Clarifying Influence in the Network Society: A Critical Investigation of Programming and Switching

Kari Ann Bakalar

3 January 2008

International Masters Course: Masters Project

Advisor: Michael Kristiansson

Total Words: 24166

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Table of Contents Page #

1. Abstract............................................................................................................................. 3

2. Problem Formulation, Goals, and Methodology ……………………………………...... 3

3. A New Society.................................................................................................................. 6

3.1. A New Organizational Pattern: Networks......................................................... 7

3.2. A New Logic: Inclusion/Exclusion................................................................... 11

3.3. A New Conflict: The Net vs. the Self............................................................... 12

4. Knowledge Management in the Network Society............................................................ 14

5. Question 1: Where Is Power? .......................................................................................... 16

5.1. Uncontrollable Logic and Meta-Social Disorder.............................................. 17

5.2. Who Are the Capitalists?....................................………………………........... 19

5.3. Structure & Agency........................................................................................... 21

6. Question 2: What is Power?.............................................................................................. 25

6.1. Problems with Programming and Switching: Stalder's Critiques...................... 29

6.2. The Consequences of Separating Programming and Switching........................ 32

7. Reformulating Power in the Network Society.................................................................. 37

8. The Clues to Programming: Identity & Culture............................................................... 39

9. Power & Identity in Discourse.......................................................................................... 42

9.1. The Principles of Discourse……………………………..…...………….......... 43

9.2. Power of Articulation: Hegemony..................................................................... 47

10. Creative Destruction: From Culture to Discourse.......................................................... 48

10.1. Articulating Identity........................................................................................ 49

10.2. Hegemony: The Articulation of Value............................................................ 53

11. Towards a Solid Theoretical Foundation........................................................................ 56

11.1. What Is Power? Articulation as Programming and Switching........................ 57

11.2. Where Is Power? Multi-directional Interaction............................................... 58

11.3. Theoretical Integrity........................................................................................ 61

12. Conclusions.................................................................................................................... 63

13. References...................................................................................................................... 68

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1. Abstract

Manuel Castells' theory of the network society raises the following question for knowledge

management theorists and practitioners: How can businesses and organizations manage their

participation in networks to improve their knowledge utilization, generation, and sharing practices?

However, this question presupposes that the knowledge management theorist knows to what extent

organizations are capable of influencing the activities taking place in networks, and that he or she

also has a clear understanding and description of the practices which manifest this influence. Yet,

Castells does not provide a clear and obviously consistent theoretical foundation for understanding

influence in the network society upon which one can ground these two premises. This paper

represents a critical examination of this insufficiency as well as an attempt to build a theoretical

foundation adequate to the knowledge management theorist's task by drawing upon Castells'

discussion of the processes of programming and switching and additional insights from Laclau and

Mouffe's discourse theory. Therefore, the main questions guiding the analysis are: To what extent

are businesses and organizations capable of influencing the activities of networks, and how is

influence achieved?

2. Problem Formulation, Goals, and Methodology:

In the mid-90s, Manuel Castells published his trilogy: The Information Age: Economy,

Society and Culture, in which he claims that we have entered a new, and fundamentally different,

form of society: the Network Society. The trilogy met with great success, catapulting Castells'

academic career and sending him to the top of the list of most cited authors in the field of

communications studies, and to fourth place on the list of most cited authors in the social sciences

(University of Southern California Website 2007). At the same time, the field of knowledge

management was coming into its own, gaining popularity and drawing upon various sources in the

social sciences. Needless to say, the far reach of Castells' insights extends to knowledge

management theory. As knowledge management is broadly concerned with how organizations

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shape and direct their knowledge sharing and creation practices and how they can best do so, the

relevant question for knowledge management in light of Castells' revolutionary observations

becomes: How can businesses and organizations manage their participation in networks to improve

their knowledge utilization, generation, and sharing practices? In other words, how can businesses

and organizations evaluate and improve the benefits they receive from their participation in

networks?

But before we can attempt to answer this question, we need to ensure that we have the

theoretical foundation and understanding of the network society necessary to carry us through such

an investigation. More specifically, such an inquiry presupposes two things. The first is that we

know the extent to which businesses and organizations are capable of influencing the activities of

networks. The second is that we understand how influence functions in the network society and

how businesses and organizations participate in those influential practices. So, to be sure that we

have the necessary theoretical foundation, two questions must precede such an inquiry: 1) To what

extent are businesses and organizations theoretically capable of influencing the activities of

networks, and 2) how is influence achieved?

The goal of this paper is not to answer the first question – what are the best practices for

businesses and organizations to manage their influence on the dominant processes and functions of

the network society? – but rather to answer the two preceding, supporting questions in hopes of

providing the foundation necessary for additional investigation into the original problem. Therefore,

my analysis does not extend beyond a critical examination of Castells' theory as it relates to these

two issues and a proposal for a solution to the problems encountered there.

Throughout my analysis I take a constructivist, post-structuralist approach, drawing upon

criticisms presented in Felix Stalder's work, Manuel Castells and the Theory of the Network Society

(2006), to show the insufficiencies of the theoretical foundation Castells provides. Later in my

analysis, I propose the incorporation of discourse theory as it is presented in Hegemony and

Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe

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in order to introduce additional theoretical concepts which I argue help clarify the theory of power

Castells briefly presents in the concepts of programming and switching.

My methodology is as follows: I begin with a brief summary of Castells' main observations,

arguments and conclusions in order to ground my subsequent analysis. Then, I briefly discuss the

implications these observations have for knowledge management and situate the goals of this

analysis within it. Next, I present the first question guiding my analysis: to what extent are

businesses and organizations capable of influencing the activities of networks? I argue that Castells

does not provide a clear answer to this question; rather, he confuses the issue by describing

suspicions that the network society is nothing more than a meta-social disorder ruled by a meta-

network operating on an uncontrollable logic. Additionally, he seems to separate the influence of

human beings from the power of networks through his discussion of the power of social

movements.

From there, the analysis moves to the second question at hand: how is influence achieved?

Castells' response to this question is also unclear. Drawing upon critiques presented by Felix

Stalder, I show how Castells uses more than one definition of power throughout his analysis. The

first is insufficient to the task because it was formulated to describe a fundamentally different kind

of society. The second is a newly revised definition that understands power (or influence) to be the

processes of programming and switching; however, it is inadequately described and involves a

theoretical division that proves problematic upon further investigation. For these reasons, I

conclude that Castells does not provide the theoretical foundation necessary for the knowledge

management theorist's task.

The second half of this paper represents an attempt to create that foundation. I begin by

revealing my intention to use Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory to fill in the theoretical gaps

Castells leaves behind. Then, I re-examine Castells' own words, particularly those concerning the

role of identity and culture in the power of social movements, in order to identify clues as to the real

natures of programming and switching. Following this, I summarize the observations and

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conclusions of discourse theory so that I may apply its concepts to Castells' analysis of the feminist

movement, the gay/lesbian movement, and the environmental movement. In addition, I relate these

concepts to value creation in the network society, showing how it exemplifies the processes of

articulation and hegemonic struggle. My next step is to clarify how this analysis fills in the gaps of

the theory of the network society and leads us to more complete and consistent answers to the two

questions guiding my work. I end the second half of my investigation with a short discussion

recapping how discourse theory complements the theory of the network society before moving on

to my concluding statements.

Through this analysis I hope to expose a few theoretical weaknesses in Castells' theory of

the network society, particularly regarding its applicability and use-value for the field of knowledge

management, and to suggest a course toward a viable solution in the incorporation of concepts from

discourse theory.

3. A New Society

With the help of a varied background in law, economics, sociology, and the human sciences

(University of Southern California Website 2007), Castells draws on a vast set of empirical

observations to propose a comprehensive, descriptive theory of today's society in his trilogy, The

Information Age. In his critical analysis of Castells' work, Felix Stalder - a lecturer in media

economy at the Academy of Art and Design, Zurich and a researcher publishing in the area of

networked technologies and the development of Open Source technologies and culture – calls the

trilogy “...the lone contender as the grand narrative of the present” and notes that it signals “the

return of sociological macrotheory after years of postmodern pessimism about the possibility, or

even desirability, of such a project” (2006, p. 1). Because The Information Age is ambitious in both

scope and depth, it is often difficult to conceptualize as a whole. For this reason, the following

section of this paper outlines the most important observations and conclusions from the first two

books of the trilogy.

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3.1. A New Organizational Pattern: Networks

In the first book of his trilogy, The Rise of the Network Society (2000), Castells introduces

his main, “over-arching conclusion: as an historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the

Information Age are increasingly organized around networks” (2000, p. 500). Put another way, the

activities that define life today take place in networks. A little counter-intuitively, Castells claims

that it is this observation, and not a new emphasis on knowledge and information, that stands out as

the defining feature of the network society. According to Castells, information and knowledge have

always been important to society, just as innovation and development have always been important

(Castells 2000, p. 17). Instead, what makes the information age unique is exactly the very feature

that makes it a network society – the organization of dominant processes in networks. In other

words, it is not the new emphasis on, or importance of, information that has brought on a new age,

but a change in the processes of information and knowledge.

It is important to note that for Castells, the networking form of society is an historical trend,

not a necessary condition or result. Under different historical circumstances a different form of

society may have emerged and another societal form may yet succeed this one. Moreover, the

network society is not a stage in a series of evolutionary or progressive changes; society does not

necessarily shift from one form of organization to a higher, or better, form. Rather, Castells views

these shifts as historical occurrences without a sense of necessarily increasing value. A pre-existing,

or determined, course of progressive development does not exist. On the contrary,“...there is no

such thing as historical necessity, and there are no social laws to be uncovered” leaving the theory

of the network society “...open to the extreme” (Stalder 2006, p. 1). In other words, nothing is pre-

determined and Castells aims only to describe the state of human society. Never does he claim that

the network society must have developed to its particular form or that it will inevitably lead to

another identifiable and necessary level in the stages of “progress”. In this way, Castells takes an

explicitly non-deterministic stance while providing an historical framework for understanding the

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shift to the network society.

In describing this historical framework, Castells points out that the network society came

about under the presence of three historical conditions that allowed it, in its unique form, to take

hold. He attributes the possibility of the network society to “...the accidental coincidence, in the

1970s, of three independent processes”, namely, the restructuring of capitalism, the rise of strong

social movements, and the technological revolution (Castells 2004b, p. 21). Of these three, the

technological revolution, centring around advancements in telecommunications technologies,

receives the most significant treatment in The Rise of the Network Society, evident in the statement

that, “our society is characterized by the power embedded in information technology” (Castells

2004b, p. 7).

Telecommunications technologies changed in three significant ways to cause a technological

revolution. First, processing abilities increased in volume, complexity and speed, allowing

communication capabilities to also increase. Secondly, by going digital, today's technologies allow

information to be recombined into new forms and new information. Lastly, digitized networking

opens up new opportunities to distribute information in flexible and interactive ways (Castells

2004b, p. 12). To explain these changes, the first represents an increase in processing power. The

second change points to the idea that new digital technologies allow communication to become ever

more interactive which increases the occurrence of, and possibilities for, recombining information.

This is important because the recombination of information is “the source of innovation, and

innovation is at the roots of economic productivity, cultural creativity, and political power making”

(Castells 2004b, p. 15). Finally, telecommunications technologies have become more flexible,

meaning that they can be applied in many different contexts and applications including military,

business, politics, media and personal (Castells 2004b, p. 15).

The above mentioned changes in telecommunication technologies, combined with the

restructuring of capitalism, paved the way for the rise of the networking system of organization.

With improvements in technology people have begun to collaborate on a grand scale, changing the

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way we interact with one another. Now that we are capable of sending digital signals from one side

of the world to another at speeds unimaginable in the past, we've been able to transcend the physical

limits of space and time. This transcendence of space and time is at the heart of the new network

society. By transforming the physical boundaries of the communication process, technology has

opened new doors for collaboration, dramatically affecting the way we organize ourselves and our

work.

As the potential for collaboration increases, collaboration becomes the essential focus of

organization. Castells writes, “For the first time in history, the basic unit of economic organization

is not a subject, be it individual (such as the entrepreneur, or the entrepreneurial family) or

collective (such as the capitalist class, the corporation, the state). As I have tried to show, the unit is

the network, made up of a variety of subjects and organizations, relentlessly modified as

networks...” (2000, p. 214). Here, we see that the sites of collaboration, the networks themselves,

have become the dominant focus of organization in society. It is important to note that Castells is

not claiming that networks have just begun to exist; rather, he claims that the new prevalence and

prominence of networks is what has changed. Just like information, networks have always been

around. What is new is the privileged role networks are playing in the organization of the core

processes of society.

Yet, the questions remains what, exactly, is a network? In Castells' own words, “A network

is a set of interconnected nodes” (2000, p. 501). Very cryptically, he defines a node as a curve

which intersects itself. The connections between nodes are digital communication channels.

However, this definition is still confusing, so in order to understand what Castells really means by a

network, it helps to look at his larger discussion of networks. Instead of focusing on individual

companies, Castells' analysis focuses on what he names the “network enterprise”. Network

enterprises are made up of simultaneously autonomous and dependent components. A network

enterprise has defined goals and these goals continuously restructure its means. (Castells 2000, p.

187). It is the unit, or actor of the network society. It is not a collection of units, but the unit itself. It

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“...is not a network of enterprises. It is a network made from either firms or segments of firms,

and/or from the internal segmentation of firms” (Castells 2004b, p. 42). In other words, network

enterprises are not companies, nor are they groups of companies; rather, they are malleable,

independent units made up of various parts. Essentially, they are networks. Networks can be made

up of any combination of large, medium and small firms, yet the common denominator among them

is a horizontal organization throughout, meaning that large companies do not control their smaller

network partners (Castells 2004b, p. 42). In this way, the network society is characterized by a shift

from vertical to horizontal business structures and the formation of network enterprises is the result

of this shift.

