Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of Geography

Smart City Policies in China:

National and Local Goals

Paper submitted as part of the seminar City and Society (40650)

Submitted to: Dr. Gillad Rosen

By: Sagi Ganot 301372546

Jerusalem, September 4, 2016

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 4 2. Background ..................................................................................................... 6 2.1. What is a smart city? ................................................................................................................ 6 2.2. Approaches to smart city governance ...................................................................................... 7 2.3. A short history of urban development and policy in the PRC .................................................. 9 2.4. China's political and administrative structure ........................................................................ 10

3. Research question and methodology ............................................................. 11 4. National smart city policies in China ............................................................. 14 4.1. Announcement of NSCPP ..................................................................................................... 14 4.2. National New-Type Urbanization Plan ................................................................................. 17 4.3. Urban Planning, Development and Administration Guidelines ............................................. 18 4.4. 13th Five-Year Plan ............................................................................................................... 19 4.5. Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 19

5. Local smart city policies in China ................................................................. 21 5.1. Shenzhen ............................................................................................................................... 21 5.2. Tianjin ................................................................................................................................... 23 5.3. Urumqi .................................................................................................................................. 24 5.4. Nanping ................................................................................................................................. 25 5.5. Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 25

6. Discussion ..................................................................................................... 27

7. Conclusions ................................................................................................... 29

Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 31 Abbreviations

CPC Communist Party of China

ESDPO Economic and Social Development Planning Outline for the Period of the 13 th Five-Year Plan

FYP Five-year plan

ICT Information and communications technology

MOHURD Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development

NSCPP National Smart Cities Pilot Program

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1. Introduction

Over the last two decades, the world has undergone a technological revolution, with the

internet, smartphones and other technologies providing high-speed connectivity and

instantaneous access to data and opportunities on a global scale. While this has

immensely empowered individuals, this revolution is also changing the nature of cities.

Nowadays, every city wants to be "smart". For some, this means ubiquitous broadband

access and WiFi hotspots. Others strive to make their infrastructure and administrative

systems more integrated and organized and to use the vast amounts of data being

generated to make more informed decisions and more efficient operations. Still others

believe that "smartness" lies not just in technological advancement, but in the

development of human capital, avant-garde knowledge-based industries or the

improvement of urban governance by integrating more stakeholders into the process.

This paper examines the way in which the concept of smart cities has been introduced

into urban development policy in China since 2012. The world's most-populated country

and second-largest economy has seen the level of urbanization rise threefold in three and

a half decades of social and economic reforms. While economic growth and prosperity

have formed the backbone of the Communist regime's legitimacy throughout this

period, they are now augmented by concern for such post-material values as

sustainability and cultural vibrancy. Within this framework, the national government

has encouraged hundreds of cities to initiate pilot smart city projects and has integrated

the concept into key policy documents on urban development.

Exploring this subject is interesting for several reasons. First, looking at how the idea of

smart cities is interpreted and implemented in China can give us insights into how

Western trends and concepts in urban development are realized in non-Western

contexts. Additionally, it can help assess the very relevance of applying concepts

grounded in the Western world in such environments. Third, from a political science

perspective, this is a case study in the application of national policy in local contexts in

a period of economic transition. Finally, exploring cases from different regions can help

us understand to what extent do economic and political geographies affect "smartness".

The first part of this paper introduces the theoretical, historical and political contexts for

the question at hand. First, various definitions of the smart city are given, with the caveat

that a consensus definition is far from being reached. Second, I present several theories

on smart city governance, with an emphasis on the level of centralization and

particularly on the desired objectives of such projects. It is here that I discuss the critical

distinction between outcome-oriented and process-oriented goals. Third, I give out a

short history of urban development and policy in China. Lastly, I provide a short

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presentation of the Chinese government's political and administrative structure, with an

emphasis on the relationship between the national and local governments.

I then turn to the questions, hypotheses and methodology underlying the research. The

main purpose of this paper is to identify the stated goals of smart city policies in China,

stand on the similarities and differences between national and local policy and observe

whether each level pays more attention to outcome-oriented goals, such as economic

prosperity and more efficient administration, or process-oriented goals, such as more

inclusion and responsiveness in the decision-making process. This examination is done

through textual analysis of policy documents issued over the last four years.

The bulk of this paper is devoted to examination of these documents. National policy is

reviewed through four key documents issued by the central government, whether solely

dedicated to smart cities or considering it in the general context of urban development.

It is shown that the national approach is primarily top-down and emphasizes the use of

advanced technology to deliver better outcomes for the operations of municipal

governments, and thus is primarily outcome-oriented.

To study local policies, four case studies are being used, chosen to reflect geographical

and institutional diversity: technology and manufacturing powerhouse Shenzhen,

important port and megacity Tianjin, relatively minor Nanping, and Urumqi, capital of

the minority frontier region of Xinjiang. Each of these has produced in early 2016 a

policy document detailing its development goals for the next five years, as part of

China's 13th Five-Year Plan implementation process. Full of buzzwords and Communist

jargon, these documents are nevertheless powerful statements on the part of local policy-

makers.

In contrast with my original hypothesis, these documents show that local policy does not

significantly stray from the top-down, outcome-oriented line of the national approach,

probably hoping to draw on central government resources allocated to smart city-related

projects. What de Jong termed "gradualism and selectiveness" in policy implementation

is mostly related to differences in resources, level of development and priorities between

the cities. The supposedly politically neutral nature of technology makes this issue less

sensitive with regard to varying social and cultural contexts.

The paper concludes by offering a few remarks on the place of the smart cities

phenomenon in China's overall development trajectory and the need to consider non-

Western perspectives in researching this topic. It also offers additional angles for future

research and suggests that policies in place today will have a great impact on China's

political, economic and social future as it continues to develop and urbanize.

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2. Background

2.1. What is a smart city?

Definitions of what constitutes a smart city have become increasingly complex and

fragmented over the last few years (Tranos and Gertner 2012), and the concept has

become easily confused with terms such as "intelligent", "information" and "livable"

cities, and also mixed with notions of sustainability and eco-friendliness (de Jong et al.

