“COERCIVE DISSUASION” Through GLOBAL STRIKE

COERCIVE DISSUASION Through GLOBAL STRIKEA Critical Assessment of the Bush National Security StrategyPresentation to the 2003 Summer Faculty Institute on World Security AffairsJune 10-13, 2003

Christopher E. PaineSenior Analyst, NRDC Nuclear Program1200 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C. [email protected]

Three (Flawed) Bush Postulates of NSC/WMD #1: The possession and increased likelihood of use of WMD by hostile states and terrorists are realities of the contemporary security environment. Comment: Note the conflation of hostile states with terrorists and the groundless suggestion that an increased likelihood of [WMD] use by both is a reality of the current security environ-ment. This is fantasy masquerading as analysis.

Flawed Postulates cont#2: We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists (emphasis added).Comment: The worlds only actual experience with WMD terrorism involved the Aum Shin Rikyo cults Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway.

Third Bush WMD Postulate#3: Todays threats are far more diverse and less predictable than those of the past. States hostile to the United States and to our friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence.

Proliferation Reality CheckIn 1979 there were 10 countries of nuclear proliferation concernToday there are 6, only one of which is a new entrant North Korea.Positive Developments:South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea are off the listNPT indefinitely extended in 1995 Nuclear weapons removed from South Korea, Eastern Europe and newly independent states of former Soviet Union.

TEN COUNTRIES

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERN IN 1979

Argentina

Secret fuel cycle facilities under control of military dictatorship

Brazil

Importation of fuel cycle facilities and secret nuclear design program under the control of a military government

India

Overt peaceful nuclear explosives program outside framework of NPT

Iran

Acquisition of light water reactors and nuclear expertise by unstable military dictatorship, and possible nuclear devolution to radical Islamic state

Iraq

Importation of excessively large research reactor from France under the control of a harsh military regime

Israel

Secret nuclear program and deliverable arsenal developed in defiance of NPT, undermining nuclear restraint in a region viewed as critical to Western energy security

Pakistan

Secret nuclear program by military regime outside of NPT

South Africa

Secret nuclear program under control of racist authoritarian regime

South Korea

Secret nuclear weapons program under control of authoritarian military government

Taiwan

Secret nuclear weapons program under control of authoritarian military government

More Positive DevelopmentsNuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in place in Latin America and AfricaChemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force, April 1997, requiring universal elimination of chemical weapon stocksTermination of vast Soviet bio-warfare program and continuing negotiations on verification improvements to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Genuine Proliferation ConcernsContinuing advances and diffusion of bio-chem engineering expertise and technology may facilitate clandestine acquisition of chem-bio capabilities by subnational or multinational terrorist organizations, or military elements or agencies within foreign governments, e.g.Aum Shinrikyo release of Sarin nerve gas, Al Qaedas interest in chemical weapons.NPT regime still allows national acquisition of inherently dangerous nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities under peaceful-use safeguards.Significant quantities of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU), directly usable in nuclear weapons of simple design and construction, are stored at various poorly-secured locations around the world in connection with civil nuclear research programs. Returning this material to secure storage in the U.S. or Russia is a high nonproliferation priority.

Are WMD for Deterrence, or Tools of Coercion?Some states, including several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort NSCWMD, p. 1.

Could Foreign WMD Deter US Use of its Conventional Forces?For them [i.e. nameless rogue states], these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nations advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. NSCWMD p. 3.

US Might Respond with Nukes in Scenarios Well Short of Last ResortThe United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including through resort to all of our options to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies. public white paper NSCWMD, p.3.

The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies. Bushs classified National Security Presidential Directive 17, issued 9/17/2002.

Does Bush Strategy Itself Envision Preemptive or Coercive Use of WMD? U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies [an apparent reference to recent empowerment of the CIA, a civilian agency, to carry out extra-judicial killings of suspected terrorists] must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversarys WMD assets before these weapons are used. NSCWMD, Dec. 2002.

Bush Strategy Authorizes US Planning for First Use of WMDJuly 2001 Report to Congress on Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets: Nuclear weapons have a unique ability to destroy both agent containers and CBW agents. Lethality is optimized if the fireball is proximate to the targetGiven improved accuracy and the ability to penetrate the material layers overlaying a facility, it is possible to employ a much lower-yield weapon to achieve the needed neutralization.

Bush Plan Pursues R&D of New Nuclear Weapons for Global StrikeSecret December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review cited limitations in the present nuclear force:moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, and limited retargeting capability;new capabilities must be developed to: defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets; find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, defeat chemical or biological agents, and improve accuracy to limit collateral damage.

WHAT IS THE ROLE FOR DIPLOMACY and RULE OF LAW?As the United States Government relies on the armed forces to defend Americas interests, it must rely on diplomacy to interact with other nations.As humanitarian relief requirements are better understood, we must also be able to help build police forces, court systems, and legal codes, local and provincial government institutions, and electoral systems. Effective international cooperation is needed to accomplish these goals, backed by American readiness to play our part.-- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 23.

BUT: SOME PIGS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERSWe will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.

We will work together with other nations to avoid complications in our military operations and cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral and bilateral agreements that will protect US nationals from the ICC.-- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 23.

Could US War on Terror Run Afoul of the ICC? (Yes)US rules of engagement in Afghanistan violated legal norms protecting civilian noncombatantsEntire villages destroyed from the air because suspect Taliban/Al Qaeda elements were believed to be in themMassive, indiscriminate responses to perceived SAFIREs (surface-to-air fire)At least 3000 civilians killed as a consequence of both deliberate and errant US attacks1000 Taliban POWs murdered by U.S. Uzbek Northern Alliance allies

War on Terror Tactics & the ICCCIA has carried out extra-judicial killings of terrorism suspects and their associatesCaptured Taliban commanders and Al Qaeda operatives subjected to beatings, denial of pain medications, stress and duress techniques in secret CIA overseas interrogation centers. Less important terrorism suspects rendered, with list of questions to be answered, to foreign secret services (e.g. Morocco, Syria, Saudi Arabia) with a long record of torturing suspects.

Civilian Death Toll in Iraq Invasion is High3,240 civilians killed during first month of invasion, 1,896 in BaghdadBased on AP survey of deaths recorded at civilian hospitalsDoes not include deaths of those who were not brought to hospitals. Toll will increase as these deaths are tabulated

Relax Bush White House Says Preventive War Strategy is LegalThe overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threatmost often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

Bush Says Attacks on US Military Forces Would Violate Laws of WarWe must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of todays adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destructionweapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare.-- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 12.

No Cause Justifies TerrorThe enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents. In many regions, legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of a lasting peace.

Such grievances deserve to be, and must be, addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror. -- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 5. (emphasis added).

Except Americas Own Heres what our mission is: to take credible combat power to the far corners of the earth, to take the sovereignty of the United States of America anywhere we want. Our mission is to give the President options. Our mission is to be able to project combat power.

It [Sea Power 21, the Navys strategic vision] is about being the most lethal, mean fighting machine that we know how to be. Its not about negotiating. They try to negotiate all of the solutions. Its good if they can. If they dont, what are we going to do? Were going to bring havoc and destruction. -- Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, speaking to sailors aboard the 6th Fleet flagship USS La Salle, as quoted in CNO Says Navy Gives President Options, Story Number NNS0021120-23, 11/2002, 11:06:00 AM, www.news.navy.mil (emphasis added)

Compressing the Kill ChainWith the B-2s [long-range stealth bombers], well take the 16 bombs that they now carry and up that to 80 individually guided weapons. Ten B-2 bombers with 80 weapons each will take care of the target decks that we have prepared for conflicts in most parts of the world.The objective is to shorten, as much as we can, the find/fix/track/ target /engage/and assess loop, which is our definition of the kill chain.

Seamless Target Location[The goal] is to be able to accomplish the part of this that relies on our sensors and shootersin less than 10 minutesThe way you accomplish this is through machine-to-machine interfaces. Some call it Network-Centric-Warfare Its done in a seamless way. The person sitting at the console in the airplane gets a cursor over the target he doesnt know, doesnt care, which piece of the puzzle put the cursor over the target.-- General John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff, quoted in Compressing the Kill Chain, Armed Forces Journal International, May 2002, p. 40-42, (emphasis added)

Full Spectrum DominanceThe AF DCGS [Air Force Distributed Common Ground System] Strategic Plan starts by describing a vision of the possibilities: A globally integrated distributed and collaborative information technology enterprise; capable of continuous on-demand intelligence-brokering to achieve full spectrum dominance by enabling America and allied aerospace forces to change the course of events in hours, minutes or even seconds. -- Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) Block 10 System Requirements Document , 5 December 2002.

Havent We Heard This Prevail Song Before?Proactive counterproliferation effortsmust also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.Effective consequence management minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people, will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. -- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 5.

WMD Defenses and Mitigation Measures Are Part of the Military MissionIn addition, robust active and passive defenses [a reference to missile and air defenses and CBW protective gear] and mitigation measures must be in place to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when WMD are used.

Its Dj Vu All Over AgainIt is time to turn the expertise we have in that [civil defense] field Im not one [with expertise] but to turn it loose on what do we need in the line of defense against their [Soviet] weaponry, and defend our population, because we cant be sitting here this could become the vulnerable point for us in the event of an ultimatum. -- Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, 1980, quoted in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War, 1982.