Two features of the network society are that it is both global and self-reconfiguring. The

network society is a global society because networks are not limited by boundaries. This does not

imply that networks include all parts of the globe; it simply shows that networks are not limited to

or cut off from any area. In this sense they are global because they are capable of a global reach

(Castells 2004b, p. 33). In addition, Castells wants to be clear that network enterprises are not

collections of multinational firms or parts of firms. Network enterprises are not multinational, but

international. He writes, “My hypothesis is that, as the process of globalization progresses,

organizational forms evolve from multinational enterprises to international networks...” (2000, p.

208). The difference is that while multinational enterprises are built around a few dominate cultures,

international networks do not impose a particular national culture upon their members.

A main reason why there cannot be one single culture dominating a network is because of

the need for flexibility in networks. The second feature that makes networks so successful is their

ability to be self-reconfiguring. This allows them to be more flexible and keep up with the fast pace

of change in a highly technological society where communication and innovation occurs at digital

speed.

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3.2. A New Logic: Inclusion/Exclusion

Rather than operating under a dominant culture, networks operate on the principles of

network logic. Network logic is a binary logic based on a distinction between inclusion/exclusion

(Castells 2004b, p. 3). One is either a part of a particular network or one is not. For those on the

inside, access to the rest of the network is equally achieved. For those on the outside, access is

completely denied. From this follows a shift from organizational hierarchies to horizontal

organizational structures. By imposing its binary logic of inclusion/exclusion upon society, the

network society imposes this kind of structural switch upon organizations because in order for

members, or nodes, of a network to have equal access to one another they must be organized in a

horizontal form. An hierarchical structure simply is not conducive to the flexibility and self-

reconfiguring capacity the information age requires.

However, by moving from organizational hierarchies to horizontal, networked structures,

companies gain the speed and flexibility to innovate but lose self-sufficiency, independence and a

share of their autonomy in the process. For example, innovation is no longer centred in the R&D

departments of large, private firms but is increasingly occurring through networks (Castells 2000, p.

175). By opening up their innovation practices, large firms are no longer self-contained and they

lose some control over processes fundamental to their business.

Yet opening up their doors is not optional for large firms today. The very advances in

telecommunications technologies that have made the networking form of organization possible have

also made it imperative. As communication has sped up, innovation and all other processes related

to production have increased in speed. When production processes become networked these

processes slip into what Castells calls the space of flows and timeless time. By linking up with a

network, a node can function, through its collaboration, in these virtual dimensions. This means that

its production processes can move at digital speed and are not limited by the boundaries of physical

space. The result is that networks can be more innovative and efficient in all areas of production.

While this new logic may be international rather than multinational, it comes with its own inherent

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conflict. This conflict makes up the second major hypothesis of Castells' Information Age.

3.3. A New Conflict: The Net vs. the Self

The second major hypothesis of Castells' trilogy is that “Our societies are increasingly

structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the self” (Castells 2000, p. 3). In other

words, there is a conflict between what Castells calls the Net and what he calls the Self. He

describes this conflict as “...a fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism, and

historically rooted, particularistic identities” (2000, p. 3). Here, abstract, universal instrumentalism

represents the Net, and historically rooted, particularistic identities represent the Self. By the Net,

Castells seems to refer to network logic or a meta-network encompassing this logic. The Net isn't

the Internet or another clearly identifiable network; it is the concept of a meta-network representing

network logic and the prevalence of networks in society. By the Self, Castells means the identity of

an single societal actor, whether that actor be an individual or a group of collected individuals.

This split between the abstract and the particular, between the Net and the Self, is a direct

result of the transformation of space and time through advances in telecommunications

technologies. Another way of explaining this division is as a split between physical places and what

Castells calls the “space of flows”, or between everyday time and what Castells calls “timeless

time”. The conflict lies in the fact that the Net exists in the space of flows and timeless time while

people, on the other hand, continue to exist in physical places and everyday, or what Castells labels

“clock” time. Because of this, people are separated from the dominant practices of their society

because, remembering Castells' first major claim that “dominant functions and processes in the

Information Age are increasingly organized around networks” (Castells 2000, p. 500), these

processes occur in the world of networks – in the space of flows and timeless time – a world from

which they themselves are cut off. In this way, the tension between the Net and the Self is a result

of the fact that the Net is timeless and exists within the computer circuits, the elites, and the hubs

and nodes of networks, whereas people (except for the few elites) exist in real-time and mostly

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disconnected places.

Castells sums up his argument for this hypothesis in the following:

The social construction of new dominant forms of space and time develops a meta-

network that switches off non-essential functions, subordinate social groups, and

devalued territories. By so doing, infinite social distance is created between this

meta-network and most individuals, activities, and locales around the world. Not that

people, locales, or activities disappear. But their structural meaning does, subsumed

in the unseen logic of the meta-network where value is produced, cultural codes are

created, and power is decided (2000, p. 508).

The result is that people feel disconnected from the processes shaping the society in which they

live. The network society is a society defined by this disconnected feeling, by the opposition

between the Net and the Self. As the dominant processes of society move into the realm of

networks they seem to also move out of the realm of everyday life. This leaves normal people

feeling as though they live in an uncontrollable society and a perpetual state of disorder.

The impression that the network society is a meta-social disorder directed only by an

uncontrollable, and nearly unintelligible logic permeates all actors in the network society, but

perhaps never so strongly as it does for those actors who find themselves excluded from networks

as a result of the structure's binary logic. The Net is simply unable to absorb the majority of the

world's people into the “power-making” aspects of its logic (Castells 2004a, p. 11). As a result,

these disempowered people rebel against the system and its logic. Their rebellion, and how and why

it is carried out, is the subject of Castells' second book in the trilogy of the Information Age.

In Castells' analysis, this rebellion takes place in the form of social movements and their

respective identity projects. He writes that one of , “...the key features of social structure in the

information age” is “...the forces against which communal resistance is organized, with new identity

projects potentially emerging around these resistances” (2004a, p. 423). Communal resistance takes

the form of collective identities aimed at combating the network logic at the core of the network

society. Castells is explicit about the fact that the aim of social movements is to “contradict the

dominant logic of the network society” (Castells 2004a, p. 423).

To recap, Castells claims that three historical conditions – the technological revolution, the

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rise of social movements, and the restructuring of capitalism – have changed the organizational

structure of society. In this new form of society, the most important activities are organized in

networks. This is a direct result of the transformation of space and time through new

telecommunications technologies. A binary logic of inclusion/exclusion acts as the organizing

principle of the network society, and social movements arise as a hostile reaction from those who

are excluded from networks as a result of this logic. These social movements aim to disrupt the

binary logic of networks through the creation of identity projects.

Castells' conclusions have had widespread impact on the social sciences and their impact has

reached the field of knowledge management as well. In the next section I outline a few of the

implications for knowledge management and identify one possible line of inquiry the knowledge

management theorist/practitioner might take. From there, I explain how my own analysis fits into

this larger inquiry and I begin my investigation.

4. Knowledge Management in the Network Society

Castells' main conclusion, that the dominant processes and functions in society are

increasingly organized around networks, implies that knowledge utilization, generation and sharing

practices are also increasingly organized around networks, as knowledge-related activities are

integral to the Information Age. Such an observation is directly relevant to knowledge management

as these practices are a main focus of the field. Therefore, a change in the way in which knowledge

activities are organized requires a change in the ways in which they are studied, evaluated, and

managed.

There are many hypotheses one could investigate in this area. For example, one might

explore how the networking form of organization increases the potential for knowledge sharing and

collaboration in knowledge creation and how theses processes have changed. Or one could use

organizational learning theories to analyze learning within networks. In other words, the theorist

might ask, can networks learn and how do they do so? One example of knowledge theorists coming

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together to explore the implications of Castells' theory is an international symposium that was

conducted by the Knowledge Lab in Odense, Denmark during March of 2006, called Post-Ontology

and Network Society. At this meeting, participants debated, among other questions, the following:

“Are networks examples of complexity or means of managing complexity?” and “Does a network

primarily constitute knowledge or are networks rather the material channels for the distribution of

knowledge?” (Knowledge Lab Website 2006).

But, very generally, one could understand the overall purpose of knowledge management

investigations in light of Castells' theory of the network society as being to determine how

businesses and organizations can manage their participation in networks to improve their

knowledge utilization, generation, and sharing practices. However, while this question is important

for the field of knowledge management, it is beyond the scope of this paper to make such an

investigation.

Rather, I intend to determine whether or not Castells provides enough information for the

knowledge management theorist to embark upon such an investigation. More specifically, I aim to

determine whether or not Castells' texts provide a theoretical basis upon which we can found an

analysis of how organizations might manage their participation in networks. Within the concept of

management two premises are already assumed. The first is that we know to what extent

organizations can influence the activities taking place in networks. The second is that we also know

how this influence functions. These two pieces of founding theoretical knowledge are implied in the

concept of management because management implies the ability to evaluate, plan and change

practices. Therefore, an organization's ability to manage its participation in networks requires an

ability to evaluate, plan and change the activities it participates in, namely, the activities of

networks. In order to evaluate, plan and change activities, organizations need to be able to influence

these activities and they need to know the extent to which they can influence these activities and

how they can do so.

In other words, before we can ask how businesses and organizations can improve their

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participation in networks, we need to have a theoretical foundation for understanding how far and in

what ways they can influence their participation. Put simply, we need to answer the following

questions: To what extent are businesses and organizations capable of influencing the activities of

networks, and how is influence achieved?

Another way of thinking about this task is as a need for a theory of power in the network

society. Influence is power. By understanding how power exists and functions generally, we will

have the tools we need to focus on the nature of influence specific to businesses and organizations

participating in networks. My first step in finding this “power toolbox” is to take a critical look at

Castells' theory to determine whether or not he provides an adequate theory of power in the network

society or a theoretical framework upon which one could construct such a theory if he himself has

not already done so. In the next two sections I make this critical examination. First, I deal with the

extent to which organizations have influence; then, I try to determine the nature of their influence.

5. Question 1: Where Is Power?

The conflict between the Net and the Self is really a conflict about influence and power in

the network society and it is in Castells' discussion of it that one can learn something about the

influence of businesses and organizations. Turning to this discussion, then, we find that Castells

seems to recognize the conflict between the Net and the Self as, on some level, a conflict with our

understanding of power. He asks, “Where is power in this social structure? And what is power

under these historical conditions?” (2004a, p. 424). Here, Castells asks the very questions at the

heart of my project because if we can locate power throughout the network society, we can

determine how much power resides in businesses and organizations. If we know how much power

businesses and organizations have, we can begin to draw conclusions about the extent to which they

are able to influence the activities of networks. Also, if we can determine what power is in the

network society, we can begin to understand the nature of influence and the practices through which

it occurs. In this way, a critical investigation of Castells' answers to the questions he poses is crucial

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to my analysis.

In this section of the paper, I embark on a critical investigation of his answer to the first

question: Where is power? To do this, I use Castells' own words and analysis to draw my

conclusions. More specifically, I look at his portrayal of how people living in network societies

experience power, his discussion of capitalists in the network society, and finally references he

makes to structural power in the networking form of society. Ultimately, I conclude that Castells

addresses the question frequently, but does not give a clear or consistent answer regarding the

location of power in the network society.

5.1. Uncontrollable Logic and Meta-Social Disorder

Perhaps the first reference to power in the network society is when Castells begins his

trilogy by introducing the conflict between the Net and the Self in the prologue of the first volume.

Describing how people experience life in the network society later in his concluding remarks,

Castells writes, “The new social order, the network society, increasingly appears to most people as

a meta-social disorder. Namely, as an automated, random sequence of events, derived from the

uncontrollable logic of markets, technology, geopolitical order, or biological determination” (2000,

p. 508). In essence, the network society presents itself as a state of “meta-social disorder” organized

only through an “uncontrollable logic”.

As we have already seen in section 3, networks operate on a binary logic of

inclusion/exclusion. Inclusion in a network allows a node to participate in activities occurring in the

space of flows and at the speed of timeless time. Therefore, participation in networks is paramount

to success in the new landscape of economic activity. By not participating, companies fall on the

“excluded” side of the binary logic line organizing society. They are cut off from others in a world

in which it is impossible to keep up with networked organizations unless one is also involved in a

network. The reality is that in the network society “...each single element of the network can hardly

survive by itself” (Castells 2000, p. 208); networking is becoming increasingly compulsory.

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However, it is also the reality that a single node cannot “...impose its diktat” because “the

logic of the network is more powerful than the powers in the network” (Castells 2000, p. 208). In

other words, each node must give up a part of its autonomy to be involved with the network. No

single node has the ability to set the network's course or to impose its own culture and personal

goals upon the others nodes sharing the network. In this way, the logic of the network dominates by

setting the rules for participation in the network.

Here, we begin to see the uncontrollable nature of the logic of networks taking shape.

Because network logic controls networks and cannot be dominated by any single node in the

network, it appears uncontrollable to those nodes. It follows its own logic and in this way becomes

something greater than merely the sum of its parts. In addition, Castells develops the concept of a

meta-network which seems even more unreachable.

This meta-network is not clearly defined in Castells' work, but he hints at the supremacy of

the network of financial flows. This larger network of financial flows affects all other networks by

organizing monetary processes. Moreover, these financial flows appear to be autonomous (Castells

2000, p. 106). Just as no single node can control any network, no single node in the financial

network can control the financial flows. Rather, “this network or networks of capital both unifies

and commands specific centers of capitalist accumulation, structuring the behavior of capitalists

around their submission to the global network” (Castells 2000, p. 505). It is evident here that the

network of financial flows controls the nodes, and not the other way around. Capitalists must adjust

their actions to conform with the logic of networks unifying and commanding the flow of capital.

Capitalists “...play their competing, or converging, strategies by and through the circuits of this

global network, and so they are ultimately dependent upon the non-human capitalist logic of an

electronically operated, random processing of information” (Castells 2000, p. 505). Ultimately, this

is how capitalists submit to the logic of networks.

