Class analysis from a normative perspective*

Adam Swift

Class analysis from a normative perspective*

ABSTRACT

Distinguishing between an explanatory and a normative interest in social strati� -

cation, this paper considers the relation between class analysis and the value ofequality. Starting from the familiar distinction between (in)equality of positionand (in)equality of opportunity, and noting the extent to which mobilityresearch focuses on the latter, it suggests that class positions can themselves becharacterized in terms of the opportunities they yield to those occupying them.This enables the clear identi� cation of the kinds of inequality that are and arenot addressed by research � ndings presented in terms of class categories andodds ratios. The signi� cance of those � ndings from a normative perspective isthen discussed, and their limitations are emphasized – though the paper alsoexplains in what ways they are indeed of normative relevance.

KEYWORDS: Class analysis; equality; opportunity; social mobility; socialstrati� cation; social justice

INTRODUCTION

There are, crudely, two reasons to be interested in social strati� cation. Onthe one hand, there is a normative interest in the distribution of bene� tsand burdens within a population. To what extent are particular goods, oropportunities to achieve goods, unequally distributed between members ofa society, and can that distribution be justi� ed? On the other, there is anexplanatory interest in social inequality. What explains, or is explained by,that distribution? Of course, the two are intimately related. Normativeassessment of inequalities depends upon information about both themechanisms by which they were generated and their effects. Sociologists,however value-free their research may be in other ways, are typically –perhaps always – interested in explaining phenomena that they take to beof normative concern. But the distinction is useful none the less, if onlybecause the conceptualizations and measurements most appropriate for

British Journal of Sociology Vol. No. 51 Issue No. 4 (December 2000) pp. 663–679© 2000 London School of Economics and Political Science ISSN 0007 1315 print/1468-4446 onlinePublished by Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd on behalf of the LSEDOI: 10.1080/00071310020015316

those motivated by an interest in one perspective may differ from thosemost appropriate for those concerned with the other. One aim of thispaper is to make clear the limitations, for the investigation of normativeissues, of the kind of class analysis primarily associated with Erikson andGoldthorpe but widely practised throughout European social strati� cationresearch. The conceptualization and measurement of their categories hasprimarily been informed by an explanatory rather than a normative inter-

est.In the past decade, prompted by critics (e.g. Pahl 1989; Sorensen 1991),

the explanatory claims of this kind of class analysis have been identi� ed,and its explanatory power defended, with some precision and cogency(Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992). While some may be disappointed by thisdefence (Pahl 1993; Holton 1994; Crompton 1996), the clear lesson toemerge is that such analysis is a narrower, or more carefully speci� ed,research programme than some had realized. Simultaneously, there hasbeen increased attention to the investigation and speci�cation of themechanisms – or ‘causal narratives’ – that generate the associations empiri-cally identi� ed (e.g. Breen and Rottman 1995; Evans 1993; Goldthorpe1996). This welcome clari� cation and speci� cation facilitates serious intel-lectual exchange and scienti� c advance – claim and relevant counter-claim– rather than confusion and misunderstanding.

There have been analogous developments on the normative side. Inresponse to Peter Saunders (1995, 1996), colleagues and I have exploredhow the findings of research into social mobility relate to questions ofmeritocracy and social justice (Marshall and Swift 1993; Marshall andSwift 1996; Swift and Marshall 1997; Marshall et al. 1997). In response toothers (Hellevik 1997; Ringen 1997), we have sought to make clear whatkinds of inequality odds ratios as used by class analysts do and do notmeasure (Marshall and Swift 1999). This paper is intended as a furtherstep in this direction. Many attend to the sociological research in ques-

tion because of their interest in understanding the social processes thatmake for inequality of a normatively troubling kind, in particular becauseof a commitment to the value of equality of opportunity.1 Some inferfrom its findings claim about the success or failure of state policies toachieve their aims. Given the moral and practical significance of theresults, it is important to be clear about what kinds of distributive con -

clusions can and cannot be established by means of this kind of analysis.Going beyond the correction of misunderstanding or misrepresentationby critics, this paper aims to specify still more precisely what it is that classanalysis using odds ratios does and does not tell us about. As on theexplanatory side, this kind of careful specification is conducive to effi-cient intellectual progress.

Those who have considered the normative implications of this kind ofmobility research have insisted on the importance of the distinctionbetween equality of position and equality of opportunity or access (Mar-

shall et al. 1997: 13–15) and have, from the beginning (Goldthorpe et al.

