecapabilities

required toundertakethese roleswill be

Edward B. Westermann,The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan 1979, School of AdvancedAirpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 997, p. .

Dr Thomas R. Searle, Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas, Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. , Fall 004, pp.4.

Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman,Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency,Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 005, p. 7.


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3 Working Paper26

assessed andevaluated interms of howwell they arelikely eitherto support or

jeopardisethefundamentalsof

thecounter-insurgencycampaign.

To enable

athoroughanalysisof thetopic, thescope ofthis paperwill be

limited totheemploymentof offensive

air power.While stillimportant inaidingcounter-insurgencycampaigns,

other air powerroles, such asintelligence,

surveillanceandreconnaissance(ISR) and rapidmobility, willnot be

examined.

The Fundamentals of CounterInsurgency Warfare

Know thyenemyandknow

yourself;in ahundredbattles,

you willnever bedefeated. When

you areignorantof the

enemybutknow

yourself, yourchancesofwinningorlosingareequal. Ifignorantboth of

yourenemyand of

yourself,

you are sure to be defeated in everybattle.

4

SunTzu

Detailedknowledgeof ones

enemyhasalwaysbeen ofcriticalimportance inwarfare. Incounter-insurgency

warfare itis even

morecrucial, asthe enemyis notrelying onovert forceto achievevictory.Counter-insurgency

wars by

their verynature arenot definedby a seriesof shortbattles;they tend tobecomplicatedaffairswhich

play out overmany years.Only when theunderlyingnature of theconflict isunderstoodand acorresponding

5

strategy developed can any analysis of the potential contribution of offensive air power beassessed.

Types of Insurgencies

Counter-insurgencyis notsimply onegenericform ofwarfare.

Everyinsurgencyis different,and thebest way to

defeat aspecific onewill dependupon itscharacteristics.Insurgency can

generally bedefined as astrugglebetween

a non-rulinggroup andthe rulingauthoritieswhere the

non-rulinggroupdeliberatelyuses acombinationof

politics andviolence tofurther itscause. To

analysethis inmoredetail, it isbeneficialtounderstandthe nature

ofinsurgencyin terms of

ends andmeans.Specifically,what arethe politicalends thattheinsurgentsare fighting

for, and by what means are they trying to achieve thesegoals?

There arefour broadareas thatdefinewhatinsurgentsfight for.

These areideologicalmotivators,nationalism,

ethnic nationalism and religion. Terrorism is a unique grouping that will be looked atseparately.

7

Ideological-basedinsurgencies were acommonoccurrenceduring thepostWorldWar II

period,where the

battle forinfluencebetween thesuperpowersled to themsupportingregionalinsurgencies.

Generally,the goal

ofideologicalinsurgentsis entirelypolitical.

Their aimis to

imposetheirideologiesonto thebroaderpopulace.

Examplesincludethecommunistinsurgen

cies incountriessuch asElSalvadorandMalaya,and theanti-

Marxistinsurgencyof theContras inNicaragua.

These typesofinsurgenciesare notalwayseasilyresolved as

there areoftenstrongexternal

influencesinvolved.

Theultimateoutcomewillusuallyrest withthesupport of

the generalpopulaceand the

ability ofthegovernmentto controlthe entirecountry.

Theoutcome islikely to

be moreprotracted

and lesspredictablewhen aninsurgentgroup iswellfunded andresourcedexternally,or can

gain sanctuary and support in a part of country that the national government cannot

influence.Nationalistinsurgenciesare fuelledby thedesire torestore self-determinationand self-rulefor a nationor

peoplesthat aregovernedexternally.

This wastypical ofthe manyanti-colonial

conflictsthroughoutthe Middle

East andAfricaduring the1920s to1950s.ExamplesincludeRhodesia

(modernZimbabwe), Angola,Algeria

andMozambique.

Theseinsurgenciesare generallywellsupported by

the populaceandthereforethey arelikely

to be successful.

4 Sun Tzu,The Art of War,edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, 97, p. .

5

JamesS.Corum,TheAirCamp

aignof thePresentandFutureUsingAirpowerAgainstInsurg

entsand

TerroristsinAllanD.English

(ed.),Air Campaigns in the New World Order, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Winnipeg,005, p. .

Bard E. ONeill,Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare,Brasseys Inc, Dulles VA, 990, p. .

7 Corum, The Air Campaign of the Present and Future, p. 7.


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Working Paper26

Ethnicnationalistinsurgenciesoften resultwhenminority

ethnicgroups findthemselvesunder-representedor

disempowered.This may bedue to thenature of thepolitical

constructwithin thecountry,deliberateoppression

from therulingregime,or a

legacyof thecolonialera thatleftdifferentculturalandethnicgroupsvying

for

power.Modernexamples

exist inmanyregions ofthe world,includingSri Lanka(Tamil

Tigers),Chechnya,and

theBasqueregion inSpain.

Theseconflictsare alsooftenprotractedanddifficult topredict.Again, the

long-

termoutcomewillusuallycomedown tothesupportof thepopulacemorethan the

specificpoliticalgoals of

theinsurgents.Religionhasproved tobe aunifyingmotivatorfor manyIslamicinsurgent

groups,such asHezbollah,Islamic

Jihad andHamas.Althoughit is notusuallythe solereason forfighting, it

can be amotivatingandunifying

characteristicamongotherwisedisparategroups withvarious goalsand beliefs.

The varietyof Islamicgroups that

fundamentally oppose Israels right to exist provide a good example of this unifyingeffect.Manyinsurgenciesdo not fallneatly into asingle

category. There maybe one ormoresources ofmotivation

behind eachinsurgency.Forexample,theAlgerianswho foughtagainstFrance weremotivatedby acombination

ofnationalismand religion,while mostof theAfricaninsurgenciesweremotivatedbynationalismand Marxist

eology. These diverse sources of insurgent motivation complicate the counter-insurgencympaign.

Terrorism

Terrorism isa moredifficultphenomenonto quantifywithin thespectrum ofinsurgencies.It has been

asserted

thatterrorismis in fact atool ofwarfarewhichmay beemployed

byinsurgentsto achievetheirgoals. Inthis

9

regard it isbeing usedto describe amethod asopposed to acause ororganisation.

Terrorismhas becomean

emotiveterm inthemodernera, withinsurgent

groupsoftenbeinglabelledterroristsbecauseof themethods

theyemploy.

This isevidentwith

groupssuch asthe Tamil

Tigers andChechens.Althoughboth areinherently

politicalorganisationsfightingethnic

minoritycounter-insurgencies,they areconsideredterroristorganisations

by the SriLankan andRussian

Governments.When tryingto understandthefundamentalnature ofinsurgent

groups it isimportant

tounderstandthedistinctionbetweenthemotivationsof thegroup andthemethods

they

employ.

As distinctfromterrorism asa method, itis becominguniversallyaccepted todescribestatelessideologically-

basedgroups,suchas AlQaeda, asterroristorgan

isations.

Thesegroups donotfitintotraditionalinsur

gent

profilesas theyare notfightingfor aparticularethnicgroup ora

definitiveend-state.Looselyspeaking,they can

be thoughtof as aninsurgencyagainst theWest,where theirgoals aresimply toundermineWesternhegemony,

influenceandculturethroughacts ofterrorism.

The lackof adefinedobjectivemakes itdifficult toadopt a

0

coherent strategy with which to combat them.

The lack ofameaningfulend-state

means it isunlikelythatstatelessterroristgroups willbecompletelyeliminated.

A morerealisticgoal is to

reducetheircapability andsupportto a levelwhichprohibitsregularlarge-scale

attacks.

Ineffect,

thismeanstryingtoreducetheviolenceto alevelwhere ithas

minimaleffect.Such agoalmay notbe

easy to

acceptpoliticallybecause itis notdefinitive,but in theshortterm itwouldappearunrealistic

to set the

objective toeliminatethe threatcompletely.A recentstudy intoUSresponsestoterrorismfound that,

counter

terroristmilitaryattacksagainstelusiveterrorists mayserveonly toradicali

zelargesectorsof the(Muslim)

population and damage the U.S. image worldwide.

ibid.

9 ONeill,Insurgency & Terrorism, p. 7.


Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman,Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency,Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 005, p. 5.


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5 Working Paper26

The Hearts and Minds Campaign

Themethodsofinsurgencyare basedon theinsurgentleadersawarenessthat theyare unabletooverthrowthe

government,eitherpolitically orthrough theuse of directforce. Thisdrives themto useinsurgentwarfare to

achievetheirpoliticalgoals. Themethodsofinsurgencyinvolveerodingthestrength,will orlegitimacyof the

government

over a longperiod oftime. Theinsurgentsmilitaryobjective isto destroygraduallytheincumbent

governmentsmanpowerandequipment,thusreinforcingthegovernmentsinability tocontrol thesituation.

The aim isfor thegovernmentand thepeople togrow wearyof thestrugglethus forcingafavourablenegotiated

settlement fortheinsurgents.

Theinsurgencywar is widelyacknowledgedto be ahearts and

mindscampaign,

aconceptarticulatedbyLieutenantGen

eralSirGeral

dTe

plarwhe

nconduc

counter-insurgency;Theshootingside ofthebusiness is

onlytwenty-fivepercent ofthetrouble.

The other

seventy-five percent is getting the people of this country behindus.