These examples evidence the uncontrollable nature of the logic of networks, but the

disconcerting experience does not end here. At points this logic seems more than just

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uncontrollable, it appears unintelligible. Because there are no nodes controlling networks, it

becomes difficult to see or understand how they are controlled. Consequently, this is a source of

great confusion for all in the network society. Once the logic governing networks is established as

uncontrollable and unintelligible, it is an easy step to understand why people might experience the

network society as a state of meta-social disorder.

Throughout The Rise of the Network Society, Castells alludes to the idea that people

experience the network society as a meta-social disorder governed by an uncontrollable logic. This

notion drives his analysis of the Information Age, particularly in the second book of the trilogy, The

Power of Identity, where he explores the conflict between the Net and the Self more fully and deals

with questions of power in the network society in a more direct manner.

5.2. Who Are the Capitalists?

In his analysis of social movements as a reaction to the experience of meta-social disorder

and uncontrollable logic in society, Castells inadvertently touches upon another source of confusion

regarding power in the theory of the network society: the concept of agency.

Traditionally, power is located in agents. For the purposes of my analysis, I define an agent

to be an non-determined actor in society. By non-determined, I mean that an agent has the power to

act according to its own will. This does not imply that an actor is totally autonomous, only that it is

not totally determined. Therefore, if power is located in agents, one can locate power in the network

society by locating agency in the theory of the network society.

The conflict between the Net and the Self, as a reaction to the impression of a meta-social

disorder and uncontrollable logic present in the network society, reflects a theoretical crisis for

agency in the network society. The crisis occurs because it is no longer clear who qualifies as an

agent and which agents dominate. Castells notes this confusion by asking, “Under these new

technological, organizational, and economic conditions, who are the capitalists?” (2000, p. 504).

Really, what Castells is asking is: who has power in this new form of society? Who are the agents

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of the information age?

His answer is unclear. At points he asserts that there is no capitalist class in the network

society (Castells 2000, p. 505) only to reference the existence of a small and obscure group of elites

elsewhere in his analysis. These elites are part of a meta-network of financial flows that seems to

hold sway over all other networks and activities in society (Castells 2000, p. 445). This discrepancy

makes it difficult for the reader to determine the distribution of power in the network society.

Adding to the confusion surrounding the agency of human beings in the network society,

Castells adds a whole new kind of agent to the mix. He writes, “...above a diversity of human-flesh

capitalists and capitalist groups there is a faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial flows

operated by electronic networks” (2000, p. 505). This new agent is “faceless”, bodiless, and

inhuman. It is the financial flows circulating through the network society.

By creating a whole new breed of agent, Castells has complicated our traditional

understanding of agency, pushing it to the extreme. Because financial flows are not human they do

not exist in the human world of the space of places and clock time. Rather, they live within the

electronic networks, in the space of flows and timeless time. By exceeding the physical limits of

space and time, this faceless capitalist has a clear advantage over the others. In this way, it seems to

have more power and influence.

Castells sums up the phenomenon saying, “While capitalism still rules, capitalists are

randomly incarnated, and the capitalist classes are restricted to specific areas of the world where

they prosper as appendixes to a mighty whirlwind which manifests its will by spread points and

futures options ratings in the global flashes of computer screens” (2000, p. 505). Here, the faceless

capitalist is portrayed as a “mighty whirlwind” storming through electronic networks. Flesh and

blood capitalists, whether they be individuals or organized groups of individuals, are pushed into

the sidelines as mere “appendixes”. They are not in control; they can only hope to ride the

whirlwind to success.

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5.3. Structure & Agency

Castells has already begun to answer his own question about the location of power in the

network society when he talks about the lack of a coherent capitalist class and the new rule of the

“faceless” capitalist that acts as a “whirlwind” whipping through the network society. Through his

discussion of the “whirlwind”, Castells places power within the networks themselves. Later, in his

article outlining the theory behind the network society, “Informationalism, Networks, and the

Network Society: A Theoretical Blueprint”, Castells is very explicit about the location of power in

the network society. He writes, “...I suggest that the power holders are networks themselves”

(2004b, p. 48).

But do networks hold all of the power? Are networks the only agents in the network society?

There are points in Castells' work that make it seem so. Take, for example, when he writes,

“...infinite social distance is created between this meta-network and most individuals, activities, and

locales around the world. Not that people, locales, or activities disappear. But their structural

meaning does, subsumed in the unseen logic of the meta-network where value is produced, cultural

codes are created, and power is decided” (2000, p. 508). Here, it is in the logic of the meta-network

that power resides and this logic wipes out the meaning of the majority of the world's individuals. In

fact, it wipes out their “structural meaning”, emphasizing a link meaning between meaning and

structure.

However, Castells' second book, The Power of Identity, is all about the power struggle

between traditional agents and the agency of networks in the network society. Traditional social

agents find their power in the concept of identity, thus the title of the book. Castells explicitly states

that the “theoretical purpose” of the second book in the trilogy is to “...interpret the interaction

between social movements claiming the primacy of identity, and the network society, as the new

structure of domination in the information age” (2004a, p. 252). Here, Castells identifies networks

as the dominating force in network societies, but by examining the interaction networks have with

social movements, Castells implies that social movements also have some form of power in the

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Information Age. Moreover he, defines social movements as “...purposive collective actions whose

outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions of society” (2004a, p. 3). By

defining social movements in this way, social movements, by definition, have power. The fact that

the collective action of social movements impacts the values and institutions of society implies that

they have power and by defining social movements as necessarily creating such an impact, Castells

builds power into his definition of them.

Due to this, it is evident that Castells locates power in at least two areas within the network

society: within the networks themselves, especially within the meta-network which appears to be

the network of global financial flows, and within the collective action of social movements.

Therefore, networks do not hold all the power in the network society; they do not hold an absolute

monopoly, but are constantly threatened by the power of social movements, just as the power of

social movements is constantly threatened by the power of the networks. This constant struggle and

its consequences are the subject of Castells' second book.

It is interesting to note that when Castells focuses on the power of collective action, he is

talking about the collective action of social movements, as opposed to other groups such as

businesses and similar organizations, so while Castells has re-empowered the traditional agents of

the network society, human beings, he has limited the extent of their power to the realm of social

movements. In other words, while networks do not have absolute reign, the autonomy of businesses

and organizations is still questionable in theoretical terms, leaving gaps in the theory of the network

society that complicate its application to knowledge management discussions.

One reason Castells might limit his discussion to groups that indicate social movements is

because of the way in which he empowers them. Social movements get their power from their

identity. In his analysis, Castells points out different kinds of collective identities and tries to define

the sort of power and influence each type of identity is capable of garnering in society. However,

each of these identities is created as a reaction to individuals' negative feelings regarding the ways

in which they experience the power of networks: their experience of an uncontrollable and

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unintelligible logic, and the state of meta-social disorder they appear to live within. When Castells

talks about the creation of collective identities, he accounts for their creation by referring to the

dissociation felt by individuals, not other collectives. In this way, he never accounts for, or

considers, the dissociation and disempowerment felt by already existing communities based in the

economic sector. While he talks about the identities of religious groups and other social

movements, he does seem to take into much consideration what has happened to the identities and

autonomy of companies.

However, it is not only individuals and their personal sense of power that is threatened by

the new role of networks. Every person, collective and formerly autonomous unit feels it too. This

is evident because “...global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off

individuals, groups, regions, and even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals

processed in the network, in a relentless flow of strategic decisions” (Castells 2000, p. 3). Here,

Castells includes groups, regions and even countries into the mix, but notice that he has, yet again,

left out businesses. Why is this so? In such a comprehensive theory, why would he overlook

identities in a section of society as important as the economic sector?

Castells' discussion of the “network enterprise” and the horizontal flattening of businesses

may be the answer to this question. By transforming businesses from their traditional, hierarchical

structures to network enterprises, they become networks themselves and enjoy all the powers of

networks. In this way, they have not been left out. Yet, isn't this transformation in itself

problematic? Can a business ever completely transition into a network enterprise? Will it not have

lost the autonomy and identity that makes it an unique business? Will not the act of transformation

itself be a kind of interaction between networks and businesses? Is this interaction any less likely to

involve struggle and reactionary movements than the interaction between individuals and the

network society? Should we not expect some reaction from businesses that would be the equivalent

to the social movements created by collected individuals? Castells' analysis, by focusing on the

power of social movements and meta-networks, neglects these questions and considerations.

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Felix Stalder sees a theoretical shift in Castells' work from analysing conflicts to analysing

forms. Prior to writing his trilogy, Castells worked in the area of urban Marxism and the lessons he

learned while doing so, concerning both Marxism's successes and failures, have influenced his

theoretical approach to describing the information society (Stalder 2006). Part of the reason for the

shift in his theoretical approach, Stalder claims, is to avoid the reductionist, structuralist critics to

which Marxist theories fall prey. Also, doing so allows Castells to create a universal theory that

spans cultures to become a truly global, macro-level explanation of a particular point in human

history. However, Stalder sees an inherent problem resulting from the shift to forms, which he

summarizes in the following paragraph:

...this reorientation came at a price. Conflicts had to be relegated from being the main

engine of social transformation to being subsumed under the heading of identity. Its

main driver is no longer structural contradictions, but reflexive social movements.

Thus actors regain a central place, but the conflicts in which they engage appear

skewed in the analysis. Collective actors on one side, processes on the other. This

might be an adequate rendering of the inner view of most social movements,

according to which people fight against systems. But as a result of this perspective,

Castells’ theory of power, particularly in the analysis of the economy and of politics,

has been hollowed out. It will be one of the main challenges to the further

development of the theory of the network society as a critical project to reintegrate

conflicts and power more prominently into the analysis without reverting to Marxist

reductionism (2006, p. 1).

Instead of analysing the structural contradictions present in society to explain mechanisms of social

change, like the “contradictory processes of economic production and reproduction” that Marxists

stress (Howarth 2000, p. 4), Castells turns his analysis to the form of networks and social

movements. But by doing so, he separates actors and processes. In other words, agents have been

separated from action. This “hollows out” any theory of power in the network society because

agents are supposed to be those actors which have the power to act.

The result is that Castells' theory does not completely avoid structuralist critiques. David

Howarth, in his book Discourse, explains that “by stressing the way social systems determine social

meaning” the classical structuralist model “...makes it difficult to provide an adequate account of

the historicity of social systems, as well as the role of social agents in bringing such change about”

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(Howarth 2000, p. 27-8). As I will soon show, Castells links power with the creation of meaning

and he locates both in the realm of networks. In this way, he locates power in the social structure.

Moreover, he asserts that power “...is no longer concentrated in institutions (the state),

organizations (capitalist firms), or symbolic controllers (corporate media, churches)” – places

constituted by powerful human agents (Castells 2004a, p. 424). Instead, it is in the digital circuits of

the space of flows, seemingly far from the reach of human beings and at an infinite social distance

from people not already connected to networks.

Ultimately, Castells determines that there is a “fundamental contradiction between the logic

of structure and the logic of agency in the construction of our world” (2004a, p. xviii). In other

words, the logic that structures the network society, network logic, and our understanding of agency

are not harmonious, leaving us confused about how power and influence functions in our new

world. In order to retain theoretical agency to avoid a reductionist form of structuralism – in order

to locate power in agents and identify how those agents use power – the theorist of the network

society needs a coherent understanding of power in the network society. Clearly, Castells has not

provided this, at least not when it comes to the location and distribution of power in the network

society, and the contradiction he notes is a largely contributing factor. It seems as though either

power is controlled entirely by the structure of the network society, or the theory requires a new

understanding of agency that is compatible with the new world it aims to describe.

6. Question 2: What is Power?

One of the reasons it might be so difficult to locate power in the network society is that it is

still unclear what power in the network society is. In other words, if we know how influence works

in the network society, we might be able to clear up the confusion about the extent to which

organizations are capable of having it. In this section, I try to determine whether or not Castells is

clear about how power functions in the network society and if so, whether or not his description of

power can help us redefine and update agency so that we might locate it more precisely.

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It is helpful to begin by looking at how Castells first defines power in his article outlining

the theory behind the network society. He claims that power is “the structural capacity to impose

one's will over another's will” (Castells 2004b, p. 47). This is a traditional notion of power and can

be considered power by force. In this definition, power is the ability to make someone do something

that he or she would not otherwise do. Castells allows room for bargaining in the network society,

but he asserts that ultimately it reaches an end point where power by force takes hold (Castells

2004b, p. 47). Here, force is a networks' ability to “switch off” any node that the network no longer

considers useful. Because networks are the site of all substantial action in the network society, to be

switched off is the equivalent of being barred from those activities – a virtual death sentence for

businesses and organizations. It is this threat that gives networks their force.

However, this notion of power does not fit with all the instances Castells wants to describe.

Later, he seems to work under a different definition. Actually, he acknowledges this himself in his

theoretical “blueprint” of the network society. When he writes the above definition, he does so in a

questioning way, leading up to a reformulated definition of power. Yet, there are instances in which

Castells is operating under this definition, just as there are instances when he operates under another

definition, and this makes the second and crucial question - what is power in the network society? –

even more difficult to answer.

Felix Stalder criticizes Castells on precisely this point in his book, Manuel Castells and the

Theory of the Network Society. The heart of Stalder's critique is that Castells seems to use more than

one definition of power in his analysis. Considering the length and breath of Castells' theory, it's not

surprising that he has room in which to make discrepancies. Stalder finds a least two separate

notions of power operating in Castells' work. The first identifiable definition, he claims, is not

suited for the new kind of society Castells puts forth for two reasons. Stalder sums up these two

reasons in the following paragraph:

There are two things that are problematic in this definition of power when trying to

understand network processes. First, power is conceptualized as being applied by one

person and directly affecting another one, as, for example, a police officer arresting a

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suspect. The problem is that this notion of power does not lend itself to investigating

how power operates in the absence of a person exercising it. Second, power is

thought to be unidirectional in the sense of flowing from the person who exercises it

to the one who is subjected to it. Again, this is hard to apply to the network processes

characterized by feedback and mutual adaptation (2006, p. 130).

