December 13, 1920G.R. No. 15149[[1]]

DOLORES RUSTIA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.MAXIMIANO FRANCO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.STREET, J.:The plaintiff, Dolores Rustia, brought this action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga to secure an injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting bamboo from certain land alleged to belong to the plaintiff and to recover damages for the plants already cut. In accordance with the prayer of the complaint, a preliminary injunction was issued ex parte upon the giving of a bond. Some of the defendants answered, denying participation in the alleged trespasses and disclaiming all interest in the land from which the bamboo in question had been cut, while three, to wit, Cecilio Franco, Benito Laren, and Mariano Manalili, admitted that bamboo had been cut by them from the land described in the complaint or in that vicinity but asserted that said land belonged to Benito Laren, Mariano Manalili, and Gregoria Dizon, wife of the defendant Cecilio Franco.It appears in evidence, and was found by the trial judge, that the defendants have at various times, not only in 1917 but in several previous years, cut bamboo from a cañaveral lying on both sides of the estero Macabucod, but the proof does not show with any certainty how many bamboo had been cut by them on either side of the estero. The plaintiff claims that the land of which she is the owner comprises an area of nearly 24 hectares, lying on the north side of the estero Macabucod, which said estero forms the southern boundary of part of the property. We consider the title of the plaintiff to the parcel in question to be fully proved by the documents introduced in evidence as well as by oral evidence. In this connection it appears that the plaintiff is a grand daughter of Doña Eulalia Bartolome, who died testate on August 12, 1899, at the age of 84. The aforesaid Doña Eulalia is said to have acquired the property from Potenciano Eugenio y Camacho, a resident of Malabon, who had obtained a composition title thereto in the year 1888. The document accrediting the ownership of Potenciano Eugenio y Camacho was presented in evidence by the plaintiff as Exhibit A. The introduction of said document was objected to by the attorney for the defendants, but this objection was overruled. In December of the year 1904, the descendants of Eulalia Bartolome entered into a partition agreement by which the property of their said ancestor was divided, upon which occasion the low in question was assigned to the plaintiff. No document was introduced to show how the title to said parcel had passed from Potenciano Eugenio to Eulalia Bartolome; but in view of the long continued possession of Dolores Rustia, as heir and successor of Eulalia Bartolome, it is unnecessary to trace the title further back than to Eulalia Bartolome. The Exhibit B, which is the deed by which the heirs of Eulalia Bartolome partitioned her property among themselves, must be considered properly before the court in relation with, and as explanatory of the testimony of the plaintiff, Dolores Rustia. Upon the statements made by her, corroborated by the testimony of witnesses introduced in her behalf, it is clear that she has maintained actual possession from the date of the partition, subject only to

the occasional wrongful intrusion thereon of the defendants. The result is that the defendants in cutting bamboo under claim of ownership on the north side of the estero Macabucod have unjustifiably invaded the plaintiff's rights, and the question now is, whether the defendants can be permanently enjoined from the repetition of these acts.The trial judge was of the opinion that an injunction suit could not be maintained; and he accordingly dismissed the case, relying upon the authority of the decision of this court in Liongson vs. Martinez (36 Phil., 948). The case was accordingly brought to his court upon appeal by the plaintiff, Dolores Rustia.It must be admitted that some of the language used in the case cited seems to support the position of the trial judge, but that was a case where the plaintiff sought by means of a preliminary injunction to oust the defendants from possession. The practice there reprobated by this court was the granting of preliminary injunction with a view of disturbing a person in possession who is claiming title as owner.As appears from numerous decision of this court, of which Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil., 273), is an example, it is considered inexpedient to allow the actual possessor of land to be disturbed or ejected by means of a preliminary injunction while the title remains undecided. The plaintiff, being out of possession, should not be given the benefit of the extraordinary remedy of injunction until his title, or right to possession, is adjudicated. The person in actual possession must be presumed prima facie to have the better right.It must be remembered, that to invoke successfully the doctrine of those cases the defendant must have possession. The situation is quite different where the person is possession, claiming in the character of owner, seeks protection from the wrongful acts of a mere intruder. As was said by Justice Johnson in Liongson vs. Martinez, supra, "The writ of injunction may be issued to restrain acts of trespass and the illegal interference with the possession of land, under certain conditions."In the American system of procedure, from which the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to injunctions are taken, the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect the owner of land, being in possession, from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger, as where a person who has no right enters from time to time to cut wood or carry off other products. The intermittent nature of such acts, and the probability, not to say certainty, of repetition in the future, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting of the equitable remedy. (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Third Edition, vol. 4, sec. 1357.)In applying the American authorities at this point, it is desirable to bear in mind - in order not to be completely misled - that in the past, under the American and English system of law, courts of law and equity were entirely separate; and it so happened that originally, while the courts of law had jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of title, only the courts of equity could administer injunctive relief. The result was that the latter courts in the beginning showed great diffidence in interfering by the remedy of injunction whenever there appeared to be a bona fide dispute over the ownership, which

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ought to be determined in a court of law. It therefore came to be accepted in common-law States that an injunction to prevent interference with rights in real property should not be granted until the plaintiff has fully established his title or right by a proper action brought, for that purpose. This meant, of course, that the plaintiff, in a State where separate courts of law and equity existed, must, first, resort to an independent action in the court of law. It seems to have resulted, furthermore, that the rule was accepted in some of these States that if, in an action for injunction in a court of equity, the defendant claimed ownership in himself, the preliminary injunction would be dissolved and the plaintiff would be required to go into the court of law. Some American cases are cited upon both these points in the opinion inLiongson vs. Martinez (36 Phil., 948). But these cases can have no application in a country like this, where both the legal and equitable jurisdiction are exercised indiscriminately by every court, both original and appellate.In the case before us the plaintiff alleges that the ownership of the questioned land is in herself, that the defendants by repeated acts of trespass have at different times entered thereon and unlawfully cut bamboo belonging to her, and that they further threaten to continue such unlawful acts in the future. In the petitory part of the complaint she asks that a permanent injunction be granted, prohibiting the defendants from repeating these wrongful acts and that she be granted whatever other remedy may be appropriate. The defendants (or such of them as seem to be interested in the matter) answered the complaint, admitting that they have cut the bamboo to which reference is made, but justify such acts on the ground that they are owners of the land where the bamboo was cut. Wherefore, the defendants themselves in turn ask that they be awarded damages against the plaintiff and that they be granted any other appropriate relief. As the plaintiff did not formally reply to this cross-complaint, she must be taken to have denied the same generally. (Sec. 104, Code of Civil Procedure.)In this state of the pleadings, the ownership of the property from which the bamboo was cut was in issue, and it would have been proper for the trial judge, upon the proof before him to have declared that the plaintiff is the owner of the land in question and in consequence to have enjoined the defendants from molesting the plaintiff by cutting bamboo therefrom in the future.In the view we take of the case, the judgment must be reversed; and judgment will be entered, declaring the plaintiff; Dolores Rustia, to be entitled to the permanent injunction as prayed for in subsection (b) of the second paragraph of the petitory part of the complaint; and the defendants will be enjoined from hereafter molesting her by cutting bamboo from the property described in the complaint, reserving to the defendants or any of them the right to institute any appropriate action, if so advised, to establish ownership and recover the property. 2 For uncertainty of proof no award for damages will be made. No special pronouncement will be made as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME, **,petitioners, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, *** , respondents.Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.R E S O L U T I O N TEEHANKEE, C.J.:Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts

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he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early

distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by the ponentethereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other members was submitted on the following day to the then President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done."The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention."The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the

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tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing." They wrote:The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored place among the sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and men of these institutions have remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our country and people.The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who has great authority can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits." Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public officials should regard public service as a reflection of human Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest esteem and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all other considerations.It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to

indicate that some of the guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy).MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the killing. 8In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10

It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-aAt the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page

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of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14

On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15

Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against herein private party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note passing issue once and for all.Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman on August

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21, 1983 was doomed to an ignominous end. Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIALAt 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and an the members of the PanelAlso present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former President became emotional (he was quite sick then).During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not know what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig be detained at city jail."From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political and legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court, Politically, as it will become evident that the government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent.In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never mentioned.It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.

Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to say on.Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He "associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the

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judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day, respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action, President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree members of the Special Investigating Panel, and justice Pamaran to a conference in Malacanang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of double jeopardy.5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be "categorized" so that some of them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to the letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in the course of the

proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the very decision rendered in the case.8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the same in the subsequent course of the proceedings.9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive, justice Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of an authoritarian ruler.The Commission submitted the following recommendation.Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be granted.The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome of the

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case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents accused of all criminal and civil liability.The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this purpose. . . .President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.xxx xxx xxxAfter an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody of the accused having thereby received satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and how long it would take to be finished.According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not

have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice thereof.It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the division headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the circumstance that he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang conference wherein the said directive was given. . . .The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to how long it would take him to finish the case.The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;" and that on their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part of justice Fernandez or justice Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.)The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on both the court and the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his instructions were directed, the motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at that time which enabled, the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those directly involved were caned to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever made of this conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months later when the former president was no longer around.President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the

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presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or "out of respect to the Office of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject deference to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985. 18The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacañang instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of

Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20

2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense."The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial. WitnessesViesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having

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been hunted by armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk with her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Fariñas offered her two million pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from testifying.It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did not end with her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera declared that the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room occupied by Malacañang people who were keeping track of the proceedings.Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then, despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such

showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have been totally uncalled for."4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else."6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having been complied with to the letter. ..."Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The evidence before the Comission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or regularly."There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justicexxx xxx xxx"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. oronly 18 minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case

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filed may be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited time available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would ring with truth.What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his division. . . .7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime. ..."8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by Malacañang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military and Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacañang showed its results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacañang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise,Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the

case should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with."9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power."In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on thestandard ground that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. ...Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the accused should be convicted he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur 22) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the

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public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24

Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:—1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators."2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the

Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men 26-a) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so,

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in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-aThe cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).xxx xxx xxxLegal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-

determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A

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judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due. 30

2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacanang.PJ PAMARANWell the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal later on with that. After all, the most important thing here is, shall we say, the decision of the case.J. HERRERAI think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the capacity of the justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than anything else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by Herrera). 31But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but is also a confession of official insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34

In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching

of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment, instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro formamotion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based

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on an entirely new material ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37

4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of

the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to anThis resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.December 1, 1911G.R. No. 6287THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,vs.THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular Government, et al., defendants-appellants.MORELAND, J.:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the controversy.The question for our consideration and decision is the power and authority of a Court of First Instance of one province to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this action is brought. The land sought to be condemned is 69,910 square meters in area. The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in

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the office of the registry of property and of the tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac. The defendants in one action all of the different owners of or persons otherwise interested in the 69,910 square meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving the complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation. During the progress of the action a commission to appraise the value of the lands was duly appointed, which, after taking oral testimony, amounting to 140 typewritten pages when transcribed, and after much labor and prolonged consideration, made a report consisting of about 55 typewritten pages, resolving the question submitted to it. On the coming in of this report the court, by order entered the 27th of September, 1909, set the 11th day of October following for the hearing thereon.On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of dismissal.The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon the proposition, already referred to, that in condemnation proceedings, and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of First Instance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power or authority where the land is located in another province, and that no such power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136  of the Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of First Instance of these Islands with respect to real estate in the following words:SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. - The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds:1. Original; and2. Appellate.SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. - Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was the intention of the Philippine Commission to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. Nor do the provisions of sections 48, 49, 50, 51,

and 52 at all militate against the universality of that jurisdiction. Those provisions simply arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. While it is provided in these sections that a particular court shall hold its sessions in any other province (except under certain specified conditions), the assertions is nevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a particular court is in no wise and in no sense limited; and it is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned.Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Other provide for the procedure by which that power or authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of the Court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by which such powers are put into action. The one is the thing itself; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred from the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the courts to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure to-day is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that the part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism.The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. While a fair hearing is as essential as the substantive power of the court to administer justice in the premises, and while the one is the natural result o the other, it is different in its nature and relates to a different thing. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it

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simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.In the light of these observations, we proceed to a consideration of those provisions of the law which the plaintiff claims are decisive of his contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action by a railroad company to condemn lands located in another province. The plaintiff relies for the success of its cause upon section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and upon the special laws relating to the condemnation of lands railroad corporations. We take up first the section of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to.The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If their interests are best subserved by bringing in the Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte, there is no controlling reason why such a course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely within the control of either party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law. It is true that this court has more than once held than an agreement to submit a controversy to a court which, under the procedural law, has not been selected as the appropriate court, generally speaking, to hear such controversy, can not be enforced. This means simply that either party to such a contract may ignore it at pleasure. The law will not compel the fulfillment of an agreement which deprives one of the parties to it of the right to present his cause to that court which the law designates as the most appropriate. But the principle asserted in the cases which hold thus is no authority for the proposition that two persons having a controversy which they desire to have decided by a competent tribunal may not, by appropriate procedure, submit it t any court having jurisdiction in the premises. In the one case the relation is contractual to be enforced over the objection of one of the contracting parties. In the other relation is not

contractual because not between the parties; but, rather, between the parties and the court. In the one case it is a contract to be enforced; in the other, a condition to be met.This being so, we say again, even though it be repetition, that after jurisdiction over real property in the Islands has been conferred so generally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to be presumed or construed that the legislature intended to modify or restrict that jurisdiction when it came to frame a Code of Civil Procedure the object of which is to make that jurisdiction effective. Such modification or restriction should be held only by virtue of the clearest and most express provisions.The wording of that section should be carefully examined. It reads as follows:SEC. 377. Venue of actions. - Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real estate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought in the province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated; actions against executors, administrators, and guardians touching the performance of their official duties, and actions for account and settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in which the will was admitted to probate, or letters of administration were granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all actions not herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province where the defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff, except in cases were other special provision is made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated or is found: Provided, that in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance with law, the action must be brought in the province where the land lies. And in all cases process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending, to be enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of the court. The failure of a defendant to object t the venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is brought, except in the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, and actions against executors, administrators, and guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies.Leaving out of discussion for the moment actions and proceedings affecting estates of deceased persons, they resting upon a different footing being governed by special laws, it is to be observed that the section contains no express inhibition

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against the court. It provides simply that certain actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." The prohibition here is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is nor a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take something from the court but to grant something to the defendant. Its wording clearly deprives the court of nothing which it had, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he did not have. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject ,after, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches convenience, not substance. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial. If it had been the intention of the law-makers by section 377 to put a limitation to the jurisdiction of the court, how easy it would have been to say so squarely. "No Court of First Instance shall have or take jurisdiction of an action touching title to or interest in real property lying wholly in a province other than that in which such court is authorized to hold sessions," or a similar provision, would have been sufficient. This would have been clearly a limitation on the court rather than the party. There would have been no room for doubt. The legislature, however, did not do so. It, rather, chose to use language which imposes a limitation on the rights of the plaintiff.In saying this we do not desire to force construction. Courts should give to language its plain meaning, leaving the legislature to take care of the consequences. The Philippine Commission having, in fullest phrase, given the Courts of First Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by Act No. 136, we are of the opinion that the jurisdiction ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an Act equally express, or so clearly inconsistent as to amount to the same thing. The fact that section 377 is not such Act, that it is found in code of Procedure rather than in the substantive law, that it deals with the relative procedural rights of parties rather than the power of the court, that it relates to the place rather than to the thing, that it composes the whole of a chapter headed simply "Venue," lead us to hold that the Court of First Instance of Tarlac had full jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action at the time when it was dismissed.That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course of practice - that is, by the process of the court - but also by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. (Ayers vs. Watson, 113 U.S. 594; Fisher vs. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133.) The defendants are now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them.

Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. It alleged in its complaint:4. That, according to the information secured after a minute investigation in the offices of the land registry and of the land-tax record of the municipalities within whose jurisdiction lie all the parcels composing the tract of land in question, the owners and occupants of the same, with their names as they appear on the plan, are as follows.At the time it commenced the action it was possessed of every fact which a complete knowledge of the location of the lands sought to be condemned required. It had the map of its entire line from Paniqui to Tayug, showing the provinces and the various municipalities through which it runs. Not only that: Before beginning its action it had to know the name of every necessary defendant, the land he owned, and the extent of that portion to be condemned. The investigation required to ascertain these facts would of necessity force into plaintiff's mind the knowledge required to bring the action in the proper court. That the plaintiff at the time it commenced this action did not know in what province its proposed stations and terminals were is difficult to believe. That it did not know in what province the land lay which it was about to make the subject of so important a proceeding is still more difficult to believe. In spite of all this, however, it deliberately laid the venue in a province where no part of the land lay, took possession of the land in controversy, constructed its line, switches, and stations, and after nearly two years of litigation, accompanied with great trouble to the court and trouble and expense to the parties, calmly asks the dismissal of the case for the reason that it did not know where its own railroad was located. Under such circumstances a dismissal of the action over the objection of the defendants ought not to be permitted expect upon absolute necessity and then only on payment of the costs and expenses of the defendants and of the actin. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)There is no equitable ground, then, upon which the plaintiff may claim that it has not yielded itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Nor, as we have seen, is there a legal ground. As we have already said, the plaintiff, having brought the action, of necessity submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of the situation it itself created to take possession of the lands described in the complaint, construct its lines, switches, stations, yards and terminals, and to carry the cause through two years of expensive litigation. It now attempts to make all this go for naught alleging its own negligence as a reason for such attempt. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)While the latter part of section 377 provides that "the failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is brought," except, a month other things, in actions affecting real estate, we apprehend that it was not intended that a defendant can not waive such objection in such excepted cases. Nor we do believe that such provision is controlling in this case. In the first place, the application is restricted to "the time of entering his appearance in the action." It might well

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have been in the mind of the lawmakers that, at the time of entering his appearance in the action, the defendant would not ordinarily be fully informed of all the facts of the case, at least not sufficiently to warrant his being held to a waiver of important rights; whereas, later in the cause, as when he files his answer or goes to trial, being fully informed, he might justly be held to have waived his right to make such objection. for this reason it might well be that the Legislature purposely refrained from extending the time for his protection beyond the "time of entering his appearance in the action." Moreover, there is, in said clause, no prohibition against an express waiver of his rights by the defendant. The general rule of law is that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such a nature that its renunciation would be against public policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughly established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in relation to the venue of the action will not be held to have been abridged by section 377 without very clear provision therein to that effect. There is no part of that section clear enough to warrant such a holding. Even though the terms of said section were much clearer than they are in this respect, we should still hold, if they were much short of express, that the right of renunciation is not abridged, founding ourselves not only upon the principles already laid down but also upon the proposition of general law embodied in section 294 of the code of Civil Procedure which provides that:When a statute or instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted.Moreover, it should be noted that this prohibition, if it be such, against waiver refers exclusively to the defendant. The plaintiff is given no rights respecting it. Yet it is the plaintiff who is here calling for the application of the provision even against the declared will of the person who is expressly named as the sole beneficiary. We will not by interpretation extend this provision so as to contravene the principles of natural rights. We will not construed it so as to included in its terms nor named as its beneficiary. But even if the plaintiff were entitled to invoke the aid of the provision he is estopped from so doing. (Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7; Babcock vs. Farewell, 146 Ill. App., 307; White vs. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Dill (U.S.), 183; Shuttle vs. Thompson, 15 Wall., 159; Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45 Mich., 103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R. Co., 18 Barb., 585; Ferguson vs. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.), 230; State vs. Mitchell, 31 Ohio State, 592; Counterman vs. Dublin, 38 Ohio State, 515; McCarthy vs. Lavasche, 89 Ill., 270; Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371; Strosser vs. City of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind., 443). Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:Conclusive presumptions. - The following presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive:1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can not, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsity it. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5

