I LEGISLATIVE LIBRARY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

~33298003105476

THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED AS “PROTECTED A”

AND MUST NOT BE PHOTOCOPIED t”~ (:~

(_1f~~/~7y

FINAL REPORT

CO-ORDINATEI) LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT (CLEU)

~ ~~1 /

/ ~ /~‘~H~ fr~ U~ u~ U~L~

AUGUST 9, 1993

DOCBCZR1992P6

R4 31993c.2

— LEGESLATIVE LI~RARY\VICTORIA, BC VSV IX4~

4025 White Rock StreetVictoria, B.C. V8N 4M4

August 9, 1993

The Honourable Mr. Justice Wallace T. OppalCommissionerPolicing in British Columbia InquiryRoom 155 (Plaza Level)800 Hornby StreetVancouver, B.C. V6Z 2C5

Dear Mr. Justice Oppal,

Re: Contract No. 93-005-NLCo-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit

In accordance with the terms of our contract, I respectfully submit my final report of myreview of the Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit, which is due on August 9, 1993.

The information on which the report is based has been obtained from a number ofdocuments provided to me by the Director, CLEU Policy Analysis Division, all of which areclassified at the level of “Protected A”; and a number of interviews I have conducted with selectedmembers of the CLEU Policy Board, past and present; Joint Management Teams of Vancouverand Vancouver Island Joint Forces Operations; Joint Force Operations Commanders; UnitCommanders; Field Investigators and selected members of the Policy Analysis Division, includingthe Director.

I also visited the Commanding Officer and staff of “D” Division, RCMP in Manitoba; theChief of Police and staff of the Winnipeg Police Department; the Commanding Officer, “0”Division, RCMP and staff; London, Ontario; the Commissioner,. Ontario Provincial Police; theChief, Metropolitan Toronto Police and his senior stafl and the Chief and staff of the PeelRegional Police Force, Brampton, Ontario.

I have received friendly and useful co-operation from all I have interviewed. In Manitobaand Ontario, CLEU’s reputation as a trail blazer in the fight against organized crime preceded me.

As I mentioned in my covering letter of the Interim Report, I would still like yourauthority to discuss this report with the CLEU Policy Board. I also ask again that the confidentialnature of this report be protected from public disclosure. I would like an opportunity to discusswith you the manner in which you plan to report on CLEU, given the sensitive nature of itsactivities.

Yours sincerelyO~!~NAL SIGNED ~.Y

R. R. BOUR)~

Robert P. (Robin) BourneTelephone: 721-4395

Attach.

FiNAL REPORT

A REVIEW OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIACO-ORDINATEI) LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT

PART ONE

ORGANIZATION, ROLE AND RESPONSIBUJTIES

The Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit in the Ministry of Attorney General was established in

1974 in response to a rapid rise in criminal activity in British Columbia in the late 1960s and early

1970s. The creation of this unit was one of a number of reforms brought about by the Provincial

Government to improve the administration ofjustice.

At the time, in 1974, there was not a consistent standard of police training, police equipment and

operational policies among municipal police forces in British Columbia Standards in the

administration of courts vaned widely There was no Provincial prosecution service

Prosecutions were carried out by over two hundred ad hoc counsel appointed for individual cases

In remote communities, RCMP officers prosecuted their own ca~es in magistrate’s courts. The

problem of increased crime was compounded by the fact that there was no common information

base with which various agencies of the criminal justice system could measure their effectiveness

in dealing with nsmg criminality It became clear to the Government that major changes to the

administration ofjustice had to be made.

These major changes included the take-over by the Province of the forty-four courts which were

administered by the municipalities and the establishment of one uniform but regionalized court

service; the formation of a Provincial crown counsel system and the assumption by the Province

-2-

of the responsibility for prosecuting all offences, except those in Federal Government jurisdiction;

the establishment of a Police Commission to be responsible for standards of police service

delivery, research, recruitment, training and the adjudication of disciplinary matters; and the

establishment of a British Columbia Police Academy.

A Provincial Sheriffs Service was formed in order to free police officers from excessive

administrative responsibilities, such as the service of criminal documents, court administration and

security and the escort of prisoners. The large numbers of police officers which then became

available for operational police work provided the manpower which made the creation of a Co

ordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU) Joint Force Operation possible. The concept of joint

force operations was not new. It had been tried in Ontario and in British Columbia, on an ad hoc

basis, when additional police manpower and equipment were required to target criminal activities

which crossed police jurisdictional boundaries. The idea of a permanent Joint Force Operation

(JFO) structure, however, was somewhat novel at the time.

In its original structure, CLEU consisted of three divisions, the investigative division (IFOs), the

legal division, and a policy analysis division The investigative division comprised a permanent

JFO structure, involving RCMP and mumcipal police officers, and was managed by a Joint RCMP

- Vancouver Police command system. The policy analysis division comprised non-police research

officers under the direction of a senior public servant. The legal division, conceptually, was to

comprise crown prosecutors assigned permanently to CLEU who were expected to be closely

involved in JFO investigations and who would prosecute CLEU cases in court. The whole

structure was designed to be directed by, and accountable to a CLEU Policy Board, chaired by

the Deputy Attorney General. Members of the Board were the Commanding Officer, “E”

Division, RCMP, the Chief Constable, City of Vancouver, the Director, Policy Analysis Division,

and, at the insistence of the Attorney General of the day, three influential private citizens.

-3-

The total CLEU effort was directed at major crimes committed by “Organized Crime”. It was

inten~ded by the Attorney General and his Deputy that the CLEU Policy Board, which brought

together senior police officers, public servants and private citizens, would collectively be able to

select criminal targets for investigation by the iFOs and prosecution by the legal division. The

policy analysis division was to explore strategies, particularly regulatory measures, for dealing

with organized crime and to research issues which were of concern to the Policy Board.

