Civil Donation

7/29/2019 Civil Donation

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLICBISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.IGNAO, petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DECASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS andTHERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLICBISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C.IGNAO, petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DECASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS andTHERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.

Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.

Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.

Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p

These two petitions for review on certiorari1 seek to overturn the decision of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05456 2 which reversed and set aside the order of the

Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as theorder of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of itsaforesaid decision.

On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint fornullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of realproperty with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and theRoman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop


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of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which wasdocketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein. 3

In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spousesEusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation

in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel ofland (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing anarea of 964 square meters, more or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides thatthe donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100)years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such conditionwould renderipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revertto the estate of the donors.

It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitiveperiod to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whoseadministration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of

Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale ofthe property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C.Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale,Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Caviteon November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.

What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision. 4 OnDecember 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion todismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein,have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.

On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion todismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that ofthe motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that thecause of action has prescribed.

On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion todismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaintdoes not state a cause of action against him.

After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss andthe petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by

private respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissingthe complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed. 5

Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on(a) whether or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed ofsale) has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission ofcontracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries withit the dismissal of the main action for reconveyance of real property. 6


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On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has notyet prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, with the followingdispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants'

complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby orderedREINSTATED and REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings.No Costs. 7

Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separatemotions for reconsideration which were denied by respondent Court of Appeals in itsresolution dated February 6, 1987, 8 hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.

It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondentshas already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)hedonation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply

with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)hisaction shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, maybe transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee'sheirs.

We do not agree.

Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation ofa donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of theconditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed ofdonation involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property

donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declarationrevoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:

By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that theviolation of the condition thereof would renderipso facto null and voidthedeed of donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no legalnecessity anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and voidfor the reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so. Forwhere (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee contemplated acourt action during the execution of the deed of donation to have thedonation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the condition

be violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null andvoid"would not appear in the deed of donation. 9

In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicialaction for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that itmay be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. 10 It calledattention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties fromentering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its


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cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for theinjured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. 11 It reiterated the doctrinethat a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision grantingthe power of cancellation. 12

It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but wesee no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case.Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by thegeneral provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III,Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on thematter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an expressprovision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of saidresolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presentlyin question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the presentcontroversy is consequently justified.

The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automaticreversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the conditionwas upheld in the recent case ofDe Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al. 13 It was held thereinthat said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescinda contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court, and that, uponthe happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the conditions of thecontract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration tothat effect. While what was the subject of that case was an onerous donation which,under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the rules on contracts, since thedonation in the case at bar is also subject to the same rules because of its provision onautomatic revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of reasons

said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently apply.

The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declarationrescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing forrescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not therescission was proper. 14

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocationand reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules onprescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 ofsaid Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses,terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or publicpolicy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the partiesproviding for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial actionfor that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescissionsought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merelydeclaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.


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On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding thatthe cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an actionto enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. 15 It is our view that Article 764was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention ofconditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on

the automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingencycontemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.

Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not bedismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground thatprivate respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.

The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach bypetitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donatedshould not be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date ofexecution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue

restriction on the rights arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contraryto public policy.

Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title overthe property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the doneebecomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may imposecertain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law,morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in thedeed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and unduerestriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is anindispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to

be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.

Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may beconsidered applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor ortestator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years.

Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or partof the estate inalienable for more than twenty (20) years are void.

It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve,in the main, the devolution of property by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the caseof donations, being an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of

prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed anathema to the basic and actualintent of either the donor or testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is ormust be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure from the normative policyexpressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.

In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against thealienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculationand denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or


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impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall beconsidered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitoryparagraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, thedeed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the

deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action,the case for private respondents must fail.

It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donationwas not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, butsuch oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolvingthe same.

It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of theland for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed ofd donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion

to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set asideby respondent court, both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent courtinterpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While theissue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctablyrelated to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are grounded onand refer to the very same provision.

This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are notassigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arrivingat a just decision of the case: 16 Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closelyrelated to an error properly assigned, 17 or upon which the determination of the question

properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate courtnotwithstanding the failure to assign it as error. 18

Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower courtfor further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position toresolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in thepublic interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions onthe merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such aswhere the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case. 19Theaforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to thematter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgmentis hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court,Branch XX, Imus, Cavite.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998


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SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M.VALDERRAMA and JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The issue raised in the appeal by certiorariat bar centers on the character of a deed ofdonation executed by the late Aurora Virto DA. de Motinola of the City of Iloilo aseitherinter vivos ormortis causa. That deed, entitled "DEED OF DONATION INTERVIVOS," 1was executed by Montinola on December 11, 1979. It named as donees hergrandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus

Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land, Lot 3231 of the Cadastral Survey ofPanay, located at Brgy. Pawa, Panay, Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.

T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of thedonees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation.

Montinola's Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented the deed for recording in theProperty Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the donor'stitle) and, in its place, issued TCT No. T-16622 on February 7, 1980, in the names of thedonees. 2 Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later,on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation, 3

and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T-16622 (issued, asaforestated, in her grandchildren's names). Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed apetition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No.T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the case beingdocketed as Special Proceeding No. 3311. Her petition was founded on the theory thatthe donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had tocomply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void andcould not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and theissuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622.

The donees (Montinola's grandchildren) opposed the petition. In their opposition dated

August 29, 1990, they averred that the donation in their favor was one inter vivos which,having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the CivilCode, was perfectly valid and efficacious. They also expressed doubt about thesincerity of their grandmother's intention to recover the donated property, since she hadnot pursued the matter of its revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim.

The case, originally treated as a special proceeding, was subsequently considered bythe lower Court as an ordinary civil action in view of the allegations and issues raised in


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the pleadings. Pre-trial was had, followed by trial on the merits which was concludedwith the filing of the parties' memoranda. The Trial Court then rendered judgment onMarch 27, 1991, holding that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing

Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. 4 The matter of its revocation was notpassed upon.

Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, her appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33202. She however died on March 10, 1993, 5 while the appeal waspending.

