Class and Status: The Conceptual Distinction and its...

INTRODUCTION

Weber’s distinction between class and sta-tus (Weber [1922] 1968:926–40) is com-

monplace in materials in introductory coursesand texts dealing with social stratification.Surprisingly, however, contemporary researchmakes little use of the distinction. Moreover, theconcepts of class and status are often applied inways that, at least from a Weberian standpoint,appear unclear if not confusing.

In the United States, much of the refinementof Weber’s approach appears to already havebeen lost by the 1950s and 1960s as leadingauthors, in effect, reinterpreted class in terms of

status. Thus, one finds definitions of socialclasses on such lines as “strata of society com-posed of individuals who accept each other asstatus equals” (Lipset and Bendix 1959:275)or “aggregate[s] of persons, within a society,possessing approximately the same status”(Shils [1962] 1975:249). Subsequently, theessentially one-dimensional view of stratifica-tion implicit in such definitions was confirmedthrough the widespread acceptance of the notionof “socioeconomic” status, which, while littleexplicated, allowed stratification to be treat-ed—in a way highly convenient to quantitativeresearchers—in terms of a single continuousmeasure such as the Duncan Socio-EconomicIndex (Duncan 1961).

In Europe, and especially in Britain, the ideaof class and status as two qualitatively differentforms of social stratification retained currencythrough the 1970s, following its effectivedeployment in Lockwood’s influential TheBlackcoated Worker (1958) and also in variouscommunity studies. Interest in status, however,then rather rapidly declined. In part, this can beseen as a response to actual social change—thatis, to the rather evident decay over the postwardecades of many features of the traditional sta-tus order. The revival of academic Marxism anda consequent preoccupation, on the part ofMarxist and non-Marxist sociologists alike,with issues of class was also important. Morerecently, the theoretical efforts of Bourdieu (see

Class and Status: The ConceptualDistinction and its Empirical Relevance

Tak Wing Chan John H. GoldthorpeUniversity of Oxford University of Oxford

In this article, we return to Max Weber’s distinction between class and status as related

but different forms of social stratification. We argue that this distinction is not only

conceptually cogent, but empirically important as well. Indeed, class and status do have

distinct explanatory power when it comes to studying varying areas of social life.

Consistent with Weber’s assertions, we show that economic security and prospects are

stratified more by class than by status, while the opposite is true for outcomes in the

domain of cultural consumption. Within politics, class rather than status predicts

Conservative versus Labour Party voting in British general elections and also Left–Right

political attitudes. But it is status rather than class that predicts

Libertarian–Authoritarian attitudes.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2007, VOL. 72 (August:512–532)

Direct correspondence to Tak Wing Chan,Department of Sociology, University of Oxford,Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK ([email protected]). We thank Geoff Evans, DavidLockwood, Don Treiman, five anonymous reviewers,and the editors for helpful advice and comments onearlier drafts. We are also grateful to Arts CouncilEngland for access to the detailed occupational codesof the Arts in England data set. The views expressedin this article are entirely our own and not necessar-ily those of the Arts Council. Our research is sup-ported by an ESRC/AHRC research grant under theirCultures of Consumption Programme Phase II, awardnumber: RES-154-25-2006. Earlier versions of thisarticle were presented at the ISA RC28 meeting atUCLA, August 2005 and at a seminar in Oxford.

Delivered by Ingenta to :University of Oxford

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esp. 1984) have attracted much attention, par-ticularly his attempt to rethink and indeed over-come Weber’s opposition between class andstatus (1984:xii): that is, by treating status as thesymbolic aspect of class structure that is itselfdeemed to be not reducible to economic rela-tions alone (cf. Weininger 2005).

In a previous article, we sought to reassert theconceptual value of the distinction betweenclass and status; and to argue, on empiricalgrounds, that, in present-day British society atleast, a status order is still discernible (Chan andGoldthorpe 2004). In the present article, wehave two further, complementary aims. We seekto show, again on empirical grounds, how, in dif-ferent areas of social life, the stratification ofoutcomes, whether seen as life-chances or aslife-choices, may predominantly occur on thebasis of either class or status. In this way, wethen hope to clarify and reinforce the case fortreating class and status as different forms ofstratification that exert their effects throughquite distinct social processes, or mechanisms.Both require recognition if a full understandingof the structuring of social inequality in con-temporary societies is to be obtained.

CLASS AND STATUS

Taking a broadly Weberian position, we regarda class structure as one formed by the social rela-tions of economic life or, more specifically, byrelations in labor markets and production units.Thus, a primary level of differentiation of classpositions is that which sets apart employers,self-employed workers, and employees. In mod-ern societies, however, further differentiation

must be recognized among employees in termsof their relations with employers, as these areregulated by the (implicit as well as explicit)terms of their employment contracts. In recentyears, a fairly wide consensus has emerged, atleast among sociologists engaging in compar-ative empirical research (e.g., Blossfeld, Mills,and Bernadi 2006; Breen 2004; Shavit, Arum,and Gamoran 2006; Shavit and Müller 1998),to treat class operationally on these lines on thebasis of the EGP or CASMIN class schema(Breen 2005; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992;Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979).1

Table 1 shows the versions of the schemathat we use in this article. The following pointsshould be noted. First, in the formation of theschema employment status (employer, self-employed, employee, etc.) and occupation aretaken as proxies for employment relations: it issupposed that individuals with similar employ-ment status and occupation are likely to be sub-ject to similar forms of employment regulationand thus to have similar class positions. Thetheoretical basis for this approach is set out byGoldthorpe (2007, vol. II, chap. 5), drawing onthe analysis of problems of work-monitoring and

CLASS AND STATUS—–513

Table 1. Versions of the Class Schema

National StatisticsOriginal Version Socioeconomic Classification

I Professionals and managers, higher grade 1 Higher managers and professionalsII Professionals and managers, lower grade 2 Lower managers and professionalsIIIa Routine nonmanual employees, higher grade 3 Intermediate employeesIIIb Routine nonmanual employees, lower gradeIVac Small employers and proprietors (including farmers) 4 Small employers and own-account workersIVb Self-employed workersV Technicians and supervisors of manual workers 5 Lower supervisors and techniciansVI Skilled manual workers 6 Semi-routine workersVII Nonskilled manual workers 7 Routine workers

Note: NS occupational unit groups in combination with employment status codes are allocated to classes follow-ing algorithms available for the original version at http://www.cf.ac.uk/CAMSIS/Data/Britain91.html and forNS–SEC at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/ns_sec/downloads/NS-SEC_User_2005.pdf.

1 An important alternative class schema is thatproposed from a Marxist standpoint by Wright. It isbeyond the scope of this article to compare the twoclass schemata. Suffice to note that Wright (1997:37)himself recognizes that although the two schematahave clearly differing theoretical origins, “as a prac-tical set of operational categories, the [Wright] classstructure matrix .|.|. does not dramatically differ fromthe class typology used by Goldthorpe.”


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http://www.cf.ac.uk/CAMSIS/Data/Britain91.html

http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/ns_sec/downloads/NS-SEC_User_2005.pdf

of human asset specificity as found in the lit-erature of transaction-cost and personnel eco-nomics. To test the validity of the schema as thusconstructed, a good deal of empirical researchhas been undertaken—and with largely encour-aging results—both with regards to the schemain its original version (e.g., Birkelund,Goodman, and Rose 1996; Evans 1992; Evansand Mills 1998, 2000) and the more recent ver-sion represented by the National StatisticsSocio-Economic Classification (NS–SEC)—aclassification that has, since 2000, replaced theRegistrar General’s Social Classes in UK offi-cial statistics (Office for National Statistics2005; Rose and Pevalin 2003; Rose, Pevalin, andO’Reilly 2005).

