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Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What is Wrongwith Communitarianism?Author(s): Veit BaderSource: Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 211-246Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191876 .
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CITIZENSHIP
NDEXCLUSION
Radical
Democracy,
Community,
nd
Justice.
Or,
What Is
Wrong
with
Communitarianism?
VEITBADER
Universityof
Amsterdam
1. PARADOXES
F
SO
VEREIGN7Y
ND
CITIZENSHIP
Ours s
a time ullof
paradoxes.
he
development
f
the
modem tatewas
characterized
y
a
specific
monopolization
nd
unificationf
powers.
How-
ever,
his
development,
ramatizeds it was n the
uridico-political
yth
of
absolute,
nitary,
nd
ndivisible tate
sovereignty,'
eems o
be
over.I
see
four
main
paradoxes
f state
overeignty
n an
epoch
marked
imultaneously
andcontradictorilyy a processof erosionandstrengtheningf nation-
states :
1)
in a worldof fast and
horough
conomic, cological,political,
and nformational
lobalization,
e are
confronted ith
ethnic
evivals,
new
ribalism,
ethnic
leansings,
he
mplosion
f
states,
nd he
ike.
(2)
The
myth
and
practices
f indivisible
overeignty
f
nation-states
ontradict
the
developments
f internal
elegation devolution
f state
overeignty
o
states,
provinces, egions,
communities)
nd external
delegation
recon-
struction f state
overeignty )
o
suprastate
evels
and nternational
rgani-
zations hataresimultaneouslyoingon. (3) Themythandpractices f
unitaryovereignty,
ocused
n
the
nation-statend
claiming
monopolyn
legislation,
urisdiction,urrency,
axation,
nd
egal
enforcement,ontra-
dicts hesimultaneous
isentanglement
nd
delegation
f
those
powers e.g.,
European
urrency,uropean
ourts). 4)
The
myth
and
practices
f unlim-
ited,
absolute
overeignty
f the
nation-state
ontradictshe
growing actual,
moral,2
nd
egal
external
imitationshat
omplement
he
well-knownnter-
nal
limitations
liberal-democratic
onstitutions). imitations
y interna-
tionalaw, nternationalovenants,ndcourts, owever recariousheymay
be,
are
ncreasingly
ollowed
by proclamations
ndpoliciesof
intervention
AUTHOR'S
NOTE:
For
corrections of the
English text,
I
would like to thank T
Dekker,
P
Pekelharing,
and
T
Strong.
POLITICAL
THEORY,
Vol.
23 No.
2, May
1995 211-246
?
1995
Sage Publications,
nc.
211
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212
POLITICALHEORY/
May
1995
in cases
n which
hemost
lementary
uman
ights
re
eriously
nd
blatantly
violated:
nternational
rotection
f civil
rights
ersus tate
sovereignty
and heoldprinciplef noninterventionnthe internal ffairse.g.,Helsinki
conference
n
peace
and
ecurity, ambodja,
raq/Kurdistan,
x-Jugoslavia);
democratic politicalights
ersusnonintervention
e.g.,
Haiti).
As I see them,
hemost mportantaradoxes
f citizenship oincide
with
these
developments
ndcanbesummarized
s follows:
1)
within
tates,
he
tendency
owarduniversalistnclusions
relatively
advancedlegal
and
politicalequality
among itizens).However,
his
equality
f inclusion
has
alwaysbeen,
and
still
s, intrinsically
nterwoven ith
systematic
xclusion
(legalandpoliticalnequality
etween
itizens
and
noncitizens
foreigners,
metics,
denizens, tc.).3 2)
Noncitizens
nddenizens
ncreasinglyetrights
that,
raditionally,
ave beenreserved
o
citizens,and,by this, citizenship
does
lose much
of
its
traditional
egal, political,
and
social
importance.
Moreover,
t is
exactly
his
development
hatadds
additional
momentum
o
the
tendency
f
exclusion.
3)
Citizenship
s
developing
n two
ways
nto a
multiple
ndmultilayeredoncept: olitical
itizenship
s
complemented
y
economic,ndustrial,ndsocialcitizenshipmany pheres f citizenship),
and
politicalcitizenship
s
gaining mportance
n
different,ncreasingly
suprastate
evels
of
political
ntegrationmany
evels of
political
citizen-
ship).4
However,
he
deaand
practice
f democraticelf-determinationnd
democraticitizenship
s still
predominantly
inkedand limited
o
state
membership
nd nationhood.
4)
As a
consequence
f
migration
nd
processes
of
European
nification
multicultural
ocieties and
European
citizenship),
ne
finds
a strong ultural nd
politicalpressure ven in so-
callednation-statesoward disentanglementf ethnicity, ulture, ndna-
tionhoodrom
itizenship.
et
at
thesame ime, n a reactivemove,onefinds
the
traditional
uperposition
nd
amalgamation
f
ethnic, racial,
ultural,
and
national
dentity
nd
citizenship
ecoming venstronger.
In
practical
olicies,
hose
paradoxes equire
flexibleresponse.Theo-
retically,
hey
ask
for
quick
and
horoughgoing
ethinking.t is
urgent,rom
botha
descriptive
nd
an
explanatory
erspective,
swellasfrom normative
one,
o
conceptualize
overeignty
s a
bundle
f
powers hat an
be divided,
limited,delegated.Citizenship as to be thoughtof as a multipleand
multilayered
oncept.'
Predominant
egal and
political heory
as well as
political hilosophy
eem
o
have
much
rouble
venstartingucha process.
They
are-as
always-in the
rearguard:ot onlyreactionarynd
neo)con-
servative
heory
butalso most iberal, ommunitarian,
nd neo)republican
theories f
democracy.6
By way
of
illustration,
shallconsiderhe
exemplary ifficulties
Michael
Walzer
has,
as
a radical
ocial democrat,n tackling hese
paradoxes f
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Bader
CITIZENSHIP
ND
EXCLUSION 213
citizenship.
Walzer
s,
for
two
reasons,
one of the more
nteresting
authors n
this
regard:
his
pluralistdemocracy
s
opposed
to
strongparticularism
nd
to
allconservativeversionsof communitarianismnddoesaccept reiteratively
universalist
claims of
justice and
morality;
he breaksthe
eardeafening
silence
or
nearlycomplete
neglectof
problems
of
membership
nd
exclusion
inpredominant
iberal heories
ofjustice
(e.g.,
Rawls,Dworkin).
(Indeed,
he
was one of the first
in recent
politicalphilosophy
o
highlight
this
perplexing
problem.)
Nevertheless,
for
ethical-political
easons,
he
opts,
with
regard
o
the
first
paradox,
for
policies
of
fairly
closed borders.With
regard
to
the
second paradox,
Walzer
attacks,
for
democratic
reasons,
all
versions of
second
class
citizenship
or extended
periods.
He therefore s in
favor of
strong
irst
admission
election.With
regard
o the third
paradox,
Walzer
hinks
that
admission ndexclusionareat thecoreof communal
ndependence.
They
suggest
the
deepest
meaning
of
self-determination
1983, 62).
He states
that
to
give up
the state
is to
give
up any
effective
self-determination
(p.
44). The hardcore of his
ethical-political
rguments
gainstopen
borders
shows
that
Walzer,
with
regard
o the
fourth
paradox,clings
to the
superpo-
sition of ethnic,cultural,andnational dentitiesandcitizenship: i) closureis
thought
o be
necessary
and
egitimate
o defendthe
shared
meanings,
values,
and
ways
of life of
specific
(ethnic,
cultural,religious,
linguistic,
historical)
political
communitiesor
states; (ii)
closure
is
necessary
and
legitimate for
the
reproduction
nd
development
of
collective
political
identity
and attach-
ment;(iii)
closure
is
necessary
and
egitimate
or the
development
of
socially
or
culturally
embedded,
rich
personalities.
In this
essay
I
first
summarize ecent
discussions n
moraltheoryon
free
movement andshow thattherearestrongmoralreasons n favor of policies
of
fairlyopen
borders.
Next,
I
present
a short
sociological
critiqueof the
four
principal
arguments
y
which
Walzer riesto show
that
he
(nation-)state
is
the
adequateunit
of
political
ntegration nd
democratic
elf-determination.
Finally,
I
will
try
to
develop
a
multilayered onceptof
citizenship hat
allows
one,
at
least
in
principle,to combine
the moral
requirements f universalist
justice
with
the
requirements f
(differentversionsof)
radical
democracyand
particularorms
of life.
2. CITIZENSHIP
ND
EXCLUSION:MORAL,
PRUDENTIAL, EALIST
AND
ETHICALARGUMENTS
In
international
elationsof
exploitation,oppression,
and
discrimination,
citizenshiphas
always
been and still is the
single most
important
riterionof
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214 POLITICALHEORY/
May
1995
inclusion
and exclusion
see
Brubaker
992).
Notwithstanding
he
strong
universalist
anguage
f human
ights
and he
nternationalisthetoric
n
the
liberal tradition( freemovementof capital ),the socialist tradition
( proletarian
nternationalism ),
nd the
anarchist
radition,
hose ex-
clusionaryconsequences
avebeen
widely gnored
n thedominant
heories
of
justice.7
Most recent
moral
theory
has as its common ore
some versionof a
universalist
galitarianism
see Kymlicka
990,5;
Goodin
1992, 7).
The
exclusionary
ffects
of
citizenship
re
ncompatible
ith this
egalitarian
plateau.
he
egalitarian
rinciple
f
equal
iberties
ervesas a criterion f
radical
ritique
of all
ascriptive rivileges.
Citizenship
aws
combine,
n
different
ways,
criteria f birthor descent
jus
sanguinis)
nd
erritory
jus
soli).
These
ascriptive
riteria re
morally
no more
defensible hanall the
other,
ike
kinship,
ex, age, region,
residence,anguage,
habits,culture,
lifestyles,
ender,eligion,
ationhood,
ocial
lass,
membership
n
churches,
parties,
nd o on.
Citizenship
n
Westerniberal
emocraciess the
modern
equivalent
f feudal
rivilege-an
nheritedtatus hat
reatly
nhances
ne's
life chances.Likefeudalbirthrightrivileges,estrictiveitizenships hard
to
justify
when
one thinksabout t
closely Carens
1987,252;
see
also
Carens
1992;
Dummet
1992, 171;
Brubaker
992, 31f;
Walzer
1983, 55,
1992,96f;SchuckandSmith
1985,
2).
Theuniversalism
f the moral
point
of
view,
even n its
thoughtful
nd weak
ersions,
which
favor,8
oes
not
allow
moral
privilege
o the
members f
particular
ommunities.
Following rguments
rom
ustice,
ather
han
rgumentsor ree
mobility
as a human
ight,9
think
necan
plausibly
how hat he
existing
nequalities
withinandbetween tatescannotbemorallydefended.Carens,Weithman,
and
Poggi
have reconstructed
awls's
1971)
argument
o
show
thatone
should
understandhe
originalpositionglobally:he
difference
rinciple,
then,requires
ar-reaching
nternational
edistributionf
resources ndre-
wards.Wereone to
introduce
ouchers or the
choice of
citizenshipn a
particular
tate nto
Dworkin'sdeaof an
ambition-sensitivend
ndowment-
insensitive
uction o as to
obtain,
nitially, fair
distributionf resources,
one
could,
most
probably, et
similar
esults.10 he
constructionf such
models s intendedoshowwhatajustdistributionn an deal,globalworld
would look
like.
They
wouldmostlikely
demonstraten
enormous ap
between hose
deal
distributionsnd the
existing
nternationalelations f
exploitation,
ppression,
nd
exclusion.A
just distribution
f resources
within tates
would
mplyredistributionf
control
ver
resources adically
incompatible ith
theusual
accommodation ith
capitalist
market cono-
mies. The
international
onsequenceswould
be, obviously,even more
radical.
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Bader
CITIZENSHIPND
EXCLUSION 215
Moral
constructions
f ideal worlds
are ntended o show what
ustice
requires;hey
do not
ellus
directly
what o do in nonidealworlds.
My
sketch
of anargumentoesnot ssue nanydirect ndunconditionalpresumption
for
ree
migration Carens
992,25).
It
shows,rather,i)
directly,
s the
irst
and
preferredption,
he
urgent equirement
f radical
nternational
edistri-
bution f
resources
the
orms
f
which cannot ven
ouch
on
here).'1
t
also
shows
ii) indirectly,
s a secondbest
option,
hemoral
equirement
f
fairly
openborders, pen
o the
degree
o
compensate
or
policies
of
international
redistribution,
renot
ntended,
mplemented,
rdo
not
have
any
successand
significant
mpact.12 ustice,
not
charity
r mutual
id,
asksfor
fairlyopen
borders.