Shortly after Montinola's demise, a "Manifestation and Motion" dated March 31, 1993was filed by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad, herein petitioners, 6 in which they (a)alleged that they had become the owners of the property covered by TCT No. T-16622in virtue of a "deed of definite sale dated May 25, 1992" accomplished by Montinola intheir favor, which was confirmed by "an affidavit dated November 26, 1997alsoexecuted by the latter, and (b) prayed that they be substituted as appellants and

allowed to prosecute the case in their own behalf.

Another motion was subsequently presented under date of April 7, 1993, this time bythe legal heirs of Aurora Montinola, namely: Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen andTeresita M. Valderama. They declared that they were not interested in pursuing thecase, and asked that the appeal be withdrawn. Montinola's counsel opposed the motion.

On June 21, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution: (a) ordering thesubstitution of the persons above mentioned Ofelia de Leon, Estela M, Jaen, andTeresita M. Valderama as plaintiffs-appellants in place of the late Aurora Montinola,as well as the joinder of the spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad as additional

appellants;

7

and (b) denying the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal.

On June 30, 1995, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decisionon the case affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court; 8 and on July 31, 1996, itdenied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M.Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderrama, on the one hand, and by the spouses, Ernest andEvelyn Sicad, on the other. 9

The Sicad Spouses have appealed to this Court; and here, they contend that thefollowing errors were committed by the Appellate Tribunal, to wit:

1) ** in ruling that the donation was inter vivos and in notgiving due weight to the revocation of the donation; and

2) ** in not ordering that the case be remanded for furtherreception of evidence. 10

The Comment filed for private respondents (the donees) under date of December 19,1996 deals with what they consider the "principal issue in this case ** (i.e.) whether the


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donation is mortis causa orinter vivos," and sets forth the argument that the "donorclearly intended to effect the immediate transfer of ownership to the donees." that theprohibition in the deed of donation "against selling the property within ten (10) yearsafter the death of the donor does not indicate that the donation is mortis causa," that thedonor's "alleged act of physically keeping the title does not suggest any intention to

defer the effectivity of the donation," that the "payment of real property taxes isconsistent with the donor's' reservation of the right of usufruct," that the donor's intent "isnot determined by ** (her) self-serving post-execution declarations," the "donation wasnever effectively revoked," and petitioners "have waived their right to question theproceedings in the trial court." 11

The Reply of the Sicad Spouses dated March 14, 1997 reiterates their thesis that thedonation was mortis causa, that "the provisions of the deed of donation indicate that itwas intended to take effect upon the death of the donor," that "the circumstancessurrounding the execution of the deed, and the subsequent actions of the donorincontrovertibly signify the donor's intent to transfer the property only after her death,"

that the donor "did not intend to give effect to the donation," and that the procedureadopted by the Trial Court in the case was fatally defective. 12 A "Rejoinder" dated April3, 1997 was then submitted by the Valderramas, traversing the assertions of the Reply.13

Considering the focus of the opposing parties, and their conflicting theories, on theintention of Aurora Montinola in executing the document entitled "Deed of Donation InterVivos," it is needful to review the circumstances of the signing of that document byMontinola, as ostensible donor, and her grandchildren, as ostensible donees.

The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donationprepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter tothe parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten(10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of theproperty for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading:"however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10years after the death of the donor." 14 The actuality of the subsequent insertion of thisnew proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easilyperceived and identified it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammedinto the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediatelypreceding it. 15

Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso,but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating theproperty as her own. She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, topossess the property, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion,paying the property taxes as they fell due all these she did until she transferred theProperty to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did not give the new certificate oftitle to the ostensible donees but retained it, too, until she delivered it to the Sicads onthe occasion of the sale of the property to them. In any event, the delivery of the title to


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the donees would have served no useful purpose since, as just stated, they wereprohibited to effect any sale or encumbrance thereof for a period of ten (10) years afterthe ostensible donor's decease. And consistent with these acts denoting retention ofownership of the property was Montinola's openly expressed view that the donation wasineffectual and could not be given effect even after ten (10) years from her death. For

this view she sought to obtain judicial approval. She brought suit on August 24, 1990 tocancel TCT No. T-16622 (issued to her grandchildren) premised precisely on theinvalidity of the donation for failure to comply with the requisites of testamentarydispositions. Before that, she attempted to undo the conveyance to her grandchildren byexecuting a deed of revocation of the donation on March 12, 1987, and causingannotation thereof as an adverse claim on said TCT No. T-16622. She also exercisedindisputable acts of ownership over said property by executing, as just stated, deedsintended to pass title over it to third parties petitioners herein. 16

As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its languageand the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon

its execution. In this respect, case law has laid down significant parameters. Thus, in adecision handed down in 1946, 17 this Court construed a deed purporting to be adonation inter vivos to be in truth one mortis causa because it stipulated (like the onenow being inquired into) "that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shallremain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margarita David, during herlifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donatedproperties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or inany other way possible," On these essential premises, the Court said, such a donationmust be deemed one "mortis causa, because the combined effect of the circumstancessurrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted clausesthereof** (was that) the most essential elements of ownership the right to dispose of

the donated properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits, possession remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees onlyafter Margarita David's death." So, too, in the case at bar, did these rights remain with

Aurora Montinola during her lifetime, and could not pass to the donees until ten (10)years after her death.

In another case decided in 1954 involving a similar issue, Bonsato v. Court of Appeals,18 this Court emphasized that the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa,which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were that "the donor not only reservedfor herself all the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even moreimportant, specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, thedonated properties could not be disposed of in any way,; thereby denying to thetransferees the most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of theproperties."

A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right todispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa.In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee whilethe donor is still alive." 19


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In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed ofdonation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did notget possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruitsthereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did notacquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten

(10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificateof title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property.All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed ofdonation reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibitingthe sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortiscausa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor'sdemise.

The case ofAlejandro v. Geraldez20 cited by the Court of Appeals in support of itschallenged judgment is not quite relevant. For in the deed of donation there in issue,

there was a partial relinquishment of the right to dispose of the property, in the eventonly that this became necessary "to defray the expenses and support of the donors."That limited right to dispose of the donated lots, said this Court, "implies that ownershiphad passed to ** (the donees) by means of the donation and **, therefore, the donationwas already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donationinter vivos." On the other hand, in the case at bar, the donees were expressly prohibitedto make any disposition of any nature or for any purpose whatever during the donor'slifetime, and until ten (10) years after her death a prohibition which, it may be added,makes inapplicable the ruling in Castro v. Court of Appeals, 21 where no such prohibitionwas imposed, and the donor retained only the usufruct over the property.