Phil. 67; 69; Municipality of Oas vs. Roa, 7 Phil. 20, 22; Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al., 7 Phil. 449, 453; Macke et al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. 553, 555.)The fact is, there are very few rights which may not be renounced, expressly or impliedly. (Christenson vs. Charleton, 34 Atl. 226, 227, 69 Vt. 91; Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56 Vt. 91; Donahaue vs. Windsor Ins. co., 33 Atl. 902, 904, 66 Conn., 21, 40; Fitzpatrick vs. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116, 134, 17 Atl., 411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288; Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44 Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl., 615, 617, 75 Conn., 104; First Nat. Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn., 22, 44; Johnson vs. Schar, 70 N.W., 838, 839, 9 S. D., 536; Corey vs. Bolton, 63 N.Y., Supp., 915, 917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply Co. vs. Jones, 68 N. Y. Supp., 806, 809, 58 App. Div., 231; Monroe Waterworks Co. vs. City of Monroe, 85 N.W., 685, 688, 100 Wis., 11; Fraser vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N.W., 476, 481, 114 Wis., 510; Cedar Rapids Water Co. vs. Cedat Rapids, 90 N.W., 746, 749, 117 Iowa, 250; Kennedy vs. Roberts, 75 N.W., 363, 366, 105 Iowa, 521; Shaw vs. Spencer, 100 Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec., 107, 1 Am. Rep., 115; West vs. Platt, 127 Mass., 367, 367, 372; Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App., 649, 653; Michigan Savings & Loan Ass'n. vs. Missouri, K & T. Trust Co., 73 Mo. App., 161, 165; Perin vs. Parker, 18 N. E., 747, 748, 126 Ill., 201, 2 L.R.A., 336, 9 Am. St. Rep., 571; Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N. E., 1072, 1075, 152 Ull. 458; Star Brewery Co. vs. Primas, 45 N.E., 145, 148, 163 Ill., 652; United Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Thomas (U.S.), 82 Fed., 406, 408, 27 C.C. A., 42, 47 L.R.A., 450; Rice vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (U.S.), 103 Fed., 427, 43 C.C.A., 270; Sidway vs. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co. (U.S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395; able vs. United States Life Ins. Co. (U.S.), 111 Fed., 19, 31, 49 C.C.A., 216L Peninsular Land Transp., etc., Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666, 676, 14 S.E., 237; Dey vs. Martin, 78 Va., 1, 7; Liverpool & L.& G. Ins. Co. vs. T.M. Richardson Lumber Co., 69 Pac., 938, 951, 11 Okl., 585; Livesey vs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50, 69; Cutler vs. Roberts, 7 Nebr., 4, 14, 29 Am. Rep., 371; Warren vs. Crane, 50 Mich., 300, 301, 15 N.W., 465; Portland & R.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587, 592, 32 Pac., 688, 689; First Nat. Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac., 980, 982, 123 Cal., 360, 69 Am. St. Rep., 64; Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 38 Atl., 320, 322, 90 Me., 385; Reed vs. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 Pac., 21, 21 Utah, 295; Dale vs. Continental Ins. Co., 31 S.W., 266, 269, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 829, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 827, 78 Miss., 525; Bucklen vs. Johnson, 49 N.E., 612, 617, 19 Ind. App., 406.)We have delayed until this moment the citation of authorities relative to the proposition that venue is not jurisdictional as to subject matter and that defendant's rights in respect thereto are such that they may be waived, expressly or by implication, for the reason that we desired that the principles which rule the case should first be discussed and presented in the abstract form. In the case of First National Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141), it was held that the exemption of national banks from suits in State courts in counties other than the county or city in which the association was located was a personal privilege which could be waived was located was a

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personal privilege which could be waived by appearing in such brought in another county, but in a court of the same dignity, and making a defense without claiming the immunity granted by Congress. the court said:This exemption of national banking associations from suits in State courts, established elsewhere than in the county or city in which such associations were located, was, we do not doubt, prescribed for the convenience of those institutions, and prevent interruption in their business that might result from their books being sent to distant counties in obedience to process from State courts. (First Nat. Bank of Bethel vs. National Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall., 383, 394; Croker vs. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass., 240.) But, without indulging in conjecture as to the object of the exemption in question, it is sufficient that it was granted by Congress, and, if it had been claimed by the defendant when appearing in the superior court of Cleveland County, must have been recognized. The defendant did not, however, choose to claim immunity from suit in that court. It made defense upon the merits, and, having been unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of error to the supreme court of the State, and in the latter tribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity granted to it by Congress. This was too late. Considering the object as well as the words of the statute authorizing suit against a national banking association to be brought in the proper State court of the county where it is located, we are of opinion that its exemption from suits in other courts of the same State was a personal privilege that it would waive, and, which, in this case, the defendant did waive, and, which, in this case, the defendant did waive, by appearing and making defense without claiming the immunity granted by Congress. No reason can be suggested why one court of a State, rather than another, both being of the same dignity, should take cognizance of a suit against a national bank, except the convenience of the bank. And this consideration supports the view that the exemption of a national bank from suit in any State court except one of the county or city in which it is located is a personal privilege, which it could claim or not, as it deemed necessary.In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369), the court said:The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive. If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient, a defendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases, and certainly jurisdiction will not be ousted because he has consented. Here, the defendant companies have provided that they can be found in a district other than that in which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding is adopted, and they have been so found. In our opinion, therefore, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the causes, and should proceed to hear and decide them.In the case of St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBride (141 U.S., 127), the court used the following language:The first part of section 1 of the Act of 1887, as amended in 1888, gives, generally, to the circuit courts of the United States jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different States where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of

two thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. Such a controversy was presented in this complaint. It was therefore a controversy of which the circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction. Assume that it is true as defendant alleges, that this is not a case in which jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the controversy is between citizens of different States, but that it comes within the scope of that other clause, which provides that "no civil sit shall be brought before either of said courts, against any person, by any original process or proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is inhabitant," still the right to insist upon suit only in the one district is a personal privilege which he may waive, and he does waive it by pleading to the merits. In Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369, 378), Chief Justice Waite said: "The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive." The Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec. 11, Stat., 79), besides giving general jurisdiction to circuit courts over suits between citizens of different States, further provided, generally, that no civil suit should be brought before either of said courts, against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process, in any other district than that of which he was an inhabitant, or in which he should be found. In the case of Toland vs. Sprague (12 Pet., 300, 330), it appeared that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the State in which the suit was brought, nor found therein. In that case the court observed: "It appears that the party appeared and pleaded to issue. Now, if the case were one of the want of jurisdiction in the court, it would not, according to well-established principles, be competent for the parties by any acts of theirs to give it. But that is not the case. The court had jurisdiction over the parties and the matter in dispute; the objection was that the party defendant, not being an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, nor found therein, personal privilege or exemption, which it was competent for the party to waive. The cases of Pollard vs. Dwight (4 Cranch., 421) and Barry vs. Foyles (1 Pt., 311) are decisive to show that, after appearance and plea, the case stands as if the suit were brought that exemption from liability to process and that in case of foreign attachment, too, is a personal privilege, which may be waived, and that appearing and pleading will produce that waiver." In (14 Wal., 282), the jurisdiction of the circuit court over a controversy between citizens of different States was sustained in a case removed from the State court, although it was conceded that the suit could not have been commenced in the first instance in the circuit court. See also Claflin vs. Commonwealth Ins. Co. (110 U.S., 81 [28:76].) Without multiplying authorities on this question, it is obvious that the party who in the first instance appears and pleads to the merits waives any right to challenge thereafter the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the suit has been brought in the wrong district. (Charlotte Nat. Bank vs. Morgan, 132 U.S., 141; Fitzgerald E. M. Const. Co. vs. Fitzergerald, 137 U.S., 98.)In the case of the Interior Construction and Improvement Co. vs. Gibney (160 U.S., 217), the court held as follows:The circuit courts of the United States are thus vested with general jurisdiction of civil actions, involving the requisite

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pecuniary value, between citizens of different States. Diversity of citizenship is a condition of jurisdiction, and, when that does not appear upon the record, the court, of its own motion, will order the action to be dismissed. But The provision as to the particular district in which the action shall be brought does not touch the general jurisdiction of the court over such a cause between such parties; but affects only the proceedings taken to bring the defendant within such jurisdiction, and is matter of personal privilege, which the defendant may insist upon, or may waive, at his election; and the defendant's right to object that an action within the general jurisdiction of the court is brought in the wrong district, is waived by entering a general appearance, without taking the objection. (Gracie vs. Palmer, 8 Wheat, 699; Toland vs. Sprague, 12 Pet., 300, 330; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S., 369, 378; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. vs. McBride, 141 U.S., 127; Southern Pacific Co. vs. Dento, 146 U.S., 202, 206; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U.S., 105; Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge, 151 U.S., 129; Southern Express Co. vs. Todd, 12 U.S. app., 351.)In the case of Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge (151 U.S., 129), the court disposed of the case as follows:The court below, in holding that it did not have jurisdiction of the cause, and in dismissing the bill of complaint for the reason, acted in view of that clause of the Act of March 3, 1887, as amended in August, 1888, which provides that "no suit shall be brought in the circuit courts of the United States against any person, by any original process or proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant;" and, undoubtedly, if the defendant company, which was sued in another district than that in which it had its domicile, had, by a proper plea or motion, sought to avail itself of the statutory exemption, the action of the court would have been right.But the defendant company did not choose to plead that provision of the statute, but entered a general appearance, and joined with the complainant in its prayer for the appointment of a receiver, and thus was brought within the ruling of this court, so frequently made, that the exemption from being such out of the district of its domicile is a personal privilege which may be waive and which is waived by pleading to the merits. (Improvement Co. vs. Gibney, 16 Sup. Ct., 272, 160 U.S., 217; 40 L. ed., 401; Walker vs. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A., 421, 56 Fed., 76, 5 U.S. App., 423; Von Auw. vs. Chicago Toy & Fancy Goods Co., 69 Fed., 448 McBride vs. Grand de Tour Plow Co., 40 Fed., 162; Black vs. Thorne, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 495 (10 Blatchf., 66, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas., 550); Norris vs. Atlas Steamship Co., 37 Fed., 279; Hoover & Allen Co. vs. Columbia Straw Paper Co., 68 Fed., 945; Blackburn vs. Railroad Co., Fed., Fed., Cas. No. 1, 467 (2 Flip., 525); Vermont Farm Mach. Co. vs. Gibson, 50 Fed., 423.)In the case of Security Loan and Trust Co. vs. Kauffman (108 Cal., 214), the court said:The constitution, Article VI, section 5, declares that, "All actions for the enforcement of liens" shall be commenced in the county in which the real estate or some portion thereof is situated; and at the time this action was "commenced" the property was situate within the boundaries of San Diego. The constitution does not, however, require property is situated, and the statutory provision in section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that actions 'for the foreclosure of liens and

mortgages on real property' must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, "subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial," shows that "the place of trial" is not an element going to the jurisdiction of the court, but is a matter of legislative regulation. The provision for the transfer of certain actions to the superior court of the county of Riverside, which is contained in section 12 of the act providing for the organization of that county, shows the extent of this regulation which the legislature deemed necessary, and implies that only the actions there designated were to be transferred for trial.In the case of Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290), the court held as follows:The statutory provision in respect to personal actions is more emphatic, requiring that "suits instituted by summons, shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought: First, when the defendant is a resident of the State, either in the county within which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found," and yet it was held in reference to this statute in the case of Hembree vs. Campbell (8 Mo., 572), that though the suit was brought in the county in which the plaintiff resided, and service had upon the defendant in the county of his residence, unless a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant, was interposed in the first instance, the objection on the score of lack of jurisdiction could not subsequently be successfully raised. And this, upon the generally recognized ground that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and that the defendant's plea to the merits acknowledged jurisdiction over his person, and precluded objection on account of absence of regularity in the instituting of the action. So also, in Ulrici vs. Papin (11 Mo.., 42), where the then existing statute required "suits in equity concerning real estate, or whereby the same may be affected, shall be brought in the county within which such real estate or greater part thereof is situate," and by demurrer to the bill it was objected that the suit was not brought in the proper county in conformity with the statutory provision, Judge Scott remarked: "That it does not clearly appear where the greater part of the lands lie. This objection, if tenable, should have been raised by a plea to the jurisdiction." And the same learned judge remarks, in Hembree vs. Campbell, supra, "No principle is better established than that a plea in bar is a waiver of all dilatory matter of defense. That the matter of abatement was apparent upon the writ can make no difference. Such matters are and should be pleaded." And pleas to the jurisdiction are as necessary in local as in transitory actions. (1 Tidd.Prac., 630.)It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere failure to plead to the jurisdiction of the court would have the effect to confer jurisdiction where none existed before; for it is well settled that even consent of parties can not confer jurisdiction. (Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 350.) But all circuit courts have a general jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages.In the case of Armendiaz vs. Stillman (54 Texas, 623), the court disposed of the question involved in the following words:In our opinion, however, these common law rules respecting local and transitory actions have no more to do in determining

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with us where a suit can be brought and maintained, than the like rules in respect to the form and names of actions; but this is solely regulated by and dependent upon the proper construction of the constitution and statutes of the State. In the first, it is emphatically declared in the bill of rights as a fundamental principle of government, "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." Now a party may not have an action in rem for or concerning land in foreign jurisdiction, because redress can not be given or had by such proceeding in due course of law; but personal damages may be given for such injury and enforced by due process of law within the State. "And it would seem if the State failed to give to one of its citizens a remedy against others for injuries of this kind, it would fail in the pledge made in the constitution as plainly as if the injury had been in a foreign jurisdiction to one's goods or person."There is, as Judge Marshall himself says, no difference in principle in giving redress for injuries to land in the jurisdiction where the defendant is found, which may not be equally applicable in other cases. He says, speaking of the fiction upon which transitory actions are sustained, where the cause of action occurred out of the jurisdiction where they are brought: "They have" (i. e., the courts), "without legislative aid, applied this fiction to all personal torts, wherever the wrong may have been committed, and to all contracts wherever executed. To this general rule contracts respecting lands from no exception. It is admitted that on a contract respecting lands, an action is sustainable wherever the defendant may be found. Yet in such case every difficulty may occur that present itself in an action of trespass. An investigation of title may become necessary, a question of boundary may arise, and a survey may be essential to the full merits of the case. Yet these difficulties have not prevailed against the jurisdiction of the court. They are countervailed by the opposing consideration, that if the action be disallowed, the injured party may have a clear right without a remedy in a case where a person who has done the wrong, and who ought to make the compensation, is within the power of the court. That this consideration loses its influence where the action pursues anything not in the reach of the court is inevitably necessary, but for the loss of its influence, where the remedy is against the person, and is within the power of the court, I have not yet discovered a reason, other than a technical one, which can satisfy my judgment.'In the case of De La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas, 205), the court said:Our statutes in force at the time the reconvention was filed provided that suits for the recovery of land should be brought in the county where the land or a part thereof is situated. This is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring suits to be brought in the county of the defendant's residence. This requirement is not a matter that affects the jurisdiction of the district courts over the subject matter of controversies about the title or possession of lands. Every district court in the State has cognizance of such suits; the requirement as to the county in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may be waived like any other privilege of this character. (Ryan vs. Jackson, 11 Tex., 391;

Morris vs. Runnells, 12 Tex., 176.) A judgment rendered by the district court of Galveston County, when the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction, would settle the title to land in McLennan County as effectually as if rendered in its own district curt. Jurisdiction of causes may be obtained by defendants in counties other than those in which the statute requires them to be brought, in other ways than by express consent or by failure to claim the personal privilege accorded by law. A suit upon a monied demand, brought in the county of a defendant's residence by a resident of another county, may be met with a counter demand against the plaintiff, and a recovery may be had upon the counter demand, though if suit had been originally commenced upon it, the county of the plaintiff's residence would have had exclusive jurisdiction. And so with other cases that might be supposed. A plaintiff calling a defendant into court for the purpose of obtaining relief against him invites him to set up all defenses which may defeat the cause of action sued on, or any other appropriate and germane to the subject matter of the suit, which should be settled between the parties before a proper adjudication of the merits of the cause can be obtained. He grants him the privilege of setting up all such counterclaims and cross actions as he holds against the plaintiff which may legally be pleaded in such a suit.This is particularly the case in our State, where a multiplicity of suit is abhorred, and a leading object is to settle all disputes between the parties pertinent to the cause of action in the same suit. The question of the original right to bring the cross action in the county where the suit is pending can not be raised; otherwise this design would, in a large number of cases, be defeated, and the various matters which could well be settled in the cause might have to seek a number of different counties, and be asserted in a number of different suits, before the controversy between the parties could be settled. The plaintiff must be considered as waiving any privilege to plead to the jurisdiction in such cross actions, and as consenting that the defendant may assert in the suit any demands which he could plead were it commenced in the county where such demands were properly usable. The question then is, La Vega have set up the matters pleaded in his answer in reconvention had the land sought to be partitioned been situated in Galveston County? This question must be determined by the solution of another, viz, can a defendant to a partition suit who claims through the title under which the partition is sought set up a superior title to the whole land? "It is doubtless true that, in a partition suit, a court of equity will not entertain any controversy as to the legal title, whether it arises between the part owners as to their respective interests, or by reason of a claim set up by one or more of them to the entire land by title superior to the one under which the partition is asked to be decreed. In our State, where there is no distinction between law and equity in the determination of causes, an action to settle disputed titles, whether legal or equitable, may be combined with one to partition the land between the plaintiff and defendant. Hence there can be no objection to determining any questions as to title between the coowners in a partition suit in our State, and the strict rules of chancery do not prevail.In the case of Kipp vs. Cook (46 Minn., 535), the court made use of the following language:

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1. The appellant contends that the district court for the county of Sibley, and of the eighth judicial district, was without jurisdiction, and could not properly determine the rights or interests of either litigant to lands located in Sherburne County, which is in the seventh judicial district; but this question was passed upon many years since, in the case of Gill vs. Bradley (21 Minn., 15), wherein it was held that, although the proper place for the trial of an action to recover real property, or for the determination, in any form, of a right or interest therein, was, by virtue of an existing statute ? now found as Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, par. 47 ? in the county wherein the lands were situated, the district court of the county designated in the complaint had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and had power to before the time for answering expired, in accordance with the express provisions of another section ? now section 51 ? of the same chapter, and the place of trial had actually been changed by order of the court or by consent of parties.In the case of the west Point Iron Co. vs. Reymert (45 N.Y., 703), the court said:The action was tried in the county of Dutches, and by the court without a jury, without objection on the part of the defendants. If the trial should have been in Putnam, and by a jury, it was for the defendants to assert their rights at the trial; and by not them claiming them, they waived them, and must be regarded as having assented to the place and mode of trial.We transcribe the following from decisions of the supreme court of Spain:Considering, further, that Pedrosa, instead of immediately objecting to the jurisdiction of the court and asking for a change of venue, sued for recovery of title, thereby submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, which reserved its decision thereon until plaintiff had presented the petition in due form. (Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)Considering that although other proceedings were had in the first court (Salvador de Granada) and in the courts of first instance of Sagrario and Guerra of said city subsequent to the death of the count, the truth of the matter is that his daughter, the countess, the only party now claiming relief, not only had the proceedings taken in the first of said courts dismissed but asked the court of first instance of Castilla de la Nueva to accept, and the court accepted, her express submission to its jurisdiction:Considering that far from objecting, as she might have objected, to the jurisdiction of the court, the countess acknowledged such jurisdiction as did the other coheirs when thru asked the court to proceed with the testamentary proceedings, thus creating a jurisdictional situation perfectly in harmony with the respective claims of the parties and so binding upon them that they are now absolutely estopped from denying its importance or legal force. (Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)He who by his own acts submits himself to the jurisdiction of a court shall not thereafter be permitted to question such jurisdiction. (Judgment of December 30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)According to article 305 (of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) the plaintiff shall be presumed to have tacitly submitted

himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the mere act of filing his complaint therein, and in the case of the defendant where the latter after appearing in the action takes any step therein other than to object to such jurisdiction. (Judgment of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur., 232.)Plaintiff and defendant are presumed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, the former by the mere act of filing his complaint therein and the latter by his answering the same and taking any step other than demurring to such jurisdiction as provided in articles 56 to 58 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment of July 27, 1883, 52 Civ. Jur., 511.)In order that a tacit submission based upon the mere act filing the complaint may be valid the court must be one of ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article 4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ. Jur., 14.)The following language is taken from The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 1, p. 50):The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory' actions, though of far less importance than it was before the passing of the judicature acts, must still be borne in mind in connection with actions relating to land situate outside the local jurisdiction of our courts. 'Transitory' actions were those in which the facts in issue between the parties had no necessary connection with a particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.; whilst "local" actions were those in which there was such a connection, e.g., disputes as to the title to, or trespasses to, land.One importance of this distinction lay in the fact that in the case of local actions the plaintiff was bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county (originally in the actual hundred) in which the land in question lay. In the case, however of a transitory action, he might lay it wherever he pleased, subject to the power of the court to alter it in a proper case. Local venues have now been abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions relating to land in England are concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.It is, however, important from another point of view, viz, that of jurisdiction as distinct from procedure. In the case of real actions relating to land in the colonies or foreign countries the English relating courts had, even before the judicature acts, no jurisdiction; and, therefore, the removal by those acts of a difficulty of procedure ?viz, the rule as to local venue ? which might have stood in the way, if they had and wished to exercise jurisdiction, did not in any way confer jurisdiction in such cases. The lack of jurisdiction still exists, and our courts refuse to adjudicate upon claims of title to foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged invasion of the proprietary rights attached thereto, and to award damages founded on that adjudication; in other words, an action for trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained in England, at any rate if the defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership of such land.There is no decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in conflict with the principles laid down in this opinion. In the case of Serrano vs. Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431), the matter before the court was the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the actions and proceedings relating to the