The concept was bold and imaginative but immediately ran into difficulties. The establishment of

the legal division was criticized by both the police and the legal establishment. It was felt that the

idea of prosecuting attorneys working closely with the police, and being involved with

investigations, was contrary to the important principle that the police fimction and the

prosecutorial ffinction should be separate. It was not long before the concept of having a

dedicated legal division was abandoned.

The police expressed concern that they did not have sufficient control over the targeting decisions

which were made by the Policy Board. This concern was overcome by including, as members of

the Policy Board, the senior operations officers from the RCMP Division and Vancouver Police

Department. As time went on, however, the police became increasingly uneasy with the fact that

there were private citizens on the Policy Board. There was a reluctance to share sensitive criminal

inteffigence with those who were not sworn police officers. The police view prevailed and again it

was not long before the private citizens were dropped from the Policy Board.

The obvious location for the CLEU JFOs was the lower mainland and they were established there

in 1974. In 1975, however, since criminal activity on Vancouver Island was often linked with the

mainland, it was decided to form an investigative JFO in Victoria, utilizing personnel from the

RCMP detachments of the Victoria Sub-Division and the five municipal police departments. An

additional Vancouver Island joint management team was also established.

-4-

In the early planning for CLEU, it was decided that an effective way to ensure the best possible

co-operation among police of various jurisdictions and, particularly, between the police and the

Policy Analysis Division, was to give to the Director, Policy Analysis Division, control of the

Provincial share of the budget. The Province’s share of the funding for CLEU was substantial and

initial police resistance to the concept of CLEU was largely overcome by the generosity of the

Province in providing ftinds for operations, specialized equipment and accommodation.

Today, nineteen years later, CLEU continues in basically the same configuration. There continues

to be a Policy Analysis Division and Joint Force Operations in Vancouver and on Vancouver

Island. The CLEU Policy Board remains virtually unchanged except for the addition of the senior

lawyer from the Federal Department of Justice Vancouver Office and the Assistant Deputy

Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Justice Branch (Provincial Prosecutors). From 1981

until this year, the Assistant Deputy Minister, Police Services Branch, also sat on the CLEU

Policy Board. In fact, during those years, CLEU was a part of the Police Services Branch.

Recent re-organization of the Ministry of Attorney General now has the Director, CLEU Policy

Analysis, reporting directly to the Deputy Attorney General.

The nature of organized crime has changed over the years. CLEU’s annual reports to Policy

Board indicate that most major criminal activity has its roots in the importation, manufacture and

distribution of prohibited drugs, particularly cocaine, heroin and marijuana. The increase in the

Asian population of the Province has manifested itself in the proliferation of criminal gangs,

whose activities, including drug trafficking, extortion, assaults and murder, have necessitated the

creation of.a South East Asia Crime Unit in CLEU IFO. There is ongoing concern, also, about

the criminal activities of the Hell’s Angels motorcycle gang and evidence that the traditional

Italian-based organized crime of the sixties and seventies is re-emerging in Vancouver.

-5-

The evidence, found in nineteen years of annual reports to the CLEU Policy Board, indicates

convincingly that the CLEU experiment has been a success. Approximately 2000 criminals have

been arrested and charged by CLEU iFOs since 1974.

-6-

CHART 1

ORGANIZATION ANT) STRUCTURE OF CLEU

Vancouver PD/RCMPWest Vancouver PD Saanich PD/RCMPDelta PD Victoria PD, Oak Bay PD,New Westminster PD Esquimalt PD

VancouverJFO ./ rlnsp ,,~ ~ . ~ I Vancouver Island JFOVancouver PD/RCMP L~°”°~ Analysis Division j lnsp I/C

____________________ ____________________ Saanich PD

Legend:

Operational Reporting

Financial Reporting

- Administrative, clerical, analytical, technical andsystems support

-7-

CHART 2

CLEU POLICY BOARD

ProvincialRepresentatives

FederalRepresentatives

MunicipalRepresentatives

- Deputy Attorney General, Chair- Director, CLEU Policy Analysis, Secretary- Assistant Deputy Attorney General,

Criminal Justice Branch

Regional General Counsel,Federal Department of Justice

- Commanding Officer, “F’ Division,Ràyal Canadian Mounted Police

- Officer-in-Chargé, Criminal Operations“E” Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Pohce

- Chief Constable, Vancouver Police Department- Deputy Chief Constable (Operations)

Vancouver Police Department- Chief Constable, Saanich Police Department *

* Alternates with Chief Constable, Victoria Police Department

CHART 3

CLEU POLICY BOARD - TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Establishes goals and priorities for the organization, including the selection ofgeneral groups and assigns priority to proposed research, intelligence,enforcement, communications, public education and/or training initiatives

2. Receives regular reports from the Joint Management Teams and the Director,CLEU PA on progress made in achieving established goals.

3 Reviews and assesses the results of completed PA projects and associatedproposals for follow-up action and either approves or recommends to theAttorney General how to proceed in each case

4 Reviews and discusses key police and law enforcement issues which mightonly be indirectly relevant to CLEU, but of major concern to the AttorneyGeneral, or particular Board members.

-9-

CHART 4

MISSION STATEMENTS

CO-ORDINATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT (CLEU)

The mission of CLEU is to develop and co-ordinate efforts to identifS’,prevent and suppress organized and major criminal activities inBritish Columbia.

JOINT FORCES OPERATION

The mission of the Joint Forces Operation is to suppress the power andinfluence of organized and major crime in British Columbia and bring allthose involved in organized criminal activity before the courts.