The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that theprohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which,if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that theyhave the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argumentalso makes no sense, because if they had the right to dispose of the property and did infact dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would beof no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily resultin the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property.

It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one intervivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. InAlejandro v.Geraldez, supra, 22 this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given inconsideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos(solely) because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason."Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that theconveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the servicesrendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds,Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may haveidentical motivation." 23


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Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code tothe effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must bethat entailing "the least transmission of rights andinterests," 24

The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; itis void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33202 datedJune 30, 1995 as well as the Resolution denying reconsideration thereof, and theDecision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Case No. 3311 are SET ASIDE. TheDeed of Donation Inter Vivos (Exh. "A") executed by Aurora Virto Vda. de Montinola onDecember 11, 1979 in favor of Catalino M. Valderrama, Judy Cristina M. Valderramaand Jesus Antonio M. Valderrama is declared null and void. The Register of Deeds ofRoxas City is directed to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16622, revive andreinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.

Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.Inocencio Rosete for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two deeds ofdonation executed on the first day of December, 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato infavor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, to be void forbeing donations mortis causa accomplished without the formalities required by law fortestamentary dispositions.

The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. 8892) onJune 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and

his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment and damages)charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already awidower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations(Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew FelipeBonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by TaxDeclaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini andBurgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in thesame act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis


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causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato andFelipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor werevoluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the lateDomingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force andviolence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and

for damages in the sum of P2,000.

After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on November 13, 1949,finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was ofsound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation intervivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death ofthe donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having beenacquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, thedonations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of landdescribed therein.

Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as primaryerror the holding of the court below that the donations are inter vivos; appellantscontending that they were mortis causa donations, and invalid because they had notbeen executed with the formalities required for testamentary disposition.

A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under consideration, and onJanuary 12, 1953, the majority rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to benull and void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without thetestamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appelleesBonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two Justices dissented, claiming that the said donations should be

considered as donations inter vivos and voted for the affirmance of the decision of theCourt of First Instance. The donees then sought a review by this Court.

The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical nature of the donationsin question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2) are couched in identical terms, with theexception of the names of the donees and the number and description of the propertiesdonated. The principal provisions are the following.

ESCRITURA DE DONATION

Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de edad, vencino

y residente del municipio de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., por la presentedeclaro lo siguiente:

Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecinode Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de su largo servicio aDomingo Bonsato, por la presente hagor y otorgo una donacion perfecta eirrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelasde terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.


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(Description omitted)

Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe Bonsato hastaen estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y estimado como uno de mishijos y siempre ha cumplido todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su

pobriza sea movido mi sentimiento para dar una recompensa de sustrabajos y aprecios a mi favor.

Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a FelipeBonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados pero de los productosmientras vive el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo yla parte como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato.

Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatorio Felipe Bonsato tomaraposesion inmediatamente de dichos terrenos a su favor.

Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donancion yel donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos los derechos de dichos terrenosen concepto de dueo absoluto de la propiedad libre de todaresponsibilidad y gravamen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que creaconveniente.

En Testimonio de todo lo Cual, signo la presente en Agno, Pangasinan,I.F., hoy dia 1.0 de Diciembre, 1939.

Domingo (His thumbmark) Bonsato

Yo, Felipe Bonsato, mayor de edad, casado, Vecino de Mabini,Pangasinan, I.F., declaro por la presente que acepto la donacion anteriorotorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi favor.

(Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato

SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:

(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Illegible

The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of Appeals that took cognizanceof this case relied primarily on the last paragraph, stressing the passage:

Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion. . .


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while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second paragraph, wherein the donorstates that he makes "perfect, irrevocable, and consummated donation" of theproperties to the respective donees, petitioners herein.

Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid

donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills(testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it iswell-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away fromthe Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donateand retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortiscausa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as anindependent legal concept.

ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of thedonor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall begoverned by the rules established for testamentary successions.

Commenting on this article, Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl, Vol. XI, 2 parte, pp. 573, 575says:

No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las donacionesmortis causa como institucion independiente, con propia autonomia ypropio compo jurisdiccional? La respuesta debe ser negativa.

x x x x x x x x x

Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo como se

conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un Museo. La asimilacion entrelas donaciones por causa de muerte y las transmissiones por testamentoes perfecta.

Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses the same opinion:

"La disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: 1..o, que handesaparecido las llamas antes donaciones mortis causa por lo que elCodigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; 2.o, que toda disposicion debienes para despues de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para lasucesion testamentaria.

And Castan, in his Derecho Civil, Vol. IV (7th Ed., 1953), p. 176, reiterates:

(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis causa? De loque acabamos de decir se desprende que las donaciones mortis causahan perdido en el Codigo Civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hayque considerarlos hoy como una institucion suprimida, refundida en ellegado ... . Las tesis de la desaparcion de las donaciones mortis causa en


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nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el pryecto de 1851puede decirse que constituye una communis opinion entre nuestrosexpositores, incluso los mas recientes.

We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term

"donations mortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name todesignate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form ofdonations.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem infavor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or allof the following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full ornaked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman

vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, adnutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power inthe donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.L-4326, November 18, 1952);

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2,executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his

lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva eldonante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a reservation that would beunnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Mostsignificant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; onthe contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutelyincompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of theessence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his rightof revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after thedeath of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la

muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression mustbe construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearlyappears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to makethe donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens andencumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a shareof the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrancethat would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in thedonees.


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Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion yel donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos derechos de dichos terrenos enconcepto de dueo absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidady gravamen y puede ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente.

Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to conflict with the irrevocabilityof the donation and its consummated character, as expressed in the first part of thedeeds of donation, a conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1285; NewCivil Code, Art. 1374; Rule 123, sec. 59, Rules of Court).

Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO, casado, tambien mayor de edad, vecino de Agno,Pangasinan, I. F., en consideracion de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por lapresente hago y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor delcitado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe masabajo.

