CIV PRO | Case Digest| Jan. 11, 2016 20

VALMONTE V CA

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office inManila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondents motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.NO.There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.1.The action herein is in the nature of an action quasiin rem.Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.2.In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside thePhilippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.3.Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.4.Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.

LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and WILSON C. YAO,respondents.G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994

FACTS: Respondent Yao was theowner of a commercial building, aportion of which is leased to herein petitioner. However, during therenewal of the contract of lease, thetwo disagreed on the rental rate, andto resolve the controversy, they submitted their disagreement to arbitration. Two arbitrators (Alamarez and Sabile) has been appointedby the parties while the appointment of the third arbitrator (Tupang) was held in abeyance because LaNaval Drug instructed its arbitrator to defer the same until its Boardof Directors could convene and approved Tupangs appointment. This was theorized by the respondent as dilatory tactics, hence, he prayed that a summary hearing be conducted and direct the 2 arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration in accordancewith Contract of Lease andthe applicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointingand confirming the appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that theBoard of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediately convene and resolve the controversy before it. The respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R. Narciso as the third arbitrator and ordered the parties tosubmit their position papers on the issue as to whether or not respondentYao's claim for damages may be litigated uponin the summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement. Inmoving forreconsideration of the said Order, petitioner arguedthat in Special Case No. 6024,the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act onrespondent Yao's claim for damages, which posesan issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. However,respondent court was not persuaded bypetitioner's submission, hence, it denied the motion for reconsideration. While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic ActNo. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether thelitigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however, considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decidein the summary proceedings private respondent's claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo.

ISSUES:1. WON THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON.1. WON THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER.

HELD: As to the first issue, it was held that jurisdiction over theperson must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded ina motion to dismiss or by way of anaffirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not beconstructed as an estoppel or as awaiver ofsuch defense. With regard to the second issue,it was held that where the courtitself clearly has nojurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation ofthis defense may be doneat any time. It is neither for the courts nor theparties to violate ordisregard that rule, let alone to conferthat jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as herein before exemplified, neither estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune

E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co., Ltd. vs. Benito, [G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999]Post undercase digests,Remedial LawatThursday, March 08, 2012Posted bySchizophrenic MindFacts:Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and withbranchoffices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed aDeed of Salewith Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision forthe constructionof low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantialdevelopmentstherein. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through itsBranchManager at the stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru itsBranchManager Engr. at their new office VillaGonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face ofthe originalcopy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in itsbranchoffice at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.Issue:Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on itsBranchManagerHeld: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearlyspecifiedin Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.Oaminal vs CastilloOaminal vs Castillo:152776:October 8, 2003FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against respondents with the RTC. The summons together with the complaint was served upon the secretary of respondent. Respondents filed their Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective alleging that the Sheriffs Return has failed to comply on substituted service of summons but said motion was not heard due to the Judges absence. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default and to Render Judgment because no answer [was] filed by [the latter]. The respondents filed Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with. The judge denied [respondents] Motion to Dismiss, and admitted [their] Answer. However six months after admitting their answer, the judge ruled that [respondents] Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim was filed outside the period to file answer, hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of [the] order, [failing] which, the case will be dismissed.ISSUE: WON respondents were properly declared in default?HELD: NO. Respondents herein were declared in default by the trial court on May 22, 2001, purportedly because of their delay in filing an answer. Its unexpected volte face came six months after it had ruled to admit their Answer on November 16, 2000.Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Educationheld that no practical purpose was served in declaring the defendants in default when their Answer had already been filed albeit after the 15-day period, but before they were declared as such. Applying that ruling to the present case, we find that respondents were, therefore, imprudently declared in default.

HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED, petitioner, vs.CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 159590 & 159591 October 18, 2004|

FACTS Frederick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to Catalan in the total amount of HK$3.2 million. Catalan presented these checks to HSBC [Bank]. The checks were dishonored for having insufficient funds. Thomson demanded that the checks be made good because he, in fact, had sufficient funds.