POLICY ANALYSIS DIVISION

To. strengthen legislative, regulatory and criminal law enforcement actionthrough the acquisition, dissemination and use of knowledge aboutorganized and major crime.

- 10 -

PART TWO

LEGAL AND FINA_NCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

There are two principle concerns about any organization such as CLEU whose activities are not in

public view. These are,

(1) Are the activities legal?

(2) Is public money being properly spent?

In other words, what provisions have been made to ensure that the organization is accountable for

its activities and its expenditures?

The files indicate that this question has been raised periodically about CLEU as management

information systems improve and senior managers in the Ministry ofAttorney General change.

Operational Control

The key to legal or operational accountability of CLEU is the CLEU Policy Board (see Charts 2

& 3). The investigative priorities are set by the Policy Board and the entire CLEU operation is

accountable through the Deputy Attorney General to the Board. Operationally, the Joint Forces’

investigations do not take place until Joint Management Teams (see Chart 1) have reviewed and

approved detailed operational plans which describe the objectives of the investigation, the

techniques to be used, the personnel and technical resources required and the projected costs and

time table. Each project is reviewed monthly, or more often if necessary, to assess progress and

conformity with the initial plans and to approve any changes recommended. Detailed annual

—11— -

reports are made by the Joint Management Team to the Policy Board, through the Deputy

Attorney General.

When Policy Analysis Division staff are seconded to JFO teams for specific projects to provide

analytical support, the terms of reference, work plans and time frames for the secondment are

developed jointly by the JFO team and the Policy Analysis section affected and sent forward for

review and approval by the JFO Inspector and the Director of Policy Analysis. In addition, these

secondment agreements provide another means of periodic review and project assessment when

the project is terminated.

Research and analysis projects by the Policy Analysis Division alone are only done at the direction

of the Board. The Board may approve a research initiative proposed by Policy Analysis or it may

initiate a project itself: Progress of major projects is monitored by the Policy Board and decisions

are made on completed projects.

The CLEU Policy Board, a multi-jurisdictional organization, is fully in the picture at afl times.

It is also noted that recent efforts have been made to making more of CLEIYs work accessible to

the public, and particularly to other Government Ministries. This has involved the preparation of

special reports and sanitized versions of classified reports, making video presentations and giving

briefings to interested parties. The object is to make ministers, senior officials and selected

members of the public more aware of the threat of organized crime in British Columbia and the

contribution CLEU is making to its control. A good example of this initiative is the work of

Vancouver JFO in making presentations about South East Asian criminal activities. Some forty-

eight presentations were made last year to such diverse groups as: the Chinese Commerce

Association; Criminology classes at Simon Fraser University; Wholesale Warehouse Alliance; Fire

Underwriters Insurance Bureau; and Greater Vancouver High School administrators and staff

- 12 -

With respect to collecting evidence for criminal prosecutions, the CLEU JFOs are accountable

and subject to the normal safeguards of the court process as are any police forces ofjurisdiction.

Financial Control

With the exception of two matters, CLEU is a full participant in the Ministry of Attorney General

financial and administrative systems. The exceptions are that CLEU vehicles, being of special

purpose, are not purchased by or managed by the Motor Vehicle Management Branch. By

agreement, CLEU has authority to purchase 2’ Class police vehicles and manage its own vehicle

fleet. Secondly, details of some police expenditures are scrutinized internally using a process

approved by government auditors. All other systems are subject to usual controls.

Financing of the CLEU operation is shared among Federal, Provincial and Municipal

Governments. The Municipal Governments which take care of salaries for municipal police

officers assigned to CLEU and the municipal share of RCMP officer salaries, benefits and

overtime costs, pay about 24 percent of the cost The Federal Government which looks after the

Federal share of RCMP officers’ salaries, benefits and overtime and a 50 percent share of certain

operational costs and costs of some accommodation, pays about 14 percent of the cost. The

Provincial Government looks after the rest which amounts to 62 percent of the total cost (see

Chart 5).

The very fact that there are three levels of Government involved in the financing of CLEU is, in

itself; a safeguard for financial accountability. In view of the uniqueness of the organization, it is

unlikely that a better system for accountability could be devised.

- 13 -

CHART 5

Note. For the fiscal year 1993-94, CLEU was required to reduce its budget by over $600,000.

A major part of this reduction is accounted for by the reduction ofPolicy Analysis staff,

and reduced expenditures on building improvements, vehicles, computers and police

FUNDING OF CLEU AND ASSOCIATED INTELLIGENCE UNITS

1992-1993

PROVINCIALGOVERNMENT

$6,810,57661.85%

MUNICIPALGOVERNMENT

$2,681,44524.35%

FEDERALGOVERNMENT

Includes salaries, municipalpolice overtime, facilities inVancouver and Victoria,equipment, communications,surveillance, vehicles andcomputing, and share ofoperational costs.

$1,519,96213.80%

Includes municipal policesalaries and benefits andmunicipal share ofRCMPsalaries, benefits andovertime.

Includes federal share ofRCMP salaries, benefitsand overtime and share ofoperational costs.

Facilities, telephone,computer system support forinteffigence units.

Salaries and operational costsfor inteffigence units.

Specialized equipment.

Salaries, operational costsand rent for intelligenceunits.

overtime.

- 14 -

. PART THREE

CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND EFFECTWENESS ISSUES

Current Activities

Information obtained from Annual Reports of CLEU Policy Analysis, Vancouver and Vancouver

Island Joint Forces Operations and, particularly, from interviews with senior management of the

RCMP and Municipal Police Departments, JFO Jomt Management Teams and supervisors and

detectives of JFO units, indicate that CLEU is a successful and important element of the law

enforcement effort in British Columbia.