Strategic Blackmail Is Back For rogue states these weapons [of mass destruction] are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.-- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 11.

With Blackmail on the Rise, Can Paralysis Be Far Behind?We dont want a war and we certainly dont want a nuclear war. But at the same time we dont want to be paralyzed by the fear of war as we pursue our economic, political, social, and cultural objectives.-- General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supporting President Reagans nuclear buildup request in testimony before Congress, 1982.

Rome on the PotomacTo contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forcesthe goal must be to provide the president with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friendsOur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.-- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 22 (emphasis added)

White House to China: Military Buildup Hampers National Greatness

In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. -- The National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, Sept. 17, 2002, p. 20.

Nuclear Strike Planning At DoD News Briefing on March 13, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld denied that the Pentagons recently leaked Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) referred to targeting any country with nuclear weapons. Preceding days news was full of stories that Bush was revising US nuclear war plans to focus on destruction of hardened, deeply buried, and mobile targets associated with weapons of mass destruction in non-nuclear weapon states such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya.

Secretary Rumsfelds Denial Rumsfeld: Let me also say a few words about the Nuclear Posture Review: Theres been some press discussion about leaks from the classified Nuclear Posture Review.Without getting into the classified details of the report, I can say that the Review says nothing about targeting any country with nuclear weapons(emphasis added). NEWS TRANSCRIPT from the United States Department of Defense,DoD News Briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (Joint Press Conferene with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Wednesday, March 13, 2002 - 11:40 a.m. EST.

What the Nuclear Posture Review Says About Nuclear TargetingIn setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential, or unexpected North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies.

Current Planning Supports Large Nuclear StrikesThe current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapon system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system requirements, is optimized to support large deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role.

Adaptive Planning Needed for Limited Nuclear StrikesDeliberate planning creates executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Adaptive planning is used to generate war plans quickly in time critical situations.Deliberate planning provides the foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises.

Quicker Nuclear Attack PlanningThe desire to shorten the time between identifying a target and having an option available will place significant stress on the nuclear planning process as it currently exists. Presently 12-48 hours is required to develop plan to attack a single new target, depending on the weapon system to be employed. New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats

Deep Underground Targets are ProliferatingMore than 70 countries now use underground facilities (UGFs) for military purposes Approximately 1,100 UGFs were known or suspected strategic (WMD, ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control) sites. Updated estimates from DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] reveal this number has now grown to over 1,400. A majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground facilities.

Bush Plan Seeks More Effective Nuclear Earth PenetratorCurrent conventional weapons are not effective for the long-term physical destruction of deep, underground facilities. With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be attacked with a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required with a surface burst weapon.

Bush sought and obtained repeal of legal restriction on new Tac-nukesIn May 2003 Republican-controlled House and Senate each repealed 1993 Spratt-Furse ban on research and advanced development of low-yield (

Creating peace in a more effective way...SEN. JIM SESSIONS (R-AL): We should not shut off any study, any evaluation, of nuclear weapons in what we might need in the future, what would be better, what could create peace in a more effective way than the current armament system we have. I believe this country has a moral responsibility to lead in this world and we will not be an effective leader if we dont maintain leadership in all forms of weaponryyes, including nuclear weaponry. It is just that simpleThey say we cant use it against al-Qaida. Maybe we can, maybe we cant. Probably we would not use a nuclear weapon against a group like al-Qaida.

We can stand for right in this dangerous worldWe absolutely cannot make a commitment that we will never do [develop] anything else in the future. That would simply set out a marker that would be the goal any nation could seek to attain, and then they would be on equal power with the United States of America militarily, in terms of nuclear weapons. We should not do that. I can say it with confidenceour Nation stands for peace, prosperity, trade, and freedom in this world. A lot of nations dont. If somebody in this body is not capable of making that value judgment, then I think they need to go back and study their history a little bit. So we can stand for right in this dangerous world; we simply have to be militarily strong.-- Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL), Chairman of Air-Land Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Congressional RecordSenate, May 20, 2003.

Would Bush Administration use new low-yield nuclear weapons it had them:SEN JON KYL (R-AZ) [and Chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee]: When a Member of the Senate speaks about low-yield nuclear weapons as nuts, we make a grave mistakeThe reason low-yield weapons research is being sought is because the world has changed since the time we developed these huge megaton nuclear weapons that can kill millions in just a few seconds. Instead of wanting to use those kinds of weapons, the United States would prefer, if it had to, to use a much smaller weapon, a low-yield nuclear weapon...In the most recent conflict in Iraq, we literally saw missiles flying through windows of buildings in downtown Baghdad. The kind of precision we have today enables us to use much smaller yield weapons to achieve the same results that large conventional weapons are being used for today. But they can do so much more effectively.

Sen. Kyl contFor example, we know that some so-called conventional bunker busters were used in an attempt to decapitate the Iraqi leadership in the early stages of the warBut it did not do the jobapparently the leadership of the Iraqi regime lived on. So we cannot say we have the capability, even in dealing with that regime, to destroy those kinds of targets. What we know from intelligence is that there are a lot of other nations in the world that know one thing: If you get deep enough underground with enough steel and concrete above your head, they cant get you. That is exactly the kind of facility being built by our potential enemies today. There is only one way to get those, and that is through a precise low-yield nuclear weapon. The design of those weapons is certainly in the mind of our scientists.-- Congressional RecordSenate, May 20, 2003.

If you get deep enough underground there is only one way to get those, and that is through a precise low-yield nuclear weapon.Like many Republican pro-defense hawks, Sen. Kyl talks first, and asks questions laterA low-yield nuclear weapon that can destroy deep underground targets does not exist, and cannot be developed using known laws of physics.To destroy a command center buried 600 feet deep under layers of hard rock would require a nuclear weapon with a yield of 300 -1000 Kilotons!Such a weapon would inundate an area of 1900 to 4,800 square kilometers with potentially lethal fallout (150 rem contour boundary at 48 hours)

WE.EXT Crater

Source: Horizon Technology, for Defense Nuclear Agency, EW.EXT Code, Version 2.1, 21 Dec 1984.

Apparent Crater Radius as a Function of Depth for a 0.01 Kt ExplosionApparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 0.01 Kt Explosion

Outside range of model; used scaling instead

DepthHardDryDryWetWetDepthHardDryDryWetWet

ofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoil

BurialBurial

(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)

-24.959.90-22.064.12

011.7723.5504.919.81

524.6048.85510.2520.35

1030.9556.931012.9023.73

1536.4961.041515.2025.45

2040.3162.552016.7926.06

2541.7362.002517.3925.83

3040.4859.743016.8624.89

Apparent Crater Radius as a Function of Depth for a 0.1 Kt ExplosionApparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 0.1 Kt ExplosionCrater Volume as a Function of Depth for a 0.1 Kt Explosion

DepthHardDryDryWetWetDepthHardDryDryWetWetDepthHardDryDryWetWet

ofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoil

BurialBurialBurial

(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)

-49.87519.75-44.1158.229-45574,459

023.4946.9809.78719.5707,50060,000

1049.0897.471020.4540.611068,410535,800

2061.75113.62025.7347.3520136,200849,300

3072.8121.83030.3350.7730223,3001,047,000

4080.42124.84033.515240301,0001,125,000

5083.26123.75034.6951.5350334,0001,095,000

6080.77119.26033.6549.6660304,900979,700

Apparent Crater Radius as a Function of Depth for a 1 Kt ExplosionApparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 1 Kt ExplosionCrater Volume as a Function of Depth for a 1 Kt ExplosionScaled to Other Yields from 1 Kt Data

20kt (yield)

DepthHardDryDryWetWetDepthHardDryDryWetWetDepthHardDryDryWetWetDryDryWetWetDepthDryDryWetWet

ofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilofRockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilDepthHard RockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoilofHard RockSoft RockSoilSoft RockSoil

BurialBurialBurialof BurialBurial

(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft^3)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)

-528.6833.5436.1345.5257.36-511.9513.9815.0518.9723.9-513,65021,84027,30054,600109,200-12.370.582.488.8111.8140.9-12.329.434.337.046.623.9

050.6159.1963.7680.33101.2021.0924.6626.5733.4742.17075,000120,000150,000300,000600,0000.0124.3145.4156.6197.3248.60.051.860.665.382.242.2

1084.4498.76106.4134168.91035.1841.1544.3355.8570.3610348,400557,400696,7001,393,0002,787,00024.6207.4242.6261.4329.2414.924.686.4101.1108.9137.270.4

2097.09112.3120.9151.1192.72040.4546.850.3962.9680.320529,600820,000102,4001,997,0004,142,00049.1238.5275.9297.0371.2473.449.199.4115.0123.8154.780.3

30109.9123.8131.3162211.33045.851.5854.7367.5188.0430768,7001,098,0001,311,0002,461,0005,459,00073.7270.0304.1322.5397.9519.073.7112.5126.7134.4165.888.0

40122.4134.5141.4172.3224.6405156.0558.9171.7893.59401,061,0001,409,0001,636,0002,959,0006,557,00098.3300.7330.4347.3423.2551.798.3125.3137.7144.7176.393.6