Stalder's first criticism comes about because networks, as meta-networks and the mighty

“whirlwind”, are not human. They are not concrete agents because they are not people. According

to Stalder, power by force requires a concrete actor in order to take place. The definition is not

formulated for a discussion of power as a force controlled by abstract whirlwinds. In fact, the

metaphor of whirlwinds exemplifies this critique quite nicely. Wind is seen only by its affects on its

surroundings. It slips by unnoticed and is difficult to harness. It is energy – a force in itself, rather

than an agent wielding a force. According to Stalder, power by force as a definition is not sufficient

for the new world Castells puts forth, a world in which a whirlwind seems to be the dominant agent.

His second criticism is that in the traditional notion of power, power is considered to be an

unidirectional flow. Insofar as power is harnessed by one person and applied to another, it can only

move in one direction. However, the network society is characterized by multi-directional and

simultaneous flows of power. As we have already seen, what gives networks their unique influence

is their extensive reach. Unlike human beings, they do not exist within the space of places and do

not function according to the rules of clock time. Rather, they exist within the space of flows and

function on timeless time. Therefore, they are not restrained by the same limits and it only makes

sense that their form of power would also need to be free from such limits. Power by force is

restrained to the space of places because it cannot exist outside of the person exercising it. For this

same reason it is also restrained to clock time as a person can no more transcend the limits of time

than he or she can transcend the limits of physical space. This means that the force a single person,

or entity, is capable of exercising is limited to the rules of the space of places and clock time and

therefore can only flow in one direction. On the other hand, networks have the freedoms of the

space of flows and timeless time. They also have power, so it follows that it must be another, less

restricted form of power they possess.

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Both of these criticisms reflect that the traditional notion of power as force is not suited to

the network society. Stalder drives this point home by drawing our attention to the fact that this

definition was a concept created to explain a fundamentally different kind of society. This

definition, power by force, was created by Max Weber “to analyze administrative bureaucracies,

which he saw as the hallmark of modern societies” (Stalder 2006, p. 130), but the whole point of

Castells' theory is to show that we are no longer living in modern societies but rather in network

societies. Because it was formulated for a different purpose, to define power in a different kind of

society, “Castells's definition of power is particularly unsuited to the very process he focuses on: the

transformation of institutions of governance from fixed hierarchies to flexible networks” (Stalder

2006, p. 130). This, in a nutshell, is the problem with using an old definition in a new and

fundamentally different theory.

Castells seems to recognize the theoretical hurdles power by force presents him and the need

to create a new, more fitting definition. While he does not spend much time on the issue in the first

two books of his trilogy, in his theoretical blueprint he suggests that “...maybe the question of

power, as traditionally formulated, does not make sense in the network society. But other forms of

domination and determination are critical in shaping people's lives against their will...” (2004b, p.

48). In this passage, Castells explicitly calls for a revised notion of power and later in the same

essay he attempts to provide one.

The new definition he comes up with relies on two concepts: programming and switching.

Castells writes,

In a world of networks, the ability to exercise control over others depends on two

basic mechanisms: the ability to program/reprogram the network(s) in terms of the

goals assigned to the network; and the ability to connect different networks to ensure

their cooperation by sharing common goals and increasing resources. I call the

holders of the first power position the programmers; I call the holders of the second

power position the switchers (2004b, p. 48).

From this passage we can conclude that power functions through the processes of programming,

which is setting the goals of a network, and switching, which is connecting and disconnecting

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networks. Power is these two processes. Moreover, power belongs to those who are able to control

and initiate these processes, namely, the programmers and the switchers.

6.1. Problems with Programming and Switching: Stalder's Critiques

By redefining power as programming and switching, Castells has moved from a conception

of power as a force applied unidirectionally by one actor upon another, to a conception of power as

operating through inclusion and exclusion. Networks have power “...over human communities of

individuals who are not integrated in these networks” and this power “... operates by

exclusion/inclusion” (Castells 2004b, p. 47). This is because participation in networks is crucial to

success in the network society. If one is not a member of a network, one cannot keep up with the

current pace of economic activity and change, a pace that is set by digital speed. Networks,

however, which exist within the space of flows – in other words, within digital transfers – move and

change easily at the pace of their world. For this reason, exclusion from networks is a virtual death

sentence. To be “switched off” or “programmed out” of a network is to be confined to the space of

places and clock time.

However, Castells' brief treatment of programming and switching is not enough to satisfy

Stalder, who does not consider Castells' discussion of programming and switching to be a complete,

new definition. He writes, Castells “argues that power today operates more through exclusion than

through repression. But if the Weberian definition of power is based on repression, and if

contemporary power's most potent threat (and practice) is exclusion, would that not indicate the

need for a new definition of power, rather than simply arguing that power has somehow diffused

into processes, or automata?” (2006, p. 132). According to Stalder, Castells does not actually give

us a new definition of power; rather, in his transition to a discussion of programming and switching,

he simply transfers power from one location, in human agents, to another, in processes. Stalder is

dissatisfied with this result because he claims that it does not provide an adequate theoretical

foundation for analysing how power is present and functions within the network society.

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A main component to Stalder's dissatisfaction is a critique I have already touched upon: that

by introducing networks as power holders and locating power in processes, Castells appears to

disempower agents. Stalder also notes the disempowerment of agents in the network society. By

moving power to the realm of networks, Stalder claims that Castells has given power to processes,

rather than agents. (This is why Stalder's first critique about needing a new definition of power that

can function independent of an agent makes sense.) He writes, “In his account, processes are indeed

autonomous. The bypassing has no agency. It is not done by identifiable agents, say, multinational

corporations managed by tightly knit networks of board members, consultants, and public

bureaucrats. Rather, he uses the passive voice, referring to flows of power and wealth” (2006, p.

132). The networks have the power, not identifiable agents within the networks. Not only does this

make Castells original notion of power inappropriate to his analysis, it disempowers people within

the network society and brings about a series of damaging theoretical consequences. As far as

Stalder is concerned “...Castells' account makes power disappear far more than necessary. Instead of

actors, we have only powerful processes. We have programs and protocols, but still no

programmers and no designers” (2006, p. 140). Removing human agents from the network society

has damaging consequences for the applicability and use-value of the theory.

As already noted, one of these consequences is that we can no longer identify and locate

powerful actors in the network society. Throughout his work, Castells hints that powerful elites

exist, but he denies the existence of a ruling capitalist class making it difficult to determine who the

powerful elites are. There is no powerful bourgeoisie in the Information Age. The time of formal

hierarchies is over and with it the time of those at the top has also passed. And yet, an elite group

still remains. So who are these elites? Stalder notes that “...there is a casual remark that there is a

global bureaucracy emerging, yet it is not investigated at any length. So the glimpses remain just

that, tantalizing allusions to otherwise absent processes, hidden actors, and unexplored realities”

(2006, p. 129). In his brief mentioning of the elites of the network society, Castells seems to be

contradicting his earlier statements that there is no capitalist class in control or with a power-

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privileged position within the network society.

This leads us to Stalder's third critique of Castells. He claims that the redefined notion of

power as the processes of programming and switching is underdeveloped and inconsistently applied

throughout Castells' analysis. Castells does not clarify these concepts and the discussion he does

provide seems discordant and even contradictory. Readers are left to wonder: what really is

programming? What really is switching?

In the following paragraph Stalder outlines what he sees as the most damaging and apparent

of Castells' contradictions regarding his discussion of programming. He writes:

In one remarkable passage Castells writes that

it all depends on the goals of a given network and the most elegant,

economical, and self-reproductive ways to perform these goals. In this

sense, a network is an automaton. In a social structure, social actors and

institutions program a network. But once programmed, information

networks, powered by information technology, impose their structural logic

on their human components.

This section is noteworthy not only because it is a rare reference to the programming

of networks, but also because the key idea is sandwiched between two sentences that

talk about something rather different. Are networks programmed or are they

autonomous? (2006, p. 133).

The discrepancy Stalder points out in this passage is that while Castells accounts for the initial

programming of networks' goals, once they are set up they seem to be beyond the reach of human

beings. It is as though once a network is created, it has a will of it's own and cannot be persuaded or

controlled. Yet, at the same time, Castells talks about the reprogramming of networks. Instead of

clarifying the process by which the goals of a network are established Castells has confused it. This

passage leads to more questions than it answers and introduces some of the discrepancies at the

heart of the theory.

If programming is the essential component of power in the network society, it is important

that the theory describing it is strong, clear, and consistent, both to ensure theoretically integrity and

for its use-value as a foundation for applied analysis. If we don't understand how power works in

the network society, we cannot complete a concrete analysis.

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To sum up, Stalder criticizes Castells' theory of the network society by saying that Castells

uses multiple and incompatible conceptions of power throughout its development and explanation.

Moreover, the definition Castells begins with and employees most frequently, the Weberian notion

of power by force, is not suited for the new social landscape Castells wishes to map. The Weberian

definition is poorly suited for an analysis of power in the network society for two reasons: 1) It does

not allow for power to exist without an agent to exercise it, and 2) In this conception power can

only flow unidirectionally; it cannot flow in multiple directions simultaneously. However, the

existence of multi-directional flows of power is at the heart of the historical, organizational change

that is the network society. Stalder ends his critique by noting that Castells attempts to deal with

this dilemma by treating networks as agents themselves, evident in his discussion of networks as

automatons and whirlwinds, and vaguely redefining power as based on a binary logic of

inclusion/exclusion which operates through the processes of programming and switching. Yet, this

attempt is, in Stalder's view, unsatisfactory because it “...makes power disappear far more than

necessary”, is not fully developed, and contains internal discrepancies.

6.2. The Consequences of Separating Programming and Switching

At this point, I intend to build upon Stalder's critique by illustrating additional ways in

which Castells' discussion of programming and switching is both underdeveloped and inconsistent.

Then, I elaborate on the damage these insufficiencies cause to the use-value and applicability of

Castells' theory of the network society to further analysis and studies within the field of knowledge

management.

While Stalder may claim that Castells “makes power disappear”, Castells actually dedicates

the entire second book of his trilogy to an investigation of power in the network society. Even in

The Rise of the Network Society, he includes a brief discussion of power to place the book in the

larger context of the trilogy. He clearly states that “power still rules society, it still shapes, and

dominates, us” (2004a, p. 425). Power, it seems, has not disappeared with the advent of networks.

33

Rather, it has changed, but Castells' account of this change, as Stalder points out, is unclear and

even hints of being at odds with itself.

To better understand how Castells' own words can lead to confusion, let us examine a

paragraph from his article outlining the theoretical blueprint of the information society in which he

begins to explain how programming and switching work:

...they are able to connect to the entire network and communicated networks from

any node in the network, on the condition of sharing protocols of communication.

Between nodes in the network and outside the network, distance is infinite, since

there is no access unless the program of the network is changed. Thus, networks are

self-reconfigurable, complex structures of communication that ensure at the same

time the unity of the purpose and the flexibility of its execution, by the capacity to

adapt to the operating environment (2004b, p. 3).

From this passage, it is obvious that programming and switching are interrelated processes. If

switching is the process of connecting networks to one another or new nodes to an existing network,

and the only way to access nodes outside a given network is for that network's program to be

changed, then it seems as though the process of switching occurs through the act of programming.

But if switching and programming are interrelated processes that imply a necessary co-

presence, why does Castells treat them as two separate concepts in his theory? The separate

treatment of programming and switching in Castells' blueprint adds to the confusion surrounding

these processes and the role that they play because Castells never explicitly explains either of them

or the relationship between them. This is key because the relationship between programming and

switching holds part of the answer to the structure/agency conflict in the network society.

One of the main claims of The Rise of the Network Society is that dominate functions and

processes in society are now organized by network logic and and operate within networks. To

recap, network logic is a binary logic of inclusion/exclusion. Networks run on this logic; to be

included is to be “switched on” and to be excluded is to be “switched off”. In this way, the power

holders are the networks because the networks are the switchers. As I have previously shown,

Castells is explicit about this view.

However, the idea that the power holders are the networks hits a roadblock when one takes

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into account the process of programming and its close and necessary connection to the process of

switching. While it may be reasonably clear that networks do the switching, it is much less clear

who does the programming. Do networks program themselves? On this issue, Castells seems to

waver. Recall the paragraph Stalder points to in which Castells writes, “In a social structure, social

actors and institutions program a network” (2006, p. 133). Here, Castells' words seem to indicate

that human actors are the programmers. And yet, his next sentence is, “But once programmed,

information networks, powered by information technology, impose their structural logic on their

human components” (Stalder 2006, p. 133).

These two sentences, back to back, make Stalder feel uneasy and cause him to sense an

inherent contradiction. He does not provide an in-depth analysis, however, of why exactly these two

sentences raise alarm. I argue that a clear reason can be identified. By recognizing the dependent

relationship between programming and switching, and applying such knowledge to an analysis of

these two sentences, we can more precisely identify the nature of the contradiction and problem

lurking beneath these words. In the second sentence, switching, as a network's “structural logic”, is

a form of power held exclusively by networks. Networks “impose” this power on “ their human

components”, indicating that humans do not have access to, or control over, this kind of power.

Moreover, Castells later writes that networks are “self-reconfigurable” with the “capacity to adapt

to the operating environment” (2004b, p. 3), indicating their autonomy.

On the other hand, the previous sentence shows that programming is a power held by human

actors. While Castells does not say in this sentence that programming is a power exclusive to human

beings, another statement made in his theoretical blueprint implies this. He writes, “To alter the

outcomes of the network a new program (a set of compatible codes) will have to be installed in the

network – from outside the network” (2004b, p. 2). While the previous statement only refers to the

initial programming of networks, this statement refers to the reprogramming of networks.