Vancouver Island JFO

In the past year Vancouver Island JFO successfully completed a major project targeted against the

receivers of stolen property in the southern part of Vancouver Island. Participating in the

undercover operation were the Victoria, Saanich, Oak Bay and Esquimalt Municipal Police

Departments, all major RCMP’ Detachments on Vancouver Island and at Powell River.

The operation lasted for seven months and resulted in the recovery of approximately $160,000 of

stolen property and the laying of 140 charges against 30 suspects.

This co-ordinated operation is but one example of how CLEU JFO assists the police community

on Vancouver Island.

- 15 -

Vancouver JFOs

On the mainland, Vancouver JFO is fully tasked with projects dealing with organized criminal

activities, massive credit card fraud and violent crimes of murder, assault, extortion and robbery.

One successful recent project was aimed at reducing the enormous loss due to theft of

automobiles. The Auto Theft Project resulted in the recovery of over $800,000 worth of stolen

vehicles and the recommendation to Crown Counsel that 49 charges be laid against 14 individuals.

This project involved the co-operation and assistance of ICBC, the RCMP, Vancouver Police,

and the Policy Analysis Division of CLEU. ICBC has now formed an on-going Task Force with

local law enforcement agencies to control better the sale and registration of salvage vehicles in the

auto-theft business.

Another successful Vancouver JFO project resulted in the conviction of a key union leader for

fraud related to the disappearance of approximately $500,0b0 in Union Funds.

It is important to note that, in addition to its own JFO projects, the CLEU IFOs have provided

assistance, directly, in investigations carried out by a number of units and agencies. These

include: RCMP Specialized Units; Municipal Police Departments; Federal Government

Departments; Provincial Government Ministries; US Federal and State Agencies; Canadian Armed

Forces; and the Royal Hong Kong Police.

During the past year Canada Immigration, Canada Customs and Revenue Canada (Taxation) have

assigned members, permanently, to CLEU JFO Vancouver. US Immigration and US Customs

have also assigned agents to work directly with CLEU JFO.

- 16-

Policy Analysis Division

The civilian component of CLEU, the Policy Analysis Division, continues to provide essential

information to the Government and support to JFO projects. The Director of CLEU Policy

Analysis has always been a civil servant and is not a police officer. He is responsible for financial

controls and for ensuring that the whole CLEU operation functions within the budget. Although

the police community do not like to share criminal intelligence with those who are not sworn

police officers, over the years, by utilizing stringent security clearance procedures and by proving

themselves useful to the JFOs, analysts from the Policy Analysis Division have become accepted.

as members of the CLEU team.

It was intended from the outset that the Policy Analysis Division be the “cutting edge”, the

innovator in the attack on organized crime, particularly in the use of regulatory strategies to

reduce the effectiveness of organized criminal activities. Although the use of regulatory

measures, such as convictions for tax evasion as an alternative to Criminal Code convictions, has

not yet reached its fill potential, the Policy Analysis Division has had some notable successes.

In the early days of CLEU, it was the Policy Analysis Division which persuaded the police to take

action against the criminal activities of the Vancouver “Mafia”, the traditional Italian organized

crime groups. Iii co-operation with the Alcohol and Drug Commission, Policy Analysis Division

established the Federal Drug Strategy Committee and developed the concept which led to the BC

Heroin Treatment Act. A trial tracking project, which followed those who committed drug

offences through the various stages of the Justice System, and illustrated the deficiencies of the

process, led to an awareness of the hard core of drug offenders in British Columbia and the

creation of a successful career criminal project. A study of the criminality of certain immigrants

and refugees, who were entering BC, contributed to amendments to the Federal Immigration Act.

At EXPO 86, a joint project with the Ministry of Finance to prevent “skimming” at cash

- 17 -

repositories saved both the BC Government and the Federal Government hundreds of thousands

of dollars in tax revenue. A study by the Drug Strategies Section of cocaine use in British

Columbia illustrated for the first time where in the Province the heaviest illicit drug use was taking

place. An early report on h*YacuzaH, the Japanese organized crime conspiracy is now being dusted

off and re-read in the light of recent Yacuza activities in BC. Excellent work is being done by

Policy Analysis on detecting bid rigging, a conspiracy on the part of certain government

contractors to keep tenders for work at an abnormally high level.

One of the most successful of the Policy Analysis Division’s on-gomg activities is the Open

Source Data Bank, operated by the Open Sources Section. In the fiscal year ending in March,

1992, there were 1,137 requests for information from law enforcement agencies all over North

America and in other parts of the world.

Policy Analysis Division’s Computer Services Section is equipped with the most modern

equipment and has the responsibility for training all members of iFOs and Policy Analysis in the

effective use of computers for crime analysis. A new software program called Special

Investigative Unit Support System (S~LTSS) recently introduced at CLEU, has the potential to

revolutionize the analysis of evidence for crime solving.

Finally, CLEU is a warehouse of sophisticated police and communications equipment for loan to

domestic and foreign police and other law enforcement bodies. In the year 1992-93, 1,115 items

of specialized equipment were loaned for 17,829 days of use.

Effectiveness Issues

After reading Annual Reports and interviewing many members of CLEU at all levels of seniority,

one is ready to conclude that the CLEU initiative has been successful. Certainly, CLEU is

- 18 -

regarded by a number of Canadian and US law enforcement bodies as the leader in the attack on

organized crime and a model of police-civilian co-ordination and co-operation. Many of those

interviewed, however, have raised issues which affect the smooth. and efficient running of CLEU

and the morale and effectiveness of its members.