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settlement of the estates of deceased persons. The determination of that question required the consideration of section 602 of the code of Civil Procedure rather than section 377 of that code. The argument of the court touching the last-named section, is inapplicable to the case at bar and would not affect it if it were. The reference to the jurisdiction of the court made in that argument based on section 377 was unnecessary to a decision of the case.The case of Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12), presented simply the question whether or not an agreement between parties to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court to the exclusion of the court provided by law as the appropriate court in the premises could be enforced. As we have before intimated, it touched no question involved in the litigation at bar.In the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (7 Phil. Rep., 302), the action was one to foreclose a mortgage upon a real and personal property. In discussing the matter before it the court said:The demurrer was also based upon the ground that this was an action to foreclose a mortgage and by the provisions of sections 254 and 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure it should have been brought in the Province of Albay where the property was situated. The action is clearly an action to foreclose a mortgage, lien, or incumbrance upon property, but it will be noticed that section 254 relates only to mortgages on real estate. This contract covered both real and personal property, and while, perhaps, an action could not be maintained in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the foreclosure of the alleged mortgage upon the real estate situated in Albay, yet so far as the personal property was concerned, we know of no law which would deprive that court of jurisdiction.As will readily be observed, the court in the remarks above quoted was not discussing or deciding the question whether or not an action could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real estate located in Albay; but, rather, whether or not an action could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgate on personal property located in the Province of Albay. The remark of the court that perhaps the former action could not be maintained was not intended to be decisive and was not thought at the time to be an indication of what the decision of the court might be if that precise case were presented to it with full argument and citation of authorities.The case of Castano vs. Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep., 310), involved the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to issue a writ of prohibition against a justice of the peace holding his court outside the province in which the Court of First Instance was sitting at the time of issuing the writ. The determination of the question presented different considerations and different provisions of law from those which rule the decision of the case at bar.We, therefore, hold that the terms of section 377 providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of

First Instance over the land itself but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to the place of trial.We come, now, to a consideration of the special laws relating to the condemnation of land by railroad companies upon which also plaintiff relies. Of those laws only one is of importance in the decision of this case. That is Act No. 1258. In it are found these provisions:SECTION 1. In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three, inclusive, of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine Islands," the procedure in this Act provided may be adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land for the construction, extension, or operation of its railroad line.SEC. 3. Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized by its charter, or by general law, to exercise the power of eminent domain in the city of Manila or in any province, and has not obtained by agreement with the owners thereof the lands necessary for its purposes as authorized by law, it may in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila if the land is situated in the city of Manila, or in the Court of First Instance of the province where the lands is situated, join as defendants all persons owing or claiming to own, or occupying, any of the lands sought to be condemned, or any interest therein, within the city or province, respectively, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant and stating with certainty the right of condemnation, and describing the property sought to be condemned. Process requiring the defendants to appear in answer to the complaint shall be served upon all occupants of the lands sought to be condemned, and upon the owners and all persons claiming interest therein, so far as known. If the title to ant lands sought to be condemned appears to be in the Insular Government, although the lands are occupied by private individuals, or if it is uncertain whether the title is in the Insular Government or in private individuals, or if the title is otherwise so obscure or doubtful that the company can not with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment may be made by the company in its complaint to that effect. Process shall be served upon resident and no residents in the same manner as provided therefor in Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, and the rights of minors and persons of unsound mind shall be safeguarded in the manner in such cases provided in said Act. The court may order additional and special notice in any case where such additional or special notice is, in its opinion, required.SEC. 4. Commissioners appointed in pursuance of such complaint, in accordance with section two hundred and forty-three of Act Numbered One hundred ad ninety, shall have jurisdiction over all the lands included in the complaint, situated within the city of Manila or within the province, as the case may be, and shall be governed in the performance of their duties by the provisions of sections two hundred and forty-four and two hundred and forty-five, and the action of the court upon the report of the commissioners shall be governed

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by section two hundred and forty-six of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety.The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to in these sections are, so far as material here, the following:SEC. 241. How the right of eminent domain may be exercised. - The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having by law the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed.SEC. 242.The complaint. - The complaint in condemnation proceedings shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, and describe the property sought to be condemned, showing the interest of each defendant separately.SEC. 243.Appointment of Commissioners. - If the defendant concede that the right of condemnation exists on the part of the plaintiff, or if, upon trial, the court finds that such right exists, the court shall appoint three judicious and disinterested landowners of the province in which the land to be condemned, or some portion of the same, is situated, to be commissioners to hear the parties and view the premises, and assess damages to be paid for the condemnation, and to report their proceedings in full to the court, and shall issue a commission under the seal of the court to the commissioners authorizing the performance of the duties herein prescribed.We are of the opinion that what we have said in the discussion of the effect of section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over lands is applicable generally to the sections of law just quoted. The provisions regarding the place and method of trial are procedural. They touched not the authority of the court over the land but, rather, the powers which it may exercise over the parties. They relate not to the jurisdictional power of the court over the subject matter but to the place where that jurisdiction is to be exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is assured, whatever the place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is the thing; the place of exercise its incident.These special laws contain nothing which in any way indicates an intention of the legislature to alter the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance granted by Act No. 136. As we said in discussing the provisions of section 277 of theCode of Civil Procedure, we can not hold that jurisdiction to be limited unless by express provision or clear intendment.We have thus far drawn an analogy between section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure and section 3 of Act No. 1258, asserting that neither the one nor the other was intended to restrict, much less deprive, the Courts of First Instance of the jurisdiction over lands in the Philippine Islands conferred upon them by Act No. 136. We have extended that analogy to include the proposition that the question of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, it simply granting to the defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to the place of trial, which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by implication. We do not, however, extend that analogy further. On reading and comparing section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure with section 3 ofAct No. 1258. both of which are hearing set forth, a difference is at once apparent in the wording of the provisions relating to the

place of trial. Section 277 stipulates that all actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated." Section 3 of Act No. 1258 provides that in an action brought by a railroad corporation to condemn land for its uses the plaintiff "may in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted . . . in the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is situated, join as defendants all persons owning, etc . . . land within the city or province . . ." Section 1 of that Act, as we have already seen, says that: "In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three" of the Code of Civil Procedure, "the procedure in this Act may be adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land . . . ."From these provisions we note, first, that the procedure expressly made applicable to actions for the condemnation of land by railroad corporations is not that contained in section 377 but that found in sections 241 to 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 377 is nowhere expressly mentioned in Act No. 1258 nor is it anywhere touched or referred to by implication. The procedure embodied in that Act to consummate the purposes of its creation is complete of itself, rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself, rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself or by reference to specific sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which by such reference are made a part thereof.In the second place, we observe that, so far as venue is concerned, Act No. 1258 and section 377 are quite different in their wording. While the latter provides that the actions of which it treats shall be commenced in the province where the land, or some part thereof, lies, Act No. 1258, section 3, stipulates that the actions embraced in its terms shall be brought only in the province where the land lies. This does not mean, of course, that if a single parcel of land under the same ownership, lying party in one province and partly in another, is the subject of condemnation proceedings begun by a railroad corporation, a separate action must be commenced in each province. Nor does it mean that the aid of section 377 is required to obviate such necessity. The situation would be met and solved by the general principles of law and application of which to every situation is an inherent or implied power of every court. Such, for example, are the prohibition against multiplicity of actions, the rules against division of actions into parts, and the general principle that jurisdiction over a subject matter singly owned will not be divided among different courts, the one in which the action is first brought having exclusive jurisdiction of the whole. The provisions of these two laws, section 377 and Act No. 1258, differ in the manner indicated because they refer to subjects requiring inherently different treatment, so different, in fact, as to be in some respects quite opposite. While it is true that section 377 speaks of action for the condemnation of real estate, nevertheless it was intended to cover simply the ordinary action affecting title to or interest in real estate, where the land involved is comparatively speaking, compact together. Its provisions were not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously from one end of the country to the other. Act No. 1258 is a special law,

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enacted for a particular purpose, and to meet a particular exigency. The conditions found in an action for the condemnation of real estate by a railroad company might and generally would be so different that the application of the provisions of section 377 permitting the venue to be laid in any province where any part of the land lies would work a very great hardship to many defendants in such an action. To hold that a railroad company desiring to build a line from Ilocos Norte to Batangas, through substantially the whole of the Island of Luzon, might lay the venue in Batangas, it being a province in which a part of the land described in the complaint was located, would be to require all the parties defendant in Ilocos Norte and intervening provinces, with their witnesses, to go to Batangas, with all the inconvenience and expense which the journey would entail, and submit the valuation of their lands into only to the Court of First Instance of Batangas but to a commission appointed in that province. The hardship to such defendants under such a holding is so manifest that we are of the opinion that it was not intended that section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure should apply to actions for condemnation. Under the provisions of that section, the defendant has no right to ask for a change of venue if the land involved in the litigation, or any part thereof, is located in the province where the court sits before which the action has been commenced. When, therefore, an action such as is detailed above is begun by a railroad company in Batangas against persons whose lands lie in Ilocos Norte, there being also involved lands lying in Batangas, such defendants would have no right under section 377, if it were applicable, to demand that the trial as to their lands take place in the Province of Ilocos Norte. We do not believe that this was intended. We believe, rather, that under the provisions of the special laws relating to the condemnation of real estate by railroad companies, the defendants in the various provinces through which the line runs may compel, if they wish, a separate action to be commenced in each province in order that they may have a fair and convenient trial not only before the court but also before commissioner of their province who are not only before commissioners of their province who are not only conveniently at hand, but who are best able to judge of the weight of testimony relative to the value of land in that province.We, therefore, hold that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly

submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to criminal cases. They seem to rest on a different footing. There the people of the state is a party. The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. As a result it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action must be laid in the place where the crime was committed. While the laws here do not specifically and in terms require it, we believe it is the established custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions must be brought and conducted, except in cases especially provided by law, in the province where the crime is committed.For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law. So ordered.G.R. No. L-25795            October 29, 1966ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P. VILLASOR, petitioners, vs.THE CITY JUDGE, CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN, and TERRA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.San Juan, Africa and Benedicto and Antonio C. Amor and Associates for petitioners. Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra and Tayag for respondents.DIZON, J.:In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin (Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those of Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that they made it appear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the "guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the

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guardians of said minors on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No. C-2268).Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to give them an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence, and after the conclusion of the reinvestigation the parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the meantime the City Court had set Criminal Case No. C-2268 for arraignment, the defendants secured from said court several postponements of the arraignment.Finally, in view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the case, petitioners filed on November 26, 1965 with the City Court a motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complainants in the case — with the conformity of the City Fiscal — filed an opposition thereto, and on February 3, 1966 the respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of all the defendants on March 5 of the same year. In view thereof, petitioners filed the present action for certiorariand prohibition.Upon the foregoing facts the only question to be resolved is whether or not the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal Case No. C-2268 for alleged falsification of a private document by the parties named in the information.It is clear that petitioners are not charged with having used a falsified document, in violation of the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge against them is that of having falsified a private document by knowingly and willfully stating therein that Aurora M. Villasor and Angelina M. Lopez were the "guardians" of their minor brothers George and Alexander, respectively, when in fact they knew that, at the time they made such written statement, it was Carolina M. de Castro who was the judicial guardian of said minors.It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction.In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners — a claim supported by the record — that Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private document wherein they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact, the first within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the province of Rizal.We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed. Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when

such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended.Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that the information was defective, in that it fails to set forth expressly the place where improper and illegal use was made of the falsified document, an allegation which counsel for appellant insists was absolutely essential for the proper determination of the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the definition of the crime of falsification of a private document as set forth in Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense is consummated at the time when and at the place where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether the falsified document is or is not put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document; . . . .Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the private document subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of falsification — the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage — was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond question.Respondents, however, contend that the motion to quash filed by the defendants necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City and that they may not be allowed to disprove this at this early stage of the proceedings. This is not exactly the law on the matter at present. It was the law applicable to a demurrer — now obsolete — to an information. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which a preliminary trial is required.In the present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation which was submitted to the respondent judge for consideration in connection with the resolution of the motion to quash filed by the defendants shows beyond

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question that the offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City.On the propriety of the writs prayed for, it may be said that, as a general rule, a court of equity will not issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the rule that upon such denial the defendant should enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by his motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions however, this is no longer the hard and fast rule.The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extra-ordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, We took cognizance of a petition for certiorari and prohibition although the accused in the case could have appealed in due time from the order complained of, our action in the premises being based on the public welfare and the advancement of public policy. In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43 Phil. 304, We also admitted a petition to restrain the prosecution of certain chiropractors although, if convicted, they could have appealed. We gave due course to their petition for the orderly administration of justice and to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And in Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari challenging the trial court's action admitting an amended information was sustained despite the availability of appeal at the proper time.More recently, We said the following in Yap vs. the Hon. D. Lutero, etc., G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959:Manifestly, the denial, by respondent herein, of the motion to quash the information in case No. 16443, may not be characterized as "arbitrary" or "despotic", or to be regarded as amounting to "lack of jurisdiction". The proper procedure, in the event of denial of a motion to quash, is for the accused, upon arraignment, to plead not guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy, and, in case of conviction, to appeal therefrom, upon the ground that he has been twice put in jeopardy of punishment, either for the same offense, or for the same act, as the case may be. However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on the merits in case No. 16443, apart from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and conviction therein would violate one of his constitutional rights, and that, on appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice.Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles over the criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to compel the parties charged to undergo trial in

said court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.[G.R. No.L-3223. October 10, 1950.]

JAMES MCI. HENDERSON, Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and THE NATIONAL RUBBER GOODS MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Petitioners, v. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Rizal City Branch, and JOSEPH ARCACHE, Respondents. 

SYLLABUS1. JUDGMENT; AMENDMENT AFTER IT HAS BECOME FINAL. — As a general rule, unless control over it has been retained in some proper manner, or a statute otherwise provides, no judgment can be amended after it has become final, except as to clerical errors or misprisions. 

2. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTE EXCESS OF JURISDICTION TO BE CORRECTED BY CERTIORARI. —A court has no power to excise a moratorium Clause from its judgment that has already become final. Such an act is in excess of jurisdiction and may be corrected by certiorari.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.:The National Rubber Goods Manufacturing Company, Inc. is a Philippine corporation with a capital stock of P1,000,000 divided into shares of the par value of P100 each. As 4,619 of those shares were Japanese-owned, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, as the official designated by the President of the United States to hold and administer enemy properties located in the Philippines, took title to the said shares by virtue of Vesting Order No. P-62 issued on March 20, 1947, and having thereby become the owner of 72 percent of the subscribed capital stock of the company, also undertook the management and control of its affairs and assets. 

On June 24, 1947, the herein respondent Joseph Arcache, claiming to be the mortgage creditor of the company in the sum of P70,000 by virtue of a deed of mortgage purporting to have been constituted on September 24, 1942, on 19 parcels of registered company land situated in Rizal City, instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the foreclosure of said mortgage. Neither the Philippine Alien Property Administrator nor the company received personal notice of this action, but following summons by publication and the lapse of the reglementary period for filing an answer, the company was declared in default and on October 2, 1947, judgment was rendered against it and in favor of Joseph Arcache for the amount of the mortgage debt and interests and for the sale of the mortgaged property, but with the following proviso. 

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"In view however, of the executive order regarding moratorium, which orders a suspension of the payment for all monetary obligations incurred after December 8, 1941, but before the liberation of the Philippines, it is hereby ordered that no execution shall issue in this case until after ninety (90) days from the lifting of said executive order."cralaw virtua1aw library

Though notified of the above judgment the Philippine Alien Property Administrator took no steps to question the same, the said officer not being then aware of any facts that could be set up as a defense against the mortgage, with the result that the judgment became final in due time. This was the status of the case when on March 15, 1949, Joseph Arcache, without notice to the company or to the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, filed a motion for the lifting of that portion of the judgment which suspended its execution until after 90 days from the lifting of the executive order on moratorium, alleging as a ground for said motion that (1) the defense of moratorium had been waived by the company by reason of its failure to invoke the same; (2) the mortgaged properties had been abandoned by the company; (3) the said properties were delinquent in the payment of taxes; and (4) the company was not entitled to the benefits of the Moratorium Law (Republic Act No. 342) for the reason that the said law was intended to be for the benefit of debtors who intended to pay and not for those who had no such intention. No one having appeared at the hearing to oppose the motion, despite notice thereof by publication, the court by its order dated May 9, 1949, granted the motion and authorized the sale of the mortgaged properties for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt. Pursuant to this order the mortgaged properties were auctioned by the sheriff and awarded to Joseph Arcache as the highest bidder, the corresponding sheriff’s deed of sale having been subsequently executed in his favor and confirmed by the court on June 30, 1949. 

Though notice of the hearing of Arcache’s motion to lift the moratorium clause in the judgment was made by publication, the Philippine Alien Property Administration never had actual knowledge of said motion or hearing, nor of the order of May 9, 1949, and the sale of the mortgaged properties to Arcache, and only came to know of these matters on July 6, 1949, when one of his employees happened to go to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal City in connection with some other business and there learned that Arcache had presented for registration in said office the sheriff’s deed of sale covering the mortgaged properties. Following this discovery the company and the Philippine Alien Property Administrator filed a petition to have the said order of May 9, 1949, and the sale of the mortgaged properties declared void. But as the petition did not prosper, they came to this Court with a petition for certiorari to have the order of May 9, 1949, and the proceedings taken thereunder declared null and void. 

The main question for determination is whether the court may by an interlocutory order change its judgment after the same has already become final. As a general rule, unless control over it has been retained in some proper manner, or a statute otherwise provides, no judgment can be amended after it has

p. 269); "The power of courts to correct clerical errors and misprisions and to make the record speak the truth by nunc pro tunc amendments after the term does not enable them to change their judgments in substance or in any material respect. . . . Consequently it is well settled that, in the absence of statute permitting it, the law does not authorize the correction of judicial errors, however flagrant and glaring they may be under the pretense of correcting clerical errors. To entitle a party to an order amending a judgment, order, or decree, ordinarily, he must establish that the entry as made does not conform to what the court ordered. 

It is obvious that the lower court has not merely corrected a clerical error, for the inclusion of the moratorium clause in the judgment must have been a deliberate act calculated to produce its intended effect, which was to suspend the execution of the judgment. The error may be one of law, but it cannot by any means be considered clerical. And the correction may not be justified on the ground that its purpose was merely to give due course to the judgment as the court alleges. If the judgment could not under its terms be executed until the lifting of the moratorium, it would not be giving it due course to change its terms by deleting the clause that prevented its execution. 