50134144.1150.8181.7234.15055.8460.0362.8575.6997.55501,393,0001,731,0001,987,0003,469,0007,426,000122.8329.2354.0370.4446.3575.1122.8137.2147.5154.4185.997.6

60144.3152.1159.5190240.66060.1263.3966.4779.16100.2601,739,0002,038,0002,349,0003,968,0008,057,000147.4354.5373.6391.8466.7591.0147.4147.7155.7163.3194.5100.2

70152.8158.4167.2197244.47063.6665.9969.6782.1101.8702,064,0002,298,0002,706,0004,427,0008,451,000172.0375.3389.1410.7483.9600.4172.0156.4162.1171.1201.7101.8

80159.1162.5173.7202.7246.08066.2967.7172.3984.44102.5802,331,0002,483,0003,035,0004,817,0008,617,000196.5390.8399.2426.7497.9604.3196.5162.8166.3177.8207.4102.5

90162.9164.4178.9206.7245.69067.8868.4974.5586.14102.3902,503,0002,570,0003,314,0005,113,0008,570,000221.1400.2403.8439.5507.7603.3221.1166.7168.2183.1211.6102.3

100164.1163.9182.6209.1243.310068.3668.376.0987.14101.41002,556,0002,549,0003,524,0005,294,0008,331,000245.6403.1402.6448.5513.6597.7245.6167.9167.8186.9214.1101.4

110162.5161.1184.8209.8239.311067.767.1476.9887.4399.71102,482,0002,421,0003,650,0005,347,0007,929,000270.2399.2395.7454.0515.4587.8270.2166.3164.9189.1214.899.7

120158.2156.1185.3208.8233.812065.9365.0677.286.9997.411202,292,0002,203,0003,681,0005,267,0007,394,000294.8388.6383.5455.2512.9574.3294.8162.0159.8189.6213.797.4

130151.5149.2184.2206226.913063.1462.1576.7385.8494.541302,014,0001,921,0003,614,0005,060,0006,760,000319.3372.2366.5452.5506.0557.4319.3155.1152.7188.5210.994.5

Apparent Crater Radius as a Function of Depth for a 10 Kt ExplosionApparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 10 Kt ExplosionCrater Volume as a Function of Depth for a 10 Kt Explosion



BurialBurialBurial


2029.8859.762012.4524.92015,444123,500

1040.1680.321016.7333.471037,490299,900

076.76153.5031.9863.970261,8002,094,000

-10148.2296.5-1061.77123.5-101,886,00015,080,000

-20164.5328.9-2068.52137-202,574,00020,590,000

-30178.4356.9-3074.35148.7-303,287,00026,300,000

-40192.1381.1-4080.03158.8-404,101,00032,020,000

-50205401-5085.4167.1-504,982,00037,310,000

-60217.7417.7-6090.73174.1-605,974,00042,190,000

-70230.3431.9-7095.97180-707,072,00046,630,000

-80242.6443.9-80101.1185-808,264,00050,630,000

-90254.4454-90106189.2-909,532,00054,170,000

-100265.7462.5-100110.7192.7-10010,850,00057,250,000

-110276.3469.4-110115.1195.6-11012,200,00059,860,000

-120286474.9-120119.2197.9-12013,540,00062,000,000

-130294.8479.2-130122.8199.7-13014,830,00063,670,000

-140302.6482.2-140126.1200.9-14016,040,00064,880,000

-150309.3484.1-150128.9201.7-15017,120,00065,650,000

-160314.7484.9-160131.1202-16018,040,00065,980,000

-170318.8484.7-170132.9202-17018,760,00065,890,000

-180321.7483.5-180134201.5-18019,260,00065,410,000

-190323.1481.4-190134.6200.6-19019,520,00064,560,000

-200323.2478.4-200134.7199.3-20019,530,00063,370,000

-210321.9474.6-210134.1197.7-21019,290,00061,860,000

Apparent Crater Radius as a Function of Depth for a 80 Kt B61-11Apparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 80 Kt B61-11Crater Volume as a Function of Depth for a 80 Kt B61-11



BurialBurialBurial


4048.2396.464020.140.194064,920519,400

3053.13106.33022.1444.283086,810694,500

2062.33124.72025.9751.9520140,2001,121,000

1081.28162.61033.8767.7410310,8002,486,000

0127.3254.6053.05106.101,194,0009,555,000

-10240.6481.2-10100.2200.5-108,058,00064,460,000

-20276.7553.4-20115.3230.6-2012,260,00098,080,000

-30292.4584.8-30121.8243.7-3014,470,000115,700,000

-40306.2612.4-40127.6255.2-4016,620,000132,900,000

-50320.5641-50133.5267.1-5019,050,000152,400,000

-60336.1669.7-60140.1279-6021,980,000173,800,000

-70349693.5-70145.4289-7024,600,000193,100,000

-80361.9715-80150.8297.9-8027,420,000211,600,000

-90374.7734.5-90156.1306.1-9030,450,000229,300,000

-100387.6752.3-100161.5313.4-10033,960,000246,400,000

-110400.3768.4-110166.8320.2-11037,130,000262,600,000

-120413783.2-120172.1326.3-12040,760,000278,000,000

-130425.5796.7-130177.3332-13044,580,000292,700,000

-140437.8809.1-140182.4337.1-14048,570,000306,500,000

-150450820.3-150187.5341.8-15052,720,000319,500,000

-160461.8830.6-160192.4346.1-16057,010,000331,600,000

-170473.4839.9-170197.3350-17061,410,000342,900,000

-180484.7848.4-180202353.6-18065,890,000353,300,000

-190495.6855.9-190206.5356.6-19070,440,000362,900,000

-200506.1862.7-200210.9359.5-20075,010,000371,600,000

-210516.1868.8-210215.1362-21079,570,000379,400,000




BurialBurialBurial


4052.55105.14021.943.794083,990671,900

3058.15116.33024.2348.4630113,800910,400

2068.36136.72028.4856.9720184,9001,479,000

1088.72177.41036.9773.9410404,2003,233,000

0136271.9056.65113.301,454,00011,630,000

-10252.4504.7-10105.2210.3-109,302,00074,410,000

-20292.6585.3-20121.9243.9-2014,500,000116,000,000

-30309.4618.7-30128.9257.8-3017,140,000137,100,000

-40323.2646.4-40134.7269.3-4019,540,000156,300,000

-50337.3674.7-50140.6281.1-5022,210,000177,700,000

-60352704.1-60146.7293.4-6025,250,000202,000,000

-70366.6729.6-70152.7304-7028,500,000224,800,000

-80379.4752.2-80158.1313.4-8031,610,000246,300,000

-90392.3772.7-90163.5322-9034,940,000267,000,000

-100405.2791.5-100168.8329.8-10038,490,000286,900,000

-110418808.7-110174.2336.9-11042,250,000306,000,000

-120430.7824.5-120179.5343.5-12046,240,000324,300,000

-130443.3839-130184.7349.6-13050,430,000341,700,000

-140455.8852.3-140189.9355.1-14054,810,000358,300,000

-150468.2864.6-150195.1360.2-15059,380,000374,000,000

-160480.3875.8-160200.1364.9-16064,110,000388,800,000

-170492.2886.1-170205.1369.2-17068,990,000402,600,000

-180503.8895.5-180209.9373.1-18073,990,000415,600,000

-190515.1904.1-190214.6376.7-19079,090,000427,700,000

-200526.1911.9-200219.2380-20084,260,000438,800,000

-210536.7918.9-210223.6382.9-21089,470,000449,100,000




BurialBurialBurial


4081.43162.94033.9367.8640312,5002,500,000

3091.33182.73038.0576.1130440,9003,527,000

20107.4214.72044.7489.4720716,3005,730,000

10135.1270.21056.29112.6101,427,00011,420,000

0187.8375.6078.26156.503,834,00030,670,000

-10317.3634.7-10132.2264.4-1018,490,000147,900,000

-20381.7763.3-20159318-2032,170,000257,400,000

-30409.1818.3-30170.5341-3039,640,000317,100,000

-40425.3850.6-40177.2354.4-4044,530,000356,200,000

-50439.2878.5-50183366-5049,040,000392,300,000

-60453.1906.2-60188.8377.6-6053,840,000430,700,000

-70934.7-70389.4-70472,500,000

-80964-80401.7-80518,400,000

-90991.6-90413.2-90564,300,000

-1001016-100423.2-100606,200,000

-110-110-110

-120-120-120

-130-130-130

-140-140-140

-150-150-150

-160-160-160

-170-170-170

-180-180-180

-190-190-190

-200-200-200

-210-210-210

Apparent Crater Radius as A Function of Depth for a 1 Mt ExplosionApparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 1 Mt ExplosionCrater Volume as a Function of Depth for a 1 Mt Explosion