2015). Albino, Berardi & Dangelico (2015) suggest that during the 1990s, the concept was

used mostly to describe the application of advanced information and communications

technology (ICT) in support of urban infrastructure. In recent years, however, the notion

of smart cities has come to more broadly represent the impact advanced technology has

on urban administration, governance, economics and everyday life.

Nam and Pardo (2011) identify three possible dimensions for a city's "smartness":

technology itself, presented as the use of ICT to utilize infrastructure and deliver

municipal services more efficiently; human capital, where creative, highly-educated

workers join together to promote innovation and a knowledge-based economy; and

community, meaning the promotion of governance networks involving a multitude of

actors and institutions in promoting the common interests of the city. Chourabi et al.

(2012) use eight "critical factors" in describing the smart city: management and

organization, technology, governance, policy context, people and communities,

economy, built infrastructure, and natural environment.

When defining smart cities, Harrison et al. (2010) focus on their capability to use data

collected regarding various aspects of city life in order to deliver municipal services

more effectively. In their view, a smart city needs to be instrumented, or capable of

collecting streams of data from a variety of sensors; interconnected, with the collected

data being fed into an integrated computing system that is shared by the various

municipal functions; and intelligent, with operational decisions based on advanced

modeling and analysis based on said data. Thus, they focus only on the first of Nam and

Pardo's three dimensions. Taking the opposite approach, Prado Lara et al. (2016) argue

in favor of a human-centric attitude, claiming that the main function of any city,

including smart cities, should be to "promote the happiness and wellbeing of their

residents."

Dameri (2013) makes the claim that smart cities are built from the bottom-up, resulting

from "the application of technology to urban problems" by private and academic

organizations working towards their own private goal, and not in service of broader,

city-level targets. She stresses the importance not only of technological prowess but also

of the creation of public value in the assessment of smart city projects.

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Lazaroiu & Roscia (2012) use the definition utilized by the European Commission in

developing projects and partnerships around the issue of smart cities, which tie the

concept directly to sustainable development. For them, technology is not an end but a

means to achieve optimization of resource and infrastructure use in fields such as

energy, water, public safety and waste management. They propose a quantitative model

for the assessment of smart cities, containing indicators ranging from empirical

measures such as CO2 emissions to much vaguer concepts such as "innovative spirits"

or "transparent governance". With this in mind, they note that there is a great deal of

subjectivity and arbitrariness in selecting and categorizing indicators.

2.2. Approaches to smart city governance

Meijer and Bolivar (2015) review the current literature on smart city governance, taken

from a wide range of academic fields, and present three dimensions by which smart city

projects and the way they affect the urban system can be measured. The first is akin to

Nam and Pardo's analysis, offering three possible definitions of the smart city. One

focuses on "smart technology", or the application of advanced technology to improve

infrastructure and services. Another is "smart people", measuring "smartness" via levels

of educational attainment. The third, "smart collaboration", revolves around the

different stakeholders involved in municipal decision-making and the interactions

between them.

The second dimension is the extent to which the smart city project transforms the way

municipal governments themselves work. Meijer and Bolivar offer four possible

conceptualizations of smart city governance, ranging by the extent to which they

transform the normal workings of urban administration. They claim that in effect, the

use of advanced technology itself has a limited impact if not accompanied by parallel

changes to decision-making processes, organizational structure and community

engagement.

The third dimension explored by Meijer and Bolivar, and the focus of this work, revolves

around the assumption that the desired goals of smart city projects and policies are

designed in order to enhance the legitimacy of urban governance. Broadly, these goals

can be divided into two types. One involves the content or desired outcomes of the

project. These outcomes can be both material, in the sense of generating wealth and

economic prosperity, and post-material, reflecting values such as health and

sustainability. The other type of goals aims at improving the process of urban

governance itself, making it more responsive, inclusive and democratic. The focus of

process-oriented smart city projects is to promote the involvement and power of

different stakeholders in the urban system, particularly citizens.

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In their review of smart city rankings, Giffinger & Gudrun (2010) divide the

characteristics of smart cities into six domains: smart economy, smart people, smart

governance, smart mobility, smart environment and smart living. By using the approach

elaborated by Meijer and Bolivar, these six domains can be divided into outcome-

oriented and process-oriented, and the outcome-oriented domains again into material

and post-material. Smart economy undoubtedly belongs to the material outcome-

oriented category, with its emphasis on productivity, entrepreneurship, economic

innovation and labor mobility. Smart governance is roughly equivalent to the idea of

process-oriented smart city project, emphasizing participation and transparency, though

it is also related to more efficient service delivery. The other four domains reflect mostly

post-material outcomes, such as sustainability, diversity and accessibility, though they

also contain elements of material benefits such as enhanced connectivity and

improvement of housing quality.

Dameri (2013), building on her model of the smart city as being constructed from the

bottom up, nevertheless stresses the importance of smart city governance, which is

defined as the ability to coordinate disparate projects and enable them to work towards

common goals through bringing stakeholders together and creating a policy and

regulatory framework. Yigitcanlar, O'Connor & Westerman (2008) reflect on

Melbourne's success as a "knowledge city", following the proposed model of

knowledge-based urban development. They allude to the state and local governments'

efforts to increase citizen participation in government through online platforms, invest

in infrastructure and amenities to attract quality human capital and transform its

economic base from manufacturing to knowledge-based industries.

A report by the GSM Association (GSMA 2013:20-26) claims that the way cities govern

smart city projects is shaped by two factors, the level of centralization of the

management of municipal assets and the city's access to significant public and/or private

funds. Lee, Hancock & Hu (2014) focus on the interaction between actors from the public

and private sectors, stressing values such as openness, innovation, proactiveness and

integration. Angelidou (2014) suggest that most researchers favor smart city strategies

that are initiated at the local rather than the national level, due to cities' advantage in

generating innovation, their ability to experiment and compare to peers and their

responsiveness. However, it is easier for the national level to pool resources and

guarantee "operational continuity".