It is, however, urged that the part of the judgment referring to moratorium which was lifted by the court below did not in reality constitute a part of said judgment for the question of moratorium had not been raised in the case. This is an assertion which flies in the face of facts, for it clearly appears that the moratorium clause in the judgment forms a material and substantial part thereof. And even conceding that it was an error for the trial court to embody such a clause in its judgment because, as the respondent Arcache alleges, the defense of moratorium had not been raised and that the debtor corporation was not entitled to it because it had no intention to pay the debt, that error should have been corrected by appeal and not by recourse to the power of the court to correct clerical error or misprisions. As Freeman says in his book already cited, the failure of the court to render judgment according to law must not be treated as a clerical misprision (par. 142, page 277), and the rule applies whether the correction consists in introducing something which ought not to be there. (par. 145, page 281), and judgments upon default are governed by the same rules in this respect as judgment rendered after an error or trial (par. 159, page 311). 

It follows that the lower court had no power to excise the moratorium clause from its judgment in the way it did after the judgment had become final. Such an act was in excess of its jurisdiction and could, therefore, be corrected by certiorari. (Section 1, Rule 67, Rules of Court; II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Second Revised Edition, p. 123.) 

In view of the foregoing, the order of May 9, 1949 and the consequent proceedings had thereafter are hereby declared void, including the order confirming the deed of sale made in favor of respondent Arcache. With costs against the said Respondent. 

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G.R. No. L-30666 February 25, 1983ANDRES ABAN and DOLORES GALOPE, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE MANUEL L. ENAGE, as District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CUENCA, and ATTY. TIMOTEO D. NALDOZA, Attorney-in-Fact and Counsel,respondents. MAKASIAR, J.:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners against private respondents and Honorable Judge Manuel L. Enage, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, to declare null and void the order of the court dated July 29, 1968, issued in Civil Case No. 1005, ordering the cancellation of TCT No. RT 1693 in the names of herein petitioners covering Lot No. 427 C-I (Subdivision Plan LRC-Psd-40107), on the ground that the same was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.The antecedent facts are as follows:On August 21, 1964, a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch 11, then presided by the late Judge Montano Ortiz, docketed as Civil Case No. 1005, entitled "Maria Balaga Severo Malvar, Ariston Blanco, Domingo Macuno plaintiffs, versus Pedro Cuenca, Moises Burdeos, Nestor Burdeos, Deodoro Burdeos, Leonila Burdeos, Remedios Burdeos, Leonardo Campana, Aprodito Campana, Cleofe Campana, Lilia Campana, Alberto Banjao, for himself and on behalf of the Minors- Luzminda, Clemencia, and Isabel, all surnamed Banjao, Felix Arriola Sr., Leonardo Villafuerte, Lope C. Jonco, Butuan City Rural Bank, Register of Deeds of Butuan City, Land Registration Commissioner, Sixto Martinez, Aurora C. Martinez, Celestino Udarbe and Andres Aban, defendants," for Nullification and Cancellation of Subdivision Plan LRC- Psd 37270 on Lot No. 427 Cad. 84, Butuan City, TCT-RT 1584, TCT-RT 1585 and Various Documents and for Damages with Injunction (pp. 12- 17, rec.).The complaint states that Celestino Udarbe and Andres Aban are sued as parties-defendants "since their consent to have them joined as parties- plaintiffs could not be secured. "Andres Aban, as a defendant in the above-entitled case, through counsel, filed a motion dated September 1, 1964 to drop him from the complaint as a misjoined party and, at the same time, moved for the dismissal of the complaint (pp. 57-58, rec.).On September 17, 1964, the CFI of Butuan City issued an order (p. 59, rec.) dropping Andres Aban as party- defendant and dismissing the complaint against him.On May 26, 1965, an amended complaint was filed wherein the names of Severo Malvar as plaintiff and petitioner herein Andres Aban and Celestino Udarbe as defendants in Civil Case No. 1005 were dropped as parties therein.Meanwhile, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca filed a petition for correction, etc. dated November 1, 1965 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1126, this time before the CFI of Agusan, Branch 1, presided by Judge Simeon Ferrer, praying, inter alia, for the cancellation of TCT No. RT- 1693 issued to herein petitioner Andre Aban. This case, however, was dismissed at the

instance of the heirs in an order of the court dated June 4, 1968 (pp. 68-69, rec.).On April 15, 1968, defendants-heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca in Civil Case No. 1005, through Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, counsel and attorney-in-fact of the Cuenca heirs, filed a motion in the aforesaid case for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-1693 issued in the name of Andres Aban, as well as all the annotations at the back thereof, alleging that herein petitioner Aban's claim over a portion of Lot No. 427, particularly Lot No. 427-C-1 is "now abandoned, waived or relinquished" (pp. 12-17, rec.).Subsequently, herein petitioner Andres Aban filed an opposition to the motion to cancel TCT No. RT-1693 filed by the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca.On July 29, 1968, respondent Judge Manuel L. Enage issued an order hereby quoted as follows:ORDERRESOLVING: On a pending motion filed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, counsel for defendants-movants, dated April 15, 1968 (See: pp. 667-672, Records), the manifestation with motion of same counsel dated May 25, 1968 (See: pp. 710-71 1, Records), all praying that TCT-RT 1693 issued to respondent Andres Aban and all the annotations at the back of said title (See: pp. 687-689, Records), be cancelled based on the grounds therein stated;CONSIDERING: That, except for respondent Andres Aban who filed an opposition to the foregoing thru his counsel, Atty. Jose L. Lachica, and plaintiff Domingo Mactino who. thru his counsel, Atty. Lydio J. Cataluna argued orally in behalf of his aforesaid client, none of the parties filed any formal opposition to the defendants-movants' aforesaid motion despite due notice given them, including the City of Butuan thru the City Fiscal, and neither did anyone of them even cared to appear in Court when defendant movants' motion was heard for oral argument;CONSIDERING: That the land in question known as Lot No. 427 of the Butuan Cadastre was by the Court setting as a Cadastral Court in Cadastral Case No. 321, Cadastre No. 84 decreed to be the absolute property of the late Eleuterio Cuenca, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendants -movants;CONSIDERlNG: That pursuant thereto, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-156 (360) was issued in the name of said Eleuterio Cuenca which title was later cancelled by TCT-RT-589 (See: pp. 683 and 783, Records)CONSIDERING: That the aforesaid TCT-RT-589 was later cancelled by TCT-RT 1584 and TCT-RT 1589;CONSIDERING: That, under the Subdivision plan LRC-Psd 37270 (See. pp. 249, 673 and 796, Records), said Lot No. 427 was subdivided intoLot No. 427-ALot No. 427-B; and Lot No. 427-C;and that sometime on November 5, 1964 said Lot No. 427-C was further subdivided intoLot No. 427-C-1 Lot No. 427-C-2; and Lot No. 427-C-3under subdvision plan LRC Psd 40107 (See: p. 674; Records);

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CONSIDERING: That TCT RT-1585 was later cancelled after said Lot No. 427-C was subdivided into three lots as aforestated byTCT-RT 1693 for Lot No. 427-C-1; TCT-RT 1694 for Lot No. 427-C-2; and TCT-RT 1695 for Lot No. 427-C-3;CONSIDERING: That defendants-movants are now asking the Court that TCT-RT 1693 above-referred to and issued to respondent Andres Aban and all the annotations at the back thereof be declared as null and void and, as consequence thereof to revive TCT-RT 1585 insofar as Lot No. 427-C-1 is concerned, declaring Entry No. 7125 at the back thereof as cancelled, and that a new transfer certificate of title be issued in the names of herein defendants-movants, after complying with the publication and other requisites for the issuance of title;CONSIDERING: That TCT-RT 1693 issued in the name of respondent Andres Aban under Entry No. 7125 at the back of TCT-RT 1585 (See: p. 802, Records) was so issued without any registered document of sale or conformity required as a prerequisite, on the approval of said subdivision plan LRC-Psd 40107 as shown on the face of said plan under the said annotation entry;CONSIDERING: That without such registered document of sale or conformity the Register of Deeds cannot validly issue TCT-RT 1693 in the name of respondent Andres Aban without a Court order to that effect and registered with the said plan under Entry No. 7125;CONSIDERING: That this case has not been tried yet by the Court, and, therefore, no order or decision has ever been entered yet declarant, respondent Andres Aban the true owner of said Lot No. 42's'-C-1 which is a portion of Lot 427, the entire property in question;CONSIDERING: That respondent Andres Aban, upon his own motion that his counsel, was declared by the Court on September 17, 1964 to be not an indispensable party in this case, thereby binding him to all its legal effects, there being no motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been seasonably brought by said respondent Andres Aban up to the present (See: p. 68, Records);CONSIDERING: That the Land Registration Commission admitted in writing that subdivision plan Psd-40107 was approved by said office with a condition that the giving of Lot No. 427-C-1 to respondent Andres Aban under the said plan was subject to the conformity of defendants-movants as owners of the said lot, which conformity is herein found wanting (See: pp. 772-813; 703-740, 736; and 740, Records), so much so that for so issuing respondent Andres Aban TCT-RT 1585 in his name the Register of Deeds was forced to admit 'clerical mistake' (See: pp. 738- 739, Records);CONSIDERING: That it is now settled in this jurisdiction that if the co- owners of a property subdivided cannot agree as to how the property is going to be apportioned among themselves, the Court shall, before title shall be issued by the Register of Deeds, duly authorized or, as in the instant case, approve the issuance thereof, which is found wanting again in this instance (See: Section 44, Act 496, as amended by Republic Act 440; Patingo vs. Pelayo, 63 O.G. 4818; and Lagula vs. Casimero, 53 O.G. 196);

IN VIEW WHEREOF, TCT-RT 1693 issued in the name of respondent Andres Aban and all the annotations at the back thereof is hereby declared, for having been issued without authority of the Court, NULL and VOID ab initio, and as a consequence thereof, TCT-RT 1685 is hereby ordered, insofar as Lot No. 427-C-1 is concerned, REVIVED, Entry No. 7126 being NULL and VOID.The Register of Deeds of the City of Butuan is hereby ordered to issue a new transfer certificate of title over Lot No. 427-C-1 in the names of defendants-movants after complying with the publication and other requisites for the due issuance of the title above-said.SO ORDERED (pp. 20-25, rec.).On August 20, 1968, herein petitioner Andres Aban filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order (p. 26, rec.) of the court dated January 11, 1969.A second motion for reconsideration dated January 22, 1969 was filed but was denied in an order (pp. 27-30, rec.) dated May 10,1969.A third motion for reconsideration dated May 15, 1969 was filed but was again denied in an order (p. 31, rec.) dated June 6, 1969.Hence, the instant appeal.Acting on the petition for certiorari, this Court, on July 9, 1969, issued a resolution requiring the respondents herein to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and, at the same time, issued a temporary restraining order restraining the enforcement of the Order "cancelling Title TCT-RT-1693 of petitioners herein, and from taking further proceedings or action in Civil Case No. 1005 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, entitled 'Maria Balaga et al. vs. Pedro Cuenca, et al.' (p. 72, rec.).On August 1, 1969, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed a telegraphic motion (p. 73, rec.) for extension of time within which to file an answer to the petition for certiorari, which was granted by this Court in a resolution dated August 5, 1969 (p. 79, rec.).On September 6, 1969, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza as one of the respondents in the instant case, filed an "Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses" (pp. 85-127, rec.).In the same answer, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza also entered his "special appearance" as counsel for and in behalf of the respondent heirs of Eleciterio Cuenca (pp. 121-122, rec.).On September 13, 1969, counsel Timoteo D. Naldoza filed a "Supplemental Answer with Additional Affirmative & Special Defenses" (pp. 222-227, rec.).In a resolution dated September 22, 1969 (p. 229, rec.), this Court set the hearing of the instant case on October 20, 1969.At the hearing of the instant case on October 20, 1969, Atty. Jose Lachica appeared for the petitioners and were given 30 days to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument; the Court likewise granted the respondents 30 days to reply upon receipt of petitioners' memorandum (p. 241, rec.).On October 30, 1969, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed an "Urgent Motion and Manifestations" (pp. 242-244, rec.) praying that the petition for certiorari be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

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In a resolution (p. 253, rec.) dated November 4, 1969, this Court denied the motion and manifestation of the respondents for the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.In a resolution (p. 253, rec.) dated November 4, 1969, this Court denied the motion and manifestation of the respondents for the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.On November 12, 1969, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed the following: "APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CUENCA WITH URGENT MOTION TO SET ASIDE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN IF ANY AND/OR TO SUSPEND RESOLUTION OF TELEGRAPHIC MOTION AND/OR WRITTEN MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO FILE MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF ORAL ARGUMENT OR OF THE HEARING SET FOR OCTOBER 20, 1969 TO ENABLE SAID HEIRS FIRST TO FILE THEIR ANSWER OR ADDITIONAL ANSWER TO THE PETITION IN ADDITION TO THE ANSWER AS FILED IN THIS CASE BEFORE SETTING THIS CASE FOR ITS HEARING" (pp. 255-256, rec.).In a resolution (p. 258, rec.) dated November 17, 1969, this Court resolved to "require Atty. Naldoza to secure respondents Heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca's conformity to his appearance herein, within 10 days from notice hereof."Thereafter, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca filed a certificate of conformity to the appearance of Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza (p. 285, rec.) as their counsel in the instant case.On December 5, 1969, the Court issued a resolution (p. 289, rec.). requiring the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca to comment on the conformity of said heirs to the appearance of Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza as their counsel in the instant case.On January 28, 1970, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca filed before this Court their comment (p. 312, rec.) reiterating their conformity to the appearance of Atty. Naldoza as their counsel of record.Meanwhile, petitioners, thru counsel, filed their memorandum (pp. 291- 297, rec.) on December 16, 1969, in compliance with the resolution of this Court dated October 20, 1969.On December 20, 1969, the respondents, thru counsel, filed their memorandum (pp. 298-3 1 0, rec.).On March 16, 1970, the respondents filed a supplemental memorandum (pp. 319-324, rec.) to their memorandum dated November 30,1969, which was filed on December 20,1969.While the instant case was pending before this Court, a certain Antonio K. Cañon came into the picture by entering his appearance (p. 327, rec.) on May 29, 1973 as counsel for the respondents and, at the same time, filing a motion for resolution (pp. 328-329, rec.).In his motion for resolution, counsel Antonio K. Cañon stated that he is appearing in collaboration with 'the original counsel of record, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza. "In a resolution dated June 5, 1973 (p. 333, rec.), this Court "resolved to require the respondents themselves to COMMENT on the said appearance, and in conformity therewith, to INFORM this Court, who between Attys. Timoteo D. Naldoza and Antonio K. Cañon shall be exclusively served with copies of all pleadings and court processes in this case, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof. This Court resolved further to NOTE the motion of

respondents heirs of the late Eleuterio Cuenca praying that this case be resolved and dismissed,"On June 19, 1973, the petitioners, thru counsel, filed a manifestation to motion for resolution (pp. 334-335, rec.) filed by Atty. Antonio K. Cañon in behalf of herein respondents, joining said Atty. Cañon in his prayer for the resolution of the instant case.On July 6, 1973, the respondent heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca filed their comment in compliance with the resolution of this Court dated June 5, 1973.In their comment (p. 336, rec.), the respondents heirs of the late Eleuterio Cuenca stated:xxx xxx xxx2. That we contracted the services of Atty.AntonioK.Cañon after we lost our faith and confidence on our counsel Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, who sold some portions of our property, subject matter of this case;3. That our counsel of record Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza neglected us after we stopped him in his acts of disposing some portions of our property under litigation and abused our ignorance which we discovered only after we contracted the services of our new counsel who informed as that the acts of Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza in disposing some portions of our property is illegal before the case is finally terminated by this Court.WHEREFORE, premises considered, co-respondents, Heirs of the late Eleuterio Cuenca through the undersigned representatives respectfully INFORM this honorable Court that copies of all pleadings and court processes be exclusively served on Atty. Antonio K. Cañon at his address at Sto. Niño San Agustin, Surigao del Sur, Philippines. "On July 31, 1973, the respondents, thru counsel, Atty. Antonio K. Cañon, filed an answer to manifestation to motion for resolution (pp. 343-345, rec.) filed by herein petitioners.On August 19, 1974, the respondents, thru Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, filed a motion captioned as "MOTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO SECTION 11 (1) and (2) OF ART. X OF THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION" (pp, 354-354a).On September 9, 1974, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to motion to give effect to section 11 -1 and 2 of Article X of the New Philippine Constitution (pp. 356-357, rec.), in compliance with the resolution of the Court to comment on said motion of respondents.On December 23, 1974, the law firm of Zarate, Artes and Vega entered their appearance as counsels of the petitioners in collaboration with Atty. Jose L. Lachica (p. 360, rec.).Herein petitioner Andres Aban likewise affirmed the appearance of the aforestated law firm in a letter (p. 362, rec.) sent to the Clerk of Court of this Court.On December 23, 1974, the petitioners, thru their new counsel, filed a motion to admit supplemental memorandum (pp. 363-364, rec.).In a resolution dated January 14, 1975, this Court granted the motion of the petitioners to admit supplemental memorandum in support of their petition for certiorari and prohibition and noted the aforesaid memorandum as well as the appearance of the law firm Zarate, Artes and Vega; and the letter of petitioner Andres Aban to the Clerk of this Court confirm the

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appearance of the aforesaid law firm as his new counsel in collaboration with his original counsel of record (p. 367, rec.).One of the annexes attached to the supplemental memorandum filed by the new counsel of herein petitioners was an affidavit (Annex 'F', pp. 105-107, Supplemental Memorandum, p. 366, rec.) executed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza which declares the following:First, to rectify my legal impression and mistakes committed in the course of various judicial proceedings conducted in the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte as well as one pending before the Supreme Court by way of a certiorari proceedings, and, after a perusal of all points of law involved in these cases, I hereby state, that TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RT-1693 issued in the name of ANDRES ABAN is free from all fatal defects, intrinsic or extrinsic in nature, valid and indefeasible against the whole world, and his corresponding right as owner thereof is beyond question, consequently, I will undertake to repair all damages and prejudice caused to him directly or impliedly by the proceeding in court, to the extent of my and/or our opposition filed in the Supreme Court under G.R. No. L-30666 filed sometime on or about 1969; and, thus, I acknowledged as erroneous and null and void my acquisition of one half (1/2) of the undivided portion of Lot No. 427-C-1 from the Heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca (Pedro Cuenca et al.) in the document entitled 'Deed of Transfer' ratified before Notary Public Noli G. Cortel of Butuan City, as Doc. No. 1657, Page No. 33, Book, No. XIV Series of 1966 on December 17,1965;Second, to fulfill my undertakings as above narrated, I will work to secure the conformity of my client within the period of two months from the date of this instrument, and, thereafter, as soon as I received the conformity thereof, then, I will submit the same to Mr. Andres Aban and his counsel, with respect to the opposition filed in the Supreme Court.Third, That the undertaking as above described is subject to the concomitant action to be taken by Andres Aban to the withdrawal of the administrative case against me.IN TRUTH OF THE FOREGOING, I have hereunto set my hand on this 27th day of September, 1974 at Manila.(SGD.) TIMOTEO D. NALDOZAOn May 14, 1975, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed an opposition to supplemental memorandum filed by the petitioners and denied the truth and genuiness of the affidavit marked as Annex 'F' (pp. 372-380, rec.).In a letter (p. 398, rec.) dated May 23, 1975, which. was addressed to the Clerk of Court of this Court, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza stated that by virtue of the written authority given by respondents heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca, duly entered into the records of the instant case, he is the principal counsel herein for all said respondents and that Atty. Antonio K. Cañon is only collaborating with him and requesting that henceforth he be considered as counsel of record for respondents and that all notices and other court processes be sent to him.On August 20, 1975, the respondents and Atty. Antonio K. Cañon filed their comment (pp. 404-405, rec.) on the letter-request of Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza in compliance with the resolution of the Court (p. 402, rec.) dated June 5, 1975.

