Hastings Environmental Law JournalVolume 4Number 2 Summer 1998 Article 4

1-1-1998

Codifying the Past, Erasing the Future: NAFTAand the Zapatista Uprising of 1994Andy Gutierrez

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Recommended CitationAndy Gutierrez, Codifying the Past, Erasing the Future: NAFTA and the Zapatista Uprising of 1994, 4 Hastings West Northwest J. ofEnvtl. L. & Pol'y 143 (1997)Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol4/iss2/4

Codifying the Past,Erasing the Future

NAFTA and theZapatista Uprising

of 1994

By Andy Gutierrez"

I. Introduction

Did the American people know that, in signingNAFTA, their government had become an accom-plice in genocide that the indigenous people ofMexico were now condemned to death?

-SubComandante Marcos, spokesperson forthe Zapatista Army of National Liberation'

On the evening of December 31, 1993, Mexican President CarlosSalinas de Gortan retreated to the exclusive Pacific resort in Huatulco,Oaxaca.2 There, in the company of close family and guests, and in thefinal moments of his regime, Salinas no doubt pondered the novel eco-nomic path that he had dutifully set for his countrymen. Dunng his sex-enio (six-year term), Salinas had done no less than retrench the entirerevolutionary course of Mexican history: he had overseen the mass pn-vatization of Mexican industry; the slashing of public-sector spending;but, above all, he had "liberated" his country from the clutches ofdecades-old state protectionism by signing NAFTA.3 Hence, as thecountdown to the midnight hour quickened, Mexico s first family andchosen guests, "raised glasses of Dom Pengnon to celebrate the long-awaited arrival of NAFTA and 1994.4

Gaiety did not last long. Moments before 2:00 a.m., a militaryattachg "stepped onto the terrace and handed President Salinas a card."5

General Antonio Reveillo Bazqn, the Secretary of Defense, was on thephone. "I have just spoken with the commander of the 31st MilitaryZone," he explained, "and he has informed me that an armed force, call-ing itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, has entered SanCristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas and declared war on the military andthe government."6

General Bazan's nervous recantation was correct. About a tenhour's bus ride southeast of the Presidential celebration, and in the lushhighlands of the country's poorest and most removed state, a wholly dif-ferent scene played out. There, amidst the elusive canopy of Chiapas'"foggy, wooded hills and valleys," masses of desperate Indians gathered.Unlike their celebrating Commander-in-Chief, however, they did notwield bottles of Dom Pen gnon. Instead, these "sons and daughters ofpoor farmers and plantation laborers," a third of them women, swarmed

9 l.D. 1997, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.The author wishes to express special thanks to Christine Ann Tyler forher inspiration and support.

1. SubComandante Marcos, 'What Do the American People Fear') Our

Bare Feet and Broken Bodies?' L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1995, at editorial section.

2. JOHN Ross, REBELLION FROM THE ROOTS: INDIAN UPRISING IN CHIAPAS

13 (1995).

3. See discussion infra parts III A-B. Even though it is widelyacknowledged that Salinas won his election through fraud (the comput-ers counting votes mysteriously crashed when it was revealed that theopposition candidate was leading in early poll results), he addedMexico as a NAFTA signatory in 1992. DAN LA BOTZ, DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO:PEASANT REBELLION AND POLITIcAL REFORM 109, 193-202. (1995).

4. Ross. supra note 2, at 13.

5. Id.

6. Id.

Andy Gufierrez Volume 4, Number 2

upon four towns - San Cristobal de Las Casas, Ocosingo,Altamirano, and Las Margaritas7 - heralding the start ofMexico's largest post-revolutionary rebellion this century.8

With hardly any resistance and only a few pitched gunbattles,'the Zapatistas managed to take control of the townsfrom the start.9 Within hours, however, the Mexican Armylaunched a fierce counterattack. From the air they strafed vil-lages and countryside with rocket and machine gunfire.i°

From the ground thousands of government soldiers "conduct-ed house-to-house" searches."

By the fifth day of the Levantamiento (Uprising), gov-ernment forces had gained the upper hand. Zapatista rebelswere by then desperately trying to flee back to the Lacandon.12Moreover, preliminary reports indicated that the MexicanArmy had resorted to, gross human rights abuses. Whenreporters were finally permitted into Ocosingo, the site of thefiercest confrontation, they found "a total of 25 bodies, main-ly of guerrillas but also including that of a baby strewnin the streets and buildings, particularly in the village market,where five bodies showed signs of execution, lying face down ina row with their hands [tied I behind their backs."13

It became increasingly clear as the days passed that theZapatistas were ill-equipped to do battle with a modern Army,particularly one trained and equipped by the United States.14

In one village market, in addition to the bodies of downedZapatistas, reporters came upon a cache of crudely fabricatedweaponry - "sticks carved in the shape of guns, some withknives or corrugated metal strapped to the barrel like bayo-nets."15

For many, an insurrection in Mexico's backcountry frontier, especially by a group of veiledunknowns, hardly seems a befitting topic for a jour-nal on environmental law. One might even marvelwhether inquiry into the uprising, and the fate of its

7. Indian Peasants in Southern Mexico State Storm 4 Cities, Towns,L.A. TME.s, Jan. 2, 1994. atA7.

8. See generally LA BoTz, supra note 3, at 1-12.

9. See id.

10. See Juanita Darling & Tracy Wilkinson, Mexican TroopsStep Up Drive to Crush Revolt, L.A. MEs, Jan. 6, 1994, at Al.

11. Tracy wilkinson & luanita Darling, Thousands in MexicoMarch to Back Indians, L.A. Times. Jan. 8, 1994, at Al.

12. See Darling, supra note 10.

13. Juanita Darling, Aircraft Strafe, Bomb Fleeing MexicanRebels, LA. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994, atAl.

14. See lulio A. Montes, Mexican Armoured Vehicles, JANE'SINTELLIGENCE REVIEw, Jan. 1, 1996, at 44.

15. Darling, supra note 13.16. See TOM BARRY, ZAPATA'S REVENGE: FREE TRADE AND THE

FARM CRisis IN MEXICO 203-05 (1995).

17. See id. at 202-03.

18. See id. at 204-08.

19. See TOM BARRY. MExIco: A COuNTRY GUIDE 67 (1992).

indigenous combatants, would be better servedfrom a human rights perspective?

Initial skepticism is understandable. Mexicoand the United States each maintain their ownunique conceptions of environmentalism. But if, fora moment, one could suppress his or her precon-ceived cognitive models of environmentalism, par-ticular to his or her country's social, economic, andpolitical milieu, Mexico's largest peasant rebelliontakes on a different hue.

In the United States, environmentalism tradi-tionally focuses on issues that are de ngueur withinthe larger mainstream movement: i.e. pollution,nature conservation, population control, and thepro1iection of lower-order species. 16 Some have evengone so far as to describe "mainstream environ-mentalism" as merely an "adjunct.of the capitalistsystem" whereby theories of sustainable develop-ment are watered down and contorted to fit withinthe controlling canons of world trade and sustainedeconomic growth.17 The protection of civilians fromthe over-arching power of police or market forces,i.e., civil and human rights, is treated as severable- an entirely distinct field with its own set of tradi-tions.' 8

In Mexico, by contrast, civil and human rightsand concern for one's natural living conditions arenot so easily separable. There, the populace grap-ples with a maddening web of basic survival andempowerment issues: i.e. land expulsions;19 state-sponsored death squads; 20 rule under one-partydictatorship;2' mass assassinations of grassrootspolitical opposition candidates; 22 extreme ruralchild poverty and malnourishment; 23 lack of educa-

20. See interview with Samuel RUiZ, Bishop of CatholicChurch, in San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico (Apr.1994). Bishop Ruiz spoke of the Guardia Blanca (white Guard), orhired thugs who threatened, at times, murdered those who stoodin the way of the local landed-elite.

21. "'Mexicans do not live but only imagine democracy.'"says one prominent Mexican historian. Ouoted in BARRY supranote 19, at I. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), whichhas ruled Mexico for over six decades, id. at 64-5, confers "dicta-torial authority" on the President. See id. at 17. The Presidentappoints and removes the state governors; installs and dismiss-es leaders of Congress; and selects whom will serve on theSupreme Court. See id.

22. See id. at 64. After Salinas took power in 1988, repres-sion and violence against political opposition achieved a state ofnear-total impunity: in Salinas's first three years in office. 97 lead-ers, members, and supporters of lust one opposition party, theParty of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), were assassinated.

23. See Guillermo Correa, Segun el INEGI. 61.45% de [aPoblacion Rural Vive en la Pobreza, EL PRocEsso, Dec 25. 1995. at 32(reporting on a national study that found 67 percent of the ruralpopulation living in "extreme poverty").

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Codifng the Post, Erasing the Future

tion24 and severe economic paralysis and unem-ployment.25 The fates of the Spotted Owl andMarbled Murrelet ring softly, if at all.

Given the enormous panoply of social, eco-nomic and political obstacles facing Mexico today,and the fact that millions of peasant families con-tinue to survive through subsistence farming, 26 anyconstruction of environmentalism as it applies toMexico must necessarily incorporate issues thattranscend 'Western" notions of land, air, water andspecies protection issues. A more nuanced con-struction would take into account core human andcivil rights issues.

Mexico's small peasant farmers understand thehuman rights-environmental linkage very well: "Weare campesinos. When the land is violated, ourrights are violated - our right to work, to feed our-selves, to our health and the health of our chil-dren."27 "'The struggle for survival is now an envi-ronmental one and it is being fought out on a veryfragile stage. Farmers now go to the NationalHuman Rights Commission because no other gov-ernmental agency will listen to them,"' addsMexican Greenpeace activist Roberto Lopez.28

The inherent difference between First Worldenvironmentalism in the U.S. and its people-cen-tered counterpart in Mexico is potentially explosive.Nowhere has this been more apparent than in thefields of environmental and international trade law.When NAFTA was passed, for instance, it includedthe much celebrated Supplemental Side Accords(SSAs) on the environment, health and labor.29

Aside from smoothing the way for the Treaty s pas-sage, the Side Accords earned NAFTA praise forbeing the world's first international trade agree-ment that substantively included quality-of-life val-ues.30 Its key legal criterion provides that sanctions

24. See id. Fourteen out of every 100 rural schools do notoffer the 6 grades of primary education; twenty-two of each 100only have one teacher and one out of every three Indian children donot have a preschool or pnmary education. Id.

25. Mexico's economy, in the last three years, has turneddisastrous. One Mexican daily headlined their country's crisis asthe 'worst economic crisis in 50 years. Mexico Sufre su Peor CnsisEconomica en 50 Years: PRD, CUARTO PODER, Jan. 7. 1996. at 7. In1995, over 1.5 million Mexicans lost their lobs; the peso lost 50percent of its value; most maior banks had to be bailed out; andthe Mexican auto industry dosed with a 70 percent loss in salesand production, "one of the worst years in decades. AnthonyDePalma, at 95, Labor's King, but Party's Vassal, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 5,1996, at A4.

26. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 103.27. John Ross, "Zapata's Children: Defending the Land and

Human Rights in the Countryside, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICANS.