664 Adam Swift

1980: 252), taken themselves to be looking behind the absolute bene� ts ofeconomic development to consider the distribution of those bene� ts. Thisexplains the signi� cance they attach to their �nding that, despite substan-

tial amounts of absolute mobility, and a preponderance of upward overdownward mobility, relative mobility rates of the kind measured by oddsratios have remained essentially unchanged over time, and differ remark-

ably little between industrial societies. This emphasis on relativities hasattracted a good deal of criticism, almost all of it misplaced. If we careabout equality of any kind, then we cannot avoid an interest in compari-sons and relativities (Marshall and Swift 1996). But good questions remain.Should we be interested, normatively, in equality of any kind? If so, to whatextent do class categories and odds ratios facilitate its investigation?2

EQUALITY OF WHAT BETWEEN WHOM?

Among various propositions outlined in a previous paper (Marshall andSwift 1999) are the following

(1) Odds ratios measure the statistical probability of members of onesub-group having some characteristic and not having another, relative tothe statistical probability of members of another group having and nothaving those same characteristics. There is nothing problematically ‘rel-ativistic’ about such measures.(2) Odds ratios thus make no attempt to capture the extent to whichthere is inequality of position between sub-groups, or between charac-

teristics. For example, the extent of the money (or any other) gapbetween members of the middle and working class could change overtime, or be different between societies, without there being any changeor difference in the odds ratios used to measure the distribution ofchances for various kinds of social mobility between those class positions.

Let me begin to go beyond these preliminary clari� cations by urgingpedantry. To maintain precision and clarity, claims about equality andinequality should be presented, or at least conceived, in terms of thefollowing formula

x is (un)equal to y with respect to (or in terms of) z

Whenever we make a claim about equality or inequality, it should always beclear – whether explicitly or implicitly – who or what is being said to be(un)equal to whom, and with respect to, or in terms of, what it is that theyare being said to be (un)equal. Talk about ‘class inequality’, withoutfurther speci� cation, is careless. Are we being told about the gap, in � nan-

cial or any other terms, between adults in different class positions? Aboutthe unequal chances of children born to those adults achieving and avoid-

ing different class outcomes? Or what?Where claims are made about the distribution of opportunities, or

Class analysis from a normative perspective 665

chances, it is similarly important to specify what these are opportunities for.Then the formula is

x is unequal to y with respect to (or in terms of), the opportunity to get(or to become) z

Even where we know who are said to be unequal with respect to oppor-

tunity, it must also be clear what it is that they are said to have unequalopportunities to get or become.

OPPORTUNITY FOR WHAT?

Clari� cation (2) reminds us that class categories are only indirect andordinal measures of that which, because it is distributed unequally betweenclasses, allows us to say that classes are unequal with respect to position.3

For this reason, the actual amount of the good(s) in question possessed bythose occupying different class positions, and the extent of the inequalitybetween them, will not show up in odds ratios of this kind, and may changeover time (or may be different across societies). This is important becauseit will have implications for the extent to which members of the differentclasses have equality of opportunity to achieve those goods.

Figure I illustrates the following wholly hypothetical example. In 1900,50 per cent of the population live in working-class households and have astandard of living at level 1, while 20 per cent live in middle-class house-

holds and have a standard of living at level 4.4 In 2000, the working class is30 per cent of the population who have a standard of living at level 4, whilethe middle class is 50 per cent of the population who have a standard ofliving at level 6. Over the hundred years, the following things have hap-

pened:

(i) the working class has shrunk and the middle class has expanded;(ii) the standards of living of both classes have increased substantially inabsolute terms;(iii) the working-class standard of living has, by 2000, risen to a levelequal to that enjoyed by the middle class in 1900;(iv) the absolute gap in terms of standard of living between the twoclasses has decreased;(v) the ratio of the middle-class standard of living to the working-classstandard of living has decreased.

Comparing these two situations, mobility analysts concerned solely with thedistribution of opportunities to achieve middle-class positions and to avoidworking-class positions might construct their odds ratios and conclude thatthere has been no change. There are more opportunities to achievemiddle-class jobs and avoid working-class jobs than there used to be,working-class children have a better chance of achieving middle-class jobsand avoiding working-class ones than they used to. But these changes result

666 Adam Swift

from changes in the shape of the class structure. The information given inFigure I, and spelled out in statements (i) – (v), tells us nothing about thedistribution, between those born into different classes, of the opportunitiesto achieve and avoid these different class positions. In terms of ourformula, there could have been no change in the extent of the inequalitybetween those born into working-class households (x) and those born intomiddle-class households (y) with respect to the opportunity to achieve amiddle-class destination and avoid a working-class one (z).