BurialBurialBurial


40133.7267.44055.71111.4401,383,00011,060,000

301503003062.49125301,953,00015,620,000

20173.7347.52072.39144.8203,034,00024,280,000

10209.8419.61087.42174.8105,344,00042,750,000

0267.6535.20111.5223011,090,00088,730,000

-10407813.9-10169.6339.1-1039,010,000312,100,000

-20498.9997.9-20207.9415.8-2071,880,000575,000,000

-30549.61,099-30229458-3096,050,000768,400,000

-40577.41,155-40240.6481.2-40111,400,000891,200,000

-50595.61,191-50248.1496.3-50122,200,000978,000,000

-60610.31,221-60254.3508.6-60131,600,0001,052,000,000

-70624.21,248-70260.1520.1-70140,700,0001,126,000,000

-806381,276-80265.8531.6-80150,300,0001,202,000,000

-906521,304-90271.7543.3-90160,400,0001,283,000,000

-100666.31,333-100277.6555.2-100171,200,0001,369,000,000

-110680.91,362-110283.7567.4-110182,700,0001,461,000,000

-120695.81,392-120289.9579.9-120195,000,0001,560,000,000

-130712.51,417-130296.5590.5-130208,500,0001,648,000,000

-140724.41,441-140301.8600.6-140220,000,0001,733,000,000

-150737.21,464-150307.2610.1-150231,900,0001,817,000,000

-160750.11,486-160312.5619.2-160244,200,0001,899,000,000

-1707631,507-170317.9627.8-170257,000,0001,980,000,000

-180775.91,527-180323.3636.1-180270,300,0002,059,000,000

-190788.71,545-190328.6644-190283,900,0002,136,000,000

-200801.61,564-200334651.5-200298,000,0002,212,000,000

-210814.41,581-210339.3658.7-210312,600,0002,286,000,000

Apparent Crater Radius as A Function of Depth for a 9 Mt ExplosionApparent Crater Depth as a Function of Depth for a 9 Mt ExplosionCrater Volume as a Function of Depth for a 9 Mt Explosion



BurialBurialBurial


40326.4652.7401362724020,120,000160,900,000

30357.3714.730148.9297.83026,410,000211,300,000

20396.3792.620165.1330.32036,020,000288,200,000

10446.1892.110185.9371.71051,360,000410,900,000

0510.710210212.8425.6077,090,000616,700,000

-10659.31319-10274.7549.4-10165,800,0001,327,000,000

-20787.31573-20328656.1-20282,400,0002,259,000,000

Damage

Source: Horizon Technology, for Defense Nuclear Agency, EW.EXT Code, Version 2.1, 21 Dec 1984.

Assume Damage Depth =

1.5x apparent crater radius

0.01 kt0.1 kt1 kt10 kt80 kt (B61-11)100 kt300 kt1 Mt9 Mt (B53)

Depth of BurialApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthDepth of BurialApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthDepth of BurialApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthDepth of BurialApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage DepthApparent Crater Radius in Hard RockApparent Crater Radius in Wet SoilHard Rock Damage DepthWet Soil Damage Depth

(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)

-4048.2396.46-72-14552.55105.1-79-15881.43162.9-122-244133.7267.4-201-401326.4652.7-490-979

-3053.13106.3-80-15958.15116.3-87-17491.33182.7-137-274150300-225-450357.3714.7-536-1,072

-2029.8859.76-45-9062.33124.7-93-18768.36136.7-103-205107.4214.7-161-322173.7347.5-261-521396.3792.6-594-1,189

-24.959.90-7-15-49.87519.75-15-30-528.6857.36-43-86-1040.1680.32-60-12081.28162.6-122-24488.72177.4-133-266135.1270.2-203-405209.8419.6-315-629446.1892.1-669-1,338

011.7723.55-18-35023.4946.98-35-70050.61101.2-76-152076.76153.5-115-230127.3254.6-191-382136271.9-204-408187.8375.6-282-563267.6535.2-401-803510.71021-766-1,532

524.6048.85-37-731049.0897.47-74-1461084.44168.9-127-25310148.2296.5-222-445240.6481.2-361-722252.4504.7-379-757317.3634.7-476-952407813.9-611-1,221659.31319-989-1,979

1030.9556.93-46-852061.75113.6-93-1702097.09192.7-146-28920164.5328.9-247-493276.7553.4-415-830292.6585.3-439-878381.7763.3-573-1,145498.9997.9-748-1,497787.31573-1,181-2,360

1536.4961.04-55-923072.8121.8-109-18330109.9211.3-165-31730178.4356.9-268-535292.4584.8-439-877309.4618.7-464-928409.1818.3-614-1,227549.61,099-824-1,649

2040.3162.55-60-944080.42124.8-121-18740122.4224.6-184-33740192.1381.1-288-572306.2612.4-459-919323.2646.4-485-970425.3850.6-638-1,276577.41,155-866-1,733

2541.7362.00-63-935083.26123.7-125-18650134234.1-201-35150205401-308-602320.5641-481-962337.3674.7-506-1,012439.2878.5-659-1,318595.61,191-893-1,787

3040.4859.74-61-906080.77119.2-121-17960144.3240.6-216-36160217.7417.7-327-627336.1669.7-504-1,005352704.1-528-1,056453.1906.2-680-1,359610.31,221-915-1,832

70152.8244.4-229-36770230.3431.9-345-648349693.5-524-1,040366.6729.6-550-1,094934.7-1,402624.21,248-936-1,872

80159.1246.0-239-36980242.6443.9-364-666361.9715-543-1,073379.4752.2-569-1,128964-1,4466381,276-957-1,914

90162.9245.6-244-36890254.4454-382-681374.7734.5-562-1,102392.3772.7-588-1,159991.6-1,4876521,304-978-1,956

100164.1243.3-246-365100265.7462.5-399-694387.6752.3-581-1,128405.2791.5-608-1,1871016-1,524666.31,333-999-2,000

110162.5239.3-244-359110276.3469.4-414-704400.3768.4-600-1,153418808.7-627-1,213680.91,362-1,021-2,043

120158.2233.8-237-351120286474.9-429-712413783.2-620-1,175430.7824.5-646-1,237695.81,392-1,044-2,088

130151.5226.9-227-340130294.8479.2-442-719425.5796.7-638-1,195443.3839-665-1,259712.51,417-1,069-2,126

140302.6482.2-454-723437.8809.1-657-1,214455.8852.3-684-1,278724.41,441-1,087-2,162

150309.3484.1-464-726450820.3-675-1,230468.2864.6-702-1,297737.21,464-1,106-2,196

160314.7484.9-472-727461.8830.6-693-1,246480.3875.8-720-1,314750.11,486-1,125-2,229

170318.8484.7-478-727473.4839.9-710-1,260492.2886.1-738-1,3297631,507-1,145-2,261

180321.7483.5-483-725484.7848.4-727-1,273503.8895.5-756-1,343775.91,527-1,164-2,291

190323.1481.4-485-722495.6855.9-743-1,284515.1904.1-773-1,356788.71,545-1,183-2,318

200323.2478.4-485-718506.1862.7-759-1,294526.1911.9-789-1,368801.61,564-1,202-2,346

210321.9474.6-483-712516.1868.8-774-1,303536.7918.9-805-1,378814.41,581-1,222-2,372

Hard Rock Chart

-17.6593321769-35.235-75.915-115.14-204-281.7-401.4

-36.8974041396-73.62-126.66-222.3-378.6-475.95-610.5

-46.4224675147-92.625-145.635-246.75-438.9-572.55-748.35

-54.7296459121-109.2-164.85-267.6-464.1-613.65-824.4

-60.4582159925-120.63-183.6-288.15-484.8-637.95-866.1

-62.5932736077-124.89-201-307.5-505.95-658.8-893.4

9 Mt (B53) Surface Burst

Penetration Limit for the B61-11 in Frozen Soils: < 10 ft

Probable EPW Penetration Limit in Hard Rock ~ 33 ft

RNEP (Proposed)

Low Yield EPW

Agent Defeat Weapons (< 5 kt)

B61-11

0.01 kt

0.1 kt

1 kt

10 kt

100 kt

300 kt

1 Mt (B83)

EPW Depth of Penetration (ft)

Damage Zone Depth (ft) (= 1.5 Apparent Crater Radius)

Figure 5: Earth Penetrator Weapon (EPW) Targeted Against a Hardened Underground Bunker in Hard RockDamage Zone Depth as a Function of Nuclear Yield and Depth of Penetration

Hard Rock Chart (2)

-115.14-190.95-75.915

-222.3-360.9-126.66

-246.7520-145.635

-267.630-164.85

-288.1540-183.6

-307.550-201

Probable penetration limit: 33 ft in hard rock

10 Kt EPW (Conceptual)

B-61 (80 Kt) Actual

1 Kt EPW (Conceptual)

EPW Penetration Depth (ft)

Damage Zone Depth (ft)

Figure 4: Earth Penetrator Weapon (EPW) Targeted Against a Hardened Underground Bunker in Hard RockDamage Zone Depth as a Function of Nuclear Yield and Depth of Penetration