JanlFeb. 1997, at 30.28. Id.

will lie once it is shown that a NAFTA nation suffersfrom a "persistent pattern of failure" to "effectivelyenforce" its environmental health, or labor laws.3'Conspicuously absent from the SSAs or NAFA,however, was a subject dear to Mexico's millions ofindigenous-peasantry - their potential displace-ment from communal lands. "lMlany people arescandalized by the ethnic cleansing in the formerYugoslavia. The current policies of the MexicanGovernment are not very different from this. Theywant to cleanse the farmers from the countryside,"said Victor Quintana, leader of the Peasant Dem-ocratic Front. 32

This cultural oversight -the complete ethnicand economic reformation of the Mexican country-side- is unfortunate. Mexico's 3.1 million indige-nous-peasant farmers are categorized as limited-surplus producers, and including their families,number approximately 18 million.3 3 They produce aselect variety of crops such a5 corn, beans, cabbage,and squash for subsistence and marketing purpos-es. 34 Corn, however, is by far the most importantcrop produced. It is estimated that 68 percent ofthose employed in agriculture in Mexico and 78 per-cent of those engaged in peasant communal farm-ing are engaged in corn production.3 5

Under NAFTA, however, the role of Mexico'sindigenous-peasant agriculture is called into doubt.They are placed in direct free-market competitionwith the world's most advanced, and highly subsi-dized, corn-producing nation in the world, theUnited States. 36

Is it any wonder, then, that the ZapatistaLevantamtento, which represents Mexico's most pop-ular grassroots peasant rebellion in recent memo-ry,37 launched their uprising on the inaugural dateof NAFTA? They claim that free trade under the

29. See lack Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-DisputeResolution Under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment,89 AM. I. INT'L L. 439, 441 (1995).-

30. See id.*31. id. at 442.32. Mexican Agricultural Policies: An Immigration Generator?.:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Housing, and Aviation ofthe House Comm. on'Government Operations, 103rd Cong.. Ist Sess. 9(1993).

33. See BARRY. supra note 16, at 119.

34. Interview with peasant farmers, Chamula. Chiapas andOaxaca, Oaxaca, Jul.-Aug. 1996.

35. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 103.

36. See Corn Commodity Description. U.S. Feed Grains Council.Jun. 3, 1996, available in U.S. Feed Grains Council Home Page(visited Jan. 12, 1997) <httpi./www.grains.org/usinfo/importer/chpt I/ ch I corn.htm>

37. See generally LA BoTz supra note 3. at Chs. 1-2.

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Andy Wafirme oue4,Nme

Treaty is the equivalent of a "summary executionorder against indigenous Mexicans" and thatunder the accord' indigenous-peasantry will be"annihilated not with bullets or bombs but by thesilent death of disease, of penury, of abandon-ment."

38

The historical power and divining quality ofthese words suggest that the Zapatista Levanta-miento goes beyond the four corners of NAFTA.Zapatistas remind us that, at the dawn of theTwenty-First Century, Native Americans still wagean uphill battle for the most basic of human digni-ties - the right to economic and cultural self-determination. 39

Seen thus from the despairing eyes ofMexico's indigenous-peasantry, disarmed and illu-minated by the cruelty of history, NAFTA ascendsto fuller meaning. More than just a novel free-trade instrument designed to spur trade andinvestment, the Treaty is seen by the peasantry asthe codification of their communities' economicmarginalization through mandatory participationin the world economy. It unilaterally imposes thedominant social orthodoxy, not by slavery as in thepast, but by the economic and legal means of thepresent.

Believing that the post-Cold War Order, prem-ised on an array of free-trade accords, seeks onlyto protect the movement of capital and goods andnot the viability of human communities, theZapatistas spoke for many, including their ances-tors, when they cried Basta! (Enough). 40 'Thisindigenous defiance, aimed at the darling center-piece of the New World Order, ushered in theworld's first organized rebellion directed specifi-cally against the seemingly unchecked process offree-market globalization.4'

This note assesses the claim by the ZapatistaArmy of National Liberation that NAFTA is a "death

38. Marcos, supra note 1.39. See Video of Foro Especial de Derechos Indigenas, convo-

cated by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Remarks ofComandanteTacho &SubComandante Marcos) (lan. 3-8. 1996) (on filewith author).

40. See Declaration of War from the Zapatista Army of NationalLiberation (Jan. I, 1994).

41. See MARc COOPER. ZAPATISTAS: SPREADING HOPE FOR GRASSROOTSCHANGE, STAFlNG FRoM CHIAPAS. Msxico (Open Magazine PamphletSenes, Pamphlet No. 30, Feb. 1994).

42. BARY, supra note 16, at 157.

43. Today, the concept of peasantry in rural Mexico is verybroad. It includes, for example, "masons, ditch diggers, truck dnvers,small.store owners, and tailors." GEORGE CowER, BASTA!: LAND AND THEZAPA,STA REBEWON IN CHIAPAS 90 (1994). This was not always so. in thepast, peasants were mostly.confined to food production. 'The vastmajority of peasant households now partiapate in some kind of wage

certificate"42 in the context of the potential long-term transformation of Mexico's agrarian sectorunder NAFTA-style free trade. First, it examines thepolitical-economic processes that led to Mexico'scurrent state of agrarian crisis, namely the "exter-nalization" of Mexican agriculture between 1940and 1980, with particular attention given to thestate of Chiapas. Next, it discusses the role ofglobal finance, in the wake of the 1982 Third WorldDebt Crisis, in limiting the ways in which Mexicocould respond to its widening agrarian crisis. Thispart is followed by a discussion of NAFTA and how,under, the theory of relative comparative tradeadvantage, Mexico's small corn producers stand tolose. The following sections then discuss theimplications for survival of Mexico's indigenous-peasantry under the current free-trade regime and.the broad rural and legal reforms necessary toensure their survival. Finally, the morality of uni-laterally'imposing free trade on our hemisphere'snative peoples'is raised.

II. Seeds of Crisis: The Transformation ofMexican Agriculture

It is no surprise that Mexico witnessed a large-scale indigenous-peasant 43 revolt in the 1990s.Between 1940 and 1980, the country underwentrapid changes in its industrial, demographic, andtrade composition - changes which led to.a fun-damental transformation of Mexican agriculture:dams, hydro-electric power plants, railroads andhighways were built;44 the population more thantripled, rising from 19.6 million in 1940 to 67 mil-lion by 1977 .45 urbanization, which until then hadbeen relatively static, took off as the proportion ofpeople living in the rural sector dropped from 80 to30 percent; 46 and, finally, even though agriculturegave way to industry in terms of contribution to

work or commercial enterpnse in addition to farming." Id. Because ofthese changes the term "peasantry" must be expanded to indudeIndians, such as "Zapatista women who want the chance to becometruck drivers," but "who still have some ability to produce their ownfood" or associate dosely with people who "have some ability to pro-duce their own food ...." Id.

Hence when speaking of indigenous people in modem Mexico,it is perhaps more accurate to speak of an "indigenous-peasantry."Indians in Mexico have realities that "are no longer stnctly defined byfood production. Id. The rapid growth of "non-agncultural work andthe increasing integration of peasant economies into national andinternational markets" has created an indigenous dass no longer com-pletely distinct from much of Mexico's wage-eaming peasantry. Id.

44. See LA Boiz, supra note 3. at 57-58 (1995).

45. See HECTOR AGUiLAR CAmi & LORENZO MEYER. IN THE SHADoV

OFTHE M acAN REVOULWON 162 (1993).

46. Seed.

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Summer 1998 (odifyin~ the Post, Erasing the Future

GDP between 1940 and 1980, the value of Mexicanagricultural exports actually increased from 4.3million pesos to 42 million during that same peri-od.

47

As a result of these long-term post-war changes(industrialization, demographic shifts and insertioninto the world economy), Mexican agriculture con-fronted new challenges. It had to meet the enor-mous food demands of a rapidly expanding popula-tion; adapt to the modern dietary tastes *thataccompany urbanization; and at the same timereorient food production to compete optimally inthe international market.4 8 Agriculture's focus thusshifted from production of basic food items andfresh foodstuffs for local and national consumptionto production of non-essential food items, such ascoffee, for consumption abroad. "Basic food pro-duction was no longer the principal goal of the agri-cultural system," one scholar observes, "it wasgeared increasingly to support agribusiness proces-sors, retailers, and intermediaries, whether at theinternational or the national level."49

Post-war externalization of Mexican food pro-duction did not bode well for the country s indige-nous-peasantry. Their small communal communi-ties, so highly dependent upon basic grains produc-tion for sustenance and marketing, suffered dispro-portionately: first, there was the loss of cultivableacreage to competing export commodities, such assorghum, oats, and alfalfa;50 and second, there wasthe leveling off of national demand for traditionalpeasant staple crops, such as maize and beans.51

This latter process can be attributed to demograph-ics: as the country urbanized, city people came to"disdain[l the traditional devotion to maize andbeans," and instead evinced a preference for fooditems "to which the peasants ha[dl no access,"namely meat and milk.52

The "double-edged phenomenon" of loss of cul-tivable acreage to export crops and reduced nation-al demand for traditional staple crops, in conso-nance with the vital nutritional role peasant-pro-duced foods play, led to one of the worst food crises

47. See STEvEN E. SANDERSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF MEXICANAGRiCULTURE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE POULicT OF RuRAL CHANGE38 (1986).

48. Seeid. at 6-11.

49. Id. at 39.50. See BARRY supra note 19, at 159.

51. SeeSANDERSON supra note 47, at 214-16.52. Id. at 228-29. Sanderson describes Mexican consump-

tion of maize after 1940 as a matter of class preference, addingthat "Imlaize is likely to continue to be a crop produced by thepoor for the poor." Id.

ever to face the Mexican rural poor this century.53 Bythe 1970s, Mexico became for the first time a netimporter of basic grains.54 And by 1980, it was esti-mated that 90 -percent of the rural population suf-fered from "some degree of caloric and protein defi-ciency."

55

Hungry, desperate and mindful of their ongoingmarginalization, by the 1980s, peasant groupsacross the country struck back. They formed inde-pendent advocacy organizations. "These rangeldlfrom zapatista groups demanding a renewal of agrar-ian reform, to sectorial associations fighting fortheir specialized economic interests, to local groupsfighting for higher prices and better access to cred-it and technology."56 Non-economic demandsincluded calls "to end government corruption andrepression by private and public security forces."57

The proliferation,58 no less than the existence, ofthese groups indicated that the Mexican country-side, by the 1980s, was a time bomb waiting toexplode.

For some regions of Mexico the pulse of indige-nous unrest pounded more furiously than in others.In Chiapas, for instance, after decades of modern-agroindustrial development between 1940 and1980, led principally through mass agroexports, 59

the Mexican backwater found itself imprisoned ineconomic irony. It had created a macabre alloybetween high economic growth and widespreadsocial misery. Thomas Benlamin describes thisprocess:

Despite the impressive economic expan-sion of the previous three decades, in 1970more than 90 percent of economicallyactive Chiapanecos earned less than 1,000pesos a month, or slightly more than eightydollars. Nearly 40 percent of the popula-,tion was illiterate; about 50 percent of allhouses were without running water andelectricity; and 80,000 day laborers workedon fincas and plantations, often living inhuts and receiving less than the minimum

53. See id. at 8.

54. See BARRY, supra note 19, at 16.

55. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 9.56. BARRY, supra note 19, at 168-69.57. Id.