Apparently, a network is not capable of reprogramming itself. New goals, or compatible codes,

must originate from outside of the network in question. Moreover, the new program needs to be

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“installed” within the network. The use of the words outside and installed demand the involvement

of a separate actor, an installer. As the initial installers are human actors, and networks are

incapable of installing their own programs and are an “infinite social distance” away from other

networks, we can only assume that the installers reprogramming a network are also human actors.

As a result, we have two conceptions of power, programming and switching, that appear to

be held exclusively by separate groups of actors, namely humans and networks, respectively. The

problem with this lies in the fact that programming and switching are not, in practice, two separate

and distinct processes. They are often intertwined and dependent. Granted, a network can switch off

a node because it is no longer relevant to the fulfilment of the network's long established goals – a

network doesn't need to be reprogrammed for it to deem a node no longer relevant to its project –

but, human actors can always reprogram the network to change the network's goals and in turn

affect what nodes will and will not be deemed relevant. The existence of programming power both

creates and undermines switching power and we see this in the fact that networks need to have their

programs installed from the “outside”.

At the same time, the human components of a node that has been switched off have no

ability to participate in the process of reprogramming a network's goals because they, like other

networks, are an “infinite social distance” from any network to which they are not already switched

on. The best they can do is try to alter themselves so as to become more relevant to a network's

goals in hopes that they will be picked up by a network and switched on.

However, recalling section 5.3, we have already noted that Castells not only locates power

within networks, he locates power in social movements through his definition of them. This is

important because social movements are, in fact, made up of humans who have found themselves

switched off by networks. In other words, humans who have been switched off from networks and

are at an “infinite social distance” from networks still have some form of power within the network

society. But kind of power is this? Is it switching? Is it programming? Or is it something else

entirely?

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Castells offers this explanation for the kind of power social movements wield: it “consists in

blocking the switches of connection between networks that allow the control of these networks by

the metaprogram of shared values expressing structural domination” (2004b, p. 53). But what does

Castells really mean when he says “blocking the switches”? If switching is based on a binary

principle of inclusion/exclusion, how can it be blocked? Either way, a node must be switched on or

switched off as there exists no third alternative. So does blocking switching simply stop the process

of change in the geography of a network? Or is it something more – something that has the ability

to do more than just freeze the geography of a network, something that can actually influence and

change network geography, something like switching itself? If so, wouldn't social movements be

employing the very logic they are meant to be excluded from?

Obviously, Castells leaves many unanswered questions, but he does hint that the power

present in social movements goes beyond the dominant logic present in the network society. One

such hint occurs in a footnote at the beginning of the section entitled “The Self in the Informational

Society” in the Prologue to the trilogy. There, Castells writes:

...one of the key features of informational society is the networking logic of its basic

structure, which explains the use of the concept of 'network society,' as defined and

specified in the conclusion of this volume. However, other components of

'informational society,' such as social movements or the state, exhibit features that go

beyond the networking logic, although they are substantially influenced by such

logic, as characteristic of the new social structure. Thus, 'the network society' does

not exhaust all the meaning of the 'informational society' (2000, p. 21). [My

emphasis].

In this footnote, Castells is trying to explain why the title of his trilogy is The Information Age as

opposed to The Network Society. His reasoning is that while network logic is the fundamental basis

of the network society there are things present in a network society that “go beyond” this logic.

Exactly what those features are is not elaborated upon and this single reference to something that

transcends network logic is easy to miss in Castells' first, hefty volume. Because of this passage, I

suspect that the power present in social movements in the network society, the ability to block the

switching process, is more than another form of binary-based logic like switching.

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In fact, my goal from this point forward is to try to determine what this kind of power is,

how it works, and how it interacts with switching and the binary network logic of

inclusion/exclusion. While I agree with Stalder that Castells has not fully developed a description of

this new form of power, I think that enough clues exist within his work for us to develop one that

would be consistent with Castells' goals for the concept and the observations of his theory as a

whole. Stalder expresses frustration that “rather than concentrating on issues of network

programming, Castells has tried to sidestep the constraints of the Weberian notion of power by

using a different notion of power in his analysis of global social movements” (Stalder 2006, p. 138),

but I disagree. I think the notion of power Castells uses in his discussion of social movements is, in

fact, programming and it is within his discussion of social movements that we can find the clues to

what constitutes the process of programming.

7. Reformulating Power in the Network Society

I have now completed the first half of my analysis in which my aim has been to determine

whether or not Castells provides a clear and consistent answer to the following question: To what

extent are businesses and organizations capable of influencing the activities of networks, and how is

influence achieved? The conclusion I have reached is that he does not.

The method I have followed to reach this conclusion has been to examine Castells' own

words for answers to two related questions he himself poses: Where is power, and what is power in

the network society? In my search for an answer to the first question, I have investigated passages

in which Castells refers to the uncontrollable binary logic of networks, the sensation that the

network society is a state of meta-social disorder, the lack of an identifiable capitalist class, and the

appearance of a seemingly new agent in the network society – the networks themselves,

characterized as whirlwinds. To answer the second question – what is power in the network

society? – I have investigated passages from the first two books of Castells' trilogy, statements he

makes in his article outlining the theoretical blueprint of the network society, and criticisms put

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forth by Felix Stalder: namely, that Castells uses at least two definitions of power throughout his

analysis; the first is not suited for the task he embarks upon and the second is under-developed.

As a result of my investigation into Castells' theory, I have concluded that he does not

provide an adequately clear and consistent foundation upon which the knowledge management

theorist can determine the extent to which businesses and organizations can influence the activities

of networks or through what practices they wield this influence. As Stalder points out when he

writes, “If the issue of programming were developed, it would help to clarify the nature and

organization of power specific to the network society” (2006, p. 134), the fundamental weakness in

the theoretical foundation Castells provides is his brief description of the concepts of programming

and switching.

More precisely, I argue that the inconsistency lies in the theoretical split between these two

concepts. The split between programming and switching is directly linked to at least two other

related and problematic theoretical divisions previously noted in my analysis and explicitly

mentioned by Castells. They are: the split between the Net and the Self, and the split between the

logic of structure and the logic of agency presented in section 5.3. The logic of the structure is

network logic (or the binary distinction between inclusion/exclusion) and it is this logic that

organizes the dominant processes and functions in society. When speaking of it, Castells seems to

use the Weberian notion of power by claiming that networks violently switch nodes on or off,

granting or blocking access to the network. Therefore, he connects the act of switching to network

logic and structure.

On the other side, social movements react to the violence of being switched off by appealing

to the logic of agency through the creation of collective identity projects to block network logic.

They employ a kind of logic that “goes beyond” the binary network logic of inclusion/exclusion

held by networks. While switching appears to be exclusive to networks, it seems that only human

beings have the ability to set and change programs. In this way, programming, identity, and the

logic of agency are all connected and set in opposition to switching, network logic, and structure.

39

However, although these oppositions are prevalent throughout Castells' theory, there are

points at which his words contradict the existence of such divisions. Take, for example, the

interrelated way in which he describes programming and switching, evidenced in section 6.2. All

this adds up to general confusion as to the location and nature of power in the network society, and

an opportunity for structuralist critiques of agency, making it difficult to answer the question the

knowledge management theorist/practitioner sets out to explore: To what extent are businesses and

organizations capable of influencing the activities of networks, and how is influence achieved?

While Castells seems content to accept the landscape of the network society as a

theoretically “structural schizophrenia between function and meaning” (Castells 2000, p. 3), doing

so damages the theory's applicability and use-value for knowledge management projects. For this

reason, the second half of my paper attempts to start down the path called for by Stalder, namely,

the further development of the concept of programming to explain power in the network society.

From this point forward, my analysis aims to suggest a direction of study that might prove useful to

the project Stalder sets out for us. That direction is the incorporation of concepts from Laclau and

Mouffe's discourse theory into Castells' discussion of programming and switching, which, I argue,

allows us to reunite the concepts and end the “structural schizophrenia” that thwarts further

knowledge management studies of the network society. In the next section, I begin down this path

by reviewing the clues to programming Castells leaves for us: the concepts of identity and culture.

8. The Clues to Programming: Identity & Culture

If the kind of power employed by social movements is indeed programming, and we want to

learn more about what programming really is, then we need to get to the heart of Castells'

discussion of power in social movements. At the centre of his analysis is the concept of identity,

which is evident in the title of the second book of his trilogy, The Power of Identity, in which he

discusses the role of social movements in the Information Age.

According to Castells, “the first historical steps of informational societies seem to

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characterize them by the pre-eminence of identity as their organizing principle” (2000, p. 22). This

is an interesting and somewhat alarming statement after reading The Network Society, in which the

main premise is that dominant processes and functions in society are organized in and around

networks and use network logic as their organizing principle. Right away, the reader knows that

Castells is presenting the network society through a different lens, and in this lens, identity plays a

major role. For this reason, it makes sense to examine identity closely for clues to the power of

social movements.

Castells defines identity, “as it refers to social actors”, as “...the process of construction of

meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attributes, that is given

priority over other sources of meaning” (2004a, p. 6). It is in this final conception of identity that I

argue the clues to programming lie. But first, let us break this statement down. This definition

applies to the identity of social actors. Obviously, Castells intends this to include, in the least,

human beings. It is unclear whether or not he might consider networks, as automatons and

whirlwinds, to be social actors as well, though it seems unlikely that he is making such a

consideration in this statement.

The next component of the definition is the construction of meaning. From this we can

confirm that Castells is taking a constructivist approach to his analysis, meaning that actors are

creating their own meaning for themselves. Continuing, this meaning is based upon a cultural

attribute or set of attributes as opposed to other sources of meaning. What these other sources of

meaning consist of is not discussed and may be considered a potential problem for the theory.

Moreover, it is difficult to compare meaning from cultural attributes to other sources of meaning

unless one first has a fair grasp on what Castells means by meaning based upon cultural attributes.

This final component leads us into the second concept in Castells' analysis of the power of identity

that might provide clues as to the nature of programming – that is: culture.

However, culture is another inadequately elaborated concept in the theory of the network

society. Again, Castells' discussion of culture tends to raise more questions than it answers. Yet

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helpful clues to the nature of programming are scattered throughout Castells' treatment of the topic,

and further investigation will be fruitful because the link between culture and programming is

actually quite blatant in Castells' work. He writes, “How actors of different kinds achieve the

programming of the network is a process specific to each network.... However, there is something

in common. Ideas, visions, projects, generate the programs. These are cultural materials” (2004b, p.

50). Here, we see that cultural materials are what generate programs. In other words, the process of

programming is intimately tied to culture. In this way, culture also acts as a link between the

discussion of the power of identity and the process of programming. Identities rely on culture for

their creation, and programs rely on culture in a similar fashion for their generation. More

specifically, program generation requires the following aspects of culture in particular: ideas,

visions, and projects.

Which cultural attributes are involved in identity creation is less clear. Castells concludes

that networks must have their own “cultural dimension” holding them together. However, it cannot

be a new, unifying culture because that goes against the diversity of networks and their subjects.

Still, Castells asserts that there is a “...common cultural code in the diverse workings of the network

enterprise. It is made of many cultures, many values, many projects, which cross through the minds

and inform the strategies of the various participants in the networks, changing at the same pace as

the network's members, and following the organizational and cultural transformation of the units of

the network” (2000, p. 214). Here, Castells basically claims that the thing holding networks

together, the common cultural code that makes them networks, is diverse and dynamic. It is so

diverse and dynamic, in fact, that he hardly makes any attempt to explain it further. However, he

does go on to write:

It is a culture, indeed, but a culture of the ephemeral, a culture of each strategic

decision, a patchwork of experiences and interests, rather than a charter of rights and

obligations. It is a multi-faceted, virtual culture, as in the visual experiences created

by computers in cyberspace by rearranging reality. It is not a fantasy, it is a material

force because it informs, and enforces, powerful economic decisions at every

moment in the life of the network. But it does not stay long: it goes into the

computer's memory as raw material of past successes and failures. The network

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enterprise learns to live within this virtual culture. Any attempt at crystallizing the

position in the network as a cultural code in a particular time and space sentences the

network to obsolescence, since it becomes too rigid for the variable geometry

required by informationalism. The 'spirit of informationalism' is the culture of

'creative destruction' accelerated to the speed of the optoelectronic circuits that

process its signals” (2000, p. 214-15).

While the culture of the network society may be so diverse and fleeting that it is impossible to pin

down, it is real. Its affects are seen throughout the network society and it informs and enforces

powerful economic decisions to become a dominate force in its own right. The nodes of networks

must learn to accept it, or be excluded from networks. It isn't a set of permanent, guiding values or

goals, like traditional cultures; rather, it is best described in the inherently contradictory term of

“creative destruction', a term Castells ultimately appeals to in order to describe the unifying culture

of the information age, but never elaborates upon.

Though Castells may not provide an explanation for creative destruction, I argue that

another theory – discourse theory as it is presented by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe – does,

and that the insights and concepts from this theory might also help us understand the true natures of

programming, switching and power in the network society.

9. Power & Identity in Discourse

At this point in my analysis, I would like to briefly outline the history of discourse theory

and its basic principles so that I might relate them back to the task at hand and use them to propose

an explanation for what Castells means by creative destruction.

In 1985, Laclau and Mouffe published Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical

Democratic Politics as a critique of structuralist Marxism and a proposal for a viable alternative.

Taking part in structuralist critiques of Marxism, discourse theorists of the time tried to take the

useful insights of such theories and incorporate them into a new, reformulated theory that would

take into account structuralist critiques (Howarth 2000, p. 11). Laclau and Mouffe's book put them

at the forefront of the post-structuralist movement. In it, they explicitly develop their version of

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discourse theory as a response to reductionist, essentialist critiques of Marxist theories (which they

themselves make), and they manage to create a theory that, I now attempt to show, can fill in the

missing pieces of Castells' conception of programming and switching to resolve the structuralist

critiques to which the theory of the network society falls prey. However, before I begin this

argument, I provide a summary of Laclau and Mouffe's conception of discourse theory as they

present it in their book in order to ground my analysis.