Second, while we regard the class structurethat the schema represents as being, preemi-nently, a structure of inequality, we do not envis-age classes as always falling into a simplehierarchical ordering (cf. Dahrendorf1959:74–77; Giddens 1973:106). Individualsin different classes may be advantaged and dis-advantaged in differing and, perhaps, not entire-ly commensurable respects as a result of theemployment relations in which they areinvolved. Thus, while members of Classes I andII, the professional and managerial salariat, canbe seen as generally advantaged relative tomembers of other classes, and members ofClasses VI and VII, the wage-earning workingclass, as being generally disadvantaged, anysingle ranking of the intermediate classes ismore problematic. Their employment relationsclearly differ—compare, for example, those ofa bank clerk (Class IIIa), a self-employed elec-trician (IVb), and a factory foreman (V)—butin ways that give balances of advantage anddisadvantage (e.g., in regard to job security,earnings stability, and prospects and promotionopportunities) that are not readily ordered.Consequently, our analyses treat the classes ofthe schema, as is the usual practice, as unorderedcategorical variables.

Third, the classes of the schema are notintended to capture “real” sociocultural group-ings in the sense of collectivities recognized byand subjectively meaningful to their members,and with well-defined social boundaries as cre-ated, say, by processes of selection, socialization,or closure. In other words, and still followingWeber, we do not treat classes as “communities”(“‘Klassen’ sind keine Gemeinschaften”) but

simply as existing insofar as “a number of peo-ple have in common a specific causal compo-nent of their life-chances” (Weber [1922]1968:930) that derives from their relations with-in labor markets and production units—which,we wish to add, also importantly condition var-ious life-choices that they are typically requiredto make. From this standpoint, class effects arebrought about in two main ways. On the onehand, they result from events that impact onthose holding different class positions with sig-nificantly differing frequencies—quite inde-pendently of their class awareness (e.g.,members of Class VII do not have to think ofthemselves as being working class to have a farhigher risk of unemployment than members ofClass I). And, on the other hand, such effectsresult simply from members of different class-es pursuing their particular interests and goalsin ways shaped by the particular patterns ofconstraint and opportunity by which their classsituations are characterized—independent ofany influence of class-specific values and normswhich may or may not exist (cf. the distinctionbetween Massenhandeln and Gemeinschaft-shandeln made by Weber [1922] 1968:930).2

Further following Weber ([1922]1968:932–39), we regard a status order as astructure of relations of perceived, and in somedegree accepted, social superiority, equality,and inferiority among individuals. This doesnot reflect personal qualities, but rather thedegree of “social honor” attached to certain oftheir positional or perhaps purely ascribedattributes (e.g., birth or ethnicity).3 The socialhierarchy thus created is expressed in differen-tial association, especially in more intimatekinds of sociability—Weber speaks of com-mensality and connubium—and in lifestyles ofdiffering distinction that are seen as appropri-ate to different status levels. In status orders in

514—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

2 Our understanding of class is therefore very dif-ferent from that of authors who argue for the “deathof class” (e.g., Kingston 2000; Pakulski and Waters1996).

3 This understanding of status should be recognizedas clearly different from that found in the current lit-erature on status generating and confirming interac-tional processes, especially in microsocial contexts,where the emphasis clearly does fall on personalqualities and their perceived worth (e.g., Jasso 2001).


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their most developed forms—such as werefound in early modern Europe—the demarca-tion of patterns of association and lifestyles isclear-cut and often institutionally grounded, as,for example, through sumptuary legislation. Inmodern societies, however, the development ofideas of citizenship, implying a fundamentalequality of legal and political rights (cf.Lockwood 1992:173–78; Marshall 1950),means that the status order takes on an increas-ingly conventional character, or in other words,is for the most part, maintained only informal-ly. Moreover, the egalitarian ideology of citi-zenship results in a greater reluctance on the partof those treated as social inferiors to respondwith deference, and in claims to superioritybeing less often made, at least in an explicit andpublic way (for Britain, see McKibbin 1998;Runciman 1997). Thus, the hierarchy of statusrelations becomes less one of well-defined sta-tus groups than one of relatively loose social net-works, and its expression is more implicit orcovert.

Although there are good grounds for sup-posing that in present-day societies the strati-fying force of status has weakened, it would berash to suppose that status can now be simplydisregarded. Most obviously, issues of statusare still widely recognized among the popula-tion at large. When the topic of class is raisedin everyday conversations or in the media, orwhen members of the public are asked aboutclass in interviews with sociologists, it is infact status rather than class, following the dis-tinction made above, that is chiefly—and quitereadily—discussed. For example, phrases suchas “class distinctions,” “class barriers,” or “classconsciousness” are commonly used in waysthat make it apparent that they in fact refer todistinctions of status and to status exclusivenessand sensitivity.4

We have already provided systematic evi-dence of the persistence of a status order inBritain (Chan and Goldthorpe 2004). Drawingdirectly on the work of Laumann (1966, 1973),we take occupation to be one of the most salient

positional characteristics to which status attach-es in modern societies. And we assume closefriendship implies a relation of basic equalitybetween individuals—that is, one into whichstatus differences are unlikely to intrude. We usenational survey data to investigate the occupa-tional structure of close friendship, and we takedissimilarity indices for the occupational dis-tributions of friends by occupational groupingas input to a multidimensional scaling analysis.From this, a leading dimension emerges onwhich occupational groupings are ordered,according to the degree of similarity of theirfriendship patterns, and which can, we believe,be most plausibly interpreted as representing sta-tus. That is to say, starting from the structuringof a relationship implying social equality, astructure of inequality can be inferred.5

Table 2 shows the 31 occupational group-ings used in the scaling exercise in the order inwhich they appear, and with the scores that theytake, on the dimension that we see as capturingstatus. This hierarchy of occupations has clearcontinuities with that described for earlier peri-ods in historical and pioneering sociologicalresearch (Chan and Goldthorpe 2004). In gen-eral, occupations that require working with sym-bols and perhaps people, and especiallyprofessional occupations, confer the higheststatus, while those that require working direct-ly with material things confer the lowest status.At a more detailed level, managers employed ina more blue-collar milieu in industry or tradetend to rank lower than managers, or indeedeven routine administrative employees, whowork in an entirely white-collar milieu, whileoccupations that require working with both peo-ple and things—such as many occupations in thenow expanding services sector—have typical-ly intermediate rankings. We report various


5 As noted above, in addition to occupation, sta-tus is also likely to be based on ascribed character-istics, such as ethnicity. Thus, Laumann (1973) treatsethnoreligious affiliation as a further characteristicof primary importance for status in modern Americansociety. However, he shows that the status-conferringeffects of occupation are largely replicated withineach ethnoreligious grouping that he distinguishes,and that no interaction effects occur. We expect a sim-ilar situation to be found in the British case, althoughwe do not so far have data available that would allowthe matter to be empirically investigated.

4 Indeed, ethnographic work (e.g., Deverson andLindsay 1975), even if of a rather unsystematic kind,has indicated that, in the right context, individualsmay still be quite ready to speak in ways that obvi-ously imply status superiority and derogation.