Wet Soil Chart

-35.3186643537-70.47-151.8-230.25-381.9-407.85-563.4-802.8

-73.2760794925-146.205-253.35-444.75-721.8-757.05-952.05-1220.85

-85.4023046101-170.4-289.05-493.35-830.1-877.95-1144.95-1496.85

-91.5669075837-182.7-316.95-535.35-877.2-928.05-1227.45-1648.5

-93.822250135-187.2-336.9-571.65-918.6-969.6-1275.9-1732.5

-92.9952911995-185.55-351.15-601.5-961.5-1012.05-1317.75-1786.5

-89.6122773726-178.8-360.9-626.55-1004.55-1056.15-1359.3-1831.5

-366.6-647.85-1040.25-1094.4-1402.05-1872

-369-665.85-1072.5-1128.3-1446-1914

-368.4-681-1101.75-1159.05-1487.4-1956

-364.95-693.75-1128.45-1187.25-1524-1999.5

Penetration Limit for the B61-11 in Wet Soil

Probable Penetration Limit for New EPW in Wet Soil: 66 ft

9 Mt (B53) Surface Burst

0.01 kt

0.1 kt

1 kt

10 kt

80 kt (B61-11)

100 kt

300 kt

1 Mt (B83)

EPW Depth of Penetration (ft)

Damage Zone Depth (ft) (= 1.5 Apparent Crater Radius)

Figure 3: Earth Penetrator Weapon (EPW) Targeted Against a Hardened Underground Bunker in Wet SoilDamage Zone Depth as a Function of Nuclear Yield and Depth of Penetration

Cavity

Rarth Penetrator Calculations

Cavity Radius

Rc = C (Y^(1/3))/((rho*H)^0.25)

1150kt (explosive yield)Y

1402m (depth of burst)H

75constantC

2.2g/cm^3 (density)rho

105.44m (radius of cavity)Parameters

345.9ftMediumCrhoK

Tuff74.75-77.661.8-2.23.8-6.8

Granite57.70-60.482.74.2-4.5

Dolomite51.312.33.2

Alluvium64.33-76.452unlimited

Salt63.27-66.752.3negligable

10kt (explosive yield)

263m (depth of burst)

MediumRc(min)Rc(max)Hc(min)Hc(max)MediumRc(min)Rc(max)Hc(min)Hc(max)

(m)(m)(m)(m)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)

Tuff34.535.9131.2243.9Tuff113.3117.7430.4800.2

Granite24.125.2101.1115.3Granite79.082.8331.8378.3

Dolomite22.322.371.371.3Dolomite73.173.1234.0234.0

Alluvium28.934.4unlimitedunlimitedAlluvium94.9112.8unlimitedunlimited

Salt27.529.0negligablenegligableSalt90.295.1negligablenegligable

Source: Edward Teller, Wilson K. Talley, Gary H. Higgins, Gerald W. Johnson, "The Constructive Uses of Nuclear Explosives," McGraw-Hill Book Co., LC 68-11621, pp. 136-137.

http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Library/Effects/UndergroundEffects.html

Gerald W. Johnson and Gary H. Higgins, "Engineering Applications of Nuclear Explosives: Project Ploughshare," University of California, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, UCRL-7634, UC-35 TID-4500 (32nd Ed.)May 19, 1964.

___________________________________________________________

Depth to Avoid Venting [70.1* Y^0.294]

H = a Y^b(m)

10kt (yield)

abH (m)H (ft)

700.294137.8451.9

900.3333333333193.9636.2Glasstone and Dolan, 1977, p. 261; Rob W. Nelson, "Low-Yield Earth Penetrator Nuclear Weapons," Science and Clobal Security, 10: 1-20, 2002, p.

1220.3333333333262.8862.3NTS Criteria

___________________________________________________________

EventDateYieldDepth ofChimneyMedium

BurialHeight

(kt)(ft)(ft)

Handcar5-Nov-64101,320233dolomite (carbonate rock)

Gasbuggy10-Dec-67294,240330sandstone

Rulison10-Sep-69408,430sandstone

Benhan19-Dec-6811501,402tuffsRc (calc) = 89 m

Data for 13 underground shots are found in Gerald W. Johnson and Gary H. Higgins, "Engineering Applications of Nuclear Explosives: Project Ploughshare," Table 1.

___________________________________________________________

Approximations:

Rc = k m/W^(1/3)

Zonek

Melt4 to 12rock is vaporized and motion produces a void

Crushed30 to 40medium has lost all its prior integrety

Cracked80 to 120characterized by radial and concentric fissures

10Irreversible strain800 to 1100local media deformation

kkt (explosive yield)

4Rc (m)Rc (ft)

128.628.3Melt

3025.984.8Melt

4064.6212.1Crushed

8086.2282.7Crushed

120172.4565.5Cracked

800258.5848.2Cracked

11001,723.55,654.7Irreversible strain

2,369.97,775.2Irreversible strain

Source: Adushkin and Spivak (1994) cited in Ward Hawkins and Ken Wohletz, "Visual Inspection for CTBT Verification," LA-13244-MS excerpt, http://www.ees1.lanl.gov/Wohletz/VISUAL-lams.htm

_______________________________________________________

At Mururoa

Rc = k m/W^(1/3)

Zonek

Melt10 to 12Rcrock is vaporized and motion produces a void

Crushed2Rcmedium has lost all its prior integrety

CrackedRd = 5Rccharacterized by radial and concentric fissures

10chimney height4-10 Rc

kkt (explosive yield)

10Rc (m)Rc (ft)

1221.570.7Melt

2025.984.8Melt

2243.1141.4Crushed

5047.4155.5Crushed

60107.7353.4Cracked

40129.3424.1Cracked

12086.2282.7chimney height

258.5848.2chimney height

Source: Prof E.T. Brown, "Consequences of Underground Nuclear Testing in French Polynesia," Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, Focus, No. 104, Nov/Dec 1998.

http://www.atse.org.au/publications/focus/focus-brown-et.htm

http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Library/Effects/UndergroundEffects.html

Paine's Crater

Apparent Crater Radius as A Function of Depth for a 1 KT Explosion

Chris' interpolation from Glasstone and Nolan, 1977, p. 255

DepthWetDry

ofSoft Rock/Hard Rock

BurialWet Soil

(ft)(ft)(ft)

08249

1011585

20130100

30143110

40150120

50165127

60175123

70185140

80190143

Source: Glasstone and Dolan, 1977, p. 254.

Scaled to Other Yields

50kt (yield)

ScaledWetDryDepthWetDry

DepthSoft Rock/Hard RockofSoft Rock/Hard Rock

of BurialWet SoilBurialWet Soil

(ft)(ft)(ft)(m)(m)(m)

0.02651580.080.848.3

32.33722759.9113.383.8

64.742032319.7128.198.6

97.046235629.6140.9108.4

129.348538839.4147.8118.3

161.753441149.3162.6125.2

194.056639859.1172.5121.2

226.459845369.0182.3138.0

258.761446278.8187.3140.9

0.0398238

32.3558412

64.7631485

97.0694534

129.3728582

161.7800616

194.0849597

226.4897679

258.7922694

Paine's Damage

Damage to Underground Bunker as a function of Apparent Crater or Cavity Radius

Source: Chris' interpolation of Glasstone and Nolan data

1kt Explosion

Apparent Crater RadiusCavity Radius

DepthWetDryTuffGraniteDolomiteAlluviumSaltParameters

ofSoft Rock/Hard RockMediumC(min)C(max)rho(min)rho(max)K (min)K (max)

BurialR(min)R(max)Wet SoilRc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Tuff74.7577.661.82.23.8-6.86.8

(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)Granite57.760.482.72.74.2-4.54.5

049828249Dolomite51.3151.312.32.33.23.2

108511511585152166112117103103134160128135Alluvium64.3376.4522unlimitedunlimited

2010013013010012814094998787113134107113Salt63.2766.752.32.3negligablenegligable

301101431431101161268589797910212197102

4012015015012010811879837373951139095

5012716516512710211175786969901078590

601231751751239710671756666861028286

70140185185140941026972646483987883

8014319019014391996670626280957680

10kt Explosion


DepthWetDryTuffGraniteDolomiteAlluviumSalt


BurialR(min)R(max)Wet SoilRc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)

(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)(ft)

09816416498

10170229229170328359241252223223289344275290

20200259259200276302202212187187243289231244

30219285285219249273183192169169220261209220

40239299299239232254170178158158205243194205

50253329329253220240161169149149194230184194

60245349349245210229154161142142185220176185

70279369369279202221148155137137178211169178

80285379379285195213143150133133172204163172


DepthWetDryTuffGraniteDolomiteAlluviumSalt


BurialR(min)R(max)Wet SoilRc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)Rc(min)Rc(max)

(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)(m)

0305050300000000000

35270705210010973776868881058488

66179796184926265575774887074

96787876776835658525267806467

127391917371775254484862745962

15771001007767734951454559705659

18751061067564704749434356675456

21851131138562674547424254645254

24871161168760654446404052625053

Delort's Crater

Cavity Radius

10kt (explosive yield)W

263m (depth of burst)H

2g/cm^3 (density)rho

9.8(gravitational constant)g

10bars (structural coefficient of the medium)Cs

2.00(adiabatic expansion coefficient of gas)gamma = (5/3) for a perfect monotomic gas

5,155rho*g*H

Rc (meters) = 52 [W/(rho*g*H+Cs)]^(1/(3*gamma))

18.36m (radius of cavity)Structual Coefficients for Different MediaDensity

60.2ftMediumCs (bars-10^6 dynes/cm^2)Mediumrho (g/cm^3)

Tuff0

Radioactive fallout from B-2 bomber attack (using B61-11 (300 kt) EPW at depth of 30ft) on military command center buried 800 feet in mountain immediately west of Pyonyang, North Korea.Casualties: HPAC code calculates 430-550 thousand

New Tools Wanted for Building Nuclear Strike Plans in CrisesShifting emphasis from large preplanned nuclear strikes on Russia to flexible global limited nuclear strike strikes is prompting:overhaul of Pentagons Strategic Warfare Planning Systemmulti-billion dollar expenditures on nuclear command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) upgrades. This includes improving the tools used to build and execute strike plans so that the national leadership can adapt pre-planned options, or construct new options, during highly dynamic crisis situations.