But it would be a mistake to conclude that, while there has been a reduc-

tion in inequality of position between the two classes, there has been noreduction in inequality of opportunity tout court. Being born working ormiddle class may make as much difference as ever to one’s relative chanceof achieving and avoiding middle- and working-class destinations, but itdoes not make as much difference as ever to one’s relative chance of

Class analysis from a normative perspective 667Standard of living

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020

Date

KEY Working class

Middle class

FIGURE I: Class sizes and standards of living: hypothetical changes

gaining (at least) a particular standard of living. The distribution of oppor-

tunities to do that is much more equal than it used to be.There are two distinct points here. First, the distribution of oppor-

tunities to achieve some things may be more equal simply as a result of thefact that those in working-class households are better off in absolute termsthan they used to be – and not at all because members of the two classesare more equal in terms of position. Assuming any inequality in mobilitychances, middle-class children in 1900 had a better chance of achieving astandard of living at level 4 than did working-class children. But in 2000children from both classes have the same chance of achieving (at least)that level. So, in 2000 there is equality of opportunity, between those ofdifferent class origins, to achieve (at least) that standard of living, purely asa result of the absolute increase in living standards throughout the society.Here what it is that people of different class origins have more equality ofopportunity to achieve is something characterized in absolute terms.

Second, inequalities in the opportunity to achieve some things can dimin-

ish speci� cally because the standards of living enjoyed by members ofdifferent classes are less unequal over time. Even if the distribution of classmobility chances remains constant, the opportunity to achieve a standardof living at least 2/3 of that enjoyed by the middle class comes to be dis-

tributed more equally over time. In 1900, only those who made it into, orstayed in, the middle class achieved this outcome, but in 2000 even thosewho stayed immobile in the working class did so. Here those of differentclass origins have more equal opportunity than they did to achieve some-

thing that is itself characterized in relative terms.5

It should be clear, then, how the possibility of changes over time (ordifferences between societies) in the extent to which there is inequality ofposition between those classi� ed as members of different classes affects thesigni� cance of odds ratios even as measures of the distribution of opportunities.It is perfectly appropriate to call ‘social � uidity’ or ‘openness’ that whichclass mobility odds ratios tell us has not increased over time. But it isimportant to realize that such ratios tell us solely and speci� cally aboutmovement between class positions. This raises the question of why oneshould be interested in the extent to which societies manifest this particu-

lar kind of equality – equality of opportunity between those of differentclass origins (x and y) to achieve and avoid different class positions (z) –rather than in the extent to which societies manifest equality of oppor-

tunity, perhaps between other sub-groups, to achieve and avoid otherthings. Why not go for more direct, and cardinal, measures of that which isdistributed less or more equally, and that which people may have less ormore equality of opportunity to achieve?6

Because of the change in the relative size of the classes between 1900and 2000, Figure I illustrates another point. Odds ratios constructed interms of class categories pay no attention to the question of how manypeople actually occupy the different class positions, either as origins or asdestinations. They are explicitly intended to be measures of association

668 Adam Swift

or inequality that are independent of the structure of positions withinwhich the associating processes, or the inequalities in allocative mechan -

isms, occur. However small the disadvantaged class, one can still sensiblycompare the chances of those born into it achieving more advantagedoutcomes, and avoiding less advantaged ones, with the chances of thoseborn into more advantaged classes, and the degree of inequality in thosechances can clearly remain the same. But one cannot, without explicitassumption or further argument, take findings about the extent ofinequality of opportunity as between those of different class origins tolicense conclusions about the extent of inequality of opportunity in thesociety as a whole. Mechanisms of allocation can be as biased againstworking-class children as they ever were, but if fewer and fewer childrenare born working class, this must surely make a difference to our judg-

ments about the extent to which the society as a whole denies itsmembers equality of opportunity.7 Again, then, clarity is aided by speci-fying precisely who is being said to be unequal to whom, and with respectto what.

POSITIONS AS BUNDLES OF OPPORTUNITIES

There is an important distinction between inequality of position, on theone hand, and inequality of opportunity to achieve positions that maythemselves be less or more equal, on the other. In one society, members ofdifferent sub-groups of the population might have an equal chance ofachieving positions that are very unequal to one another, while in anotherthey might have very unequal chances of achieving positions that arealmost equal to one another. But not all opportunities are opportunities toachieve less or more equal positions. Some opportunities are constitutive ofthe positions themselves. That is, the positions that people may have less ormore equality of opportunity to achieve can themselves be regarded asbundles of opportunities. The confusion to which this ambiguity may leadis best averted by precise and careful speci� cation of what it is that a personis said to have the opportunity to do.

Social positions can be characterized in terms of the ‘opportunities’ theyyield to their possessors where these are not opportunities to climb thesocial ladder but constituents of the individual rungs. Indeed, what makesone position better or worse than another will precisely be the oppor-

tunities, in this second sense, afforded to those who occupy them. Twopeople, from different class backgrounds, may have unequal opportunitiesto achieve a position that can itself be understood as a bundle of oppor-

tunities – such as the opportunity to go on holiday, buy goods, exerciseauthority over others at work – or whatever. Rich people have more oppor-

tunity to buy things than do poor people, and this remains so even if they,or their children, have exactly the same opportunity to achieve positionsless or more � nancially advantaged than the ones they currently occupy.