The conceptof Centre ofGravityis onethat can behelpful in

understandingthe nature ofthe counter-insurgency

campaign.The Centreof Gravity isessentially

the heart oftheproblem,the sourcefrom whichallprotagonists

derivemotivation,fundament

alstrength,and thewill tofight. TheCentre ofGravity forcounter-insurgency

4

operationsrevolves

around thehearts andmindscampaign.For theinsurgents,the Centreof Gravitywill be the

support for

their causefrom thepopulation.Withoutthispopularsupporttheinsurgentsbecomeisolated

and

unable toachievetheirpoliticalgoals. Theincumbentgovernmentalso relieson thesupport ofthese

people, but

the Centreof Gravityis slightlydifferent.UScounter-insurgencytheoristMaxMainwaring

put it bestwhen

he describedthis Centreof Gravity asbeing thecredibility oftheincumbentgovernment.Understanding

5

theseCentres ofGravityprovidesan

insightintohowtherespectivecampaignsarelikely

tobeconducted.

Fundamentally,both sides willbe battling forthe hearts andminds of thepopulation.More

specifically,each side

will betrying toattack theiropponentsCentre ofGravity

whileprotectingtheir own.

Thegovernmentwill be

trying toreduce supportfor theinsurgentswhileimproving theirown legitimacy.Simultaneously, the insurgents

will be trying to rally support for their cause while attacking the credibility of thegovernment.Inrallying

supportfortheircause,theinsurgents areessentiallyconducting

whatWesternmilitaries referto

as an

InformationOperations(IO)campaign.Whether itisespousingpoliticalideologiessuch asMarxism,

orreligiousideologiessuchasIslamicfundamentalism,

thecentraltenetis

toconvincetheg

eneralpop

to embracethe cause.

Themethodsused toachievethese goalsmay rangefrom acharismatic

approach,where

aleader

aybuildideasandsupportarou

ndtheirindiv

idualpopula

rity,toa

strategyrevolvesaroundprovidingsupport tothe public inareas wheregovernmental

action isdeficient. Agood

example ofsuch anoperationwasHezbollahsprovisionof food,

shelter andother aidto thevictims ofIsraeli

attacks inLebanonduring2006.Hezbollahssocial

serviceswing wasable tospendUS$500000 perdayhelping

approximately 155 000 people who had been displaced during thefighting.

7

Operationsby the

Taliban inAfghanistan usemore thanoneapproachto buildsupport.

Theideological

foundationsof theircause arestronglypromoted,but the

Talibanalso try toprovidesecurityandstability tothe

localpopulace.In thisway evenpeoplewho donotsupportthe strictreligiousandideologicalprinciplesof the

Taliban areattracted bythe prospectof living in amore secureenvironment,making themmoresympatheticto

the Talibans cause.

ONeill,Insurgency & Terrorism, p.70.Dr Rod Thornton,Historical Origins of the British Armys Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism Techniques,Geneva Centre for the

Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 00, p. 9.

4 Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0 Joint Planning (Provisional),Department of Defence,Canberra, 00, p. -.

5 Thomas Keaney, Air Campaigns: Current Practice and Future Trends in Allan D. English (ed.),Air Campaigns in the New World Order,Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Winnipeg, 005, p. .

Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication .Information Operations,Department of Defence, Canberra,00 .

7

NGO

Watch,HezbollahReliefCentres WellRun:UN:$500000U.S.Spent

DailyonFood,Shelter,August 00;http://www.

ngowatch.org/articles.php?id=404; accessed 5 February 007.


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7 Working Paper26

ofprogressis difficulttoquantify,and often

there is nodefinitivevictory.

Therefore,from theoutset,Western

governmentsinvolved incounter-insurgencycampaigns

must do allthey can tomaintaintheir ownpublics

support.

The Role of the Media

In moderndemocraciesthe mediamakes thetask ofmaintainingsupport for alongcounter-insurgencycampaign

difficult.Themediasfundamentalinterestis tosellnews;therefor

e, itwillnaturallygravitatetowardsstories

which areprovocativeor createdebate andinterest.Over a longcampaign,wherenational

interestmay not be

clearandwhereprogressisdifficulttoquantify,

themedia islikely toquestionthedecisiontoprovideexternal

support.Success in acounter-insurgencycampaign isdifficult todefine,

measure anddemonstrate.Conversely,

the cost indollars,equipmentand lives isclearlyvisible. The

combinationof these twofactorsresults inincreased

media criticism of the campaign, putting pressure on the external governments Centre ofGravity.

Whenstories onredev

elopmentandrebuildingsuccessesareavailable,they

willoftennotbegivenmuch

coverageas theydo not

readilyqualifyas eithercaptivating orcontroversialnews. Ontheotherhand,

any

negativeeffect

resultingfrommilitaryoperations,such asinadvertentdamage tobuildingsor civilians(defined

as collateral

damage),incorrecttargeting, orevenincidents ofinappropriatebehaviour,will receivewidecoverage

in themedia. Thisis clearlyevidentfrom theCanadianmediacoverage ofAfghanistan.A studydone by the

CanadianJournalismFoundationshows thatthemajority ofCanadiansbelievethat thecombat

elementsare

morereadilyreportedthanthereconstruct

ionelementsbecausetheyaremoreexciting.When

themedia

portrayssensationalevents theresultingimagesmay havea profoundaffect on

thesupport forthecampaign.

This was welldemonstratedin Somaliawhere thefootage of USairmen beingdragged

through thestreets of

Mogadishu has been widely acknowledged as the catalyst which ultimately ended theoperation.The externalgovernmentand itsmilitary need

to be awareof thesemediarealities.Regardless ofthegovernments

ability tomitig

atethesituationthroughpublicrelationsstrategies,

thefundamentalnature ofthemedia will

remain.This

meansthat for alongcounter-insurgencycampaign,maintaining publicsupportwill bedifficult. It

also

highlightsthat incounter-insurgencywarfaremistakesor errors,regardlessof whetherthey areintentional

or not, will have a direct negative impact on the external governments Centre ofGravity.

Public Support The Pressure to Respond

Whilstpublicsupportforprotractedcounter-insurgencywarfare is

difficultbutfundamentallyimportantto

maintain,governments canalso beunderpressurefrom the

publicand themedia todosomething. This

4

is where airpower couldbe seen bygovernments as anattractive

option.Superficially,air powerprovides a

relatively low-risk,high-visibility

responseoption.Anexampleof sucharesponseoccurredduringthe2006

conflictbetweenHezbollahand Israel.

After thekidnappingof Israelisoldiers, theGovernmentand the new

PrimeMinisterwere

underpressuretorespond.

The initialactionwas anaircampaignto stopHezbollah

rockets

frombeinglaunchedagainstIsrael.

TheIsraeliAirForceflewover8700sorti

esandstruckmorethan600

targets.Despitehitting 90rocketlaunchersandtargetingleadershipandresupplyroutes,the air

campaignwas

ultimatelyunsuccessful.Groundforces alsoentered intothe conflictas itdeveloped,with limitedsuccess at

5

best.Theend-statewhereinHezb

ollahwasstillabletolaunchrocketattacks

onIsraelanditsonceflagging

support among the populace had been renewed was undeniable.

Air poweralsoprovidedthe initialresponseto theSeptember

11 attackson theUnitedStates.Withinweeks

of theattacks, USbombersaided byNorthernAlliance

forces anda smallnumber ofSpecialForceswere

David Gates, Airpower: The Instrument of Choice? in Peter W. Gray(ed.),

Air Power 21: Challenges for the NewCentury

, The StationeryOffice,London, 000, p. 4.

CanadianJournalismFederation,CanadiansAssess the

CanadianMedia anditsCoverage oftheAfghanistanMission,December00;

http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/December00/0/c459.html; accessed 5 January 007.Clarke, Airpower and Military Intervention, p. 0.

4 ibid.

5 Robert S. Dudney, Editorial: The Air War Over Hezbollah,Air Force Magazine, Vol. 9, No. 9, September 00, p. .


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8 Working Paper26

targeting AlQaeda and

Talibanfighters inAfghanistan.

The effects

achievedwerefavourablewith the

Taliban

regimebeingremovedfrompower.

Despitethis initialoperationalsuccess,US andCoalitionforces arestill in

Afghanistanwith noevidence ofa near-term

victory insight. Thelesson forpoliticiansandplanners isthat even

if the initialresponsefrom air

powermight beeffectivefrom apublicopinionperspective,it is unlikelythat air

power alone can achieve any long-term success.

For anexternalgovernment,theCentreofGravitysupport

fromthehomepopulationisvulnerable ina

numberof areas.

Thelength ofthecampaignmakesensuringlong-termsupport

difficult,progressis difficultto

define andmeasure,andconsequentlythe media islikely tofocus on thenegative.Paradoxically

however,there

may bepublicandmediapressurefor somesort ofinitial

militaryresponse.Thetensionwhichexistsbetweenthe

immediatepressure todosomethingand thechallengeof

maintaininglong-termpublicsupport isdifficult to

reconcile forcounter-insurgencyconflicts.Externalgovernments

mustunderstandthis beforecommittingforces

in supportof acounter-insurgencycampaign.

Likewise,militaryplannersmust alsobe awareof thesefactors

when designing their campaignstrategy.

Developing Effective Strateg y

Theanalysisofthefundamentalsof

insurgencieshighlightssomegeneral

principleswhichmaybeapplied

todevelopinganeffectivecounter-insurgencystrategy. Ithas beendemonstrated thatincounter-insurgency

operations,there areoften threedistinctparticipantsthe insurgentgroup orgroups, theincumbentgovernment

or power,and in somecasesexternalsupportingpowers.Effectivestrategydevelopmentwill thereforebe reliant

on a thoroughunderstandingof each ofthese parties.