Bottom Line: Rogue States ARE TargetsDespite Rumsfeld denial, Bush team is spending billions to reinvigorate Limited Nuclear Options capability with a rapid global reach;Any state deemed hostile to US interests and suspected of having chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon stocks or facilities is a potential target for US nuclear weapons;Formerly nuclear deterrent Strategic Forces are becoming dual-capable, long-range global strike forces.

Could OBL Have Crippled Nuclear Command System?Pentagon believes September 11 identified the need to expand the current nuclear command and control (C2) architecture to a true national command and control conferencing system. (NPR, p. 26)Immediate upgrades to aircraft for national leadership after 9/11, but much more is in the works.

GEMS RFI/Industry Day

Ground Element Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) System (GEMS)

6 August 2002Strategic and Nuclear Deterrence Command and Control System Program OfficeElectronic Systems Center Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)Hanscom Air Force Base, MA 01731

Why GEMS?GEMS provides worldwide nuclear survivable communications nodes Integrates Extremely High Frequency (EHF), Very Low Frequency/ Low Frequency (VLF/LF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) communica-tions into one operational system that can: perform both fixed and transportable strategic and sub-strategic nuclear execution forces missions.

GEMS For Post Attack ConnectivityGEMS, using EHF, Aircrew Alerting, and VLF/LF will provide pre-, trans-, and post attack connectivity to the nuclear execution forces. -- Combat Air Forces (CAF) Air Mobility Command (AMC) ORD-408-00-I, 1 August 2002

High Level CONOPS

GEMS for Non-Strategic ExecutionGEMS provides [nuclear]command posts, Munitions Support Squadrons, and Mobile Support Teams with the flexibility to conduct mission requirements through the full spectrum of nuclear warfare using EHF and VLF waveforms.We need systems that ensure reliable, secure, and responsive communications are maintained between the President, the SECDEF and our nuclear execution forces and associated commands involved in strategic and non-strategic execution.

GEMS for Endurable Phase of a Nuclear Conflict[GEMS] terminal data flow must [provide] for directed terminal reconfigurations during the endurable phase of a nuclear conflict.In the pre- nuclear environment, transportable GEMS setup/teardown times, to include antennas, shall take no more than two hours; one hour is desirable.

Soldiers Get a Break in the Post-Nuclear EnvironmentIn the trans- and post nuclear environment, transportable GEMS setup/teardown times do not apply to personnel wearing Military Operational Protective Posture (MOPP) IV gear.

GEMS Must Also Operate in Chem-Bio EnvironmentsGEMS shall be protected to withstand the effects of biological, chemical and radiological events. GEMS shall be capable of operations, main-tenance and setup/teardown by personnel wearing MOPP IV gearFor EHF, GEMS shall be configured to support global protected communications and for en-route threat and target updates for both conventional and nuclear operations

GEMS is Just the Tip of Global Strike C3I IcebergSystem: Advanced Polar EHF Satellite Communication (SATCOM)Cost: $ billions? Still in early stages of developmentMission: Bush Nuclear Posture Review called for development of new SATCOM system primarily for national and strategic users requiring nuclear-protected communications in the mid-latitude and polar regions, with a planned first launch during FY 09. Survivable, jam-resistant, secure voice conferencing among principal nuclear C2 decision makers remains essential to facilitate discussions of tactical warning and assessment, response options, and force management.

Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (WGS)Joint Air Force-Army program for communications during all levels of conflict short of nuclear warCost: $1.7 billion for five satellites; based on Boeing commercial satellite technology, but production cost is rising, due to prior commercial contract cancellationsBridge to Advanced Wideband System (AWS)

ADVANCED WIDEBAND SATELLITE (AWS)

AWS is Integral to Prompt Global Strike CapabilitySupplements AEHF satellite system and replaces current Milstar system;Improved survivable jam-resistant worldwide secure communications for DOD, NASA, and intelligence communityFirst satellite launch: December 2009Current Program Cost Estimate: $8.2 billion ($2.05 billion per satellite)New hurry-up National Security Space Acquisition process makes no distinction between end of technology development and start of product development.

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) SatellitesFirst of 3 launches in 2006Contractor: Lockheed-MartinCost: at least $1.7 billion per satellite

Nuclear C3 for Strategic/Tactical WarfightingSystem: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) SatellitesCost: $5.6 Billion (three satellites)Mission: Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for three satellites in FY2008 will provide nuclear-survivable, anti-jam, low and medium data rate communications to strategic and tactical users. Developments costs increased $1.8 billion last year, due primarily to additional requirements needed to fulfill warfighting requirements.

Space-Based Infrared System High (SBIRS)

SBIRS High for Missile Warning and Defense, Battlespace CharacterizationContractor is Lockheed-MartinProgram cost has doubled since March 1998: five satellites will cost at least $8.25 billion, or $1.65 billion per satelliteRumsfeld is building first two satellites using research and development fundingFirst launch in FY 2007.

Other Important Bush-Rumsfeld Changes in US Strategic PostureBush unilaterally withdrew US from the ABM Treaty (June, 2002)Republicans have doubled Missile Defense spending (to $9 billion/yr) while systematically reducing Congressional and independent oversight of iterative spiral development programAnnounced emergency deployment of an unproven ground-based midcourse hit-to-kill system in Alaska and California by October 2004

More important changesSpecial Operations Forces are being enlarged and equipped with more powerful weaponsUS Global Basing Structure is expanding againThe former nuclear Strategic (Air) Command and Space Command merged in 2002 to form a new unified Strategic Command (STRATCOM) with a huge mission portfolio: Deterrence of Nuclear AttackGlobal conventional and nuclear strikesMissile DefenseSpace Control and DefenseInformation Warfare

More important changesRepublicans have created new Pentagon post of Undersecretary for Intelligence.This official (currently Rumsfeld mandarin Stephen Cambone) has been given direct control over the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaisance Office (NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).Change reduces authority and influence of CIA Director, and further compromises independence of intelligence process.

Defense Industry Consolidation$140 billion annual defense R&D and procurement spending now largely shared by five huge firms (underlined) which have incestuous teaming and subcontracting arrangements:Lockheed-Martin-Loral-ComsatNorthrop-Grumman-Litton-Newport News Shipbuilding-TRW)Boeing-Rockwell Int. Aerospace-McDonell Douglas) Raytheon-Hughes Aircraft-E Systems-TI DefenseGeneral Dynamics-Bath Iron Works-GTE Government SystemsIn the 1999/2000 election cycle, these 5 firms alone donated more than $1.4 million to the campaigns of Senate and House Armed Services Committee members. Dozens of former senior executives and board members from these companies populate the top defense management jobs in the Bush Administration.

Chart1

6144183826581064020021100

383630683686105902007954

22002870491099802012933

"Operationally Deployed Strategic Weapons"

Ready Reserve Weapons

Inactive Reserve Stockpile

Total Stockpile (intact nuclear weapons)

(Not shown:stored Pu/HEU components for ~ 5000 additional weapons)

Strategic Launchers (I.e. missile silos, sub-launch tubes, and nuclear-equipped long-range bombers)

BUSH PLAN FOR US NUCLEAR FORCES2002 - 2012

Sheet1

"Operationally Deployed Strategic Weapons"Ready Reserve WeaponsInactive Reserve StockpileTotal Stockpile (intact nuclear weapons)(Not shown:stored Pu/HEU components for ~ 5000 additional weapons)Strategic Launchers (I.e. missile silos, sub-launch tubes, and nuclear-equipped long-range bombers)

200261441838265810,6401100

200738363068368610,590954

20122200287049109980933

Sheet2

Sheet3

Bush Plan Keeps Huge ForceNuclear Posture Review (NPR) projects indefinite retention of large modern, diverse nuclear forces:In 2013, US President would still command a massive force: - 954 strategic launchers - 3000 operational strategic and substrategic weapons - 2100 active reserve weapons ready for re-deployment - 4900 intact but inactive reserve weapons (not ready). - nuclear components for ~ 5000 additional weaponsTotal potential for 15,000 weapons.

Bush Nuclear Force Structure Reductions Are Exceedingly ModestDeactivation and removal of 50 deployed MX/ Peacekeeper ICBMs began October 1 and is scheduled to be completed in three years. Secret NPR report explains leisurely pace by noting that MX elimination is phased to correspond with introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific sub fleet.MX remaining during the elimination period are being kept on alert to provide a necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities.