These issues are:

(1) Lack of support from the Courts•(2) The dual management structure of CLEU JFOs(3) Lack of priority in staffing CLEU JFOs(4) Level in the criminal hierarchy of targets assigned to CLEU(5) Productivity of Criminal Intelligence organizations associated with CLEU

Lack of Support from the Courts

Organized crime is a criminal conspiracy. Yet it is becoming virtually impossible for the police to

take conspiracy charges through the courts. A number of court decisions, based on the Charter of

Rights and Freedoms, have seriously curtailed the use of electronic eavesdropping for obtaining

criminal intelligence. Of particular significance are: Regina V. Duane (January 1990); Regina V.

Wong (1990); Regina V. Gsrofoli (November 1990); Regina V. Wise (February 1992).

Information used to obtain an authorization under Part VI, CC, is often produced by informants.

Yet new disclosure rules make it very difficult to protect the identity of informants (Regina V.

Stinchcombe). Even to obtain a search warrant, police claim they no longer need provide

“reasonable and probable grounds”. They are expected to produce “proof positive”. It is the

opinion of members of CLEU that these developments have reduced CLEtJs effectiveness in

controlling organized crime.

- 19 -

The DuaI-Mana2ement Structure of CLEU JFOs

When CLEU was first established, the principle components of the Joint Forces Operation were

members of RCMP “E” Division and the Vancouver Police Department. Sensitive to the rivahy

between these two forces and being aware that both operated under the guidance of different

policies and procedures, the creators set up a dual system of management and command (see

Chart 6). There were two Officers-in-Charge, Vancouver JFO, one RCMP Inspector and one

Inspector from the Vancouver Police Department. Each operational unit was commanded by one

RCMP Staff-Sergeant and one Vancouver Police Staff-Sergeant. The integrated inteffigence unit

was commanded by one RCMP Inspector and one Inspector from the Vancouver Police

Department.

Some have argued that the dual management system is not efficient. It is a form of “rule by

committee11 and decisions take a long time to make. Often it is difficult to know who is in charge

and the antipathy between the RCMP and Vancouver Police is exacerbated by having the two

organizations constantly on display. All agree that whether the system works at all depends

almost entirely on the compatibility of the personalities of those in charge. If the senior members

of the RCMP and the Vancouver Police do not get along then the effectiveness of the unit is in

serious jeopardy.

- 20 -

CHART 6

VANCOUVER JFO SKELETON ORGAMZATION

JOrNT MANAGEMENT TEAM

JFO OFFICERS JJC

Inspector, RCMPInspector, Van PD

UNIT

Commanders:

S/Sgt, RCMPS/Sgt, Van PD

Field Supervisors

Sgt, RCMPSr Det, Van PD

Investigators

4xRCMP4xVanPD

- 21 -

Others disagree. They have argued that, short of designing operational rules and procedures

specific to CLEU JFO, the dual system does work and to a certain extent provides operational

advantages. A method of operating, designed specifically for CLEU, is not considered a practical

proposition as long as those assigned to CLEU JFO are drawn from the RCMP and Municipal

Police Forces, all of whom have been trained in their parent force procedures. The advantages of

the dual system are seen in the choice available to the unit commanders as to whether to adopt

RCMP rules or Vancouver Police rules fOr any particular operation. There is also benefit to be

derived from compromise solutions since all involved parties have some claim to the result.

An alternative to the dual management system for Vancouver IFO is found in the single

management organization of the Vancouver Island JFO. On Vancouver Island, the JFO is

commanded by a municipal police inspector. He has an RCMP Sergeant as Operations NCO and

a municipal police Sergeant as Administration NCO. The system works for Vancouver Island.

How well it works depends almost entirely on the competence and the personality of the

municipal police inspector who is assigned to the JFO.

In Vancouver, a single management system, with the Officer-in-Charge alternating between the

RCMP and the Vancouver Police every three or four years, was suggested as a possibility. It was

not looked upon with favour. The general opinion seems to be, “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it.”

A related issue, which is consistently raised by certain senior police officials, is the fact that the

Director of CLEU Policy Analysis is a civilian and not a police officer. In the view of some police

officers, this leaves the organization vulnerable to possible use of sensitivepolice information for

political purposes. The line of thought is that since the Director is not a sworn police officer and

owes his job to the Government of the day, the Director might pass on information to the

Attorney General, which could then be used in an inappropriate manner. These police officers

would prefer to appoint a senior police officer to the position of Director of Policy Analysis..

- 22 -

Some have even suggested that a police superintendent direct the entire CLEU operation,

including the associated criminai intelligence organizations.

There are several arguments against this proposal, some of which were put forward by police

officers themselves. It should perhaps be made clear at the outset that, in its nineteen years of

existence, there is no information on record which would indicate that inteffigence obtained by

CLEU Policy Analysis has ever been used for political purposes. An Attorney General who

allowed this to happen would put his political career at serious risk.

More telling, however, is the argument that it is of great advantage to CLEU as a whole that the

Director of Policy Analysis be a senior public servant who is known by senior Government

officials and is completely familiar with the workings of Government. One of his important

functions is to ensure that full support fOr the attack on organized crime is forthcoming and that

appropriate resources are allocated to this task. To place the operation totally in police hands

might limit the breadth of Government support and narrow the focus of activity to the point that a

broad, strategic approach to the control of organized crime is jeopardized.

Lack of Priority in Staffln~ of CLEU IFOs

Staffing of CLEU JFOs has not always been given a high priority. It was readily acknowledged

that, over the years, there have been times when CLEU was used by both the RCMP and

Vancouver City as a repository for police officers who were nearing the end of their careers, or

who had lost the incentive to excel, or who were difficult to handle. On the other hand, some of

the best detectives in the Province have done assignments at CLEU. In view of the emerging

crime situation, it was recently agreed by senior management that every effort should be made to

staff CLEU IFO. with the best detectives available. Recent changes in RCMP rank structure in

Vancouver JFOs have made it simpler to assign younger and more ambitious investigators; and

-23-

the introduction of the ten hour shift system to CLEU JFO has made an assignment to CLEU

more attractive to municipal police officers; A recent increase in applications, from police officers

wanting to be assigned to CLEU, is encouraging and is indicative of a recent enhancement of

CLEU1s reputation as a prestigious place to work.