While other theorists such as Derrida and Foucault have also developed unique conceptions

of discourse theory, I have chosen to use only on Laclau and Mouffe's theory for reasons of clarity

and focus. A similar analysis using another theory, such as Foucault's Genealogical Analysis, in

place of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, goes beyond the scope of this paper and therefore is

not included here. I chose to use Laclau and Mouffe's version of discourse theory because various

theoretical similarities to Castells' theory of the network society allow the two theories to be

combined without damaging the original integrity of either individual theory. In section 11.3 I

elaborate upon this issue.

Please also note that a critical investigation into the soundness of Laclau and Mouffe's

discourse theory, hereafter referred to simply as discourse theory, is also beyond the scope of this

paper and is not included in my analysis. This is not to say, however, that the theory is uncontested

or that criticism of it would not prove damaging to my current analysis and conclusions. In light of

the limited scope of this paper, I adopt the premises of discourse theory as my own and work under

the assumption that the reader acknowledges this.

9.1. The Principles of Discourse

To summarize, the primary principle of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory is that a

discourse can never be complete. This principle needs some elaboration. First, one needs to identify

what a discourse is. A true, complete discourse would be a set of elements with fixed relationships

among them, in other words, a complete and permanent system of meaning. However, Laclau and

44

Mouffe assert that such fixed relationships are impossible to achieve. At best, these relationships

can only be partially-fixed, with some relationships more fixed than others. To understand this

better, it is helpful to look at how Laclau and Mouffe define the terms that they use. In the

following passage they present definitions for some of the most important concepts of their theory:

...we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such

that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured

totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. The

differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will

call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not discursively

articulated (2001, p. 105).

In this paragraph, we are given definitions for elements, moments, articulation and discourse.

Elements are symbols that do not have any meaning yet. They are also known as “floating

signifiers” because they act as meaningless signifiers waiting for a meaning to be attached to them.

In this way, elements have no prior identity or meaning and therefore no necessary identity or

meaning. An element can have any meaning attached to it and an element can be anything that can

have meaning attached to it. In other words, an element can be anything and has the potential to

mean anything.

Once an element has a meaning attached to it, it is no longer an element, but a moment. Just

as anything can be an element, everything has the potential to become a moment. However,

moments are just what the name implies – fleeting, so fleeting in fact, that they never truly exist.

Because the identities and meanings that make moments into moments are not attached to their

elements in any necessary way they are also reversible. Put differently, the connection between an

element and a given meaning that makes it a particular moment can always be broken, returning the

signifier back to the status of an element, or allowing it to become a new moment with a different

meaning attached to it.

The act of attaching a meaning or identity to an element is called articulation. However is it

deceiving to think that articulation is just a matter of assigning a particular meaning to a particular

signifier. Instead, imagine a space in which an infinite set of signifiers floats around freely. All the

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signifiers are equal in character and therefore impossible to tell apart from one another because they

have not yet been assigned any meaning. One could focus on a particular signifier, but as soon as it

continued to float around the sphere, which it would do immediately, one would no longer be able

to tell it apart from the others, but if one attached a meaning to the signifier relationally by fixing

the signifier in a single location within the sphere, one would be able to identify it by its location.

However, the space in which the signifiers (or elements) are floating is also infinite, so in order to

identify a particular location within the space one would have to do so by relating it back to the

locations of other fixed signifiers (or moments). The act of articulation is the attempt to make an

element a moment by trying to fix it in a certain position in relation to other moments. By

establishing a relative location for an element, the element gains an identity, or meaning, and

becomes an articulated moment. In this way, everything with any meaning has been placed in

relation to other articulatory moments. At the same time, anything can have meaning, because

everything is an element, so every identifiable thing falls somewhere in these discursive

relationships (Andersen 2003, p. 51).

These relations are created through two logics: the logic of equivalence and the logic of

difference. The logic of equivalence equates elements with one another, attaching them together

and creating shared identities. This is done by emphasizing their shared distance to an “Other” by

implying that “we are all the same in that we are different from x”. This “shared negation” binds the

elements together (Howarth 2001, p. 107). The logic of difference, on the other hand, disassociates

elements, separating them from one another. The logic of difference creates distinct and separate

identities, increasing the number of identities in a discursive formation, while the logic of

equivalence breaks up differences and simplifies the discursive formation by decreasing the number

of unique identities within it.

The field of possible meaning, or the space in which elements float, is called the field of

discursivity. Another way of thinking about discursivity is as an unstructured, fluid mass of

meaning. A complete set of articulated moments is called a discourse. In order for discourse to

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occur, then, all possible elements – in other words, all possible things in the world – would need to

be fully articulated as moments. Yet, Laclau and Mouffe assert “the impossibility of fixing ultimate

meanings”, making complete articulation impossible (2001, p. 111). Therefore, the process of

articulation never ends. As a result, true discourse is impossible to achieve. For this reason, the term

discursive formation is used in place of discourse to draw attention to the fact that it is not a

structured totally, but a continuous practice, operating through articulation. Only through this

practice can anything have meaning (Andersen 2003, p. 50).

The reason that an element can never be fully articulated is because elements do not have

any innate or necessary meaning attached to them. In this way, an element is like a blank canvas: it

can mean anything, but never fully because the element originally had, and will always retain, the

potential to mean something else. Because of this, identities are always challenged by the

possibility that they could be something else: an “Other”. Laclau and Mouffe note that “...the

presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being totally myself. The relation arises not from full

totalities, but from the impossibility of their constitution” (2001, p. 125). The presence of the

“Other”, as a result of the impossibility of totally fixing meanings, causes any meaning attached to

an element to remain artificial because the natural state of an element is to float within the field of

discursivity rather than to be fixed in a particular set of meaningful relations. The lingering

potential to mean anything can be theorised as a “surplus” of meaning still present in moments and

it is this surplus that makes complete articulation and true discourse impossible. Laclau and Mouffe

call the experience of this surplus antagonism.

However, it is also the case that “this 'surplus' is the necessary terrain for the constitution of

every social practice” (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. 111). In other words, antagonism is what makes

social practices possible. Within the idea that discourse is unachievable and complete articulation

can never happen, we find Laclau and Mouffe's answer to essentialist critiques of structuralism.

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9.2. Power of Articulation: Hegemony

In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Laclau and

Mouffe's goal is to create a theory that still incorporates the insights and theoretical tools of

structuralist Marxism, but avoids the essentialist critique by opening up structure to the possibility

of politics. Laclau and Mouffe claim that structuralism make politics impossible because people are

unable to change their world as a pre-existing and totally fixed structure determines social

relationships. In the case of Marxism, the organizing principle of society is the structure of the

material world, or more specifically the structure of the material world that is involved in the

production process and ideology creation.

In discourse theory, the struggle to create discourses – in other words, the conflicts between

attempts to fix privileged elements into moments – acts as the organizing principle. Using Laclau

and Mouffe's terms, hegemonic struggle is the organizing principle of society, where hegemonic

struggle means the competitive struggles to secure the dominance of one system of articulation over

another possible system. This is done through the struggle over articulating and creating nodal

points. Nodal points are privileged signifiers, or elements that are more fixed than others. They act

like landmarks in discursive formations, to which less fixed elements depend for meaning. The

semi-fixed nature of nodal points helps to stabilize necessarily contingent discursive formations,

providing at least the weak sense of stability required for social order. Which moments take on the

role of nodal points affects “...the conditions of conflicts within a specific discourse” because these

will be the future sites of continued hegemonic struggle (Andersen p. VII). Elements become nodal

points when they are frequently and continuously articulated in a discursive formation. Their

prevalence in a discursive formation gives them privileged status because they organize the

relationships of that discursive formation. This is important because without organization there is

no meaning, so it is only when elements are organized into relative relationships that they attain

meaning. In this way, nodal points help give other elements their meanings.

However, as we have already seen, these meanings are never necessary and therefore always

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open to change. Antagonism leaves open the possibility for power struggles concerning the

articulation of nodal points in a society at any given time. Without these power struggles there

would be no way to change society. By asserting that all meanings are relational, Laclau and

Mouffe show that the structure of meaning is, therefore, the structure and organization of relations.

To fix relations, which is impossible, would be to fix the organization of the structure, and vice

versa. But because meaning cannot be fixed, structures cannot be fixed either, allowing the

possibility for change in society and averting that critique of structuralism.

Because change is possible, there will be struggle to control it. People will either want to

avert it, initiate it or influence its direction. The struggle to control the pace and direction of change,

the struggle that occurs when many articulatory antagonisms “criss-cross” one another in the field

of discursivity, is hegemonic struggle (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. 135). Hegemony has its own logic

and this logic orders society and the meanings and identities within it. Laclau and Mouffe claim that

“the logic of hegemony, as a logic of articulation and contingency, has come to determine the very

identity of the hegemonic subjects” so that “unfixity has become the condition of every social

identity” (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. 85).

10. Creative Destruction: From Culture to Discourse

Now that the principles and conclusions of discourse theory are clear, it is easier to see how

the theory might help us understand what Castells means by creative destruction. Recall that

Castells uses the term creative destruction to describe the underlying culture of networks. Prior to

using this term, he tells his readers that the culture holding networks together is like a virtual

culture. It is a real force, but it is always changing because it exists within each strategic decision

and action occurring in networks. This observation is at the heart of the link between discourse

theory and creative destruction.

Just as discourses are never fully-achieved, network culture is never complete. In the same

moment that culture is created, it is destroyed. This idea reflects the contingency and open nature of

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articulation. Recall that culture makes up the building blocks of identities, and that “...identities

organize the meaning” (Castells 2004a, p. 7). If culture is characterized by creative destruction, then

it seems reasonable to expect that identity and meaning also retain these qualities. In discourse

theory, identities and meanings do have the characteristics of creative destruction and these

characteristics are explained and described through the ideas of antagonism and the 'surplus' of

meaning contained in elements and lingering in moments. Because elements have no necessary

meaning (or identities) attached to them, they always retain the potential to mean anything, even

during the articulation process, the time during which they are closest to becoming actual moments.

This surplus of meaning makes it impossible to fix identities (or create true moments), allowing

hegemonic struggle over how elements are articulated to occur.

Hegemonic struggle is the process of creative destruction. By simultaneously employing the

logics of equivalence and difference, those engaged in hegemonic struggles in society seek to both

destroy current nodal points and re-articulate them into new nodal points. For this reason, the act of

articulation and its resulting hegemonic struggle is creative destruction. As already shown in section

8, Castells links culture, identity and meaning to the power present in social movements. Therefore,

if creative destruction is at the heart of meaning and identity, and discourse theory explains creative

destruction, it makes sense to investigate whether or not discourse theory is also capable of

contributing to the explanation of power in social movements. In the next section I show how the

concepts of discourse theory can be directly applied to the examples Castells provides to illustrate

the power of social movements.

10.1. Articulating Identity

In The Power of Identity, Castells examines some of the most prevalent social movements of

recent times. To show how discourse theory can be applied to, and enhance, his discussion of the

power of social movements, I focus on three of the examples he provides – the feminist movement,

the gay/lesbian movement, and the environmental movement – and identify the hegemonic

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struggles taking place in each.

The goal of the feminist movement is to redefine of the concept of woman. Castells calls our

attention to this when he writes, “...the essence of feminism, as practised and as narrated, is the

(re)definition of woman's identity: sometimes by affirming equality between men and women, thus

de-gendering biological/cultural differences; in other instances, on the contrary, as affirming the

essential specificity of women” (2004a, p. 234). This statement can be seen as evidence that woman

is the nodal point around which the hegemonic struggles of feminism revolve. Moreover, the

struggle to redefine woman involves using the logic of equivalence to break apart the distinction

between women and men (e.g. we are all people, as opposed to, say, animals), as well as using the

logic of difference to create a new, distinct identity of woman.

A more specific example of the logic of difference in action is apparent when Castells

continues the passage, writing: “In all cases, through equality, difference, or separation, what is

negated is woman's identity as defined by men, and as enshrined in the patriarchal family” (2004a,

p. 234). Here, Castells notes the separation of woman and the patriarchal family and identifies

another nodal point at the heart of the hegemonic struggle carried out by feminists: the patriarchal

family itself.

Patriarchalism has its own discursive formation, and the struggle over woman affects it

because woman is also a nodal point for that discursive formation. Through the redefinition of

woman, other nodal points in the discursive formation of patriarchalism are shaken because one of

the nodal points that helped secure their meaning has become even more unstable. By redefining

women's roles, the concept of family is suddenly opened up to the possibility of change. Out of the

loosening of the nodal points of patriarchalism comes the potential for another social movement:

the gay/lesbian movement.

The gay/lesbian movement struggles to redefine the nodal point family so that

heterosexuality is no longer linked with it. While the gay/lesbian movement clearly struggles to

redefine the meaning of relationships in many areas, family stands out as a prime battle ground for

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determining what kinds of relationships are acceptable in society. Castells notes, “This coherent

system of domination, which links the corridors of power to the pulse of the libido through

mothering, fathering, and the family, does have a weak link: the heterosexual assumption. If this

assumption is challenged, the whole system crumbles” (2004, p. 262). In other words, sexuality

plays a large role in our understanding of family. By using the logic of difference to break the link

between heterosexuality and family the gay/lesbian movement further destabilizes the discursive

formation of patriarchalism. Although feminism and the gay/lesbian movement each have their own

discursive formation and hegemonic battles to pursue, both of their struggles have pegged them

against the discursive formation of patriarchalism. Their attempts to redefine family and woman

have shaken loose two of the nodal points at the heart of the discursive formation of patriarchalism.