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2.3. A short history of urban development and policy in the PRC

The development of national urban policies in the People's Republic of China since its

founding in 1949 are closely tied to the prevailing political, ideological and economic

conditions during each period. During the first few years following the country's

establishment, the Communist regime followed Soviet-style policies, placing an

emphasis on the development of heavy industry. This meant de-prioritizing investment

in urban housing and services, while concurrently placing tight controls on rural-to-

urban migration through the hukou household registration system.

From the late 1950s to the late 1970s, China underwent a series of crises that stymied the

regular course of urban development. During the so-called Great Leap Forward (1958-

1960), misguided attempts at mass mobilization to achieve supercharged industrial

growth led to uncontrolled rural-to-urban migration. This put enormous pressure on

urban economies and contributed to the wholesale failure of the program. The political

upheaval during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) caused millions of youths to be sent

from the cities to rural areas, bringing the economic and cultural life, and subsequently

urban development, to a standstill (Ma 2002).

In 1978, following Mao Zedong's death and the ensuing power struggle, Deng Xiaoping,

the new paramount leader of China, launched the Reform and Opening Up era, which

meant a sea change in Chinese economic policies. Through a cautious process of trial

and error, beginning with the designation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and later

expanding across the country, the Chinese government gradually introduced elements

of a market economy that would have been an anathema to Mao and hardline socialists

in the years before. Despite the need to maintain political control, cautious reformist

policies have continued under Deng's successors and have resulted in an average annual

GDP growth of around 10% (Taylor 2015:2).

Reform-era growth has also resulted in mass urbanization. Between 1978 and 2013, the

level of urbanization nearly tripled from 18% to 54% (Taylor 2015:2). Kamal-Chaoui,

Leman & Zhang (2009) identify four distinct policy eras under reforms. Until the late

1980s, due to the cities' limited capacity to absorb migrants, urbanization was tightly

controlled and investment focused on the rural sector. During the 1990s, deregulation

and an increase in foreign investment created significant growth in coastal regions that

drew in large amounts of migrants despite government efforts. In the early 2000s, the

government finally began enacting administrative and land reforms that encouraged

urbanization and industrialization at the town level. Finally, beginning in the mid-2000s,

the importance of large cities and metropolitan regions was realized, and their

development was encouraged alongside efforts to mitigate the adverse effects of rapid

urbanization, such as inequality and environmental degradation.

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2.4. China's political and administrative structure

The People's Republic of China is a unitary state with an authoritarian regime under the

control of the Communist Party of China (CPC). At every level of government, there

exists a dual power structure, with party organization largely responsible for political

affairs, and state organs charged with the execution of policies and day-to-day

administration. The party and state apparatuses are led by the CPC Central Committee

and the State Council, China's cabinet, respectively. The sub-national administrative

structure is quite complex. China is divided into 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4

province-level cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and two Special

Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau). The rural areas are further subdivided

into counties and townships, while cities and towns exist in various administrative

levels. To confuse matters further, cities often include not only the built-up area but large

areas of urban hinterland (Chan 2010).

Alongside the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, there are numerous other

governmental organizations that have taken up the issue of smart cities. The National

Reform and Development Commission (NRDC) is the leading government agency in

charge of economic and spatial planning. The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural

Development (MOHURD), Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of

Industry and Information Technology have all taken up regulatory issues and pilot

projects in this field, and the China Academy of Engineering has designed a "Strategy

of Intelligent City Construction and Advancement in China" (Whyte 2013).

Though many consider China to be a highly centralized state, the vast size, highly

diverse political, social and cultural environments and increased role for the media and

civil society in the era of reform mean that policies prescribed by higher levels of

government are rarely executed verbatim by lower levels. Rather, policy

implementation by local governments is now characterized by "gradualism and

eclecticism". Reforms are enacted selectively and creatively in accordance with the

unique needs and attitudes of the administrative unit in question and through a process

of negotiation between those dictating the policy and those carrying it out (de Jong 2013).

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3. Research question and methodology

The main purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions: What are the main

desired goals of government-led smart city projects and policies in China? Are these

goals primarily geared towards achieving better outcomes for municipal operations,

both in terms of material and post-material values, towards more informed and inclusive

processes of governance and administration, or both? Are there differences between

national and sub-national government in this regard? If so, what are the origins of these

differences?

My basic assumption in analyzing the goals of national smart city policies in China is

that they are designed to serve the overarching purpose of promoting the Communist

regime's political legitimacy. Since 1978, this legitimacy has been built around the

Chinese government's ability to provide economic well-being to its citizens and to

march China down a path of modernization and growing national power and pride. In

recent years, though, the single-minded focus on economic growth has been adjusted to

include other aspects related to quality of life, such as sustainability, and governance,

such as fighting corruption. All this has been done alongside the strict maintenance of

political hegemony by the CPC, though some controlled public discourse is allowed on

the media and internet (Panda 2015; Zhu 2011).

With that in mind, national smart city policies are expected to serve the outcome-

oriented goals of enhanced material wealth, both at the individual and local level,

alongside post-material values, alongside promoting more informed and effective

municipal decision-making and administration. Thus the emphasis is likely to be on

infrastructure, databases and back-office platforms. Formal engagement with

stakeholders and encouragement of citizen participation in decision-making are much

less likely to make the cut.

On the other hand, with localized self-expression more tolerated by the Communist

regime, municipal governments might be freer to experiment with e-government and

citizen engagements. In particular, the middle- and upper-class of wealthy, globalized

cities are likely to demand a voice in the way local governments work. They might also

place a higher premium on post-material values, which might be reflected in the

priorities considered by decision-makers in local smart city projects.

The basic approach for this research will be to conduct qualitative textual analysis

comparing policy documents from the national and local levels, seeking to identify the

goals and desired outcomes of smart city policies and projects and to understand to what

extent do local governments exercise the implicit selectiveness, flexibility and creativity

in policy design as described above. The field of smart cities is quite young, especially

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in China, where the first targeted policy on the national level, the National Smart City

Pilot Program (NSCPP), was launched in 2012 (Li, Lin & Geertman 2015:291-2). This,

alongside challenges in obtaining empirical data, means that it is difficult at this point to

evaluate the actual implementation of smart city projects, hence the choice to focus on

stated policies. The documents were obtained through Chinese-language internet

searches for "smart city" or "smart city pilot" in addition to related keywords such as

"13-5" and "new-type urbanization" as well as the names of relevant cities or

governmental organizations. All translations and summaries are my own.

