(Clockwise starting in left back row) Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist Sharon Christa Mc...

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Challenger Analysis Project Andrea Hansen BS 311

Transcript of (Clockwise starting in left back row) Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist Sharon Christa Mc...

Challenger Analysis Project

Andrea Hansen BS 311

Introduction of Crew51(Clockwise starting in left back row)

Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist

Sharon Christa Mc Auliffe, Teacher

Greg Jarvis, Payload Specialist

Judy Resnick, Mission Specialist

Ron McNair, Mission Specialist

Dick Scobee, Commander

Mike Smith, Pilot

Purpose

My purpose is to analyze the communication and organizational behavior components that played a significant role in the Challenger space shuttle tragedy.

Image of the Challenger Space Shuttle crash of 1986.

Questions that will be answered… Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this

tragedy?

What could have been done to have prevented these communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion?

How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of command influence the events?

Are the communication problems that led up to the launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical organizations?

What role did structural design play in this event?

Communication

Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this tragedy? › NASA was unaware of recommendations by MTI (Morton

Thiokol International) advising against the launch. Temperatures below 53 degrees were deemed unsafe

(NASA, 1986). Constant opposing views on safety by MTI engineers and

upper management further contributed to the breakdowns in communication. › They disagreed over the seriousness of the O-ring

problem› They failed to use the same communication style for

better understanding. (Winsor, 1988).

Communication Winsor states, “Communication is not just shared

information; it is shared interpretation” (p. 101, 1988).› Implies that information was received, but there was

a failure by NASA to properly interpret its severity.› The O-ring failure should not have been as

unexpected as it was.

Management at Marshall appeared to have the tendency to withhold important information rather than bringing it forward (NASA, 1986).› Portrayed Marshall as a part of the system not

interfacing or communicating with the other parts to produce successful flight missions

Communication

What could have been done to have prevented these communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion?› There could have been more coordination between

MTI, Marshall and NASA. Integration would have ensured that the overall

goals of each organization were achieved (Anthony, Gales, & Hodge, 2003).

Major goal: To have a safe, successful flight mission

The engineers and managers of MTI could have developed a communication style that Marshall and NASA would have been able to interpret and understand.

Organizational Behavior

How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of command influence the events?› Three main organizations put pressure on NASA to

launch the Challenger as quickly as possible. Military Congress Media

(Neuner & Rider, n.d.) Without the pressure from these organizations, the

Challenger wouldn’t have been rushed to launch.› May have prevented overlooking technical problems

with the shuttle

Organizational Behavior

Morton Thiokol International (MTI)› Contractor responsible for solid rocket boosters

(Winsor, p. 101).

Between MTI engineers, management in NASA, and Marshall Space Center, news moved slowly.› “News moved slowly among the organizations

because they were in a hierarchical relationship, with MTI dependent on Marshall for the contract and Marshall dependent on NASA for funds and career opportunities” (Winsor, p. 101).

Organizational Behavior

Are the communication problems that led up to the launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical organizations?› Miscommunication is inevitable to some extent when

dealing with different corporate roles, agendas and personalities.

› Because there are so many levels, communication is especially vital.

› Unfortunately, in this situation, it was a matter of life and death.

Organizational Behavior

Differences in corporate roles lead to greater difficulty in communicating (Winsor, p. 101).› Concerns and values often differ› Levels of experience are broad

Lower-level employees are more likely to pass bad news upward than middle- high level management. Why?› In this situation, politics were involved at the higher

level.› Pressure to succeed grows stronger as you go up the

hierarchical ladder.

Organizational Behavior

What role did structural design play in this event?› The structural design of NASA was lacking..

Adequate planning and control systems Adequate procedures and policies for safe

practices Structure for centralized decision-making

Decisions were being made at all levels of employment

The military, Congress, and the media swayed the decision to launch, thus straying further away from centralized decision-making

With as big of an organization as NASA, decision-making should be centralized.

Analysis

Failure to communicate effectively allowed warnings to be dismissed on the part of MTI, Marshall and NASA.

Communication breakdowns resulted from opposing perspectives and mismatched communication styles.

Hierarchical pressure was evident and the decision to launch was influenced by this pressure.

Structural design impacted the ability to effectively communicate.

Conclusion

It seems that MTI and Marshall both did not want to acknowledge safety standards were not all up to par because of hierarchical pressure to launch on time.

“Even when MTI engineers came to believe that a problem existed, they had a difficult time convincing management” of the severity, as well as Marshall, which both shared the same opposing perspective (Winsor, p. 106).

Although the Challenger crash was the result of various technical problems, the ultimate cause of the crash was the communication breakdown.

THE END

References Anthony, W. P., Gales, L. M., & Hodge, B. J. (2003). Organization

Theory: A Strategic Approach (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.

  NASA. (1986, February 3). Report of the Presidential Commission

on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved August 24, 2010, from:

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogers-commission/table-of-contents.html

Neuner, K., & Rider, J. (n.d.). The Challenger Disaster. Retrieved on August 24, 2010, from:

http://studenthome.nku.edu/~riderj/challenger%20report.pdf