Central to the hegemonic struggles of the environmentalist movement are the same three

concepts, or nodal points, Castells identifies as central to social movements' attempts to block

network logic. He writes, “resistance and projects contradict the dominant logic of the network

society by engaging in defensive and offensive struggles around three foundational realms of this

new social structure: space, time, and technology” (2004a, p. 423). Recall that changes in space,

time and technology have been fundamental to the emergence of the network society. Castells

argues that space and time have been redefined to take on new meanings in the network society. In

fact, the redefinition of space and time is at the heart of the unease with which people experience

network logic. Reacting to this logic, social movements try to redefine the ideas of space and time

by either reverting back to a former understanding or trying to install a new way of thinking about

these concepts within society at large. To make this argument, Castells provides many examples of

prevalent social movements and how they have engaged in a battle over the meanings of space and

time in an effort to block the spread and influence of network logic, but of all of these examples, the

environmental movement is perhaps the most successful.

At the heart of the environmental movement is a battle over the nodal point time.

Environmentalists try to combat timeless time by redefining time as “glacial”. Rather than focusing

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on the immediate affects of our actions, environmentalists ask us to consider the long-term affects

of the choices we make today. The affects are slow moving, but over time they amount to huge

changes in the environment, similar to the slow movement but high impact of a glacier on a

landscape. According to Castells, the environmental movement represents probably the most

important hegemonic struggle over time in the network society (Castells 2004, p. 182).

In their effort to make people value the environment around them, environmentalists also

struggle to control our understanding of spaces. The network society is characterized by the fact that

society's most important activities happen within the space of flows, within digital networks. This

devalues the space of places and the environment that makes up those physical places. By

reaffirming the value of these physical locations, environmentalists combat the network logic

supporting the space of flows.

Finally, the environmental movement takes part in a hegemonic struggle over the meaning

of technology by lobbying for “the science of life versus life under science” (Castells 2004, p. 186).

Environmentalists assert that science should serve to protect life; life should not be exploited to

serve the goals of science. Rather, life should be the goal of science. Therefore, scientific

advancements should strive to protect the environment rather than to exploit the environment for

the convenience of human beings.

All three of these battles, or hegemonic struggles, add up to “...the creation of a new

identity, a biological identity, a culture of the human species as a component of nature” (Castells

2004a, p. 184). By attempting to redefine time as glacial rather than timeless, reaffirm the value of

physical places over virtual spaces, and re-evaluate the goals of science, the environmental

movement has created a new identity and a new culture that see humans beings as components of

nature. In other words, the hegemonic struggles taking place over time, space and technology add

up to a new discursive formation. New identities and meanings are created, and the identity at the

heart of the environmental movement's discursive formation is human beings as part of the natural

world. Here, environmentalists use the logic of equivalence to break apart the separation between

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the human world and the world of nature.

All of these examples indicate how social movements aim to block the logic of networks. As

we have seen, the practice through which social movements wield this influence can be described

through the practice of articulation as it is presented in discourse theory.

10.2. Hegemony: The Articulation of Value

Up to now, we have seen that discourse theory can help explain the power of social

movements and their ability to block the switching power of networks; however, it remains to be

shown that this power is, in fact, the same programming and switching power that programs

networks. In this section, I show that the power in social movements is programming and switching,

and how the same concepts that helped us understand programming in social movements can help

us understand programming in networks. To do this, I analyse Castells' words on the changing

concept of value in networks, particularly the meta-network of financial flows to which Castells

gives privileged status.

To remove any lingering doubt as to whether or not the power of identity Castells claims

social movements have is the same programming power that he claims exists in networks, one need

not look any further than the following quote: “...resistance to power is effected through the same

two mechanisms that constitute power in the network society: the programs of the networks, and the

switches between networks. Thus, collective action from social movements, under their different

forms, aims at introducing new instructions and new codes into the networks' programs” (Castells

2004b, p. 52). In this passage, Castells makes it clear that social movements aim to block

networking logic through the very same processes networks employ: programming and switching.

Therefore, because the insights of discourse theory, particularly the concepts of articulation and

hegemonic struggle, helped explain programming and switching in social movements, it is

reasonable to hypothesize that they might help explain programming and switching in networks.

Although Castells gives many examples of power in social movements, his discussion of

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power in networks is indirect and minimal; however, he does identify at least one very important

struggle for power taking place in networks: the struggle to define value. For Castells, value is the

“...expression of power: whoever holds power (often, different from whoever is in government)

decides what is valuable” (Castells 2004b, p. 37). Therefore, defining value is a type of power in

itself. But why is the ability to define value a kind of power?

The answer: because value is a nodal point for all discursive formations. Castells notes that

“...ideas, and a specific set of ideas could assert themselves as the truly supreme value (such as

preserving our planet, our species), as a precondition for everything else” (2004b, p. 39). By saying

that value is a precondition for everything else, Castells says that the meaning of value must be

established before the meaning of other things can be determined. In this way, value acts as a

privileged signifier, or nodal point, to which other elements are related in order to be articulated.

Just like in discourse theory, the concept of value is specific to each network because its

meaning depends on each network's unique “logic of value making” and program (Castells 2004b,

p. 36). In the following paragraph, Castells provides an example of how a network is being

reprogrammed through the process of re-articulating value. He writes,

An example of the new codes in the global financial networks is the project of

evaluating company stocks according to their environmental ethics in the hope that

this ultimately would impact the attitude of investors and shareholders vis a vis

companies deemed to be bad citizens of the planet. Under these conditions, the code

of economic calculation shifts from growth potential to sustainable growth potential

(2004b, p. 52).

Here, Castells illustrates how value is being re-articulated in global financial networks to include

environmental ethics. Through the attachment of value to the environment, the meaning of value

has changed, affecting the entire discursive formation of global financial flows by changing the

relationships between value and all other moments in the discursive formation. In this way, the re-

articulation of value has reprogrammed that network.

Because value is a nodal point common to all discursive formations, it is an important

landmark in the landscape of discursivity, and like all important nodal points, it becomes a site of

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hegemonic struggle. The re-articulation of value to include environmental ethics in the discursive

formation of global financial flows has not happened on its own. Rather, it is the result of a

hegemonic struggle to control the meaning of value. Involved in this hegemonic struggle is the

environmental movement whose impact and activities have already been noted in section 10.1.

Value has always been an important and contested nodal point in society, but in the new

network architecture it is even less stable because each network has its own understanding of value,

making the power relations between networks “critical” as they compete over the meaning of value

(Castells 2004b, p. 37). On top of this, compared with old, hierarchical structures of power making,

networks are characterized by a horizontal or flat organizational structure, increasing the number of

players involved in the process of articulating value in a network and complicating the process

through which value is assigned (Castells 2000, p. 155). For example, capitalism, while still present

in the global network of financial flows, is not the only influence on the meaning of value in this

network; environmental considerations factor in as well (Castells 2004b, p. 39).

In addition to the increased number of players in the articulation process, another factor

complicates hegemonic struggle in the network society; that is, the increased speed of the

articulation process. The very same telecommunications technologies that enable networks to

transcend the limits of space and time have sped up the communications processes that constitute

articulation. Because of this, value is articulated or “...processed in every dominant network at

every time in every space” (Castells 2004b, p. 39). The result is an ever-increasing level of

complexity and confusion that contributes to the sensation that the network society is a state of

meta-social disorder ruled by an uncontrollable logic. The following passage exemplifies this:

“...the performance of companies, supply and demand, macro-economic indicators, interact with

various sources of information in an increasingly unpredictable pattern, where valuation may be

ultimately decided by random combinations of a multiplicity of factors recombining at increasing

levels of complexity, as the speed and volume of transactions continues to accelerate” (Castells

2000, p. 159). This sentence shows that Castells attributes the complexity of articulating value to

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the increasing number of players participating in the process of articulation and the increasing speed

with which it occurs. It also shows that the consequence of this complexity is a certain sense of

randomness and contingency to the meaning of value in the network of financial flows.

Ultimately, the contingent and never complete meaning of value extends to all networks and

leads to “structurally induced instability” in the network society (Castells 2000, p. 134), the very

same structurally induced instability discourse theory attributes to the necessarily open nature of

discourse. In this way, one can see that understanding programming and switching as two parts of

the process of articulation helps to clarify Castells' observations.

11. Towards a Solid Theoretical Foundation

Now that I have analysed Castells' accounts of power in both social movements and

networks using concepts from discourse theory, I would like to clarify the conclusions I mean to

draw from this analysis. This section of my paper aims to elaborate upon how understanding

programming and switching as two parts of discursive articulation and hegemonic struggle can

resolve the confusion regarding where and what power is in the network society.

In section 6, I determined that Castells' theory could not adequately answer the question

“what is power?” because Castells employs at least two distinct notions of power, each with their

own problems and inconsistencies. The first, the Weberian definition of power, is ill-suited for the

task of describing power in the network society, because it cannot describe power as multi-

directional or without an agent to enact it. The second definition, power as the processes of

programming and switching, is underdeveloped and involves a problematic separation between

between two related processes.

This last criticism brings me to the problems I encountered while trying to determine the

location of power from Castells' own words. Because we don't know how programming and

switching really work, we have difficulty locating these process within the landscape of the network

society. At points, the theoretical separation between programming and switching seems to imply a

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divide between the power of social movements and the power of networks, with social movements

employing programming and networks using switching. Yet at other times, Castells says that social

movements use switching to block the binary network logic at the heart of switching, while

simultaneously hinting that they wield some additional power through identity capable of “going

beyond” network logic. Finally, Castells confuses the location of power even more by including

another kind of agent into the mix – the networks themselves, characterized an uncontrollable

whirlwind – which seems to control the dominant processes of society and undermine, or even

cancel, the power of human beings.

Conceptualizing programming as the process of articulation, and switching as a part of that

process, solves these problems and secures the theory of power in the network society from these

critiques.

11.1. What Is Power? Articulation as Programming and Switching

To reiterate, Castells is clear that the processes of programming and switching constitute

power. Through programming, cultural codes are created and arranged to constitute the goals of a

network. Determining what value is in each network is at the heart of programming a networks'

goals. Through switching the binary logic of networks is manifested, connecting and disconnecting

nodes and networks, and networks and other networks. A node or network can be connected to

another network “...as long as they share the same communication codes (for example, values or

performance goals)” (Castells 2000, p. 501), but as we have already seen, goals and values are

determined by programming (Castells 2004b, p. 2). In other words, goals determine which nodes

and networks should be switched on and which should be switched or kept off, yet goal setting

occurs through programming. Because of this, programming and switching are two aspects, or

perceptions, of the same practice; however, Castells never analyses them as a whole or gives this

combined practice a name.

I argue that this practice is actually the same practice of articulation Laclau and Mouffe

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describe. In discourse theory, articulation is power and hegemonic struggle is the struggle to obtain

this power by successfully articulating a given element. Articulation takes place through the logics

of equivalence and difference. These logics connect and disconnect elements in a fashion similar to

the binary logic of inclusion/exclusion operating in switching power, but in the process of doing so

they attempt to articulate moments, or assign meanings, to elements. In this way, they create

meaning. Castells writes that: “...networks do more than organizing activity and sharing

information. They are the actual producers, and distributors, of cultural codes” (2004a, p. 427).

Networks don't just organize the dominant functions and processes in society, they create the

meaning of these activities through the process of developing their discursive formations. These

discursive formations are created “not only over the Net, but also in their multiple forms of

exchange and interaction. Their impact on society rarely stems from a concerted strategy,

masterminded by a center. Their most successful campaigns, their most striking initiatives, often

result from 'turbulences' in the interactive network of multilayered communication (Castells 2004a,

p. 427-8). It is through communication that networks create meaning and communication can take

many forms. While written and spoken text are part of communication, they do not exhaust the

concept of communication. Rather, all exchanges and interactions contribute to the creation of

meaning. In this way, articulation is communication; it is an on-going practice, not the result of a

practice (Howarth 2000, p. 101).

11.2. Where Is Power? Multi-directional Interaction

Once one understands power as an on-going practice – the interactive practice of articulation

– it becomes possible to locate power within the network society; if power is a practice, it exists

within that practice. In this case that practice is the interactive, communicative activity of

articulation. In other words, power exists within the interaction between human beings. In the

following passage, Castells notes how programming and switching occur through human

interaction. He writes:

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More often than not these mechanisms [programming and switching] operate at the

interface between various social actors, defined in terms of their position in the social

structure, and in the organizational framework of society. Thus, I suggest that the

power holders are networks themselves. Not abstract, consciousless networks, not

automata: they are humans organized around their projects and interests. But they are

not single actors (individuals, groups, classes, religious leaders, political leaders)

since the exercise of power in the network society requires a complex set of joint

action, that goes beyond alliances to become a new form of subject... (2004b, p. 49).

Here, Castells shows how programming and switching happen in the interactions between social

actors, or the interface between them. Networks are the power holders of the network society

because they are the of flows of interactive, communicative practices that constitute this interface.

They are a new form of subject because they are not a single entity. In fact, they are not an entity at

all; rather, they are activity, organized in a particular fashion. In this way, networks hold power

because they structure activity, but human beings still play an integral role in the execution of the

practices that constitute power: programming and switching. In the network society, just as in

discourse theory, meaning organizes structure and structure organizes meaning. In the same ways

that programming and switching are inter-related and dependent concepts, meaning and structure

share a mutually affecting relationship because one cannot exist without the presence of the other

and both are necessarily contingent and incomplete.

Re-conceptualizing power as an interactive process helps avoid the “analytical dead end”

one encounters if one tries “...to answer one dimensionally: The Source of Power as a single entity”

(Castells 2004b, p. 47-8). As a practice, power can be multi-directional and involve multiple agents

simultaneously, answering the first two criticisms Stalder puts forth. If one thinks of power as the

practice of articulation, power can flow in any direction, and because it exists within the

interactions of people, it does not need to be connected to a single, particular agent. In this way, the

flow of power is multi-directional and, in a sense, agent-free, meeting the criteria Stalder sets out.