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Table 2. 31 Status Groups Ranked in Descending Order of Status Score and RepresentativeOccupations Within Each Category

Rank

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

0910

1112

13

14

15

1617

18

19

20

21

2223

2425

26

27

Title

higher professionals

associate professionals in business

specialist managers

teachers and other professionals ineducation

general managers and administrators

associate professionals in industry

scientists, engineers, and technologists

filing and record clerks

managers and officials, nec administrative officers and assistants

numerical clerks and cashiers associate professionals in health and

welfare secretaries and receptionists

other clerical workers

buyers and sales representatives

childcare workersmanagers and proprietors in services

plant, depot, and site managers

sales workers

health workers

personal service workers

protective service personnelroutine workers in services

catering workersstore and dispatch clerks

skilled and related manual workers n.e.c.

transport operatives

Code

HP

APB

SM

TPE

GMA

API

SET

FRC

OMOAOA

NCCAPH

SEC

OCW

BSR

CCWMPS

PDM

SW

HW

PSW

PSPRWS

CWSDC

SMO

TO

Representative Occupationsa

chartered accountants, clergy, medicalpractitioners, solicitors

journalists, investment analysts, insurancebrokers, designers

company treasurers, financial managers,computer systems managers, personnelmanagers

college lecturers, education officers andinspectors, school teachers

bank and building society managers, generalmanagers in industry, national and localgovernment officers

computer analysts and programmers, quantitysurveyors, vocational and industrial trainers

civil and structural engineers, clinicalbiochemists, industrial chemists, planningengineers, software engineers

conveyancing clerks, computer clerks, libraryassistants

security managers, cleaning managersclerical officers in national and local

governmentaccounts assistants, bank clerkscommunity workers, nurses, occupational

therapists, youth workerspersonal assistants, receptionists, secretaries,

word processor operatorsgeneral assistants, commercial and clerical

assistantsbuyers and purchasing officers, technical sales

representatives, wholesale representativeseducational assistants, nursery nursescatering managers, hoteliers, publicans, shop-

keepers and managersclerks of works, farm managers, maintenance

managers, transport managers, works man-agers

cash desk and check-out operators, sales andshop assistants, window dressers

ambulance staff, dental nurses, nursing auxil-iaries

caretakers and housekeepers, hairdressers andbeauticians, travel attendants, undertakers

fire service and police officers, security guardscar park attendants, cleaners, counter-hands,

couriers and messengers, hotel porters,postal workers

bar staff, chefs, cooks, waiters and waitressesdispatch and production control clerks, store-

keepers

gardeners and groundsmen, printers, textileworkers, woodworkers

bus and coach drivers, truck and van drivers,taxi drivers

Score

0.5643

0.5337

0.5107

0.5017

0.4114

0.3116

0.3115

0.2559

0.23550.2274

0.22380.2228

0.1539

0.1443

0.1193

0.1097–.0453

–.0625

–.1151

–.2121

–.2261

–.2288–.2974

–.3261–.3353

–.4072

–.4114

(Continued on next page)


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other instances where occupations located ineconomically advantaged classes are of rela-tively low status, and vice versa (Chan andGoldthorpe 2004:391–92). These examples areimportant insomuch as they demonstrate thatalthough both the class schemata we use and ourstatus scale are occupationally-based constructs(with, in the case of class, other information onemployment status also being required), quitedistinct, even if moderately correlated, aspectsof occupations are in fact captured: on the onehand, the employment relations typicallyinvolved and, on the other, the degree of socialhonor typically conferred.

Several further points are of relevance forour present purposes. First, while status, asdetermined by an analysis of the occupationalstructure of close friendships, is correlated withincome and education, the correlation is quitemodest, especially for income (Chan andGoldthorpe 2004). The status scale is clearly tap-ping something other than socioeconomic sta-tus insofar as this is determined by acombination of income and education.6 It isalso distinct from—supposed—scales of occu-pational prestige, insofar as these simply reflectjudgments of job rewards and requirements (cf.Goldthorpe and Hope 1974).

Second, while a status gradient can be seenas running across classes (as represented by theschema of Table 1) from the higher profession-al and managerial salariat down to the non-

skilled working class, there is still a good dealof variation in status homogeneity within class-es. Some classes, notably Class II, the lowersalariat, and Classes IVac and IVb, smallemployers and the self-employed, show rela-tively high internal stratification by status, whileothers, notably Class I, the higher salariat, andClass VI, skilled manual workers, are far morestatus homogenous (see Chan and Goldthorpe2004, fig. 6).7

Third, although we shall for conveniencerefer to the occupational categories of our scaleas status groups, we would again, as in the caseof classes, not wish to imply that they are “real”sociocultural entities, or at all events not onesof a clearly bounded kind. Rather, as we alreadyindicated, we see the social organization of sta-tus in modern societies as taking the form of rel-atively loose social networks—networks ofrelations, often extensive in space, among indi-viduals who come together as equals in moreintimate forms of sociability, and who tend tovalue and seek to pursue broadly similarlifestyles with, perhaps, only quite limited nor-mative reinforcement from the expectations of


28

29

30

31

Note: The four broad status bands that are for some purposes used in the analyses are indicated by dashed lines.a Representative occupations refer to those that account for relatively large numbers of individuals within eachcategory and at the same time give some idea of its range.

Table 2. (continued)

Rank Ttile Code Representative Occupationsa Score

skilled and related manual workers inconstruction and maintenance

skilled and related manual workers inmetal trades

plant and machine operatives

general laborers

SMC

SMM

PMO

GL

bricklayers, electricians, painters and decora-tors, plasterers, roofers, telephone repairmen

fitters, setters, setter-operators, sheet metalworkers, turners, welders

assemblers, canners, fillers and packers, foodprocessors, moulders and extruders, routineinspectors and testers

agricultural workers, factory laborers, goodsporters, refuse collectors

–.5014

–.5121

–.5589

–.5979

7 In the context of a comparative research projecton social stratification and cultural consumption,colleagues from six other countries (Chile, France,Hungary, Israel, the Netherlands, and the UnitedStates) have followed the methodology describedabove in constructing status scales for their soci-eties, although using for the most part data on mar-riage rather than friendship. Preliminary analysesindicate a high degree of cross-national commonal-ity in the ordering of occupations on these scales.

6 When the status scale is regressed on income andeducation, the coefficient for income turns out to beinsignificant (Chan and Goldthorpe 2004, table 3).


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significant others.8 We thus treat status effects,in those areas of social life where they are appar-ent, as resulting primarily from individuals’efforts to maintain, and possibly to enhance,their status via various lifestyle choices andcommitments.

This final point is of particular importance indifferentiating our position from that recentlytaken up by Grusky and his colleagues inresponse to claims of the decay, or death, of classin contemporary societies (e.g., Kingston 2000;Pakulski and Waters 1996). If such claims areto be adequately countered, it is argued, classanalysis and, it would seem, the study of socialstratification more generally, will need to beratcheted down to and regrounded at the levelof occupations (see, e.g., Grusky 2005; Gruskyand Sørensen 1998; Grusky and Weeden 2001;Weeden and Grusky 2005). In this way, “real”sociocultural entities may be more readily iden-tified, arising from processes of occupationalselection, socialization, and regulation, and itwill in turn be possible to show the full extentto which, and range of mechanisms throughwhich, experience at “the point of production”impacts on social attitudes and behavior. Weourselves take occupation (along with employ-ment status) as a proxy for class position and,again, as a prime characteristic to which statusattaches. However, we are concerned only withquite specific—and quite different—aspects ofoccupations in thus seeking to make ourWeberian approach operational. Indeed, we donot consider it necessary to conceive of occu-pations, classes, or status groups as being “real”entities in Grusky’s sense to show that individ-uals’ class and status positions can, and do,have very real consequences for their sociallives. This becomes apparent in the analysesthat follow.9

RESULTS

CLASS AND ECONOMIC LIFE-CHANCES

Given our understanding of class in terms ofemployment relations, we expect individuals’class positions rather than their status to be themajor influence in determining their econom-ic life-chances. Goldthorpe and McKnight(2006) present empirical results for Britainshowing strong connections between class andrisks of unemployment, short-term variability inearnings, and long-term earnings prospects;and they also spell out the underlying mecha-nisms operating through different forms ofemployment contracts. It is not easy to envisagesimilar mechanisms that might operate in thecase of status. Nonetheless, we seek to test ourexpectations more strictly, at least in regard tounemployment and earnings prospects, by bring-ing status as well as class directly into the analy-sis.10

With regard to unemployment risks, we usethe same data set as Goldthorpe and McKnight,the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Wetake individuals ages 21 to 54 in 1991 who wereinterviewed in all years between 1991 and 2002(N = 2,860). Over this 12-year period, 826respondents (28.9 percent) reported at least onespell of unemployment and 299 (10.5 percent)reported a cumulative unemployment durationof 12 months or more. To avoid cases of mere-ly transitional or even planned unemploymentbetween jobs, we concentrate on these latterindividuals who experienced what could be


detailed occupational classification with which theywork are to be ordered, and according to what crite-ria. When attitudinal and behavioral differences arerevealed across occupational groups (cf. Weeden andGrusky 2005), these are likely to result only in partfrom their stratification—that is, from structuredsocial inequalities in some form or other—and in partalso from purely “horizontal” differentiation (soci-ologists and accountants, say, may have similar classand status positions but still very different occupa-tional subcultures). It seems essential to specify somebasis on which these two kinds of effect are to be dis-tinguished (see Goldthorpe 2007, vol. II, chap. 5).