Moral
arguments
re not the
only practical
rguments.
he
worldof
practical eason
and
udgment
s
a
complex
one. Moral
arguments
aveto
compete
with
prudential
rguments,
ith
realist
rguments,
ndwithethical-
political
ones.13
As we
are
confrontedwith
many
serious
heoretical nd
practical
ensions
between
hem,
t
is
useful o
distinguish
hese
arguments
analytically.
n all
those
hard
ases,
one needsnot
only prudence
ut
some
kindof priorityules.
Prudentialrgumentsanbe in favorof
open
bordersn all
conditions
n
which
open
borders re
n
the
well-informed,ong-termational
nterest f
the
particular
tate
n
question.
ut
prudential
rguments
re
always ondi-
tional.
n the
present lobal
ituation,
think
t is
unproblematic
o state
hat
arguments
bout nterestare
mainly
used
by defenders
f
fairly closed
borders:ollectivewelfare
hauvinism.
The
status
of
political
ealism s a
distinct
ormative
heory s question-
able,andrealismdoesnot, n itself,haveany ntrinsic irection.However,
realist
rguments
t eastremind s of two
points: i) ought
mplies an nd
(ii)moral rgumentshould
ake
nto
accounthemostprobablend xpected
consequences
f
just
action:
thicsof
responsibilityersus
justice e done,
though
heheavens
all.
From
umerous
olitical
nd
heoreticaltatements,
we know
herealist
rgumentsgainst penborders lltoo
well:overwhelm-
ing
numbers f
migrants
nd
refugees
flood ); ublicorderproblems;
unemployment
ndethnic
egmentationf labor
markets;
tressor break-
downof thesocial ecurity ystems; erious verload fpublic ocial ervices
(education, ousing,health,
ransportation,tc.); serious
politicaleffects
(welfare
backlash,
enophobia, acism,and immigrant
undamentalism);
cultural
Uberfremdungalienation).
n
thisarticle
cannot iscuss he real-
ity of thesewell-known
cenariosor
disaster. orthe sake
of argument,
accept
hat
hey
arenot
ust
black
prophecy laying
on
fear
andprejudice.
AndI
take t for
granted
hat
heopening f
borderss notan
adequate olicy
against nternational
nequalities.
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216 POLITICAL
HEORY/
May
1995
Realistarguments,
f
applied gainst penborders,
ead
to two
conclu-
sions: i)
it is
apparent
hat adical
nternational
edistributions thefirstand
most mportantptionn thestruggle gainsttructuraloverty nd nequal-
ity.14
o
hedegree
hat
his
policy
doesnot
ucceed,
neof themost
mportant
causes
of forced
migration
annotbe removedand the
legitimacy
f
all
possible
other
normative
rguments
n favor of closed borderswill
be
severelyundermined
s a
consequence.
ii)
If one defends he
opening
of
borders s
asecond
best
stop-gap,
nehas to tackle he
apparent
ensions
between
moral
equirements
f
justice
andrealist
equirements
f
prudence.
Defensible olicies
of
open
bordershould ake
consequences
nto
account.
Neither
Carens
nor
Goodin,
herefore, pt
for
an
immediate
nd
complete
opening
f
all
borders;
haveused
he
phrase fairly pen
borders.
ut
f
it
comes
o
practicalmmigration,
efugee,
ndnaturalization
olicies,
doesnot
thatmean hat
he
seemingly uge
differencesetween
ositions
n
normative
philosophy
ecome
rrelevant? oesnot
fairly pen ctually
mean
xactly
the same
as
fairly
losed?
do notthink o. Firstof
all,
these
positions
influence
he
way
in which
consequences
re
conceived,discussed,
and
takenntoaccount ;econd, he directionf thosepoliciesdiffers onsid-
erably:
rom
a moral
point
of
view,
one
asks,
ooks
ntensely or,and ries
out
more,
much
more
Carens).
Realist
argumentsin
their
traditional
mixture
with
prudential
nd
ethical-politicalrguments)urrently
ean
ess,
much ess
immigration,sylum,
ndnaturalization.
Prudentialndrealist
arguments
or
closedborders
re
usuallymixedup
with different ersions
of
ethical-politicalrgumentssee the Walzerian
versionof communitarianism
n
section
1).
One can
speculate hat,
n an
imagineddealworld, herequirementsf morality ndSittlichkeit ould
complement
achother
harmoniously.
n
our
world,
and
particularly
n
the
case
of borders nd
citizenship,
heir ensions re
sharp
ndvisible.
Walzer,
in his characteristic
larity, learly
mentionshese ensions'5
see 1983,280.
On
the
other
hand,
he
recognizes,
with
a
disarming penness, he limitsof
hiscommunitarian
pproach:
Ican'tmove
beyond.Todo thatwould equire
a different
heory
which
would akeas its
subject
ot he
commonife of the
citizen
p. 30).
If
communitarianism,
or
all its versions, retendso be an
identifiableositionnpracticalhilosophy,hen t mustmean hat n allhard
cases
he
particularistequirementsf
community ust rumpheuniversal-
ist ones of
justice.
This
priority
ule
clearly
contradicts
he strongmoral
intuitions
hat are elaborated
n
modem
universalistmoraltheoriesand
internationalndconstitutionalaw:universalist
rinciplesndrights hould
not
only trump rudentialisttility
but
alsothe ethicsof particularommu-
nities.
Otherwise,morality
wouldbe no
more
hana thin
deological
mask
of
ethicalor utilitarian elfare hauvinism.
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Bader
CITIZENSHIP
ND
EXCLUSION 217
3.
SOCIOLOGICAL
RITIQUE
OFA
COMMUNITARIANEFENSEOF CLOSED
BORDERS
Walzer
represents
one of the most liberal
and
pluralist
versions
of
com-
munitarianism.'6
herefore,
he
cannot
be criticizedfor the usual
theoretical
andhistorical
myths
thatcharacterizehe conservativeor
protective
versions:
the basic
concept
of
community
emains
vague;
he historical
oleof
violence
and
community
construction
or
building
s
ignored
n
pictures
of an
organic
development
of
communities;
nternal
homogeneity
of
communities s
pos-
tulatedand
cross-cutting
communal
allegiances
and
collective
identities are
forgotten;
n a kind of
retrospective
nostalgia,
communities
are
thought
o
be
harmonious
(traditional)
Gemeinschaften
and
confronted with
conflict-
ridden
and
(modem)strategic
Gesellschaften;
ultural
ommunities
are
con-
structedwithout
anyanalysis
of
structural
ntagonism
nd
conflict,
particularly
class
antagonism
and
conflict; 7
he idea of
shared
meaning,
of
shared
cognitive
andnormative
ramesand
nterpretations
s
very
much
overstressed.18
Nevertheless he does sharefour
presuppositions
with all
hard-core
political
communitarians.These are not
very plausible
and can
easily
be
refuted:
1.
Superimposition
f
linguistic,cultural,
religious,ethnic,
national,po-
litical communities
andthe state.
In
sociology
as well
as
in
normative
heory,
broad
container-concepts
f
ethnicity preclude
a
detailed
analysis
of
the
analytically
different
but
historically
overlapping
criteriaof
exclusion and
possible
community
formation.
Elsewhere,
I
have
triedto
construct,
rom a
perspective
of
inequalities,
a
disaggregated
cheme of
criteria
of
exclusion
and
corresponding
practices
and
legitimations
of
exclusion. 9
From a
per-
spectiveof identity,culture,andcollectiveaction,I also tried to show under
which
circumstances
particular
ommunities
develop/canbe
constructed.20
Even
in
Walzer one can
find the
usual mix
of
ethnic,
linguistic,
territorial,
cultural,religious,
and
national
communitiesand
statescommon
to
commu-
nitarian
egitimationsof
exclusion. It is
obvious,however,
hat
some of
these
communities
are not
onlyseparated
nalyticallybut
historicallyas well.
They
do not
always
peacefully
overlap.
Usually
they
are
not
coextensive,
andthey
conflict with
one
another.
2. Walzer, of course, knows that
states
are not necessarily, or even
commonly,
ethnic or
cultural
homogeneous
entities.2'
Nevertheless,he
does
speak
of
states as
nations r
communities ll
the time,
even
whenthis is
obviously false.22
This is
notjust a
conceptualweakness,
it
plays a
crucial
role in the
first
(hermeneutic) f the
four
argumentsn
favorof
states as
most
appropriateunities
for
arguments
about
distributive ustice.
Without
it he
would
not be
able to
writethese
normatively rucial
sentences:
thepolitical
community
is
probably the
closest
we can
come to a
world
of common
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218
POLITICAL
HEORY/
May
1995
meanings. anguage, istory,
ndculture ome
ogethercome
more
closely
together
herethan
anywherelse)
to
produce
collectiveconsciousness
(1983, 28).23 tateswouldonlybe legitimate,n thisregard, s worldsof
common
meaning,
hared
anguages,
ndcommon
ognitive
nd
normative
frames.
But his ink s
theoretically
eakand
historically
ore handubious.
It is obvious
hat
historical tatesdiffer n
degree
of
linguistic
ndcultural
homogeneity
nd
hat hesedifferencesre
very mportant.
or hree
easons,
Walzer's
tatement
mustbe refuted:
i)
it is
obviouslywrong
o
assume,
ven
under
resent onditions,
hata stateless orld wouldbe a worldwithout
particular eaning 1983,34),
inhabited
y radically
eracinatedenand
women
p. 39);(ii)
his
argument,bviously,
oesnot
hold or
multicultural
and
bi-
or
multilingualtates;
iii)
there re
many
nter- national
inguistic-
cultural
ommunities,
ld ones as well as new
(religious,
professional,
artistic, olitical),
ndWalzer imselfknows
perfectly
ellthat
many
maller
infra-statenits
howmuch
stronger
worlds f common
meaning
nd
much
tronger
ffiliation nd
commitments.
3. Not
allcommunitarians-andot
only
communitarians24-conceive
f
the state as
apolitical community.
Walzerhalfheartedly, ut no less mislead-
ingly,
treats
he state n
analogy
with
neighborhoods,
lubsand amilies
(pp.
35-42).
Historical tatesare not such
warm,
horizontal
Vergemein-
schaftungen
or
freeand
democratic
ssociations,
ased n
consent,
ut
rather
coldvertical
nstitutions,
asednoton free
entry
buton
enforced
membership
and
physical
violence.
Strictly
peaking,hey
are
not associations
t
all,
but nstitutions. f
course,
here
re
differencesn
this
regard
etween
tates,
and hesedifferences re
mportant.
uteven
nation-states
hat
are
cultur-
ally fairlyhomogeneousnd ratherdemocratic ave beenstates n class
societies.Toevade he
connotationsf
coldness, ertical ierarchies,
ureau-
cracy,centralism,
ultural
normalization,
nd
illegitimate ominationo
commonly
ssociatedwith
states,
Walzer
misleadingly refers o speakof
countries r
politicalommunities. emaybeperfectlyightnstating
hat
the
ommunity
s itself
a
good-conceivably
he
most
mportantood p.
29),
but
this
communitarian
onviction
robably
ells less in
favor han
against
the
state,
or
more
precisely,
t couldbe
mobilizedn
its favoronly if and o
thedegreenwhich, mpirically,tateswere o resemblehenormativedeals
in
the booksof
democraticonsent-theory.f one recognizeshatstates
are
not
culturally omogeneous
r
democraticolitical ommunities,he
moral
and
ethical
egitimacyf their
xclusionaryrighto communal
elf-detenrnina-
tion
gets severelyundermined.
4. Walzer
hereforeriesto
backup the ethical egitimacy f states
by
ascribing
o thema
crucial
ole in the defenseandreproductionf cultural
diversity:
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Bader
CITIZENSHIPND
EXCLUSION
219
Neighborhoods
anbe
openonly
f countries reat east
potentially
losed....
Neigh-
borhoods
might
maintainomecohesive ultureor a
generation
rtwo on a
voluntary
basis,butpeoplewouldmove n,peoplewouldmoveout; oon hecohesionwouldbe
gone.
Thedistinctivenessf cultures
nd
groups
epends pon
losure
nd,
without
t,
cannot e
conceived
s a stable eature f human
ife. If distinctivenesss a
value
..
thenclosure
mustbe
permitted
omewhere.
pp.
38-9)
To
put
t
crudely,
Walzer
redicts,
s
a
necessary
esult
of
open
borders,
some
kind
of cultural
ntropy
Walzer's
amous
second aw of
cultural
thermodynamics?).
his,
n at
least
hree
espects,
s a
curious
rgument:
(i)
That ultural
istinctiveness
epends
n one or
other ormof
closure
may,
n a
verygeneral
ense,
betrue.25
owever,
he
phrase
s much oo
vague
to
be useful
n
either
mpirical
r normative
rguments:
irst,
not
all
cultural
distinctions
an be defended
rom
a liberal-democratic
erspective
e.g.,
classist,
litist, acist,
exist, tc.).Second,
ne
should
pecify
he
ype
or form
of closure:losure
y
free
onsent
from
nsiders nd
utsiders)
iffers
adically
fromenforced
losure
by custom,
ocial
convention,
nd
law
(backed
by
threat r
application
f
physical
iolence).
