Civil Law-For Writing

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    HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON vs. ELVIN CHAN AND CAG.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

    FACTS:City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the MeTC of Manila charging Eduardo Simonof violating BP22. Simon issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check with a declared amount of P336,000.

    The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund the check he issued, contrary to theinformation he had given to respondent. Despite notice insufficiency of his accounts funds, petitioner

    failed to pay respondent the value of the check within 5 days after receiving t he notice. Elvin Chancommenced in the MTC, Pasay City a Civil Action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00. Simon filed an urgent MTD with application to change plaintiffs attachmnent bond for

    damages on the ground of litis pendentia as a consequence of the pendency of another action betweenparties for the same cause. Plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any

    allegation as to the exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, constituting an implied right to initiatecivil action. The Plaintiff also cited Rule 11 1 Section 2, exception to file separate civil action during the

    pendency of a criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the CCP. The case falls under Art. 33

    of the CCP. MCTC, Pasay granted Simon s urgent MTD with application to charge plaintiff s attachmentbond for damages. RTC upheld MCTC s dismissal of Chans initiated Civil Case. Chan appealed to CA

    by petition for review with the following issue; Whether or not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his caseon the ground of litis pendet ia. CA overturned the decision of RTC with following legal basis; Though

    CA recognized that civil case cannot anymore initiated ff. the filling of a criminal case, the ff. case fallsunder the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. The case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.Simon appealed to the SC for petition for review.

    Issue/Issues: 1. WON Chans Civil action to recover the amount of the bounced check a s an independentcivil action.2. WON new SC Circular pertaining to BP22 can be applied retroactively.

    Ruling: SC set aside the decision promulgated by the CA. SC reinstate the decision by MeTC, PasayCity. SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 shall be

    deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil actionseparately shall be allowed or recognized. The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if

    not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that theretroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adverselyaffected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested

    right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to casespending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in therules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit orrequire a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of theoffenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the

    Constitution. Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, theconcurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a)there must be identity of parties orat least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and

    reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should

    be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of theexistence of the third becomes nil.

    DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA vs. FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEONG.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975

    FACTS: Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a motor launchnamed M/L"SAN RAFAEL". A year later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the

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    on what to do and more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by PresidentAquino, freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his

    wifetheir close friends, subordinates, business associatesThe trial courts award of these kinds ofdamages must perforce be deleted. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial thatRespondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art.32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats,

    violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another personshall be liable to the latter for damages.

    LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATIONG.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

    FACTS: CIR issued RMC 37-93 which subjected cigarette brands "Champion," "Hope," and "More," to55% ad valorem tax. Respondent company filed a petition for review with CTAs, which ultimately ruledthat RMC 37-93 as defective, invalid and unenforceable. Such pronouncement was affirmed by the CAand the SC, for being an invalid administrative issuance. Thereafter, respondent filed with RTC a

    complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity, under Article 32, considering that theissuance of the RMC violated the constitutional right of the respondent against deprivation of property

    without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner's MTD was denied by

    RTC, and eventually the case got to SC, wherein it is contended that it is Section 38, Book I of theAdministrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there

    is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.

    ISSUES:Is petitioner liable in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge ofthe functions of his/her office?Does Article 32 of the NCC, or Sec 38, Book I of the Admin Code should govern in determining whetherthe instant complaint states a cause of action?

    HELD:Petitioner in the case at bar is liable for damages. Although the general rule provides that a publicofficer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official dutiesand within the scope of his assigned tasks, there are exceptions to such, (1) where said

    public officer acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated aconstitutional right of the plaintiff. The second exception is clearly applicable in the instant case.

    Article 32 is the governing provision in determining whether or not respondents' complaint had a validcause of action. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawfulan act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded bythe fact that defendant acted without evil intent. The clear intention therefore of the legislature was tocreate a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective

    of the motive or intent of the defendant. The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article32

    of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause ofaction. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to statea cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the

    plaintiff.

    ARTHUR TE vs. CA, and LILIANA CHOAG.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000

    MANOLO P. SAMSON vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY

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    G.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004

    COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION andDR. DEAN CLIMACO

    G.R. No. 159323 July 31, 2008

    DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. CLEOFE S. JANIOLAG.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

    ERNESTO C. DAWSON vs.REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITYG.R. No. 120600 September 22, 1998

    CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORP. vs. HON. ACCREDITEDVOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO

    G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

    JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC, and RAUL R. LEEG.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

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    LT. SALVADOR PARREO vs. COA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFPG.R. No. 162224 June 7, 2007

    GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA vs. COMELEC and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTINGG.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009

    ROSELLER DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZG.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009

    ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC, HON. ALBERTO ROMULOG.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003

    LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006