Catalan knowing that Thomson had communicated with the Bank, asked HSBCBank to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC did not heed her.

Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account was transferred to HSBC [Trustee]. Catalan then requested Trustee to pay her. They still refused and even asked her to submit back to them the original checks for verification.

Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong on their own expense to personallysubmit the checks. They still were not honored, leading Catalan to file a suit against HSBC to collect her HK$3.2M

ISSUES

Whether or not HSBC Bank and Trustee are liable to pay damages to Catalan on the ground of Abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code

ARGUMENTSPetitioner: HSBC claims that they are a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines thus the courts do not have jurisdiction over them. Moreover, there is no cause of action because it was not alleged in the there was abuse of right.

Respondent: Catalan claims that although HSBC has the right to examine the checks, they did so in bad faith because they required her to submit all sorts ofdocuments and yet even upon showing that the checks were good, the Bankstill refused to release the money to her. There was abuse of right on the part of the Bank.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION, IT NEED NOT BE EXPRESSLY STATED, THE FACTS SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBE THAT THERE WAS AN ABUSEOF RIGHT.

APPLICATION:Article 19 of the Civil Code speaks of the fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance ofhis duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is therebycommitted for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose forwhich it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.

Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements must concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

HSBANK is being sued for unwarranted failure to pay the checks notwithstandingthe repeated assurance of the drawer Thomson as to the authenticity of the check sand frequent directives to pay the value thereof to Catalan. Her allegations in the complaint that the gross inaction of HSBANK on Thomsons instructions, as well as its evident failure to inform Catalan of the reason for its continued inaction and non-payment of the checks, smack of insouciance on its part, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of right for which it may be held liable to Catalan for anydamages she incurred resulting therefore. HSBANKs actions or lack thereof, prevented Catalan from seeking further redress with Thomson for the recovery ofher claim while the latter was alive

DECISION OF THE COURT:The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75757 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited is AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 75756 dismissing the petition for certiorari of the HSBC International Trustee Limited is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 01-11372 against the HSBC International Trustee Limited, and all its orders and issuances with respect to the latter are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further proceedings against the HSBC International Trustee Limited in the case aforestated.

Santos vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation [G.R. No. 170943; September 23, 2008]Post undercase digests,Remedial LawatSunday, March 11, 2012Posted bySchizophrenic MindFacts:PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of thecar loanadvanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of itsboard of directors.Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted theaffidavitof publication and theaffidavitof service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons byregisteredmail to petitioners last known address.Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that theaffidavitof service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.

Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest and cost of suit. Hence, this petition.Issues:(1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons.

(2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Courtappliesonly to actions in rem, not actions in personam.

(3) Whether or not theaffidavitof service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.Held:(1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligentinquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.

(2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been changed, it nowappliesto any action. The present rule expressly states that itappliesin any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligentinquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that the complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action forrecoveryof sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.

(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons byregisteredmail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by anaffidavitshowing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant byregisteredmail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that theaffidavitof complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service byregisteredmail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

NM Rothschild vs. Lepanto Consolidated DigestG.R. No. 175799

NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, Petitioner, v. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,Respondent.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondents motion, the trial court authorized respondents counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner.

The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.

The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court, there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during the trial.

ISSUES:

I. Whether petitioner is a real party in interest

II. Whether or not it was proper for the petitioner to resort to a petition for certiorari with the CA

III. Whether or not the lower courts correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss

HELD:

(1) Respondent points out that as of the date of the filing of the Petition, there is no such corporation that goes by the name NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited. Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists as a corporation under the laws of Australia under the new name Investec Australia Limited. We find the submissions of petitioner on the change of its corporate name satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the ground of not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest.

(2) We have held time and again that an order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The general rule, therefore, is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for Certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, we have likewise held that when the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari may be justified

The resolution of the present Petition therefore entails an inquiry into whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its denial of petitioners Motion to Dismiss. A mere error in judgment on the part of the trial court would undeniably be inadequate for us to reverse the disposition by the Court of Appeals.