The heartsand mindscampaign willalso be criticalas it is

of centralimportance toall sides. Anunderstandingof these keycomponentsand how theyinterplay willbe the

foundation of any effective counter-insurgency strategy.

Understanding the Enemy

Understandingan insurgency

should not bethought of instrictlymilitary termsof knowingthe enemysorder of

battle, tactics

and numbers.Anunderstandingof thefundamentalnature of theinsurgency isrequired.

Thorough

knowledge ofanadversarysmachinations,motivations,methods,goals,strengths andweaknesseswill be key

ultimatelytodeterminingan effectivecounter-insurgentstrategy.Althoughfour broadcategories

from which

insurgenciesaregeneratedhave beenidentified,aninsurgencycan alsoinvolve a

mixture ofgroups withdifferent

motivations.A goodexample ofthepotentialcomplexitiesinvolved isthe

insurgencysituationpresent inIraq.

The maininsurgentgroupsinvolvedare theSunniswho

want toregaintheirpoliticalpowerbase, theShiites

who aftermanyyears ofoppressionwant toensure

theymaintainpower,and theKurds whowant someform of

long-termregionalautonomy.Withinthese

groups aremanysubgroupsandfactionswhich aredriven bydifferent

combinationsof factors.Complicatingthe situation

further arethe regionalandinternationalinfluences ofIran,

SyriaandSaudi

Arabia,and theotherGulfStateshaveinterestsbased onpolitical,securityand

religiousagendas.

Clearly, such acomplexinterdependentsystem cannotbe neatlythrown into asingle categoryto which asimple

solutionapplies. Adetailedunderstandingof themotivations,methods andinteractions ofthe groupsinvolved is

requiredbefore ameaningfulstrategycan bedeveloped.Althoughthestrategicend-statemay bereadilyidentifiable

in each case,the ways andmeans ofachieving itcan only bedeterminedthrough acompleteunderstandingof the

insurgent environment.

Understanding Incumbent and SupportingNationsA thoroughunderstandingof theinsurgentenvironment

will alsorequire ananalysis oftheincumbentand

supportinggovernments.

Thevulnerabilities

, strengthsandweaknessesof theincumbentgovernmentmust be

clearlyunderstood.

The risks totheincumbent

governmentofemployingforce atvariouslevelsacross abroad

range ofenvironments

need to beknown. Thisknowledgewill enablethe strategyto be built ontheincumbent

governments strengths, while protecting its

weaknesses.

Similarly thecapabilities,limitations

andvulnerabilities of anyexternalsupportingnation needto beanalysed and

understoodso that acoherentstrategy

can bedeveloped.As counter-insurgencycampaignsaregenerallylong-

termendeavours,the broad

spectrumapproachinvolvingmilitary andnon-militarymeansneeds to becarefully


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9 Working Paper26

coordinated.Militarykineticactionsmustproduce

effectswhichultimatelycontributepositively tothiscoordinated

strategy.Thesupportingnationsintent andlevel of

commitmentwill providean indicatorfor howresilient itwill be

to poorlyappliedforce, loss ofmen and

materiel,andprogresswhich isdifficult toquantify.Realisticexpectations

can then bepromoted sothat

politiciansand thepublic alikecan betterunderstandthecommitmentthat will

be involved.Mostimportantly, athoroughanalysis andunderstandingenables anacceptablelevel of risk tobe

determinedbalancing theneed toachievemilitaryobjectivesagainst therisks ofdestabilisingthe long-term

strategy.

The Importance of the Hearts and Minds Factor

The heartsand mindsaspect ofthecampaign iscentrallyimportant to

allparticipatinggroups andit istherefore

essential thatit becomesthe focal pointof strategydevelopment.Understanding

the hearts andmindscomponent

is acomplextask withmanyfactors that

need to beconsidered.One of themostimportantfactors inensuring

success isthelegitimacyand

effectivenessof theincumbentgovernment.

This factoralso hasimplicationsfor

externalgovernmentssupporting

thecampaign. Ifthe externalgovernmentsupport isexcessive orisolates the

incumbentgovernment

it is likely todo long-termharm. Theexternalsupport caninadvertently reinforceto the

local

populacethat theirgovernmentisineffective.

Therefore,anystrategythat isemployedmust be

undertaken

as much aspossiblewith theinvolvementof theincumbentgovernmentso that theircompetenceisreinforced.

Thestrategyforwinningheartsandminds willoften benon-military in

focus.Manyotheroperationsproviding

improvementsto the qualityof life of thelocalpopulation willbe necessary.Militarysupport willbe focused on

providing thesecureconditionsrequired fortheseimprovementsto occur.Military and

non-militaryoperations

needtobewellcoordinated

andpartof acommonstrategy.

Themilitaryalso

needs tobecognitiveofthe

potentialtoundermine thebroaderstrategythroughthemisapplicationof force.

To bemosteffective, force

applicationneeds to becarefullycoordinatedwith aneffective IOstrategy.

This servesto counteranyinsurgent

IOcampaignand canalsomitigatethe impactof militaryoperationson thelocalpopulation.Locals arelikely to

be moresupportiveof both theirowngovernmentandsupportingforces iftheyunderstandwhy force isbeing

used and if it isbeing usedwithdiscriminationandproportionality.Aggressivelypursuingmilitaryobjectives

without understanding the possible impact on local support may be fatal to thecampaign.

The analysisof insurgencyfundamentalsleads to threemainprincipleswhich needto beconsideredby militaries

whenemployingforceduring acounter-insurgencycampaign.Firstly, theincumbent

government mustbe

involved tothe greatestextentpossible inorder tohighlight itscompetenceand

legitimacyto its ownpeople.

Secondly,any use offorceneeds tobeunderstoodin terms of

itspotentialstrategiceffects onthecampaign.

Theseeffects canbemitigatedby aneffective

and well-coordinatedIOcampaign.Finally, andmostimportantly

for offensive air power, when force is required the minimum force possible should be used.

The Application of Air Power in CounterInsurgencyWarfareAir powerhas a role toplay inmoderncounter-insurgencywarfare, butit is differentto its role inconventional

warfare.During theKosovo aircampaign of1999 and inthe conductof theconventionalphases ofboth recent

Iraq

wars,muchwasmadeofairpowers

abilitytocontributetoaswiftand

decisivevictory.

Thetraditional

functionsof airpowerhittingcriticaltargetsdeepbehindtheenemyslines,destroyingcommandandcontrol

functionality, andimpedingtheenemysability todeploy andsustain hisforceswereall evidentin these

campaigns.Thesefunctions,which giveair powermuch of its

potency,are not asrelevant incounter-insurgency

campaigns,wheremany of airpowersgreatest

strengthscannot beemployed.In fact,some ofthetraditional

functions of airpower can becounterproductive.

Thus there is a

need to examinewhat air power canand cannot

do incounter-insurgencywarfare.

Tomaximise

itseffectiveness incounter-insurgencywarfare,airpowers

capabilities and limitations must be determined and clearly understood.

Major Kenneth Beebe, The Air Forces Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency, Air and Space PowerJournal,Vol. XX, No. , Spring 00, p. 9.


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10 Working Paper26

Support and Supplementation of Incumbent Forces

The analysisof thefundamentalsofinsurgencieshasdeterminedthat one ofthe bestways of usingair power

is to providelow-profilelong-termassistance totheincumbentgovernmentsair force. Thiscomplementsthe

incumbentgovernmentsown force inthe shortterm with theaim ofoptimising itscounter-insurgencywarfare

capability

. Theassistance alsoallowstheincumbentgovernment todevelopits ownindependentcounter-

insurgencycapability overthe longerterm.Thesupplementationanddevelopment ofthe incumbentgovernments

air poweraligns wellwithcounter-insurgencywarfaretheory.Importantly,theincumbentgovernmentwill be

seenastakingtheleadintheoper

ation.Thiswillreinforcetothepeoplethatthegovernmentiscapableof

handlingthesituationandprovidingsecurityfor thepopulation,

thusworking insupport ofits Centreof Gravity.

Thegovernmentthat is

providingtheexternalsupportals

obenefitsfromusingthisapproach.Byproviding

support forthecampaign,thepressure onthe external

governmentto dosomethingis relieved.Additionally, by

providingsuch arelativelylow-riskcommitment,

the externalgovernmentis more likelyto be able tomaintain

itspublicssupportover the

longterm.Thisapproachultimately allowsthe finelineinvolvingpublicsupport

to

be negotiated with more confidence.

The USinterventio

n in ElSalvadorin the1980sdemonstrates theeffectiveprovisionofcounter-insurgency

support

usingoffensiveairpower.TheUSprovidedequipmentin theform ofaircraft,such as

the A-37Dragonfly,

andpersonnel toprovidetraining andmilitaryadvice. Eventhough itwas a majorcommitmentfrom the US

7

in termsoffunding,resourcesandforeignpolicyeffort,only asmall

numberof USpersonnelweredeployed.

Theinsurgencywaspowerfuland thecampaignwas foughtover manyyears, but

by notbeingdirectlyinvolved

the US was able to maintain the long-term support it needed. The El Salvador Air Force (FAS

Fuerza AereaElSalvador

)became credible and effective with a genuine counter-insurgency capability. The aircampaigncontributed

considerablyto thesuccess ofthe counter-insurgency

campaignthatconcludedwith thesigning of

9

a peaceaccord in1992. Thesupportprovided tothe FAS bythe UScontributedsignificantly to thissuccess.