Walzer
ees
clearly
hat
enforced
closure replacescommitment with coercion.
. .
. So far as the coerced
members re
concerned,
here s no
longer
a
community
orth
defending
(p.
39).
But
his
own
argument epends
upon
a
completelyunspecified
conception
f enforced losure
by
the
state.
f
cultural
istinctiveness
ould
thrive
otally
on
state-enforced
losure,
he
postmodernist
ppraisal
f dif-
ference
would
have o
be
judged
roma
different
ngle.
Third,
ne
should
be sensitive o thesocial
context
n which
losure
akes
place:
losure
under
conditions
f
rough
quality
iffers
adically
rom losure nder
onditions
of systematicxploitation,ppression,iscrimination,ndexclusion.26
(ii) Historically,
ithmodern
apitalism,
he state
has
alwaysbeen
the
strongest nemy
of
cultural
iversity.nternally,he modern
nation-state
actedas a
radical ultural
nifier, reating
thenation
y
making
peasants
into
Frenchmen,
sing outright
iolenceto
crush
cultural
ndnational
minorities. t
applied
well-known
ducational,
edagogic,and
civilizing
strategies
f
normalizationnd
discipline
n
order o
erase
other
anguages
and/or ialects
n
creating
he
unified
igh
anguage;o crush
ivalpagan
nd
other eligions ycreating eligious omogeneity;ocrush ompetingeas-
ant,
popular,
raft
cultures,
ndframes f
meaning
nd
nterpretation.
he
creation
f Walzer's
common
world
of
meaning,
equired n
erasure f
rival
memories ndhistories
o
as
to
producehe
dominanthistory
f the
nation, and so
on.27
Externally,modern
nation-states
ave acted,as a
byproduct
f
theirdirect
conomic nd
political
olonization
ndconquest
of
the
world,
nd
usually s
its
main
deologicalmyth,as
large-scale
ultural
imperialists
complete
xtinction
r
radical
ubmission nd
enforceddapta-
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220
POLITICALHEORY
May
1995
tion
of
all
native
eoples
and
cultures).
t is a
strangerony
of
history
hen
thatWalzer ntrusts o those
very
states he heroicrole of
champions
nd
defendersf cultural iversity
(iii) It
is one
thing
o
recognize
heenormous
ole
of
force,violence,
and
power
n the
historical
ormation
f
linguistic,eligious,
thnic, ultural,
nd
so
on,
homogeneity.
t is
quite
anothero
argue mpirically
nd
normatively
forthe
necessary
ole
of
enforced
losure or the
preservation
nd
develop-
ment
of cultural
iversity.
mpirically,
Walzer's
rediction
f cultural n-
tropy
s not a
very
soundone:
contrary
o the common
myth
of
purity
and
organic evelopment
f national
ultures,
most
high
culturesn
history
ave
been the resultof
hybrid rossings.Contrary
o conservativeearsof one
unified Coca-Cola
orld-culture,
ne finds
even
in the
present
world
context
f
severe
economic,ultural,
nd
political
nequalities
rich
variety
of
newly
created ultures.
Normatively,
onservationist
rguments
ay
be
appropriate
ith
respect
o
national ndcultural
minoritieshatwould
other-
wise become
xtinct
by
the
overwhelmingower
of
imperialist ajorities.28
But
or
me,
t is
strange
o
see
those
argumentspplied
with
espect
o
exactly
thoseculturalmajorities, hich, or the ast 500yearsorso, conqueredhe
world
culturally
s well as
economically
nd
politically.
he
threat f
the
poor mmigrants
houldbe
analyzed
n the
context f
powerasymmetrieso
put
t in context.Wheredoes his
fear
or
cultural
ncounter,
o
typical
or
conservatistndneonationalistlracist
olitics,
ome rom n
Walzer's
oliti-
cal
theory,
which
otherwisetretches
luralism
o its
limits?
In
Walzer's
pheres f
Justice
1983),
these four
communitarianrgu-
mentsarebacked
by
the
traditional
rgument
n
favorof
state
sovereignty.
As alternativeosovereigntates sunits fpolitical ecisionmaking,Walzer
allows
only
fora choicebetween
two
ormsof
simple quality
with
regard
to
membership p. 34)
and
dismissesboth
of
them.The
choicewouldbe
between
global
tate
world
tate
p.48],
global
ocialism
p.34]) or a
worldwithout
tates, global
ibertarianism.
ertiumon
datur.Theworld-
state
option
would
mean
a
world
without
articular
eanings ndwithout
political
ommunities
p.
34), global ibertarianismould
also be a world
without
olitical ommunities,world
n
which no
one
was
a
member r,
moreprecisely,world fmany mallparochialtates: if tates verbecame
largeneighborhoods
t
is
likely
hat
neighborhoodsill
become ittlestates
(p. 38).
To ear
down hewallsof
thestate s
not. . .tocreate
worldwithout
walls,
butrather
o
create
a
thousand etty ortresses p.
39). Even f one
were o
accept
all
this,
one is still
notforced
o accept,
without lternatives,
theworldof the
bigexclusionary
ortressesf the
existing tates s the
esser
evil.
Walzer,
n
his
struggle gainst imple
equality,alls
prey o the simple
conception
f
absolute,
ndivisible
overeigntyhat have
already riticized.
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Bader CITIZENSHIPND
EXCLUSION
221
In
fact,
we
already
ive
in
a worldwith
limited,delegated,
nd
divided
sovereigntyights,
a world
n
whichunitsof
political
decision
making ery
much ross-cut ndoverlapachotherneighborhoods,ommunities,ities,
regions,
tates,
ederal
epublics,nions,
united
nations).
And t is
precisely
this
kindof constellationhat hould
be
argued
or
morally.
do
agree
with
Walzerhat
aneffective
ight
against
arochial
losure
does,
ndeed, equire
some kindof
largeness
p. 39).
However,
not
just
states are
able
to
counterbalance
his
trend,
butall inter-local
nd
nter-national
nits.29 he
ideal
of
democratic
olitical
elf-determinationells us little
about he ade-
quate
erritorial
nits,
and f
it does
tell
us
something,
t is
that t is
in
favor
of smaller nits.
So
we
may
conclude hat he
hermeneutic,
ultural,ocial,
and
political
arguments
or he
ethico-political
ustification
f
the
right
f
states
o closure
do notstand
p
to critical
crutiny.
nd
we arenow n
aposition
o
understand
whyWalzers forced o talkso
often
n
a
crypto-normativist
ay:
he
wants
states o be what
hey
historically
nd
actually
ever ave
been-linguistically
andculturally
omogeneous
orldsof common
meaning,
ree
associations
based on democraticonsent.Onlyin this way is he able to link state
sovereignty
o thedemocratic
rinciple
f
self-determinationr
communal
self-determinationndcan he
say,
as
already
uoted,
hat to
give
up
the
state
s to
give
up any
effective
elf-determination
p.
44).3?
4. HOW
TO COMBINE
THE
REQUIREMENTS F
UNIVERSALISTUSTICEANDRADICALDEMOCRACY
Forms
f
democracy
tronger
han
hose
predominant
n
developed
api-
talist tates hould
be
favouredor our
easons:i)
political
emocracy
tself
is,
intrinsically,form
of
good ife;(ii) the
reproduction
f thin
democracy
asks or
strongerorms
of
political
llegiancehant can
create
y
itself; iii)
ecologicaldisasters
nd the
destruction
f
nature an
be
prevented,n a
democratic
ay,
only
bystronger
ormsof
democracy;31
iv)
radical edis-
tributions,withinandbetweenstates,can be realized,egitimately nd
effectively, nly
n
stronger
emocracies. etall
known
historical
ormsof
stronger
emocracy
nd
most
heoretical
odelsof
republican,
eorepubli-
can,
and
communitarian
emocracy
ave
been inkedwith
rigorous
olicies
of
exclusion.
The
developmentf
theoretical
modelsof
strong,
empow-
ered
democracy,
pluralist
epublicanism,
associational,
associative,
or
liberal-socialist
emocracy as,up till
now,
not
sufficiently ealt
with
this
problem.32
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222
POLITICALHEORY
May
1995
Recently,
s a
consequence
f
growing
umbersf
migrantsndrefugees,
the contradiction
between
the universalist
principles
of rule of law and
democracy n one hand,andtheparticularistlaimsto integrity f given
formsof
life,
on the
other
hand
Habennas 992,632f)
hasbecome
greater.
Not
each ethos
s
worth
defending.
heconfrontationetween
iberalism
and
communitarianism
as shown hatone
always
has to ask:Which om-
munities?
see Kymlicka1988;
Walzer
1990b;Cunningham 991).
The
tension
between
moral
equirements
nd
ethical-political
iscourse
hould
be
approached,
s
I
stated
bove,
roma
qualified riority
or
morality.Many
authors, tarting rom
similar
considerations,
ave
analyzed he conse-
quences
for the internal
relationswithin
communities.
Conservative
r
protective
ommunitarianism
s criticizedor
(i)
a lack
of individual uton-
omy
and he
freedomo
choose; ii)
not
eavingany,
or
enough,
oom
within
communities
r traditions
or
distance, riticism, ebellion, onflict,
and
change; iii) ignoring
ll formsof structural
nequalities
nside
communities
(exploitation,ppression, iscrimination,xclusion);iv)
lack
of
civil
rights
and
civil
culture;
nd
(v)
lack of
democratic
oliticalrights
and culture.
Normatively, third osition longsideiberalism ndcommunitarianism
emerges
rom
his
criticism, omething
ike a
liberal-democraticommuni-
tarianism
r a communitarianiberalism.33ut even within his
evolving
tradition,
o serious ttentionasas
yet
been
paid
o the
problematicxternal
relations etween
ommunities:
i) parochialistlosure nd ii)allformsof
power-asymmetries
etween
communities,
most
particularly,omination/
oppression
ndexclusion.34
Bringingogether
oth inesof
argumentfordemocracy
nd
ommunity),
aconceptuallarificationndnormative-theoreticalethinkingf therelation
of
democracy
o
particularistethnic, ultural, ational)
dentities r
commu-
nities
and
itizenship
nd
democracy,
emains
rgent.
n
other
words,wehave
to
rethink
he
relations etweenhe
ethnic nd ivic
aspects
f modern
ations
(A.
D.
Smith).
4.1
Disentanglementf Citizenship
fromAscriptive Characters ndIdentities
Any morally
efensible
oncept
f
democraticitizenship ught o start
fromuniversalism.Within
tates,
universalnclusion s
required;
etween
states,
all formsof
morallyllegitimate
losure re o
be criticized. s a first
step,therefore,itizenship ught
o be
disentangled
rom
ascriptive riteria
and dentities
particularly
rom
descent, olour, ex, ethnicity, ationhood).
This s what have
suggestedabove. tsconsequencesorconceptsof citizenship
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Bader
CITIZENSHIPAND
EXCLUSION
223
in
political
philosophy
nd
egal
theory
havebeen
worked
ut
by
Carens,
Kymlicka,
nd
Habermas,
nd
by
Brubaker,
eater,
Meehan,
nd
others.
Carens1993), ollowingHabermas,istinguishesharply etween two
cultural ontexts:
group
culture,
ike
the
culture f a
religious
or
ethnic
group,
nd he
public
political
ulture
f a liberal
democratic
ociety
25).
He
distinguishes
between
hose
aspects
f the
public
ulture f a
particular
democratic
ociety
hatare
required
y
liberal emocratic
rinciples
.. and
those
aspects
f a
society's
ulturehat eflectts
particular
istory,
raditions,
and
forms of life but
cannotbe
construed s
ways
of
instantiating
he
requirementsf liberal
democracy
p.23).
The
constitutional
rinciples
rooted
n a
political
ulture re an
expression
f
moral
universalism,
he
substantive nd
concrete,
icher
ethical-cultural
orm
of
life as a
whole
refers o
the
ethical-political
iscourse.
The
most
promisingpplication
f
Habermas's
ifferentiated
iscourse
theory
1992),up
till
now,
can
be found n
his
treatmentf
citizenship
nd
national
dentity.
fter
riticizing
eorepublican
nd
ommunitarian
oncep-
tions of
constitution,
olitics,
and
citizenship,35
e
argues
or
a
complete
analytical eparationf Ethnos nd Demos : n unfasteningf the
semanticink
between
itizenship
nd
national
dentity p.634)36
and
even
for a
relatively
argoing
istorical
isconnection.With
he
French
Revolu-
tion,
he
argues,
thnic ementwas
replaced
y
a
democratic
ommunity
f
consent
p.636).
Thenation
of
citizens
inds ts
identity
not in
ethnic-
cultural
ommonalities,
ut in
democratic
rocedures,
alk,
and
decision
making.