Because they do not attend to the extent of the inequality of positionbetween class positions, mobility researchers tell us nothing about thedistribution of opportunities in this second – constitutive of rung – sense.

It has for some time been apparent, in the political-philosophical litera-

ture on distributive justice, that even the kind of egalitarian who caresabout equality of position, and not just about equality of opportunity (toachieve less or more unequal positions), will do best to formulate the kindof equality she cares about as some kind of equality of opportunity oraccess – to buy goods, to do the things she might want to do, or whatever.This is because it seems to make sense to care not about whether people doin fact get an equal share of goods, or equal levels of happiness, or what-

ever, but about their feasible set – whether such an equal share is in theappropriate sense available to them. (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989).8 So dis-

tributing resources equally, for example, which is typically regarded asequalizing ‘positions’ should rather be regarded as equalizing ‘oppor-

tunities’ (or ‘opportunity-sets’).Even if there is no change in the pattern of movement between positions

(indeed even if there is no movement whatsoever), there can be changesover time (or differences between societies) in the extent to which differ-

ent positions, such as class positions, are unequal with respect to any metricof advantage. This reduction in inequality of position can itself be charac-

terized as a reduction in the extent of inequality of opportunity. So, forexample, there can be a reduction in inequality of opportunity to buythings even if there is no reduction in inequality of opportunity to achievethe positions characterizable in terms of the opportunities to buy thingsyielded to those who occupy them. Conversely, there can be a reduction inthe inequality of opportunity to achieve the positions characterizable interms of the opportunities to buy things yielded to those who occupy them,even if there is no reduction in the extent to which the different outcomepositions yield their possessors unequal opportunities to buy things. Every-

thing turns on a precise speci� cation of the kind of opportunity we aretalking about.

The fact that one can translate talk about inequality of position oroutcome into talk about inequality of opportunity makes it particularlyimportant clearly to specify claims about changes, or lack of them, ininequality of opportunity. Those who claim that there has been no reduc-

tion in inequality of opportunity must specify both who is being said to beno less unequal to whom and the kind of opportunity which they claim tobe no less unequally distributed. The distinction between inequality ofoutcome and inequality of opportunity is not the end of the story, becauseoutcomes are themselves bundles of opportunities.9

670 Adam Swift

A COMBINED MEASURE?

Why should one be interested in the distribution of opportunities toachieve and avoid different class destinations rather than in the distri-bution of the opportunities constitutive of those destinations? Presumablyit is the latter that actually matter – presumably, where we care aboutpeople having equal opportunity to achieve relatively advantaged class pos-

itions (and avoid relatively disadvantaged ones), we do so because of thekind of ‘constitutive of rung’ opportunities afforded to those occupyingdifferent class destinations. In that case, why should we show any interestin the distribution of the former? Provided that opportunities of the kindthat matter are being distributed more equally, does persisting and rela-

tively unchanging inequality in the distribution of opportunities to achieveand avoid unequally advantaged class destinations have any real signi� -

cance, even for an egalitarian?10

We started by distinguishing between (a) (in)equality of position and(b) (in)equality of opportunity to achieve unequal positions. But recog-

nizing that inequality between positions can itself be characterized in termsthat refer to inequalities of another kind of opportunity possessed by thosewho occupy those positions points us towards a way of combining these twokinds of inequality into a single measure. We would then have a moreprecise and common currency in terms of which to assess the extent towhich societies manifest equality, and to measure changes over time ordifferences between societies.

Children from different class backgrounds can have unequal oppor-

tunities to achieve and avoid different class destinations and, to simplify, letus say that those different destinations are themselves constituted byunequal amounts of money, hence, ceteris paribus, unequal opportunities tobuy goods.11 In principle, then, for each member of a society, we can cal-culate her expected outcome in terms of money (hence opportunities tobuy the things money can buy). This will be a function of the various prob-

abilities of her achieving the various class positions, and the variousamounts of money characterizing those different class positions. A measureof the overall extent of inequality of opportunity to buy goods, as betweenthose born into different classes, would be the gap between the expectedoutcome of the average working-class child and the expected outcome ofthe average middle-class child. On this kind of measure, a society with highmobility rates but large gaps between classes could achieve the same overall‘index of inequality’ as a society with low mobility rates and small gapsbetween classes. This could be used to measure changes in the ‘index ofinequality’ over time, or to compare different societies. Assuming that theextent of money inequality between those non-mobile in working-class andmiddle-class positions has reduced since 1900, this index would permit oneto say that, even though relative class mobility chances had not changed,overall inequality of opportunity to buy the goods that money can buy,between those born into different classes, had indeed diminished during


that period. Assuming that the extent of money inequality between classpositions is less in Poland than in England, it would permit one to say that,even though relative class mobility chances are the same, opportunities tobuy the things that money can buy are more equally distributed, as betweenthose from different classes of origin, in Poland than they are in England.12