In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for nothaving been executed with the formalities of testaments, the circumstances clearlyindicated the transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his death. Thus,in Cario vs. Abaya, 70 Phil., 182, not only were the properties not to be given untilthirty days after the death of the last of the donors, but the deed also referred to thedonees as "those who had been mentioned to inheritfrom us", the verb "to inherit"clearly implying the acquisition of property only from and after the death of the allegeddonors. In Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil., 244, the alleged donorexpressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties conveyed at any time beforehis death, and limited the donation "to whatever property or properties left undisposedby me during my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their ownership until his death. While in

David vs. Sison, 42 Off. Gaz. (Dec, 1946) 3155, the donor not only reserved for herselfall the fruits of the property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important,specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donatedproperties could not be disposed of in any way", thereby denying to the transferees themost essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties. No similarrestrictions are found in the deeds of donation involved in this appeal.

That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and theservices rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whetherthe deeds Exhibits 1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy mayhave identical motivation. Nevertheless, the existence of such considerationcorroborates the express irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of anyreservation by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated, andreinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence, it was error for the Courtof Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1 and 2 were invalid because the formalities oftestaments were not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities required forthem were those prescribed by Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art.749 of the new Code, and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As theproperties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the


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donations could not affect the half interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, etal. from the predeceased wife of the donor.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instanceis revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.

G.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977

TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIAALEJANDRO, SALUD ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIOALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, petitioners,vs.HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance ofBulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, ANDREA DIAZ and ANGEL DIAZ, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977

ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,

vs.

HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Courtof First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEOPOLICARPIO, VIRGINIA ALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO,FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO, respondents.

Ponciano G. Hernandez for Teodorico Alejandro, et al.

Porfirio Villaroman for Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.

AQUINO. J.

This is a case about donations inter vivos and mortis causa . The bone of contention isLot No. 2502 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate with an area of 5,678 square meters,situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7336.The facts are as follows: On January 20, 1949 the spouses Gabino (Gavino) Diaz and

Severa Mendoza, their daughter-in-law Regina Fernando and their three children,Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eightlots of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses, located at BarrioParada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The deed reads as follows:

KASULATAN NG PAGKAKALOOB (A DEED OF DONATION)

ALAMIN NG LAHAT NG MAKATUTUNGHAY NITO:


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Ang pagkakaloob (donation) na ito, ginawa at pinagtibay dito sa municipiong Sta. Maria, lalawigan ng Bulacan, Pilipinas, ngayong ika 20 ng Enero,1949, ng mag-asawang GABINO DIAZ at SEVERA MENDOZA, filipinos,may mga sapat na gulang, naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria,Bulacan na dito'y kinikilalang NAGKALOOB (DONORS), sa kapakanan

nila REGINA FERNANDO, filipina, may sapat na gulang, viuda; OLIMPIADIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Teodorico Alejandro,ANGEL DIAZ, filipino, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Catalina Marcelo,at ANDREA DIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kay PerfectoMarcelo, mga naninirahan sa nayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, nadito'y kinikilalang PINAGKALOOBAN (DONEES).

PAGPAPATUNAY:

Na ang Nagkaloob (DONORS) ay siyang mayari, at kamayari atnamomosision sa kasalukuyan ng mga parcelang lupa kasama ang mga

kagalingan na nasa lugar ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, mapagkikilalasa paraang mga sumusunod (description and statements as to registrationare omitted):

1. TCT No. 7336, Lot No. 2502, 5,678 square meters.

2. TCT No. 10998, Lot No. 2485, 640 square meters.

3. TCT No. 10840, Lot No. 2377,16,600 square meters.

4. TCT No. 10997, Lot No. 2448,12,478 square meters.



7. TCT No. 17961, Lot No. 2521, 715 square meters.


Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong pagtingin na taglayng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) sa Pinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun

din sa tapat at mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahonna ginawa ng huli sa una, ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamamagitanng kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) ay buong pusong inililipat atlubos na ibinibigay sa nasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggitat makikilala sa unahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at pagkakautang,katulad nito:


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(a) Na ang lupang sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2502 o Titulo No. 7336, (No.1) sa unahan nito ay hinati sa dalawang parte ang unang parte (1/2) nanasa bandang Kanluran (West) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawangGabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Angel Diaz, kasalkay Catalina Marcelo; at ang ikalawang parte (1/2) na nasa 'bandang

silangan (East) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz atSevera Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si Andrea Diaz, kasal kay PerfectoMarcelo."

(Note Some dispositions are not reproduced verbatim but are merelysummarized because they are not involved in this case. Paragraph (a)above is the one involved herein).

(b) Lot No. 2485, TCT No.10998, to Regina Fernando (daughter- in-lawof the donors and widow of their deceased son, Miguel Diaz) and OlimpiaDiaz in equal shares.

(c) Lot No. 2377, TCT No. 10840, 1/3 to Angel Diaz, 1/3 to AndreaDiaz, and 1/3 "ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz atSevera Mendoza sa kanilang sariling kapakanan o mga gastos nila.

(d) Lot No. 2448, TCT No. 10997 to Olimpia Diaz sa condicion napagkakalooban ni Olimpia Diaz si Crisanta de la Cruz, asawa ni Alejandro- - - - - (sic) sakaling si Crisanta ay mamatay ng halagang isang daangpiso (P100), bilang gastos sa libing."

(e) Na ang lupang-solar na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 4168 o Titulo No.

2051 (No. 5); lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 25?2 o Titulo No.17960 (No. 6); at lupang-bukid na sinasaysay sa Lote No. 2521 o TituloNo. 17961 (No. 7) sa unahan nito ay inilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang sariling kapakanano mga gastos nila.

(f) Lot No. 2643, TCT No. 21453, to Regina Fernando and her childrenwith the deceased Miguel Diaz in whose name the said Lot was alreadyregistered.

Na kaming mga pinagkakalooban (DONEES) na sila Regina Fernando,

Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz at Andrea Diaz ay tinatanggap namin ng buongkasiyahang loob ang pagkakaloob (Donation.) na ito, at sa pamamagitannito ay kinikilala, pinahahalagahan, at lubos na pinasasalamatan naminang kagandahang loob at paglingap na ipinakita at ginawa ngnagkakaloob (Donors).