The local level will be analyzed through four case studies. In early 2016, dozens of

Chinese cities published documents titled "[City Name] Economic and Social

Development Planning Outline for the Period of the 13th Five-Year Plan". These

documents, averaging around a hundred pages in length, detailing each city's

development strategy for the next five years, in line with the prescriptions of the FYP

and other national and local policy considerations. I chose to analyze these documents,

rather than programs submitted under the NSCPP, because I feel they better reflect how

the issue of smart cities ties into each city's overall development efforts, rather than its

presentations under the strict confines of the NSCPP guidelines. Each of these

documents will be referred to as ESDPO.

In selecting cases from the dozens of cities and other administrative units in China

engaging in so-called smart city projects, several criteria were used. The first was

geographical diversity, whereas I wanted to choose cases from different regions of

China, with an emphasis on the difference between the heavily industrialized coastal

areas and the relatively backwards interior regions in the west of the country. The second

was diversity with regard to the type of administrative unit in question. It is worth noting

that unlike in Western countries, the administrative boundaries of Chinese cities usually

include not just the built-up area, but also large swaths of rural hinterland. For example,

the built-up area of Nanping, one of the case studies for this research, covers only about

10% of what is considered to be Nanping City.

The third criterion was to select cases that exhibit a different degree of development with

regard to smart city projects. In this case, I used the categorization contained within the

2015 Report on the Assessment of Smart City Development Level, which ranks 151 cities

according to different measures of progress on their smart city projects (CASS

Informatization Research Center & Govmade Smart Cities Research Center 2015). I

intentionally avoided Beijing and Shanghai, which are considered by many to be global

cities and thus perhaps less indicative of the "Chinese" nature of smart city development.

There are several downsides to the proposed methodology. First, as was briefly

mentioned above, the analysis of stated policies rather than their actual implementation

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can create a bias towards similarity between the national and local levels. Local

governments can formally adhere to the official line in writing while informally carrying

out the policies differently. Secondly, without an authoritative repository of

governmental documents, especially at the local level, it is very hard to make an

exhaustive search for relevant documents. Thirdly, the need to work with Chinese-

language materials creates challenges in translation and analysis. Nevertheless, I believe

that the approach taken in this paper is sufficient to give a general idea on what the

Chinese smart city is about at this early stage of its development.

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4. National smart city policies in China

In this section, I will analyze relevant sections from four documents pertaining to

national policies on smart cities in China that have been issued since 2012 in a

chronological order. The first is a document issued by MOHURD as Annex II to its

announcement of the NSCPP in November 2012 and will be referred to in this work as

the Pilot Index System. The second is the National New-Type Urbanization Plan, a

major policy document on urban policy released in 2014. The third document contains

guidelines on urban policy issued by the State Council in February 2016. Lastly, I will

review material contained in China's 13th Five-Year Plan, published in March 2016.

4.1. Announcement of NSCPP

On November 22, 2012, MOHURD published a short statement titled the "MOHURD

General Office's Announcement Regarding Work on Launching the National Smart City

Pilot Program", which was the first directive authorizing local governments to submit

proposals for participation in the program, with a deadline of December 31, 2012

(MOHURD 2012). The statement contained two annexes. Annex I, titled "Interim

Measures for the NSCPP", briefly outlined the methodology and standards required of

each proposal. More interestingly for this research, Annex II, titled "Index System for

the NSCPP", took the form of a nested table containing a three-level hierarchy of issues

for the pilot program to consider. The first level contained four issues, subdivided into

11 second-level and 57 third-level issues, and with each of the latter followed by a short

explanation.

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Index System for the NSCPP1

First-level subjects Second-level subjects Third-level subjects

Secure systems and infrastructure

Secure Systems

Implementation of the Smart City Development Plan Outline Organization Policies and regulations Funding for planning and maintenance Operational management

Internet infrastructure

Wireless networks Broadband networks

Next-generation broadcast networks

Public platforms and databases

Municipal public infrastructure database

Municipal public information platform

Information security

Smart development and amenities

Urban development administration

Urban and rural planning

Digitization of municipal administration

Administration of the construction market

Housing administration

Greening the landscape

Preserving historical and cultural heritage

Energy efficient buildings

Green building

Enhancement of municipal amenities

Water supply systems

Drainage systems

Water-saving measures

Gas supply systems

Waste separation and disposal systems

Heating systems

Lighting systems

Integrated administration of underground infrastructure

1 The explanations for each third-level subjects are not included.

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First-level subjects Second-level subjects Third-level subjects

Smart administration and services

Government services

Support for decision-making

Publication of information

Online government services

Integration of government service systems

Basic public services

Basic public education

Employment services

Social security

Social services

Health

Culture and sports

Services for disabled citizens

Basic housing security

Specific subjects

Smart transportation

Smart energy

Smart environmental protection

Smart land use management

Smart contingency management

Smart security

Smart logistics

Smart community

Smart households

Smart payment

Smart finance

Smart business and economics

Industrial planning Industrial planning

Innovation

Industrial upgrading Industrial agglomeration

Transformation of traditional industries

Development of new industries

High-tech industry

Modern service industry

Other types of new industrial activities

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As can be seen from the choice of subjects, the emphasis for the pilot program is

overwhelmingly on streamlining and increasing the efficiency of urban systems,

especially with regard to the municipal government and public services, in addition to

urban economic development. Even when there is a measure of engagement with the

public that is not technical or administrative in nature, it does not create avenues for

public participation. For example, when explaining the subject of "publication of

information", the document emphasizes a one-way dissemination of information to the

public on topics such as construction and welfare projects. Even discussion of a "smart

community" mentions sensors and security rather than focusing on community

development.