10 We cannot include analyses of variability inearnings since no data set is available that containsinformation on this matter and also occupationaldata of a kind that would allow us to implement ourstatus scale.

8 While Weber ([1922] 1968:932) sees statusgroups (Stände) as tending, unlike classes, to formas communities (Gemeinschaften), he still adds thatthese are often “of an amorphous kind,” especially in“modern democracies,” and he speaks also of status“circles” (Kreise).

9 While we see the research program envisaged andembarked on by Grusky and his colleagues as hav-ing the potential to revitalize the sociology of occu-pations, its relevance to research in the field of socialstratification must be difficult to assess until theproblem is resolved of how the categories of the


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regarded as long-term (or recurrent) unem-ployment.

Table 3 reports results from binomial logis-tic regression analyses in which experience (ornot) of long-term unemployment is the depend-ent variable. In Model 1, class is included as anexplanatory variable along with a number ofsociodemographic variables that, for presentpurposes, we treat as controls.11 Class effectsshow up quite consistently and on essentially thesame pattern as found by Goldthorpe andMcKnight (2006, fig. 2). The most striking fea-ture is the much greater risk of long-term unem-ployment run by members of Class IVb,self-employed workers, and of Classes VI andVII, the working class, than by members ofClass I and Class II, the salariat. At the extreme,

an unskilled worker in Class VII is four times(e1.398) more likely to have been long-termunemployed than a higher-level professional ormanager in Class I. As noted by Goldthorpeand McKnight, the form of regulation ofemployment—the service relationship—that istypically enjoyed by members of the salariat ismore likely than the basic labor contract toimply an expectation of continuity of employ-ment or at least of employability; and further,should job loss occur, usually involves a muchlonger period of notice during which alternativeemployment can be sought (see also Gallie et al.1998).

Model 2 repeats the analysis with status, asmeasured by the scale presented in Table 2,included. Two points of main importanceemerge. First, while class effects are in mostcases lowered, and those for Class VI and IIIbbecome marginally insignificant at the 5 percentlevel, their pattern is little changed. In particu-lar, the far more serious risk of long-term unem-


Table 3. Determinants of Long-Term Unemployment (logistic regression, N = 2,860)

Model 1 Model 2

.0� .SE .0� .SE

Age 34–43a .145 (.150) .152 (.150)Age 44–51 .154 (.175) .155 (.176)Femaleb –.710** (.145) –.674** (.148)Cohabitc .636** (.221) .633** (.221)Single .668** (.215) .670** (.215)Wid./Div./Sep. 1.097** (.193) 1.092** (.193)Childrend .102 (.150) .095 (.150)Class IIe .339 (.265) .267 (.273)Class IIIa .763** (.279) .645* (.298)Class IIIb .859* (.335) .664 (.375)Class IVac –.073 (.557) –.311 (.595)Class IVb 1.193** (.303) .897* (.398)Class V .622* (.309) .317 (.407)Class VI 1.145** (.291) .800 (.416)Class VII 1.398** (.242) 1.062** (.379)Status –.413 (.359)Constant –2.986** (.265) –2.836** (.295)

Pseudo R2 .065 .066Log-Likelihood –895.38 –894.72

a Age 21–33 as reference categoryb Male as reference categoryc Married as reference categoryd Childless as reference categorye Class I as reference category* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

11 Descriptive statistics for all variables includedare available from the authors on request.


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ployment for unskilled workers remains almostthree times greater (e1.062) than for those inClass I. Second, although introducing statusreduces class effects somewhat, the effect ofstatus itself is far from significant. In account-ing for this, more detailed analyses show thatthere is a particularly weak association betweenstatus and the risk of long-term unemploymentacross the higher ranges of our status scale,where the risk tends to be well below average.12

Turning now to economic prospects, wefocus, as do Goldthorpe and McKnight, on age-earnings curves. We cannot, however, followthem in using the data set of the New EarningsSurvey because of difficulties in applying ourstatus scale. We therefore continue with theBHPS data set, despite problems that arise withrelatively small numbers. Goldthorpe andMcKnight (2006, f igs. 4 and 6) show thatmarked differences exist in the economicprospects of members of different classes asindexed by age-earnings curves. Most notably,while the earnings of those in the salariat tendto rise with age up to around age 50, reflecting,it may be supposed, the operation of incremen-tal salary scales and promotion ladders, forthose in the working class earnings tend moreor less to level out in their thirties.13

Figure 1, Panel A, presents age-earningscurves, based on BHPS data, for men andwomen who were employed full-time in 2002and were in Class I, Class II, or a combined blue-

collar Class V+VI+VII.14 These curves bring outessentially the same class differences as thoseobserved by Goldthorpe and McKnight. Theother panels of Figure 1 present curves for broadstatus bands within these three classes, using thefour major divisions that we proposed within ourstatus scale (see Table 2).15 It can be seen (PanelsB and C) that within both Class I and Class II,the higher and lower salariat, the curves for sta-tus band 1 lie somewhat above those for statusband 2 but are still very similar in shape (allow-ing for some fluctuation in band 2, probably dueto small numbers); and further (Panel D), thatwithin Class V+VI+VII both status bands 3 and4 show the same, much flatter curves, with thecurve of status band 4 actually lying above thatof status group 3—reflecting the fact that themanual occupations that predominate in band 4yield generally higher earnings than the personalservice or people-processing occupations thatpredominate in band 3.

In sum, thinking in terms of status as well asclass does not appear to add a great deal to ourunderstanding of differences in age-earningscurves. To check this impression more formal-ly, Table 4 shows results from analyses, basedon the same data used in Figure 1, in which weregress earnings on age and age-squared.

It is evident from the first panel of Table 4that, as would be expected, the coefficients forboth age terms are significantly larger forClasses I and II than for Class V+VI+VII. Butthe second panel shows that, while the coeffi-cients for status band 1 are larger than those forstatus bands 2, 3, and 4, there is far less differ-


12 Since class and status are correlated, if class isdropped from Model 2, status becomes statisticallysignificant and negative, suggesting that low statusrespondents face higher risks of long-term unem-ployment. We regard this, though, as a misspecifiedmodel. A graph plotting the risk of long-term unem-ployment by status group is available from the authorson request. In another model, not reported here, weadded educational qualifications in the regression.This again leads to marginal reductions in classeffects but the effects of different levels of qualifi-cation are not themselves statistically significant.

13 Neither Goldthorpe and McKnight’s analyses norour own claim to trace the actual life-course earningsof individuals but, rather, to show how age-specificearnings differ by class. Some distortion is possibledue both to cohort effects and to selection effects (seeGoldthorpe and McKnight 2006) but not, we believe,of a kind sufficient to disturb the main results of theanalyses.