Necessary Contribution?What portfolio of capabilities?President says US is no longer targeting Russia with nuclear missiles.If true, does this mean nuclear missiles are being kept on alert without targets? If so, whats the point? Who, and what is being deterred by these alert missiles? China?Bottom Line: Somebody is Lying, or Else Wasting a Great Deal of Money probably both.

Nothing Gets EliminatedBush plan calls for MX silos to be retained, rather than destroyed as specified in START II Treaty;MX missile stages also retained, with no controls in SORT over future military use of analogous Russian missiles;500 W87 MX warheads (300 kt) will be shifted to single-warhead variant of Minuteman III ICBM;MM III missile is being rebuilt and modernized at a cost of some $6 billion.

Bush Plan Modernizes/Extends Life of SLBM Force From now to 2013, Pentagon will spend at least another $10.4 billion on the Trident II missile system, including: - additional 115 Trident II missiles ($4.3 billion) - improved guidance systems and missile electronics ($4 billion)- Pacific deployment with Mk5/W88 silo-busting warhead

Trident Sub ConversionBush program implements 1994 planned cut in Trident ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 14 by FY 2007.Four older subs will be converted to carry Special Operations Forces and up to 154 conventional cruise missiles per boatOf 14 Tridents remaining in service, first will not retire until 2029, some 60 years after the United States ratified its NPT Article VI obligation.Navy is already studying concepts for a replacement that would begin development around 2016.

No further reductions planned in nuclear force structureFollowing these gradual and modest reductions in deployed ICBMs (9%) and Trident launchers (22%), Bushs secret plan states:No additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service.

Bush Plan Revitalizes US Nuclear Weapons ComplexBush wants modern capacity to:upgrade existing nuclear weaponssurge production of weapons develop and field entirely new weapons.Bushs desired nuclear arsenal of the future would have capability to target and destroy:mobile and re-locatable systemshard and deeply buried targetschemical and biological stocks (Agent Defeat).

Bush Plan Keeps US Nuclear Weapons Research at High LevelCurrent Bush FY 2004 funding request of $6.6 billion for nuclear Weapons Activities account is about 65% HIGHER than Cold War average level (~ $4.1billion per yr. in current 2003 dollars) 23% higher than last Clinton-era budget (FY2001)Plans underway to expand Pantex nuclear weapon assembly plant capacity to 600 warheads per year, up from current 350 wh/yr.

No Time For Disarmament Pantex Fully Booked with Double-Shift Warhead RefurbishmentsNo capacity available to dismantle any warheads that might be retired under Moscow Treaty;Any plan to increase dismantlements prior to at least FY 2014 would compete for resources with critical refurbishment or evaluation work. -- NNSA, Aug. 1, 2002.

Bush Plan Resurrects Advanced Concepts Nuclear Design Teams Advanced Concepts Initiative ongoing at all three nuclear weapons labs:Purpose is to energize design work on advanced concepts, according to NPR Report.Work focuses on evolving DoD requirements:Defeat Hardened and Deeply Buried TargetsAgent Defeat Weapons to attack chem-bio warfare sites; High-Power Microwave weapons to disable power grids, communication networksReduce collateral damage via improved accuracy, reduced and variable yields

Bush Plan Calls For New Plutonium Pit FactoryNuclear Posture Review projects need for Modern Pit Facility (MPF), to deal with the large-scale replacement of plutonium components and new production. MPF would cost on the order of $2-4 billion and have a modular expandable capacity of 125 to 500 pits per yearCandidate sites are Los Alamos or Carlsbad, N.M.; Amarillo, TX; Aiken, SC; and the Nevada Test Site (NTS).

Bush Administration may accelerate MPF to produce new weapons$1.7 billion modernization of Los Alamos pit production facilities is already ongoing; designed to provide (doubleshift) capacity for up to 50 pits per year by 2007.However, according to DOE, lack of a permanent plutonium pit production facility is a critical issue in defense readiness since it deals directly with our ability to keep our nuclear stockpile safe, reliable, and secure.But DOE also say new facility, if approved, will reestablish the capability to manufacture current and future pit types for the nuclear stockpile by 2020. A Republican-inspired advisory panel, chaired by John Foster, is pressing that this date be moved to within the next 10 years.

Plan Modernizes Thermonuclear Component Factory Bush plans includes 7-8 year, billion-dollar project to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to meet the planned workload for replacing thermonuclear warhead secondary stages and other uranium components.

Tritium Boost Gas Production to Resume in Fall 2003There will be no near-term reduction in the demand for tritium. NNSA, Aug. 1, 02.NNSA completing construction and will soon begin operation of a new $507 million Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at the Savannah River Site so that tritium can be delivered to the stockpile in advance of need.Producing a decaying asset (- 5.5%/yr) in advance of need makes no sense.

Bush Plan Seeks Enhanced Readiness for Nuclear TestsBush Administration is shortening period needed to field fully-diagnosed nuclear tests to within 18 months of a decision to resume testing, by:replacing key underground-test-unique componentsmodernizing certain test diagnostic capabilitiesaugmenting key personnel and increasing their operational proficiencyconducting test-related exercises of appropriate fidelity, and decreasing the time required to show regulatory and safety compliance.

Pentagon seeking broad reviewof risks in Stockpile StewardshipBush review of nuclear posture states:While the US is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing problems in the stockpilehave already been identifiedjudgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult.Each year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume testing

Will Testing Resume after November 2004?Underground nuclear testing could begin at the Nevada Test Site in the next decadeDr. Dale Klein Rumsfelds assistant for nuclear chemical and biological defense programs, said that the nation may need hard data to check the weapons.As time goes on there will likely have to be some tests performed beyond the small scaleWe didnt think they would be in the stockpile this long. Las Vegas Sun, Aug 14, 2002

Where does all this leave nuclear arms control?

Answer: Somewhere between a dead letter and a charade.Bush Administration opposes any further limitation on the development, testing, production or deployment of nuclear weaponsSupported non-binding Moscow Treaty, ratified earlier this year:calls for reduction to not more than 2200 operationally deployed strategic weapons by December 31, 2012.

IS THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY A SHAM?Reagans Doverai no Proverai a longstanding mantra of pro-defense conservatives -- is DEAD. SORT lacks verification and inspection provisions of any kind.President Bush did not deliver on his pledge to make the force reductions legally binding. Effective date of the treatys only constraint a reduction in operationally deployed strategic weapons which must occur by December 31, 2012, lags by a microsecond the expiration of the overall treaty, which remains in force only until December 31, 2012.

No Interim MilestonesMoscow Treaty lacks interim milestones for implementing reductions and assessing compliance.Bush article-by-article analysis: Prior to December 31, 2012 each Party is free to maintain whatever level of strategic nuclear warheads it deems appropriateSame is obviously true on or after 31 Dec 2012 treaty expires before the reductions are required to take effect.

SORT Eliminates NothingTreaty does not require the elimination of a single nuclear missile silo, submarine, missile, warhead, bomber or bomb.Allows unlimited production and deployment of new nuclear warheads, and delivery systems, tactical and strategic.Lacks agreed definition of what, if anything, is being reduced.

No Limit on Warheads in OverhaulVoluntary treaty limit on operationally deployed strategic weapons does not apply to systems in overhaul, but:Treaty contains no cap on the number of deployed warheads that may be claimed to be in overhaul at any given time; Result: 1700-2200 warhead limit is not merely flexible its unenforceable.

Permissive Withdrawal ClauseStandard is lowered from extraordinary events that require withdrawal to a mere exercise of national sovereignty.What difference can a standard make?Secretary Rumsfeld has already threatened U.S. withdrawal from the treaty if the Congress doesnt fully fund the Presidents Missile Defense program.

Pay Up, or We Bail OutThe proposals with respect to 1,700 and 2,200 are premised on some investments that need to be made in missile defense and investments that need to be made in infrastructure Investments in these and many other transformational capabilities in the 2003 budget should allow the U.S. over time to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and enact the reductions contained in the treaty.Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, July 25, 2002.

Bottom Line on SORTMoscow Treaty erodes very concept of negotiated binding arms control agreements as a means of reducing the nuclear threat and enhancing international security.That is the Administrations real purpose, and the treatys main accomplishment.Senate should have declined to act on treaty. It provides misleading PR cover for assertive Bush nuclear posture, without reducing future nuclear risks in any way.

In the Short Term: Deeper Real Stockpile Reductions Are Feasible Move beyond SORT by implementing a permanent, verified two-thirds reduction in U.S. and Russian aggregate nuclear stockpilesMatches promised two-thirds cut in operationally deployed strategic weapons3500 total US stockpile weapons by 2007, rather than 10,000 in 2012.Dedicate huge, modern, and mostly unused Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at Nevada Test Site to warhead dismantlement and Pu component storage.

Bush policy poses triple threat to nuclear arms reduction/NPT: Moscow Treaty is a non-binding sham that fails to create technical/political basis for deep verifiable nuclear arms reductions;Bush program for modernizing nuclear forces & weapon design/production complex is excessive & appears designed to lead to a resumption of testingWorldwide preventive/preemptive strike doctrine & nuclear contingency planning will spur rather than discourage proliferation.