0

Despitethesucces

s ofsuchsupportoperationsovertheyears,the UShasonly

periodicallyundertakenthis

role.Recognising

the value ofsuch acapability,the USAFhasexpandedits rolesince 2001and it iscontinuing

to grow.

Therecognitionof thevalue of asupportingstrategy isnowreflected inthe UScounter-insurgency

doctrine manual,Military Operations in Low IntensityConflicts

, which states that, US policy recognizesthatindirect,

rather thandirect,applications of USmilitarypower arethe mostappropriateand cost

effectiveways

to achieve nationalgoals.Althoughindirectsupport ofair powercapabilityhas manybenefitsin

counter-insurgencywarfare, itis not

alwaysviable. Theincumbentgovernmentand itsmilitaryforces musthave aminimumlevel ofcompetenceand

infrastructurefor suchexternalassistance tobe absorbed;such anapproach inthe currentenvironmentsin Iraq

and Afghanistan isimpossible.When theincumbentgovernment

has asuitablelevel ofcapability,supportingoperationsshould beconducted

in someform.

Theseoperationssatisfymany oftheprinciplesof counter-insurgencywarfare byenhancingthe

incumbent

governmentsCentre ofGravity whilesimultaneously protectingthe supportinggovernmentsCentre

of Gravity.Actingthrough theincumbentgovernmentreinforcesitscompetencyto its peopleand alsodevelops

its self-sufficiency.Self-sufficiencyhelps theexternalsupportinggovernmentby reducingthe amount

of time

it needs toremainengaged.Additionally,by providingrelativelylow-cost andlow-risksupport it is

more likely

7 Captain Vance C. Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict,Airpower Journal, Vol. V, No. , Spring 99, pp.77.

Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill and Karl P. Mueller,Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The StrategicImportance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions, RAND, Santa Monica CA, 00, p. 7.

9 James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson,Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence

KS, 00, p. .0 ibid, p. 9.

Vick et al,Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era,p. 7.

Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 7.


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11 Working Paper26

theexternalgovern

mentwillavoidpublicpressureto

withdrawfromthecampaign.

This

allowstheexternal

governmentto providethe long-termcommitment

that isnecessaryfor successin counter-insurgencywarfare.

Strategic Bombing

Strategic

bombinghas beenone of thefundamentalaspects ofair powertheoryalmost sincetheinvention ofthe

aeroplane.Air powertheoristsandpractitionershave longargued thatair powersgreateststrength isits ability

to attackdirectlyanenemysstrategicCentre ofGravity.

This isproblematic in

counter-insurgencywarfare

4

where theCentre ofGravityrevolvesaround thepopularsupport andlegitimacy ofthe

incumbentgovernment.

Thesociopolitical nature ofthisstrategicCentre ofGravity doesnot provide

a neat set ofkinetictargetswhich

air powercan attackeffectively.Strategicattacktheory asdescribed

byWardensRingsmodelpromotesthe use

of air powerto strikedirectly atthe enemyleadershipscommand

and controlnetwork aswell as theirwill to

fight. Thisis difficultin counter-insurgencywarfare for

tworeasons.Firstly, theenemyleadershipareunlikely

5

to operatewith ahigh-fidelity,

high-technologycentralisedcommandandcontrolsystem.

They aremore likely

to use adecentralisedcommand

structureincorporatinga low-technologyandredundantcontrolsystemmaking

it difficultfor air

power toattackphysically.Even if thecommandand controlsystem issuccessfully attacked,

the

insurgentsability tooperate isunlikely tobeundermined.

The secondreason themodel doesnot apply is

that theinsurgentsaremotivated tofight bydifferentreasonsthancombatantsinconventional

warfare.Their

end-staterequiresapoliticalsolution;therefore, theirwill to

resist isunlikelyto beaffectedthroughmilitary

action alone.

Despite itsobviouslimitationsin counter-insurgencywarfare,the use ofstrategic

bombingagainstinsurgents

hashistoricallybeenchampionedby air powertheorists andpractitioners.

The aim ofthesebombingcampaigns

has beentounderminesupport fortheinsurgentsthroughpunitive orcoercivebombing oftheirsupporters.

The

BritishandFrenchfrequentlyemployedthistechniqueduring theinter-warperiod inanattempttomaintain

control oftheircolonialempires. Intheatressuch asSomaliland,Aden,Mesopotamia,KurdistanandPalestine,

7

theBritishstrategicbombingfailed toachievedecisiveeffects.

Theenemywouldquicklyadapt tothesituation

and wouldcontinue tofight on.During the RifWar, theFrench andSpanish foundthat heavybombardment

of townsand citiessupportingthe rebelsdid notaffect theirwill toresist. Infact,against adeterminedenemy

fightingfor anationalcause,coercivebombingactually wasfoundtostrengthen anenemys willtoresist.

9

In themodernera, theSovietstried tobomb theMujahideeninAfghanistanintosubmission.

Theytargeted

sympatheticvillages andother areasin order todepopulatethem.Althoughthere weretens ofthousandsof

casualtiesand manyAfghanswere drivenintoPakistan, theMujahideensmorale andlevel ofsupport wasnot

severely affected.40

For agovernmentprovidingexternal

support toa counter-insurgencycampaign,strategicbombingwould

seem anattractiveoption. Itsatisfies the

requirementto dosomethingby providinga quick andhigh-visibility

response. Itis also a low-risk

commitmentwithrelativelylow costsinvolved andminimumexposure toloss of

life orequipment.

Thesefactorsmakestrategicbombing apopularchoice withpoliticians.Similarly,thestrategic

nature of

air poweralso islikely toresonatewithairmenand airplanners,where ithasdominated

both airforce

thinkinganddoctrine.Despitethis,historicalevidencedoes notsupportstrategicbombing

as aneffectivetool

4

Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Buckham, Strategic Bombing: What is it, and is it Still Relevant? in Stuart Peach (ed.),Perspectives onAirpower: Airpower in its Wider Context, The Stationery Office, London, 99, pp. 90.

4 Clayton K.S. Chun,Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century: A Basic Primer,United States Air Force Academy in cooperation withAir University Press, Colorado Springs CO, 00, p. .

5 John A. Warden III,The Air Campaign, Excel, New York, 99, p. 4.

Dr Thomas R. Searle, Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas,Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. , Fall 004, p. 5.


ibid.9 Corum and Johnson,Airpower in Small Wars, p. 4.

40ibid, p. 9.

4 Dennis M. Drew, U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion,The Journal of Military History,


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12 Working Paper26

againstinsurgents.Whilearespons

e mayachievetheshort-termpoliticalaim ofa high-visibility low-risk

4

response,withoutaconcerted long-

term fullspectrumapproach, it isunlikelyto haveanyenduringsuccess.

As partof abroaderstrategy,

the useofstrategicbombinghasmanyrisks.Even ifnot usedovertlyfor

punitive

purposes,strategictargeting of

infrastructurecan make theperpetratorsappear likeheavy-handedbullies. This

may generatesympathy forthe insurgentcause, whilesimultaneously underminingtheaggressorssupport both

at homeand withinthe theatreofoperations.For anycounter-insurgencycampaign,theseeffectsmay prove

at

best detrimental, or at worstdisastrous.

Interdiction

The aim ofinterdiction isto disrupt theenemy beforehe engagesyou by hittinghis

concentrationsof force and

materiel, anddisrupting hislines ofcommunication.Insurgentsfaced with

superiorfirepower willgenerally

4

adaptbyavoidingovert

concentrationsofforce.

Theywilltendtomeltaway

intothelocalpopulacewhen

threatened,creatingchallengesin

prosecutingthem.Dependingupon how itis applied,interdictioncan have

44

both positive and negative effects on the larger counter-insurgencycampaign.

Theeffectiveness

ofinterdictionwill varywithin eachtheatredependingon manyfactors,including thetype of

insurgency

and thesuitability ofthe operatingenvironment.Factors suchas theweather,terrain andweapons

available canmarkedlyinfluence theeffectivenessof aninterdictioncampaign.

The junglesof Vietnamand the

mountainsofAfghanistanhaveprovidedprotectionforinsurgentforces andrestricted

the abilityof air powerto

interdictoperations.When airpower isapplied insuitableconditionsand with anunderstanding

of thecounter-

insurgencyfundamentals,interdiction can beveryeffective.

The

advantages andrisks ofusinginterdiction in

counter-insurgency campaigns are analysed below.

Interdiction AdvantagesTheabilityto

conductinterdictionwithin atheatreofoperationsprovidessignificant

advantages,bothdirect

andindirect. Air

power hasthe abilityto coverlargedistancesquickly andcan havedevastating effect onhow

insurgents

canoperateandemploycombatpower. Insuitableconditionsanyattemptby the

insurgentsto use

massedforce canbe dealtwitheffectivelyby airpower.

This wasevidentduring theearly

stages ofthecurrent

45

conflictinAfghanistan.Whenthe

Talibanattempted tooperat

e asmassedconventional-stylefieldedforces,

Western air power was able to target them with devastatingeffects.

4

In additionto the firstordereffects ofinterdiction,where theenemy isdirectly

destroyedon theground, italso

producessecondand thirdordereffects.