4.2. National New-Type Urbanization Plan

The National New-Type Urbanization Plan (NNTUP) was published by the Central

Committee of the CPC and the State Council in March 2014, and constitutes the first

official national policy document on urbanization in China (CPC Central Committee &

PRC State Council 2014). Following on over 35 years of mass urbanization since the

launch of the Reform and Opening Up process, the document outlines policies that are

meant to support the gradual shift of the Chinese economy from an export-led to a

consumption-led model, to encourage more balanced urban development between the

different regions and to maintain social stability. Anticipating an urbanization rate of

about 60% in 2020, it aims to improve public services and infrastructure while

maintaining sustainability (Taylor 2015:2-3; Bai, Shi & Liu 2014).

Chapter 18 of the National New-Type Urbanization Plan deals with "promoting new-

type urban development". The subject of smart cities is grouped here with "speeding up

green urbanization" and "emphasizing urban cultural development", which are

elaborated in Articles 1 and 3 respectively. It can be surmised that "new-type" is used

here to mean urban development that also has post-material goals in mind, in addition to

the strong focus on economic growth that has characterized reform-era Chinese

development policies.

Article 2, carrying the title "Advancing Smart City Development", lists several

principles that are elaborated in Table 8. This table divides the "guidelines on smart city

development" into six fields: "broadbandization" of information networks,

"informatization" of planning and administration, "smartization" of infrastructure,

increasing the efficiency of public services, modernizing industrial development and

fine-tuning social services such as environmental governance and public safety.

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4.3. Urban Planning, Development and Administration Guidelines

In February 2016, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued a guideline

document for urban planning, development and administration (CPC Central Committee

& PRC State Council 2016). This document, based on the outcomes of the 2015 Central

Urbanization Work Conference and other policy work by the CPC and state leading

organs, has the overall objective of "realizing orderly urban development and the

creation of modern cities that are developed appropriately, operate efficiently, offer

ardent growth, harmonious livability and rich vitality, in order to improve the lives of

the people." It is a short document, containing 30 articles in nine sections discussing

issues such as urban planning, administration and organization, public services,

sustainability, energy efficiency and cultural development.

The guidelines refer to smart cities in Article 28, appearing under Section 8, "Innovating

Municipal Governance Methods", alongside proposed improvements to the regulatory

and administrative framework of city administration and the promotion of desired social

and cultural values. It is useful to quote Article 28 in full:

"28. Promote smart urban administration. Strengthen the development of smartized

municipal administration and service systems, integrate modern information

technology such as Big Data, Internet of Things, cloud computing etc. into

municipal administration and services, and raise the level of municipal governance

and services. Strengthen the development and successful integration of digitized

municipal administration platforms [in fields such as] infrastructure operational

administration, transportation administration, environmental administration,

contingency management etc. and construct integrated databases for municipal

administration. Promote the development of broadband IT infrastructure and

strengthen internet safety and security. Ardently develop the smart delivery of civil

services. By 2020, create a tier of characteristic smart cities. Relentlessly raise the

level of efficiency in municipal operations through the development of smart cities

and other methods of urban planning, development and administration."

The English-language release accompanying the document simply referred to

"developing smart cities through various Internet technologies, such as big data and

cloud computing, aiming to upgrade urban management and services" (Xinhua 2016a).

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4.4. 13th Five-Year Plan

Five-year plans (FYP), comprehensive policy documents on economic and social

development, are a tenet of many planned economies, such as India and the former

Soviet Union. In March 2016, China introduced its 13th FYP for the years 2016-2020. The

new FYP, nicknamed "13-5" (十三五) in China, contains goals such as lifting tens of

millions out of poverty, doubling the GDP from 2010 to 2020, reaching the

aforementioned goal of an urbanization rate of 60% and making significant reductions

in both carbon intensity and energy intensity (Ng, Mabey & Gaventa 2016).

The 13th FYP Main Points document (Xinhua 2016b) makes only a passing reference to

smart cities. Section 30 of the document is titled "Constructing Harmonious and Livable

Cities", and deals among other issues with infrastructure improvements, slum

redevelopment and raising the efficiency of municipal operations. Article 1 of this

section, titled "Speeding Up New-Type Urban Development", discusses sustainability,

innovation, social and cultural development and inclusiveness and New Urbanism-style

planning and development in the spirit of the Guidelines on Urban Planning,

Development and Administration. The relevant sentence reads: "strengthening the

construction of modern information infrastructure, promoting the development of Big

Data and Internet of Things, constructing smart cities."

4.5. Analysis

It appears that the primary goal of national smart city policy in China is the delivery of

better outcomes by urban systems, especially with regard to the activities of the public

sector, through the integration of advanced technology and better use of information.

Infrastructure is to be "digitized" and "informatized", with information from an array of

advanced sensors flowing into integrated management systems. Though not mentioned

in name, bureaucracy based on compartmentalized departments and paper forms is to be

replaced by integrated databases allowing both for better intra-governmental

cooperation and enhanced engagement with citizens.

Looking at Nam and Pardo's typology, it can be observed that the Chinese government's

view of a smart city is largely about technology, and not about human capital or

community development. "Smart" is often used tautologically, and it is left to the reader

to understand intuitively that this has something to do with technology and information.

In the Guidelines on Urban Planning, Development and Administration in particular,

"smart" is joined by other technological buzzwords such as Big Data and Internet of

Things without explanation with regard to their meaning and usefulness. Apparently,

Albino, Berardi & Dangelico's (2015:4) observation that Western discussion on smart

cities in the 1990s had a narrow focus on "the significance of new ICT with regard to

20

modern infrastructures within cities" can be also applied to the Communist regime's

thinking two decades later.

This vision of smart cities is also exclusively top-down, in sharp contrast to the vision

proposed by Dameri. This makes some sense, with the documents being primarily

directed at government agencies and local authorities. Still, the private sector is barely

mentioned, except with regard to economic development, and China's vibrant social

media scene appears to be ignored entirely. The benign reference to "information

security" belies the fact that the national government's view of smart cities is still

anchored in the overall policy of maintaining political control, even as the quality of life

keeps improving for the Chinese people.