US Nonproliferation Policyis on Life Support, Fading FastArticle VI arms control agenda from 1995 NPT Extension Conference no longer supported.Nominal interest in fissile material cutoff survives, but in a form designed to advantage US and obstruct consensus on a negotiating mandate.BWC: two years wasted trashing other parties efforts; Bush now claims to support identification and promotion of constructive and realistic measures to strengthen the BWC, but opposes formal negotiations before 2006.

Sole new Bush nonproliferation initiative is wildly counter-productiveAs outlined in the National Energy Policy, the United States will work in collaboration with international partners to develop [plutonium] recycle and fuel treatment [i.e. reprocessing] technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation resistant. NSC/WMD, Dec. 2002, p. 4-5.

Bush Energy Program Promotes Civil Use of PlutoniumBush-Cheney, Congressional Republicans, and DOEs Office of Nuclear Energy are pushing:Generation IV (Gen-IV) Nuclear Reactors, including 3 types of plutonium breedersAdvanced Fuel Recycle Initiative (AFCI) would provide $400 million over four years for two pilot reprocessing plantsGoal is construction of worlds largest commercial reprocessing plant by 2015 to recover 20,000 kg of plutonium per year (enough material for 5-10 thousand nuclear bombs)

Offer Russia a Plutonium Breeder to Dump Iranian Bushehr Project??Moscow is resisting US pressure to cease construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran;Condi Rice knows that Russias Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) LOVES Plutonium breeders reactors; SOLUTION: The US, she indicates, is holding out the possibility of help for Russia's energy industry - in particular in the development of a new generation of fast-breeder reactors.-- Rice interview with Financial Times 09/23/02

ConclusionsBush National Security Strategy policy is not merely misguided it is hypocritical, incoherent, and dangerous:Rehabilitates limited and tactical nuclear warfare Extends U.S. preemptive nuclear use threats to non-nuclear weapon states, violating longstanding US security assurances to NPT member states suspected of acquiring chemical or biological weaponsErodes political/technical basis for continuing process of deep verified nuclear arms reduction;Wastes huge sums maintaining and modernizing excessive nuclear forces that would be be better spent on nonproliferation initiatives, improved nuclear safeguards, retrieving/securing HEU worldwide.

Conclusions - 2Bush policy has abandoned verification improvements to BWC, & obstructs implementation of CWC inspectionsMoscow Treaty designed to end not accelerate US-Russian nuclear arms control processCounter-proliferation strategy based on global military threat of preventive strikes is unworkable e.g. North Korea violates acceptable use-of- force provisions of United Nations Charter, and will produce international chaos if widely imitated.

Conclusions - 3New preemptive/preventive attack doctrine mindlessly conflates special force operations against terrorists with conventional and even nuclear disarming first strikes against hostile sovereign states that possess, or are thought to be acquiring, nuclear, chem- or bio-weapon capabilities;Bush doctrine incorrectly equates possession/use of nuclear, chem- and bio-weapons, when military civil, and geopolitical consequences of such weapons vary widely.

With reference to state-sponsored proliferation threats, these statements constitute an utterly phony premise for analysis, with almost no grounding in external reality. What is the empirical or intelligence basis for concluding that we are suffering through an upward trend in the likelihood of WMD being supplied by rogue states to terrorists? What realities about these kinds of WMD attacks other than the U.S. assisted Iraqi chemical attacks against Iran in the 1980s do we know from experience. The twin towers attack used kerosene, and as far as we know there was no state sponsorship for that attack. As for terrorist assaults with chem-bio weapons, we have only the experience of the Japanese cults sarin attack on the Japanese subway system, in the mid-1990s. But this was not an example of rogue state-sponsored WMD terrorism the cult manufactured the sarin itself. And the evidence in the still unsovled anthrax scare points to an American insider. As for nuclear weapons, here is the list of states of proliferation concern with overt or covert nuclear programs from the late 1970s, when I got started in the nonproliferation-arms control business:

The 1979 list of ten states of immediate concern, on three continents, has shrunk to six states on one continent, Eurasia. Latin America and Africa are now, by treaty, nuclear-weapon free zones, with South Africa actually giving-up its secret nuclear arsenal, destroying its weapons, and joining the NPT as a non-weapons state. Five states put aside or postponed their nuclear ambitions, and are no longer on the list, but only one North Korea has joined. And, I might add, huge segments of the former Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Trans-Caucasus, are now de-nuclearized and members of the NPT. Likewise, with respect to chemical weapons, the situation has clearly improved. Twenty years ago, the U.S. and Soviet Union were brimming with such weapons, and developing a new generation of more readily deployable, transportable binary chemical weapons, and Saddam Hussein, with U.S. assistance, was gassing Khomeinis legions to beat back their fierce counter-attack to his war of aggression.Today we have in place a global convention banning Chemical Weapons, international agreement on an intrusive monitoring regime, and large-scale destruction of chemical arsenals underway in the US and, very soon, we hope, in Russia as well. With respect to biological weapons, a global ban is still in place, and many governments but tellingly not the Bush Administration -- have shown a considerable commitment to developing a more effective regime for verifying that the ban is being observed. As for Exhibit A in the pantheon of proliferation pessimists Iraq Husseins putative arsenal has been ground down and whittled away by more than a decade of UN sanctions and search-and-destroy inspections. Whatever else one may say about the nature of Saddams brutal regime, its residual biological or chemical arsenal does not pose a substantially greater threat to the United States, than similar weapons in the hands of say, Syria or Libya.. In reality, a new pandemic of state-sponsored proliferation cannot be substantiated. It doesnt exist. It is the creation of Pentagon propagandists in Washington, unfortunately echoed by loyal transponders in Whitehall. The Bush strategy is to take advantage of the publics natural defensive responses to 9/11 to dismantle the international structures and political expectations, and ultimately third country deterrent capabilities, that could impede the discretionary exercise of American power.

Well, what if any threats have increased. I think a dispassionate analysis supports the conclusion that the steady diffusion of nuclear, chemical and biomedical technology throughout the world has made these technologies more widely accessible, potentially, to subnational groups, criminal enterprises, and terrorist organizations. In this sense, the steady inherent technical background risk of supplies for such an attack has increased. But the availability of this technology is greater in the developed world than out there in the periphery of failed states. But on the demand side of the ledger, if Im not mistaken, the actual number of discrete terrorist organizations operating worldwide is actually lower today than in the past, and will could undergo a further dramatic decline if political settlements can be reached in Israel-Palestine, Colombia, and Chechnya. And very few of the rebel movements that employ terrorism as a tactic have shown an interest, or would stand to gain politically, from the use of chemical or biological weapons in their attacks. Contrary to the Bush-Sharon orthodoxy, negotiations CAN ameliorate or eliminate terrorism, as the recent examples of Ireland and Sri Lanka have shown, by addressing the political and econiomic roots of conflict. And no terrorist organization, with the exception of the Aum Shin Rikyo cult in Japan, is known to have employed chemical or biological weapons in a successful attack. Im not sure how one can conclude, from this set of facts, that the current and prospective terrorist threat to employ chemical or biological weapons justifies a policy of preventive war or preemption against potential state sponsors of such an attack. After all, any terrorist group, operating independently, can more easily mount a chemical attack by using conventional explosives to attack the right kind of chemical production facility. In this connection, it is sobering to recall that accidental release of toxic gas from an Allied Chemical plant in Bhopal, India killed significantly more people than Al Qaedas attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon With respect to bioweapons, the inherent potential for inflicting mass casualties is considerably greater, but it does not provide the terrorist with the quick and highly visible destruction of physical target with high symbolic and political value. Obviously, being able to strike at the financial and military nodes of the US infidel empire was of great symbolic and substantive importance to Bin Laden and his associates. It by no means clear that even the most cold-blooded terrorists are interested solely in racking up large anonymous, and physically dispersed body counts from disease, which have no clear connection to the cause they claim to be advancing. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad strike within Israel, because coercing Israel is the object of their bombing campaigns.Dispersion of a pathogen in into a population in a way that nullifies or diminishes the effects of emergency medical response requires access to technical facilities and expertise. Or it requires a band of suicidal highly-infectious carriers. Assuming the existence of an unvaccinated population, and a willing cadre of highly mobile carriers, a lot of damage could be done by roving bio-weapon suicide teams. But access to the pathogen and dispersal techniques is at least, as likely to be obtained by disaffected insiders in advanced industrial states, rather than by bands of Islamic bio-warriors prospecting for state-sponsorship in places like Iran, Iraq, and Suadan. Recall that Mohammad Atta spent the last seven years of his life in Hamburg, not Baghdad or Tehran. In fact, a credible impetus for such deliberate state sponsorship of bio, chemical, or nuclear weapon terrorism would seem to arise only in extremis, if the state in question were, for example, the target of the type of preventive war campaign that the Bush Administration envisions as necessary. It is at least conceivable that a state subjected to such pressures but seek to establish some form of immediate pre-war or intra-war deterrence against the US by developing some sort of terrorist delivery option. But that is very different from believing that this state-sponsored threat already exists autonomously, simply because, as Bush repeats over and over again, these are people hate America. The whole Bush strategy, I fear, suffers from the deficiency that it could accelerate the very trends it is nominally designed to prevent, and create a kind of negative feedback loop that is self-validating, much like the reciprocal death spiral th

“COERCIVE DISSUASION” Through GLOBAL STRIKE

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