AT SA WAKAS, ang pagkakaloob na ito (DONATION), ay sumasailalim saparaang mga sumusunod:


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1. Ang mga Pinagkakalooban (Donatarios) na sila Regina Fernando,Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz, at Andrea Diaz, siyang nakaaalam sa mgagastos sa pagkakasakit at sa libing ng NAGKALOOB (DONANTE);

2. Na ang mga Pinagkalooban (DONATARIOS) ay hindi maaaring

makapagbili sa pangatlong tao ng nasabing mga pagaari samantalangang nagkaloob (Donante) ay buhay Datapwa't kung ang pagbibilinggagawin ay upang malunasan ang mga gastos at menitencion ngNagkaloob (Donante) samakatuwid ang nasabing pagbibili ay matuwid;

3. Gayun din, samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at SeveraMendoza ay buhay, patuloy ang aming pamamahala, karapatan, atpagkamay-ari sa mga nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito napag-aari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay bawian ng buhay ng PanginoongDios at mamatay na ang mga karapatan at pagkamay-ari ng bawa'tPinagkalooban (Donatarios) sa bawa't pag-aari na nauukol sa bawa't isa

ay may lubos na kapangyarihan."

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, linagdaan namin ang kasulatang ito, dito saSta. Maria, Bulacan, ngayon ika 20 ng Enero, 1949, sa patibay ngdalawang sacsing kaharap. Signature Thumbmark Signature GABINODIAZ SEVERA MENDOZA REGINA FERNANDO Thumbmark SignatureSignature OLIMPIA DIAZ ANGEL DIAZ ANDREA DIAZ

(Acknowledgment signed by Notary Celedonio Reyes is omitted)

Gabino Diaz died in 1962. On October 20, 1964 Severa Mendoza and her two children,

Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz, executed a deed of donation denominated as "Kasulatanng Pagbibigay na Magkakabisa Pagkamatay (Donation Mortis causa )" over one-half ofLot No. 2377-A, which is a portion of Lot No. 2377 of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate(which in turn is item 3 or [c] in the 1949 deed of donation already mentioned).

In that deed of donation, Severa Mendoza donated to Andrea Diaz her one-half share inLot 2377-A, which one-half share is Identified as Lot 2377-A-1, on condition that AndreaDiaz would bear the funeral expenses to be incurred after the donor's death. She died in1964.

It should be noted that the other one-half share in Lot 2377-A or Lot No. 2377-A-2 was

previously adjudicated to Angel Diaz because he defrayed the funeral expenses on theoccasion of the death of Gabino Diaz.

On May 12, 1970 Andrea Diaz sued her brother, Angel Diaz, in the Court of FirstInstance of Bulacan, Sta. Maria Branch V for the partition of Lots Nos. 2377-A and 2502(Civil Case No. SM-357). Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving spouse of Olimpia Diaz,and their children intervened in the said case. They claimed one-third of Lot No. 2502.

Angel Diaz alleged in his answer that he had. been occupying his share of Lot No. 2502


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"for more than twenty years". The intervenors claimed that the 1949 donation was avoid mortis causa disposition.

On March 15, 1971 the lower court rendered a partial decision with respect to Lot No.2377-A. The case was continued with respect to Lot No. 2502 which is item No. 1 or (a)

in the 1949 deed of donation. The record does not show what happened to the other sixlots mentioned in the deed of donation.

The trial court in its decision of June 30, 1971 held that the said deed of donation was adonation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties donated did not pass tothe donees during the donors' lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only "upon thedeath of the donors".

However, it sustained the division of Lot No. 2502 into two equal parts between AngelDiaz and Andrea Diaz on the theory that the said deed of donation was effective "as anextra-judicial partition among the parents and their children. Consequently, the

Alejandro intervenors were not given any share in Lot No. 2502. Angel Diaz and theintervenors were ordered to pay Andrea Diaz "attorney's fees of P1,000 each or a totalof P2,000".

The Alejandro intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration, On July 16, 1971 the trialcourt denied that motion but eliminated the attorney's fees.

Andrea Diaz and the Alejandro intervenors filed separate appeals to this Court underRepublic Act No. 5440. Andrea Diaz contends that the 1949 deed of donation is a validdonation inter vivos and that the trial court erred in deleting the award for attorney'sfees. The Alejandro intervenors contend that the said donation is mortis causa ; that

they are entitled to a one-third share in Lot No, 2502, and that the trial court erred incharacterizing the deed as a valid partition. In the ultimate analysis, the appeal involvesthe issue of whether the Alejandro intervenors should be awarded one-third of Lot No.2502, or 1,892 square meters thereof, as intestate heirs of the Diaz spouses.

To resolve that issue, it is necessary to determine whether the deed of donation is intervivos ormortis causa. A brief exposition on the nature of donation inter vivos and mortiscausa may facilitate the resolution of that issue. Many legal battles have been fought onthe question of whether a particular deed is an inter vivos ormortis causa donation. Thecopious jurisprudence on that point sheds light on that vexed question. The Civil Codeprovides:

ART. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donorpartake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed bythe rules established in the Title on Succession. (620).

ART. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effectduring the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be deliveredtill after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of


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the property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertainto the donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)

ART. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensivecondition, which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life of

the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter vivosunless a contrary intention appears. (n)

ART. 731. When a person donates something subject to the resolutorycondition of the donor's survival, there is a donation inter vivos. (n)

ART. 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governedby the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is notdetermined in this Title. (621)."

Nature of donations inter vivos and mortis causa transfers. Before tackling the issues

raised in this appeal, it is necessary to have some familiarization with the distinctionsbetween donations inter vivos and mortis causa because the Code prescribes differentformalities for the two kinds of donations. An utter vivos donation of real property mustbe evidenced by a public document and should be accepted by the donee in the samedeed of donation or in a separate instrument. In the latter case, the donor should benotified of the acceptance in an authentic form and that step should be noted in bothinstruments. (Art. 749, Civil Code. As to inter vivos donation of personal property, seeart. 748).

On the other hand, a transfermortis causa should be embodied in a last will andtestament (Art. 728, supra). It should not be called donation mortis causa . It is in reality

a legacy (5 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 107). If not embodied in a valid will, thedonation is void (Narag vs. Cecilio, 109 Phil. 299; Aznar vs. Sucilla 102 Phil. 902;Tuazon vs. Posadas, 54 Phil. 289; Serrano vs. Solomon, 105 Phil. 998, 1002).