21

5. Local smart city policies in China

5.1. Shenzhen

In 1980, right at the beginning of the reform era, the national government decided to turn

a sleepy town in southern China's Guangdong Province, not far from Hong Kong, into

the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ), where it could safely experiment with market

economics without destabilizing the whole country. Less than 30 years later, Shenzhen

was a sprawling, dynamic metropolis with over 8 million residents, the majority of

whom are migrants who were drawn to the jobs created by the city's strong

manufacturing base. Shenzhen, administratively placed directly under the Guangdong

provincial government, is now a global manufacturing hub and an important component

of the Pearl River Delta megalopolis (Wang, Wang & Wu 2009). The 2015 smart city

rankings put Shenzen in sixth place, with high scores on smart services and smart

economy but very low on smart administration when compared to other major cities.

Shenzhen's ESDPO (Shenzhen City People's Government 2016), published in April 2016,

is 115 pages long. This document, prepared with the primary FYP and the directives of

the city's Party committee in mind, is rife with CPC jargon such as "raising the banner

of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" or "constructing a moderately prosperous

society". But it also goes into great detail in more practical matters such as promoting

the city's globalized character, maintaining Shenzhen's position as an important

economic center at the national level, strengthening the municipal organizational

infrastructure and streamlining the city's regulatory framework.

Section 6 of the document, which is about eight pages long, is titled "Constructing a

Leading Smart City through Information Economy", and is based on the government's

"Made in China 2025" and "Internet+" initiatives. The first part of the section revolves

around the need to make Shenzhen a "world-class information gateway". First, the city

aims to achieve near-ubiquitous high-speed internet connectivity and to deploy 4G and

5G cellular networks. Second, it seeks to create integrated, cloud-based information

systems and data infrastructure and advanced sensors in order to support municipal

operations and decision-making. Lastly, Shenzhen wants to establish a "safe and

controlled" cyberspace that works to strengthen online security and privacy and prevent

fraud and other illegal activities.

The second part of Section 6 refers to the further development of Shenzhen's

comparative advantage in knowledge-based industries. Progress is desired in both

hardware fields such as integrated circuits and LCD panels and software fields such as

databases, networking technology and cloud-based solutions, with specific attention to

groundbreaking technologies such as 3D printing. These advances are to be supported

22

by research and development efforts in fields such as carbon nanotubes, quantum

computing and artificial intelligence. Special emphasis should be made on the collection,

storage, analysis and use of data. In this regard, a reference is made to making public

data more accessible.

The third part of the section discusses the need to develop Shenzhen as a global hub for

internet economy under the Chinese government's "Internet+" paradigm. The city

aspires to maintain its position as a research, development and manufacturing

powerhouse in fields such as intelligent sensors and wearable devices with regard to

hardware, and e-commerce, financial technology (fintech) and "smart" logistics with

regard to software. Shenzhen should also develop solutions related to the sharing

economy. In addition, the industrial sector should be supported by an ecosystem

integrating educational institutions and government organizations.

Finally, the fourth part deals with the need to "smartize" public services. This primarily

involves creating integrated information systems and databases among various

departments, streamlining e-government solutions and public engagement with the

government through online platforms and social media and improved governance of the

cyberspace. Administration in fields such as energy, water, waste management and

environmental protection should also be "smartized" with regard to monitoring and

operations. Healthcare and other social services should work on the basis of digitized

records, unified databases and information systems and easy access by citizens to

information and services.

The section concludes with Box 8, titled "Important Benefits of Information to the

People", listing five domains in which smart city initiatives can directly contribute to

public welfare. "Smart transportation" is about integrated, data-supported traffic

management and transport-related decision-making and development of advanced

control and networking solutions for individual vehicles. "Smart environmental

protection" is mostly about environmental monitoring, advanced waste management

solutions and increased energy efficiency. "Smart health" involves everything from

family planning, through public health and up to pharmaceuticals. "Smart education"

refers both to the development of integrated administration solutions for educational

systems and the advancement of online teaching and the sharing of educational

resources. Finally, the idea of "smart communities" seeks to promote the creating of

information sharing platforms among regular citizens in fields such as entertainment and

shopping.

23

5.2. Tianjin

Tianjin, one of China's four provincial-level cities, is a megacity of over 15 million

people and an important port and export hub for northeastern China. It lies on the Yellow

Sea, bordering Beijing to the northwest, and is considered to be part of the massive Bohai

Rim megalopolis, home to over 240 million people and 25% of China's GDP (Gong, Xiao

& Lu 2013; Liu et al. 2009). The 2015 smart city rankings have Tianjin in the 26th place,

with the other provincial-level cities, Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing, ranked 2nd, 3rd

and 48th respectively, though the latter is much less developed in general. Tianjin scores

high on smart economy but comparably very low on smart administration and smart

services.

Tianjin's ESDPO (Tianjin City People's Government 2016) is rather short, at about 60

pages, and was released in late February 2016. The city's development goals for the

period of the 13th FYP are listed as efficient and sustainable economic development, the

promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation, environmental protection, cultural and

social vibrancy, security and harmony. The document's different sections deal with each

of these issues, alongside reforms to municipal administration and the legal and

regulatory framework.

The main reference to smart cities in the Tianjin ESDPO is make under Section 4,

"Constructing and Administrating a High-Quality Modern City". It appears alongside

issues such as the designation of development priorities for specific areas such as the

city center and the waterfront, the development of a new international shipping hub,

modernizing transportation networks, optimizing resource use and fine-tuning

municipal administration processes.

Section 4, Article 5 is titled "Accelerating the Construction of the Smart City". It reads:

"Accelerate the construction of a high-speed, mobile, secure, next-generation

information infrastructure, increase the coverage of fiber optic networks, ensure

ubiquitous phone, television and internet access, make Tianjin a model city with

regard to broadband access. Accelerate the development of municipal Internet

of Things, increase the use of technologies such as cloud computing and Big

Data, implement smart urban administration. Create a National Pilot City in

information services, implement services such as smart social insurance, smart

health and smart education. Develop online government, create an integrated e-

government platform, realize the sharing of government information resources.