Level in the Criminal Hierarchy of Targets assi2ned to CLEU

Of major concern is whether CLEU JFOs are assigned targets at a high enough level in the

criminal hierarchy. Conceptually, CLEU is a specialized unit, well equipped and reasonably well

financed, designed to control organized crime. Street level crimes should be the business of

police forces of jurisdiction. CLEU should be free to target those, behind the scenes, who are

controlling the street level criminals.

Experienced detectives have explained that continuous contact with street level criminals is

essential to develop the necessary criminal inteffigence for investigating higher levels of

criminality. It has already been mentioüed, however, that the increased difficulty in obtaining

authorizations for electronic eavesdropping makes it almost impossible to target high level

criminals. The use of informants and keeping them from harm has also been jeopardized by recent

court decisions.

This issue is one which the CLEU Policy Board must address on a continuing basis.

Productivity of Intelligence Organizations Associated with CLEU

In theory, criminal intelligence organizations identifSr criminal activities, which are then worked up

into an operation or project by the JFO for the approval of the Joint Management Team.

- 24 -

At present there are three criminal intelligence organizations associated with CLEU iFOs plus an

additional intelligence network managed exclusively by the RCMP.

Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, “E” Division, RCMP, and the Chief Constable,

Vancouver Police Department, a major review of the criminal intelligence function is currently

underway. The object is to fine tune the provincial organizations and improve the inteffigence

product.

Since the review is ongoing and the subject has high sensitivity, no further comment will be made.

- 25 -

PART FOUR

JOThJT FORCE OPERATIONS iN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

There are two basic differences between CLEU and the Joint Force Operations in other Provinces

in Canada. The first is the extent to which the Government of British Columbia provides funds

for the CLEU operation compared with provincial funding in other jurisdictions. The second is

the fact that CLEU has within its structure a large component of civilian research officers. Other

police forces employ civilian personnel in their intelligence units but they are part of the police

structure and under police command.

CLEU is a permanent Joint Forces Operation. Although there are permanent IFOs in most

provinces, partiäularly in Ontario, there are also large numbers of ad hoc or “case specific” JFOs.

The principle advantages of case specific JFOs are that there is a clear target; a definite time frame

- a beginning and an end; a specific allocation of funds, personnel and equipment; and in most

cases a clear result. Many senior police managers in Ontario seem to prefer the case specific IFO

to the permanent JFO because its targets are current and appropriate and its results are more

easily measurable.

In Manitoba, the RCMP and the Winnipeg Police established a permanent JFO two years ago

which was targeted against the illegal drug trade. Recent budget reductions by the City of

Winnipeg, however, have caused the Winnipeg Police Department to withdraw its members from

the permanent JFO. At present, only case specific JFOs are used in Manitoba. These consist of

RCMP and Winnipeg City police officers and often include members of Canada Customs. These

JFOs are established by comprehensive written memoranda of understanding among all parties to

the JFO.

- 26 -

Funding for these iFOs is shared equally among police forces, with the exception of costs of

accommodation which in most cases is paid by the RCMP. There is no funding provided by the

Province ofManitoba for IFOs, on an ongoing basis.

In Ontario, there are five permanent JFOs and a number of case specific IFOs. The permanent

iFOs are targeted against organized crime; Asian crime; outlaw motorcycle gangs; municipal

corruption and major commercial crime. There are also integrated intelligence JFOs, and a JFO at

the Pearson International Airport. These permanent JFOs comprise members of the RCMP,

Ontario Provincial Police, Metropolitan Toronto Police and other Municipal and/or Regional

Police Forces as appropriate.

As in Manitoba, funding is shared among police forces, with the costs of accommodation being

provided by the police force on whose premises the JFO is housed. There are funds available,

however, in the budget of the Ministry of Solicitor General of Ontario for special JFO operations

targeted at major criminal activities or serious crimes. These funds are provided, on approval of

the Minister, if specific criteria are met.

Concerns expressed in Ontario about permanent JFOs were similar to issues raised about CLEU.

Permanent JFOs become stale after a period of time and personnel assigned lose their energy and

focus To monitor this failing, steering committees and Joint management teams must maintain

continual vigilance. They should meet frequently and ensure that non-productive personnel are

re-assigned.

Problems were also experienced in Ontario with rivalry among police forces and the mixing of

different operational policies and procedures. All JFOs have a single management system. The

officer-in-charge is selected after consultation among the forces participating in the JFO.

Experience has shown that if the police officer in charge of the permanent JFO is a strong leader,

- 27 -

a competent investigator and is professional in his dealings with the other members of the JFO,

the parent unit of the officer in charge is soon forgotten. In other words, if the right man is

chosen to lead the JFO, the inter-force aspects become a non-issue.

In Manitoba and Ontario, the problem of lack of support from the Courts does not seem to be so

acute as it is in British Columbia. It was acknowledged that much greater care must now be taken

in the preparation of court documents and that this was time consuming.