(3) As correctly ruled by both the RTC and the CA, the alleged absence of a cause of action, the alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the execution of the challenged contracts, are not grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16[17] of the Rules of Court. Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or existence of respondents alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the trial.

As regards the allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits of the main case. In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article 2018[25] of the Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of the parties was allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the value of the gold at the forward price stated in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery. The determination of whether or not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into whether or not the assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue to be determined. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.

Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner through the DFA, with respondents counsel personally bringing the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia. Moreover, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

SANTOS VS LIWAGFACTS:1. Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo J. Liwag with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 57282, seeking the annulment of certain documents as having been executed by means of misrepresentations, machination, false pretenses, threats, and other fraudulent means, as well as for damages and costs.1. Liwag filed a bill of particulars on certain allegations on the complaint.1. The plaintiff opposed the motion saying that the allegations in his complaint are sufficient and contain ultimate facts con- constituting his causes of action and that the subject of the defendant's motion is evidentiary in nature.1. The trial court granted the motion and directed the plaintiff "to submit a bill of particulars with respect to the paragraphs specified in defendant's motion",1. The plaintiff failed to comply with the order.1. The court, acting upon previous motion of the defendant,5dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of particulars filed by Respondent Liwag.HELD:NOBILL OF PARTICULARS DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT. - The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order.In the instant case, the complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an orderly and expeditious disposition tion in the case.NEED FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS DUE TO VAGUE COMPLAINT; FAILURE OF TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO FILE A BILL OF PARTICULARS RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF COMLAINT. - The present action is one for the annulment of documents which have been allegedly executed by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means. Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats, however, are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof without a statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are not sufficient. The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as a conclusions In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the use of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations, threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or misrepresentations are predicated.

LEE BUN TING V ALIGAENWhere A Filipino Citizen Sells Land To An Alien Who Later Sells The Land To A Filipino, The Invalidity Of The First Transfer Is Corrected By The Subsequent Sale To A Citizen

The Facts: Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot 398 from the Dinglasans in 1936. When Lee died in 1944 without will, he was succeeded by his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who extrajudicially settled the estate among themselves and partitioned Lot 398. When the brothers died, Lot 398 was transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth and Pacita Yu-Lee. In the 1956 case ofDinglasan vs. Lee Bun Ting1, the Court held that the sellers (Dinglasan) cannot invalidate the sale of land (Lot 398) to the buyers who are Chinese citizen on the ground of in pare delicto; in the latter case ofLee Bun Ting vs Judge Aligaen2, the Court again dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata, being a mere relitigation of theDinglasancase.On January 26, 1995, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Complaint for Reversion of Lot 398, praying that the sale of Lot 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void, and for Lot 398 to be reverted to the public domain for State disposal in accordance with law. In their answer, Elizabeth and Pacita invoked the affirmative defense of prescription; Lee a buyer in good faith and for value, and that they were qualified to own by succession Lot 398, being Filipino citizens. The RTC ruled in favour of the OSG and declared the sale of Lot 398 to Lee Liong as null and void. His being a purchaser I good fait and for value did not cure the nullity of the sale, and prescription does not run against the State. The Court of Appeals however reversed the RTC. It ruled that the transfer of the land to Elizabeth and Pacita who are both Filipino citizens may no longer be impugned even though the initial sale was void, considering that the objective of the constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved. The OSG elevated its case to the Supreme Court. It argues that since the acquisition of Lot 398 was null and void, it did not form part of estate of Lee Liong, and thus cannot be transmitted by succession to his heirs and eventually to Elizabeth and Pacita.The Courts ruling:The petition is without merit.Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void, Lot No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liongs estate. Hence, Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liongs surviving heirs and eventually to private respondents.We do not subscribe to petitioners position. The circumstances of this case are similar to the case ofDe Castro v. Teng Queen Tan,3wherein a residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased and the subject land was transferred to a son who was a naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine ofin pari delicto, the Court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a Chinese citizen, his widow and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective spouses, herein private respondents who are Filipino citizens.We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still viable considering that Lot No. 398 has already been transfered to Filipino citizens. In the reconstitution case ofLee v. Republic of the Philippines4involving Lot No. 398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it was already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus:Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine ofpari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein [Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.5(Emphasis supplied)In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40 years from the promulgation of the case ofDinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting,6where the Court held that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If petitioner had commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, then reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be allowed. However, this is not the case here. When petitioner instituted the action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been transferred by succession to private respondents who are Filipino citizens.Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured.7As held inChavez v. Public Estates Authority:8Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that W.Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short,the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.9(Emphasis supplied)Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Decision dated 12 July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.SO ORDERED.