Historically
verstretching
is
case,
he
continues:
Herehe
repub-
lican
component
f
citizenship
isengages
tself
completelyrom ts
affili-
ationto a pre-politicalommunityGemeinschaft)ntegratedy descent,
shared
radition nd
common
anguage
p.
636).37
Whereasn
1983,
Walzer
eems
completely
ommittedo
the
conceptual
and
historical
onnectedness
f
citizenshipwith
ethnicity
nd
nation/state,
his later
position
becomes
much
more
ophisticated,s in
his
in 199038
and
his
1992article
n civil
society:
The
ourth
nswero
the
question
bout
he
good life
prefers he
setting
of
the
nation,within
which
we are
loyal
members, ound
o one
another
y ties of
blood
and
history
p.
96); its
understandingf memberships ascriptive;t requires opolitical hoices
and no
activity
beyondritual
affirmation. n
a
much
more
distancing
treatment,
e
sees
that in
time of
trouble,t can
readilybe
turned
gainst
other
nations,
particularly
gainst
he
internal
thers:
minorities,
liens,
strangers.
Democratic
itizenship,
worker
olidarity,
ree
enterprise nd
consumer
utonomy-all
theseare
ess
exclusive
han
nationalism....
The
nature
f
nationalist
ervor
ignals
he
inadequacy
p.97).
In
his
favorite
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224 POLITICAL
THEORY
May
1995
pluralist
erspective p.
98),
thecivil
society
s a
setting
f
settings, iving
some
hope
to domesticate
ationalism
101),
particularly
s
international
civilsociety.
Inweaker
ersions
f this
disentanglement,
ommon
anguage
nd
history
are
still
accepted
as
legitimate
riteria,
n
stronger
ersions
hey
are not
crucial
anymore
or the
concept
and
practice
f democratic
itizenship.39
Historically,
ome
version f the
disentanglement
rom
ascriptive
riteria
nd
identities
asbecome
a
crucial lement
n
the
myth
andhas
been,
o
a
lesser
degree,
n the constitutionsnd
practices
f
French,American,
nd
Swiss
republicanism.
As
a
second,much
more
ontested,
tep,
democratic
itizenship
ught
o
be
disentangled
rom
itizenship
s
state
membership.
istorically,
ome
version
of
this
type
of
disentanglement
s at the
root
of
all versions f
economic,
industrial,
rsocial
associational)
emocracynd
of
all forms
f
local, own
hall,provincial
olitical
democracy
s
well.
In
recent
political
philosophy,
the
conceptual
isentanglement
s
perhaps
most
learly
tated
y
Habermas.40
Political
philosophy,
with he
usual ime
ag,
reflects
practical
rocess-
es, forcingus to disconnect emocraticitizenshipromboth ethnicity/
nationhood
nd rom
state
membership.4
his s
quite
obvious
n
the
case
of
European
unification.
t the same
time,
this
case remindsus of
the
enormous
ractical
ensions ndcontradictionshe
reformulationf
collec-
tive
political,
particularlyational,
dentities
ring
withthem
n an
age
of
democratic
luralism,
multiculturalism,
mmigration,
nd he
formation
f
inter- national
oliticalunits.
Onlyextreme
ight-wing
eonationalistnd
conservative
hilosophy
nd
politics
can
openly
avoidthis
dilemma.The
hiddenneonationalistdeologyof conservativearties ndgovernments,t
least n
Europe,
s
put
under
much
tress, nd
iberal,
emocratic,nd ocialist
positions
have o
come
to
terms
with hese
ensions.
4.2
Thick r Thin
Concepts
f Citizenship?
Different
Citizenshiptatuses
Theugly nternalonsequencesf republicanoncepts fcitizenship re
criticized
n anexcellent
waybyBenjamin
arber
1984,chaps.
8
and
9) and,
more
uperficially,
y
Walzer
1990a,
217f;
1992,91f,105ff)and
Habermas
(1992,
6580).
Strong
democratic
itizenship,
owever,
does not,unfortu-
nately,
exclude
illegitimate
xternal
exclusion,
even
if it is completely
disentangled
romall
ethnic
r
nationalriteria
nd
dentities.nthisrespect
it is
symptomatic
hat
both
modem
tatesmentioned y
Habermas1992,
642f)
to show the
possibility
f this
disconnection,heUnited
Statesand
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Bader CITIZENSHIP
NDEXCLUSION
225
Switzerland,ave
external
olicies
marked
y
collective
gotism
and
condi-
tional
nclusion
r
exclusion.42
o avoid his
morally
llegitimate
xclusion
and to defendstronger ersionsof democracy,ne shoulddifferentiate
conceptually
nd
practically
etween
ifferentevels
of
citizenship
nd
argue
for a
legal
nd
low hreshold
oncept
f
citizenshipCarens
993)
with
regardo
immigration,
efugee,
and naturalizationaw and
policies.
The
indications
or such a
strategy
n
Carens
and,
particularly,
n
Habermas43
remain
oo
vague
n
legal
and
practical
erms.
They
hould
urgently
e
made
more specific.
In
a
very
shortoutlineof such a
program,
propose
o
distinguish
he
following
evels of discourse nd
related tatuses
f citizen-
ship
andduties:
Discourse
Citizenship
Status
Duties
1.
Passive status of
person moral
duties
Moral
2.
Negative
status or status libertatis
legal
duties
3.
Positive status or
status civitatis
status
subjectionis
Legal
(Staatsangeh6rgkeit)
4.
Active status or
status activus civilis
legal
duties
(aktive
Staatsburgerschaft)
Political 5.
Liberal,
republican,
or
strong political
moral
and
politicalduties
citizenship
Ethical
6.
Ethnic,
cultural,
national
concepts
ethical
duties
of
citizenship
Figure 1.
Citizen-Status or
Levels of
Citizenship
Ad1. Themoral
oncept
f
an
autonomous
ndividual,
moral erson
with
freedomo
chooseand
responsibilityor
her
actions,s
the
basisofany
egal
concept
of a
person
as a
bearer
f
rights,
he
precondition
f the
general
concept
f
right
andall
specific
ubjective
ights,
rivate r
public.44
ights
require
hemoral
nd
egal
recognition
f
individualss
persons;
ubjective
public
rights
cannotbe
separated
rom
natural ersons
see
Jellinek
1905,
83f;1928,418).Theposition fthe ndividual ithrespect othestate s the
basisof
the
egal
concept fa
status, t
is
expressedn
this
verygeneral
nd
abstract
oncept
of
a
status
passivus.
Ad
2.
The
negative
status,status
libertatis or
Menschenrechtsstatus
(Grawert),
s
a
bridge etween
moral nd egal
concepts.
Historically,
t is
the
result
fexternal
nd
nternal
imitationsf
state
overeignty.
he
protection
of a
sphere
f
individuality
y
specific ights
of
privacy nd
due
process
s
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226 POLITICAL
HEORY
May
1995
guaranteed
o allhuman
eings
ntering
he
erritory
f
a
state;
t
is
not
imited
to
Staatsangehorige.
Therefore,
t is
not
called
a
status
civilis but
a human
rights tatus. t applies, rbetter,houldapply, qually oaliens, trangers,
tourists,
iplomats,egal
or
illegal
residents
capitalists,
usiness
managers,
migrant
workers,
tc.)
as toinborn
r
naturalizeditizens.
Ad
3.
The
positive
status of
citizenship,
status
civitatis
or
Staatsange-
horigkeit,
sually
ontains
wo
things:
egalprotection
nddue
process
nd
claims
n the administrative
ctivities f the state
or
individual
nterest
(Jellinek
1928,420)
or claims
o
public
goods
and
services
like
housing,
education,
ealth
are,
social
security,
nd
services),
whether
r
not articu-
lated
constitutionally
s
social
rights.
ellinek
has
conceptualized
his
positive
tatus
as
a kindof
compensation
or all the
sacrifices he
state
asks
from ts
subjects.
ogether,
hese
sacrificesorm
heir
tatus
ubjectionis:
their
egal
duties
o
perform
irectly
r
indirectly
or the
state
(obey,pay
taxes,
or
perform
ublic
work)
and/or o fulfill
public
services
military,45
social,
udicial).
Concerning
ur
problem,
'd ike o
mention
nly
wo
points.
(i) Just ikeclaims o legal protectionincluding ightsof privacyanddue
process),
claims to
public
social
insurances nd
services
ncreasingly
o
longer
depend
on
state
membership:
status
ositivus
s not
anylonger
coextensive
with
status
ivitatis.
s
I
stated
lready
n
section
1, egal
state
membership
oses
importance
n this
regard see
Grawert
984,
184).
All
legal
residents an
legally
claim
protection
nd
services
they
pay taxes,
social
security, nd
old
age
contributions),
ndeven
illegal
residents ave
better
moral laims he
onger
hey
stay. ii)
If
one
accepts
hat
heer
duration
of stay,andwith t growingocialrelations ndexpectations-irrespective
of the
character
legal
or
illegal)of
the
firstentry
nto a
state
whateverts
criterion
r
motivation-isa
sound asis
orenhanced
moral
nd
egal
claims
to
citizenship,he crucial
ssue
becomes
ncreasinglyhe
legitimacy nd
effectiveness f
control f
first
entry seeWalzer
983,34f).
Furthermore,f
one
accepts
hat
lldifferent
tatusesf
long-term
econd- r
hird-class
itizen-
ship,
metics,
denizens, Gastarbeiter
re
morally
ndefensible,
nd hat,
accordingly,
ll
statemembers
ndat
eastall
ong-term
esidentshould
ave
activeandpassivedemocraticolitical ights seetheexcellentreatmentn
Walzer
993,
53ff),
his rucial
ole,
orall
restrictive
olicies, f
first
dmission
decisionsand
effective
border
ontrol,
becomes
even more
evident.
Ad
4. The
status
activus
ncludesall
activeand
passive
political
ights
(universal,ree,
equal,
ecret,
direct
ballot,and
right o get
elected n
office)
and the
freedoms f
political
communication.
n
most
liberal-democratic
constitutions,
hese
rights
are
not
connectedo
a
corresponding
egal
duty o
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Bader CITIZENSHIP
AND EXCLUSION
227
vote,
to
candidateor
office, or to
makeactive
use of thepossibilities
or
political
participation,
egally
guaranteed
y
thefreedoms f
political
om-
munication.nmyview,one shoulddistinguishharply etween thin r
low threshold
oncept
of this
legal
status
activuscivilis and
the
different
empirical
ractices
nd thicker
ormative
onceptions
f
political
itizen-
ship see
Ad
5). Legal
itizenship
s no
more,
but
alsono
ess,
thanoneof
the
prerequisites
or active
political
participation:
t is not meant o
guarantee
political
articipation
nd
t cannot o so. It
is a
complex
f
moral,egal,
and
politicalrights.
These
rights
are
compatible
with
competing
moral
and
politicaldutiesandconceptionsf politicsanddemocraticitizenship,ut
they
do
not andshouldnot
prescribe
egal
duties.Political
ights
and
ree-
domscannot
uarantee
hared ivic and
democratic
ommitment,
common
culture,
ommon
irtues,
nd
moral
nd
political)
duties.This
asymmetry
between
ights
andduties s
typical
or
modern
aw.46
One
point
needs o be stressed ere.Of
course,
we
expectmmigrants
nd
applicants
or naturalizationo
obey
the
law and fulfill
their
egal
duties
entailed
n the status
subjectionis.
And,
of
course,
we
mayhope
that,
n
addition, heymorallyacceptandrespect he law as we hopethat state
members o,
although
we
may
nothave
hemeans o enforce t.
Butwe
do
not askfull native
itizens o makeactive
use
of
their
ights
o
participate
norarewe
legally ntitledo ask
hem.
We
do notand
arenot
entitledojudge
whether hey are
competent
itizens,
s so
many liberal
efenders f
privileges
f
wealthand
education nder he
guiseof
democracy avedone.
Consequently,
e
are not
entitled,
ither
egally
or
morally,
o
ask
from
immigrants hat
we
do notask
from
ourselves.
Ad 5.
It is
quite
obvious hat
his low
threshold
onceptof legal
status
activus
oes,
and s
meant
o, allow or
different
mpirical
egrees f
political
participation.
t is also
obvious
hata
democratic
olitical
ystem
annotbe
reproducedr
strengthened
ithout t
east ome
minimumf
active
political
participation
f
some
citizens.
Empirically,
ne
can
udge hedegree f
actual
democracy
y
studying
how
many
people
participaten
public
talk and
decision/action
ow
often, n
how
many
pheres, ndon how
many
evels.47
Thisdegreewillbequite owincapitalist,exist,racist, ndelitist ocieties.
Normatively,
the
moral,
ethical,and
politicalduties
to
participateiffer
significantlyn
accordance
with the
competing
onceptsof
democratic
constitutions,olitics,
and
citizenship.These can
be
grouped,ollowing
Barber,ntothree deal
ypes:
liberal,
unitary, nd
strong
emocracy.
