(Clockwise starting in left back row) Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist Sharon Christa Mc...
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Transcript of (Clockwise starting in left back row) Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist Sharon Christa Mc...
Introduction of Crew51(Clockwise starting in left back row)
Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist
Sharon Christa Mc Auliffe, Teacher
Greg Jarvis, Payload Specialist
Judy Resnick, Mission Specialist
Ron McNair, Mission Specialist
Dick Scobee, Commander
Mike Smith, Pilot
Purpose
My purpose is to analyze the communication and organizational behavior components that played a significant role in the Challenger space shuttle tragedy.
Image of the Challenger Space Shuttle crash of 1986.
Questions that will be answered… Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this
tragedy?
What could have been done to have prevented these communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion?
How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of command influence the events?
Are the communication problems that led up to the launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical organizations?
What role did structural design play in this event?
Communication
Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this tragedy? › NASA was unaware of recommendations by MTI (Morton
Thiokol International) advising against the launch. Temperatures below 53 degrees were deemed unsafe
(NASA, 1986). Constant opposing views on safety by MTI engineers and
upper management further contributed to the breakdowns in communication. › They disagreed over the seriousness of the O-ring
problem› They failed to use the same communication style for
better understanding. (Winsor, 1988).
Communication Winsor states, “Communication is not just shared
information; it is shared interpretation” (p. 101, 1988).› Implies that information was received, but there was
a failure by NASA to properly interpret its severity.› The O-ring failure should not have been as
unexpected as it was.
Management at Marshall appeared to have the tendency to withhold important information rather than bringing it forward (NASA, 1986).› Portrayed Marshall as a part of the system not
interfacing or communicating with the other parts to produce successful flight missions
Communication
What could have been done to have prevented these communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion?› There could have been more coordination between
MTI, Marshall and NASA. Integration would have ensured that the overall
goals of each organization were achieved (Anthony, Gales, & Hodge, 2003).
Major goal: To have a safe, successful flight mission
The engineers and managers of MTI could have developed a communication style that Marshall and NASA would have been able to interpret and understand.
Organizational Behavior
How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of command influence the events?› Three main organizations put pressure on NASA to
launch the Challenger as quickly as possible. Military Congress Media
(Neuner & Rider, n.d.) Without the pressure from these organizations, the
Challenger wouldn’t have been rushed to launch.› May have prevented overlooking technical problems
with the shuttle
Organizational Behavior
Morton Thiokol International (MTI)› Contractor responsible for solid rocket boosters
(Winsor, p. 101).
Between MTI engineers, management in NASA, and Marshall Space Center, news moved slowly.› “News moved slowly among the organizations
because they were in a hierarchical relationship, with MTI dependent on Marshall for the contract and Marshall dependent on NASA for funds and career opportunities” (Winsor, p. 101).
Organizational Behavior
Are the communication problems that led up to the launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical organizations?› Miscommunication is inevitable to some extent when
dealing with different corporate roles, agendas and personalities.
› Because there are so many levels, communication is especially vital.
› Unfortunately, in this situation, it was a matter of life and death.
Organizational Behavior
Differences in corporate roles lead to greater difficulty in communicating (Winsor, p. 101).› Concerns and values often differ› Levels of experience are broad
Lower-level employees are more likely to pass bad news upward than middle- high level management. Why?› In this situation, politics were involved at the higher
level.› Pressure to succeed grows stronger as you go up the
hierarchical ladder.
Organizational Behavior
What role did structural design play in this event?› The structural design of NASA was lacking..
Adequate planning and control systems Adequate procedures and policies for safe
practices Structure for centralized decision-making
Decisions were being made at all levels of employment
The military, Congress, and the media swayed the decision to launch, thus straying further away from centralized decision-making
With as big of an organization as NASA, decision-making should be centralized.
Analysis
Failure to communicate effectively allowed warnings to be dismissed on the part of MTI, Marshall and NASA.
Communication breakdowns resulted from opposing perspectives and mismatched communication styles.
Hierarchical pressure was evident and the decision to launch was influenced by this pressure.
Structural design impacted the ability to effectively communicate.
Conclusion
It seems that MTI and Marshall both did not want to acknowledge safety standards were not all up to par because of hierarchical pressure to launch on time.
“Even when MTI engineers came to believe that a problem existed, they had a difficult time convincing management” of the severity, as well as Marshall, which both shared the same opposing perspective (Winsor, p. 106).
Although the Challenger crash was the result of various technical problems, the ultimate cause of the crash was the communication breakdown.
References Anthony, W. P., Gales, L. M., & Hodge, B. J. (2003). Organization
Theory: A Strategic Approach (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.
NASA. (1986, February 3). Report of the Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved August 24, 2010, from:
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/table-of-contents.html
Neuner, K., & Rider, J. (n.d.). The Challenger Disaster. Retrieved on August 24, 2010, from:
http://studenthome.nku.edu/~riderj/challenger%20report.pdf
References Winsor, D. A. (1988). Communication Failures in the Challenger
Accident. IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication, vol. 31, no. 3. 101-107. doi: 0361-1434.1988.0900.0101. Retrieved August 24, 2010, from:
http://people.emich.edu/jsteichma/winsor_challenger.pdf
Cover Imagehttp://
www.starstryder.com/2008/01/28/remembering-the-role-models-on-the-challenger/
Seven Astronauts Imagehttp://www.webbooks.com/eLibrary/ON/B0/B58/070
MB58.html
References Challenger Explosion Image-http://
www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/nasa/
Astronaut in Air Image-http://www.allbestwallpapers.com/space-nasa_
_space_shuttle_challenger_astronaut_mccandles_wallpapers.html