14 We combine Classes V, VI, and VII and pool menand women together, since we wish to consider earn-ings within combinations of age, class, and broad sta-tus band, and, for such analyses, the sample size ofeven the BHPS is relatively small. We do not considerage-earnings curves for Class III, that of routine non-manual workers, because it could in this case be mis-leading to treat men and women together. AsGoldthorpe and McKnight (2006) show, age-earningscurves show marked differences by gender, and thisproblem could only be addressed by making a furtherIIIa/IIIb division.

15 For purposes of comparison with classes, we usethe four broad status bands defined within our scale(see Table 2). However, in all other analyses, statusis treated as a continuous variable, using the statusscore indicated in that table.


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Figure 1. Median Annual Earnings by Age for Men and Women in Full-Time Employment byClass (Panel A) and by Broad Status Band Within class (Panels B to D)

Table 4. Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors of Age and Age-Squared in OLS RegressionModels Predicting the Logarithm of Annual Earnings (Men and Women Combined)

Age Age Squared

.0� .SE .0� .SE N0

Class I .116 .011 –.127 .013 954Class II .111 .011 –.124 .013 1,255Class V+VI+VII .055 .007 –.063 .009 1,600

Status Band 1 .145 .01 –.163 .013 1,317Status Band 2 .056 .009 –.058 .011 1,540Status Band 3 .088 .011 –.101 .014 786Status Band 4 .051 .009 –.057 .011 1,155

Class I & Status Band 1 .137 .012 –.152 .015 735Class I & Status Band 2 .054 .023 –.053 .026 218

Class II & Status Band 1 .147 .017 –.168 .022 577Class II & Status Band 2 .070 .013 –.074 .017 585Class II & Status Band 3 .251 .058 –.299 .076 76

Class V+VI+VII & Status Band 3 .063 .013 –.073 .015 497Class V+VI+VII & Status Band 4 .045 .009 –.052 .011 1,090

Note: The regression models also control for the logarithm of hours worked and gender.

inco

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ageage

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Fri, 27 Jul 2007 07:54:23

entiation among the latter.16 Similarly, theremaining panels of the table show that,although within both Class I and Class II ageeffects on earnings are clearly stronger for thosein status band 1 than for those in lower statusbands, in Class II the coefficients for statusbands 2 and 3 go in the “wrong” direction—amajor factor being the inclusion in band 3 ofprotective service personnel—and in ClassV+VI+VII the coefficients for status bands 3and 4 are not significantly different.

Insofar, then, as risk of long-term unem-ployment and age-earnings curves serve well asindicators of economic life-chances—as goodindicators of security and prospects, respec-tively—we can say that our expectation thatclass rather than status will mainly differentiatesuch life-chances is in general confirmed. Weturn next to a quite different topic: that of cul-tural consumption considered as an aspect oflifestyle. In this case, and following from ourearlier discussion, our expectation is the exactreverse of the above: we expect that stratifica-tion here will be on the basis of status rather thanof class.

STATUS AND CULTURAL CONSUMPTION

For Weber, lifestyle is the most typical waythrough which members of different statusgroups, even within the purely conventionaland relatively loose status orders of modernsocieties, seek to define their boundaries—thatis, to establish cues or markers of inclusion andexclusion. Furthermore, a number of morerecent authors emphasize cultural taste and con-sumption as an aspect of lifestyle that is of par-ticular importance as a means of the symboliccommunication of “distinction” and thus ofexpressing a form of hierarchy that is set apartfrom that of mere economic advantage (e.g.,Bourdieu 1984; DiMaggio 1987; Peterson1997).

In a series of published and forthcomingpapers (Chan and Goldthorpe 2005, 2007b,2007c) we examine the social stratification ofcultural consumption in three different

domains—music; theater, dance, and cinema;and the visual arts—using data from the Arts inEngland Survey of 2001 (Skelton et al. 2002).17

For each of these domains we first applied latentclass analysis to raw data on the frequency ofdifferent kinds of consumption, for men andwomen ages 20 to 64, to establish patterns ofconsumption and, in turn, types of consumer. Wethen used multinomial logistic regression analy-ses to examine the determinants of individuals’approximation to one type or another.

An initial finding from these analyses is thatcultural consumption in England is not stratifiedalong elite-to-mass lines: in particular, we can-not identify an elite that is distinctive in con-suming “high” cultural forms while at the sametime rejecting “lower,” or more popular, forms.There is, in other words, no evidence of a closehomology between cultural and social stratifi-cation. We do find support, albeit with somequalifications, for the alternative hypothesisthat the main axis of cultural stratification, inmodern societies at least, is one that separatescultural “omnivores” from cultural “univores”(see Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson andSimkus 1992). The former have relatively highlevels of consumption of all genres within aparticular domain, but the latter are restricted intheir consumption to popular genres only.18 Forour present purposes, therefore, the questionof chief importance is that of the basis on whichomnivore–univore stratification occurs.

Table 5 shows selected results from our arti-cles previously referred to: specifically, from ourlogistic regressions in which the dependent vari-able is type of cultural consumer. We presentthose results that relate to the major contrasts ofinterest: that is, the effects of covariates on the


17 Chan and Goldthorpe (2007a), which examinesthe social stratification of newspaper readership, isalso relevant.

18 For example, in the case of music, omnivoreshave similarly high levels of consumption of popand rock as do univores but, unlike the latter, also con-sume classical music, opera, and jazz. In the case oftheater, dance, and cinema, omnivores have rela-tively high attendance at plays, musicals, pantomimes,ballet, and other dance performances as well as thecinema, while univores are essentially restricted to thelatter. With the visual arts, however, as noted in thetext below, the most extreme contrast is that betweenomnivores and nonconsumers.

16 For example, the 95 percent confidence inter-val of the linear age term for status band 2 is: .038 –.074 (i.e., .056 ± 1.96 � .009), which overlaps withthat for status band 3, .066 – .110.


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log odds of being an omnivore rather than eithera univore or, as with the visual arts, a type thatcan only be described as a nonconsumer orinactive.19

Note first from Table 5 that the range ofsociodemographic variables that we introducechiefly as controls have significant effects inonly rather patchy, albeit fairly plausible, ways.Turning then to the stratification variables onwhich our interest centers, one can see that theeffects of class on the chances of an individualbeing an omnivore rather than a univore or aninactive are largely insignificant across each of


Table 5. Determinants of Types of Consumer in the Domains of Music; Theater, Dance, andCinema; and the Visual Arts (multinomial logit model, N = 3,819)

Music Theater, Dance, and Cinema Visual Arts

Omnivore Omnivore Omnivoreversus Univore versus Univore versus Inactive

.0� .SE .0� .SE .0� .SE

Femalea .156 (.137) .615** (.092) .223 (.192)Marriedb –.321 (.176) .148 (.112) –.200 (.239)Separated –.065 (.214) .188 (.139) .180 (.295)Age .066** (.006) .005 (.004) .026** (.009)Child (0–4)c –.391 (.214) –.562** (.113) –.639* (.285)Child (5–10) –.340 (.188) .070 (.100) .260 (.232)Child (11–15) –.397* (.191) .088 (.105) .039 (.252)The Northd –.470* (.193) –.231 (.124) –.089 (.253)Midlands –.198 (.184) –.207 (.123) –.880** (.279)South East .060 (.198) .083 (.135) –.150 (.270)South West –.224 (.238) –.189 (.153) –.174 (.321)Income .012 (.007) .026** (.005) .006 (.009)CSE/Otherse 1.006** (.276) .169 (.152) 1.220* (.499)O-Levels 1.109** (.242) .668** (.128) 1.072* (.462)A-Levels 1.523** (.265) 1.130** (.145) 1.849** (.471)Subdegree 1.851** (.266) 1.027** (.160) 2.219** (.469)Degree 2.367** (.256) 1.223** (.151) 3.260** (.450)Class IIf –.135 (.172) .078 (.126) .613* (.241)Class III –.329 (.247) –.161 (.160) –.396 (.376)Class IV .299 (.291) –.205 (.203) .699 (.411)Class V –.253 (.382) –.134 (.218) .073 (.554)Class VI –.107 (.317) –.199 (.195) –.480 (.514)Class VII –.109 (.387) –.507* (.230) –.325 (.646)Status 1.047** (.287) .631** (.179) 1.229** (.402)Constant –5.906** (.472) –2.118** (.292) –5.461** (.688)

a Male as reference categoryb Single as reference categoryc Childless as reference categoryd London as reference categorye No qualification as reference categoryf Class I as reference category* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

19 In the case of the visual arts, we also need tomodify the omnivore–univore distinction to allowfor a type of consumer we label as a “paucivore,” whoconsumes across a modest range of genres; and in thecase of music, to allow for a type of omnivore–lis-tener who consumes most genres via various mediabut not in live form. Supplementary tables for Tables5 to 7 are provided in the Online Supplement on the

ASR Web site: http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2007/toc058.html.