Strengthen internet information security and increase security and control of

government information. By 2020, complete initial construction of a smart

24

Tianjin that is intelligent, secure and serves the public well, and attain an internet

penetration level of 85%."

An additional reference to "smart pharmaceuticals", meaning the development of an

internet-based platform to regulate drug sales, is mentioned in the section that deals with

food and drug safety. New urban districts should be "smart and ecological", and

consumer services should be "safe, smart and convenient". Once again "smart" is code

for "made more efficient through the use of technology."

5.3. Urumqi

Urumqi, a city of about 3.5 million residents, is the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur

Autonomous Region in northwestern China, the economic and cultural heart of the

region and a highly dense, multi-polar metropolis. (Mu & de Jong 2016). In addition to

its key role in the development of one of China's most important frontier areas, it has

also been a focus of attention by the Chinese leadership and security apparatus since the

eruption of violent confrontations between native Uyghurs and Han Chinese migrants

in 2009. The city ranks 109th in the 2015 smart city rankings, third-lowest among the

provincial capitals, with a dismal score in smart services but better results on smart

manpower and smart infrastructure.

The Urumqi ESDPO (Urumqi City People's Government 2016) comes in at slightly under

100 pages. The stated main goals for the period 2016-2020 appear quite similar to those

in the national FYP. Those include the maintenance of a medium-high growth rate,

creation of a modern and globalized city with an elevated quality of life, progress in

environmental quality, improvement of the "urban civilization", strengthening of the

national unity and religious harmony and maintenance of overall social stability. The

last two naturally hint to the ethnic tensions plaguing Urumqi and Xinjiang, and the

similarity to the national program indicates that the city may have had less independence

in drawing up its version of the ESDPO. Under the stated goals, creating a smart city is

tied to efforts to reorganize the spatial structure of the city and change the character of

specific quarters.

The subject of smart cities features prominently in Section 4 on creating a modern and

globalized city, and more specifically under Article 4 of that section on "promoting the

modernization of municipal administration and services." Constructing a smart city is

presented as a "key element" in the modernization and globalization process due to its

contribution to making municipal administration more efficient. The city's

"internetization", "digitization" and "smartization" levels are to be raised. Specific

measures include the integration of databases and systems related to public services,

creation of pilot "smart homes" and "smart buildings", engagement with the public

25

using smart identification cards and e-billing and the like. All this is aimed at making

the urban system run more efficiently and be administered more professionally.

5.4. Nanping

Nanping is a district of about 3 million residents, covering about 20% of the coastal

Fujian Province in southeastern China, though the district itself lies inland. Its main

urban area, Yaping, has about 500,000 residents. For a relatively small city, Nanping

ranks a respectable 43th on the 2015 smart city rankings, scoring high on smart

administration and services.

Nanping's February 2016 ESDPO (Nanping City People's Government 2016) is about 115

pages long, similar to Shenzhen's. It has no dedicated section on smart cities. The section

that deals with general development goals only mentions smart cities in passing,

alongside the concepts of "green city" and "sponge city". The latter is a uniquely

Chinese buzzword, referring to the idea of flood prevention through the use of materials

that can absorb water instead of standard concrete at ground level. This is listed

following several other infrastructure projects.

Further mentions of "smartness" are made in connection with the tourism industry.

While implementing the tourism component of the "Internet+" vision, the city aspires

to "construct a smart tourism information database", create an integrated tourism service

platform and a "smart" tourist map and to "smartize" a one-stop tourist information

platform. A "smart health platform" is also to be created under "Internet+". In short, the

Nanping document tends to equate "smart" with "digital".

5.5. Analysis

The vision of a smart city that appears in the four case studies is still very much outcome-

oriented and top-down. Once again, there is virtually no mention of engagement with

the private or nonprofit sector. There is a strong emphasis on making municipal

administration and public services more streamlined, integrated and efficient. And while

the tone is somewhat less "buzzwordy", "smart" is still frequently used as a catchphrase

for "technologically advanced", with the underlying assumption that more technology

means more efficiency and better outcomes.

That is not to say that the programs are carbon copies of the national policy, however.

Each city chooses to stress the contribution of advanced technology to specific subjects

on its agenda. Thus, industrial powerhouse Shenzhen goes into great detail in listing

specific industries, technologies and infrastructure projects that will help it maintain its

position. Nanping places a focus on tourism, perhaps since its position away from the

seaboard makes it less competitive as a manufacturing and shipping base. Tianjin favors

26

a more balanced approach with a focus on infrastructure and service delivery, while

Urumqi suggests projects such as smart homes or smart IDs that engage more directly

with the populace.

Of course, the attention given to smart cities and the level of detail vary greatly

according to size, location and level of economic development. Shenzhen, as the most

economically advanced and highest-ranked in terms of smart city development of the

four, devotes no less than eight pages to detailing its vision of a smart city. Backwater

provincial capital Urumqi and relatively minor Nanping appear to mostly be paying lip

service to the notion of "smartness". Tianjin, though, does rather poorly in ranking and

does not put a lot of emphasis on smart cities in its policies for a city of such size and

importance, though its ESDPO is admittedly more concise.

27

6. Discussion

As previously mentioned, Meijer and Bolivar claim that the "smartness" of a city can be

examined by looking at its use of technology, efforts to develop its human capital and

its ability to involve different stakeholders in a meaningful way. It appears that current

Chinese thinking on smart cities is narrowly focused on the first of those at the expense

of the two others, in line with the technocratic character of the political and

administrative system. Policymakers do seem keen on transforming municipal

governance, but appear to have a belief that merely employing more advanced and

integrated systems will on its own contribute to delivering better outcomes.

The focus on outcomes is apparent in both national and local smart city policies in China.

The city is to be modernized, globalized and "smartized". New technologies and

industries are to be encouraged alongside notions of innovation and entrepreneurship to

deliver stronger economic growth and better livelihood. Municipal decision-making and

administration is to become more streamlined and based on real-time data flowing into

integrated systems. Everything from tourist maps to pharmaceutical records is to be

digitized and centrally organized. Infrastructure is to be upgraded and the whole system

made more sustainable. All of this reflects the promotion of prosperity from both the

material and post-material points of view.