In terms of the conventional distinction, such a measure would be sensi-tive both to inequalities of opportunity and to inequalities of outcome. Forsomeone who cares about inequality, this measure, combining both theextent of inequality of opportunity to achieve various outcome positionsand the extent of inequality of position between those positions, looks likea good measure of the kind of inequality that they should care about.13

WHICH INEQUALITIES MATTER, IF ANY?

One aim of this paper is to distinguish between different kinds of inequal-ity in order to help our thinking about which of them matters, normativelyspeaking. But it is not clear that inequality of any kind is what reallymatters. Many of those who object to a kind of inequality, or who argue fora more egalitarian distribution of certain things, do so for reasons that arenot, at root, reasons of equality. If one advocates � nancial redistributionbecause one believes that the poor but not the rich need the money, orthat those who have least should get as much as possible, then one’s reasonis not a reason of equality. In the � rst case, one believes that people shouldget what they need. In the second, one believes that the advantage of theworst-off should be maximized. In neither case is one an egalitarian. To bethat one has to care not about the absolute amount people get, nor thatthey have enough to meet some basic threshold of adequacy; but that theyget an equal, or at least a less unequal, amount than one another. Politicaltheorists have explored in some details whether it makes sense to careabout equality as opposed to these other things (Raz 1986: 217–44; Frank-

furt 1987; Par� t 1998).Let us distinguish three different things that might matter from a nor-

mative point of view:

(i) the absolute level of advantage enjoyed by people (perhaps the worst-

off, perhaps the average; perhaps one cares that they have an adequateor suf� cient amount of good things, perhaps one cares that they have asmuch as possible);(ii) the extent to which valued goods are distributed equally betweenthose in different social positions;(iii) the extent to which the opportunity to achieve social positionscharacterized by the possession of less or more of those goods is distrib-

uted equally.

The � rst has nothing to do with equality at all. Faced with the research � nd-

ings of class analysts, someone insisting on the importance of (i) might say

672 Adam Swift

I accept that goods are not distributed very equally in our society, and itmay even be the case that they are not being distributed more equallyover time. Moreover, I accept that opportunities or chances to achievepositions where one gets less or more goods are not distributed veryequally, and you may even be right to claim they are not being distrib-

uted more equally over time either. But why this hang-up with equality?It’s quite consistent with your � ndings that (a) the absolute position ofthose in all classes has improved considerably so even those who are notmobile up from the working class are far better off in absolute termsthan were their parents and (b) economic development has generatedso much ‘room at the top’ that children of working-class parents have afar better chance of upward mobility than did their parents. It is true thatthere are two kinds of equality that we haven’t got and that we may noteven be getting more of. But the way to judge a society is to see whetherit is able to give its members what matters, what matters is increasingliving standards all round (or perhaps particularly for the worst-off), andincreasing chances for children of the disadvantaged to move up in theworld. On that score, there has been substantial progress.14

Contrast this with the person who favours (ii), who might say

Unlike the advocate of (i), I really do care about equality and not justabout absolute improvements (not even when those are improvementsin the position of the worst-off). I accept that your odds ratios show thatthe distribution of opportunities to achieve and avoid different class pos-

itions has not become more equal. But why this hang-up with mobilitybetween classes? For all you have told us, the gap in what matters – let’scall it money – between those ending up in different class positionscould have been getting smaller. If that were the case, and since thedistribution of money is itself a measure of the distribution of oppor-

tunities to buy things, that means that the distribution of those oppor-

tunities – the ones that matter – would have been getting more equal.

To advocates of (i), one might respond by insisting on the normativeimportance of who exactly is claimed to be bene� ting from the ‘generalbetterment’, and, if it is indeed the least advantaged, whether they are ben-

e� ting, over time, to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, it might sen-

sibly be argued that – whichever aspect of absolute improvement one caresabout – greater equalization of mobility chances is likely rather to promotethan to impede it. It might be perverse to focus on changes over time inthe distribution of mobility chances rather than on changes in the absoluteposition of the worst off, but the distribution of mobility chances could stillbe important as a measure of the extent to which the society allows itsmembers to compete on equal terms, in a way conducive to the very econ-

omic growth that tends, over time, to bene� t the worst off (Swift and Mar-

shall 1997). Equality of opportunity of the kind that mobility theoristsinvestigate would, on this view, be valuable as a means rather than an end.But it would be valuable, and worth measuring, none the less.