58. During the 1980s. peasant groups formed in states asdiverse as Oaxaca, Pueblo, Veracruz, Tabasco, Hidalgo. Sinaloa,Bala California, Baia California Sur, and Michoacan. See Interviewwith Zapatista Supporter, in Mexico City, Mexico (Jun. 5, 1996) (onfile with author);, see also BARRY. supra note 16. at 153-17 1.

59. See discussion infra part II.A.

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Andy Gufferiez Vlm ,Nme

wage. Chronic alcoholism, malnutrition,and diseases such as tuberculosis, typhus,and intestinal parasites plagued Indiancommunities. Perhaps 90 percent of Indian

children were undernourished. 60

The shameful specter of "prosperity besidemass poverty" in Chiapas led one notable scholar ofthe region to conclude that "Itihe distribution ofpower and wealth within Chiapas has changed verylittle since the 1890s."61 "'The government andthe finqueros -are the same thing,"' remarked oneagrarian leader, "Itihey are together and they wantto screw the Indian."62

if poverty as handmaiden of high economicgrowth has become the resolute rule in Chiapas,then Mexico and its NAFTA partners had better takeheed; the export-led development schemeemployed in Chiapas during the last forty years isthe precise model contemplated under NAFTA.63

Will NAFTA thus normalize throughout Mexico whathas now become true of Chiapas -that it "remainsas before: a rich land, and a poor peopleXW

The rapid industrialization and urbanizationthat occurred throughout Mexico after 1940, andwhich led to deep agrarian crisis, did not similarlyalter the rural-economic composition of Chiapas. It"remained predominantly rural and agricultural."65

For example, while agriculture suffered a precipi-tous decline in national importance between 1940and 1977 66 in Chiapas "Itlhe total value of agricul-tural, livestock, and lumber production increasedfrom 81 million pesos in 1950 to 1.5 billion by 1970and 3 billion by 1975 "67 Land in cultivation"increased from 270,000 hectares in 1950 to 750,000

60. THOMAS BENIAMIN, A RICH LAND, A POOR PEOPLE 230

(1989).

61. Id.at 231.

62. Id.

63. See discussion infra part I.B.I-2.

64. Sae BENIAMIN, supra note 60, at 223.

65. Id.

66. Even though, as previously mentioned, agriculturalexports grew after 1940, see supra note 47 and accompanying text,by 1977, Mexican agnculture, which in 1940 had comprised 10percent of the nation's total production, had fallen by half, to lust5 percent. CAMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 162.

67. BENIAMIN. supra note 60, at 224.

68. Id. at 224.69. See id.

70. See id. at 223-24.

71. Id. at 224.

72. Id. at 223.

in 1975."68Chiapas' impressive economic growth concen-

trated almost exclusively in agroexports and ranch-ing. In fact, between 1940 and 1970, Chiapasbecame Mexico's number one coffee producer,69

with that commodity comprising 40 percent of thestate's total agricultural production by 1970.70 Sugarcane and cotton had also become "economicallyimportant."7i But the greatest agricultural expan-sion was, seen in cattle raising. Between 1950 and1960, "ranchers increased their herds by 65 percent

from 480,000 head to 790,000."72 "By 1970, thecattle stock had reached 1.25 million head (or morethan 2 million according to one estimate)."73

Chiapas' disproportionate and rapid growth inproduction for the national and international mar-ket led to a considerable over-concentration andunderdevelopment of the Chiapan ejida 74 sector.By 1960, latifundistas (large landowners with over1,000 hectares) owned about 60 percent of all landin Chiapas while comprising only 2.4 percent of alllandowners.75 In addition, "while some 900 ejidossupported 92,000 families, as compared to 30,000land-owning families, the ejidal sector earned one-third as much, owned one-tenth as many tractors,and possessed land valued at one-third of theamount. of prtvate property."76 Much of this socialdistortion can be attributed to the process ofganadenzacion in Chiapas "the expansion of pasturesfor cattle at the expense of cropland."77

Un'der ganadenzacion, "Iclattlemen convertedlands formerly rented or sharecropped by cornfarmers into pastures, rented or simply invadedejido lands."78 The case of Venustiano Carranza isillustrative: Beginning in 1945 residents there had

73. Id.

74. Efidos and comunidades agranas are the two main types ofindigenous-peasant landholdings in Mexico. See BARRY, supra note16, at 120. Although both have elements of communal ownership.comunidades agrarias, which number only about 1200 in all ofMexico, are distinguishable from elidos in that they consist most-ly of holdings of indigenous communities whose claim on theland usually dates back to "pre-Columbian and colonial eras.- Id.

75. See BENIAMIN, supra note 60, at 226.

76. See id.

77. Id. at 232. Another factor fueling rising land pressures,in addition to ganadenzaoon, was the construction of dams andhydroelectric power plants. The construction of only a few ofthese could easily wipe out hundreds of thousands of cultivableacres. One example of this was the construction of the Grijalva-Usumacinta hydroelectric facility and three dams in Chiapas.

Their construction, during the 1970s, required that over 200.000hectares of cultivable land in the Central Valley be submerged.See id. at 229-230.

78. Id. at 232.

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petitioned the government for the return of landsbeing held by cattlemen. In 1967 the MexicanPresident awarded provisional title to 50,000hectares to the residents. The cattlemen, who werein possession of 20,000, refused to leave. Later, in1974, the Department of Agrarian Affairs andColonization ordered the cattlemen to cede theland. Still, nothing happened. Finally, in 1976, theyear after one of their ejido leaders was assassinat-ed, the ejidatanos moved back on to their lands, "builthouses, and started farming." However, the MexicanArmy interceded by forcibly evicting the ejidatanos,burning their homes, and jailing their leaders.During the army offensive, several of the ejidatanos,"including women and children, were killed orwounded."

79

Incidents of state-sponsored terrorism were notan isolated event during the era. In 1975, 1976 and1980, soldiers and/or police forced indigenous peo-ples in Chiapas off their lands by killing them andburning their homes.8 0 Amnesty Internationaldescribed these peasant removal efforts as "'a pat-tern of apparently deliberate political killings."'8i

Mexico's leadership was not impervious to theagrarian crisis festering in its resource-rich south-ernmost region and elsewhere in the country. But,by 1980 any diversion of state assistance was "acase of too little, too late."82 Overpopulation, soildegradation, stagnant agrarian reform, corruptionof government aid entities, increased land concen-tration, inflation and labor exploitation had com-bined 83 to create "a system not only incapable ofreproducing the conditions for the survival of therural population but one fundamentally threateningto peasant agriculture and nutrition."84

In these circumstances, it became clear that theseeds for violent and epic agrarian struggle hadlong been sown. In the center of that crisis strainedthe tug-of-war between large private landowners, onthe one hand, and subsistence producers, on theother, for the country's most-prized natural resource

79. Id.80. See id. at 235.81. Id.

82. Id. at 230.83. See interview with Bishop Ruiz, supra note 20.84. SANDERSON. supra note 47, at 8.85. BENIAMIN. supra note 60, at 234.86. See LA BoTz, supra note 3. at 101.87. BARRY, supra note 16. at 47 (emphasis added).88. Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), for example, on the

heels of several conservative regimes and rising rural tensions,nationalized oil companies and railroads and energetically

-land. In one study of 115 peasant uprisings inChiapas during the 1970s, ranging from violentattacks to simple takeovers of municipal buildingsand land, the conclusions, though not surprising,are nonetheless telling: 87 of the uprisings "hadbeen caused by the takeover of ejidal and commu-nal lands" by large agroexport entities, namely cat-tle ranchers. 85

III. Zapata In Reverse:8 6 Global Finance andthe Stralghtacketlng of the MexicanRevolution

"[Slome two million campesino families-about three-quarters of the nation's cornfarmers- 'will have to search for alterna-tives in other crops, reorganize their- land-holdings, associate with private capitalists,or become wage laborers."' -Mexican Gov-ernment's 1992 Program for AgriculturalDevelopment 87

Mexico's leadership, during the 1980s, did notrespond to its nation's widening agrarian crisis withsocial development schemes or mass land redistri-bution efforts, as had some of its predecessors. 88 Itinstead looked to Latin America's version of the"invisible hand" theory, or neoliberalism, for nation-al well-being and prosperity.89 Given-Mexico's tradi-tional populist and nationalist slant, this new eco-nomic course was truly revolutionary. Combiningpart philosophy with part religion, 0 "[tlhe neoliber-al prescription is always the same: swiftly privatizethe economy, liberate markets or government regu-lations and other obstacles, and open up thenational economy to international and foreigninvestment."9 1 The "social amelioration role" of gov-ernment is rejected outright.92

The obvious question remained, however: Whywould a nation, once so committed to state inter-vention, suddenly "steerl I hard in the direction of

redistributed record amounts of land to peasants. See E.BRADFORD BURNS, LATIN AMERICA: A CONCISE INTERPRETIVE HISTORY

196 (1990).89. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 78.90. "Even more than other social theorists, neo-liberals

in their public discourse are notably dogmatic and technocrat-ic." JOSEPH COLLINS & JOHN LEAR, CHILE'S FREE-MARKET MIRACLE: A

SECOND LOOK 45 (i995). Neoliberals "routinely put forward theireconomic program as the 'true;' 'modern' economic science, theonly rational option, the only one backed by 'absolute knowl-edge' of a 'scientific character." Id. (footnote omitted).

91. Id. at 40: see also Barry, supra note 19, at 77-78.

92. COLLINS & LEAR, supra note 90, at 40.

Summer1998 Codhngl the Past, Erasngq the Future

Andv Gufierrez Vlm ,Nme

economic orthodoxy" 93 To answer that question weneed to visit the Third World Debt Crisis of 1982and, in particular, consider the role of the worldfinancial community in crafting austere free-marketdebt rescheduling plans. 9 4

A. Submission to the International LendingCommunity"I can assert that in a few, recent years, a group

of Mexicans headed, counseled and aided by theprivate banks, have withdrawn more money fromthis country, than all of the empires that haveexploited us from the beginnings of our history."95

With these words Mexican President Jose LopezPortillo (1976-82) nationalized all of his country'sbanks and declared a moratorium on debt pay-ments.9 6 After years of lavish spending and ill-advised borrowing at high interest rates, the nationsuddenly found itself unable to make payments onits national debt.97 Nevertheless, its departingleader, who himself had overseen much of the debtaccumulation,9 8 struck a defiant tone againstunscrupulous Mexican capitalists and interest-happy global lending institutions. 99

Several factors contributed to Mexico's debt cri-sis. Expansionary government policies, currencyover-evaluation, capital flight and "extremely high"U.S. interest rates explain parts of the problem.1°

The greatest contributing factor, however, was over-reliance on oil revenues. During the 1970s, asMexico became a world leader in oil exports, its

93. Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, The Origins andSustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 459. 463(1994).