Fri, 27 Jul 2007 07:54:23

http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2007/toc058.html

http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2007/toc058.html

the three cultural domains. The effects of status,in contrast, are significant for each and quitestrong.20 It is true that we here treat class on thebasis of the seven-class NS-SEC rather thanthe original nine-class version of the schema thatwe use in analyzing the risk of unemployment.However, while we measure class in a somewhatless detailed way than previously, we think itunlikely that this in itself could be the source ofthe clear predominance of status over class thatwe find.21

In addition, Table 5 shows that while incomehas a significant effect in only one domain (the-ater, dance, and cinema), level of educationalqualifications is generally significant in itseffects, even if not always in an entirely mono-tonic way. But the question then arises of howfar, given that class, income, and status are alsoincluded in our analyses, education is to beregarded as itself operating as a stratificationvariable. It seems reasonable to suppose thatlevel of qualifications is, to some extent at least,picking up individual psychological attributes,such as information processing capacity, thatcould exert a quite independent influence on thelikelihood of being a cultural omnivore (cf.Berlyne 1974; Moles 1971; see also Chan andGoldthorpe 2007a).

Regardless of what view may be taken on thislast issue, Table 5 still provides clear support forour expectation that differences in lifestyle willbe associated with—and can indeed be taken asexpressions of—stratification by status ratherthan by class.22 By way of illustration, we can

turn to some of the descriptive detail of ourresults. For example, while members of ClassesI and II, the professional and managerial salari-at, are more likely to be cultural omnivores thanare members of other classes, the importance ofstatus stratification within these classes is muchin evidence. We have previously observed thatin the higher ranges of the status scale profes-sionals generally rank above managers.Correspondingly, we find that the groups thatmost regularly show the highest proportions ofomnivores are higher professionals, teachersand other professionals in education, and spe-cialist managers, for example, finance, IT, andpersonnel managers, who often have profes-sional qualifications and operate in professionalroles.23 Conversely, other types of managers, inmanufacturing, transport, construction, or serv-ices, whose status rankings are similar to, oreven below, those of some groups of routinenonmanual workers in Class III, have only a sim-ilar, or if anything a lower, probability of beingomnivores.

So far, then, we have sought to bring out thecontrast between the stratification of econom-ic life-chances and the stratification of cultur-al consumption—the former primarily reflectingindividuals’ positions within the class struc-ture, understood in terms of employment rela-tions; the latter, their position within the statusorder. We do not wish to suggest, however, thatit is possible for all areas of social life to be sim-ply divided into those in which either class orstatus is the dominant stratifying influence.Often the situation may be more complex. Wenow seek to illustrate this point by focusingspecifically on individuals’ political commit-ments and value orientations.

CLASS, STATUS, AND POLITICS

A relationship between class and political partysupport has long been recognized. Indeed, sev-eral authors view the development of electoralpolitics in modern societies as “the democrat-


dropped from the model. Details available from theauthors on request.

23 As seen in Table 2, these groups rank 1, 3, and4 in the order of our status scale. The second-rank-ing group, associate professionals in business, alsotends to show relatively high proportions of omni-vores.

20 For example, in the case of theater, dance, andcinema, the probability of a hypothetical womanwho is 40 years old, childless, lives in London, andearns £25,000 being an omnivore rather than a uni-vore is 23 to 26 percentage points higher (dependingon her educational attainment) if she is at the toprather than at the bottom of status hierarchy. Fordetails, see Chan and Goldthorpe (2005:206).

21 NS-SEC could in fact be regarded as instanti-ating the conceptual approach of the schema in amore reliable way than previously. Moreover, as wenote in the articles previously cited, even if we sim-plify our measure of status to the four broad statusbands that we introduced above in our analyses ofage-wage curves, this still does not remove the clos-er association of cultural consumption with statusthan with class, as treated by the seven NS-SECclasses.

22 This remains the case even if education is


Fri, 27 Jul 2007 07:54:23

ic translation” of the class struggle (Korpi 1983;Lipset 1960). Of late, though, it has been wide-ly argued that class politics are in decline; andsome authors claim a growing importance forwhat has been variously termed identity,lifestyle, or status politics (e.g., Beck 1992;Giddens 1994; Hechter 2004). In Britain, theassociation between class and vote did in factweaken at the General Election of 1997 (Evans1999) and has since remained at a lower levelthan previously. This is not to say, however, thatclass is no longer a major influence on voting,nor that it has become overshadowed by otherinfluences such as status (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta,and Manza 2006).

To investigate this matter further, we turn tothe data set of the British Election Surveys and,

to obtain an adequate basis for the kind of mul-tivariate analysis we wish to undertake, poolthe data for the 1997 and 2001 elections. InTable 6 we take party choice, between theConservatives, Labour, and all other parties, asthe dependent variable in a multinomial regres-sion that includes similar explanatory and con-trol variables as we use in our previous analyses.

Under Model 1, it is clear that at all eventsin the case of the major contrast—votingConservative rather than Labour—class is themost important explanatory variable (using theoriginal version of the class schema) and on apattern that is familiar from all earlier research.The higher salariat of Class I, the small employ-ers of Class IVac, and the self-employed work-ers of Class IVb are the most likely to vote


Table 6. Determinants of Party Choice at the 1997 and 2001 British General Elections (multi-nomial logit model, N = 3,407)

Model 1 Model 2

Conservatives Others Conservatives Others versus Labour versus Labour versus Labour versus Labour

.0� .SE .0� .SE .0� .SE .0� .SE

2001a –.220* (.101) .259** (.095) –.220* (.101) .258** (.095)Age .030** (.003) .009** (.003) .030** (.003) .009** (.003)Femaleb .250* (.101) .016 (.098) .230* (.103) .008 (.099)CSEc .126 (.152) .281 (.151) .126 (.152) .281 (.151)O-Levels .468** (.151) .490** (.157) .465** (.151) .489** (.157)A-Levels .288 (.179) .797** (.175) .280 (.179) .794** (.175)Subdegree .381* (.168) 1.154** (.166) .363* (.169) 1.146** (.167)Degree –.313 (.179) .977** (.169) –.347 (.183) .961** (.172)Income .032** (.004) .006 (.004) .032** (.004) .006 (.004)Class IId –.159 (.151) –.036 (.152) –.129 (.154) –.023 (.155)Class IIIa –.313 (.182) .108 (.183) –.259 (.190) .132 (.192)Class IIIb –.600** (.216) –.001 (.211) –.499* (.240) .045 (.236)Class IVac .655* (.265) .235 (.310) .760** (.287) .283 (.329)Class IVb .248 (.232) .079 (.260) .395 (.278) .147 (.305)Class V –1.046** (.231) –.043 (.206) –.879** (.289) .034 (.272)Class VI –1.126** (.222) –.466* (.215) –.944** (.291) –.382 (.289)Class VII –1.013** (.182) –.222 (.178) –.838** (.257) –.141 (.257)Status .243 (.252) .111 (.256)Constant –2.651** (.289) –1.828** (.281) –2.709** (.296) –1.857** (.289)

Pseudo R2 .064 .064Log-Likelihood –3296.90 –3296.43

Note: Others = all other parties.a 1997 as reference categoryb Male as reference categoryc No qualification as reference categoryd Class I as reference category* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).