The abilityof

interdictionto hit theenemywheneverandwhereverhe

concentratesmanpower,equipmentor resourcesforces anadaptation

of tactics. Toescape thethreat fromthe

air,insurgentsmust avoidlargeconcentration

s which canbe easilyinterdicted.Consequently, theirfreedom

ofmovementand abilityto

concentratefirepowerbecomemorelimited. Aresultantpositiveeffect isthat the

counter-insurgentsare also able

to distributetheir forcesin a lessconcentratedmannerthroughoutthe area of

operations.Thisdistributionof forceenablesincumbentgovernmentcontrol tobe spreadto areaswhich may

havepreviouslybeeninaccessibledue to theinsurgentactivity.Once thiscontrol isestablishedthe non-military

functionscritical to theultimatesuccess of thecampaign,such asrebuilding theinfrastructure,economy and

standard of living, can be carried out.

Agovernment whichissupportingthecounter-insurgency

externallycan alsobenefitfrom theeffects of

interdiction. The insurgents inability toconcentrate their forces or resort to the use ofheavy weapons typical of

Vol. , No. 4, October 99, pp. 09.

4 Clarke, Airpower and Military Intervention, p. .

4 Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publication 000Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, Fourth Edition, AerospaceCentre, Canberra, 00, p. 0.

44Drew, U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge, p. 0.

45Vick et al,Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era,p. .

4 Dr Mark Clodfelter, Airpower versus Asymmetric Enemies: A Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness,Air and Space Power Journal,Vol. XVI, No. , Fall 00, p. 45.


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13 Working Paper26

a moreconventionalwar altersthe forcestructurethat is

necessary tocombatthem.Equipmentwhich wouldbe

essentialto combata heavyforce is nolonger

required,significantly reducingtheamount ofsupportingequipment

andpersonnelrequired intheatre.

Over thecourse of alongcampaignthissignificantly reducesthe costand

strain whichwould beassociated

withdeployingandsustaining amuch largerforce. Thelowercommitmentin

troops andmaterielalsoserves toreducethe extentto whichthesupportingcampaignisvulnerableto

criticism

from the media regarding its drain on funding and resources.

Lastly, andperhapsmostimportantly,a smallerfootprint ofexternalmilitaryforces onthe ground

workstoward

aiding thekeyperceptionthat theincumbentgovernmentforces arein control.

The

incumbentforces donot

need manyof the heavyweaponscapabilitieswhich wouldbe requiredagainst amore

concentratedand heavily

armedinsurgentforce.

Thisenablesthem tobe more

effectivewith lessexternalsupportand islikely tocreate

animpressionof controlandcompetence.Such a

perceptionprotects theCentre ofGravity oftheincumbent

governmentand isthereforefundamentalto the

ultimatesuccess ofthe counter-insurgencycampaign.

Interdiction RisksFaced withthe

superiorand far-reachingpower of airinterdiction,insurgentsadapt byreducingthe amountof

lucrative

targetsavailableand byblendingthemselvesinto thelocalpopulation.In theseinstancesinterdiction

47

missions can not easily beaccomplished.

Thelogisticalframeworkof

aninsurgencyisusuallyfundame

ntallydifferenttothatofconventionalwarfare.

Conventionalwarfareinvolves linesofcommunicationtravelling inthe samedirection as

fielded forces.The areas

behind thelinescontain thelucrativetarget setswhich arevulnerable

to airborneinterdiction.However,embedded

insurgenciesoften drawtheirsustenancefrom thelocal

people, thustheirlogisticallines ofcommunication

do notexist in amannerwhichallows for

interdictionfrom theair. Anyattempt totarget dualuse lines of

4

communication,such as bridges,roads andcommunication

nodes, mayactually becounterproductive.Although

a short-termdisruption

toequipmentandsupplymay beachieved,it is likelythat thenegativesecondorder

effects,where the

localpopulationsaredisrupted orinadvertently punished,may bedetrimentalto theoverall

counter-

insurgencycampaign.

ThesenegativeeffectsoccurredduringIsraels2006campaignagainst

Hezbollah.

Israeltargetedbridges,airportsandhighways withtwoaims.

The firstaim was

to cutthesupply ofweaponsto

HezbollahfromSyria andIran,effectivelyisolatingHezbollahfromtheir

externalsupport.

Thesecondaim was

topersuadeLebanonslargeChristianand Sunnipopulationto turnagainst

Hezbollah.Not onlydid it fail

49

in itsaims onbothaccounts,Hezbollah actuallygainedsupport.

Also,internationalsupportforIsraelsactions

among key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia waslost.

50

Imprecisetargetingofinsurgentsin urbanareas canalsounderminethesupport forthecampaignamongboth

thelocalpopulationbeingattacked

andthehomepopulationofthenation

conductingtheattacks.

Thiswas

seenduring thesecondChechenWarbetween1999 and2002where theRussiansconductedmanyinterdiction

missionsusingimprecisebombingtechniques. Theresulting lossofcivilianlivesanddamagetocivilian

infrastructure led to a drop in Russian support from both the Chechen and Russianpublic.

5

Insurgentgroupsfurtheradapt tothe airthreatbydeliberatelymakingairborne

targetingmoredifficultand

dangerous.Their use ofcamouflage,concealmentanddeception isincreasing inits level ofsophistication and

innovation.Manportablethreats withadaptedtactics aremaking theoperatingenvironment

moredangerous

5

47Drew, U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge, p. 0.

4 ibid.

49Seymour M. Hersh, Watching Lebanon,The New Yorker, August 00; http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/0 0 fa_fact; accessed January 007.

50ibid.

5 Marcel de Haas,The Use of Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War,Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, Surrey, 00, pp.4 and 9.

5 Christopher J. Bowie,Destroying Mobile Ground Targets in an Anti-Access Environment,Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, WashingtonDC, 00, p. .


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1 Working Paper26

andlimiting tocounter-insurgencyair power.Insurgents

may alsoactivelyencourageair powerto cause

5

unintentional damagewhich can beexploitedthrough the

insurgentsIOcampaign.

Theseinsurgentstrategies

54

areeffectivein anumber of

ways.Increasingthedifficultyof locatingvalidtargetsmakesoffensiveair powerless

effective.Increasingthe risk of

platformloss orcausingcollateraldamageforcescounter-insurgencyair power

to adapt.The threatof platformloss orcollateraldamagecan bereduced byimposingrestrictionsonoperations,

althoughtheserestrictionsare likely toresult inreducedeffectiveness.If theincreasedlikelihood ofplatform loss

orcollateraldamage isnotaddressedby suchrestrictions,the Centreof Gravityfor the boththe

incumbentand

externalgovernmentswill be placedat risk. Killinginnocentpeople anddestroyinginfrastructurewill result in

reducedsupport forthecampaignfrom boththe localandinternationalpopulation,whileplatformloss will put

pressure on the external governments ability to provide long-termsupport.Ultimatelyinterdiction is aviablerolewithin

counter-insurgencyoperationsas it actsas aforcemultiplier,

allowing asmallerground forceto operate ina less

concentratedmanner overa larger area.It will neverbe able

to achievea decisiveresult initself, but

does denytheinsurgentsthe abilityto movefreely anduse force

en masse.Interdictionmust beconducted

according tothefundamentalprinciples ofcounter-insurgencywarfare.Suitable

targetsmust

becarefullydeterminedandengagedwiththeminim

umforcerequired toachieve thedesired

effect. This

minimumforce mayincludenonlethaland non-destructivemeans; apreferableoption incounter-

insurgencywarfare.When deadlyforce isemployed itmust bedeliveredprecisely andwith dueconsiderationof

the risksassociatedwith itsuse. Poorlyappliedforce mayachieve atacticalobjectivebut it

seriouslyundermines

the fundamentals required for strategic success.

Close Air Support

It is difficultto provideeffective firesupport to alargenumber ofdispersedtroops.Conventionalwarfare has

traditionallyrelied onartillery toproviderapid firesupport togroundtroops.Within aconventionalwarfare

construct ofdefinitiveforward lines,massed troopconcentrationsand anidentifiableenemy, this isone of the

cornerstonesof combinedarmswarfare.Counter-insurgencywarfare,however,does not fitneatly withinthis

paradigm.Theenemy islikely tobedispersedanddifficult toidentify,andfriendlyforces arelikely tooperate in

smallgroupsbeyondtheprotectionofartillery.In thissituationClose AirSupport(CAS) canprovide ahighly

effective means of supporting ground forces conducting counter-insurgency warfare.

CAS hasbecome amoreprominentair powerroleamongWesternair forces

in recentyears. Forexample,in

anefforttoincrea

seitsagilitytheUSArm

yhasbecomemorerel

iantonCAStoprovidefir

epower, atrend

thatislikelytocontinueinto

thefuture.Morethansimplyoperatingasairbo

rneartillery,airpower isable

55

toprovideprecisioneffectsthroughoutthebattlespac

einaresponsive

manner,thusma

kingitwell

counter-insurgencywarfare.AlthoughCAS is

generallythought ofas a singlerole, thereis adifferencein how

it is appliedoffensivelyanddefensively

. Therefore,bothoffensiveanddefensiveCAS mustbeconsideredwithin

the context of counter-insurgency warfare.

OffensiveCAS isused tosupportgroundforcesconductingoffensiveoperationsagainstknownenemylocations

orstrongholds.Theadvantageof offensiveCAS is thatit can bethoroughlyplannedand fullyintegratedinto the

battleplan, thusprovidingmaximumefficiencyandflexibility.Battlelocationscan beselected,targetareas canbe

analysed androbustcommunicationsprocedures canbe put in placeprior to anyaction. Weaponscan be matched

to expectedtargets,Rules ofEngagement(ROE) canbeoptimisedand air

powerassets canbecoordinatedto

cover abroad rangeof options.Suchpreparationsenableoffensive

operationsto beconductedwithmaximum

effectivenessandefficiency,whilereducing thelikelihood of

an adverseoutcome.This wasevidentduring the

successfulBattle ofFallujahconducted during

November200.Detailedplanningcommenced inmid-200

with thecoordinatesof manyknown and

expectedtargetsbeingdeterminedto allow forprecisionengagement

during

thebattle.USArmyandMarineCorpsforward aircontro

lteamsweresupplemented by28USAF

5

5 Byron Reynolds,Postmodern Tactical Air Intelligence,Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 00, p. .54ibid.