Two points about this response are worthy of note. First, it involves anempirical claim about the likely consequences of reduced inequalitybetween those of differing class origins in the mechanisms allocating themto different class destinations. It is, in principle, possible for the goal ofequalizing opportunities for social mobility as between those of differentclass origins, to con� ict with, rather than contribute to, the goal of maxi-mizing the opportunities available to the least advantaged members ofsociety. The resources that would be spent on social policies aimed atensuring that children’s class of origin made no difference to their chanceof achieving an advantaged destination might more ef�ciently be used toimprove the position of less advantaged children in other ways (Clayton1997: 233–91; Arneson 1999). The response offered supposes that, atpresent, greater equalization of those opportunities that class analystsmeasure would improve the position of the worst off. This depends on awide range of empirical factors, including how the more advantagedrespond in their economic activity to measures aimed at reducing the bias.For example, abolishing private education might make for greater equal-ization of mobility chances, but if its abolition resulted in those with highproductive potential losing an important incentive to produce, then suchan equalization might come at the cost of the absolute advantage of theworst-off.

Second, the worst-off members of society are not the working class, asthat class is constructed in the Erikson and Goldthorpe class scheme.Although the least advantaged class in that scheme, there are people worseoff than those living in working-class households. If there were not, onecould not invoke working-class aversion to the risk of downward mobility inexplanation of educational differentials by class (Breen and Goldthorpe1997). Those who defend the relevance of class analysis in the instrumentalterms offered need to be clear about who is being claimed to bene� t, inabsolute terms, from the kind of equality of opportunity that they measure.The position of the working class could be improving over time while theposition of those beneath them deteriorates.

Unlike the � rst, the second challenge does take seriously the value ofequality – what it rejects is a particular conception of what should be equal-ized: class mobility chances. Constant inequality or bias in the mechanismsallocating those from different class origins to different class destinations,as measured by odds ratios, is compatible with reduced inequality in thekind of opportunities that characterize those destinations. If inequality inthe latter is diminishing, does it matter, normatively speaking, if inequalityin the former is not?

The response to this second challenge depends less on empirical con-

tingency. How could reducing inequality or bias in the processes by whichthose of different class origins come to achieve different class outcomes failto contribute to a reduction in class inequality of the kind that our secondchallenger would wish to reduce? As noted above, overall measures ofinequality of opportunity to (e.g.) buy goods are going to combine (a)

674 Adam Swift

chances of movement between positions characterized by different levels ofopportunity to buy goods and (b) the amount of opportunity to buy goodsthat constitute those different positions. Where, in the previous response,the claim was that increased social � uidity, and reduced odds ratios ofother kinds, were likely to be a means to the goal of maximizing the absol-ute position of the worst off, here the claim is that, ceteris paribus, increased� uidity is itself going to be part of the equalization of opportunities to buygoods between those of different class origins.

CONCLUSION

I have, I hope, provided an analysis of the concept of equality facilitatingthe precise speci� cation of claims formulated in terms of that concept;identi� ed which kinds of inequality are and are not addressed by researchusing the Erikson/Goldthorpe class scheme and odds ratios; shown howeach kind of inequality can be formulated in terms of a claim about thedistribution of opportunities, thereby providing a clearer and morefocused exposition of the differences between them; and made explicitsome of the normative issues implicitly at stake between those engaging inthis kind of research and their critics.

Comparing those from different class origins: everybody can be gettingbetter off, there can be more chances of upward mobility, the gaps betweenthe positions that members of the two groups tend to end up in can begetting smaller, the distribution of opportunities to achieve absolute levelsof goods can be getting more equal. More equal, also, can be both thedistribution of opportunities to achieve (e.g.) a level two-thirds that of thebest-off class and the distribution of opportunities to buy goods. All of thiscan happen without any increase in social � uidity between class positions,without any greater equalization of the distribution of opportunities toachieve those. So why, from a normative point of view, focus on this par-

ticular aspect of social strati� cation?I have attempted to justify the normative signi� cance of the � ndings of

mobility analyses, and other forms of class analysis, involving odds ratios.But I have not sought to conceal the complexities involved in such a justi� -

cation. To those who do not value equality (of any kind) per se, I have sug-

gested that social � uidity matters only instrumentally – in so far as it is ameans to the goal of maximally improving the absolute position of theworst off members of society (or whatever other absolute improvementthey regard as normatively relevant). To those who do care about equality,but who also care about the distribution of things like opportunities to buygoods, social � uidity is an important part of the story. But it is only part. Acomplete analysis of the distribution of those opportunities would involvereference to the size of the gaps between class positions as well as the extentof the movement between them.