Likewise, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca executed a joint affidavit (pp. 406- 408, rec.) dated August 2, 1975 relative to the letter- request of Atty. Naldoza.Attached to the comment filed by Atty. Antonio K. Cañon are Annexes '1', '2', '3', '4', '5' and '6', all xerox copies of alleged Deeds of Sale executed by Atty. Timoteo D., Naldoza in favor of several persons over some portions of the land subject matter of this litigation (pp. 409-416, rec.).In a resolution dated August 26, 1975, this Court resolved to require Atty. Naldoza to file a reply to the comment of Atty. Cañon (p. 418, rec.).On October 10, 1975, the respondents, thru Atty. Antonio K, Cañon filed a "MANIFESTATION AND/OR OBJECTIONS TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF ATTY. TIMOTEO NALDOZA (pp. 424-425, rec.).In his manifestation and objection, Atty. Antonio K. Cañon stressed:1. That the above-mentioned affidavit is unauthorized, unethical, and without any basis in fact and in law and was procured by the petitioner Andres Aban after the petitioners commenced a Disbarment Proceedings with the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, against Atty. Timoteo Naldoza;xxx xxx xxx4. That said statements are unauthorized, baseless, and illegal on the ground that it constitutes conflicting interest prejudicial to his clients during the pendency of the above-entitled case before this Honorable Court, which are contrary to the evidence on the records of this case, showing his ignorance of the law and total disregard of the trust and confidence imposed on him by his clients. The last time Atty. Naldoza had contract with his clients was in the month of September, 1972.5. That what he (Atty. Naldoza) stated in said affidavit is binding on him personally and cannot legally bind his clients, said statement was executed without authority from them.6. That said statement of the affiant Atty. Naldoza is an act of betrayal of the trust and confidence imposed on him by his clients and respondents through the undersigned course', humbly ask this Honorable SUPREME COURT that a disciplinary action be imposed on Atty. Timoteo Naldoza,WHEREFORE, premises considered, Respondents through the undersigned counsel respectfully pray the Honorable SUPREME COURT to disregard the above-mentioned affidavit annexed to the Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioners; to impose a disciplinary action on Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza, and such other remedy which this Honorable Court deem just, equitable and proper on the premises.In a resolution dated October 14, 1975 (p. 427, rec.). this Court noted the foregoing manifestation and objection of Atty. Antonio K. Cañon to the affidavit marked as Annex 'F' allegedly executed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza and attached to the supplemental memorandum filed by petitioners herein.On December 12, 1975, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed a reply (p. 433, rec.) to manifestation and objection filed by Atty. Antonio K. Cañon asserting that said affidavit attached to petitioners' supplemental memorandum was procured through "deceit and misrepresentation."On December 24, 1975, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed a "REPLY TO COMMENT WITH PETITION TO RECORD ATTORNEY'S LIEN" (pp. 436-440, rec.) praying, among

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others, that his aforesaid contingent claim for attorney's fees "be entered into the records of this case and that the same be duly registered at the back of the certificate of title that may be issued to the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca in the event of a favorable decision in this case,"On April 27, 1977.the petitioners, thru counsel, filed a motion for early resolution of the instant case (pp. 446-449, rec.).In a letter dated September-22, 1977, a certain Atty. Cesar T. Palana of Tolosa, Leyte, informed this Court that his legal services were engaged to represent respondents Cuencas in this case by their attorney-in-fact Alvin Domingo and praying that his name be entered in the records of this case and that he be furnished with all notices, pleadings and other court processes (p. 453, rec.).Attached to the letter of Atty. Cesar T. Palana is a xerox copy of the special power of attorney executed by the respondents heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca in favor of Mr. Alvin Domingo (pp. 454-455, rec.).In a resolution dated November 10, 1977, this Court resolved to require the respondent Cuencas to comment on said letter (p. 457, rec.).On January 27, 1978, the respondent heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca filed a manifestation (p. 459, rec.). before this Court affirming the appearance of Atty. Cesar T. Palana as their new counsel of record.On February 22, 1978, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed an opposition to appearance of Atty. Cesar T. Palana (p. 464, rec.).In a resolution dated March 16, 1978, this Court resolved to require the respondent heirs and Atty. Cesar T. Palana to comment on the opposition filed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza (p. 466, rec.).On May 2, 1978, the respondent heirs of the late Eleuterio Cuenca filed their comment before this Court reiterating that they have lost their trust and confidence in Atty. Naldoza as their counsel of record (pp. 468-470, rec.).On May 10, 1978, Atty. Cesar T. Palana filed his comment (p. 476, rec.) on the opposition filed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza.On June 19,1978, a letter-appeal (p. 479, rec.) signed by Alvin Domingo, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca, asking for the early resolution of this case, was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the President through a memorandum (p. 478, rec.) dated June, 5, 1978 of Senior Presidential Staff Officer Francisco A. Robles.On August 4,1978, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed a motion to strike out comments of Atty. Palana and the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca (pp. 481-482).In a resolution dated August 15, 1978, the Court resolved to require Atty. Palana and the respondent heirs to comment on the aforesaid motion of Atty. Naldoza.On September 25, 1978, Atty. Cesar T. Palana filed his comment (pp. 486- 487, rec.) on the motion filed by Atty. Naldoza.On October 3, 1978, the respondent heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca submitted their comment (pp. 489-490, rec.) to this Court.On October 6, 1978, Atty. Naldoza filed a reply to the comment of Atty. Palana (pp. 493-495).

On October 20, 1978, Atty. Naldoza filed a supplemental reply to comment of private respondents (pp. 499-501, rec.).On December 22, 1978, Atty. Cesar T. Palana filed a rejoinder (p. 511, rec.) to the reply of Atty. Naldoza in compliance with the resolution of the Court dated October 19, 1978 (p. 497, rec.).In a letter dated June 25, 1980, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca represented by Nestor Cuenca Burdeos and Nemecio Cuenca, wrote a letter to the Chief Justice asking for the early resolution of this case (p. 532, rec.).In a resolution dated August 7, 1980, the Court noted the letter of Nestor Cuenca Burdeos and Nemecio Cuenca, heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca, and henceforth reassign this case to the First Division of this Court (p. 534, rec.).In a letter (pp. 540-542, rec.) dated January 14, 1982, which was addressed to the Clerk of Court, the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca pray for the change of their counsel of record Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza with Atty. Francisco T. Concon.In a resolution (p. 544, rec.) dated February 8, 1982, the Court resolved to require Atty. Naldoza to comment on the letter- request of the Cuenca heirs.On April 15, 1982, Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza filed an "URGENT/VEHEMENT OPPOSITION" (pp. 550-553, rec.) to the letter- request of the Cuenca heirs, asserting that his services as counsel of said heirs is covered by a "contingent fee agreement" duly executed between him and the said heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca.In a resolution dated May 31, 1982, the Court resolved to require the petitioners to file a reply to the urgent vehement opposition (p. 564, rec.).The records of this case do not show any reply filed by herein petitioners to the urgent vehement opposition filed by Atty. Naldoza; however, Atty. Francisco T. Concon, in behalf of the Cuenca heirs, filed a reply to said opposition (pp. 567-569, rec.).On August 12,1982, Atty. Naldoza filed his comment on the reply filed by Atty. Francisco T. Concon.IGoing back to the main case, herein petitioners alleged that the order of the court a quo dated July 29, 1968, issued in Civil Case No. 1005, ordering the cancellation of TCT No. RT-1693 issued in the name of herein petitioner Andres Aban over lot No. 127-C-1 (Subdivision Plan LRC-Psd-40107' ), was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or without jurisdiction because:(a) The motion [Annex 'A'] filed in the lower Court is improperly filed because the Court below had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the same being a separate, distinct, and independent action by itself;(b) Your petitioners are not parties in Civil Case No. 1005 [Annex 'F'] and therefore, the Court below was without jurisdiction over them;(c) There is patently no basis for respondent Judge Enage to give due course to a mere motion to cancel the title of petitioners there being no proper proceedings conducted, petitioners not being parties in Civil Case No. 1005 as amended, and therefore respondent judge had no power, jurisdiction or authority to order the cancellation of said title No. RT 1693 of petitioners herein;

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(d) According to records of Civil Case No. 1005 the respondent heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca are represented by their counsel, Atty. Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., and not respondent Atty. Timoteo Naldoza; said case is still pending before respondent Judge Enage; consequently, respondent, Atty. Naldoza had no authority or power to file the motion to cancel Title No. RT-1693; such act of respondent Atty. Naldoza constitutes malpractice and a ground for disbarment before this Court;(e) Respondent Judge Enage acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order of cancellation of TCT-R,T-1693 of Andres Aban by an unlawful and improper motion of respondent Atty. Naldoza, Attorney-in-fact for heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca, filed in Civil Case No. 1005 as amended, wherein, petitioners herein are not parties [attached Annex 'F', amended complaint 1005];(f) Petitioners are without any remedy of appeal nor is there any plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law against the patently unlawful order of the lower court to cancel Title No. RT 1693 of herein petitioners;(g) Respondent Judge Enage has set the execution of his order after the lapse of the reglementary period, which order are clearly illegal and unwarranted and will result in irreparable damage and injury to the petitioners herein;(h) There is therefore an imperative need for the issuance of an ex parte Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and prohibiting the respondents, their agents, attorneys, representatives, deputies, servants, or any other persons acting in their behalf from enforcing the Order of which purposes petitioners are ready and willing to put up the necessary bond in the minimum amount which the Honorable Court will require" (pp. 8-10, rec.).In fine, herein petitioners assert that the court a quo could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the motion to cancel TCT-RT-1693 filed by the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca, private respondents herein, because the aforesaid motion to cancel partakes of a separate, distinct, and independent action by itself; that since herein petitioners are not parties in Civil Case No. 1005, the Court a quo was without jurisdiction over their persons.It may be well to state at this point that jurisdiction of the court over the subject or nature of an action, is conferred by law. Jurisdiction over the persons of the parties may be acquired by the voluntary appearance of the plaintiff, and, with respect to the defendant, by the service of summons upon him or by his voluntary appearance in court.It may be recalled that when the motion to cancel dated April 15, 1968 was filed by the heirs of Eleuterio Cuenca in the Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 1005, the court served summons to the petitioners herein who subsequently filed their opposition thereto (pp. 18- 19, rec.). When the motion to cancel was set for hearing (pp. 149-167, rec.) on June 17, 1968, Atty. Jose L. Lachica, counsel of herein petitioners, appeared in court. During said hearing, the parties were given ample opportunity to argue their respective stand, present evidence and exhibits, after which the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which the parties did.

Against the foregoing backdrop, this Court is not inclined to sustain herein petitioners' contention that the lower court was without jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion when it ,acted on the motion to cancel filed by private respondents herein by issuing an order dated July 29,1968 cancelling TCT-RT-1693 in the name of Andres Aban, petitioner herein.For even assuming that the motion to cancel filed by private respondents in the court below is a separate, distinct, and independent action by itself, as argued by the petitioners, nevertheless, by the service of summons upon herein petitioners, and by their act of filing an opposition to the motion as well as their voluntary appearance in court when the motion was set for hearing, together with the submission of their memorandum (pp. 168-177, rec.), the petitioners are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, and, consequently, they are bound by the legal implications of the order of the court a quo.Moreover, the filing of petitioners' three motions for reconsideration is a further submission on their part to the jurisdiction of the court, and the denial of such motions was binding on petitioners herein (Soriano vs. Palacio, et al., 12 SCRA 447, 449).It cannot be said that the petitioners were denied their day in court. Neither can it be said that the petitioners' substantial rights were prejudiced thereby. The petitioners have had the fullest opportunity to lay before the court the merits of their claim when they, as stated heretofore, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court a quo.To assert that the court had no jurisdiction because petitioner Andres Aban was not a party in Civil Case No. 1005 would appear therefore to be a mere technicality that would not serve the interest of the administration of justice (Torres vs. Caluag, et al., 17 SCRA 808, 811). Besides, petitioner Andres Aban's not being a party in Civil Case No. 1005 was of his own making. By not joining as party-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1005, and, at the same time, asking the court to drop him as party-defendant (he was sued as one of the parties-defendants when his consent to have him joined as one of the parties-plaintiffs could not be secured) in the same case' which the court a quogranted in an order dated September 17, 1964, petitioner Andres Aban virtually toyed with his right to enforce and protect his claim over a portion of Lot No. 427 of Butuan Cadastre. There is no plausible reason for petitioner Andres Aban to assume that the lot he claims (Lot No. 427-C-1) is not involved in Civil Case No. 1005 because what is precisely under litigation in said case is ' Lot No. 427 as a whole, of which Lot No. 427-C-1 is part and parcel.Under the circumstances, petitioner spouses Andres Aban and Dolores Galope are deemed impleaded as party respondents in Civil Case No. 1005.IIWith respect to the petition filed by Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza to record his attorney's lien and to consider him as the principal counsel of record of herein private respondents, suffice it to state that this Court finds the petition meritorious.While concededly, private respondents herein have the right to dismiss their attorney with or without cause, however, any change or substitution of attorney must have to follow the

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procedure prescribed by Rule 138, Section 26 of the Revised Rules of Court.Unless the formalities required by the Rules of -Court on valid substitution of attorneys are complied with, no substitution will be permitted and the attorney who appeared last in the cause before such application for substitution will be regarded as the attorney of record and entitled to be notified of all notices and pleadings and responsible for the conduct of the case (Olivares vs. Leola 97 Phil. 352). Specifically, We have ruled in several cases that "no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless the following requisites concur: (1) there must be filed a written application for substitution; (2) there must be filed the written consent of the client to the substitution; (3) there must be filed the written consent of the attorney to be substituted, if such consent can be obtained; (4) in case such written consent cannot be procured, there must be filed with the application for substitution, proof of the service of notice of such motion in the manner required by the rules, on the attorney to be substituted".In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no valid substitution of counsel. The records show that from the time this case was filed in the CFI of Agusan until the same reaches this Court, it was Atty. Timoteo D. Naldoza who appeared and filed all the necessary pleadings and motions in court as counsel of record for private respondents herein. The subsequent appearance of Attys. Antonio K. Cañon Cesar T. Palana, and Francisco T. Concon bears no significance because there was practically nothing to be done in the case any more as the same was already submitted to this Court for decision.WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 29,1968 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, AND THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED BY THIS COURT ON JULY 9,1969 IS HEREBY LIFTED AND SET ASIDE. NO PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS. SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-27365 January 30, 1970FELIX L. LAZO, MERCEDES CASTRO DE LAZO, and JOSE ROBLES, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.REPUBLIC SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC. represented by ANTONIO M. KOH, General Manager and as Attorney-in-Fact of plaintiffs, FELIX and MERCEDES LAZO defendants-appellants. MAKALINTAL, J.:This case is before us on appeal by the defendants from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I, Judge Francisco Arca, presiding) rendered on December 7, 1966, in its Civil Case No. 55734.The original complaint was filed on December 12, 1963, and subsequently amended on November 9, 1964. The plaintiffs are the spouse Felix L. Lazo and Mercedes Castro de Lazo, and Jose Robles; the defendants are Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. its general manager Antonio M. Koh, the sheriff of Manila and the Register of Deeds, also of Manila. The pertinent allegations which make up the plaintiffs' cause of action are: that the spouses Lazo, acting as guarantors for Jose Robles in connection with a loan of P12,000.00 obtained by the latter from the Philippine Bank of Commerce, executed on August 18, 1953 a real estate mortgage in favor of the

defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. in consideration of its having consented to act as principal co-debtor for the loan aforesaid; that the mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially on July 1, 1958 and sold to the mortgagee, as purchaser at such sale, for P18,627.00, the corresponding sheriff's certificate of sale being formalized on August 2, 1958; that defendant Antonio M. Koh, pursuant to the power granted to him in the instrument of mortgage, executed on March 20, 1963 (for purposes of registration) a deed of absolute sale of the foreclosed property of the mortgagee — purchaser which sale was registered on March 28, 1963; that by virtue of such registration the certificate of title in the name of the spouses Lazo was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the defendant company; that the foreclosure of the mortgage was invalid because plaintiff Jose Robles had paid on the mortgage loan the sum of P13,466.36 from August 20, 1953 to May 24, 1958; and that thereafter, from July 8, 1958 to August 23, 1963, he continued to make other payments, aggregating P17,250.00.The principal prayer of the plaintiffs was for the defendant company to render an accounting of the payments thus made, so that if it should appear that the original loan of P12,000.00, together with the stipulated interest, had been paid in full then the real estate mortgage should be cancelled; otherwise the plaintiffs should be allowed to pay, by way of legal redemption, whatever Balance still remained. An additional prayer was for compensatory and moral damages as well as for attorney's fees.In a motion to dismiss filed by all the defendants with respect to the original complaint, they raised two issues, namely: that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the claim or demand set forth therein had already prescribed. On this second point the defendants pointed out that under the Rules of Court (Rule 39, Section 34) an accounting such as that prayed for by the plaintiffs could be demanded only in cases where real property is sold on execution by virtue of a final judgment and not where it is sold on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; and if the rule is applicable at all in the latter case, it is available only to a mortgage debtor who exercises his right of redemption within the period provided therefor. In the present case, the defendants maintained, the redemption period had already expired when the action was commenced.The trial court did not resolve the motion to dismiss categorically, but in an order dated September 22, 1964, set the case for trial, with the advertence that "evidence on whether or not the action has prescribed shall first be presented ... (and) then the court will consider the same ... as part of the evidence on the merits."After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on November 9, 1964 the defendants answered the same, alleging inter alia that all the payments made by the plaintiffs after the foreclosure sale on July 1, 1958 were made in the concept of rents, for which the defendant company was under no obligation to render an accounting.The issue thus made out by the pleadings was whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to the accounting sought by them. A corollary issue — indeed the one on which the first depends — was whether or not the right of redemption With respect to the force losed property was still available. These issues were

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spelled out before the court a quo by the plaintiffs themselves in their answer to the defendants' memorandum below, where it was stated:... The complaint at bar for accounting and liquidation is fully sanctioned ... by section 34, of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court ... .It is not disputed by the parties, that the mortgage was executed by the plaintiffs, the spouses Felix L. Lazo and Mrs. Mercedes C Castro de Lazo, to secure a loan of P12,000.00 which plaintiff Jose Robles obtained from the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. (sic) and neither is it disputed, that the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. Two vital issues or causes of action, therefore, are presented before this Hon. Court by the case at bar, with:a) — Can the plaintiffs demand an accounting and liquidation of accounts from the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. in the legal capacity of said plaintiffs as redemptioners; and,b) — Is the legal right of redemption of said plaintiffs still subsisting, in the light of their indubitable causes of action in the case at bar.The trial court, however, went entirely out of the issues submitted to it and chose to decide the case on a point which was not at all litigated. It said: "The key, as it appears to this Court, lies in the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure over the real estate mortgage, Exh.-A. If valid, then in the ordinary course of things, all subsequent transactions by defendants dependent thereon can be taken to be valid also. If not, then they of necessity must fall as a nullity."In this connection it should be stated that the loan with the Philippine Bank of Commerce was on a sixty-day note, which was renewed several times, until the said bank refused to grant any further renewal. To accommodate the plaintiffs, on August 14, 1954 the loan was transferred to the Republic Investment Co., The. as the new creditor, on a note payable on December 12, 1954; and when after three renewals the plaintiffs, again defaulted the defendant Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. paid the account, and thereafter foreclosed the mortgage in its favor on July 1, 1958. The trial court, after having stated what it believed to be the "key" to the problem, ruled that the transfer of the loan to the Republic Investment Co., Inc. constituted a novation of the obligation, and that the defendant company was released from its liability as co-debtor because it does not appear to have signed the new promissory note executed by the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court concluded, the real estate mortgage in favor of said defendant was extinguished, and the foreclosure thereof was a nullity.The actuation of the trial court was not legally permissible especially because the theory on which it proceeded involved factual considerations neither touched upon the pleadings nor made the subject of evidence at the trial. Rule 6, Section 1, is quite explicit in providing that "pleadings are the written allegations of the parties of their respective claims and defenses submitted to the court for trial and judgment." This rule has been consistently applied and adhered to by the courts.The subject matter of any given case is determined ... by the nature and character of the pleadings submitted by the parties

to the court for trial and judgment. Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100, 103.It is a fundamental principle that judgments must conform to both the pleadings and the proof, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action upon which the pleadings were framed and the case was tried; that a party can no more succeed upon a case proved. but not alleged, than upon one alleged but not proved." (Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 742)It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." (Lim Toco vs. Go Pay, 80 Phil. 166)A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid." (Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236, 244.)The parties here went to court and presented their respective sides on the premise, admitted by both, that the mortgage was valid and subsisting. Evidence, therefore, to establish such premise was unnecessary and uncalled for. Indeed, it was for that reason and because in any event the record of this case, particularly with respect to the actuations of the parties after the mortgage was foreclosed, shows with overwhelming preponderance that the said mortgage had not been extinguished, that this Court did not consider favorably the defendant company's petitions to submit a photostat of the first promissory note, and signed duplicates of the three renewal notes, executed by the plaintiffs in favor of Republic Investment Co., Inc. bearing not only their signatures as debtors but also the signatures of the defendants company as solidary co-debtor — all these being evidence which the said defendant could have submitted at the trial if the validity and existence of the mortgage had been a contentious issue raised in the pleadings. That the copy of the note in the hands of the plaintiffs does not bear the signature of the defendant company is not decisive of the latter's liability, the primary evidence thereof being the original of the said note in the hands of the creditor, to whom, after all, the right to recover exclusively belonged.With particular reference to the first promissory note above mentioned, dated August 14, 1954, the trial courts conclusion that defendant company never became obligated thereunder in favor of the Republic Investment Co., Inc. is belied by the plaintiffs' own Exhibit N, which is the indemnity agreement, also dated August 14, 1954, executed by the plaintiffs in favor of the defendant company precisely to indemnify the latter for acting as solidary co-debtor said indemnity agreement being identical in terms with the one previously executed when the loan was originally contracted with the Philippine Bank of Commerce (Exh. G). And it was precisely because the plaintiffs defaulted on the note of August 14, 1954 and on the renewals thereof that the defendant company had to pay the Republic Investment Co., Inc. and to foreclosed, in turn, the mortgage on the plaintiffs' property. It would have been absurd for the plaintiffs to execute the indemnity agreement, and to agree to pay the premium thereunder as well as interest in the contingencies envisaged, if it were true that the said company has assumed no liability at all in favor of the creditor.