94. The Third World Debt Crisis announced its arrival in1982 when Mexico discontinued servicing its debt. See DougHenwood, Whatever Happened to Third world Debt?, in 50 YEARS isENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BAK AND THE INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY FUND 39 39-43 (Kevin Danaher ed., 1995). Marcos Arruda,coordinator of the Institute of Alternative Policies for the SouthernCone of Latin America describes the origin of Third World Debt:

During the 1970s, there was an enormous flow ofpetrodollars seeking easy investments throughout theworld. The Northern countries sent ambassadors offer-ing very cheap loans to finance investments inSouthern countries. The 1970s was the decade of thetwo oil crises of 1974 and 1979, and it was also thedecade of military regimes all over the world, many ofthem sponsored by the CIA. During the 1970s, 18 of 24Latin American nations were under military dictator-ships. So the bankers actually dealt with our dictatorson the big loans that created our countries' over-whelming indebtedness.

Marcos Arruda, interviewed by Multinational Monitor, Brazil:Drowning in Debt, in 50 YEARS is ENOUGH supra, at 44.

95. CtMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 216.

96. See id.

97. See BURNS, supra note 88, at 198-99.

source of revenue and share of imports rose dra-matically.Oi Soon the value of imports far exceededthe balance of revenue generated by oil exports. Forexample, between 1976 and 1981, while "the valueof oil exports grew from $560 million to $14,600million," the total value of imports disproportion-ately skyrocketed from $9 400 million to $32,000million.102 By the end of the 1970s Mexico was fac-ing disastrous yearly current account imbalances.

One man's desperation is another man's oppor-tunity. As Mexico's immense need for foreignmonies became apparent, international lendinginstitutions envisaged a golden opportunity to fun-nel endless amounts of funds to the region at highinterest rates and, at the same time, make "verysubstantial profits."' 03 "U.S. money banks" led theway. 04 By 1982, when 'three-quarters of Mexico'sexternal debt was owed to commercial banks, "Itlhelargest chunk of commercial credit-about one-third--came from U.S. banks."105 Moreover, the thir-teen largest, U.S. banks, led by Citibank and ChaseManhattan, saw profits from Latin America increasefrom 16.7 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1976. 06

Loose international borrowing ultimately led toMexico's undoing. By 1982, the country had "accu-mulated an external debt amounting to 49 percentof its gross domestic product."' 07 "Interest pay-ments alone represented more than 50 percent ofexport income." 08 But even then, while Mexico'slong-term economic health stood in the balance,Washington did not confer its highest concern; the

98. See CAIMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 216.

99. Mexico was not the first Third World country to soundthe nationalist alarm against the debt crisis. Three years earlier, in1979, Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, declared beforethe United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), that"under the present world economic order, the rich and the indus-trialized areas-automatically, as well as by the exercise of nakedpower, extract from the poor and rural areas even the little whichthey have. JuLIus K. NYERERE, MAN AND DELOPMENT 109 (1979).

100. See Rudiger Dornbusch & Alelandro Werner, Mexico:Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth, I BROOKING'S PAPERS ON ECONOMICAcnTvm, 253, 256-257 (1994).

101. See BURNS, supra note 88, at 198.

102. CAMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 210.

103. Louis W. Pauly, Promoting a Global Economy: The NormativeRole of the International Monetary Fund, in PouTicA. ECONOMY AND THE

CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 204, 210.(Richard Stubbs et al. eds., 1994).

104. Id.

105. BARRY, supra note 19, at 84.

106. See Pauly, supra note 103, at 204-210.

107. Dornbusch & Werner, supra, note 100, at 256-57.Among the seventeen highly indebted Third World countries in1982, Mexico was one of a group of four that accounted for 78 per-cent of total debt owed to commercial banks. Id.

108. BARRY, supra note -19, at 84.

#Volume 4, Number 2Andv Gutierrez

Summer 1998 Codifying the Post, Erasing the Futureexposure of the U.S. dominated lending industry toThird World debt was more worrisome. The ninelargest U.S. banks had seen their debt exposure tothe seventeen most-highly indebted Third Worldcountries rise to 194 percent of capital reserves by1982.109 A "definitive default on this debt could haveprovoked bankruptcy at the heart of the industrialbanking system."'i0

Mindful of the impending collapse of the worldfinancial system, and with the "international bal-ance-of-payments adjustment mechanism" firmly intheir hands, private and world lending institutions,in conjunction with the Federal Reserve, the FDICand the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,quickly put together a stabilization strategy."' Thehallmark, and most controversial aspect, of thisstrategy was that debtor nations "demonstrate theirability and willingness to repay their debts in full."I 12

In the context of international lending euphemisms,this translated to submission to a prescribed free-market structural adjustment program: privatization,trade liberalization, and the slashing of public sectorspending.ii 3 Mexico, as the largest Third Worlddebtor country and first to default, stood first in lineto receive "free-market economic communion."' 14

B. Straightiacketing the Mexican RevolutionThe southern version of "trickle-down econom-

ics," imposed upon the Mexican people because oftheir lenders irresponsible borrowing and globalfinanciers' unscrupulous lending, gave the MexicanRepublic little choice in how it could respond to itssevere agrarian crisis, now in its second decade.Instead of rendering state assistance to the smallcampesino and indigenous farmer, as past regimeshad done,ii 5 the new technocraticii6 power structure

109. See WILLIAM CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT RE-EXAMINED 6

(1995).110. Id.11I. Matthew Shepherd, U.S. Domestic Interests and the Latin

Amencan Debt Cnsis, in POLTCAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBALORDER, supra note 103, at 302, 309.

112. Id. at 307.113. Se Walden Bello, Global Economic Counterrevolution: How

Northern Economic Warfare Devastates the South, in 50 YEARS is ENOUGH

supra note 94, at 16-19.[Als more and more Third World countries ran intogreater difficulties servicing the huge loans made tothem by Northern banks in the 1970s. the banks madethe adoption of the World Bank structural adjustmentprogram essential to debt rescheduling. They arguedthat the structural reforms ensured debtors' abilitiesto continue paying their debts beyond the short term.Unable to gain access to further private bank financingwithout the World Bank seal of approval, governmentssurrendered. By the end of 1985,12 of the 15 debtorsdesignated as top-priority debtors IMexico mclud-

abandoned completely the idea of the populist-agrarian state and instead led a massive economicrestructuring based on free-market principles: theyopened up the country s domestic markets to foreigncompetition by joining GATT [General Agreement onTariffs and Tradel ii7 dramatically reduced the num-ber of state enterprises from 1,155 in 1982 to 217 in1992;ii8 eliminated state subsidization, assistance,and price guarantee programs for the agriculturalsector;" 9 and, finally, imposed fiscal austerity mea-sures in the areas of wage and price controls. 20

By far the most far-reaching of these changes,however, occurred in the area of land reform. After 75years of mandatory land redistribution, as set forthin Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, Mexico'slatest elite decided that a continued constitutionalcommitment to the indigenous-peasantry was nolonger necessary.

When Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution,was amended in 1992, it "created a completely newlegal framework for land tenure and propertyrights." 2 1 Up until then the Constitution had guar-anteed land redistribution to peasant groups.i 22 Inaddition, it contained a whole battery of restrictionsand stipulations severely limiting land use: govern-ment land endowments were limited to ejido orcommunal farms; new ejidatanos could not sell, rentor mortgage their endowed lands; the land could notbe used as loan collateral; all labor on the lands hadto be done by the ejidatanos themselves or familymembers; inheritance and inter-ejido contractingwere subject to multifarious regulations; and finally,corporations could not own or manage ejido landsfor agricultural, livestock or forestry activities.123

The breadth of these rights and restrictions wasimmense. By 1990, land expropriation and redistrib-

ed] had submitted to structural adjustment pro-grams.

Bello, supra, at 17.

114. Sew LA BoTz supra note 3, at 105; see also Mexico: September1996, National Westminster Bank country Briefs, Sept. 1996,available in LEXIS. Nexis Library, Quest Economic Database.

115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

116. 'Technocrat" refers to those in government whobelieve in the "science of economics, neoliberalism, as the sole"basis of decision making." LA BOTZ, supra note 3 at 103.

117. See Pastor & Wise, supra note 93, at 463.118. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 261.119. Se BARRY, supra note 16, at 105.

120. See BARRY, supra note 19, at 91

121. Jose Cordoba, Mexico, in POLMCAL ECONOMY AND THE

CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 103, at 232, 254.

122. Se BARRY, supra note 16, at 117.

123. See CORDOBA, supra note 121, at 255.

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Andy Gullerrez Volume 4, Number 2

ution had affected one-half of the country's totalrural area and encompassed approximately threemillion people organized into over 28,000 ejidos.' 24

By amending Article 27 of the MexicanConstitution, however, Salinas demonstrated to hispeople and the world why Mexico has been coinedthe "perfect dictatorship." In -November 1991Salinas announced his proposed changes to Article27 of the Mexican Constitution. 25 Within twomonths his text was approved by both houses ofCongress and ratified by all 31 states in theRepublic. 26 Enabling legislation, La Ley Agrana,was passed soon after.'27

The changes to Article 27 granted ejidatanos theright to sell, buy, and rent their land; to hire labor;and to contract with other producers, including for-eign entities. 28 In addition, domestic and foreigncorporations were given the authority to acquireejido lands for agricultural, livestock and forestryactivities. 129 And in order to make the newly priva-tized lands transactable, the new law included anambitious land titling and registration program.Land titling covered all 29,000"ejidos, spanning anarea 102 million hectares or "more than one-halfthe national territory." 30

Complementing land reform was the govern-ment's termination of agricultural price supportsand subsidies. Under the new agricultural regime,crop prices would fall to international levels andpayments were to be made directly to producers ofbasic grains on a per-hectare basis.3i This newemphasis obviously called for a "shift of resourcesfrom traditional crops into those in which Mexicohas greater comparative advantage." 132

The gist of Salinas' agricultural reform wasclear. The government wanted to end Mexico's sta-tus as a bi-modal economy (agrarian-industrial) byprivatizing indigenous lands, conferring land titlesand registration, and terminating-price guarantees.The country's "backward" and "inefficient" agricul-tural sector (the indigenous-peasantry), it was

124. See EIIDo REFORM RESEARCH PROIECT, CENTER FOR U.S.MEXICAN STUDIES, UCSD, PUB. No. 3, THE END OF AGRARIAN REFORM

IN MEXICO 1 (1994).

125. See id. at 2.

126. See id.

127. See id.128. See Cordoba, supra note 121, at 256-257.

129. See id; see also'Luis Felipe Valladolid Chavez,Pnvatization of Mexican Efidos: The Implications of the New Article 27,U.C. BERKELEY MCNAIR JOURNAL, (visited Sept. .24, 1998)http://www-mcnair.berkeley edu.80/951ournal/LuisChavez.html.

130. Id.

hoped, would modernize "so as to compete effec-tively in the capitalist world system." 133 Thegroundwork for NAFTA, the vehicle by whichMexico's leaders hoped to carry them into the glob-al economy, and the instrument that the Zapatistasperceived as their final death-knell, had been obe-diently laid.