In any case, whether one cares about absolutes or relativities, it is a


further question why the absolute position or comparison one should beinterested in is that captured by empirical � ndings about class categories.Erikson and Goldthorpe prefer their class analysis approach to the ‘Ameri-can Dream’ that seeks parsimoniously to model mobility regimes within aprimarily hierarchical perspective. This is because they wish ‘to be able totreat adequately the effects on mobility of the structural development ofnational economies’ and to make their analysis of mobility ‘as relevant aspossible to the work of other sociologists – and of social historians – pri-marily interested in questions of class formation and decomposition, thelinkages between class structures and educational systems and the classbases of political beliefs, values, and action’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe1992b: 284). It is in this sense that their interest is explanatory rather thannormative. Since, however, inequalities between class positions contributeto the explanation of these class-related phenomena, it should be clear thatdistributive issues – and detailed speci� cation of the various kinds ofinequality that distinguish class positions from one another – remain cru-

cially relevant even to class analysis as an explanatory project.15

(Date accepted: May 2000) Adam SwiftBalliol College

University of Oxford

NOTES

676 Adam Swift

* I am grateful to Diego Gambetta,John Goldthorpe, and an anonymousreferee, for their helpful suggestions.

1. In his seminal study, Goldthorpesays that he is interested in mobility for twodistinct reasons. On the one hand, he hasa positive interest in mobility ‘in so far as itis associated with greater openness: that isto say, with a tendency towards greaterequality of chances of access, for indi-viduals of all social origins, to positions dif-ferently located within the social divisionof labour’, and this kind of equality itself isvalued for its relation to the realization ofpeople’s full potentialities. On the other,and ‘of prior importance’, he is interestedin mobility because of its implications for‘class formation and class action’(Goldthorpe et al. 1980: 27–30). SinceGoldthorpe’s dual interest corresponds tomy ‘explanatory vs normative’ distinction,it is worth remarking that one reasonoffered for his interest in class formationand class action is precisely his belief that

the attainment of greater openness is likelyto result only from class con� ict of somekind. In his case, the explanatory interestis itself, and despite his claim that it is ‘ofprior importance’, at least partly groundedin the normative.

2. I ignore the fact that, in being basedon data about the extent to which those ofdifferent class origins actually achieve andavoid particular class destinations (statisti-cal ‘chances’ or probabilities), thisresearch might seem unable to address theissue of the distribution of opportunities(‘chances’ as opportunities that peoplemight or might not (be able to) grasp).Adequate treatment of the issues raised bythat observation would require, inter alia,careful discussion of the vexed matter ofadaptive preferences. (See Marshall et al.(1997: 176–8) for some preliminary obser-

vations).3. This paper relates only to those class

categories representing positions that arebetter or worse, with respect to somemetric of advantage, than others. It is a

further drawback of the Erikson/Gold-

thorpe class scheme, from the point of viewof normative discussion of inequality, thatnot all classes can be conceived as hierar-

chically ordered, but the analysis hereapplies even where they can. For dis-

cussion of the implications of the non-

hierarchical aspects of that scheme for theissue of equality of opportunity, see Mar-

shall et al. (1997: 219–21).4. I use the term ‘standard of living’ as

an ordinary language placeholder forwhatever index of advantage or well-beingis regarded as normatively relevant. Ofcourse, constructing an operationalizablecardinal scale for that index will be a verydif� cult matter – especially if potentiallysubjective and comparative components,such as ‘contentment’, ‘self-respect’ or‘feelings of inferiority’, are to be included.In that case, depending on the weightinggiven to the various components, somepeople may be better educated, have moremoney, and be more healthy than theyused to be, but none the less be worse offoverall – simply because they are lesscontent, now feel inferior to those whohave even more than they do, and so on.Though creating practical problems, andcertainly complicating matters, these sub-

jective and relational aspects can, in prin-

ciple, be incorporated within an index ofadvantage, and do not touch the point ofthe analysis here.

5. At the suggestion of an anonymousreferee, it may be worth making clear that,although the hypothetical example refersto a case of constant odds ratios andreduced inequalities of other kinds, thepoints it makes apply equally to caseswhere things move in the opposite direc-

tion. Origin-destination odds ratios mighthave remained constant over some periodof time even though the inequality inaverage income between class destinationsduring that period might have increased.