This Court advised notaries to apprise donors of the necessity of clearly specifyingwhether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to control anddispose at will of the property before their death, without the consent or intervention ofthe beneficiary, since the reservation of such right would be a conclusive indication thatthe transfer' would be effective only at the donor's death, and, therefore, the formalitiesof testaments should be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right offree disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond dispute

(Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68,72).

From the aforequoted articles 728 to 732, it is evident that it is the time of effectivity(aside from the form) which distinguishes a donation inter vivos from a donation mortiscausa . And the effectivity is determined by the time when the full or naked ownership(dominum plenum or dominium directum) of the donated properties is transmitted to thedonees. (See Lopez vs. Olbes, 15 Phil. 540; Gonzales and Fuster Fabra vs. Gonzales


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Mondragon, 35 Phil. 105). The execution of a public instrument is a mode of delivery ortradition (Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 46).

If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full ornaked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the

donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donationmortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament (Bonsato vs. Courtof Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).

But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of thedonor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) ) of thedonated properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of hisdeath but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos (Castro vs.Court of Appeals, L-20122, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1076).

The effectivity of the donation should be ascertained from the deed of donation and the

circumstances surrounding its execution. Where, for example, it is apparent from thedocument of trust that the donee's acquisition of the property or right accruedimmediately upon the effectivity of the instrument and not upon the donor's death, thedonation is inter vivos (Kiene vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 97 Phil. 352).

There used to be a prevailing notion, spawned by a study of Roman Law, that the CivilCode recognizes a donation mortis as a juridical act in contraposition to a donation intervivos. That impression persisted because the implications of article 620 of the SpanishCivil Code, now article 728, that "las donaciones que hayan de producir sus efectos promuerte del donante participan de la naturaleza de las disposiciones de ultima voluntad,y se regiran por las reglas establecidas en el capitulo de la sucesion testamentaria" had

not been fully expounded in the law schools. Notaries assumed that the donation mortiscausa of the Roman Law was incorporated into the Civil Code.

As explained by Justice J. B. L. Reyes in the Bonsato case, supra, article 620 brokeaway from the Roman Law tradition and followed the French doctrine that no one mayboth donate and retain. Article 620 merged donations mortis causa with testamentarydispositions and thus suppressed the said donations as an independent legal concept.Castan Tobenas says:

(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro Derecho las donaciones mortis causa ? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las donaciones mortis

causa han perdido en el Codigo civil su caracter distintivo y su naturaleza,y hay que considerarlas hoy como una institucion suspirimida, refundidaen la del legado. ...

La tesis de la desaparicion de las donaciones mortis causa en nuestroCodigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente por el projecto de 1851, puededecirse que constituye una communis opinio entre nuestros expositores,incluso los mas recientes. ...


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Garcia Goyena, comentando dicho proyecto, decia que la Comision sehabia adherido al acuerdo de suprimir las donaciones mortis causa ,seguido por casi todos los Codigos modernos. Las donaciones mortiscausa a;adia-eran una especie de montsruo entre los contratos yultimas voluntades; las algarabia del Derecho romano y patrio sobre los

puntos de semenjanza y disparidad de estas donaciones con los pactos ylegados no podia producir sino dudas, confusion y pleitos en los rarisimoscasos que ocurriesen por la dificuldad de apreciar y fijar sus verdaderoscaracteres' "(4 Derecho Civil Espanol, Comun y Foral, 8th Ed., 1956, pp.182-3).

Manresa is more explicit. He says that "la disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lotanto: (1) que han desaperacido las llamadas antes donaciones mortis causa , por loque el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en absoluto; (2) que toda disposicion de bienespara despues de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesiontestamentaria" (5 Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, 6th Ed., p.107). Note that the

Civil Code does not use the term donation mortis causa . ( Section 1536 of the RevisedAdministrative Code in imposing the inheritance tax uses the term "gift mortis causa").lwphl@it

What are the distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa? Justice Reyes inthe Bonsato case says that in a dispositionpost mortem (1) the transfer conveys no titleor ownership to the transferee before the death of the tansferor, or the transferor(meaning testator) retains the ownership, full or naked (domino absoluto or nuda

proprietas) (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108; De Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil. 633; (2) thetransfer is revocable before the transferor's death and revocabllity may be provided forindirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties

conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 92 Phil. 244), and (3) the transfer would be void if thetransferor survived the transferee.

In other words, in a donation mortis causa it is the donor's death that determines thatacquisition of, or the right to, the property donated, and the donation is revocable at thedonor's will, Where the donation took effect immediately upon the donee's acceptancethereof and it was subject to the resolutory condition that the donation would be revokedif the donee did not give the donor a certain quantity of rice or a sum of money, thedonation is inter vivos (Zapanta vs. Posadas, Jr., 52 Phil. 557).

Justice Reyes in the subsequent cast ofPuig vs. Penaflorida, L-15939, November 29,1965, 15 SCRA 276, synthesized the rules as follows:

1. That the Civil Code recognizes only gratuitous transfers of propertywhich are effected by means of donations inter vivos or by last will andtestament executed with the requisite legal formalities.

2. That in inter vivos donations the act is immediately operative even if thematerial or physical deliver (execution) of the property may be deferred


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until the donor's death, whereas, in a testamentary disposition, nothing isconveyed to the grantee and nothing is acquired by him until the death ofthe grantortestator. The disposition is ambulatory and not final.

3. That in a mortis causa disposition the conveyance or alienation should

be (expressly or by necessary implication) revocable ad nutum or at thediscretion of the grantor or so called donor if he changes his mind(Bautista vs. Saniniano, 92 Phil. 244).

4. That, consequently, the specification in the deed of the cases wherebythe act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is intervivos and not a mortis causa disposition (Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil.557).

5. That the designation of the donation as mortis causa , or a provision inthe deed to the effect the donation "is to take effect at the death of the

donor", is not a controlling criterion because those statements are to beconstrued together with the rest of the instrument in order to give effect tothe real intent of the transferor (Laureta vs. Mata and Mango, 44 Phil. 668;Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823; Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 98 Phil.68).

6. That a conveyance for an onerous consideration is governed by therules of contracts and not by those of donations or testaments (Carlos vs.Ramil, 20 Phil. 183; Manalo vs. De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495).

7. That in case of doubt the conveyance should be deemed a donation

inter vivos rather than mortis causa , in order to avoid uncertainty as to theownership of the property subject of the deed.