In Metro-Toronto, much progress has been made in creating a co-operative attitude among the

prosecutors and the police by the establishment of a “Justice Liaison Committee”. This is ,a

committee chaired by Metro-Toronto Police and comprising supervisors from the offices of both

the Federal and Provincial Crown prosecutors; police officers from the RCMP, Ontario Provincial

Police, and Metro-Toronto; and other municipal and regional police forces as required. The

Committee meets monthly to discuss the impact of recent “Charter” decisions on the preparation

of cases for Court and how to deal with them. For example, much time has been saved with

respect to the. new disclosure rules by establishing a disclosure control office in Court Houses,

managed by a police officer, and by providing the defence attorneys with computer discs of

evidence instead of large volumes of paper.

In spite of the stated advantages of ad hoc, short-term, case-specific iFOs, there are a number of

reasons why JFOs targeted against organized crime should be of a permanent nature:

• Organized crime investigations often take years to complete. Permanent JFOs are designed to

provide a platform for long term investigations through continuity of assignments, case

records management and analytical and systems support.

- 28 -

• A permanent JFO provides a neutral base of operations for police from different jurisdictions.

This, in turn, fosters a shared sense of identity, reduces inter-agency rivalry and increases co

operation. It also promotes team building, mutual confidence and effective working

relationships among investigators.

• Police investigators are not taken away from their regular duties to participate in a JFO. The

JFO is their regular duty.

• Investigators from other Federal and Provincial agencies, such as Customs, Immigration and

Revenue Canada, can use the permanent JFO as a firm base from which to launch joint

investigations with the police. This ensures better long term co-ordination and co-operation

• and communication among the police and all federal and provincial agencies affected.

• A permanent organization of skilled mvestigators can provide mvestigational assistance to

jurisdictional police forces when major crimes are committed. Sophisticated equipment which

is beyond the budget capabilities of smaller police departments can be kept in a pool by the

permanent JFO and loaned when required;

• Specific to CLEU, and unique in Canada, is the large component of civilian analysts which not

only provides analytical, technical, administrative and systems, support to JFO teams but, also,

provides a corporate memory with respect to organized crime, criminal groups, crime trends

and prevention and enforcement strategies which have been tried in the past. The civilian

component is uniquely placed as a research resource to provide the Provincial Government

with advice on the control of organized crime.

On balance, it can be concluded that short-term, case specific JFOs are an effective way to

investigate criminal activities which take place in several jurisdictions simultaneously, and do not

-29 -

involve complicated criminal conspiracies. They require strong leadership, a commitment to

teamworlç and strong co-ordinated support from senior management of parent departments.

They are relatively inexpensive.

For long term criminal conspiracies, a permanent JFO structure is desirable. it is essential,

however, that joint management teams and steering committees meet frequently, once a month is

not too often, to ensure that objectives and goals, originally agreed upon are reviewed and

updated and that JFO performance is assessed on a regular basis. These IFOs are expensive and

should not be allowed to outhve their usefulness.

- 30 -

PART FIVE

~ CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For reasons of security, it has not been possible to include a criminal intelligence threat

assessment with this report. Suffice it to say that the threat from South East Asian crime,

traditional organized crime, outlaw motorcycle gangs, criminal gangs and the illegal international

drug trade continues in British Columbia. The reasons for the creation of the Co-ordinated Law

Enforcement Unit (CLEU) in 1974 are valid today.

RECOMMENDATION ONE

It is recommended that a Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit be continued as an essential

element of the Government’s effort to control organized crime in the Province.

The structure of CLEU requires “fine tuning”. The management structure of the Vancouver

JFOs, whereby there is a parallel Vancouver PoIIceIRCMP command structure, is no longer

required. It is wasteflul of senior personnel. It slows down the decision-making process. It

emphasizes the differences between the RCMP and the Vancouver Police Department instead of

the more desirable objective of minimizing them.

RECOMMENDATION TWO

It is recommended that the Vancouver JFO be placed under the command of one Inspector, to be

provided alternately, every three years, by the RCMP and Vancouver Police Department; that, at

Unit level, one of the Staff Sergeant positions be eliminated and each Unit be commanded by a

Staff Sergeant from either the RCMP or the Vancouver Police Department; that, at Squad level,

-31-

one of the RCMP Staff Sergeant or Vancouver Police Senior Detective positions be eliminated

and each squad be commanded either by an RCMP Sergeant or a Vancouver Police Senior

Detective; that in selecting Unit Commanders and Squad Leaders, a balance be maintained

between the numbers ofRCMP personnel and Vancouver Police personnel; and that, for the sake

of consistency, the officer in charge of the Vancouver Island JFO be alternated every three years

between the RCMP and Municipal Police Departments.

The difficulties in receiving support from prosecutors and the Courts for investigations into

organized crime at an appropriately senior level of the criminal hierarchy must be overcome if

CLEU is to continue to be an effective law enforcement tool.

RECO?vIMENDATION THREE

It is recommended that British Columbia benefit from Ontario’s experience and that Justice

Liaison Committees be established in appropriate jurisdictions to facilitate better co-operation and

understanding among Federal and Provincial Prosecutors, the RCMP and Municipal Police

Departments and to decide jointly how best to deal with “Charter” decisions from the Courts.

It is essential that CLEU JFOs continue to be staffed with the most experienced and effective

police officers available. The emerging violent crime situation makes it essential that CLEU

becomes increasingly effective in its efforts to control organized crime.

RECOMMENDATION FOUR

it is recommended that the CLEU Policy Board and the Joint Management Teams commit

themselves to a staffing policy which accepts only the best available personnel for assignment to

-32- V

CLEU IFOs and to a performance evaluation policy which maintains a continuous high standard

of police work.

The debate as to whether the Director of CLEU Policy Analysis should continue to be a public

servant or a senior police officer raises a number of issues. The intention of the creators of

CLEU, in 1974, was that the civilian component, under the direction of an experienced academic

researcher, would provide a general overview of organized crime activities in the Province but

would also be the “cutting edge” in the formulation of regulatory strategies to control organized

crime. It was not intended that the Policy Analysis Group be a support group for JFOs.