Moving on to the next critique identified in section 6.2, recall that Castells claims that

“between nodes in the network and outside the network, distance is infinite, since there is no access

unless the program of the network is changed” (2004b, p. 3), yet networks must be programmed and

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reprogrammed from the “outside”. Our revised understanding of power in the network society

resulting from the incorporation of concepts from discourse theory addresses this problem. By

breaking up the closed structure of relationships, discourse theory breaks up the closed structure of

networks, making them porous and placing them in a larger social context capable of change.

Laclau and Mouffe write:

The hegemonic subject, as the subject of any articulatory practice, must be partially

exterior to what it articulates – otherwise, there would not be any articulation at all.

On the other hand, however, such exteriority cannot be conceived as that existing

between two different ontological levels. Consequently, it would seem that the

solution is to reintroduce our distinction between discourse and general field of

discursivity: in that case, both the hegemonic force and the ensemble of hegemonized

elements would constitute themselves on the same plane – the general field of

discursivity – while the exteriority would be that corresponding to different

discursive formations (2001 p. 135).

Here, we see how the “infinite social distance” between nodes switched off from a network and the

network itself is broken down. Castells writes that a network must be programmed from the

“outside”, yet those outside a network have no access to it. Thinking about a network as a discursive

formation, or each network having its own discursive formation, eliminates this contradiction. All

people and things, including all networks, remain inside the field of discursivity. This is what allows

them to act upon one another. Different discursive formations exist within this field of discursivity,

so a particular agent can be both simultaneously outside of a particular discursive formation, but

still inside the field of discursivity alongside a network it is excluded from. In this way, agents

excluded from a network's discursive formation can still reprogram that network by engaging in

hegemonic struggles to re-articulate the nodal points of the discursive formation in which that

network is involved.

By incorporating the concept of articulation, we manage to keep the idea of a structural

influence (and the power of network logic and its binary form) but still open up the structure to

outside influence and re-empower people theoretically. In this way, conceptualizing programming

and switching as two perspectives on the practice of articulation eliminates the problematic

theoretical splits between programming and switching, and structure and agency. Moreover, the

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structuralist critiques that agency had disappeared and change could not be explained have been

averted. Through hegemonic struggle, discourse theory provides a mechanism to explain historical

change within the network society and how human agents are involved in bringing about that

change.

11.3. Theoretical Integrity

Integrating discourse theory into the theory of the network society fills in the missing gaps

surrounding the nature of programming and switching and generally clarifies the definition of

power and the location of power in the network society, but before the knowledge management

theorist can proceed with confidence, it must be shown that doing so does not damage the integrity

of Castells' theory. In other words, we need to be sure that incorporating discourse theory as

suggested does not take away from the useful insights and observations that make Castells'

Information Age so revolutionary and unique. The most important claim of the theory of the

network society is that “...dominant functions and processes in the Information Age are increasingly

organized around networks” (Castells 2000, p. 500). Therefore, it is this statement and the

subsequent insights it implies that need to be maintained.

Networks are made up of nodes that function collaboratively to achieve a goal, where no

single node dominates their collaboration. Therefore, the goals of a network are not controlled by

any one node. According to Castells, the goals of a network are determined by the program of the

network, making the programmers the power-holders. From this, one can conclude that there cannot

be a single, dominating programmer of a network. Understanding programming as hegemonic

struggle fits with this idea because hegemonic struggle is an interactive process that is never

complete. No one can ever assert the supremacy of a particular discursive formation; no one can

ever completely control meaning because by its nature, meaning is always contingent.

Castells writes, “We know what it is, yet we cannot seize it because power is a function of

an endless battle around the cultural codes of society. Whoever, or whatever, wins the battle of

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people's minds will rule.... But victories may be ephemeral, since the turbulence of information

flows will keep codes in a constant swirl” (Castells 2004a, p. 425). Here, Castells echoes the

contingency celebrated in discourse theory when he says that we are involved in an endless battle to

control people's minds. To fight the battle, people constantly try to redefine – or re-articulate – and

fix the meaning of certain ideas in society, like woman, family, space, time, technology, and, more

generally, value. But information is turbulent, articulation is incomplete, and the struggle never

ends. Because of this, “...the old question of the industrial society, indeed the corner stone of

classical political economy, namely 'what is value?', has no definite answer in the network society”

(Castells 2004b, p. 39). Just as in industrial society, the meaning of value cannot be fixed.

Therefore, discourse theory is as relevant to describing the nature of influence in the network

society as it is to describing the nature of influence in industrial societies.

But if this is the case, one might wonder what it is that is new about the network society. If

discourse theory complements Castells' theory of the network society in these ways, what unique

observations and conclusions does Castells add? In other words, what is new in the theory of the

network society? One need only to review Castells' theoretical blueprint for the answer. He writes,

“What is actually new, both technologically and socially, is a society built around microelectronics-

based information technologies” (2004b, p. 7). Improved telecommunications technologies have

had a huge impact on the organizational structure of society, increasing opportunities for

collaboration by circumventing the physical limitations of time and space. Doing so has flattened

organizations and increased the number of players competing in hegemonic struggles.

Moreover, improved technologies have sped up the communication processes through which

articulation and hegemonic struggle – or as Castells would say, programming and switching –

occur. The result is a society based on ever more volatile and contingent relationships.

Technological advancements have increased the speed and frequency of articulatory practices and

therefore increased the speed and frequency of hegemonic struggle and change in the network

society. In short, the discursive formations of the Information Age are more unstable than ever

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before and this instability increases correspondingly to the pace of technological advancements;

creative destruction is continuously “... accelerated to the speed of the optoelectronic circuits that

process its signals” (Castells 2000, p. 214-15). In this way, the incorporation of discourse theory

does not damage the conclusions and observations Castells puts forth; rather, it reinforces and

elaborates upon them.

12. Conclusions

I began my analysis by identifying the main question Castells' theory of the network society

poses for the knowledge management theorist/practitioner: How can businesses and organizations

manage their participation in networks to improve their knowledge utilization, generation, and

sharing practices? However, I determined that before one could begin such an investigation, two

premises had to be supported: 1) that we know the extent to which businesses and organizations are

capable of influencing the activities of networks, and 2) that we understand how influence functions

in the network society and how businesses and organizations can participate in it. Therefore, the

specific question guiding my analysis became: To what extent are businesses and organizations

theoretically capable of influencing the activities of networks, and how is influence achieved?

I set out to examine Castells' text for answers to this question, focusing on two related

questions Castells himself poses: where and what is power in the network society? After a close

analysis of Castells' own words, a summary of criticisms posed by Felix Stalder, and my own

elaboration upon those criticisms, I concluded that Castells does not provide either an explicitly

clear set of answers to these questions or a theoretical foundation upon which one could construct

such answers without first incorporating additional theoretical tools.

My reason for concluding this was that Castells uses multiple and inconsistent definitions of

power throughout his analysis. Of these, the first is inadequate to the task of describing the network

society because it cannot explain power as multi-directional or agent-free. The second, power as the

processes of programming and switching, is under-developed. Moreover, the implied theoretical

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division between the concepts of programming and switching proves problematic when elsewhere

in the analysis these processes appear to be inter-related. In addition to this, Castells' discussion of

the conflict between the Net and the Self, combined with his description of the sensation that the

network society as a meta-social disorder ruled by the uncontrollable and nearly unintelligible logic

of networks, opens up the theory to the structuralist critique that human agency appears lost and

historical change is difficult to explain.

More specifically, I noted that while Castells' main claim is that the dominant functions and

processes in the information age are organized in and around networks operating on a binary logic

of inclusion/exclusion, he also claims that another, separate process plays an integral role in the

network society – the formation and expression of social movements and their identities. Social

movements are characterized by their aim to block the binary network logic that organizes the

dominant processes in society. At points, Castells states that social movements employ the same

tactics as networks – programming and switching – paradoxically employing network logic in their

quest to block network logic. Elsewhere, however, Castells attributes to social movements a power

that “goes beyond” binary network logic. What it is that “goes beyond” network logic, seems, in his

analysis, to be located in identity and the process of selecting cultural attributes to create identities.

Still, Castells does not fully explore exactly what this is and how it functions. He briefly

mentions the process of programming and its connection to identity creation and the power human

beings hold in the Information Age, but he never touches upon how two very different logics,

network logic and the transcending logic of social movements, and two theoretically separate power

processes, switching and programming, can coexist within a single social movement. Moreover, he

only very briefly describes the processes of programming and switching or the role they play in the

network society. These discrepancies and loose ends, coupled with Castells' description of a new,

faceless capitalist manifested as a whirlwind whipping through the space of flows, leaves the reader

unsure as to how Castells would answer the question guiding my analysis: To what extent are

businesses and organizations theoretically capable of influencing the activities of networks, and

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how is influence achieved?

In the second half of the paper I aimed to expand upon Castells' discussion of programming

and switching in order to resolve these discrepancies and loose ends. Following Stalder's suggestion

that more attention needs to be paid to the concept of programming (Stalder 2006, p. 140), I

reviewed Castells' texts for clues that might lead to a better understanding of this process. I found

those clues in his discussion of identity and culture, particularly in the section in which he refers to

the culture of networks as a culture of “creative destruction”. In order to elaborate on the meaning

of creative destruction I turned to Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory. Using concepts at the heart

of discourse theory – articulation, structural openness, and contingency – I theorized how creative

destruction can be understood to represent the continuous process of creation, destruction, and re-

creation of meaning in the network society. From there, I went on to analyse Castells' words on

social movements and value creation through the lens of discourse theory, showing how the logics

of equivalence and difference are used in hegemonic struggles over the articulation of discursive

nodal points such as space, time and value itself.

As a result of this analysis, I would like to suggest that programming and switching can be

better understood by theorizing them as two different descriptions of the same process: the process

of articulation described in discourse theory. On the one side, switching captures the binary nature

of the logics of equivalence and difference through which articulation occurs. On the other side, the

idea of programming reflects the contingent, open and created nature of meaning.

Uniting programming and switching through the process of articulation and the concept of

hegemonic struggle solves both the question about what power is and the question regarding where

it is located. As Castells tells us, power is programming and switching; therefore, if programming

and switching are the process of articulation, then power is articulation. This clearly answers the

first question: what is power in the network society? As for the second question, power lies within

the act of articulation. Those involved in articulation are the power holders. Those “winning” a

particular hegemonic struggle over the articulation of nodal points are the dominant power-holders.

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This interpretation ends any doubt as to the influence human beings have on their world, resolving

structuralist criticisms regarding a lack of agency or way to explain historical change in society.

Finally, conceptualizing programming and switching as articulation alleviates the conflict

between Castells' statements that 1) networks are programmed from the “outside”, and 2) that those

outside a network are at an “infinite social distance” from it. Through discourse theory, an agent

may be disassociated from a particular discursive formation, in other words be “outside” of it, but

still be involved in the hegemonic struggle over its nodal points, in other words its programming,

because both the network and those “outside” it exist within the common field of discursivity where

hegemonic struggle takes place. In this way, an agent maybe be outside the realm of a particular

discursive formation, but still able to act on it through the process of articulation (or programming).

Incorporating concepts from discourse theory fills in the missing theoretical pieces noted in

the first half of this paper to provide a clear answer to the question guiding my analysis: To what

extent are businesses and organizations capable of influencing the activities of networks, and how is

influence achieved? Businesses and organizations do have influence over the activities of networks

and it is achieved through their participation in the articulatory practices of networks. In other

words, through their actions within a network, the people that make up an organization are

constantly involved in the process of articulating that network's program, either reaffirming the

dominant articulations of nodal points or challenging them by attempting to articulate the nodal

points in another way. The extent of an organization's influence depends on its ability to

successfully engage in the hegemonic struggles taking place over the nodal points central to the

network's program.

With the incorporation of concepts from discourse theory, the knowledge management

theorist/practitioner has at least one possible theoretical foundation upon which he or she can

proceed to investigate the original question: How can businesses and organizations manage their

participation in networks to improve their knowledge utilization, generation, and sharing practices?

However, even with a solid theoretical foundation, a great deal of work remains. In fact the very

67

nature of the network society – that the networking form of organization is becoming ever more

prevalent – complicates hegemonic struggle in networks by speeding up the frequency and volume

of articulation. As technology speeds up communication, and networks diffuse activities central to

the articulation of nodal points across a vast sea of participants, the game of power and meaning, a

game in which “the rules and the players are never fully explicit” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001 p. 193),

becomes ever more complex and contingent. Understanding the hegemonic struggles of the network

society, and the role individual businesses and organizations play in them, is just one of the many

challenges facing the knowledge management theorist in the Information Age.

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13. References:

Andersen, Niels Åkerstrøm. (2003). Discursive analytical strategies. Understanding Foucault,

Koselleck; Laclau, Luhmann. Bristol: Policy Press.

Castells, Manuel. (2000). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume I: The Rise

the Network Society, 2nd

Edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Castells, Manuel. (2004a). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume II: The

Power of Identity, 2nd

Edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Castells, Manuel. (2004b). “Informationalism, Networks, and the Network Society: A Theoretical

Blueprint” in The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Ed. by Manuel Castells.

Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. [Online]. Available:

http://annenberg.usc.edu/images/faculty/facpdfs/Informationalism.pdf.

Howarth, David. (2000). Discourse. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Knowledge Lab. (2006). Post-Ontology and Network Society. [Online]. Available:

http://www.knowledgelab.dk/now/news/symposium.

Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal. (2001). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical

Democratic Politics, 2nd

Edition. London: Verso.

Stalder, Felix. (2005). Open Cultures and the Nature of Networks. [Online]. Available:

http://felix.openflows.com/pdf/Notebook_eng.pdf. [Biography of Author only, p. 89].

Stalder, Felix. (2006). Manuel Castells and the Theory of the Network Society. Polity Press.

[Online). Available: http://felix.openflows.com/html/castells_polity.html. [Introduction,

Chapters 4 and 5 only].

University of Southern California Website. (2007). USC Annenberg / Manuel Castells. [Online].

Available: http://annenberg.usc.edu/Faculty/Communication/CastellsM.aspx.