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDOOctober 25, 2012 FACTS:Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law , their respective wives being sisters. Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.ISSUE: WON brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.HELD:Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word No, the requirement is mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that [i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law

G.R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs.LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent

FACTS:Edwin Tribiana & Lourdes Tribiana are husband and wife. Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter Khriza Mae 1 year and 4 months old it turned out that it being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana.

Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that it failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss that there were prior efforts at a compromise but failed. Lourdes attached the Certification to file Action from their barangay.

RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother to bring Khriza Mae before the RTC. Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari. The CA denied Edwins petition and also the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, should have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent under art. 151 of Family code.

HELD:The petition is lack of merit, for the habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the article 151 of Family Code, can not be allowed such to dismiss such with the compliance of art.151 because they are both different in nature. The petition for habeas corpus is a valid ground or contention of the respondent because she was deprived of personal liberty. The art. 151 cannot be applied with this present case, if ever it were supposed to be applied, Lourdes validly answer it with its compliance when she attached the court to file action from their Barangay.

DANFOSS, INC. V. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 143788, 9/9/05

TOPIC: UNDER CAUSE OF ACTION, IN CONTRAST WITH THE BLOSSOM CASE, THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE PRINCIPLE OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH CANNOT BE APPLIED

DANFOSS, INC. V. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 143788, 9/9/05

NATURE OF THE CASE:The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC that the CCCs (herein respondent) complaint for damages against Danfoss. So, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal of the said ruling of the CA and the CAs denial for Danfoss motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) is an agent of Danfoss, Inc.s products here in the Philippines. On September 1997, CCC ordered two unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter from MINCI to be used in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant in Bulacan. In the terms of conditions of the original purchase order, the two unit Frequency Converter shall be delivered by Danfosswithin 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of credit. The letter of credit opened by CCC in favour of Danfoss on September 9, 1997.On September 17, 1997, MINCI informed CCC that its order are already ready for shipment and MINCI requested to amend the letter of credit changing the port of origin/loading from Singapore to Denmark (Singapore is the Asian Regional Office of Danfoss, the Head Office of the company is Denmark). CCC complied and the port of origin in the letter of credit was changed.On November 6, 1997, MINCI relayed to CCC that Danfoss Inc. was still checking the status of their order. CCC replied that every delay in the delivery of the order will cause loss to their company, so CCC requested for early work out and immediate shipment to avoid further loss.But, on November 9, 1997, Danfoss Inc. informed MINCI through fax, that the reason for the delivery problems was that some of the supplied components for the new VLT 5000 series (this may be a part of the converter which is the subject thing in this case or a machine to create the converter) did not meet the agreed quality standard. So, Danfoss was canvassing for another supplier for the said VLT 5000 series. In the fax, there was no clear message as to when normal production will resume.Upon receiving the relayed information, CCC surmised that Danfoss would not be able to deliver their order. There was also no definite commitment of the delivery from Danfoss and MINCI, so CCC informed MINCI that they intend to cancel its order. The order was cancelled on November 13, 1997.Hence the complaint for damages filed by CCC with the RTC of Quezon City against Danfoss and MINCI on November 5, 1998. In reply, Danfoss filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

CCC:Due to the impending delay in the delivery of its order, it suffered more than P8 million and was compelled to look for another supplier.