Over the years it has become the practice to assign civilian analysts to assist in sorting out the

evidence in complicated JFO investigations and this has proven to be a useful initiative.

Nevertheless, CLEU Policy Analysis continues to be a Government resource, not a police

resource, for obtaining information. Its Mission Statement makes this clear:

“To strengthen legislative, regulatory and criminal law enforcement action throughV the acquisition, dissemination and use of knowledge about organized and major

crime.” V

Policy Analysis Division’s latest work on the detection of “Bid Rigging” is a case in point.

There is no doubt that there are, within the police community, certain well qualified police

officers, who could effectively direct the Policy Analysis Division. The danger, from the point of

view of the Government, is that the work of the Division might become too narrowly focused and

become only an information and intelligence resource for the JFOs. From the Government’s point

ofview this is not desirable.

- 33 -

The question of the reliability of the Director, because he is a civilian and not a police officer, has

also been raised. This has nothing to do with the present incumbent. It has to do with the fact

that he is a civilian. The possibility that information obtained by CLEU might be used for

“politiãal” purposes is of concern to senior police officers. As noted earlier, there is no evidence

that information obtained by CLEU has ever been used improperly. A casual examination of

information leaks in British Columbia over the past few years indicates that civilians have no claim

to be the only perpetrators These concerns are misplaced

RECOMMENDATION FIVE

It is recommended that the Director of the civilian component of CLEU, the Policy Analysis

Division, continue to be a senior public servant; but that, in the future, when it becomes necessary

to select the next Director, the police community be consulted and take part in the selection

process.

PROTECTED “A”

RESEARCH PROJECT

CO-ORDINATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

* Brian Neal, Deputy Attorney General and Chair, CLEU Policy Board

* Peter Engstad, Director, CLEU Policy Analysis Division

Allan Williams, QC, Former Attorney General ofBritish Columbia

Inspector AW.H. Hickman, Saanich PD, OIC Vancouver Island JEFO

Sergeant Ken Rogers, Victoria PD, NCO IJC Administration, Vancouver Island JFO

Sergeant Gary Spence, RCMP, NCO I/C Operations, Vancouver Island JFO* Chief Constable W.O. Nixon, Saanich PD, Joint Management Team Vancouver Island

* Assistant Commissioner Frank Palmer, OIC Operations, “E” Division, RCMP

Mr. Justice David Vickers, Former Deputy Attorney General* Chief ConstableBill Marshall, Vancouver PD

Superintendent Dick Wailer, OIC Victoria SubfDiv, RCMP, Joint Management TeamVancouver Island

Inspector Paul Cheney, Ops Offr, Victoria Sub/Div, RCMP

Chief Constable Doug Richardson, Victoria PD,. Joint Management Team, VancouverIsland

Dr. Malcolm Matheson, Former Director, CLEU Policy Analysis

Inspector Carson Turncliffe, OIC Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD

Inspector Doug Ewing, OIC Vancouver JFO, RCMP

Ray Waters, Computer Services Section IC, CLEU PA

Staff Sergeant Greer, Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD

Constable Dean, Vancouver )FO, West Vancouver PD

Constable Howman, Vancouver JFO, RCMP

Staff Sergeant Nimmo, Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD

Constable Liu, Vancouver JFQ, RCMP

Sergeant Connolly, Vancouver IFO, RCMP

Detective Pascuzzo, Vancouver JFO, Vancouver PD

Dr. Beverly Riddell, CLEU Policy Analysis

Julie MacDonald, CLEU Policy Analysis

Dean Benson, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Services

• PROTECTED “A”

RESEARCH PROJECT

• CO-ORDrNATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Vancouver Island Jomt Forces Operations Annual Reports

Vancouver Joint Forces Operations Annual Reports

Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit Background Information, February 1993

CLEU Policy Analysis Division Annual Reports

Co-ordinated Law Enforcement Unit Orientation Handbook, 1991

CLEU Vancouver Island JFO Procedure Manual, 1992

CLEU Justice Administration Act Employee Handbook, 1993

Project Reports CLEU Policy Analysis Division

Police Studies, Volume 5, No. 2, Summer 1982“The Co-Qrdinated Law Enforcement Unit - A Canadian Strategy Against Organized Crime” byTonita Murray. V

Ontario Provincial Police, “Joint Force Operations”, July 1993

-2-

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED (continued)

Kevin Begg, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Services* Deputy Commissioner Dennis Farrell, Commanding Officer, “E” Division, RCMP

Judy Reykdai, Ministry of Attorney General, Police Set-vicesRobert Chamberlain, Director, Law Enforcement Services, ManitobaChief Dale Henry, Winnipeg PD, Winnipeg, ManitobaDeputy Chief Joe Gallagher, Winnipeg PD, Winnipeg, ManitobaAssistant Commissioner Richard Bergman, Commanding Officer, “D” Division, RCMP1Winnipeg, ManitobaA/Deputy ChiefRon Dick, Metro-Toronto PD, Toronto, OntarioStaff Inspector Ron Sandeffi, Metro-Toronto PD, Toronto, OntarioDeputy Chief James Wmgate, Peel Regional Police Force, Brampton, OntarioCommissioner Thomas O’Grady, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto, OntarioDetective Chief Superintendent Gary Wood, Ontario Provincial PoliceDetective Inspector Mike Connor, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto, OntarioAssistant Commissioner Hap Armstrong, Commanding Officer, “0” Division, RCMP,London, OntarioStan Shillington, Policy Analysis Division, VancouverHelen Arnett, Policy Analysis Division, Vancouver

* CLEU Policy Board Member