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We now come to the real issues as defined by the parties. The plaintiffs rely on Rule 39, Section 34.1 In this connection Section 9 of Act No. 3135, as amended, may also be cited.2

Implicit in the application of these provisions is the premise that the period for redemption of the property sold on execution (on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in the present case) has not yet expired. For if the right to redeem has been lost it stands to reason that there is no redemption price to speak of, to which the rents received by the purchasers are to be applied or credited.3

The plaintiffs' position is that since the sheriff's certificate of sale was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for Manila on March 28, 1963, the one-year period of legal redemption had not yet expired when the action was commenced on December 12 of the same year.There are, however, certain circumstances peculiar to this case which take it out of the operation of the rule concerning registration in this regard. There is, to begin with, the categorical statement in the certificate of sale that "the period of redemption of the said property sold will expire on the 2nd day of July, 1959." Then there is the fact that no lien or encumbrance, right or claim of any person, other than the mortgage in question, appeared on the transfer certificate of title of the plaintiff spouses covering the mortgaged property, such that when the defendant company obtained a new transfer certificate in its name on March 28, 1963, the same was entirely clean. In other words, no third parties who might have an interest in the property, either as possible redemptioners or otherwise, had to be protected by due notice of the sale through its registration.4 As far as the plaintiffs themselves were concerned, not only were they duly notified of the sale but the same was postponed twice, first upon their request and then upon written agreement of both parties. These circumstances, in our opinion, have relevance in the consideration of the equities, as distinguished from the purely legal technicalities, of this case.But the more decisive developments ensued later: Beginning July 1958, immediately after the foreclosure sale, the plaintiffs — in some instances in the joint names of Jose Robles and Felix Lazo and in other instances in the name of Jose Robles alone — started paying rents on the property to the defendant company, indicating that the former owners, while remaining in occupancy, did so in the concept of tenants. The receipts for such payments, until May 1961, invariably referred to "rents" on the "foreclosed property of Felix Lazo, et al." Thereafter the receipts merely stated "rents for the Nadelco property." The receipt dated June 30, 1959 (presented by the plaintiffs as their Exhibit J-16) is significantly worded as follows:At the insistent request of Messrs. Felix Lazo and Jose Robles, we acknowledge receipt of the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as rental corresponding to the months of July and August, 1959 for premises No. 32A/B Callejon Nadelco, Manila, with the condition that the redemption period provided by law for the property of the spouses Felix L. Lazo and Mercedes Castro is thereby extended to the last time up to August 31, 1959.It is further provided that on or before August 31, 1959, the full redemption price of P18,627, ... together with unpaid post insurance premium must be fully paid as promised.

The foregoing was the first extension of the redemption period granted at the request of the plaintiffs. It was an acknowledgment that the original period was expiring and a conventional stipulation on a new period. This new period passed, but the defendant company did not consolidate its title. Instead it sent a letter to the Lazo spouses on March 30, 1960, as follows (Exh. 1):On July 1, 1959, this company purchased the property ... at an auction sale conducted by the Sheriff of Manila for the amount of P18,627.00. The redemption period of said sale has expired on the 2nd day of July 1959.However ... we have deferred the consolidation of title to our name. This is last call for you to act before it is too late. If you wish to redeem the property above described, kindly call at this office on or before April 30, 1960 to arrange for a settlement of your obligation.The foregoing letter elicited a reply from plaintiff Felix L. Lazo on April 8, 1960, wherein he said (Exh. 2):We wish to acknowledge receipt, with thanks, of your letter of March 30, 1960, regarding our property involved in the transaction of Mr. Jose Robles. I feel really grateful to you and your old manfor having given us time to redeem it. It is really unfortunate that Mr. Jose Robles, to whom we loaned the property as security for his mortgage, has kept the matter dragging along for so many years. I have urged him to settle the matter before April 30, 1960 and he promised earnestly to do so. He says he is trying to raise the necessary funds, and will see you before the target date.We are very much worried about this matter.Thus was a second extension granted — up to April 30, 1960. Still no payment was tendered.On May 30, 1960 it was plaintiff Jose Robles who wrote another letter to the defendant company, making reference to the plaintiffs' "commitment to pay the redemption price of the foreclosed property at the end of this month, May 1960," and pleading for a last extension of the redemption period. The letter continued (Exh. 7):In spite of our several failures to secure the expected fund for payment to your goodselves, we assure you that we have not overlooked, nor forgotten, our said obligation. However, this time, considering the fact that our said loan application only requires the necessary inspection by our Bank before it is finally approved, we are again constrained to request your kindselves to grant us another period of one month (June) within which to remit to you the amount of redemption for the said foreclosed property of Mr. Lazo, and this would he the last extension that we will beg of you to consider. Please be assured that should we be able to get our funds much earlier than expected during the period of extension herein requested, we shall tender to you our payment without further delay. At the moment, we are tendering you the amount of P250.00 as rental corresponding to the month of June, 1960.Trusting for your usual kind consideration on the above request, we are.Felix L. Lazo himself confirmed the above request for extension by another letter dated May 31, 1960 (Exh. 8), thus:I am lawfully embarrassed for the failure of Mr. Jose Robles to settle the amount ...

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Out of equity, I am forced to consent to his extension for another 30 days by paying the advanced rental. He expects the loan to be released in 15 days from now, and he promised to settle our case.May I ask again your kind indulgence on the matter.The extension asked for was once more granted, this time up to June 30, 1960, with the same negative result. Then again, on August 31, 1962 Felix L. Lazo wrote still another letter (Exh. 9) as follows:Here we come again about the house. I am really feeling ashamed to you. But Mr. Robles said he failed to obtain the amount of about P6,000 he was going to pay as down payment for the repurchase — even without a contract yet. He expected to get the sum in a week time or until the 10th of September.If you could still hold the property until that time, kindly give your consideration. May be this is the last chance.The plaintiffs having reneged on all their repeated promises, the defendant company finally consolidated its title to the property as purchaser at the foreclosure sale on March 28, 1963, and obtained the corresponding transfer certificate of title. That was almost five years after the said sale.It is clear, in the light of the facts and circumstances above set forth, that the parties had abandoned entirely the concept of legal redemption in this case and converted it into one of conventional redemption, in which the only governing factor was the agreement between them. The registration of the certificate of sale on March 28, 1963 was entirely unnecessary and irrelevant to the question of when the period of redemption agreed upon expired. The record shows that the last request for extension approved by the defendant is that contained in the letter of Jose Robles dated May 30, 1960 (Exh. 7), at the bottom of which appears the handwrittten notation: "Ok for last extension one month. Please attach note of Mr. Lazo," this last evidently referring to the latter's confirmatory letter of May 31, 1960 (Exh. 8). Consequently, the period to redeem expired on June 30, 1960.There is no evidence that Felix L. Lazo next "last" request for extension, until September 10, 1962, contained in his letter of August 31, 1962 (Exh. 9), was acted upon or approved by the defendant company; but even if it was, then after September 10, 1962 the right to redeem had Become irretrievably lost.The plaintiffs' repeated requests for time within which to redeem, each with a definite date of expiration, generated binding contracts when approved by the defendant company. A contract, needles to say, has the force of law between the parties. In any event, the principle of estoppel would step in to prevent the plaintiffs from going back upon their own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. This is a principle of equity and natural justice, expressly adopted in our Civil Code (Arts. 1431 et seq.) and articulated as one of the conclusive presumptions in Rule 31, Sec. 3(a), of our Rules of Court as follows:(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.In considering the equities of the case it may be pertinent to note that the property in question consists of a small lot of 270

square meters and the house situated thereon, yielding a monthly rent, of only P250.00, and that its fair value therefore, especially in 1958, could not be widely disparate from the sale price of P8,627.00.In the defendants' answer there is a counterclaim for attorney's fees in the amount of P6,000, aside from moral damages. We do not find this second item sufficiently justified, but with respect to attorney's fees there is a stipulation in the mortgage contract, Exh. A, for "15% of the total indebtedness then unpaid." Under this stipulation the sum of P2,700.00 is recoverable.IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed; and on the counterclaim the plaintiffs appellees are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, defendant company the sum of P2,700.00 by way of attorney's fees plus costs.G.R. No. L-28518           January 29, 1968THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LORENZO PADERNA Y GAMBOA, Defendant-Appellant.CASTRO, J.:The appellant Lorenzo Paderna y Gamboa was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for unlawful possession of four packs of untaxed imported cigarettes known locally as "blue seal" cigarettes. The information, filed on August 8, 1966 and denominated "for violation of Rep. Act No. 4097," charged;          That on July 25, 1966, in the evening, in La Carlota City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines . . . the abovenamed accused, without justifiable cause or reason, intentionally, feloniously, criminally and illegally had in his possession four (4) packages of UNTAXED BLUE SEAL CIGARETTES the specific tax of which in the amount of P4,224 has not been paid, in violation of law.          After trial, the court found Paderna "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act 4097" and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200 and suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day.          He then appealed to the Court of Appeals where he moved to quash the information on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try the case. He contended that Republic Act 4097, which punished the unlawful possession of untaxed article with a "fine of not less than ten times the amount of the specific tax due on the articles found but not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and . . . imprisonment of from four months and one day to four years and two months, had been amended by Republic Act 4713, effective on June 18, 1966, and that the penalty for the same offense was reduced to a fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than thirty-days, if the appraised value . . . of the article does not exceed five hundred pesos." The result is that the case was now cognizable only by the city court of La Carlota City, this, according to the appellant, for the reason that criminal statutes should be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused.          Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contended that the CFI of Negros Occidental, having validly acquired

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jurisdiction under Republic Act 4097, could not thereafter be divested of it.          In its resolution of December 20, 1967 the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, because in issue is the jurisdiction of a court.          In our view both the appellant and the Solicitor General are in error.          1. To begin with, what the appellant should have filed is a motion to dismiss this case, not a motion to quash the information. The rule that objection to the jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings is not waived by a failure to file a motion to quash, 1 does not mean that a motion to quash based on that ground may be filed at any stage of the action. Under the rules of criminal procedure, a motion to quash an information may be filed only before the defendant enters his plea. 2 Nevertheless, we will brush aside this technicality, and treat the appellant's motion as one to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.          2. Republic Act 4097, which took effect on June 19, 1964, and Republic Act 4713, which took effect on June 18, 1966, are both amendatory statutes relating to section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It is not the principal purpose of Republic Act 4713 to reduce the penalty earlier provided by Republic Act 4097, for while the reduction in penalty may be the result of its enactment in this particular case it is so only incidentally. Rather, the purpose of Republic Act 4713 is to draw a distinction between unlawful possession of untaxed imported articles and unlawful possession of untaxed locally manufactured articles. A graduated scale of penalties is provided for the former even as the same penalty (introduced by Republic Act 4097) is maintained with respect to the latter. Thus, section 174 of the Tax Code, as amended by Republic Act 4713, now reads:          Sec. 174. Unlawful possession or removal of articles subject to specific tax without payment of tax. - Any person who owns and/or is found in possession of imported articles subject to specific tax, the tax on which had not been paid in accordance with law or any person who owns and/or is found in possession of imported tax exempt articles other than those whom they are legally issued shall be punished by: 1. A fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred pesos and imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than thirty days, if the appraised value, to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and Customs Code, including duties and taxes, of the article does not exceed five hundred pesos.2. A fine of not less than six hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than six months and one day nor more than four years, if the appraised value, to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and Customs Code, including duties and taxes, of the article exceeds five hundred pesos but does not exceed fifty thousand pesos.3. A fine of not less than five thousand pesos nor more than eight thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than four years and one day nor more than eight years, if the appraised value to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and Customs Code, including duties and taxes, of the article is more than fifty thousand pesos but does not exceed one hundred fifty thousand pesos.

4. A fine of not less than eight thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than eight years and one day nor more than twelve years, if the appraised value, to be determined in the manner prescribed in the Tariff and Customs Code, including duties and taxes, of the article exceeds one hundred fifty thousand pesos.x x x           x x x           x x          Any person who is found in possession of locally manufactured articles subject to specific tax, the tax on which has not been paid in accordance with law, or any person who is found in possession of such articles which are exempt from specific tax other than those to whom the same is lawfully issued shall be punished with a fine of not less than ten times the amount of the specific tax due on the articles found but not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos and imprisonment of from four months and one day to four years and two months. . . .          In this case the charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed, "blue seal cigarettes" of an appraised value of less than P500, which makes the case fall under paragraph 1 of section 174, but, as already stated, this is a mere happenstance, and a general statement that the latest amendment reduced the penalty for the offense is unwarranted.          3. Nor is it correct to say that since the amendment of section 174 of the Tax Code by Republic Act 4713, as applied to the facts of this case, is favorable to the accused it should be given retroactive effect in determining the jurisdiction of the trial court. It is now a settled rule of law that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, 3 and that once acquired, jurisdiction is retained until the case is finally terminated. In this respect, the Solicitor General is correct. But the Solicitor General nonetheless has overlooked the important and cogent fact that both the commission of the offense and the filing of the information in this case took place after the enactment of Republic Act 4713 on June l8, 1966. Thus, the offense is alleged to have been committed on July 25, 1966; the information was filed by the city attorney on August 8, 1966. Consequently, jurisdiction over this case should be determined under the provisions of Republic Act 4713. Since the penalty provided by this latter statute is a fine of not less than P50 nor more than P200 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500, this case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court of La Carlota City. 4 

          Indeed, this case is in substance similar to People vs. Pegarum 5 in which this Court made the following findings and pronouncements:          Before the Revised Penal Code took effect, the penalty provided by law for the offense alleged to have been committed by the appellant was arresto mayorin its medium degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree, or from two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years and four months of presidio correccional. The penalty prescribed in the Revised Penal Code for the same offense is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or from two months and one day to six months of arresto mayor. This is the penalty applicable in this case. (Revised Penal Code, article 22)

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          It is, thus, clear that under the law in force at the time the crime was committed, the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to try the case; while under the law in force at the time the complaint or information was filed, the case was originally cognizable by the justice of the peace. The specific question thus raised is whether the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime, or by that in force at the time of instituting the action. "As a general rule the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of the facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached." (16 C.J., sec. 246, p. 181) In the instant case, jurisdiction was invoked for the first time when the complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court on February 6, 1932. That was after the Revised Penal Code took effect. By reason of the penalty which might be imposed, jurisdiction to try the case was already vested in the justice of the peace. Hence, the Court of First Instance acted beyond its jurisdiction in trying the case.          4. Jurisdiction over this case therefore belongs exclusively to the city court of La Carlota, pursuant to section 81 of its charter 6 in relation to section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. But what of the jurisdiction of the newly-created circuit criminal courts? Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8, 1967, provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall have -          limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the regular court of first instance, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:x x x           x x x           x x          C. "Violations of sections 3601, 3602, and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code." (emphasis supplied)          The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the city court, it cannot, even if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by circuit criminal courts the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first instance in criminal cases where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive.ACCORDINGLY, the motion is granted, and this case is dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of information for the same offense in the city court of La Carlota City.G.R. No. L-21450             April 15, 1968SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.DIZON, J.:On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 —

the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding company-appellant.

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III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No.L-14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of

appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñëtACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of

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estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse

decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court, as follows:1äwphï1.ñëtAs prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.SO ORDERED.Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA Judge(Record on Appeal, pp. 64-65, emphasis ours)Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the same was "issued

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without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958.From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 — denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively — the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads;"Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours)Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for consideration.In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.

It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.G.R. No. 147406               July 14, 2008VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who

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unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect?e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9

Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively

participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16

Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of

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previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18

But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter’s jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20

Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had

jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22

For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed

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principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24

In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s

jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26

Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v.

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Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30

Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar

circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoyis an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32

And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34

The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,

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even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43

With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.D E C I S I O NREGALADO, J:Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).IIt appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary

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prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.IIIn the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)[1] pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the

Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on law.x x xSec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.x x xSec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the due process. x x xx x xSec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:x x xFindings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the

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Ombudsman, et al.[5] was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,[6] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7]Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,[9] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.[11] which was a special civil action for certiorari.Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.IIIAfter respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the

case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgement.[12]

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings,[13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.[14]

Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.[15] The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed.[16] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]

The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among other."It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."

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The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.IVThe records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide," said section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court.[18] Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and

already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure[19] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof.Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies[20] are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .[21]

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*

The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that

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fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. [22]

It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.VTaking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court [24]

We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and

some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives.[25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 [26] and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANIx x xThereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent .[28]

VIAs a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in

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essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[32]

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.[34]

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy.[35]

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect [36] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the

Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.SO ORDERED.

SPS. ERNESTO V. YU AND G.R. No. 172172ELSIE ONG YU,Petitioners, Present:PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,- versus - CARPIO,CORONA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBALTAZAR N. PACLEB, BRION, JJ.

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(Substituted by ANTONIETA S.PACLEB, LORNA PACLEB- Promulgated :GUERRERO, FLORENCIO C.PACLEB, and MYRLA C. PACLEB),Respondents. February 24, 2009x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N PUNO, C.J.:Before the Court is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing: (i) the Decision[1] dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78629 setting aside the Decision[2] dated December 27, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1325-96; and (ii) the Resolution[3] dated April 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals denying reconsideration of the said decision.