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Conservative rather than Labour, and unskilledworkers in Class VII are the least likely—infact, only about a third (e–1.013) as likely asmembers of Class I. Further, the probability ofsupporting the Conservatives rather than Labourrises with income.

Level of educational qualifications also hassignificant effects on voting, and in the contrastbetween voting “other” rather than Labour, edu-cation could be regarded as more influentialthan class. It should be noted, however, that inneither contrast are the effects of educationmonotonic. Thus, in the case of theConservative–Labour contrast, those with O-levels or subdegree qualifications are most like-ly to vote Conservative. For this reason, therole of education specifically as an indicator ofstratification again seems somewhat problem-atic.

Introducing status into the analysis (Model 2),we see that in most cases class effects are some-what reduced (though the effects of incomeremain unchanged). However, while in the con-trast between other parties and Labour, no classeffect is now signif icant—only educationeffects, in much the same way as before—in theConservative–Labour contrast class effects, aswell as those of education, remain very muchon their previous pattern. Unskilled workers inClass VII are still less than half (e–.838) as like-ly to vote Conservative rather than Labour as arethe higher salariat of Class I. Furthermore, theeffect of status itself is clearly not significant ineither contrast. On this evidence, then, we cansay that class has certainly not disappeared asa basis of the stratification of political parti-sanship in Britain. And at least so far as the cen-tral division within electoral politics isconcerned, class remains of obvious importanceeven when the effects of status are also takeninto account.24

From the general theoretical position that wehave adopted, the results in Table 6 should be inno way surprising. Individuals holding differentclass positions, as we wish to understand themin terms of employment relations, can quiterationally see themselves as having differentinterests (e.g., on economic inequality and the

redistribution of income and wealth, levels ofpublic spending on social welfare, and relationsbetween employers and employees). These inter-ests are likely to be better represented andupheld by different parties—for those in thesalariat and the petty bourgeoisie, by theConservatives, and for those in other classes,particularly the working class, by Labour.25

However, in addition to these more or lessstandard, left–right issues, it may be supposedthat various other issues also have resonanceamong the electorate, and perhaps to an increas-ing extent. Issues relating to social order and tothe limits of freedom and authority—issuesconcerning tradition and respect, compliancewith the law and its enforcement, and censor-ship—attract much attention today. Likert-typescales with good reliability are now availablethat allow for the measurement of individuals’value positions on the left–right dimension andalso on what might be called thelibertarian–authoritarian dimension (Evans,Heath, and Lalljee 1996; Heath, Jowell, andCurtice 1994). We would then ask if, in theplacing of individuals on the left-right scale,class maintains its importance relative to statusin the same way as with voting; and, if so,whether a similar situation obtains in regard tothe libertarian-authoritarian scale.

To address this question, we draw on the dataset of the British Social Attitudes Survey of2002 that allows respondents to be given scoreson both the left–right and libertarian–authori-tarian scales (see the Appendix for the surveyitems used in the construction of these scalesand also Park and Surridge [2003]). Table 7shows the results of regressing individuals’scores on these two scales on a similar range ofexplanatory and control variables as those weuse in regard to voting.

In the case of the left–right scale, the resultsin Table 7 are, in most respects, similar to thechances of voting Conservative rather thanLabour. Class effects are generally significant,often strong, and on essentially the same patternas before—due allowance being made for thefact that we have reverted to the seven NS-SECclasses; and class effects are, as it were, rein-forced by income effects. The effects of educa-


25 On the rationality of class voting see Evans(1993) and Weakliem and Heath (1994).

24 If education is dropped from the model, classeffects become slightly stronger, while the statusparameter remains nonsignificant for both contrasts.


Fri, 27 Jul 2007 07:54:23

tion are also on the same pattern as for voting:that is, those with intermediate-level qualifica-tions tend to be more right-wing than eitherthose with lower or higher qualifications. Again,too, the effect of status fails to reach signifi-cance—although only marginally so, and withthe sign of the coefficient indicating a tenden-cy for higher status to be associated with a moreright-wing orientation.

In the case of the libertarian–authoritarianscale, however, an entirely different patternemerges. All class effects, and likewise those ofincome, are now far from significant while theeffect of status is both significant and quitestrong. The higher a person’s status, the morelikely the person is to express libertarian ratherthan authoritarian values. Specifically, otherthings being equal, an increase of one standarddeviation in status is associated with a changeof –.51 (–1.381 � .366) on thelibertarian–authoritarian scale. Education also

shows some positive libertarian effects, althoughonly for those with A-level qualifications orhigher, and by far the strongest effect occurswith graduates.26


Table 7. Determinants of Political Attitudes on Left–Right and Libertarian–Authoritarian Scales(OLS regression)

Left–Right Libertarian–Authoritarian

.0� .SE .0� .SE

Age .005 (.005) .030** (.005)Femalea .605** (.166) .136 (.169)10–23kb .257 (.214) .297 (.217)23–44k .958** (.233) .209 (.237)> 44k 2.153** (.277) –.111 (.282)CSEc .472 (.276) .193 (.281)O-Levels 1.039** (.261) –.261 (.263)A-Levels 1.090** (.294) –.726* (.299)Subdegree 1.089** (.289) –.822** (.292)Degree .153 (.321) –3.223** (.325)Class IId –.873** (.282) .020 (.288)Class III –1.233** (.359) –.004 (.367)Class IV .021 (.429) –.138 (.438)Class V –1.553** (.434) .082 (.443)Class VI –1.551** (.406) –.340 (.416)Class VII –1.732** (.453) –.130 (.462)Status .684 (.377) –1.381** (.385)Constant 11.711** (.529) 21.363** (.537)

N 2,421 2,441R2 .13 .17

a Male as reference categoryb Income < 10k as reference categoryc No qualification as reference categoryd Class I as reference category* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

26 Park and Surridge (2003), in their analysis of thesame data set, find stronger and more consistenteffects of education in regard to libertarian–author-itarian values. This suggests that neglecting status, asthey do, may lead to an overestimation of the impor-tance of education. If education is dropped from themodel, the status parameter still fails to reach statis-tical significance at the conventional 5 percent levelfor the left–right scale, and while some patchy classeffects appear for the libertarian–authoritarian scale,the estimate for status almost doubles in magnitude.Details are available from the authors on request.Park and Surridge also include a measure of religiousadherence and find that this too has significanteffects. We repeated our own analysis with religionincluded and obtained similar results to Park and


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A more detailed examination of our datareveals that the far more important effect ofstatus on libertarian–authoritarian than onleft–right value orientations is a phenomenonchiefly of the higher ranges of the status order.Figure 2 shows that at lower status levels—thatis, in status bands 3 and 4 (marked in Figure 2by ‘+’ and ‘�’ respectively), which comprisemainly routine service and manual occupationalgroups—left-wing and authoritarian values tendto go together rather closely (cf. Lipset 1960).But as status increases, authoritarian valuestend to give way to more libertarian ones andleft–right differences become apparent. Thus,among groups in status band 2 (marked by ‘o’in Figure 2), who tend to hold middling posi-tions on the libertarian–authoritarian scale, onefinds both groups that are quite right-wing,such as plant, depot, and site managers andmanagers and proprietors in services, and thosewho are more centrist, such as buyers and salesrepresentatives and several lower administra-tive and clerical groups. A similar divisionoccurs in status band 1 (marked by ‘�’ in Figure2) among groups who are alike in having themost libertarian values. Thus, general managersand administrators, specialist managers, andhigher professionals are clearly more right-wingthan are teachers and other professionals ineducation; scientists, engineers, and technolo-gists; and the three groups of associate profes-sionals.