A
low
threshold
oncept f
legal
tatusactivus
doesallow or he
corresponding
and
competingormative
onceptionsf
political
itizenship,
hich, or our
purposes,
an
be
summarizedy
reproducing
arber'sable
1984,
219).4
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228
POLITICAL
THEORY
May
1995
TABLE 1
Forms of
Citizenship
Representative
Unitary
Strong
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Citizens conceived
legal persons
brothers
neighbors
Bound together
by
contract blood
common
partici-
patory
activity
Related to
sovereign
but
corporate body
active
participant
govemment
as also
subject
By
ties that
are vertical
(citizen
horizontal
(citizen
dialectical
( levels
to
government)
to
citizen)
vanish)
Political
style
distrusfful,
self-abnegating,
cooperative,
active
passive
submissive
Civic
virtue
accountability
fratemrity
civility
(reciprocal
(reciprocal
(reciprocal
love
empathy
and
control) and
fear)
respect)
Status
of
citizenship
discretionary
omnicompetent
sovereign
(the
first
(vis Avis other (one among (the only among equals)
social identities
many) permissible
one)
Ideal
ground
common
contract
common
beliefs,
common
talk,
(actural
ground
(generic
valuec, ends,
decision,
work
is
territory)
consensus)
identity
(creative
(substantive
consensus)
consensus)
SOURCE:
From
Benjamin
Barbers
Strong
Democracy:
articipatory
olitics ora
New
Age. (1984, Figure3, p. 219). Reprntedby pernission from he UniversityofCalifomiaPress.
I
sharemostof
Barber's
rguments
gainst
thin 49
nd
unitary
emoc-
racy
and n
favor
f
the
nstitutions,
ultures,
irtues, nd
practices f
stronger
democracy.
owever,
t
seems
necessary
o stress
wo
points,both
ignaling
thatmost
recent
neorepublicanheories
have
trouble
voiding strong
e-
mocracy
o
fall back
nto
unitary
emocracy. hey
thereby
ross, n
a
thoughtless
ut
systematic
way,
he
ine
between
egitimatemoral,
political
duties and
legal
duties.
(i) Internally,
this
line should
function as
a
legal
safeguardgainst
oth
otalitarianism
nd he
ethical
monism f
republican
versionsof a
good
life, whichare
incompatible
ith
ethicalpluralism
n
modern
ocieties.It is true
that
some
ingredients
f
stronger
emocratic
culture,
virtues,
habits,
and
practices re
requiredor
the
reproduction
f
thin
emocracy
nd
that, herefore,
omplete
tate
neutralitys
wrong.50
The
stateandother
public
agents
implyhave o opt
for
andrealize
policies
that
ocialize,
ducate,
nd
rain
nborn
nd
mmigrant
itizens nthe
neces-
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Bader
CITIZENSHIPND
EXCLUSION 229
sary
habits,
ustoms,
ndvirtues f a minimal
ublic
or
political
morality.
Without
uch,
he
reproduction
f
liberal-democratic
nstitutions
nd
public
political ulturewouldbeseriously ndermined,ndwith t thesafeguards
of
precisely
hat thical luralism.
efending
minimal
hreshold
oncept
f
status
ctivus husdoesnot
prevent
nefrom
defending
nd
arguing
or
much
thicker
onceptions
f
political
itizenship
ndof democratic
ducation.
t
onlyprevents
ne from
doing
so in an lliberal
way.
(ii)
Externally,
hick
republican
onceptions
f
citizenship
ecessarily
work
and are meant o work n favorof
highly
restrictive
mmigration,
asylum,
nd
naturalization
olicies
wheneverhe ine
s crossed
hat
eparates
the
ethical,
moral,
nd
political
uties,
nd
democratic
irtueshat
are
praised
in all citizens
rom
egal
dutiesandcriteria f
entry.5
Ad
6.
In
most
neo)republican
heories,
trong-democratic
olitical
oncep-
tionsof
citizenship
re
ntimately
ied
up
with
ethico-political
rguments
or
ethnic,
ultural,
r national
onceptions
f
citizenship
nd
he
corresponding
ethical uties ndvirtues.Most civil
eligions
re
n
fact
ethnicist,
enomina-
tionalist,ulturalistic,rnationalist.his, gain, emonstratesowdifficultt is
to
distinguish
etween
ifferent
ersions
f
democratic
olitical
culture nd
virtueshat
re,
n
principle,
niversalistnd
particularist
thical
onceptions.52
Unfortunately,
ere can
only
state hat
hese
onceptual
istinctions
pen
up
a
promising
nd
new
strategy
n
normative
heorizing,
llowing
one
to
combine
he
advantages
f
minimal, eutral,r
so-callediberal
onceptions
of
politics
and
citizenship
using
their
critical
power
against
llegitimate
exclusion)
with
those of
conceptionsnd
theories f
stronger
emocratic
politicsandcitizenship, ecessaryor thecontinuity ndreproductionf
liberal
emocracy.
Such
an
argument
s
confronted
ytwo
serious
heoretical
nd
practical
problems:
ow s
it
possible
o
distinguishhe
hardoreof
universalist
iberal
and
democratic
olitical ulture
rom
particularist
thnic-culturalorms n
which t
is
inevitably
mbedded?
ow
s oneto
overcome
he
impotencef
the
ethical,
he weak
motivational
orceof
universalist
moral alk and
minimal
hreshold
oncepts
f
politics
and
citizenship?
hese
arethehard
questionscommunitarianriticismoses ouniversalistliberal efenders
of
human
ights,
democracy,nd
he
ruleof
law.
4.3
What
s
the
Hard
Core
of
Liberal
Democratic
Culture?
Even
analytically
nd
theoretically,
he
proposed
istinction
etweena
liberal, democratic
public
or
political
cultureand
ethical-cultural
orms of
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230
POLITICAL
THEORY/
May
1995
life
is not
without
problems.
A
complex
normative
heory
of
democracy
should
distinguish
nd
discuss
the interrelations
etween he
following
levels:democraticrinciples,nstitutions,
ultures-habits-virtues,
nddemo-
cratic
udgment
ndaction
see
Bader
1990).
Now
it is an
old
republican
wisdom hatdemocratic
rinciples
nd
nstitutions
annotbe
maintained
r
strengthened
ithoutdemocratic
ulture
nd
hat hereexists a
dialectic
between ulture ndhabits
as well asbetween
irtues nd
udgment. 3
s
it
possible
o
spell
out he
hard,
niversalist
oreofthis
civic
ulture,
which,
historically,
an
only
be
found mbeddedn
rivaling
nd
changing articu-
larist
orms
of
ethnic, eligious,nationalultures?Or, o state heproblem
more
generally
nd
systematically:
how)
canone
identify
he
hard oreof
liberaland
democratic
rinciples,
nstitutions,
ultures,
abits,
virtues,
nd
practicesf one
recognizesi)
that
hey
all are
developed
n
particularist,
historically,
nd
socially
situated
ultures;
ii)
that
they
themselveshave
changed
istorically
ndcontinueo do
so;
and
iii)
that heir
articulation
nd
interpretation
s
always
contested. must
confine
myself
to
three
remarks
using
democracy
s an
example.
1.Democraticrinciplesautonomy,oliticaliberty nd quality,artici-
pation)
do notfall
from
heaven,
orare
hey
nscribedn
nature r
language.
They
are
articulated
n
specific
(e.g.,
western,
modern,
apitalist,
acist,
sexist)
societies,
periods,
nd
political
units.Their
articulation
as
changed
considerablyduring
he
last
three
centuries
e.g., through
he
struggles
for a
truly
universal
understanding
nd
codification of
the
right
to
vote). Their
interpretationas
always
been,andstill
s, contested:
short ook
in
books
in
political
philosophy
makes his
evident.There s
not even
consensus n
what he basicprinciples re,whetherhere s oneormany. f many,how
many?
How do
they
relate to
each
other?
This
means,
however, at
best that
theyshould
not
be identified
with
specific
nterpretations
ndrecent
odifi-
cations.The
process
of their
understandingnd
articulations
open-ended,
but uch
hat t
showsa clear
direction
oward
niversalist
nclusion.t
means,
second,
hat
hey
can
always
be
challenged.
A
fundamental
isagreement
even on
principles s
possible
and s
protected
by
something ike
a
metanorm
of
consensuso
dissent,
agreement
o
disagree.
hird,
t
means hat
he
processof theirchangingarticulationsannotbe
steered
completelyby
propositionally
rticulated
rinciples.t
assumes
omethingikea
metalegal,
metaconstitutional
asic
commitmentor
democratic
habit
beyond
construc-
tivist
rationalism. hismust
be
embeddedn the
evolution f culture54
nd
cannot e
controlled
y
Reason
witha
capitalR.
Finally,or
allthis
historical,
social,
cultural,
or
hermeneutic
boundedness,
there
still is no
cause
for
historicism r
social
and
cultural
elativism.Many
ommunitarian
nd
her-
meneutic
hilosophersr
cultural
nthropologists
hink t
is thefinal
blow
to
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Bader
CITIZENSHIPND
EXCLUSION
231
any
kindof universalist
rgument.
t isn't.
It is
only
the
starting oint
of
all
interesting
iscussions.We
areable o
translate,
o
learn,
o
compare,
nd
o
detectdirectionn thesechanges, o engage n reiterative r relational
universalist
rojects.55
2.
It is
quiteeasy
to show that
our
interpretations
f
principles
are
informed,
ometimes
vendetermined
y
our
nstitutions,
ur
cultures,
nd
our
practices.
And his s the
basic
argument
gainst
iscourses
n
normative
theory
hatrestrict
hemselves
o this level of
principles
see
Unger1983,
99-102).
Thecritical istanceoward
articular
nstitutions on
by
analytical
andcomparative
bstractionlsoworks n the
otherdirection.t
opensways
to thinkaboutalternativenstitutionalranslationsf
democratic
rinciples
and allows for
a
thoroughgoing
ritique
f
the
common deduction
f
a
present onstitutional
esign
e.g.,representative
olitical
arty-democracy)
in
a particularistorical
radition.
emocratic
rinciples
llow or
different
institutional
esigns
e.g.,
direct
s.
representative)
n
different
ontexts.56
3. The more
specific
and more
context-dependent
he
level,
the
more
difficult
s
the
process
f
abstraction
n
search orthe
common oreof
liberal
democracy. etit shouldbe possible o spellout what iberaldemocratic
culture,
abits,
nd
virtues, part
romall
particularist
ariations, inimally
mean.Whatdo we refer
o whenwe
speak
f a liberal
nd
democratic
ublic
or
political
ulture?What
redemocratic
ultures,
hat re
epublicanirtues
of
citizenship
part
rom
heir
French,
American,
Genevan
oinage?
These
again
are
hard
uestions.57 confine
myself
o two
verygeneral emarks.
(i) Even f one
stresses hat
radical
emocracy
s an
open-ended
roject,
directed
mainly
oward
resent
nd
uture
public
alk
and
action ather
han
towardome maginedr realpast,it stillmustberooted n somecommon
democraticnd
iberal
ractices
f the
past o
form
a
traditiont
all, toshow
relatively
table
habits,
o
develop
ecognizable
irtues.
Cultures,
abits, nd
virtuesneed ime o
growanddevelop
see
Bader1991a,
98ff).
Democracy
and
olerationmustbe
learned nd
practicedhrough
onger
periods f time
to
strike oots n the
character
f
persons,heir
udgments, nd
actions.Even
Habermas-whootherwise
eriously
underestimates,oth
empirically nd
theoretically,
tradition n
modernity-putshis trust
n and
buildsupona
populaceBevdlkerung)abituatedopolitical reedom, ccustomedo the
We-
perspective
f
the
practice f
self-determination
1992,
642).Herewe
are
confronted,
heoretically
nd
practically,
ith
another
hard
paradox.
Universalist
rinciples
nd
institutions f
democracy sk
for
democratic
cultures,
abits,
nd
virtues hat
annot e
thoughtwithout
heir
wn
history
and
radition;
et,
at the
same
ime,
his
reference
o
particular
istories an
be
used,
and
s
used,
as a
criterion f
exclusion.
This
paradox
maywell be
thebestandmost
egitimate
rgument,rom
a
democratic
ointof
view, n a
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232
POLITICALHEORY
May
1995
defense
of
politics
of
fairly
closedborders.
t liesat theheartof
the
tension
between
democracy
nd
ustice,
ven n theories
hat
ry
o
interpretemoc-
racy
n termsas
universalists
possible.
Of courseno
easy
solution
may
be
expected,
but
all
democrats
hould
hink
very
hard o show
practical
ways
outof
this
dilemma.58
(ii)
Everything
epends,
herefore,
n
a
specification
f those
raditions:
which
traditions?
Theymust,
of
course,
be liberal
and democratico
a
considerable
egree.