6. There are two distinct issues here.On the one hand, one can query thechoice of x and y: why the focus on inequal-ities of opportunity as between those ofdifferent class origins? On the other, onecan query the choice of z: why the focuson inequalities of opportunity to achieveand avoid different class destinations?Erikson and Goldthorpe’s answers to both

questions derives from their explanatoryinterest in processes of class formation.From their perspective, constructing anordinal scale of ‘advantage’ misses thepoint that occupations ranking closetogether on such a scale may well be dif-ferently located in the economic and socialstructure, and thus misses the structuralprocesses that explain the development ofthe class structure (Erikson and Gold-

thorpe 1992a: 30–1, 34, 45).7. Hellevik (1997: 387) and Ringen

(1997: 142) notice this point, though theformer confuses it with other, mistaken,objections.

8. On some views, to give people equalopportunity -sets just is to give them equaloutcomes, all goods considered. If some-

body chooses leisure over work, and endsup with less money than somebody whomakes the opposite choice, the resultshould not be thought of as inequality ofoutcome money-and leisure considered.They simply have different, but ex hypothesiequal, overall bundles of money-and-

leisure (Barry 1989: 224), (Cohen 1995:165–6).

9. The concept of ‘life-chances’ is simi-larly vague and in need of speci� cation.Does this refer to a person’s chances forimproving her position, or the chancesthat constitute her current position? If wecare about equality of life-chances shouldwe be looking at rates of mobility betweenpositions, at the extent of inequality of pos-

ition between positions – in, say, money, orhealth terms – or, as suggested in the nextsection, at both?

10. It might do if we were consideringthe association between class and edu-

cation. To simplify the exposition of itscore theses, this paper presents them onlyin terms of that case where both origin andoutcome variables are class categories (i.e.mobility research stricto sensu). With anoutcome variable like education, thingsare more complicated. In that case, andbecause of the extent to which it is a posi-tional good, ‘what matters’ might be lessthe distribution of educational oppor-

tunities in the ‘constitutive-of-rung’ senseand more the distribution of opportunitiesto achieve and avoid higher and lowerrungs. Even if the absolute ‘knowledge’gap between those leaving school at the


� rst opportunity and those acquiring uni-versity degrees had reduced over a periodof time, the positional aspect of educationmeans that this might not be of much help,in terms of inequality in the kind of oppor-

tunity that matters – such as to achieve andavoid better or worse rewarded jobs (andthe bundles of opportunities that they rep-

resent). But this reason to care about rela-

tive chances of achieving differentoutcome levels, without so much regard tothe size of the absolute gap between thoselevels, is speci� c to education and cannotbe invoked to justify the neglect of suchgaps in the case of other ‘outcome’ vari-ables.

11. It bears repeating that this is just asimplifying assumption. My analysis holdsfor any metric, however multi-dimensionalor composite, that conceives advantage interms of opportunities.

12. Cf. Sorensen (1991: 75): ‘the valueof being in a certain class depends on therewards obtained in that class and on theopportunities for moving to other classeswith their rewards’. Sorensen, however,thinks that the logic of Erikson andGoldthorpe’s argument means that theyshould be using a measure of this kind inthe construction of class categories. Mysuggestion is only that it provides a betterindex of the extent to which those borninto different classes of origin can be saidto have unequal opportunities – all oppor-

tunities considered.13. Again (cf. fn.6), it is, from a nor-

mative perspective, a further questionwhy one should care about inequalitybetween those born into different socialclasses – rather than between peoplecharacterized or categorized in other ways– at all.

14. This is a charitable construal ofSaunders’ (1990) emphasis on generalbetterment though it is not clear that hewould give any particular emphasis to thewell-being of the least advantaged. Noticethat, in accordance with one of the pointsto emerge from the discussion of my hypo-

thetical example, even this position couldbe given the following egalitarian twist:‘Moreover, general betterment has beensufficient to ensure greater equality ofopportunity to achieve particular levels ofadvantage. Isn’t that enough? You think

that I fail to see that equality is an inher-

ently comparative notion. This is mistaken,for I am interested in some comparisonsbetween people. But what I think weshould compare are people’s chances ofachieving particular absolute outcomes,and you accept that general bettermentdoes equalize some of those. What I objectto in your emphasis on relativities is not somuch that you compare the chances ofadvantage between different groups –though I do think it odd to care about suchcomparisons rather than, say, the absoluteposition of the least advantaged – but thatwhat you compare their chances for is itselfcharacterized in relative terms’.

15. Even so-called ‘relational’ attrib-

utes, which class analysts going back toMarx have tended to regard as moreimportant or fundamental than merely‘distributional’ phenomena, can perfectlywell be incorporated into a metric ofadvantage, the distribution of which canthen be identified and analysed. Forexample, it may be true that the character-

istic of ‘being subordinate to others’ direc-

tives at work’ is relational in the sense thatit necessarily refers to a person’s relation toothers. But it is also an attribute possessedby some and not others and can, if sodesired, be regarded as a component ofthe metric used to chart the distribution ofadvantage in society.

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Class analysis from a normative perspective*

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