It appears that the Chinese leadership disagree with Meijer and Bolivar (2015:11) when

they claim that the process-oriented perspective is "hardly political in nature" since the

involvement of multiple stakeholders generates better outcomes a priori. When

Schaffers et al. (2011) speak of "sustainable partnerships and cooperation strategies

among the main stakeholders" as the building blocks of innovation-oriented smart city

projects, they assume the existence of a strong, independent civil society and private

sector that can find common interests among themselves and with the public sector. But

every engagement between stakeholders is inherently political. And in China, the place

for political activity is within the CPC apparatus, with a limited space for discussion and

criticism on the media and internet. In other words, process-oriented legitimacy for

smart city project presupposes an open and democratic model of urban governance,

which does not exist in our case.

What of the so-called "institutional bricolage" theory proposed by de Jong (2013)? Local

attitudes towards smart cities can be compared to his description of the "eco-city" trend.

In the latter case, it appears that marketing proposed developments as "green" helps

primarily in drawing on national resources to help fund these projects and to increase

the attractiveness of the city. In de Jong's words, "[t]he best possible outcomes for these

local governments is for the Chinese national government (…) to approve of their

projects and place them on special national lists." Thus, cities have a strong incentive to

28

keep their projects in line with national policy in order to secure the funding and prestige

that accompany the latest trend in urban development that is recognized by Beijing.

Moreover, the purpose of gradualism and selectiveness in policy transfer from higher to

lower levels of governments is usually tied to the need to adapt the policies to the specific

political and social context of the administrative unit. Thus, the one-child policy was

never strictly enforced, or sometimes even applied, to rural regions, or Muslim areas

where it might generate opposition. But since technology is perceived to be politically

neutral, placing the focus on this dimension rather than on human capital and

communities is less risky territory for local officials, and lessens the need for

compromise and "bricolage" that constitute a deviation from the national policy line.

Still, as mentioned above, local policies do not fully imitate those prescribed by Beijing.

Each city has its own resources and priorities. Probably due to its political circumstances,

Urumqi is the least independent, and the mention of smart identification cards might

relate to security concerns just as much as to the delivery of better public services. The

emphasis on "smartness" as a pathway to "modernization and globalization" might also

hint at wanting to better integrate the city, located over 2,400 kilometers from Beijing,

into the Chinese economy. Shenzhen works to enhance even more its supercharged

economy. Tianjin wants to raise the quality of infrastructure and public services to match

its size and importance, and Nanping to promote its relative advantage. There is a

measure of "selectiveness" here, if not for the reasons elaborated by de Jong.

29

7. Conclusions

Buzzword or not, the idea of smart cities is taking China by storm. In 2013, MOHURD

listed 90 cities and other administrative units as participants in the NSCPP. By early 2016,

this number was approaching 400 (NMCDR 2016). In this paper, I tried to take stock of

the current policy climate on smart cities at a national level and compare it to the way

some cities are working towards their own vision of a smart city. It appears that much

like any other major policy initiative in reform-era China, the idea of the smart Chinese

city is subservient to the overall objective of delivering prosperity based on material and

post-material values within the framework of continued CPC political hegemony.

That aside, it appears that the current "trendiness" of smart cities in China, alongside

sustainability, is driving cities to closely align their policies with that of the national

government not just for political reasons, but also in order to draw resources for their

development needs. In 2013, investments in Chinese smart cities reached nearly 500

billion RMB, or roughly US$75 billion (Li, Lin & Geertman 2015:291-6). Thus cities

enjoy benefits both in terms of reputation and financial prosperity when labeling projects

and policies as "smart".

The smart cities phenomenon should also be viewed in the context of China's ongoing

transition from an export-led model to one focused on domestic consumption (Tyers

2015). On the one hand, the term "globalized" is thrown around quite a lot in the policy

documents examined in this paper, and Shenzhen is still set on becoming the world's

leading Internet of Things manufacturing hub (Harris 2016). On the other hand, the

international context, both in terms of cooperation and competition, is barely mentioned.

It can be surmised that China is aspiring to create a closed smart cities ecosystem, from

research and development through manufacturing to implementation and consumption,

akin to its domestic internet market, while still maintaining the potential for exports.

The research of smart cities is still in its infancy, and there is much room for debate and

definitions. One lesson from this research is that examination of urban development

trends can never be disengaged from the prevailing political and economic context.

Much of the underlying assumptions of the current discourse in the West about smart

cities assume that we are speaking of a liberal democracy. We do not necessarily have

to accept the supposed superiority of this model to authoritarian capitalism or other

forms of politico-economic systems. Nevertheless, it can be said that proposed

frameworks for analysis of smart cities and other trends in urban development have to

take into account the existence of what Eisenstadt termed "multiple modernities"

(Schmidt 2006).

There is much more to study on the subject of smart cities in China. First, there is a rich

academic debate on the subject, that undoubtedly informs much of the policy

30

discussions, and it should be compared to the official discourse. Second, as was seen,

the Chinese government is already investing in empirical measurements of the outcomes

of smart city projects. These should be compared to policy goals, and factors that

contribute to the success of such initiatives. Third, with hundreds of pilot projects

underway, there are many more case studies to learn from. The existence of empirical,

quantitative rankings lends itself to a quantitative analysis of the geography of

"smartness" in China. Lastly, it is interesting to compare the Chinese situation to the

state of affairs in other Asian countries.

Thirty years ago, China was still an overwhelmingly rural country, reeling from the

effects of Maoist economic and social experimentation. Today, it is the world's second-

largest economy, with an abundance of megacities and a rapidly growing middle class.

As China continues to transform and to urbanize, decisions made in Beijing and

elsewhere regarding the patterns of its urban development will be crucial to the way most

Chinese are going to live their lives. The future of "Smart Cities with Chinese

Characteristics" could mean better infrastructure, more efficient public services and

stronger economies. It could also mean tighter surveillance and stronger political control.

As always, it will be the clash between policy and reality that governs the future.

31

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