It may be added that the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love andaffection or past or future services is not a characteristic of donations inter vivosbecause transfers mortis causa may be made also for those reasons. There is difficultyin applying the distinctions to controversial cases because it is not easy sometimes toascertain when the donation takes effect or when the full or naked title passes to thetransferee. As Manresa observes, "when the time fixed for the commencement of theenjoyment of the property donated be at the death of the donor, or when the suspensivecondition is related to his death, confusion might arise" (5 Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., p. 108).

The existence in the deed of donation of conflicting stipulations as to its effectivity maygenerate doubt as to the donor's intention and as to the nature of the donation(Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823).

Where the donor declared in the deed that the conveyance was mortis causa andforbade the registration of the deed before her death, the clear inference is that theconveyance was not intended to produce any definitive effect nor to pass any interest to


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the grantee except after her death. In such a case, the grantor's reservation of the rightto dispose of the property during her lifetime means that the transfer is not binding onher until she dies. It does not mean that the title passed to the grantee during herlifetime. (Ubalde Puig vs. Magbanua Penaflorida, L-15939, Resolution of January 31,1966, 16 SCRA 136).

In the following cases, the conveyance was considered a void mortis causa transferbecause it was not cast in the form of a last will and testament as required in article 728,formerly article 620:

(a) Where it was stated in the deed of donation that the donor wanted to give the doneesomething "to take effect after his death" and that "this donation shall produce effectonly by and because of the death of the donor, the property herein donated to pass titleafter the donor's death" (Howard vs. Padilla, 96 Phil. 983). In the Padilla case thedonation was regarded as mortis causa although the donated property was delivered tothe donee upon the execution of the deed and although the donation was accepted in

the same deed.

(b) Where it was provided that the donated properties would be given to the doneesafter the expiration of thirty days from the donor's death, the grant was made in thefuture tense, and the word "inherit" was used (Carino vs. Abaya, 70 Phil. 182).

(c) Where the donor has the right to dispose of all the donated properties and theproducts thereof. Such reservation is tantamount to a reservation of the right to revokethe donation (Bautista vs. Sabiniano 92 Phil. 244).

(d) Where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation reveal

that the donation could not have taken effect before the donor's death and the rights todispose of the donated properties and to enjoy the fruits remained with the donor duringher lifetime (David vs. Sison, 76 Phil. 418).

But if the deed of donation makes an actual conveyance of the property to the donee,subject to a life estate in the donors, the donation is is inter vivos (Guarin vs. De Vera,100 Phil. 1100).

Articles 729, 730 and 731 have to some extent dissipated the confusion surrounding thetwo kinds of donation. The rule in article 729 is a crystallization of the doctrineannounced in decided cases.

A clear instance where the donor made an inter vivos donation is found in De Guzmanvs. Ibea 67 Phil. 633. In that case, it was provided in the deed that the donor donated tothe donee certain properties so that the donee "may hold the same as her own andalways" and that the donee would administer the lands donated and deliver the fruitsthereof to the donor, as long as the donor was alive, but upon the donor's death the saidfruits would belong to the donee. It was held that the naked ownership was conveyed to


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the donee upon the execution of the deed of donation and, therefore, the donationbecame effective during the donor's lifetime.

In Sambaan vs. Villanueva, 71 Phil. 303, the deed of donation, as in Balaqui vs.Dongso, 53 Phil. 673, contained conflicting provision. It was provided in the deed that

the donation was made "en consideracion al afecto y carino" of the donor for the doneebut that the donation "surtira efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte (donor's death).

That donation was held to be inter vivos because death was not the consideration forthe donation but rather the donor's love and affection for the donee. The stipulation thatthe properties would be delivered only after the donor's death was regarded as a meremodality of the contract which did not change its inter vivos character. The donor hadstated in the deed that he was donating, ceding and transferring the donated propertiesto the donee. (See Joya vs. Tiongco, 71 Phil. 379).

In Laureta vs. Mata and Magno, 44 Phil. 668 the deed of donation provided that the

donor was donating mortis causa certain properties as a reward for the donee's servicesto the donor and as a token of the donor's affection for him. The donation was madeunder the condition that "the donee cannot take possession of the properties donatedbefore the death of the donor"; that the ' donee should cause to be held annuallymasses for the repose of the donor's soul, and that he should defray the expenses forthe donor's funeral.

It was held that the said donation was inter vivos despite the statement in the deed thatit was mortis causa . The donation was construed as a conveyance inpraesenti("apresent grant of a future interest") because it conveyed to the donee the title to theproperties donated "subject only to the life estate of the donor" and because the

conveyance took effect upon the making and delivery of the deed. The acceptance ofthe donation was a circumstance which was taken into account in characterizing thedonation as inter vivos.

In Balacui vs. Dongso, supra, the deed of donation involved was more confusing thanthat found in the Laureta case. In the Balaquicase, it was provided in the deed that thedonation was made in consideration of the services rendered to the donor by the donee;that "title" to the donated properties would not pass to the donee during the donor'slifetime, and that it would be only upon the donor's death that the donee would becomethe "true owner" of the donated properties. However, there was the stipulation that thedonor bound herself to answer to the donee for the property donated and that she

warranted that nobody would disturb or question the donee's right.

Notwithstanding the provision in the deed that it was only after the donor's death whenthe 'title' to the donated properties would pass to the donee and when the donee wouldbecome the owner thereof, it was held in the Balaqui case that the donation was intervivos.


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It was noted in that case that the donor, in making a warranty, implied that the title hadalready been conveyed to the donee upon the execution of the deed and that the donormerely reserved to herself the "possesion and usufruct" of the donated properties.

In Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, it was provided in the deed of donation,

which was also styled as mortis causa , that the donation was made in consideration ofthe services rendered by the donee to the donor and of the donor's affection for thedonee; that the donor had reserved what was necessary for his maintenance, and thatthe donation "ha de producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante".

It was ruled that the donation was inter vivos because the stipulation that the donationwould take effect only after the donor's death "simply meant that the possession andenjoyment, of the fruits of the properties donated' should take effect only after thedonor's death and not before".

Resolution of the instant case. The donation in the instant case is inter vivos because

it took effect during the lifetime of the donors. It was already effective during the donors'lifetime, or immediately after the execution of the deed, as shown by the granting,habendum and warranty clause of the deed (quoted below).