IV. NAFTA and the Decline of Mexico's CornProducers

"NAFTA is fundamentally changing theface of Mexican agriculture. Because itforced the Mexican government to sub-stantially reduce supports for Mexicangrain farmers, they are shifting away fromcorn production." 34

On the eve of NAFTA's adoption, its U.S. pro-ponents waxed poetic about the economic goodthe Treaty would bring to Mexico. "Illncreased"trade, investment, and cooperation between theUnited States and Mexico, stimulated by theNAFTA should result in significant environmentalgains," gushed USA*NAFTA, Inc., a consortium rep-resenting "1100 large and,small companies" and"CEO's of 60 large U.S. multinational corpora-tions." 35 The U.S. Department of State opined thatexpected increased trade and investment flowsamong NAFTA partners "Iwould] lead to lob cre-ation and allow for more balanced developmentthroughout Mexico."' 36 It stated that "the wholeidea of INAFTA] is to raise standards of livingand incomes."'137

Mexican free-trade adherents were no less hor-tatory in their free-trade incantations. But to them,NAFTA promised much more than mere economicsalvation. It meant the difference between a countrylabeled as emerging and one garnering full member-ship in the western community of nations. As theSalinas Administration averred: "A North American

131. See id.

132. Id.

133. EIDO REFORM RESEARCH PROIECT, supra note 124. at 2.

134. Corn Commodity Description, U.S. Feed GrainsCouncil, supra note 36.

135. Environmental Aspects of the North American Free TradeAgreement: Heanng Before the Senate Comm. on Environment andPublic Works. 103rd Cong.. ist Sess. 108 (1993).

136. Chiapas: implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations, U.S.Dept. of State, Feb. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,Dept. of State Dispatch.

137. Id.

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Summer ~998 Codifying the Post, Erasing the Fuli~re

free trade agreement will pull Mexico out of thestagnation of the third world and place it firmly inthe realm of the first world."138

If, however, by shrouding NAFTA in a syrup ofeconomic and nationalistic euphemisms, U.S. andMexican- free-trade proselytizers wished to avert aMexican backlash, they grossly miscalculated."ENOUGH IS ENOUGH," the Zapatista Armydeclared on January 1, 1994, NAFTA's inauguraldate. 39 For too long -

Iwle have been denied the most elementalpreparation so they can use us as cannonfodder and pillage the wealth of our coun-try. They don't care that we have' nothing,absolutely nothing, not even a roof overour heads, no land, no work, no healthcare, no food nor education. 40

The launch date of the Zapatista Uprising is notcoincidental. NAFTA was viewed by them as thefinal insult after "500 years of struggle."4i Lamentedone campesino, Margarito Sanchez, from Tuxtepec,Veracruz: "For us campesinos, the problem is thatwe are Just beginning to understand all the implica-tions of free trade and having to compete againstU.S. farmers. We don't know why it has to be thisway, but it probably means the end to our commu-nities."i

42

Mexico's indigenous-peasantry worry, in partic-ular, about food security. Since they are first andforemost subsistence corn growers, they worry thatfree trade might fatally undermine their ability tocontinue producing that crop. As one writerobserves: "Under NAFTA there is legitimate fear thatcheap food imports from the United States will wipeout whatever small margin currently exists for thesmall producers. Bad news for the 90 percent ofChiapas communities already classified as econom-ically 'marginal." '143

138. BARRY, supra note 19, at 113.

139. Declaration of War, supra note 40.

140. Id.

141. Id.

142. BARRY, supra note 16, at 65.

143. COOPER, supra note 41, at 7.

144. BARRY, supra note 16, at 93.

145. SANDERSON. supra note 47. at 215.

146. See id. at 221 (according to 1968 and 1975 householdexpenditure surveys).

A. Corn and the Indigenous-Peasantry"If the community loses corn, it means thatthe indian campesino loses dignity. Corn isour food, and the life of our culture." 44

Maize, or corn, more than any other staple fooditem produced in Mexico, is a "crop of the poor."' 45

Together with beans, maize provides 84 percent ofthe dietary protein consumed by the poor inMexico. 46 By contrast, for those at the top incomecategory, maize and beans provide less than 13 per-cent of the dietary protein consumed. 47 In the ruralsector, where poverty rates are highest,' 41 thedietary importance of maize is most striking - "atypical rural resident will consume three-fourths ofhis daily calories and 80 percent of his protein inthe form of [corn] tortillas and beans ",149

The vast amounts of cultivable land surfacedevoted to maize production reflects the large num-bers of poor in Mexico. "Maize is grown throughoutMexico, a crop spanningthe full range of Mexicanproductive ecologies, from the highlands of Tlaxcalaand Puebla to the irrigation districts of Sonora,Aguascalientes, Jalisco, and Michoacan, to the trop-ical extremes of the Yucatan Peninsula." 50 It ISgrown by an estimated 68 percent of thoseemployed in agriculture.' 5' And, as of 1990, it wasplanted on approximately 40 percent of the coun-try's arable land surface. 152

In some regions, maize production reaches theextremes. In 1978, for example, maize cultivation"consumeldl over 90 percent of the agricultural area.of the state of Mexico and over 85 percent of all landcultivated in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, andYucatan." 53 Nonetheless, as testimony to its "broadgeographical base," only Jalisco produced morethan 10 percent of the total national production. 154

A substantial bulk of Mexico's corn is grown bythe country's indigenous-peasantry. Categorized aslimited-surplus producers, and numbering approxi-mately 2.2 million,"' they produce crops on subsis-tence and infra-subsistence farms of 5 hectares or

147. See id.

148. SeeCorrea, supra note 23, at 32.

149. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 221.

150. ld..at 215.

151. SeeBARRY, supra note 16, at 103.

152. See Steve Suppan, Mexican Corn, NAFTA, and Hunger,1996 INST. FOR AGRICULTURE &- TiRAE POLICY, (last modified July 2,1996) <httpJ/www.igc.apc.orgliatp/Mexcorn.html>

153. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 215.

154. Id.

155. SeeBAR, supra note 16, at 1Oi.

Z0

=Codhng the Past, Erasig the FutureSummer 1998

Andy Gufterrez Volume 4, Number 2less.156 And though their farmlands are usually ofmarginal quality, 57 indigenous-peasantry havebeen able to produce enough corn to feed not onlythemselves, but a considerable portion of theircountrymen as well. In recent years, limited-surplusproducers contributed 3.5 million metric tons ofcorn to their nation, an amount corresponding toone-fourth of the total national corn production. 58

They also produce approximately 40 percent ofMexico's commercial corn. 5? It is estimated that 78percent of the country's communal farmers, i.e.,those living on ejidos and comunidades agranas,are engaged in corn production. 60

It is important to note, however, that while"Iclorn is central" to Mexico's small rural economy,"it is the rare campesino who depends solely onwhat he or she harvests."161 Corn production, evenprior to the neoliberal privatizations of the 1980s,rarely met the subsistence needs of the small peas-ant farmer. 62 Consequently, "lain estimated 85 per-cent of corn growers depend on other economicactivities on or off the farm to ensure family sur-vival."

1 63

Nonetheless, the importance of corn produc-tion to Mexico's small corn growers cannot be gain-said. In addition to comprising the vital core of theirnutritional profile, corn contributes significantly tothe peasantry's economic survival: small growers of5 hectares or less market nearly "one-half of thetotal corn they produce."164 Additionally, there is thefear of contaminating ancient native breeds ofMexican corn with biogenetically engineered U.S.equivalents:

Should Mexico become entirely dependenton corn imports -from the Midwesternstates in the U.S., just imagine what wouldhappen in the case of [U.S.] floods like theone in the Summer of 1993" In Mexico, wehave 20 breeds of corn, which have evolvedover a period of one thousand years. Thosefarmers that are technologically moreadvanced in Chihuahua, are now facingviruses and plagues in their farms, due tothe fact that they imported contaminated

See id.

See id.

See id.

See Suppan, supra note 1 52.

See BARRY, supra note 16, at 103.

Id. at 103-04.

See id.

seeds from the U.S. 165

B. Corn Under Siege: NAFTA's AgnculturalProvisions"The only thing that is not negotiable [inthe free trade agreementl is the virginity ofthe Virgin of Guadalupe. That stays.Everything else is on the table."-SeniorMinistry of Finance official, 1990166

NAFTAs agricultural provisions best reflect theanxiety felt by Mexico's small corn producers. Thoseprovisions remove all protective measures affordedthe peasantry and pit them in direct competitionwith multinational U.S. grain concerns. LuisHernandez Navarro, a peasant leader, captured theobvious asymmetry of this new relationship in 1993:

The losers [under the NAFTA] , above all[arel the small corn producers. Thenational average yield is 1.7 tons perhectare, compared to 7.5 tons per hectarein the United States. Corn is the heartof campesino production. Liberalization ofcorn markets associated with NAFTA andthe elimination of government-guaranteedprices (almost double the price on theinternational market) will mean an end tofood self-sufficiency in Mexico, or what'sleft of it 167

Some indigenous-peasantry are more blunt.They speak of the "great population surgery" or thedemographic cleansing of the small peasant farmerfrom the Mexican countryside. 68 They believe thatfree trade will lead to:

the ruin of hundreds of thousands of pro-ducers; and the more or less massive emi-gration of many of these to the UnitedStates as illegal workers - all this, eventaking into account the fifteen year transi-tion period established by the agreement.Several researchers have calculated thatnearly 850 thousand households will leave

163. Id.

164. Id.

165. Mexican Agncultural Policies: An Immigration Generator?,supra note 32, at 15.

166. BARRY, supra note 19, at 75 (quoting David Goldman, ARevolution You Can Invest in., Forbes, July 9, 1990).

167: Mexican Agricultural Policies, supra. note 32, at 69.168. Id. at 14.

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Summer 1998 Codifying the Post, Era~ng the Future

the countryside, 600 thousand of which willgo to the United States in search ofemployment.i69

The predictions made by Mexico's indigenous-peasantry are dire. They essentially claim that theentire Mexican countryside will be transformedunder NAFTA as their numbers are forced from theland. In the bosom of free-trade, there simply is noroom for subsistence agriculturalists.

Because of the millions of families implicatedand the relatively short tenure of NAFTA, it wouldbe difficult, if not impossible, to confirm or deny thisallegation. However, by focusing solely on.the lastthree years, it is possible to ascertain whetherNAFTA trade data either supports or negates theZapatista's likening of NAFTA to a "death certifi-cate."

The cardinal threat that NAFTA's agriculturalprovisions pose to Mexico's indigenous-peasantryis the potential for rapid and sustained surges inbasic grain imports from the U.S. 17° If that were tooccur, and the indigenous-peasantry were unable torespond in kind with more cheaply produced corn,their ability to hold on to their farms, to feed theirfamilies, and to remain in the countryside woulddisappear.i71 How and why this would occur, and theparticular crops most susceptible to suddenimport/export surges, requires a summary review ofrelevant NAFTA agricultural provisions and a basicunderstanding of the theory of relative comparativetrade advantage that undergirds free trade.

1. NAFTA's Agricultural ProvisionsUnder NAFTA Mexico maintains separate bilat-

eral agricultural agreements with the U.S. andCanada 172 covering virtually every sector of Mexicanagriculture. Under the U.S.-Mexico accord domesticprotection is removed for all classes of agriculture,livestock, poultry and dairy products. 173 TheCanada-Mexico accord is less ambitious. Dairy,poultry, egg and sugar sectors remain tariff protect-

169. Id. at 69.170. See BARRY. supra note 16, at 100, 157, 253.

171. Seeid.at233.

172. See Mexico: Agricultural MachJEquipmentlRelated Services,National Trade Data Bank Market Reports, Mar. 21, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, National Trade Data Bank File.