55Rebecca Grant, Bombs on Target,Air Force Magazine, Vol. 88, No. 8,August 005, p. 9.

5 Tim Ripley, Close Air Support in the st Century,Air International, Vol. 7, No. 4, October 00, p. .


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15 Working Paper26

groundcontrollersallowing for ahigh degree ofinteroperability with ground

forces. Largenumbers ofaircraft

wereallocated totheoperationallowing a

continuouspresenceover thebattlefield.From the USperspective,it

was oneof themostsuccessful

offensivejointoperationsof the war.OffensiveCASsgreateststrengthwithin

57

counter-insurgencywarfare is

that itallowstime forthoroughplanningprior toemployingforce. Thisability

to plan inadvanceenables thepositiveeffects of airpower to bemaximisedin this casecoordinatedprecision

firepowerwhilereducingthepotentialfornegativeeffectssuch ascollateraldamageand

fratricide.Targeting

and itsmultipleeffects canbethoroughlyevaluatedand therightproceduresand peoplecan be put

in place to

reduce the risk of any unwanted outcomes.

DefensiveCASdiffersfromoffensiveCASbecauseit occurs

unexpectedly. Thesmallsizes ofgroundtroop

patrolsdeployed incounter-insurgencywarfaremake themvulnerable

to attackfrommoderatelysizedenemy

forces.Thesetroopsoften lacktheir ownheavy

firepowersupportandcannotusually bereinforcedquickly. In

thesesituationsdefensive

CAScanrapidlyprovidetherequiredfiresupp

ort.Airpowersability torespond

rapidlywithprecisioneffects

reducesthelikelihood offriendlylosses aswell asenablingthefriendlyground

forceseither toneutralise

or defeattheenemyattack.HowevercomparedtooffensiveCAS,defensiveCAS holds

significantly more risk.

This risk isevident intwo mainareastherisk thatthe job willnot getdone,known

as

operationalrisk, andthe risk tothebroadercounter-insurgencycampaignif collateraldamageoccurs

during

execution.

Overall, CASis afundamentallyimportant airpower role incounter-insurgencywarfare. Theability toprovide

rapidprecisioneffectsthroughoutthebattlespaceallowsgroundforcesmorefreedom tooperate inthedispersed

mannerwhich isdesirable incounter-insurgencywarfare.

The uniqueview of thebattlespacefrom theair and

theabilitytoprovide

anindependentvisualverificati

onofthetargetprovidesadvanta

gesoverartilleryfor

counter-insurgencywarfare.However,CAS is notwithout itsrisks;defensiveCAS inparticular.

Theserisks may

bemitigatedbyhaving

robusttraining,procedures andROE.More sofor CASthanother airpowerroles,good

judgementand sounddecision-

makingwill beessentialat thetacticallevel.

Time iscritical,information is often

limited,and

decisionshave to bemade atthe lowestlevels.Good

judgementanddecision-makingcan onlybe

achieved if

thefundamentalconcepts ofcounter-insurgencywarfare areunderstoodby theaircrew andground

troops whoultimatelyapply deadlyforce. Byunderstandingthe benefitsand risksassociatedwithemploying

force in acounter-insurgencycampaignthose atthetacticallevel aremorelikely to

makedecisionsthat willmeet

the objectives of the broader campaign.

Targeted Killing

Due to airpowersability toprojectlethalforce over

longdistances,it hasbeenused totargetindividualleaders

ofinsurgentorterroristgroups in

what hasbecomeknown astargetedkilling.Withincertaintypes ofcounter-

insurgencies,where thegroup reliesextensively

on one or anumber ofkeyindividualsto operate,conducting

targetedkilling isan

attractiveoption.

Thereare,however, anumberoffactorswhich

need tobeconsidered

thoroughlybefore

conducting suchanoperation.

Theseincludeunderstanding thenature oftheinsurgenc

y,

deducing

the short-term andlong-termeffectsresultingfrom asuccessfulkilling,anddecidingwhether a

kinetic

responseis themostappropriate. Therisk ofcollateraldamageandwhateffect it

mayhave onthebroader

campaign must also be clearly understood.

Thenatureofthe

insurgencywilldeterminetoa

largeextenthoweffectivethetar

getedkillingislikelyto

be.Generally,ethnic orterritorial-basedinsurgencies are

moreresilientto thedeath ofkeyleadersthan are

ideologicalinsurgencies.Ideologicalinsurgencies

normallyrevolvearound asmallnumberof leaderswhich

means theyare morelikely to beaffected by aleaders loss.

Considerationmust also begiven towhetherkilling

5

theinsurgentleader isthe bestoption.

Thecapture

of a keyleadermay bemoreuseful tothe long-termconduct

of thecampaign,especially formore

secretiveorganisationssuch asglobalterroristnetworks.For thesesecretive

and difficultto penetrate

organisationstheintelligencegained froman individualis likely to bemorevaluable

57ibid.

5 Bolkcom and Katzman,Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, p. 0.


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16 Working Paper26

than theirdeath. Theeffects ofkilling anindividual aredifficult to

predict, butconsiderationmust begiven as to

whether the killing will in fact embolden theinsurgency.

Targetedkilling is aviable role

foroffensiveair powerwithin acounter-insurgencycampaign.

The keyissues are

consistentwith those

found inotheroffensiveair powerroles. Thenature oftheinsurgencymust beunderstood

before

using force,and therisk ofusing forcemust beweighedagainst anyeffectswhich maybedetrimental

to

theoverallcampaign.If athoroughanalysishas takenplace,intelligence isreliable

and thecollateraldamage

potential is eliminated or greatly minimised, then targeted killing may be a suitableoption.

Summar y Benefits andRisksAir poweroffersmanyadvantages whenconducting counter-

insurgencywarfaredue to itsability tocover

largedistances andreact quicklywithoverwhelmingforce. It does

havelimitations,however, andmany of the

traditionalrolesconsideredto be thecornerstone

of air powertheory are oflimitedeffectivenessandquestionable

utility incounter-insurgencywarfare.

Strategicbombingmay beeffectivein isolatedcases, butthe smallnumber

of targetsand thenature of

insurgencywill notmake itdecisive.Punitive orcoercivebombinghas beenshown

potentiallyto be

detrimentalto the long-term aimsof counter-insurgencywarfareand shouldnot beconsidered

on both

practicalandethicalgrounds.

Targetedkillingmay beuseful incertainsituations, but the

mosteffective

roles foroffensiveair powerin counter-insurgencywarfareareinterdictionand CAS.Interdictiondegrades

the

adversarysability tocommandand controlits forcesand alsomakes itsresupplymoredifficult.

Even whenthere

are fewopportunitiesto interdict,the merepresence ofaninterdictioncapability intheatre has

a passivepositive

effect.Theenemy isforcedtoadaptby

avoidingtheovertmovementoflargenumbers ofmen

andsupplies.

Enemyforces canno longermass inlargenumbersfor long

periods oftimebecausethey arevulnerableto attack

from theair. Theavailabilityof CASfurtherenablesfriendlyforces tobedeployedin moreareasthroughout

thetheatre,thusworking insupport ofthefundamentalcounter-insurgencyprinciples.A largernumber of

secure areasallow theincumbentgovernmentto aid moreof its ownpeoplethroughinfrastructuredevelopment

andotherprojects.

Thisultimatelyincreasesthesupportfortheincumbentgovernme

ntandunderminesthe

insurgentsaims. Whentheconditionsof theinsurgencyallow,externalsupportingrolesshould betransitioned

from directto indirectinvolvement.Supportingtheincumbentgovernmentwithtraining,doctrine,intelligence,

airframesandweaponshelps tore-establishitscredibilitywith itsownpeople.

Thiscreates afavourablesituation

for boththesupportingandincumbentpowersand ismorelikely toresult in aresolutionof theconflict.

Thediscussionof thebenefitsand risksassociatedwith usingoffensive

air powerin counter-insurgencywarfare

can beused toprovide aframeworkforevaluatingthe tools

required toapplyoffensiveair powerpracticallyand

successfullythroughoutthebattlespace.

The benefitsthat air

powerprovidesneed to bemaximised,while the

risks that itcarriesneed to bereduced oreliminated.

Theprecedinganalysishas shownthat thereare anumber

of broadareaswhichmust be

consideredbeforeemployingoffensiveair powerin counter-insurgencywarfare.

Whenevaluatingthe

suitabilityofoffensiveair powertools incounter-insurgencywarfare,thefollowingfactors

should be considered:

Ubiquity offensive air power must be able to operate throughout thebattlespace.Speed offensive air power must be able to respond rapidly to situations on theground.Firepower offensiveair powermustpossessthecapabilityto destroyorneutralisepotentialtargetsets.

Collateraldamage(unintended damageto buildingsor peopleresulting

fromtargeting alegitimatetarget)

must be minimised oreliminated.Incorrecttargeting(somethingorsomebody

beingincorrectlyidentifiedas alegitimatetarget) must be

minimised or eliminated.

Fratricide risk must be minimised oreliminated.Survivability vulnerability to attack must be minimised or

eliminated.