 The facts are well established.Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife,

Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-118375[4] (Langcaan Property). In 1992, the Langcaan Property became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to transfer its ownership. On February 27, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N. Pacleb and Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario. On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale[6] was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and Ruperto L. Javier (Javier). On November 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell[7] was entered into between Javier and petitioner spouses Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu. In their contract, petitioner spouses Yu agreed to pay Javier a total consideration of P900,000. Six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000) (consisting of P200,000 as previous payment and P400,000 to be paid upon execution of the contract) was acknowledged as received by Javier and P300,000 remained as balance. Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within thirty (30) days from execution of the contract. All the aforementioned sales were not registered. On April 23, 1993, petitioner spouses Yu filed with the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, a Complaint[8] for specific performance and damages against Javier, docketed as Civil Case No. 741-93, to compel the latter to deliver to them ownership and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan Property. In their Complaint, they alleged that Javier

represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not tenanted. However, after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into an Agreement dated September 11, 1992 for the sale of the Langcaan Property, they discovered it was tenanted by Ramon C. Pacleb (Ramon).[9] Petitioner spouses demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment. Thereafter, petitioner spouses and Javier verified from Ramon if he was willing to vacate the property and the latter was agreeable. Javier then promised to make arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay the latter his disturbance compensation. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier failed to comply with his obligations. Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default. On September 8, 1994, the trial court rendered a Decision,[10] the dispositive portion of which reads: 

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant based on the sale of subject parcel of land to the former who is entitled thereby to the ownership and possession thereof from the said defendant who is further directed to pay damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) including attorneys fees and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in this case as a consequence.

The defendant is further directed to deliver the certificate of title of the land to the plaintiff who is entitled to it as transferee and new owner thereof upon payment by the plaintiff of his balance of the purchase price in the sum of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) with legal interest from date.

SO ORDERED. The said Decision and its Certificate of Finality[11] were annotated on TCT No. T-118375 as Entry No. 2676-75[12] and Entry No. 2677-75,[13] respectively. On March 10, 1995, petitioner spouses and Ramon and the latters wife, Corazon Bodino, executed a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan.[14] Under the said agreement, petitioner spouses paid Ramon the amount of P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the Langcaan Property.On October 12, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint[15] for annulment of deed of sale and other documents arising from it, docketed as Civil Case No. 1199-95. He alleged that the deed

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of sale purportedly executed between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del Rosario was spurious as their signatures thereon were forgeries.Respondent moved to have summons served upon Rebecca Del Rosario by publication since the latters address could not be found. The trial court, however, denied his motion.[16] Respondent then moved to dismiss the case, and the trial court granted the motion in its Order[17] dated April 11, 1996, dismissing the case without prejudice. 

Meanwhile, on November 23, 1995, petitioner spouses filed an action for forcible entry against respondent with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). They alleged that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee, Ramon, until the latter was ousted by respondent in September 1995. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner spouses, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court.[18] However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts and found that it was respondent who had prior physical possession of the property as shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon.[19]

 On May 29, 1996, respondent filed the instant case

for removal of cloud from title with damages to cancel Entry No. 2676-75 and Entry No. 2677-75, the annotated Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 and its Certificate of Finality, from the title of the Langcaan Property.[20] Respondent alleged that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del Rosario, who is not known to them, could not have been possibly executed on February 27, 1992, the date appearing thereon. He alleged that on said date, he was residing in the United States[21] and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, died twenty (20) years ago.[22]

On May 28, 1997, during the pendency of the instant case before the trial court, respondent died without having testified on the merits of his case. Hence, he was substituted by his surviving spouse, Antonieta S. Pacleb, and Lorna Pacleb-Guerrero, Florencio C. Pacleb and Myrla C. Pacleb representing the children with the first wife.[23]

 On December 27, 2002, the trial court dismissed respondents case and held that petitioner spouses are purchasers in good faith.[24] The trial court ratiocinated that the dismissal of respondents complaint for annulment of the successive sales at his instance sealed the regularity of the purchase[25] by petitioner spouses and that he in effect admits that the said salewas valid and in order.[26] Further, the trial court held that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 on petitioner spouses action for specific performance against Javier is already final and can no longer be altered. Accordingly, the trial court

ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-118375 in the name of respondent and the issuance of a new title in the name of petitioner spouses. The trial court also ordered the heirs of respondent and all persons claiming under them to surrender possession of the Langcaan Property to petitioner spouses.On appeal by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court.[27] The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner spouses are not purchasers in good faith and that the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 did not transfer ownership of the Langcaan Property to them. Accordingly, the appellate court ordered the cancellation of the annotation of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 on the title of the Langcaan Property. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration of said decision.[28]

 Hence, this Petition.

 Two issues are involved in the instant petition. The first is whether petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. The second is whether ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in petitioner spouses by virtue of the Decision in Civil Case No. 741-93. 

Petitioner spouses argue that they are purchasers in good faith. Further, they contend that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that: Ramon told him [Ernesto V. Yu] that the property is owned by his father, Baltazar, and that he is the mere caretaker thereof[29] since Ramon clarified that his father was the former owner of the Langcaan Property. In support of their stance, they cite the following testimony of petitioner Ernesto V. Yu:

 Atty. Abalos: Mr. Witness, you testified during the direct that you acquired the subject property from one Ruperto Javier, when for the first time have you come to know Mr. Ruperto Javier? A: I first came to know him in the year 1992 when he was accompanied by Mr. Kalagayan. He showed me some papers to the office.

 Q: Do you know the exact date Mr. Witness?

 A: I forgot the exact date, maam.

 Q: More or less can you estimate what month?

 A: Sometime in February or March 1992.

 Q: When you said that the subject property was offered to you for sale, what did you do Mr. Witness, in preparation for a transaction?

 

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A: I asked my lawyer Atty. Florencio Paredes to check and verify the Deed of Sale.Q: And after Atty. Florencio Paredes verified the document you decided to buy the property?

 A: No, maam. We visited the place.

 Q: When was that?

 A: I could not remember the exact date but I visited the place and I met the son, Ramon Pacleb. I went there in order to verify if the property is existing. When I verified that the property is existing Mr. Javier visited me again to follow-up what decision I have but I told him that I will wait for my lawyers advi[c]e.

 Q: Mr. Witness, what particular instruction did you give to your lawyer?

 A: To verify the title and the documents. Court: Documents for the title?

 A: Yes, Your Honor. Atty. Abalos: When you were able to get the title in whose name the title was registered?

 A: It was registered in the name of the older Pacleb.

 Court: By the way Mr. Witness, when you said you met Ramon Pacleb the son of the owner of the property, was he residing there or he was (sic) just went there? When you visited the property did you find him to be residing in that property?

 A: No, Your Honor.

 Atty. Abalos: You mean to say Mr. Witness, you just met Mr. Ramon Pacleb in the place at the time you went there?

 A: No, maam. He went to my office with Mr. Kalagayan. He was introduced to me at the Kelly Hardware. I do not know Mr. Ruperto Javier. He told me that there is a property that [is] tenanted and occupied by the son Ramon Pacleb after that I went with them to visit the place. On (sic) there he introduced me [to] Mr. Ramon Pacleb the caretaker of the property and I told them that I will still look at the property and he gave me some documents and that (sic) documents I gave it to my lawyer for verification.

 Q: You said that Mr. Ruperto Javier went to your office with Mr. Kalagayan, so the first time you

visited the property you did not see Mr. Ramon Pacleb there?

 A: No, maam. When I went there I met Ramon Pacleb the caretaker and he was the one who showed the place to us.

 Q: Mr. Witness, since you visited the place you were able to see the allege[d] caretaker Mr. Ramon Pacleb, did you ask him regarding the property or the whereabouts of the registered owner, did you ask him?

 A: When Ruperto introduced me to Mr. Ramon Pacleb he told me that he is the son of the owner and he is the caretaker and his father is in the States. He showed me the place, I verified and I saw the monuments and I told him I will come back to check the papers and if it is okay I will bring with me the surveyor.

 Q: Could you estimate Mr. Witness, more or less what was the month when you were able to talk to Mr. Ramon Pacleb?

 A: I am not sure but it was morning of February.

 Q: So it was in February, Mr. Witness?

 A: I am not sure if February or March.

 Q: But definitely

 A: Before I purchased the property I checked the property.

 Q: But that was definitely after Mr. Ruperto offered to you for sale the subject property? 

x x x Atty. Abalos: Okay, Mr. Witness, you said that you talked to Mr. Ramon Pacleb and he told you that his father is the owner of the property?

 A: He told me that property is their former property and it was owned by them. Now, he is the tenant of the property.[30] (Emphasis ours)   Petitioner spouses conclude that based on their personal inspection of the property and the representations of the registered tenant thereon, they had no reason to doubt the validity of the deeds of absolute sale since these were duly notarized. Consequently, the alleged forgery of Angelita Chans signature is of no moment since they had no notice of any claim or interest of some other person in the property despite their diligent inquiry.

We find petitioner spouses contentions without merit.

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At the outset, we note that in petitioner Ernesto V. Yus testimony, he stated that he inspected the Langcaan Property and talked with the tenant, Ramon, before he purchased the same. However, in his Complaint for specific performance and damages which he filed against Javier, he alleged that it was only after he had entered into an Agreement for the sale of the property and his initial payment of P200,000 that he discovered that the property was indeed being tenanted by Ramon who lives in the said farm, viz.:

 8. Sometime on September 11, 1992,

defendant came again to the Office of plaintiff reiterating his offer to sell said Lot No. 6853-D, containing an area of 18,000 square meters, at P75.00 per square meters (sic). Defendant manifested to the plaintiff that if his offer is acceptable to the plaintiff, he binds and obligates himself to pay the capital gains of previous transactions with the BIR and register subject Lot No. 6853-D in his name (defendant). On these conditions, plaintiff accepted the offer and made [the] initial payment of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) to defendant by issuance and delivery of plaintiffs personal check.

 9. Sometime on September 11,

1992, plaintiff and defendant signed an AGREEMENT on the sale of Lot No. 6853-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-282604, containing an area of 18,000 square meters, more or less, located at Bo. Langcaan, Municipality of Dasmarinas, Province of Cavite, at a selling price of P75.00 per square meter. A xerox copy of this AGREEMENT signed by the parties thereto is hereto attached and marked as ANNEX D of this complaint.

 10. Thereafter, however, plaintiff

and defendant, with their surveyor discovered that subject Lot No. 6853-D offered for sale to the plaintiff is indeed being tenanted by one RAMON PACLEB who lives in the said farm.

 11. In view of the foregoing

developments, plaintiff informed defendant that he wanted the Agreement be cancelled and for the defendant to return the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00).[31] (Emphasis supplied)

 This inconsistency casts grave doubt as to whether

petitioner spouses personally inspected the property before purchasing it.

 More importantly, however, several facts should have

put petitioner spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan Property.

 First, it should be noted that the property remains to

be registered in the name of respondent despite the two (2) Deeds of Absolute Sale[32] purporting to transfer the Langcaan Property from respondent and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, to Rebecca Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier. Both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the Langcaan Property.

 Second, a perusal of the two deeds of absolute sale

reveals that they were executed only about two (2) months apart and that they contain identical provisions.

 Third, it is undisputed that the Langcaan Property is

in the possession of Ramon, the son of the registered owner. Regardless of the representations given by the latter, this bare fact alone should have made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their vendor. Moreover, as noted by the Court of Appeals, petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true status of the Langcaan Property from Ramons wife, since the latter is their relative, as averred in paragraph 13 of their Answer in Civil Case No. 1199-95.[33] The case law is well settled, viz.:

 The law protects to a greater degree

a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.

 This Court has consistently applied

the stricter rule when it comes to deciding the issue of good faith of one who buys from one who is not the registered owner, but who exhibits a certificate of title.[34] (Emphasis supplied) 

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Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1199-95 (the action to annul the successive sales of the property) cannot serve to validate the sale to petitioner spouses since the dismissal was ordered because Rebecca Del Rosario and Javier could no longer be found. Indeed, the dismissal was without prejudice.

 Based on the foregoing, therefore, petitioner spouses

cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith. We now go to the second issue.

 Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 741-93 as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto since it involved the question of possession and ownership of real property, and is thus not merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem. In Domagas v. Jensen,[35] we distinguished between actions in personam and actions quasi in rem. 

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety (sic) to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. x x x

 

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

 Civil Case No. 741-93 is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner spouses against Javier to compel performance of the latters undertakings under their Contract to Sell. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, its object is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Property in their favor. The obligations of Javier under the contract to sell attach to him alone, and do not burden the Langcaan Property.[36]

 We have held in an unbroken string of cases that an

action for specific performance is an action in personam.[37] In Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction and Development Corporation,[38] we ruled that an action for specific performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam. Being a judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.[39] Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein. Neither can respondent be considered as privy thereto since his signature and that of his late first wife, Angelita Chan, were forged in the deed of sale.

 All told, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that, as between respondent and petitioner spouses, respondent has a better right over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Costs against petitioners. 

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SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998]

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J.:

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).[1]

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.[2]

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.[3]

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.[4]

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.[5] Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,[6] hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.[7]

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation.[8] Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only.[9] Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC.[10] The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.[11]

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Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,[12] and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,[13] for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.[14]

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.[15]

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo

warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court,[16] the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Italics supplied)

3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

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This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC.[17] Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech[19] from which we reproduce the following excerpts:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of

Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)

x x x

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.

In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:

x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the peoples basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now to determine whether or not there has been a grave

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abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases.Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.

x x x

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired:[20]

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, add the phrase THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Italics supplied)

x x x

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed.[21]; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp. 180-181.21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995,[22] inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been alapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;[23] whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:

On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.

Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.[24]

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

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Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.[25] should be taken into account:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31303-04 May 31, 1978REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO V. DE OCAMPO, and OSCAR ANGLO, respondents.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz for petitioner.

Eusebio V. Navarro, Eugenio G. Gemarino and Eusebio P. Navarro for respondent Alfredo V. de Ocampo.

Vicente F. Delfin and V. del Rosario & Associates for respondent Oscar Anglo.

 

SANTOS, J.:

An appeal by certiorari filed on December 5, 1969 by petitioner, Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short), from the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1969 1 dismissing petitioner's appeal in CA-G. R. Nos. 40683-84-R, as well as from the resolution of the said Court dated November 14, 1969 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof

The relevant and essential factual and procedural — antecedents follow. Both Republic and respondents Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo claim ownership over the same lots, i.e,, Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-Escalante Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject matter of this litigation. The basis of Republic's claim is that said lots were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) on September 21, 1926 by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. 3 Republic further alleged that the said parcels of land were already registered under the Torrens System "before 1919 in a cadastral case in the name of Meerkamp and Company" in whose favor Original Certificate of Title (OCT, for short) No. 370 was issued, that said company sold the lots to Esteban Jalandoni who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT, for short) No. 1251: that TCT No. 6014 was issued to the Bureau of Education when the subject property was bequeathed to it; and that as a matter of fact, a sugar quota (Plantation Audit No. 24-10) was issued for the lots under the name of the Bureau of Education. 4 The lots have a total area of 289.47 hectares. 5

Respondent de Ocampo, upon the other hand, predicates his claim on an application for registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in Land Registration Case No. N-4, LRC Rec. No. N-19196, wherein a decree of registration No. 105538 was issued over the lots, followed by the issuance in his name of OCT No. 576, on October 1, 1965. 6 He averred that the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation dated November 10, 1911 from one Luis Mosquera. 7

Respondent Anglo intervened in the case on February 21, 1966, having allegedly bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966. TCT No. 42217 was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 8

Procedurally, the records show that the Bureau of Public Schools, then represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental initiated on December 24, 1958, a forcible entry and detainer case against de Ocampo over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the complaint (Civil Case No. 5353). 9

Then on June 29, 1960, de Ocampo filed an application for registration of the same two parcels of land in Land Registration Case No. N-4 LRC Rec. No. N-19196, entitled "Alfredo V. de Ocampo, Applicant, v. Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor Republic filed its opposition; in due time. 10

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On May 2, 1961, Republic, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint against de Ocampo with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Branch VII) for the recovery of possession of the subject lots, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed therein as Civil Case No, 264 (6154), entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Alfredo v. de Ocampo, Defendant, " 11 De Ocampo averred in his answer that the properties alleged to have been donated by Esteban Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were different from the properties involved in this case, the former being titled lands (TCT No. 1251) containing two million nine hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four square meters (2,912,474), while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by de Ocampo and which Republic sought to recover were unregistered lands, and that granting, without admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since the issue of possession over said lots was already decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. 12

On May 26, 1961, a preliminary hearing was held before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental where the land registration case was pending, but inasmuch as the issues involved in both Civil Case No. 264 (6154) for recovery of possession and the land registration case were Identical, the parties agreed to a joint trial, this time before Branch VI I, Judge Jose D. Divinagracia, presiding, where the civil case was pending. 13

After a joint trial of the above-mentioned two (2) cases, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on August 3, 1965, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and adjudging the registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo. On October 1, 1966, OCT No. 576 was issued in his name. 14

It is admitted by Republic that it received a copy of the decision on August 13, 1965 15 but no appeal was taken therefrom. However, Republic later filed with the trial court on December 28, 1965, a "Petition for Relief from Judgment with Preliminary Injunction Pending Proceeding 16 (petition, for short) praying, among other things, that de Ocampo be restrained from enforcing the decision dated 3 August 1965, and that after the hearing, an order be issued declaring the decision to be not yet final add executory, and granting Republic the right to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the period granted, to commence upon receipt of the order.

The petition alleged inter alia that the Republic's failure to appeal was due to accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence, specifically, stating that its docket clerk, Cesar Salud, merely committed excusable negligence when he inadvertently attached the copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was only on November 5, 1965, that Cesar Salud found the copy of the same; and that petitioner has a substantial cause of action in Civil Case No. 264 (6154) and a

good and substantial defense in Land Registration Case No. N-4 Rec. No. N-19196.

An opposition to the petition was filed by respondent de Ocampo on February 5, 1966 17 on the ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. The petition was, however, given due course on January 11, 1966. 18 On February 21, 1966, respondent Oscar Anglo filed a motion for intervention alleging that he bought the subject two (2) Lots Nos. 817 and 1509 from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966 and that TCT No. 42217 of the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental was issued to him (Anglo) on January 12, 1966. 19 He also filed an answer in opposition to Republic's petition for relief from judgment 20 on the grounds, among others, that the decree of registration and certificate of title had already been issued and that a writ of preliminary injunction will not lie to restrain enforcement of the decision of the trial court.

On June 6, 1966, after respondents filed their respective memoranda, the trial court dismissed the Republic's petition for lack of competent proof, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court which the court said required a hearing. 21

On July 25, 1966, petitioner Republic filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order dismissing its petition; 22 and on August 4, 1966, it filed a manifestation averring additional grounds in support of the motion for reconsideration. 23 Respondent Anglo and de Ocampo opposed the same. 24

On September 28, 1966, Republic filed an "Amended Petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree with Preliminary Injunction 25 (Amended Petition, for short). In specific regard to the petition for review of the decree, Republic contended, inter alia, that actual fraud had been perpetrated by respondent de Ocampo in securing the lower court's decision ordering the registration of the lots in his name, as well as the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title, on the grounds which, briefly restated. advert to respondent de Ocampo's alleged misrepresentations that the two parcels of land applied for by him in the land registration case were "different from the two parcels of land of the same lot numbers, technical descriptions and areas belonging to the Government, knowing such allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being that said parcels of land are the same property owned by the Government"; 26 that there was previous registration of the same parcels of land, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, under the Torrens System in favor of Meerkamp and Company which later sold the same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the lots to the Bureau of Education as a legacy and that the Court of First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the registration of Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the same lands in favor of Meerkamp and Company.