Even
if it
turned
out to be
quite
difficult,
t
is
not
impossible
o
disentangle
emocratic
olitical
ulture
nd
citizenship
rom
too narrow inks withparticularthnic,nationalhistories.The familiar
distinction etween
praiseworthy
atriotism
nd
nasty
nationalismries
o
articulate soft version f this
disentanglement. 9
4.4
Weakness
f
Morality ?
The defenseof low
threshold
oncepts
f
citizenshipndof the
discon-
nectionof democratic
olitical
citizenship
rom
all
ascriptive
raditions,
loyalties,allegiances,ommitments,ollective
dentities,
nd
particularly
fromnational
ultures,
s
confronted ithat
least our
serious
problems.
1. Is
it
possible
o have
strong
ommitments
asedon
universalist
rinci-
ples?
Benjamin arber
nd
many
thers ave
onvincingly
emonstratedhat
the
reproduction
f thin
emocracy
tself
requires
t least
some
stronger
democratic
olitical
commitments.6'
s it
possible
empiricallyo
develop
these
stronger
ommitmentsn a
universalist
manner
without
he
familiar
connotationsfnationalism,hauvinism,ingoism;o havea constitutional
patriotism
ithoutall
traditional
onnotations
f
patria ?
owfar can
liberal-democratic
oncepts
of
constitution,egal
and
political
itizenship,
political
ommunity
nd
dentity,without
considerable
oss
in motivating
force,
etorn
way,
bstracted,
isentangled,
leaned
rom-real
or
magined-
common
descent,
heredity,
istory,
eligion,
thnicity,nd
nationhood,nd
be based
only
on
language?
s it even
possible o
do
without
nedominant
common
anguage?
an
we not
only
magine
ut
realize
political
commu-
nity withouta particularististoryandculture?6's it possible o break
fundamentally
ith
the
superposition
f
culture-nation-state-citizenship?
Historically,
ll
known
ormsof
liberal-democratic
r
republican
niver-
salism
p
till
noware
badly
disguised
ersions f
chauvinism.here
s still
a
longway
o
go
in
the
historical
rocess
f
universalization,
owunderway
for more
han hree
enturies,ut
which
might
ultimately
ead-in afuture
hopefully
not
too
distant-from
universalist
eclarationsnd
claims to
universalist
ractices.f
thiswere
o be
possible, s I
believe t is,
would uch
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Bader
CITIZENSHIPAND
EXCLUSION 233
a
political
dentity
have
enough
practical,
motivating
orce
to combat
and
overcome
he
strong
dentifications
long
ethnic,
cultural,
nationalist,
statist
ines?
Or
to be more
precise:
would
t be
strong
nough
o
tackleall
premodern
ersions
f
conservative
ommunitarianism,
s
well
as the
reac-
tionary
appeal
o
ethnic,
racist,
nationalist
communities,
o
successful
today
n
ex-Jugoslavia,
n the ormer oviet
Union,
butalso
n
many
respect-
able tates
n
Western
urope?
ndwould
t be
strong
nough
o
cope
with
the
neorepublican
nd
democratic-communitarian
ppeal
or
fairly
losed
borders?
2. How
may
one deal
with
the
impotencef morality n normative
theory?
n
terms f recent ormative
heory,
his
problem
s
probably
he
most
problematic
onsequence
f the
analytical
eparation
rom
morality
and
Sittlichkeit.
abermas,
gain,
learly ecognizes
his
problem.
The
motiva-
tionaldeficit
of
procedural,
ommunicative
eason s
a
result f
thefact
hat
this
reason
an
only
present
he weak orceof
rational
motivation.
Any-
way, t cannot
guarantee
he
transmission
f
insights
n
motivated
ction
(1992,
19).
This is
the core
problem
hat
Habermashares
with
Kant's
autonomous oralwill(seeHabermas992,145,202),withRawls's heory
of
justice,
which ooks or the
motivational
hrust
f a
convivial
entgegen-
kommend) olitical
culture
86),
and
with
Dworkin's
ttempt
o
embed
principles
f
law intoa liberal
thics
p.
87).
The
action-relevanceof such a
morality hat has been
absorbedback
into
the
cultural
system remains atentas
long
as it is
not
actualized
by motivated
actors
hemselves.They
must be in a
disposition to
act
conscientiously.Rational
Moralitythus
dependsupon
convivial socializingprocesses.These shouldproducecorresponding nstances of con-
scientiality,
that
is
to
say
corresponding ormations
of the
superego.
Although
the
motivating orces of the
good reasons of such
a moralityare
weak
it
becomesstronger
only
to the
degree
that
moral
principles
are
intemalizedand
anchored n
the
personality
system.
(Habermas
1992,
145f)
Thisskepticism
ith
regardo
the
motivationalorceof
universal,moral-
point-of-view
rguments as
oneof
themain
easonsor
he
strong articu-
larist
bias
in
Walzer's
Spheres.
nterestingly
nough,Walzer
himself s
immediatelyonfronted ith he sameproblem ssoonas hetries o tackle
the
nasty
nternal
nd
external
onsequences
f the
nation,
whichaskfor
a
domestication
y
civil
society.
He
feels
somewhat
neasywith the
civil
societyargument:
It
cannotbe
said that
nothing s
lost
when we
give up the
singlemindedness f
democratic
citizenship
or
socialist
cooperation
or
individual
autonomy or
national
dentity.There
was a kind
of
heroism in
those
projects-a
concentration
of
energy, a clear sense
of
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234
POLITICALHEORY
May
1995
direction,nunblinldngecognitionf friends
ndenemies.Tomakeoneof them
one's
own
wasa serious ommitment.
1992,105)
And this
threatening
oss of commitments
particularly
erious n
com-
parison
with
the
very strong
nationalist/ethnic/racist
dentifications. oth
positions,
universalist emocratic
iscourse
heory
andcivic
pluralism
n
nationalopular iscourse,
s Brian
Barry
alled
t,
have o tackle hesame
problem.They
do so
starting
romdifferent
ngles,but,
as faras I can
see,
they
do
not differmuch
n
topics
and
policies.
3. How
o
develop oyalty
o universalist
emocracyractically?
he ask
is threefold:i) to socializepeoplen awaythat hey identify ithcivility
and
iberal-democratic
rinciples, onstitutions,
nd
culture;
ii)
to educate
them
effectively
n a democratic
anner;62iii)
to create nstitutional
ppor-
tunities
or
practicing
olerationnd
democracy
n all
spheres
f
life,
not
only
in politics. 63
ll
liberal
emocratsan
only hope
that his is not
only
possible,
but
effectivelydone,
andwe
should,
as
political
heorists,
ot be
content
with
reiterating
hat t shouldbe donebut workout more
detailed
institutionalndpractical roposals.
4. Which
public
shouldone talk to? The
preferred
iscoursesdiffer:
universalist
moral-political
iscourse ersus
national-popular
iscourse.
But
again,
n the
end,
he differences not as
great
as
one
might
expect: i)
One
mustwrite oror
speak
o a
public.
Butthereare
numerous
ublics
nd
arenas f
publicity.
Mostwrite oran
(international)
cademic
ublic
as well
as
for
a broader
mostlynational) ublic
of citizens.Walzer oes
t
in
a
style
and hetorichat
onlyslightly
iffers romone
group
o the
other.Habermas's
styleandrhetoricn his academicexts s verydifferentrom hose n his
broader
ublic
nterventions.
e, rightly,
hinks hatthere s a
necessary
divisionof discourses ndwork
andthat heoreticalnd
politicalprojects
both
are
cooperative
ndeavors.Walzer eems
o be
reluctant
n
this
regard,
showing
at least some remnants f the
integratedheoretical
ndpolitical
oneman
how,
o
characteristicf the
orerunnerse admires,
heHebraic
prophets.ii)
Both
mustkeep
n
touchwith pecificpublics;nterestingly,he
public
f Walzer's
ational-popular
iscourses
increasinglyn nternational
one,although nfortunatelytillmostlyacademic.f Iunderstandis articles
from
1989
on
correctly,
he nation
ecomes progressively
oreproblem-
atic
public.
f
there till does
not exist a globalpublicof
citizens, his does
not
mean
hatone shouldnot
contributeo
creating ne (asChomsky nd
otherswish to
do). (iii)
What
o tell the
public?Oneshould
avoidnotonly
the
danger
f
speaking
o a
globalpublic
hatdoes
not yetexist or cannot
understandutalso he
danger
f
telling
he ocal
publicwhat twants o hear.
In
most
questions,Walzer-again ike his beloved
prophets-clearly ount-
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Bader
CITIZENSHIP
ND
EXCLUSION
235
ersthis
danger.
With
egard
o
citizenship
s
exclusion,
is talk
unfortunately
is more
dubious.Nevertheless,
believe hatboth
hope
hat
something
ike
an internationalivil society s actually eveloping,withglobalor atleast
interstate
renas, ublics,
ocial
movements, ongovernmental
rganizations
(NGOs),
nd
a
variety
f official
nternational
rganizations.
4.5
RadicalDemocratic
Communitarians
andNeorepublicans
s New
Conservatives?
Politicalheoristsfradical, niversalistemocracy-Iseemyselfasone
ofthem-have
considerablerouble
inding
onvincing
heoreticalnd
prac-
tical
answers o
the
problems
hat
I
dealt
with n the
preceding
wo
para-
graphs.
Democraticommunitarians
nd
neorepublicans
o have
really
hard
times
in
combining ustice
and
democracy
withoutmorally llegitimate
exclusionary
onsequences.
All
good
easons or
stronger
ersionsof
democracy, articularly
ll reasons or
solving
n a
radical emocratic
ay
the two
most
paramountroblems
f the
twenty-first
entury, amely,
he
ecologicalproblemnd heproblemf internationalnequalitiesndmigra-
tion,
canbe
transformed
nto
ust
as
many
bad easons orexclusion.This
will
happen
f it
proves
o
be
impossible
o elaborateoncepts
ndpractices
of
stronger
emocracy
n
sucha
way
as
to
prevent
r
at eastseverely
hinder
their
use as exclusionary evices.Otherwise,
oth heorieswould ust add
another
rancho the ast-growing
reeof
exclusionary
deology:
esides he
all
too
familiar acist and neonationalist
deologies,
one is increasingly
confronted ith
new
iberal,
ommunitarian,
ndneorepublicanersions f
culturalundamentalism. '4adical ndprogressiveemocrats ould urn
out to be transformed
nto
defenders
f morallyllegitimaterivileges
n a
similarway
as liberaldefenders fprivileges f wealth
ndeducation
n the
nineteenthentury rgued
ndacted sconservatives
gainst
he rendoward
internally
niversalistnclusion.
Notes
1.
See Bader and Benschop
(1989, chap. 8,
4.4), for the cross-cutting and
analogous
development
of
absolute
privateproperty. Pogge's
(1992)
treatment s much
too
vague,
analytically
as well as
historically.
See the classical
historical tudiesof v.
Gierke,Kern,Hintze,
Max
Weber,Elias, Tilly,and
manyothers.See the short
andexcellent
reatmentnRuggie (1993).
2. The
increasing
factual limitation s a
consequence of growing
internationalnterdepen-
dencies
in
economic
(capitalist
world
economy,
nternational
Monetary
Fund
[IMF],
Worldbank,
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236
POLITICAL
THEORY
May
1995
etc.), political
(alliances, etc.),
ecological,
and cultural
perspective.
The
increasing
moral
limitation
s due
to the
impact
of human
rightsdiscourses,
nternational
ocial
movements,
and
nongovernmental rganizations NGOs;like AmnestyInternational). ee for the latteraspect:
Habermas
1992,
659f)
and Walzer
1992a, 1993, 53).
3. See
Walzer
1983) ( metics ),
Heater
1990),
Brubaker
1992),
Tassin
(1992),
Meehan
(1993),
Muus
(1993)
for excellent
treatments
f second-class
citizenship.
See
v.
Dijk (1992)
for
an excellent
treatment f the so-called
Schengenparadox:
ree movementwithin he EU. On
the
other
hand,
states are
required
o lead
policies
to make
people
stay
where
they
are and to
radically
close the
European
Fortress
externally.
4. See
the relation of
Citizenship
of the Union and Danish
citizenship
in the
Danish
Declaration
n
Edinborough
December
11-12,
1992
(quoted
n
Lange
1993).
5. See for
sovereignty:Ruggie
(1993).
His treatment s
very
similarto
my protheoretical
strategy
of
disaggregation,
laborated
n
Bader
(1989, 1991).
This
strategyopens
up promising
perspectives
or normative
heory
and
political
philosophy
as
well. See
Kymlicka
and Norman
(1994,
309f)
and Parekh
1990, 702).
6. It is a clear
symptom
hatthe
exclusionary
effects of
citizenship
are
completely lacking
in
two
recent readers:
Gemeinschaft
und
Gerechtigkeit
Brumlik
and
Brunkhorst, ds., 1993;
exception:
Wellmer)
and
Auf
der Suche
nach
der
gerechten
Gesellschaft
Frankenberg 993)
in
which
many
different third
ositions
are
gathered
between
liberalism nd
communitarian-
ism.