173. See Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selectedindustries of the North Amencan Free-Trade Agreement, United StatesInternational Trade Commission, Jan. 1993, available in LEXIS,Nexis Library, USITC Publication No. 2596.

174. See Mexico: Agricultural MachJEqupmenlIRelated Services,supra note 172.

ed. Despite the different tariff reduction schemes,however, all three nations are expected to eventual-ly move toward domestic support policies that arenon-trade distorting. =74"

The centerpiece of the agricultural agreement,the portion that may pose the greatest threat toMexico's small corn producers, is the market accessprovisions that open up Mexico's protected sectorsto international free trade. Principally contained inarticle 703 of NAFTA, they provide for the immedi-ate elimination, or progressive elimination in a 5,10, or 15-year period, of all tariff and quantitativerestrictions on every agricultural good tradedbetween member countries. 75 This includes grainsand oilseeds, fruits and luices, vegetables, sugar,sugar-containing products, dairy products, cotton,peanuts, livestock and meat, poultry, fish, cut flow-ers, lumber and wood products and alcoholic bev-erages.1 76 Under this schedule, by 2009 thereshould be no remaining agricultural tariffs betweenthe U.S. and Mexico. All non-tariff barriers, such asimport licensing restrictions, are eliminatedthrough conversion to a tariff rate quota system(TRO). 177 Under the TRO system, a particular item isassigned a specific quota on imports, with importsbelow this quota tariff free.178

Certain domestically sensitive crops are given amandatory long-term phase out schedule. InMexico's case corn, dry beans, milk powder andsugar are assigned the maximum 15-year phase-outperiod. 179 For the U.S., the 15-year phase out periodcovers frozen concentrated orange juice, sugar andpeanuts. 180

2. Relative Comparative Trade AdvantageThe success of NAFTs agricultural provisions

hinges on the theory of relative comparative tradeadvantage. According to this theory, if each nationwere to produce solely those products to whichtheir natural resources best conduce, then globalproduction becomes maximized, followed by"improved quality and lower prices for con-

175. Seesupra note 173.

176. See id.

177. See International Agriculture and Trade - NAFTA (pt. I),Economic Research Service, M2 Presswire, Sep. 26, 1996, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Database.

178. See Mexico: Agricultural Mach./EqupmentlRelated Services,supra note 172. The initial quota amounts are based generally onthe highest annual trade level in the 1988-91 trade period and aretracked to grow at 3 percent annually. See id.

179. See Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selectedindustries of the North Amencan Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 173.

180. See i.

Codhng the Pes, Erasing lhe FutureSummer 1998

Andv Gutierrez Vlm ,Nme

sumers." 8i Malthus, in his "The Grounds of anOpinion on the Policy of Restricting th, Importationof Foreign Corn," summarized the process over acentury ago:

[lf every nation were to devote itself par-ticularly to those kinds of industry and pro-duce, to which its soil, climate, situation,capital, and skill, were best suited; andwere then freely to exchange these prod-ucts with each other, it would be the mostcertain and efficacious mode, not only ofadvancing the wealth and prosperity of thewhole body of the commercial republicwith the qfiickest pace, but of giving toeach individual nation of the body the fulland perfect use of all its resources. 182

Under NAFTA, relative comparative tradeadvantage is taken to its logical extreme. Since allprotective tariffs and other protective measures arephased out in 15 years, NAFTA trade membersshould only produce those products that can turn aprofit on the international market, i.e., those prod-ucts in which they enjoy a relative comparativetrade advantage.i83

One way of predicting which food items Mexicoand the U.S. m intain comparative trade advan-tages in is through the United Nations Food andAgricultural Organization's Relative Trade AdvantageFactor (RA). 184 An RA measurement greater than zeroindicates a "relative comparative advantage for aspecific commodity in a global market, while a valuebelow zero indicates a relative disadvantage."185 Forcoarse grains, such as corn, wheat, and oil seeds,the U.S. has the highest positive rating, a 7.5.186 Butfor fruits and vegetables the U.S. records an RA ofzero. 87 Mexico is a near mirror opposite. It has an

181. Cleanng Mexico's Hurdles: U.S. Exporter's Checklist.

Amencan Chamber of Commerce. Business Mexico, July 1995,

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.

182. Rev. T.R. MalthusThe Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy

of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn: intended as an Appendix to

"Observations on the Corn Law," 1815, available in Internet,http.J/fisher.ecn.bris.ac.uk/het/malthus/grounds.txt. Malthus wasnot endorsing comparative trade theory. He was in fact warningBritain against the food insecurity that could obtain from relyingon other nations for corn. See id.

183. See International Agriculture and Trade - NAFTA (pt. 1),supra note 177.

184. See Cleanng Mexic's Hurdles: U.S. Exporter's Checklist,

supra, note 181.

185. Id.

186. See id.187. See id.

RA of -7 and -6 in basic grains and oilseeds, respec-tively, but a positive 3 RA for fruits and vegeta-bles. 188

Accordingly, under comparative trade theory,Mexico ought to become the malor, if not sole, sup-plier of fruits and vegetables to the U.S., while theU.S. becomes the major, if not sole, supplier ofbasic grains to Mexico. This form of global foodsourcing was evident by the 1980s. By then, Mexicohad already become the largest single supplier ofhorticultural products to the U.S., "no match sup-plying more than 50 percent of the- winter vegeta-bles imported into the United States."'189 In the lastthree years, it appears that this process has acceler-atecf considerably.

C. Agncultural Trade Trends Under NAFTARecently, Florida vegetable producers began

dramatically dumping their produce in a symbolic'gesture to signal their displeasure over a rapid risein Mexican vegetable imports. 190 Senator BobGraham of Florida complained that "the domesticfarmer is about to be wiped out because he can'tcompete overnight with this surge of Ivegetablelimports coming out of Mexico."' 9'

Senator Graham was correct. Under NAFTA,Mexico had dramatically increased its already dom-inant share of the U.S. winter vegetable market. Infact, by March 1996, it had increased its share of theU.S. winter fresh vegetable market to 62 percent. 192

While Mexican horticultural products floodedthe U.S., U.S. grain likewise deluged the Mexican,market. Marked by progressive record increases foreach year of NAFTA, corn led the way.. In NAFTAsfirst year, 1994, for instance, U.S. corn exports toMexico rose-tenfold to 3 million metric tons. 193 As ofOctober 31, 1995, Mexico's corn imports surpassedby 71.9 percent the record levels achieved in 1994.194

188. See id.

189. BARRY, supra note 19. at 165. There were other Mexicanagroexport products reflected Mexico's comparative trade advan-tage with the U.S. By 1990, "coffee exports to the United Statesconstituteldl more than a third of the country's agriculturalexports" and its feeder cattle market became the largest U.S. sup-plier. Id.

190. See U.S. Proposing Tariffs, Weekly Ouotas on Mexican Fruit,CNN, Jan. 19. 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript No.791-5.

191. Id.

192. 'See World Agricultural Outlook Board: Vegetables andSpecialties Part 1, M2 Presswire, Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS,Nexis Library, Newsletter Database.

193. See Mexico Tightens Rules on Booming U.S. Grain Imports,Reuter, Mar. 24, 1995, -available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Centraland South America File.

194. See Mexico Corn Imports Up 71.9 Percent to October 31,

I

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Summer 1998 Cd~gtePsEaigteFtr

Still, the most stunning gains came in 1996. BySeptember of that year, the U.S. had exported some6.3 million metric tons of corn to Mexico.195

The surge of U.S. corn exports to Mexico in

NAFTA's first three years would, at first glance,

appear counterintuitive. In late 1994, Mexico suf-fered from a 50 percent peso devaluation.19 6 This not

only made the import of foreign goods prohibi-tive, 197 but, by making Mexican products relatively

cheap, it actually spurred Mexican exports. 198 In

addition, in 1995/96 the world experienced a globalgrain shortage, 199 "with the prospective stocks-to-use ratio matching the low reached in the 1930'sDepression."20° Corn prices consequently skyrocket-ed to record levels. 2 i

In the face ofa dramatic peso devaluation and

record global grain price increases, how can thesurge of U.S. corn exports to Mexico be explained?One reason posited by trade analysts is that Mexicosuffered from drought during the last three years,and that this fueled the need to import historicamounts of U.S. corn. 202 This scenario, by itself, how-ever, is inadequate. Not only is corn known for itsresistance to inclement weather,20 3 but in Mexicocorn has traditionally been planted on close to 50percent of its arable land surface by an estimated 68percent of those engaged in agriculture.204

Additionally, the drought has afflicted only certaincorn-producing states of Mexico, mostly in theNorth.205 And what little drought assistance theMexican Government offered to afflicted states wasnot directed to corn producers, but instead was slat-ed for modernizing the irrigation systems "for live-stock producers"- agroexporters. 2G6

Reuter, Dec. 1. 1995, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Central andSouth Amenca File.

195. See USDA, Foreign Agncultural Trade of the United States,ECONOMIc RESEARcH SERVICE, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1996, at A-29.

196. See LA Borz, supra note 3, at 230.

197. See International Agriculture and Trade - NAFTA (pt. 1),supra note 177.

198. Evidence suggests, in fact, that the peso devaluationhelped spur Mexican exports to the U.S. Between Jan.-Feb. 1994and lan.-Feb. 1995, a $200 million Mexican agricultural tradedeficit turned into a $579 million Mexican trade surplus. See TradeSecretanat Authorizes Duty-Free Import of 1.67 Million Tons of U.S. CornUnder NAFTA Terms, Latin Amencan Institute, lun. 7, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Latin American Database.

199. See Food Plentiful But Shortage of Cash, Inter Press Service,Apr. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.

200. Feed Outlook Part 2, M2 Presswire, May 14, 1996. avail-able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Database.

201. See Suppan, supra note 152.

202. See International Agnculture and Trade, supra note 177.

If the drought does not provide a completeexplanation for the record flow of U.S. corn exportsto Mexico in the last three years, NAFTA's agricultur-al provisions, in conjunction with past neoliberalreforms, provide additional insight. Recall that dur-ing the 1980s to early 1990s, Mexico slashed its ruralassistance to small farmers - cutting subsidies,technical assistance, and credit programs. 20 7 Thisled to a marked decrease in cultivation of tradition-al peasant staple crops. Between 1991 and 1993, forinstance, land devoted to basic grains productiondropped from 12,427,000 hectares to 9 406,000.208

The movement away from peasant-producedcrops resulted in a marked national diminution inthe production of basic grains, including corn, and,therefore, set the stage for increased dependency onU.S. grain products. The results have been devastat-ing for Mexico's peasantry. The Institute forAgriculture and Trade Policy writes that "[ilnChiapas, approximately 200,000 farm workers havelost their lobs because of the 50 percent drop in agri-cultural production," adding that "most of the reduc-tion is in maize and bananas, which account for 60percent of agricultural employment in Chiapas."20 9

NAFTA complements and accelerates theprocess of food insecurity. It achieves this chiefly bypermitting U.S. corn producers to ship millions oftons of corn to Mexico completely free of tariffs.