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Additionally, Republic claimed that its counsel was not given notice of de Ocampo's motion and the corresponding order dated September 16, 1965, for the issuance of the decree of registration and the issuance of the decree itself by the Land Registration Commission, in violation of its constitutional rights to due process", 27 that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open and public owner and possessor, in good faith and with just title" of the lots "deriving the fruits and products of said properties and appropriating them to the purpose and purposes they were intended for"; 28 that they were in fact declared for tax purposes; 29 that on April 11, 1927, the lands were leased for ten (10) years but the lease was amended several times to extend the same; 30 that on September 17, 1964, Republic's counsel filed a "Petition for an Order to Produce the Original Documentary Exhibits and Submit Same to the NBI for Examination, 31 Which petition was communicated to de Ocampo's lawyers, Atty. Gemarino and Garingalao, earlier on September 7, 1964; that they did not object or state that the originals were burned or lost; that it was only on September 28, 1964 that de Ocampo's lawyers revealed for the first time in their "Manifestation and Reply" that the purported originals were burned in the house of Atty. Gemarino on May 16, 1963; 32 and that the "supposed originals were fake and their alleged burning was false and these pretenses were intentionally resorted to only to evade the examination of the spurious documents by the NBI and as camouflage to hide their fraudulent character. 33

On October 4, 1966, the trial court set, aside its order of June 6, 1966, dismissing the petition for relief, 34 having found Republic's motion for reconsideration well-founded, and scheduled December 1 and 2, 1966, for Republic's witnesses to testify, and likewise gave respondents, a chance to oppose the amended petition. Respondents and Republic filed their opposition 35 and reply; 36 respectively. Republic alleged in the said reply that "(T)he lands in question and their incomes are used exclusively for a public purpose: public education. 37

In a subsequent hearing on June 6, 1967, the trial court ordered Republic to present its evidence in the absence of respondents, who objected thereto for lack of jurisdiction, the parcels of land having been already registered in the name of respondent de Ocampo and in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in good faith, the other private respondent, Anglo.

On August 30, 1967, the trial court rendered its decision on the Amended Petition 38 against Republic, upon resolution of what it considered the "decisive" issue, i.e., that the allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud which is the only ground available to review or reopen a decree in cadastral cases pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496. 39

On the other issues, the trial court found that it was through mistake, accident and excusable negligence that the decision of August 3, 1965 was not brought to the attention of Solicitor Emerito Salva "as it was inadvertently clipped to the record of another case". 40 However, while the petition for relief itself another case was filed within the reglementary period

prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court 41 the remedy of relief from judgment was no longer available since the decree, and later the title, were already issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo. 42 It also held that the amended petition was still legally available as it was filed within one (1) year after the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act No. 496, "in case of actual fraud" and that it had jurisdiction to entertain the amended petition and to receive evidence in support thereof, 43 but it had to deny the relief prayed for on grounds already adverted to. In regard to respondent Anglo's claim that the petition for review was no longer tenable as against him because he was a purchaser in good faith, the trial court ruled that competent evidence to that effect should be submitted considering, among other things, that the case was pending when he acquired his interest. 44 Finally, it held that the fact that the Republic was not notified of the motion and the corresponding issuance of the decree and title was immaterial since petitions for issuance of decrees in cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for execution in ordinary cases and parties are not entitled to notice thereof as a matter of right. 45 Thus —

In the light of the decision of this Court dated August 3. 1965, Section 39 of Act No. 496 and the authorities cited ... this court is persuaded to conclude as it hereby holds, that the evidence adduced by the petitioner in this incident does not establish actual and constructive fraud which is the only kind of fraud that is considered a legal ground to review, reopen or set aside the decree which has already been issued in the name of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition for Relief from Judgment and/or Review of Decree is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. 46

From the said decision, Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. Nos. 4083-84-R. Private respondents de Ocampo and Anglo moved to dismiss the appeal which was opposed by petitioner, Republic. 47 A supplemental motion to the same effect was later filed by respondent de Ocampo for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that it was filed on time, 48 followed by an ex parte motion to consider the Solicitor General to have waived his right to oppose the said supplemental motion to dismiss and that the case be submitted for resolution. 49 A new party, Salvacion Marañon, sought to intervene in the case and also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal before respondent appellate court.

In its minute resolution of August 21, 1969, 50 the Court of Appeals resolved —

(1) To DISMISS ... the appeal ... for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the record on appeal was filed within the period fixed by the Rules (Secs. 3 & 6, Rule 41, Sec. 1[a] & [b), Rule 50, Rules of Court), it appearing that appellant's motion

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for extension of 20 days from October 14, 1967 to file the record on appeal was never granted by the lower court (there being no showing to that effect in the record on appeal); and even if there was such an order granting it, the extension asked for would have expired on November 3, 1967 and, therefore, the record on appeal filed on November 9,1967 was filed six days late ...; and

(2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion Maranon following the doctrine enunciated in Hant, et al. vs. O'Leary, et al., page 993. At any rate, the purpose of intervening; which is to join the appellees in their motion to dismiss the appeal of the appellant, has already been served by the dismissal of the instant appeal.

On September 11, 1969, Republic filed a motion for reconsideration 51 but on November 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals —

RESOLVED TO DENY the said motion for reconsideration. Killings in the pertinent cases are equally applicable to the Republic of the Philippines where the latter is the appellant that recourse to 'the original records is immaterial because it is what appears in the record on appeal that is essential. 52

Hence, this appeal by certiorari on the following assignment of errors, i.e., that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that — (1) prescription, the statute of limitations and laches do not lie against the Republic, as a sovereign state, and that, it is not bound or prejudiced by the faults or mistakes of its officers and employees, (2) the dismissal of Republic's appeal is not in accordance with the liberal construction of the Rules of Court and the promotion of its object to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of actions and proceedings; (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of Alfredo V. de Ocampo on the ground that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were already registered under the Torrens System before 1919; (4) the dismissal of Republic's appeal placed technicality over, substance; and (5) the dismissal of Republic's appeal will abet and promote land grabbing. 53

Private respondents in turn stress in their respective briefs, inter alia, (1) that Republic shed its immunity and sovereignty and assumed the garb of an ordinary private litigant when it initiated an action for forcible entry and detainer case over Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 against respondent de Ocampo. filed I s opposition in the land registration case, and instituted Civil Case No. 264 (6154); 54 (2) that Republic should comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of the rules on perfection of appeals, citing cases; 55 that there cannot be one set of Rules for ordinary private litigants, and another set for the State otherwise the set-up will result in the denial of due process and equal

protection of law to private litigants as well as chaos in the administration of justice; 56 and (4) that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by the, law. 57

The threshold and, in the ultimate analysis, the decisive issue raised by this petition is whether the dismissal by respondent. Court of Appeals of Republic's appeal from the decision of the trial court denying its Amended Petition, is not proper and should be set aside as contended by Republic, or correct and should be maintained, as argued by respondents. The issue — framed in the context of the suit's true significance to the parties involved in this protracted proceeding and in the light of the value the protagonists attach to the outcome of the litigation — may be stated thus-Should the government, represented by petitioner Republic not be permitted by respondent Court of Appeals to show that it stands Lo lose thru fraudulent machinations close to three hundred (300) hectares of prime sugar land to the private respondents who have allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long after the same parcels of land were already titled in the name of the original owner, Meerkamp and Company and, therefore, the trial court's action in directing the issuance of the title in the name of respondent de Ocampo is null and void ab initio and of no legal effect, simply because petitioner Republic failed to show in its record on appeal that it was perfected on time and that it actually filed its record on appeal six (6) days late?

Respondent Court of Appeals, in a very simplistic approach, which disregards the substantive merits of the appeal dismissed, the same on the grounds that the record on appeal did not show on its face that it was perfected on time, and, additionally, that even if it were to be assumed that the motion for extension of 20 days to file the record on appeal was indeed granted, the appeal was still not perfected on time because the record on appeal was filed November 9, six (6) days after November 3, 1967, when petitioner's requested extension expired.

If respondents' line of reasoning were to be upheld, the dismissal of the appeal may be sustained. For, as stated, in its notice of appeal filed on October 12, 1967, petitioner Republic received a copy of the decision of the trial court on September 14, 1967. 58 Therefore, it had until October 14, 1967 within which to file its record on appeal. The record on appeal does not show that the extension prayed for was granted, but the lower court in its order of December 4, 1967 approved the same, as there was no opposition to its approval. There is also no mention in the order approving the record on appeal as to whether or not it was filed on time. The record on appeal is, however, dated November 9,1967. Assuming then that this was also the actual filing date, and on the further assumption that the 20day extension was impliedly granted with its approval, it was still filed six (6) days late, after the requested extension expired on November 3, 1967. 59 And, as to the legal ground for the dismissal on the foregoing bases, this Court has repeatedly construed Section 6, Rule 41, of the Rules of

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Court 60 as mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, non-compliance with which justifies the dismissal of the appeal. 61

However, a consideration in depth of the unique and peculiar facts attendant to this case and the procedural and substantive implications of the dismissal of the appeal now sought to be reviewed and reconsidered; and a due and proper regard to the merits of the case rather than a fascile reliance on procedural rules, compel this Court to reverse and set aside the dismissal of Republic's appeal by respondent Court of Appeals for the following reasons, viz: (1) Should Republic prove that the subject Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were registered in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919, the trial court's decision decreeing again the same lots in the name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 is null and void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and a fatal infirmity necessarily attaches to the said decision; (2) There are strong and substantial allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations employed by respondent de Ocampo in securing his title Relevant to this is The express finding of the trial court that The Petition for Relief was filed within the reglementary period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was filed within one year from issuance of the decree. If the appeal is dismissed without considering its merits, the above periods will resumed to run and will lapse, and the reliefs sought herein will be forever foreclosed to Republic; (3) Assuming that respondents can invoke, the material data rule, and/or the fact that Republic's appeal was filed out of time because the record On appeal was submitted to the Court six (6) days beyond the requested extension of 20 days, it always in the power of this Court to suspend its rules or to except certain cases therefrom whenever courtervailing considerations so warrant; and (4) This Court, is not powerless to prevent gross miscarriage of Justice, which would follow if Republic's appeal is dismissed — since it stands to lose close to 300 hectares of prime sugar land already titled in its name and devoted to educational purposes — if it is true that the land registration court was without jurisdiction to issue a Second decree of registration in favor of respondent de Ocampo and, if it is also true that fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations attended respondent de Ocampo's application for registration and likewise prevented Republic from exposing the fake exhibits, on the basis of which he secured his title. 62

1. Specifically both Republic and respondents claim ownership over the same Lots Nos. 811 and 2509, hence, this controversy. If Republic's contentions are true that the said lots had been registered twice, with OCT No. 370 issued in favor of Meerkamp and Company before 1919 and another, OCT No. 576, issued in the name of respondent de Ocampo in 1965 — or some forty-six (46) years later — then the decision of the trial court, sitting as land registration court, is null and void ab initio and suffers from a fatal infirmity, which is also a ground for the review of a decree of registration. provided no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced. 63

It is very significant in this connection that respondent de Ocampo admitted the donation of Jalandoni in favor of the

Bureau of Education, but averred that the lots so donated were titled (TCT No. 1251), 64 while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 applied for by him in the land registration case were "unregistered. 65 Yet, both parties claim to be the owners of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509. Respondent de Ocampo also gave the area of the lots covered by TCT No. 1251, in the name of Jalandoni, as two million nine hundred and twelve thousand four hundred and seventy four (2,912,474) square meters, or 291 hectares plus. 66 Coincidentally, Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 claimed by Republic have a total area of 289.47 hectares, 67 or only about two (2) hectares less. These factors, brought to light by respondent de Ocampo himself, cannot simply be ignored in reaching the conclusion that the disputed resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals be reversed.

It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced by Republic in the hearing of the Amended Petition below, one of which was a certification dated November 8, 1952 signed by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, stating that on May 13, 1919, there was registered a sale executed by Meerkamp and Company in favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result OCT No, 370 in the name of the Company was cancelled and TCT No. 1251 was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT No. 1251 was later cancelled by virtue of the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to the then Bureau of Education; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly issued to the Bureau of Education; and that lease contracts were annotated in TCT No. 6014 in favor of Francisco Copper, executed by the Division Superintendent of Schools. 68 However, the above certification does not mention the lot numbers, and no certificates of title were exhibited in court, the incumbent Register of Deeds having declared that the titles could not be found in his office. 69

The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed of donation by Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo, dated November 10, 1911, acknowledged before one Notary Public John Boardman does not appear in his notarial book which is on file in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila, from October 16, 191 1 to May, 1913. 70

The Provincial Assessor of Negros Occidental likewise issued a certification, dated November 29, 1966, stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were never declared in the name of Mosquera. 71 His later certification states that the said lots were assessed in the name of the Bureau of Education, and that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp and Company. 72

Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void. 73 If there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration court to speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appeal from the decision denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no moment, in so far as these proceedings

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are concerned in view of the congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision. decreeing for the second time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 in favor of respondent de Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp and Company. Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to perfect an appeal on time, "although ordinarily decisive, carries no persuasive force" and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted without jurisdiction. 74 As held in United States v. Jayme, 75 lack of jurisdiction. la jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection on the lack of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. The infirmity cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, 76 or by win of the parties. 77

In the interest of justice, which is the paramount consideration in all litigations, and especially considering the cloud surrounding the decision of the land registration court, as aforesaid, the more judicious course to follow is for respondent Court of Appeals to entertain Republic's appeal, not to dismiss it, so that if it finds the same to be meritorious, and the decision appealed from is reversed, the correct Identity of the lots that were donated to the then Bureau of Education (admitted by respondent de Ocampo), as well as those parcels of land applied for by said respondent in the land registration case, may already be ascertained once and for all, in the trial court below, and in this same proceeding, without Republic having to resort to relitigation to prove its claim. Further proceedings will not prejudice respondents. On the contrary, the cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 and TCT No. 42217. issued in favor of respondents de Ocampo and Anglo, respectively, will be removed if Republic's claim is not true.

2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the parties, that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations in securing his title, Firstly, there was the averment in his Answer in Civil case No, 264 (6154) for recovery of possession of the subject lots by Republic, which case was jointly tried with the land registration case,, that the properties alleged to have been donated by Jalandoni to the then Bureau of Education were "different" from Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, applied for by him, the Jalandoni holdings being "titled" lands, while Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were "unregistered" lands. The then applicant de Ocampo even cited TCT No. 1251 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental as the title covering the lots in the name of Jalandoni, further stating that the lands donated by him to the Bureau of Education had an area of 2,912,474 square meters, 78 or 291 hectares plus. Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 have a total area of 289.47 hectares 79 or a difference of only 2 hectares, more or less. The coincidence in area is highly significant since both claim to be the owners of the same lots. Secondly, certain documents which were presented as exhibits by respondent de Ocampo, on the basis of which he secured OCT 576 in his name, were withdrawn from the files of the trial court, and, thereafter were allegedly lost by fire. As a

result, Republic's pending motion to have the said exhibits produced for examination of their genuineness by the NBI could not be made. Unless successfully traversed, the inference is strong that respondents did not want a full disclosure of the true nature of the same by the NBI and that the truth had been suppressed. The inference is also buttressed by the Republic's claim that despite their counsel's knowledge of Republic's intention to file the said motion which was orally communicated to them earlier, the alleged loss was not revealed to Republic's counsel. 80

If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive Republic of just rights which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual — as distinguished from legal — fraud. 81 As Justice Fernando stressed, "Nicolas v. Director of Lands 82 should erase any doubt as to the extreme judicial displeasure at this species of fraud of an applicant seeking to include as a part of the property to which title is sought land actually in possession of another. 83 This is very relevant in view of the denial of the Amended Petition which was premised on the conclusion that allegations in the said petition did not constitute actual and extrinsic fraud and which, according to the trial court, is "the only ground" available to review or reopen the decree. Of related significance is the express finding of the trial court that the original Petition for Relief was filed within the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and the Amended Petition was filed within one year from issuance of the decree. For, if the appeal is dismissed — notwithstanding allegations of fraud which appear to be supported by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the Amended Petition below — the appealed decision will become final and executory, and the aforesaid periods will lapse, foreclosing forever to Republic the reliefs prayed for in the Amended Petition. Although Republic may seek to recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally available to it after the appeal is dismissed, that recourse will involve not only a re- litigation and, therefore. multiplicity of suits, but will also entail the risk that subject lots may be disposed of to innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond recovery. As it is, the other respondent, Anglo, has already intervened. alleging that he bought the same lots from respondent de Ocampo on January 6, 1966, and that TCT No. 42217 was in fact issued to him. 84 A new party, Salvacion Marañon, also sought to intervene in the case and filed in respondent Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss Republic's appeal before the said Court. 85

Finally, We held in Reyes, et al. v. Borbon, et al. 86 "(W)hen the attention of the Court of Land Registration is called to the fact that the same land has been registered in the name of two different persons, it is the duty of said court to order an investigation of that fact and that should be done even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud has been committed in during the double registration. When it is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different person the titile should remain in the name of the person securing the first registration." This Court further held that " (T)he very purpose of the Torrens System would be destroyed

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if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. 87

3. The foregoing overriding considerations then — the alleged lack of jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations, which, buttressed by strong evidence, can nullity the second registration and/or set aside OCT No. 576 issued to respondent de Ocampo — taken in relation with the procedural and substantive implications which could and would arise if the appeal were dismissed, namely, the risk that the holdings may be transacted to third parties and the fact that Republic's action to recover tile holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits — compel Us to conclude that the only recourse — in the interest of just and expeditious proceedings. considering that these have been pending for close to twenty (20) years now — is to suspend Our rules and/or to except this case from their operation. For when the operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice We have, in justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. 88 The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. 89 As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, "(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, to lay down for recognition in this jurisdiction the sound rule in the administration of justice holding that 'it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice required it ... 90

Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the rules on perfection of appeals are to be noted in Sarmiento v. Salud, et al., 91 penned by Justice J.B. Reyes, Dequito v. Lopez 92 and Carillo v. Allied Workers Association of the Philippines 93 both written for the Court by Justice E. M. Fernando, decided years after the Revised Rules of Court took effect in January, 1964. In the Sarmiento case, the late appeal was allowed on the ground of laches on the part of the appellees, the filing of the motion to dismiss having taken place six (6) years after the brief for appellees was filed, and after the case was submitted for decision. This, according to the Court, "constitutes a unique instance of laches without comparable precedent in the records of the Court. 94 The Dequito and Carillo cases, upon the other hand, took into account the fact that labor cases were involved. Justice Fernando expressly noted in the Dequito case that "in the light of the constitutional as well as codal and statutory mandates, there being an explicit command of protection to labor as well as the promotion of social justice," 95 the motion to dismiss the late appeal which was "filed much too late" hardly deserved sympathy or consideration. 96 In the Carillo case, no question whatsoever as to the late appeal was raised, hence, "it would seem that whatever right to contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by now no longer in existence. 97 Continuing, Justice Fernando stated

that "Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like the present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural precepts and made to recover the matter. Flexibility should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly so declared by the Constitution is the effectiveness of the community's effort to assist the economically underprivileged." The responsibility to protect labor is incumbent "not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a living reality. 98

While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they nevertheless support the view that the rigid adherence to the rules on perfection of appeals may and should be relaxed where compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds invoked in this case — not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself — more than justify the exception — considering further that the delay in the perfection of the appeal involved six (6) days only.

4. Finally, enshrined in our legal and judicial annals is the maximum Chat no person should enrich himself at the expense or prejudice of others. 99 Courts should not be used as instruments Lo disregard this elemental and basic norm — which is the essence of justice and fair play. The whole trust of our laws on civil relations enjoins all those who come before the courts of justice to observe true faith and candor in their dealings with one another — the government included.100 The commendable and determined efforts on the part of the citizenry to fashion a New Society rid of graft, corruption and the persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set back, if the subject lots — consisting of close to 300 hectares which are devoted to educational purposes — have indeed been wrongfully titled to respondent de Ocampo, Happily, We can at this stage still prevent this, if true, by setting aside the dismissal of Republic's appeal and according the parties the opportunity in this proceeding, and without further need to re-litigate, to terminate this litigation, which has been pending for close to twenty (20) long years — in fairness to both parties.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 21, 1969, dismissing the appeal, as well as its resolution of November 14, 1969, denying petitioner Republic's motion for reconsideration in CA G.R. Nos. 40683-84 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the said Court to give due course to and consider on its merits Republic's appeal. No costs.

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