In that clause it is stated that, in consideration of the affection and esteem of the donorsfor the donees and the valuable services rendered by the donees to the donors, thelatter, by means of the deed of donation, wholeheartedly transfer and unconditionallygive to the donees the lots mentioned and described in the early part of the deed, freefrom any kind of liens and debts:

Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at masuyong

pagtingin na taglay ng NAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) saPinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa tapat atmahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipas na panahonna ginawa ng huli sa una ang nabanggit na nagkakaloob sapamagitan ng kasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) aybuong pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sa nasabingpinagkakalooban ang lupang binabanggit at makikilala saunahan nito, laya sa ano mang sagutin at pagkakautang,katulad nito:

Following the above-ousted granting, habendum and warranty clause is the donors'

declaration that they donate (ipinagkakaloob) Lot No. 2502, the property in litigation, inequal shares to their children Angel Diaz and Andrea Diaz, the western part to Angeland the eastern part to Andrea.

The acceptance clause is another indication that the donation is inter vivos. Donationsmortis causa , being in the form of a will, are never accepted by the donees during thedonors' lifetime. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos.


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In the acceptance clause herein, the donees declare that they accept the donation totheir entire satisfaction and, by means of the deed, they acknowledge and giveimportance to the generosity and solicitude shown by the donors and sincerely thankthem.

In the reddendum or reservation clause of the deed of donation, it is stipulated that thedonees would shoulder the expenses for the illness and the funeral of the donors andthat the donees cannot sell to a third person the donated properties during the donors'lifetime but if the sale is necessary to defray the expenses and support of the donors,then the sale is valid.

The limited right to dispose of the donated lots, which the deed gives to the donees,implies that ownership had passed to them by means of' the donation and that,therefore, the donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. That is acharacteristic of a donation inter vivos.

However, paragraph 3 of the reddendum in or reservation clause provides that "also,while we, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severa Mendoza, are alive, our administration,right, and ownership of the lots mentioned earlier as our properties shall continue but,upon our death, the right and ownership of the donees to each of the propertiesallocated to each of them shall be fully effective." The foregoing is the translation of thelast paragraph of the deed of donation which reads:

(3) Gayun din samantalang kaming mag-asawang Gabino Diaz at SeveraMendoza ay buhay, patuloy and aming pamamahala, karapatan, atpagkamayari sa mga nasabing pagaari na sinasaysay sa unahan nito napagaari namin; ngunit sakaling kami ay bawian ng buhay ng Panginoong

Dios at mamatay na, ang mga karapatan at pagkamayari ng bawa'tpinagkalooban (Donatorios) sa bawa't pagaari nauukol sa bawa't isa aymay lubos na kapangyarihan.

Evidently, the draftsman of the deed did not realize the discordant and ambivalentprovisions thereof. The habendum clause indicates the transfer of the ownership overthe donated properties to the donees upon the execution of the deed. But thereddendum clause seems to imply that the ownership was retained by the donors andwould be transferred to the donees only after their death.

We have reflected on the meaning of the said contradictory clauses. All the provisions

of the deed, like those of a statute and testament, should be construed together in orderto ascertain the intention of the parties. That task would have been rendered easier ifthe record shows the conduct of the donors and the donees after the execution of thedeed of donation.

But the record is silent on that point, except for the allegation of Angel Diaz in hisanswer (already mentioned) that he received his share of the disputed lot long beforethe donors' death and that he had been "openly and adversely occupying" his share "for


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more than twenty years". (Andrea Diaz on page 17 of her brief in L-33849 states thatthe donees took possession of their respective shares as stipulated in the deed ofdonation. Pages 3,4,18 and 19, tsn March, 1971).

Our conclusion is that the aforequoted paragraph 3 of the reddendum or reservation

clause refers to the beneficial ownership (dominium utile) and not to the naked title andthat what the donors reserved to themselves, by means of that clause, was themanagement of the donated lots and the fruits thereof. But, notwithstanding thatreservation, the donation, as shown in the habendum clause, was already effectiveduring their lifetime and was not made in contemplation of their death because the deedtransferred to the donees the naked ownership of the donated properties.

That conclusion is further supported by the fact that in the deed of donation, out of theeight lots owned by the donors, only five were donated. Three lots, Lots Nos. 4168,2522 and 2521 were superflously reserved for the spouses or donors in addition to one-third of Lot No. 2377. If the deed of donation in question was intended to be a mortis

causa disposition, then all the eight lots would have been donated or devised to thethree children and daughter-in-law of the donors.

The trial court's conclusion that the said deed of donation, although void as a donationinter vivos is valid "as an extrajudicial partition among the parents and their children" isnot well-taken. Article 1080 of the Civil Code provides that 46 should a person make apartition ofhis estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected,insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."

We have already observed that the said donation was not a partition of the entire estateof the Diaz spouses since, actually, only five of the eight lots, constituting their estate,

were partitioned. Hence, that partition is not the one contemplated in article 1080.

There is another circumstance which strengthens ' the view that the 1949 deed ofdonation in question took effect during the donors' lifetime. It may he noted that in thatdeed Lot No. 2377 (items 3 and [c]) was divided into three equal parts: one-third wasdonated to Andrea Diaz and one-third to Angel Diaz. The remaining one-third wasreserved and retained by the donors, the spouses Gabino Diaz and Severo Mendoza,for their support. That reserved one-third portion came to be known as Lot No. 2377-A.

In 1964 or after the death of Gabino Diaz, his surviving spouse Severa Mendozaexecuted a donation mortis causa wherein she conveyed to her daughter, Andrea Diaz

(plaintiff-appellant herein), her one-half share in Lot No. 2377-A, which one-half share isknown as Lot No. 2377-A-1, the other half or Lot No. 2377-A-2 having been alreadyconveyed to Angel Diaz.

That disposition of Lot No. 2377-A-2 clearly implies that the conveyance in the 1949deed of donation as to Lot No. 2377 took effect during the lifetime of the donors, GabinoDiaz and Severa Mendoza, and proves that the 1949 donation was inter vivos.


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The instant case has a close similarity to the pre-war cases already cited and to threepost-liberation cases. In the Bonsato case, the deed of donation also containedcontradictory dispositions which rendered the deed susceptible of being construed as adonation inter vivos or as a donation causa.

It was stated in one part of the deed that th

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