2 10

This may seem striking considering that Mexicancorn is categorized as a sensitive national crop,slapped with the maximum 15-year tariff phase outschedule. 211 Under the tariff-free corn provisions,however, "many sensitive products," corn included,are assigned a tariff rate quota (TRO).212 "TROs

203. There are narrow windows in the corn growing cyclewhen weather extremes can significantly retard harvest yields. SeeCorn Commodity Description, supra note 36. However, corn is particu-larly known for its ability to grow in desert-like conditions, suchas in the Amencan Southwest, where Indian civilizations have formillennia depended upon it. See id.

204. See discussion supra part IVA.

205. See International Agriculture and Trade, supra note 177.

206. Id.

207. See discussion supra part lli.B.

208. See NAFFA & Inter-American Trade Monitor, Coalitions ofAgricultural Groups Demand Action, 2 INST. FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADEPOLICY (1995), available in Internet, http://www.envirolink.orglseeIliATP/nafta/vol2no I .htr.

209. Id.

210. See NAFTA two years of achievement, FertilizerInternational, Sep. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.

211. See discussion supra part IV.B.2.

212. International Agnculture and Trade - NAFTA (pt. I ), supranote 177.

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Andy Gufierrez Volume 4, Number 2

allow a specific quantity to enter at a reduced tariff,usually zero."213 While imports above the quota "facea higher tariff, these over-quota tariffs will bereduced to zero during the implementation period,thus eliminating the need for a TRO."214

To date, Mexico has been very liberal withNAFTA's tariff-free quota provisions, permitting tar-iff-free importation of virtually all U.S. corn.215 As ofOctober 1995, for instance, Mexico had raised its tar-iff-free corn import quota to 3 million tons, an 18percent increase over the 2.5 million tons originallycontemplated under NAFTA.216 Of this total nearlyall, or 2.5 million tons, were slated for direct con-sumers in Mexico.2 17 By June 1996, "Mexico's duty-free quota for U.S. corn imports" was set at 4.5 mil-lion metric tons. 21 8

Hence, while NAFTA's 15-year phase out pen-od219 ostensibly protects Mexico's "sensitized" cropsfrom sudden import surges from the U.S., the Treaty,by its TRO terms, renders the phase out periodmeaningless. Not only is the U.S. given the econom-ic incentive to flood the Mexican market with corn,but the U.S. is so doing in record fashion. In thesecircumstances, where nearly 18 million indigenous-peasant families depend upon corn production forconsumption and marketing, 220 and where the 15-year phase out. period is but a fiction, the Zapatista'slikening of NAFTA to a "death certificate", for thecountry's Indians, 221 rings more true than hollow.

V. Implications

Today, Mexico's indigenous-peasantry stand atan historic crossroads. After having endured twomajor agricultural upheavals since the 1910Revolution - the gradual externalization of Mexicanagriculture after 1940 and the abandonment of pop-ulist-agrarianism during the 1980s 222 - they nowstruggle in a new, more globalized context. UnderNAFTA, the centerpiece of this era's formal globalfree-market integration, Mexico's small corn produc-

213. NAFTA: Two Years of Achievement, supra note 210.

214. Id.

215. See Mexico Ups Tariff-Free Corn Imports Quotas, Reuter, Oct.6, 1995, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Central and South Americafile.

216. See id.217. See id.

218. Impact of NAFTA, U.S. Feed Grains Council, Jun. 3, 1996,(visited Sept. 24, 1998) http/www. grains.org/policy/ nafta.htm.

219. See discussion supra part IV.B.2.

220. See discussion supra part IV.A.

221. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 157.

ers are thrust headfirst into the unannounced twistsand turns of the international market. Whether theircommunal subsistence communities will wither orsurvivein the long term, depends on their ability totransmogrify themselves into savvy export-orientedfree-marketeers.

Unfortunately, information gleaned from thefirst three years under NAFTA countenances other-wise. The ongoing neoliberal "policies underminingMexican family farmers" meant that Mexico contin-ued its national slide in basic grains production.2 23

"According to the Mexican government, basic-grainproduction IfellI for the ten principal basic-graincrops" by 13.3 percent during the first year ofNAFTA.224 Production of corn, between 1994 and1995 fell by 2.5 million tons.225 Victor Suarez, direc-tor of the National Association of CommercializingEnterprises of Rural Producers (ANEC), remarks thatin these circumstances, with Mexican agriculture"decapitalized, stagnant, without integration in itsdifferent phases, with government institutions dis-mantled, and with drastic reductions in subsidies,"his country's food dependency will worsen. 226

Already under NAFTA, the U.S. is shippingrecord levels of tariff-free corn to Mexico. As men-tioned earlier, in 1994, the first year of NAFTA, theU.S. shipped ten times more corn than in 1993 or 3million metric tons; 227 in 1996, that figure topped 6million metric tons. 228 Meanwhile, Mexican exportsto the U.S. of non-basic food items increased torecord levels.229

It is thus apparent that after three years underNAFTA, Mexico has quickened the pace toward fooddependency and peasant marginalization: the U.S. isproviding more and more of Mexico's basic grains,namely corn, and Mexico is in turn producing moreand more of the fruit and vegetable products con-sumed by U.S. families. While this may represent a,more efficient allocation of productive resourcesand lower regional food prices, it may very well leadto what peasants have feared all aloig - their "eth-

222. See discussion supra part II.

223. Suppan, supra note 152.224. Inst. For Policy Studies, et al., No Laughter in NAF'A:

Mexico and the United States Two Years After (1996) httpJ/www.igcorg/dgap/.

225. See Suppan, Mexican Corn, NAFTA. and Hunger, supranote 152.

226. Eduardo Molina yVedia, Mexico Trade: NAFTA Blamed forFarmers' Problems, Inter Press Service, Jan. 7, 1997.

227. See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.228. See id.

229. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.

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Summer 1998 CdfigtePsEaigteFtr

nic cleansing" from the Mexican countryside.230 Thisethnic transformation will likely result in both shortand long-term consequences.

A. Short-Term ConsequencesReports of rural violence have grown com-

monplace in Mexico since NAFTA took effect. Asthe trend of rising U.S. basic food imports, cou-pled with the intensification of Mexican agroex-port production, continues in Mexico, the historictension between subsistence producer, on the onehand, and the large landowner and government,on the other, worsens.

In June 1995 seventeen peasants in the stateof Guerrero were assassinated in a hail of gun-fire. 231 Numerous state police officials were impli-cated by federal authorities in the massacre,including the state governor.23 2 A new rebel group,the -People's Revolutionary Army (EPR), incensedat the impunity afforded the perpetrators, formedin the wake of the massacre. Seemingly betterfinanced, and certainly more violent than theZapatistas, they have already engaged in severaldeadly combats with the Mexican Military.233

The Zapatistas, for their part, endure immi-nent threats of attack from Mexican army unitsringing their stronghold. In December 1994, asZapatistas and their supporters peacefully fin-ished construction on several small villageencampments 234 in preparation for their SpecialForum on Indigenous Rights, government forcesinexplicably went on heightened alert in and

230. See supra note 168-169 and accompanying text.

231. See 10 More Arrests in Mexican Massacre. S.F. CHRON., Feb.12, 1995, at A-12.

232. See Anthony DePalma, Report on Mexico MassacreProvokes Political Storm, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at A3.

233. See Falso, que el EPR haya estado en Acapulco. precisaGobernacion, LA JORNANDA, Jul. 3, 1996, at 1.

234. Sometime during the summer of 1995, thousands ofMaya Indians, at the behest of the Zapatista High Command,began construction on four symbolic village encampments, eachgiven the name "Aguascalientes." Interview with ZapatistaSupporter, San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas (Dec. 1995). Theyeach took their name from the town in central Mexico whereEmiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, in 1914, convened a conven-tion in which delegates "pledged to support Zapata's Plan ofAyala. calling for the distribution of land to the peasant commu-nities. LA BouZ, supra note 3. at 175-76. One writer captured themomentous significance of the "new" Aguascalientes movement:"For the first time in Mexico's history, the Indians had summonedthe people of Mexico to discuss the fate of the nation on theIndians' terms and on native soil." Id. at 176.

235. See Julio Cesar Lopez, Se Levantan Ya la Nuevos"Aguascalients" del EZLN, EL PROCESSO, Dec. 25, 1995, at 33-34.

236. See Videotape: Mexican Military Staging Area. San

around the village areas.235 Sporadic reports sooncame in that large numbers of Mexican armytroops were on their way toward the tiny villages,accompanied by tanks and antipersonnel carri-ers. 236 On December 26, 1996, the EZLNannounced publicly their fear of an impending"military action."237

When reporters inquired of the Commander ofthe 7th Military Region as to the sudden increasein military presence, his only response was thatthe military was committed to "maintaining" thepeace. 238 The Mexican Secretary of State'sresponse to questions about the new troopdeployments was even less satisfying. He indicat-ed that the military was only conducting "roadpatrols." The Governor of Chiapas went so far as tosay that "the situation in Chiapas is normal." 239

Reports from independent observers andIndians near the new Aguascalientes belied thegovernment's assertion that things were "normal"and that the troop movements were only routineroad patrols. 210 Around one Aguascalientes vil-lage, Oventic, about ninety minutes outside of SanCristobal de Las Casas, a whole battalion ofMexican soldiers reportedly stood several hun-dred feet from the village and assumed attack for-mation. 241 They were armed with assault rifles andother heavy military machinery.242 On the otherside of their guns stood whole families of Indians- men, women and children.243

Violence -is likely to get worse. There arereports of the Mexican Army acquiring military

Cristobal de Las Casas, (Dec. 1995) (on file with author).237. LA JORNADA, Dec. 27, 1995. at 2.

238. See id.

239. Id.

240. The author arrived in San Cristobal de las Casas lustas the Mexican Army went on heightened alert, various localnewspaper reports and local citizens spoke of the recent militaryshow of force. The author then went to investigate the scene of analleged military confrontation at Aguascalientes, located inOventic. On his way there, he encountered numerous soldiersstationed at strategic locations alongside roads and hiding in theforest. In addition, not far from where the OventicAguascalientesvillage was, there were what looked like modified U.S. "HUMVEE"vehicles, but mounted with rather large machine guns. As theauthor approached the village entrance, Zapatista security per-sonnel informed him that indeed there had been a close con-frontatiop and that as a result the Indian village would have to beclosed off to outsiders until the Mexican Army stood down. SeeField Study by author in Chiapas, Mexico, (Dec. 1995-Jan. .1996)(information on file with author).

241. See id.

242. See id.

243. See id.

(odbngq the Post, Erasing the FutureSummer1998

And. umrVue4Nubrvehicles that are sppcially designed for riot controland suppression of guerrilla warfare. Much of thisequipment has been supplied by the U.S. in thewake of the Zapatista Uprising. For instance, justafter the rebellion in 1994, the U.S. sent twenty-sixmilitary vehicles "equipped with water cannonlsl"to Mexico. 244 In addition, the U.S. has already sup-plied Mexico with 3,297 "Hummers," (armoredinfantry vehicles) which have been equipped for usewith light machine guns and grenade launchers.245

B. Long-Term ConsequencesGiven the increasing use of military and police

force against Mexico's indigenous-peasantry, itseems likely that Mexico is poised to fulfill ex-President Salinas's goal of compelling "some twomillion families - about three-quarters of thenation's corn farmers Itol 'search for alternatives inother crops, reorganize their land holdings, associ-ate with priyate capitalists, or become wage labor-ers."'24 6 But integrating Indians into the country'surban-industrial market economy faces at least twoformidable obstacles. First, it is virtually impossiblefor the Mexican market economy to absorb the mil-lions of potentially displaced Indians. Second, thereare key social factors, akin to those confronting U.S.southern blacks as they migrated from the ruralSouth to the urban North, that will stunt any fulland meaningful integration of Mexico's Indians.