In thispaper,thesefactorshavebeenused to

evaluatethesuitabilityof variousplatforms,sensorsandweapons

for use incounter-insurgencywarfare.Platforms,

weaponsandsensorsare theactualinterfacethroughwhich

offensiveair power isapplied,and will

thereforebe thefocus of theevaluation.

To allow foranappropriatedepth


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17 Working Paper26

ofanalysisandevaluation,otherfactorscontributingto

theoveralleffectiv

enessoftheairca

mpaign,su

tactics,training,doctrine andforceenablers,

have not beenconsidered.Byunderstandinghowplatforms,sensors

andweaponscan beapplied to

thecounter-insurgencycampaign,a morecoherentandeffectivestrategyfor the

employment of offensive air power can be developed.

Platforms, Sensors and Weapons in CounterInsurgency Warfare

Platforms

Theframeworkforevaluatingtheeffectiveness of

offensiveair powertools incounter-insurgencyoperations

indicatesthat someplatformswill bebettersuited to

thecounter-insurgencyrole thanothers. Acaveat tothis

discussionis that eachspecifictheatre willhave its

own uniqueterrain,weatherand threats.Accordingly,some

platforms willrealise certainadvantages ordisadvantage

s due to thesevariables. Thisshould be aconsideration

for airpowerplanners,

but adetailedbreakdownfor eachpotentialtheatre isbeyondthe scopeof thispaper.

Thefollowing

evaluationwill insteadconsidergenericstrengthsandweaknessesof variousplatformtypes. The

considerations which are discussed below could then be tailored for specific

theatres.Theplatformswhich aremostsuitableforcounter-insurgencyoperationsare thosewhich are

the mostsurvivable,

can bedeployedas requiredwithin thetheatre ofoperations,have goodrange andenduranceto provide

long-

term coverageover a broadarea, and havethe capability tocarry suitableweaponry,sensors andcommunications

suites toaccomplishthemission.

Theyshould beplatformswhich candeliverweaponsaccuratelysuch thatthe

risk of fratricide and collateral damage is minimised.

Helicopters

Themain

advantageofhelicoptersistheirabili

tytooperateatlowspeednearthe

ground.

Thisallowsthem

toope

rateclosetobothfriendlytroops

andpotentialtargets.

Thisproximityena

bleshelicopterstomaintain

sensors on

a target orin a targetarea withminimalmanoeuvreor loss ofcontact.With lesschance ofvisual

misidentification, correcttargeting ismore assured.Sensorcapability ismaximised dueto closer rangesand the

slow rateofmovementof theplatform.Helicoptersnormallycarrydirect firelow-yield

weapons,whichmakes

them wellsuited foroperationsin areaswherecollateraldamage isa concern.By

operatingprimarilyat lowlevel

and slowspeeds,helicopters can alsooperatemoreeffectivelywith lower

cloudcover andlowerlevels ofvisibility

than fixed-wing platforms.

Thelow-levelandlow-speed

capabilitiesofhelicoptersaretheirsource ofstrength

andalsotheirsource of

weakness.Operationsat lowlevel andlow speedmakehelicoptersvulnerableto attackfrom theground.

Insurgentsareunlikely tohavehighlycapablesurface-to-airmissiles(SAMs),but willlikelyhaveaccess tosome

form oflow-technologytacticalanti-aircapability.Infra-red(IR) SAMs,such asthe USStingerand theSoviet

SA-7series, areprevalentamongmany ofthe worldsinsurgentgroups.Even whenhelicoptersareequipped

with thelatestmissileapproachandwarningsystems(MAWS)and IRdecoys,they arestillsusceptible to attack

with low-technologyweapons,such asheavycalibremachineguns androcket-propelledgrenades.Forinsurgent

groups

lacking anyearlywarningtechnology,helicoptersmakeattract

ivetargets astheyareeasilydetected

visually andaurally.

There havebeen manyoccurrenceswhenhelicoptershave provedvulnerableto insurgent

attacks.Duringcounter-insurgencyoperationsinPanamain thelate1980sbothhelicopters andfixed-wing

aircraftwere usedfor CAS,but it wasonly thehelicopterswhichreceivedbattledamage.Between1999 and

592002during thesecondChechenconflictthe

Russianslost over33helicopterscomparedto onlythreefixed-

wingaircraft.

The UShassufferedsignificant

helicopterlossesrecentlyin Iraqwithsevenhelicoptersbeing

0

shotdownbetween20

Januaryand 7February2007.

Suchlossescan havestrategiceffectson thesupportfor

59Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 7.

0 de Haas,The Use of Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War, p. 5.

Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, Planning Seen Behind Attacks on U.S. Copters inThe New York Times, February 007.


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18 Working Paper26

themission.

This wasseen inSomalia in1993

where theloss ofBlack Hawkhelicopters,and thesubsequent

treatment of the downed crews, effectively ended the US mission.

Onbalance,helicopters

offer aviableoffensivesupportplatform,but theiruse hassignificantrisk.Theiradvantages

needto

beweighedagainsttheriskofplatformloss

andthestrategiceffectsthismayhave. Forsitua

tions

where such

losses arepolitically orstrategicallyuntenable,effortsshould bemade toachieve thesamecapability

through more-survivable platforms.

High-speed Multi-roleFightersThissectionfocuses onhigh-speed,multi-

rolefighterswhichwerenotspecificallydesigned forCAS

or

interdiction.Thesetypes ofaircraft,such asthe F-15,F-16 and

F-18series, arethe onlytypes ofoffensive

platformsmany airforces have.

They weregenerallydesigned for

conventionalwarfare andthereforehave certain

disadvantages when used in counter-insurgencywarfare.One of themajordisadvantage

s of high-speed multi-role aircraft isthat they areexpensive tooperate andhave

alarge

logisticaloverhead.

Theyneedtooperatefrombasesthathavesubstantialinfrastructure.

Theirhigh-

technology

avionicsandwarfightingequipmentmust besupported,eventhough itmay not beutilised ina low-

technologycounter-insurgencycampaign.High-speedmulti-roleaircraft arealso notgenerallydesigned

to have

the longendurancewhich isdesirable forcounter-insurgencyoperations.Thislimitation inendurancemeans that

a largenumberof theseaircraftwilllikely berequiredintheatre

toprovidetherequisiteairsupporttoground

troops.Additionally,capabilitiessuch as air-to-airrefuellingwill likely be

required intheatre tosupplementthe

limited rangeandendurance oftheseaircraft.

Theserequirements

increase thelevel ofcommitmentneeded from

externallysupportinggovernments,placingfurtherpressure on

their ability tosupport thecampaign forthe long

term.

The riskof losingexpensive high-

speedmulti-roleplatformsisnormallysountenablethattheseaircrafttend to

operateabovethe

altitudeofshoulder-launchedSAMS,generallyten tofifteenthousandfeet. Thisreduces

the

ability toaccurately

identifytargetsvisuallyfrom theair. Higheraltitudesalsoreducethecapabilityof

sensors,

perhaps

evenrenderingthemineffectiveif aircraftare forcedto operateabovesignificantcloudcover.

During

theBalkanscampaignheightrestrictionsabove 15000 feet,poorweatherandrestrictions

designedto prevent

collateraldamageorfratricideseverelyimpairedNATOsability toprovideair

support.Althoughtheserestraints

andimpositions areunderstandablefrom astrategic andpoliticalstandpoint,they dohighlight the

limitations

of this typeof platformwhen suchrestrictionsare inplace.Even whendeployedat loweraltitudes,the high

speed of theseaircraft makesit difficult forthem visuallyto identify anddiscriminatetargetsindependently. This

reduces theeffectivenessofinterdictionmissions andthere is anincreasedrisk ofattacking thewrongtarget. CAS

missionsusinghigh-speedmulti-rolefighterswill behighlyreliant ongroundforces tonominateandidentify

targetscorrectly. Theinability tocorroboratethisinformationindependently increasesthe risk of thewrong target

beingattacked.Some ofthe riskmay bemitigatedthroughthe useof highlycapablesensors,but thesetoo have

limitations. Anothermethod ofmitigatingthese risksis to applymorerestrictiveROE.Althoughthis maybe

required from a strategic imperative it will ultimately compromise tacticaleffectiveness.Asignificantadvantageof high-speedmulti-roleplatformsis thatthey areavailable

in mostWesterncountries

and in largenumbers.Survivability isgenerallyexcellent asinsurgentsdo notreadily

have theability totarget

small,high-speed,high-altitudetargets.Unlesstheseaircraft

areoperating atextreme lowaltitude, theonly

genuinethreat istheshoulder-launchedSAM.Modernhigh-

speedmulti-roleaircrafthavecountermeasures

that areeffectiveagainstmost SAMs.Even thelatest

generationsSAMs havelimitedcapabilityagainstthese

platforms.A furtheradvantagetheseaircraft

offer isthat theyareusuallyable to befitted witha broadrange

of sensorandweaponsuites.Suchflexibilityenables

theplatformto beoptimisedforoperationsin acounter-

insurgency environment.

Clarke, Airpower and Military Intervention, p. 0.

ibid, p. .


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19 Working Paper26

Conventionalmilitary fast

jets arenever goingto be theoptimum

solution forprojectingoffensive airpower in

counter-insurgencywarfare.

Theirlimitations in

range,enduranceandsupportability are noteasy toovercome.

However,to getsufficientnumbers

of aircraftto providetheubiquityrequired incounter-insurgencywarfare,

theseaircraftmay be all

that isavailable.