In
Kymlicka
and Norman
1994) they are,
explicitly
but not
surprisingly,
xcluded.
In
this
article,
I
exclude so-called differentialistor
postmodern
attempts
to deal
with the
problem
because they have still not overcome their fundamental trangenessto ethics and political
philosophy,
particularly
heir
really
terrible ack
of institutional
concreteness
(see
the
more
interesting
versions of
Connolly
1991; Young 1990;
Benhabib
1993;
in
some
respect
also
Brunkhorst
1994).
7.
Only veryrecently
one finds a
growing
amountof studies
on these
topics (Singer 1972;
Barry 1973, chap. 12;
1989, chap.
12
and
16;
Beitz
1979;Beitz,
Cohen,Scanlon, and
Simmons
1985; Dowty 1987;
Shue
1988;
Veldhuis
1990;
Shklar
1991; Barryand
Goodin
1992). My own
sketch
(for
a more
extended
version,
see Bader
1993b)
is
verymuch
informedby
the writings
of
Joe Carensand Goodin.
8. See Waldron 1987);Bader(1990).
9. See Carens
(1992)
and
Dummett
(1992)
along
those lines.
Both
strategiesencounter
serious internal
consistency problems
and
externalcriticism(see
the
commentariesby Wood-
ward
[1992]
and Finnis and the
illuminatingcomparison
of
alternative
perspectivesby Terry
Nardin
[1992]).
Without
being
able to
show this
here,
argumentsfrom justice seem more
promising
to me. Frank
Cunningham
as
rightly
criticizedmy
essay for not
giving reasons in
this
respect.
10.
Suggestion
made
by
Robertv.d.
Veen.
11. This is
as seriousan
omission
n
the
sketchof
my argument
s the fact thatI have to leave
out the
question
of how
and
by
whom
ustice will be
democratically
mplemented bothMichael
Walzer and Frank
Cunningham
did
remind
me
in
their comments of the
seriousness of this
omission).
12. See Goodin
(1992,
8f)
for the
logic of this
indirectmoral
argument.
13. See Raz
(1975), Habermas
1991, 1992). A
note on
terminology eems urgenthere: he
distinctionbetween
morality nd ethics ollows
Habermas's
erminology. Ethics efers to
Sittlichkeit
ndcould
perhaps
better
be
translatedwith
ethos. The
Hegelian
distinctionbetween
Moral
(Kant)
and
Sittlichkeit
Aristotle)
shows analogies but is not
identical with the
distinctionbetween
the
right
nd the
good n the
Rawlsian
tradition.
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Bader CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION
237
14.
Realist
arguments,
f
applied against
open
border
policies, strengthen
he
urgency
of
international
edistribution. f
appliedagainst
both
options (as
usual), they
are
outright
conser-
vative in theirconsequences.
15.
Only
the world
is
a
self-containeddistributiveworld
(Walzer1983, 28),
the
only
plausible
alternative
s
humanity
tself....
entire
globe (p. 29):
a Rawlsian idealcontractual-
ism or Habermas's
undistorted ommunication
may
be
the
only
viable
options.
See Brumlik
and
Brunkhorst
1993, 13).
16. If one
sets aside communitarian
iberals ike
Selznick,
Etzioni
1989),Unger,and,
more
outspoken
liberal,
Gutmanand
Kymlicka.
17. And that
s even true for
Kymlicka
1989b, 178, 199,
201f).
18.
See
for a
critique:
Bader
199la, chap.
Artikulation),
xcellent:
J. Scott
(1985),
Anderson
(1993,
104ff).
Walzer
himself
recognized ( second
qualification
n
a lecture in
Amsterdam,
October
26,
1993)
that
he should have
seriously
better
qualified
his talk about shared
values
and shared
meaning
n
Spheres.
19. See Bader
and
Benschop (1989,
234). Unfortunately,
common
history-Estab-
lished/Outsiders-historistic
ideologies
are
not
analytically
solated and
separately
dealt with.
They should therefore
be
added
(after
erritorial
haracteristics).
20. See Bader
(1991a) chap.
3
on Collective
Identity.
See excellent
historical
examples
in
Brubaker
1992);
Anderson
(1983).
21.
See Walzer
(1983, 28f, 52) ( national
lub
is
different rom
the
state ).
See a bit
clearer
in his
Comment
Walzer
1992c)
on
Taylor,
where he
distinguishes liberalnationstates ike
Norway,France,and the Netherlands rom immigrantocieties like theUnitedStates p. 101).
But
even
this distinction
does,unwillingly, eproduce
he
deology
of the
ethnically
and
culturally
homogeneous
nationstates
(ask
the
Bretons,
the
Occitantiens,
he
Fries).
A
really homoge-
neous nation-state s a theoretical
iction,
not
a
historical
eality,
even afterso
many
centuries
of
unifying
and
disciplinary
tate
policies.
Empirically,
he
real
nterestingquestions
concern,
as
always,
the different
degrees
of
homogeneity
or
heterogeneity.
See for
a
critique
of
this ideal
fit
of states
in
cultural traditions :
Kymlicka
(1989b);
v.d.
Berg (1993)
B
Presumptionof
Nation-States.
22. See Walzer
1983,
42) Perhaps he
borderof the
political community sic] was drawn
years ago so as to leave theirvillagesand towns onthewrongside ;states arealso the political
expression
of a common life
and
(most
often)
of
a
national
family' ; (63)
If
the
community
[sic]
is
so
radically
divided
that
a
single citizenship
s
impossible,
then its
territorymust be
divided,
too.
If
Walzerwould
take this
crypto-normativist
axim
seriously,
t
wouldmean that
most recent states should
radically
be broken
up into smaller
quasi-homogeneous ommuni-
ties: see below
(vs. global
state andstate-less
world).
If
the
sharing akesplace
in smallerunits
(p. 29), why
not
adjust
the
politicalunits ?
That the
adjustmentmust itself be worked out
politically
and
that one has
to appeal o
common meanings s not only no
argument n favor
of the state as the
appropriate
nit,
but
it
outright ontradicts t.
23. See Walzer 1992b,164f, 168)withmorestresson thesocial construction f communities.
24. One
can
find
that
too,
for
instance,
n
texts
of
Kymlicka (1989b, 135,
178, 199, 201f)
and
Carens.See for
critique:
Habermas
1992, 166); Bader,
Berger,
GanlBmann,nd Knesebeck
(1976, 356ff)
25. See
Bourdieu (1979). But from the
very general
argumentof some
necessary relation
between
identity, group,
boundaries, nd closure, no
specific
argument n favor of the
state can be
drawn.
Normativelyspeaking,
t
may
be
legitimate
for
co-owners of apartment
houses
andfor worker
ooperatives o apply
strongly elective
admission
policies (bothexamples
from
Walzer's
reply
to
my critique n
Amsterdam,October
1993) because theexcluded can find
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238 POLITICAL
THEORY
May
1995
their way somewhereelse, but
even this
example
shows the limits: morally llegitimate
criteria
of exclusion
on one
hand,
exclusion without
alternatives
n the other.The
analogy
with the
state
is frivolousfortwo reasons: i) so long as statememberships such an important sset in many
respects (including housing,
work,
etc.),
it should not be
simply compared
o
membership
n
neighborhoods
nd
clubs ; (ii)
if all states
apply
the same
exclusionarypolicy (see
Carens's
critique
of the
legitimacy
of the state
system
and the
asymmetry
of exit and
entry ;
ee
Brubaker1992).
26. See Kymlicka 1990, chap. 9)
for
consequences
n the normativedebateabout
pluralism
and
state
neutrality.
ee
also Carens
1990);
see
analytically:
Bader and
Benschop (1989, IV, ?
4.6.3 Selective association vs. ? 4.6.4 Patronage.
27. See
E.
Weber,Elias, Foucault,
E. P.
Thompson,AnthonySmith,
B.
Anderson,Brubaker,
Hobsbawm,
and
many
others.
28. See Kymlicka(1989b)
for native Indians
n Canadaand the
United
States.
29. See Ruggie (1993, 174);Pogge (1992)
for a
critique
of this ideal it of institutions
within
territorial
tates.
This
presumption
f State of
Spheres Berg 1993)
and
the
corresponding
statement
of state
sovereignty
s much
qualified
n later
writings
of Walzer
see 1993, 54). Pogge
(1992, 61ff)
discusses
four
main
reasons
for
a vertical
dispersal
of
sovereignty
in
his multi-
layered
scheme :
peace/security, educingoppression,global
economic
ustice,
and
ecology.
30.
This
voluntarist hetoric
of
exclusion
s
quite
common
anguage
n
right-wingparties
(see
for
France:
Brubaker
1992, 157).
31. Achterberg 1994).
32.
See
(Barber 1984; Unger
1987
II;
Walzer
1989;
Hirst
1994;
Cohen and
Rogers 1992;
Held
1992;
Brunkhorst
994).
For
an
excellent treatment f the historical raditionsof the
two
conceptions
of
citizenship
and
the
respective egitimations
of
exclusion,
see Schuck
and
Smith
(1985).
33.
See
(Gutman1985;
Greschner
1989; Kymlicka1988, 1989, 1990;
Selznick1992;Etzioni
1988).
34. See Barber
1984) (very
little on
parochialism,nothing
on
exclusion);
Greschner
1989,
140); (Hirst 1994)
is much
more
aware
of
the
problem.
n
his
later
writings,
Walzer
moreclearly
distinguishes
between
nasty
nd noblenationalism
1989, 1990)
and triesto discuss nations
in different historical contexts of dominance(1992a, 164, 166, 169f): historical forms of
nationalismand
the
consequences
or
the
many
conceivable
arrangements
etween dominance
and
detribalization nd
dominanceand
separation ;
ee also his
defense
of moral
minimalism
as a standard
or
dealing
with tribal
zealots. Of course there is some
hope that internal
democratic
organization
t least
helps
to
temper
external
oppression, xploitation,
and exclusion
(see Cunningham1991, 317,
who is
more
friendly
to the communitarian osition than I) for a
restatementof Friedrich
Engels's hope
in
this
respect, which has a hard
time with Athenian,
Venetian,Dutch, American mperialism,and Swiss xenophobia.See also Macedo's (1991, 279)
questionable
statement hat
no
two
liberal
regimes
have ever
gone
to war with one another.
Unfortunately,hereis, in my mind,more reasonforskepticism.
35.
See
Habermas
1992, 333-48): Discourse theory breakswith an
ethical conceptionof
civic
autonomy,
which draws
ts
legitimatingpower from the convergence
of familiarethical
convictions,
and
presupposes
an
ascriptive membership n an intersubjective
ife-form and
coherence
of
tradition,
common
ife, a commonpast, anda substantial
onceptof a people
(Volksbegriff),
which
apprehends
he
constitutionas a civic or national
religion, which
understands
Staatsburgerschaft
r
citizenship
not
legally but ethically,
and which favors
(austragt)
a dominant thical
meaning
n
politics andpoliticaldiscourse.
Accordingly his does
not
make
sharpenough
the actualdifference
between politics andethics
(p. 346).
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Bader CITIZENSHIP
AND
EXCLUSION 239
36.
See
Habermas
1992,637)
Conceptually,
itizenship
and
national
dentity
were
always
already independent.
Historically,
o the
contrary,
thnic and
civic
aspects
have
always
been
combined, n one way or the other, n nations(see Smith 1989, 348f).
37. See
much more
critically:
Brubaker
1992).
See for some
consequences
of the
republican
French
traditionof
citoyennete,
which-officially-does
not
pay any
respect
to
ascriptive
criteria,
for
immigration
and
naturalization
policies
and traditions
(political
integration)
n
comparison
with
he British
race -basedmodel
of
multiculturalism nd
incorporation :
erena
Stolcke
(1993).
38.
I
do not wantto
suggest
too
strong
a link
betweennationand
community.
Communities
can
take other
forms....
Reiterativeuniversalismoffers a
way
of
understanding
nd
ustifying
those boundaries.
There is no sure
way, given
the
circumstancesof
national
ife,
to
get
them
right.Nor
is it
any
part
of
my argument
hat
hese boundaries hould
always
be state
boundaries
(Walzer
1990a,554f).
39.
With
respect to
language,
Habermas's
reatment
emains
inconsistent:
sometimes
he
seems to
accept
linguistic
bonds as essential:
In
the last
analysis,
what
brings together
egal
associates
in a lawful
community
s
the
tie
of
language,
of
people
communicating
ogether
(1992,
372,
interestinglyenough
with
reference to Walzer's
FourMobilities
[1990,
13f]).