This indicates the importance of the class-sta-tus distinction in allowing a new perspective onthe social stratification of political partisanshipand of value orientations.27 Class politics areclearly not dead. Class can still be regarded asthe main basis of social cleavage so far asleft–right issues are concerned: that is, issues

that turn on divergent interests arising out ofinequalities in economic conditions and life-chances. But in regard to libertarian–authori-tarian issues, it is status, not class, that appearsas the major stratifying force. Adherence to lib-ertarian values, we suggest, tends to be a fea-ture of a high-status lifestyle and generalWeltanschauung—in just the same way as isrelatively high and omnivorous (rather than elit-ist) cultural consumption. In this regard, weagree with Hechter (2004:404) that status pol-itics are likely to bring together “individualswho have a common interest in consuming cul-turally specific goods and who are attributedwith a specific degree of social honour on thisaccount.”28 It is still important, however, to rec-ognize that status politics do not replace classpolitics but rather coexist with them in a com-plex interrelationship.29


Surridge, but without the pattern of our other resultsbeing appreciably affected.

27 If the class dummies are dropped from the mod-els in Tables 3 and 6, or from the regression predict-ing left–right values in Table 7, the status parameterbecomes statistically significant. Likewise, if thestatus parameter is dropped from Table 5 or from themodel predicting libertarian–authoritarian scale inTable 7, then some class parameters become signif-icant. This is not surprising because class and statusare correlated. However, we would regard these asmisspecified models.

28 This line of argument could be subjected to amore stringent empirical test if we had a data setthat included information on both individuals’culturalconsumption and their sociopolitical values, as wellas class and status. But, so far, we have not been ableto find such a data set for Britain. For the UnitedStates, DiMaggio (1996) reports that art-museumvisitors tend to be more liberal, tolerant, and open tothe values of other lifestyles and cultures than non-visitors—but no more likely to have voted for Clintonthan for Bush in the 1992 presidential election andno less likely to be supportive of capitalist econom-ic institutions. This points to the relevance of distin-guishing, as we have suggested, between orientationson the left–right dimension, differentiated by classrather than by status, and orientations on the liber-tarian–authoritarian dimension, differentiated by sta-tus rather than by class. Unfortunately, the data setused by DiMaggio contains information only on edu-cation and income.

29 The various associations reported in this articlebetween cultural consumption, politics, and attitudeson the one hand, and status or class on the other, mightarise partly as a result of self-selection. That is, peo-ple with certain unobserved dispositions mightchoose to take up particular occupations and there-by acquire a specific status (and class). At the sametime, such dispositions might be associated with par-ticular lifestyles or attitudes. Having said that, classand status might also shape attitudes and other lifechoices (Kohn 1977). Both causal and self-selectionprocesses could be at work.


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In the case of politics, we have sought toshow that both class and status are involved inthe shaping of partisanship and value orienta-tions, but in clearly differing ways. Class isdominant with regard to left–right issues thatinvolve primarily material interests. Status, how-ever, prevails when it comes tolibertarian–authoritarian issues that involve, touse Weber’s phrase, ideal interests. We believethere may be many other situations of this kindthat, rather than calling for analyses primarilyin terms of class or status, will require a care-ful separating out of the influence that eachexerts.30

As an illustration, a rather fierce debate hasrecently broken out over social inequalities inhealth between, one the one hand, epidemiolo-gists and medical sociologists favoring materi-al or political economy explanations of suchinequalities and, on the other, those favoringpsychosocial or cultural-behavioral explana-tions—to follow the terminology used inBartley’s (2004) valuable review of the debate.There are obvious parallels here between class-based and status-based explanations, and itseems essential that, to advance the debate, thestratification of different health outcomes shouldbe investigated on the basis of reliable measuresof both class and status, rather than of just oneor the other or of ad hoc measures that confusethe two.

By extending the substantive range of analy-ses of the kind that we have presented in this arti-cle, a more comprehensive mapping should bepossible of the relative importance of stratifi-cation by class and by status across differentareas of social life. In turn, a wider basis maybe provided for a more detailed investigationthan has so far proved possible of the range ofcausal processes or mechanisms through whichthe effects of class and status on individual livesare actually brought about.


Figure 2. Mean Position of the 31 StatusGroups on Left–Right andLibertarian–Authoritarian Scales

Note: Groups in status bands 1, 2, 3, and 4 are markedby the following symbols respectively: �, �, �, +. Table2 provides a key to the status groups abbreviations. Thedashed lines refer to the mean sample values of the twoscales.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we have aimed to show that recenttendencies to disregard, or to seek to elide, theWeberian distinction between class and statusare unfortunate. Indeed, where the distinction isnot recognized, and empirically implemented,research into the stratification of British socie-ty—and, we believe, of other modern soci-eties—may well go astray. This point seemsespecially relevant with regard to studies of theimpact of social stratification on life-chancesand life-choices across different areas of sociallife. As shown in our analyses, individuals’posi-tions within the class structure, understood interms of employment relations, have a prevail-ing influence on economic life-chances, as indi-cated by risks of long-term unemployment andearnings prospects, while it is their positionswithin the status order that are of key importancein regard to at least one major aspect of lifestyle:level and pattern of cultural consumption. Ifthe study of these outcomes had been under-taken on the basis of some unidimensional con-ception of stratification, a less clear appreciationof their structuring would in all probability haveresulted.

30 Because in the foregoing analyses we focus onstatus as attaching to occupation, it is quite possiblethat status effects on both cultural consumption andpolitics are underestimated. For example, these effectsmight be somewhat greater if status as attaching toethnicity were also taken into account.

liber

taria

n–au

thor

itaria

n sc

ale

left–right scale


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APPENDIX

THE LEFT–RIGHT AND

LIBERTARIAN–AUTHORITARIAN SCALES

The two scales used in the section “Class, Status,and Politics” are constructed additively fromthe following survey items. Each item has fiveresponse categories, ranging from 1 (agreestrongly) to 5 (disagree strongly). The values ofthe left–right scale range from 5 to 25, withhigher values denoting more right-wing views,and the values of the libertarian–authoritarianscale range from 6 to 30, with higher valuesdenoting more authoritarian views. Cronbach’salpha for the two scales is quite high, at .82and .74 respectively.

Left–Right scale:

• Government should redistribute income from thebetter-off to those who are less well off.

• Big business benefits owners at the expense ofworkers.

• Ordinary working people do not get their fair shareof the nation’s wealth.

• There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.• Management will always try to get the better ofemployees if it gets the chance.

Libertarian–Authoritarian scale:

• Young people today don’t have enough respect fortraditional British values.

• People who break the law should be given stiffer sen-tences.

• For some crimes, the death penalty is the mostappropriate sentence.

• Schools should teach children to obey authority.• The law should always be obeyed, even if a partic-ular law is wrong.

• Censorship of films and magazines is necessary touphold moral standards.

Tak Wing Chan is a university lecturer in Sociologyat the University of Oxford, where he is also a fellowand tutor of New College. His research interests aresocial stratification and mobility, and the life course,especially family formation and dissolution.

John H. Goldthorpe is an Emeritus Fellow of NuffieldCollege, Oxford and a Fellow of the British Academy.His main area of research is social stratification.His two current research projects are concerned withproblems of education-based meritocracy and withsocial status and cultural consumption. He is alsointerested in the closer integration of sociologicalresearch and theory. The second, two-volume editionof his book, On Sociology, is published by StanfordUniversity Press.

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