Danfoss:The case should be dismissed on the ground that it did not state a cause of action.1)The letter of credit was opened on September 9, 1997, so, since the agreed delivery period is 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the letter of credit, the due date is until November 19, 1997.2)Although Danfoss was having a problem with its supplier priorto CCCs cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised that Danfoss could not deliver within the due date agreed upon.3)Neither Danfoss nor CCC agreed to change the date of delivery. Only the port of origin was changed in the letter of credit. Danfoss has until November 19, 1997 to deliver the order, CCC cancelled the order on November 13, 1997.4)CCC never made an extrajudicial demand for the delivery of its order on its due date as it cancelled the order before the due date.5)Damages sought for by CCC could not have accrued yet since the order was cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed.

RTC:Judgment in favor of CCC. According to the RTC:...the issue of whether or not the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the equipment in question within the period stipulated is a debatable question which necessitates actual trial on the merits where the parties have to adduce evidence in support of their respective stance.While the defendants contend that the stipulated period of delivery had not lapsed yet when the plaintiff cancelled its order of the two equipments in question as the cancellation took place seven (7) days before the expiry date of the defendants obligation to deliver, the plaintiffs position is that the acts of the defendants had made compliance with their obligation to deliver within the period stipulated, impossible, hence, there was no need for a demand as the law provides that when demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.The plaintiffs contention if properly and strongly supported by evidence during the hearing of the merits of the case may well negates (sic) the defendants contrary stand.

CA:Affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Danfoss.

ISSUE:WON there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by CCC against Danfoss and WON the principle of anticipatory breach can be applied in the case.

HELD:No, there was no cause of action in the complaint for damages filed by CCC.

In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint.And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

The RTC erred in ruling that the issue of whether or not the defendants incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment within the period stipulated was a debatable question. How could Danfoss be liable for damages when Danfoss had not yet breached his obligation to deliver the order of CCC, aside from the fact that the obligation was already negated when CCC cancelled the order before the prestation became due and demandable? Thus, there was no breach and there was no damage caused by Danfoss.The principle of anticipatory breach cannot be applied here because the obligation was single and indivisible to deliver two units of frequency converter by November 19, 1997. There was no showing that Danfoss refused to deliver, and on the contrary, Danfoss made an effort to make good in its obligation by looking for other suppliers who could provide the parts needed to make the timely delivery of the order. Thus, the case was prematurely filed.CCCs fear that Danfoss might not be able to deliver its order on time was not the cause of action referred to by the Rules and jurisprudence.PETITION GRANTED. THE CAS DECISIONS ARE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.G.R. No. 185922 : JANUARY 15, 2014HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., represented by their co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS-VILLAFUERTE,Petitioners, v.JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents, SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS,Respondents.

FACTS:Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano), he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis (Larcelita), with whom he has four children.Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation.The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the petitioners nullification case. The CAmotu proprioproprio orderedthe dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court.ISSUE:Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made?HELD:The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.REMEDIAL LAW : motu proprio dismissalTheappellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courtsdecision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, Art.151.No suit between members of the samefamilyshall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.The appellate court correlatedthis provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:Section 1.Grounds.-Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motionto dismiss the complaint. It must bedistinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals withdismissal of the claim by the courtmotu proprio.Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure.Section 1, Rule9 provides foronly fourinstances when the courtmaymotuproprio dismissthe claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia;(c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramascited inP.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corporationwhere we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motuproprioon any of theenumerated grounds. The tenor of the second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propiodismissal can proceed only from the exemption from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.Afailure to allege earnest butfailed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of action.In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full course. The complaint ofpetitioners wasanswered by respondentswithout a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in favorof the petitionerswas appealed by respondentson the basis of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to petitioners complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have anyauthority or basis to motu propioorder the dismissal of petitioners complaint.The correctness of the finding was not touched by the Court of Appeals. The respondents opted to rely only on what the appellate court considered, erroneously though, was a procedural infirmity. The trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide us with any argument to have it reversed.The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

Petition for review is GRANTED.