As it stands now, Mexico has no formal integra-tion plan for the displacement of its millions ofIndians under NAFTA. 247 Rather, Mexico expectsthat the increased agricultural and industrialexports predicted from free trade will fuel expan-sion, create more jobs, and thereby absorb any inci-dentally displaced citizens. 2 48 There is one signifi-

244. Julio A. Montes, Mexican Armoured Vehicles. JANE'S

INTELLIGENCE REVIEw, Jan. 1, 1996. at 44.

245. See id.

246. BARRY, supra note 16, at 47.247. See generally Mexican Agricultural Policy: An Immigration

Generator?, supra note 32, at 1-6.

248. See id.249. See Clearing Mexico's Hurdles: U.S. Exporter's Checklist,

supra note 181.

250. See Dornbusch & Wemer. supra note iO0, at 294-295.

251. Seeid.at295.

252. See id. at 296. Exports growth under NAFTA has sky-rocketed. Between 1993 and 1995, two-way trade betweenMexico and the U.S. rose from $81.5 billion to $107 billion. SeeCENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HEMISPHERIC TRADE, NAFTA AT THREE:

How's IT DOING? (Feb. 1997) <http://lanc.utexas.edu/cswht/NAFTA3.html>

253. See Dombush & Werner, supra note 100, at 295. Under

cant problem with this theory - it flies in the faceof existing economic reality.

In the last several years, Mexico has increasedits volume oftrade in agricultural and industrialexports.249 Yet not only has the number of jobs fall-en considerably, real wages for the remaining work-ers dropped.250 For example, between the years of1983 to 1993, when Mexico began opening its mar-kets to the U.S., Mexico's real GDP achieved steadyannual growth.251 In fact, its volume of exports dou-bled from,$25.95 billion to $5-1.88.252 Nonetheless,those years were marred by tremendous job loss-es 253 and falling wages; between 1982 and 1993, theMexican minimum wage fell by over 70 percent.254

There thus seems to be a direct correlationbetween industry productivity and profit, on the onehand, and the increasing impoverishment of theMexican work force on the other. This perverse eco-nomic reality undermines the argument that mil-lions of Mexico's Indians can be successfully inte-grated, through free trade, into the market econo-my. The obvious question remains: what willbecome of Mexico's Indian population if U.S. corncontinues to flood the Mexican market underNAFTA's tariff-free provisions.

One model might be that of the African-American. As African-Americans migrated out of therural South, primarily during World War I and espe-cially during and after World War II, they encoun-tered two obstacles: 1) a racist and inhospitabletemper in the urban sectors; and 2) a lack of train-ing and job skills required for their new setting.255

Consequently, they became what MichaelHarrington aptly termed the "Other America," poor,neglected, and channeled into what we now call theinner city.256

NAFTA, the decline in jobs continues: "According to Mexicangovernment figures, the unemployment rate doubled betweenSeptember 1994 and September 1995. The number of workersregistered at the Mexican Social Security Institute fell by 900,000during the first eight months of 1995." No Laughter in NAFTA, supranote 224. "Adding to that figure all those workers who were notregistered who have lost their jobs, business leaders estimatethat over 1.5 million people have been left unemployed [in19951. Id.

254. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 294.Wages continue to plummet under NAFTA: 'The MexicanCongress of Workers (CTM) reports that the purchasing power ofthe average wage has fallen by 54 percent this year. The CTMasserts that the real minimum wage in 1976 was 3.4 times that of1995 and has characterized 1995 as 'the worst lyearl we've had inour history.'" No Laughter in NAFTA, supra note 224.

255. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROMSLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 291-310. 385-

424 (1987).

256. See MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).

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Summerl 998f h , t u

Much the same experience may await Mexico'sIndian population if they are economically and eth-nically cleansed from their lands. Like post-bellumAfrican-Americans, Mexico's Indians lack the neces-sary training and lob skills to effectively compete inthe urban economy.257 In addition, racism directedagainst Indians in Mexico is deeply-rooted andwidespread. 25 8 They may thus face the one-twopunch of poor preparation and racism in theirforced bid to integrate.

But the situation may even prove to be worsefor the Indians. Unlike post-bellum African-Americans, many Indians in Mexico speak only theirnative tongue.259 This then places a severe languagebarrier on their urban integration. It is, therefore,more accurate to say that indigenous peoples inMexico will face three legion obstacles in theirforced bid to integrate into the global economy:inadequate training, racism, and the language bar-rier. It is hard to see how any full and meaningfulintegration can be achieved in these circumstancesby reliance alone on free-market exports.

VI. Solutions

The ghettoization of Mexico's Indian popula-tion is not inevitable under a free-trade regime. It isquite possible that by reforming NAFTA and rollingback certain provisions, the U.S. and Mexico canengage in free trade and at the same time providefor the sovereignty, dignity and economy ofMexico's indigenous-peasantry.

Conspicuously absent from NAFTA is thedemocratic process. Mexico's Indians had no say inthe development of the terms of trade under thisnew treaty.26

0 The trade accord was simply put on afast-track path and commandeered through toadoption by Mexico's 60-year old ruling party, thePRI. To U.S. citizens, this may seem appalling - thefact that the planned displacement of millions offamilies was decided upon without hearings, com-munity input, nothing. Any attempts at NAFTAreform must therefore begin and end with democra-tization. Military intimidation and assassination ofthe indigenous-peasantry and political oppositiongroups must stop.

Beyond democratization, there are severalbroad areas where reform is also required:

First, the preamble in NAFTA requires changeto reflect a more enlightened philosophy about

257. See Interview with Indian refugees, in San Cristobalde Las Casas, Chiapas (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (on file with author).

258. See LA Boinz, supra note 3, at 23-24.

259. See Filmed Interview with Mayan Indians, in Chiapas

development. Rather than focus purely on exportsfor regional prosperity, 261 the new philosophy needsto link gross domestic product with a gross social prod-uct. Thus, when an indicator shows real economictrade growth, there should be a corresponding risein a nation's standard of living. If this does notoccur, there should be provisions to roll back or,implement remedial measures to protect the livingstandards of NAFTA citizens. The power to effectthese remedial measures should lay not lust withindividual governments, but with citizen groups aswell.

Second, the NAFTA and future trade agree-ments of the Americas need to have a special sec-tion that addresses indigenous rights. Issues suchas autonomy and meaningful participation in thefree-trade process ought to be covered. In no situa-tion should a consortium of governments simplydecide to unilaterally change the productive rela-tions of its native peoples.

Third, a Hemispheric Reconstruction Fundshould be set up to deal with economic dislocationin the wake of free trade. These monies can bedirected to the training, education, relocation anddevelopment of dislocated individuals and commu-nities.

Fourth, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution,covering land redistribution, rights and privileges,needs to be amended again. The amendments in1992, ending the state commitment to land redistri-bution and permitting the privatization of ejidos,exposes vulnerable Indian communities to possibleexploitation and, perhaps, expropriation of theirlands. Article 27 should again mandate a constitu-tional commitment to Mexico's Indians in the formof land redistribution.

However, the land titling and registrationaspects of the 1992 amendment may be somethingto retain. They impose a semblance of, order onchaos in that disputes as to land boundaries cannow be resolved by reference to government titlingdocuments. Moreover, because the ambiguity sur-rounding ownership of ejido land is eliminatedthrough the titling process, ejidatanos may be betterable to seek assistance from lending sources, suchas commercial banks, cooperatives and non-govern-mental organizations.

Finally, the Mexican government needs tofinancially re-commit itself to its rural poor. Forinstance, Indian communities require credit, techni-

(Mar.-Apr. 1994) (on file with author).

260. Se BARRY, supra note 16, at 72.

261. See generally BARRY. supra note 19. at 113-119.

CodlifynQ tle POs, Erasn~Q the Futureumm .r 1998

kidy Gulierrezcal assistance and irrigation systems. These are thetypes of public works programs that only govern-ments can or are willing to provide. The knee-lerknotion that a country must uphold cuts in socialspending, in order to remain globally competitiveand credit worthy, simply must be abandoned.

VII. Conclusion

President Clinton has expressed hope. that bythe year 2005, a Free Trade Area of the Americas(FTAA) will be established. This will include theentire Western Hemisphere. 262 However, once again,as in NAFTA, nowhere is there discussion aboutwhat role our Hemisphere's native peoples willplay.263 What, for example, will become of theXicaque in Honduras; the Ngobe-Bugle of Panama;the Mapuche of Chile; or'the millions of Mayaspread across Central America? In Brazil, suiciderates among the Guarani Kaiowa have reachedalarming levels due to extreme loverty, loss of tra-ditional religious practices, but, "above all," due tolack of land.264 Will free-trade's emphasis on landconcentration exacerbate this situation?

As it stands, Latin America seems poised tointegrate with the United States and Canada, irre-spective of the wishes and concerns of the tens ofmillion of Native Americans in our Hemisphere. TheWhite House has already asked that Congress grant

262. See Hon. Barbara Franklin et al., Remarks at TheHeritage Foundation's Lectures and Educational Programs (Dec. i5,1995), <http./www.heritage.org/heritagellibrary/categories/trade/lect555.htrnil>

263. See id.

264. Indigenous Assembly Grapples with Suicides. ABYA YALANEWS, Vol. 9, No. i, Spr. 1995, at 5.

265. See Hon. Barbara Franklin et al., supra note 262. Formore information on a Free Trade Agreement with the Americas(FrAA), see generally Joseph A. McKinney et al., eds., Free Trade Areafor the Amencas: Issues in Economics, Trade Policy, and Law, 1995 DEPT.OF CONTINUING EDUCATION BAYLOR UNIVERSITY.

266. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:1492 - Present I (HarperPerennial)(1995).

it the power to negotiate free trade with Chile andother Latin American countries on a fast-trackbasis.

265

Perhaps that is fitting. It was only five centuriesago, after all, when Europe's steely advocate ofmultinational trade, by chance, first set eyes on theWestern Hemisphere. And even then, full knowingthat he stood amidst the protean stages of globaleconomic integration, he could not help but ignorethe human forms before him, instead delighting intheir bounty. On that first encounter with theArawak of the Bahama Islands, ChristopherColumbus wrote:

They brought us parrots and balls ofcotton and spears and many other things,which they exchanged for the glass beadsand hawk's bells. They willingly tradedeverything they owned. They were well-built, with good bodies and handsome fea-tures. They do not bear arms, and do-not know them, for I showed them a sword,they took it by the edge and cut themselvesout of ignorance. They have no iron. Theirspears are made of cane. They wouldmake fine servants. With fifty men wecould sublugate them all and make themdo whatever we want. 266

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