The truecapabilityof theseplatformswill beaffectedby theequipment

they carry.Sensorsuites,communicationsequipment,weapons,night andall-weatheroperatingability willall

affect how suitable a particular multi-role aircraft is for counter-insurgency warfare.

Slower Speed Air-to-Ground Aircraft

Aircraftwhichare abletooperateat lowerspeedsclose to

thegroundhaveprovedhighlyeffectiveincounter-

insurgencyoperationsin manytheatresover manyyears. Theiradvantages

are thatthey arecheap tooperate,can be

deployed witha smallsupportinfrastructureand canoperate from

lesssubstantialfacilities thanhigh-technology

multi-rolefighteraircraft.

Tacticallythey can

operateat lowaltitudesand slowspeedswhich arebetter fortarget

acquisitionandidentification.

This

improvedacquisitionallows themto find andprosecutetargets thatare difficult

to detect.Robusttarget

identificationreduces thelikelihood ofincorrecttargeting orfratricide.During theMalayan

counter-insurgency

campaign,the Britishfound thatthe older,slowerairframesofferedsignificantadvantagesover

faster jets.

They provedso valuableduring theMalayancampaignthat therewasconsiderableresistancewhen the

Britishbegan totransitionto an all-

jet force.DuringtheKoreanandVietnamWars the

US alsofoundthat the

4

apabilities of piston engine aircraft were more suitable for the roles of CAS and interdiction than jets5

At thepremiumend of theinterdictionand CASplatformspectrumis the A-10Warthog.

Itsrelativelyslow speed

and goodmanoeuvrabilityallows it to getin close totargets foridentificationand verification,thus greatly

reducing

the risk ofattackingthewrongtarget. Ithas abroad

range ofweaponryavailableto matcha varietyofpotential

targets.It candeliverheavyprecisionordnanceto largertargetsand alsouseweaponswhichminimisethe riskof

collateraldamagein urbanareas.Lastly, itisdesignedto besurvivable with anarmouredcockpit,redundant systems

and astate-of-the-artmissiledecoysuite.

The factthat thisaircraft isbeingupgradedyearsafter itwasplanned

to

be retiredistestimonyto howuseful it isin counter-insurgencywarfareroles.Currently,the US isthe onlycountry

which fields such a specialisedcapability.

Thelowerendofthespectrumoffersmany

cheapalternatives tomodernfighteraircraft.

Manyofthe

Third

Worldcountrieswhich fightcounter-insurgenciescannotaffordmodernequipment.For these

countries,the use

of older,cheaperaircraft isthe onlyalternative;one whichover manyyears hasproved to

beeffective.Even when

threatened by SA-7 SAMs andlacking IRcountermeasures,aircraft such asthe A-37 havebeen successfully

employedin thecounter-insurgencyrole. InColumbia,aircraft

such asthe OV-10andDragonflyhaveproved

to be veryeffectivecounter-insurgencyplatformsover many

years. Theeffectivenessandaffordabilityof such

7

platformshas led totheColombianGovernment

seekingsimilarqualities inreplacementplatforms,with aircraft

such as theEmbraerSuper

Tucano

beingconsidered.Havingsuch acheap andeasy tooperate,independent

offensive aircapabilitysatisfies

many of thefundamentalcounter-insurgencyfactors.Theincumbentgovernments

indigenous

capabilitygives itmorecredibilitywith itspeopleand alsoreducesthesupportburden

placed onthe

external government.

Slow-speed air-to-groundaircraftalso havelimitationsin counter-insurgencywarfare.While theirslowerspeed

and abilityto operatecloser topotentialtargetsoffers manyadvantages,it alsoincreasesthe risk ofthem being

shot down.Additionally, theirslowerspeedmeans thatthey are notable to

respond asquicklythroughoutthe

battlespace ashigh-speedfighters.Despite thesedisadvantages, slow-speedair-to-ground

aircraft can behighly

effective incounter-insurgencywarfare. Theiradvantagesneed to be

balanced withtheirdisadvantages and will

vary withspecifictheatresofoperation.

Outside ofthe A-10Warthog,Westernair forceshavetended toignore

this type ofcapability infavour ofplatforms

designed forhigh-technologyconventionalwarfare.Consideration

4 Corum and Johnson,Airpower in Small Wars,p. 97.

5 ibid, 9.Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 77.

7 Corum and Johnson,Airpower in Small Wars,p. 7.

Jose Higuere,Latin American Air Forces,Air University Press, Colorado, 004, p. .


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20 Working Paper26

needs tobe giventodevelopingsimple,cheap

andsurvivalaircraftwhich canbe usedincounter-insurgency

warfare.While they donot representthe completesolution, they

are clearlyable tosupport thefundamentalsof

counter-insurgency warfare in a practical and cost effective manner.

GunshipsIn manywaysgunshipssuch asthe AC-130Spectreseemideallysuited tocounter-insurgencywarfare.

They have

goodrange,longenduranceand cancarry largepayloads.

Thispayloadability

allowsthem tobe fittedwith the

most advancedsensors andcommunicationsequipment.

They are alsoable to carryaccurate directfire weapons

whichminimisethe riskofcollateraldamage,incorrecttargeting

andfratricide.Theirability toorbit thetarget

area,observeand firewithoutinterruptionhas madethem a

valuablecounter-insurgencyplatform ina number

ofcampaignsfromVietnam toIraq. Duringthe

insurgencyin ElSalvadorthepredecessorof the AC-130, the

9

AC-7gunship,proved tobe a veryeffective

weapon.Thecombinationof itsaccuracy,heavyfirepower,long

70

loiter time and relative ease of use made it the most effective weapon in the FASarsenal.

7

There aretwo majorissues which

limit theeffectivenessof theairbornegunship inthe modernera. Firstly, itis

prohibitivelyexpensive.

Compared toa regular C-130 transportcostingapproximatelyUS$50 millionper aircraft,

the AC-

130SpectregunshipcostsUS$190milliondollars.

Thismeansthat fewcountries

besidesthe USare

7

likely tobe able tofield suchacapability. The highcost alsoleads tothesecondweakness

of theplatform.It is

such avaluableandscarceasset thatit cannotbe placedatsignificant risk. The

AC-130operatesat low tomedium

altitudes, islarge andcomparativelyslow. Thismakes it anideal targetfor modernshoulder-launched

SAMs. This

riskmeansthat theAC-130isusuallyonlyoperated

at night.Evenduringtheperiodsofintenseneed,such as

duringthe USbattle toregaincontrolofFallujah

in Iraq,the AC-130 wasnotdeployedduringdaylighthours.

7

The gunshipis anextremelypowerfulweapon forcounter-insurgencywarfare andin the rightenvironmentwill

often bethe weaponof choice.Its cost andoperatingrestrictions,however,limit itsbroaderapplication.

Uninhabited Combat AerialVehiclesUninhabited

CombatAerialVehicles(UCAVs) areanemergingcapabilitythatappears tohave agreat future

incounter-insurgencywarfare.UCAVssatisfymany ofthefactorspertinentto

counter-insurgencywarfare.

Without therequirementtoaccommodatepeople onboard, UCAVscan remain onstation forextendedperiods

of time. Theyare able to carryadvancedsensors,advancedcommunicationssuites andprecisionweaponry. The

altitudeand speedat whichtheyoperatemakethemhighly

survivableplatforms.Even ifthey areshotdown, the

fact that no lives are lost reduces the likelihood that support for the campaign will beaffected.

There arecurrentlysomelimitationswhich affectthe

employmentof UCAVs in acounter-insurgencyenvironment.

Thetechnologyis onlyemergingand

weaponsintegrationhas beenminimal.

Thismeansthat theunmanned

platformswhich havebeen usedto date are

largelyUninhabitedAerialVehicles(UAVs).

These UAVshave

successfully beenused in

supportrolesprovidingISR inputsanddirectingtargeting.Currently,UCAVs lack

74

therequiredautonomyto realisetheir fullpotential.

Thecentralcontroltheycurrentlyrequirelimits the

ability of

fielded unitsto operateautonomouslyand withmaximumflexibility.Additionally,havingnobody in thecockpit

75

with eyesdirectly onthe targetareaeffectivelyremoves animportantsensor fromthebattlespace.

The

platform

becomesreliant onitsonboardsensors,thelimitations of whichwill beanalysedin thefollowingsection ofthis

paper.

9 Vick et al,Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era, p. 4.

70Corum and Johnson,Airpower in Small Wars,p. 4.

7 ibid, p. 7.

7 Bolkcom and Katzman,Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, p. 5.

7 ibid.

74Charles E.Kirkpatrick,Joint Fires as They Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group During Operation IraqiFreedom,Land Warfare Paper No. 4, The Institute for Land Warfare, Arlington VA, 004, p. .

75Bolkcom and Katzman,Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Comparing Terrorism and Counterinsurgency,p. 5.


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EventhoughUCAVshave onlybeenemployed

in limitednumbers,theirsuccess inAfghanistanand Iraqhas

invigoratedplans todevelop thetechnologyfurther.

UAVs suchas Predatorand Hunterhave beenweaponised

andtheUSAr

myhasselectedtheWarriorasthei

rfutureUCAVvehicle.

TheIsraelis

haveconsiderable

7

experienceoperatingUCAVs

over theWest Bankand GazaStrip andarecontinuingto increasetheir UCAV

capability.Astechnologyadvances,developmentcontinuesanddoctrinematures, itis likelythatUCAVs will

77

becomeaninvaluableplatformforsupportingcounter-insurgencywarfa

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