Whereas
at other
places,
common
language
s
treated
as an
ascriptive
criterion
see
Habermas
1992,
636, 642),
which is
more
in line
with the
reality
of bi-
or
multilingual
tates like
Canada,
Switzerland,and,
more
recently,
South Africa. Carens s
defending
he claim
that
n
Quebec,
in
a contextof
power
asymmetries,
anguage
s a
legitimate
riterion n
immigration
olicies (1993,
10), but he carefullycriticizes thick heoriesof languageacquisition 33f) to prevent urther-
going
claims of cultural
adaptation
o which
Charles
Taylor
has
drawn
much
attention. V.
Gunsteren
1988)
unproblematically
ccepts
history
as a
relevant
criterion,
whereas
Choenni,
following
Baubock,signalizes
llegitimate
xclusionary
ffects
(1992,67,71,74)
of
conceptions
of
citizenship
starting
rom
predefined
olitical
community
and assumes
that
citizenship
s
the
cement
of its
cohesion. See below
(section
4.3)
for a
more
systematic tatement f this
problem.
40. If
one understands
emocracypolitically,
not
ethically,
nd
if
one shifts the
balance
n
the
democratic
rinciple
rom he
still,
n some
way, particularist
echtsform
oward
Moralprinzip,
the
result
is
a universalist
onception
of
democratic
itizenship
hat
leaves
completely
open the
questionof political evelsorunits. However,hisunmistakabledentity i.e.,anassociationbound
together
by
law with
specific
forms of
life
and
traditions
V.B.]
does
not
identify
t
as a
political
community
f
citizens.On the
contrary, eneral
principles
fjustice
hold
sway
over
the
democratic
process, principles
which are
equally constitutive for each
polity
(Burgerschaft)
Habermas
1992,
372).
In
Habermas's
version of the
democratic
principle,
the
universalistprinciple of
morality
s
stronger
hanthe
lawful form
(Rechtsform)
f the
particular
awful
communitywith
which it is
combined. State
citizenship and world
citizenship form
a
continuum,
which can
already
be
recognized
in
its
outlines
(das sich immerhin
schon
im Umrissen
abzeichnet).
Democratic
citizenship (in
the
universal
sense of
Burgerschaftnot
Staatsburger)
howing a
tendency toward a global citizenship status, becomes historicallydisconnectedfrom state
membership
and linked with
membership
n
the
republic
of
republics
n
the Kantian
or
Habermasian
version:
der
Republik
der
Weltburger.
The
political
discourse,
consequently, s
supposed o show a
significantshift
from
ethical-political oward
moral-political
iscourse.
41. Carens
1993, 37ff) for Quebec.
42.
See for the
UnitedStates:
Korver
1990,
chap.5);see the short
review
of U.S. immigration
law in
historicalperspective:
Elster
(1992,57-61). See for
Switzerland:
Anderson 1983, 123-7).
43.
Following
an
old
legal distinction
between
different
statuses f
citizenship,Habermas
(1992, 638ff)
distinguishes
between
Staatsangehorigkeit nd
Staatsburgerschaft,
r, tradi-
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240 POLITICAL
THEORY
May
1995
tionally,
between
status
positivus
civilis and
status activus.
Unfortunately,
he
consequences
of
this
distinction
for
our
problem
are
not elaborated n detail.
Habermas
s content with two
remarks: i) the conventionalascriptivendices of residenceandbirth ius soli and ius sanguinis)
establish
no irrevocable
ubmission
to the
sovereign power, they
are much more
only
admin-
istrative
criteria
or the attribution
f civil status.But he
correctly
ndicates hat the
decoupling
of the normativemeaning
of civil
status rom the
ascriptive
ndices
of descent has
certainly
not
been completely
carried out. Normatively,he argues
for a very liberal and
permissive
immigration
policy
without
any
further
pecification
635f). (ii)
He
distinguishes
betweenlegal
political rights,
which are included n the status
activus on the one
hand,
and more
extensive
republican
olitical
or moral duties
of a civic
praxis,
to which no one can be
compelled by
legal
norms.
A
legally
enforced
obligation
o observe democratic
ights
has
something
of
the
totalitarian.... Forgood reasons,modernobligatory ight(Zwangsrecht)
s
not
concerned
with
motives
and
disposition.
Republicanpractices
and virtues
depend
properly
n
uncompelled
motives and opinions
of
a
citizenry
oriented o the common
good
(Habermas1992,641). Again,
the consequences
for our
problem
remain
very
much
implicit
and would
roughly
mean that
republican
democraticculture,virtues,
and
practices
cannot be used
in
any way
as criteriaof
exclusion,
because
they
cannot
even
legally
be asked from state members.
In
my sketch,
I
elaborate
he
multilayered
oncept
of
citizenship
tatusesof
Georg
Jellinek
1905,
1928)
without
stating
hatthese
different tatuses
shouldbe
integrated
n some
harmonistic,
olistic
concept
of
citizenship.
I
hope
that it is
unnecessary
o mention that
I
do not follow Jellinek's more than
dubioustheory
of
democracy see
de
Lange
1993).
44. Still excellent:
Jellinek
(1905, 83f) See,
for one of the
many
recentversions of the same
argument,
Dworkin
(1977).
45. See
Brubaker
1992)
for the
importance
n
republicanpolitical
discourseon
citizenship
law and
naturalization
n France.
46.
From Kant onward:
oro
interno versus
oro externo;
see Walzer
(1990a, 216); status
activus
and
what ies
beyond.
47. See
Cunningham 1987)
for those criteriaand the crucial
question
of
degrees.
Empiri-
cally,
there
can be found
huge
differencesbetween democratic
political
systems (see
v. Beyme
and
many others).
Normatively,
he scale runs from defendersof restrictiveelite
versions of
representativepoliticaldemocracy(fromSchumpeter o Huntington) o extensive versions of
participatory
ocial
and
political
democracy.
48.
For
similar,
but much less
developed
treatments,
ee
Habermas
1992, 640-3);
Walzer
(1983, 306-11, 1989,
and
particularly
1992: comparison
of
the
model of the good life in
republican
democracy ? II],
in
the
marketplace? IV],
and
in
civil
society [?
VI]).
49. See
Bader
(1992).
See
Kymlicka
and Norman
(1994, 357ff).
Unfortunately,Barber
(1984)
himself,
in
his
regrettable
nd unnecessaryantiliberal hetoric,
usually equalizes
liberal
theories
with liberal
onstitutions,politics,
and
practices ;
ow threshold
egal citizenship
and
representative emocracy
with
thin
democracy. This does
not help to clarify the relation
betweenlegalstatusactivusandstrongpoliticalcitizenshipor thatbetween representative nd
strong
democracy.
n
Figure
3 of Barber
p.
219),
it
would,therefore,be muchbetter
andmore
in line with the
spirit
of
his
arguments o deal with thindemocracy
nstead of representative
democracy
in strong
democracy:
itizens are also
legal persons, tc.).
50.
See
(Raz 1986;
Gutman
1987;Kymlicka
1990,205-7,216-25,
throughout).The minimal
nonneutrality
of liberal-democratic tates can be, and is commonly,
overstressed. In their
criticism of The
Left,
Civic
republicanism,
nd Civil society theorists, Kymlickaand
Norman
distinguish
between
citizenship
s
legal
status and citizenship s desirable
activity
(1994, 353),
a distinction that is
very
close to what I have
proposed.
They point to urgent
dilemmas
confronting
iberal heories
of
virtues.
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Bader CITIZENSHIPAND
EXCLUSION 241
51. This is evidently
he case in v. Gunsterens iscussionof admission
equirements 1988,
736-8). See,
for similar
arguments,
Oldfield
(1990, 147).
See as a kind of
post
mortem
warning
the perverse version of communitarianism n constitutional heory and practice of real
existing
socialism
(see
the shortreview in Grawert
1984,
195f)
52.
A
symptomatic
ndicationof this
difficulty
can be found n Carens's
ambivalent
attitude
toward stronger conceptions
of culture and virtues: in his texts on distributive
ustice
and
problems of incentives he, rightly,
insists on their relevance
(1981, 1987);
in his texts on
immigration,refugees
and
naturalization,
e avoids it
for fear of
exclusionary consequences.
Now,
I thinkthis
fear is
empirically
well foundedbut
conceptuallyunnecessary.
And it
forms
a
bottleneck
in
normative
theory.
One
can and should defend a minimal threshold
concept
of
citizenship,
but
doing
this does not
prevent
one from
arguing
or much
thickerversions
of
politics
and political citizenship.
The
importance
of a clear
distinction
of
thick
political conceptions
from thick
ethnic
conceptions
of
citizenship
is demonstrated
xcellently by
Brubaker
see
1992,
178ff for
Germany).
53.
See Bourdieu
1979);
Bader
(1991a, chaps.
on Habitusand Kollektive
Identitat);
Barber
(1984). This,
in
part,
s
recognizedby
Habermas:
Legallyguaranteed
onditionsof
recognition
do not however
reproduce
hemselves
automatically.They
need the
cooperative
ffort of a civic
practice,something
to which no one
can
be
compelled by
legal requirements.
Thus
the
legally
constituted
civic
dependsupon
a
convival,
consonant
background
f motives and
opinions
of a
citizenryreceptive
o the
common
good
whichcannotbe
legally
ordained
1992, 641). Compare,
Thecontext
of a
political
culture
of
freedom
p. 642).
See Wellmer
1993, 183ff), Brunkhorst,
and others.
54.
This
insight
is not
a
privilege
of
communitarians.
ee,
for different
versions, Dewey
(see Joas 1993);
Rawls's
overlapping
consensus
(1993, 133ff);
Habermas's
evolutionary
arguments.See Carens(1993),
the
only ust political order,
at least
undermodem conditions
(p. 24),
the
political
culture
of a liberaldemocratic
ociety
itself
implies
a
specific culture,
ethos, history,
and
way
of life
(39f). Living
in
modem societies includes a minimal
prize:
societal
differentiation,
ne or other version of
private-public
istinction,
ecularized
public
spheres
that are
incompatible
and incommensurable
with all
versions of
religious
fundamental-
ism;
the
commitment o
pluralism
s
not without imits
of
tolerationof cultural
differences
(see
26f on violence andon exit optionsfordissenters).
55.
See Walzer
(1990a).
Re-iterativeuniversalism does not
require
an
external
standpoint
or
a universal perspective (527);
the universalvalues
of moral minimalism
all have
particularist mplications ;
thin
morality
is
always
and
necessarily
embedded
in
thick
morality see
lecture
Amsterdam,
October
26, 1993).
56.
All
this is
excellently
elaborated
y
Roberto
Unger(1983,
1987
II;
see
also Bader199 b).
See the same idea
in
Habermas
(1992, chap. 9), but with the usual lack
of institutional
concreteness.
57.
See the excellent treatment f
liberaltheories
of
virtue, which have been neglected for
so long, in Macedo(1991) andGalston(1991); see also Cunningham 1987, 144-50).
58. See Bader
(199la, 421f)
for
individual and
collective
problems
of
reconciliation of
individuality,contingency,mortality,
and
history with
universalistreason under conditions of
modernity.
59.
See
Riedel
(for
an excellent
interpretation f
Kant).
Huizinga,
Putte. Habermas s not
content
with
this
proposal.
It is for
Habermasa historical act thata political culture n which
the basic
constitutional
principles
can
put down roots may in
no ways rest on a common ethnic,
linguistic and culturaldescent of all citizens (Habermas
1992, 642). My personal aversion
against
he
use of nation-states
ay,
n
this respect,be
very much nfluencedby the historically
understandable
egativeattitude f most democratic nd
eftist German ntellectualswith regard
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242
POLITICAL
THEORY May
1995
to (mainstream)
German
history,
community,
nd traditionof this verspatete
Nation. But
I
doubt
that this
would
make
much difference for the core of
my
theoreticalargument.
Joas
highlightscorrectly he completelydifferent ontextandhistoryof community iscussionsin
the United States,
but even
he
completely
neglects,
in his
critique
of the
generalized
uspicion
againstparochialism,
egional
and national dentities
1993,
60),
all exclusionary
effects.
60.
Carens,
to my mind,
is
too careful
in this
regard:
democraticcommunitiescannot
do
without
more
than
some commitment o civil
rights,
rule
of
law,
democraticrights (see
1993,
24f, note
27:
Howmany
citizens
have to be committed
howmuch o secure he
reproduction
of democratic
culture
and therewith
of democratic nstitutions
and
principles?
Probably
too
weak,
iberal
state
neutrality
may
not be
enough.
61. These questions
can
easily
be misunderstood s if I would
perpetuate
hree
well-known
shortcomings
of most
versions
of liberal
heory: 1) usually,
he
benign
ersions of
state-neu-
trality
with
regard
o
ethnicity
are
only
thinlydisguised
versionsof
chauvinist niversalism
n
which the ethnicity
of the
predominant
roup/nation
s ignoredand,
thereby,presented
as
neutral
and universal. 2)
No
complete
ethnic
neutrality
f
states
is
possible
if one takes into account
thatall states
have one
(or more)
official
languages,specific
borders,
anddistributions
f
powers
between
federal,
regional,
and local
levels;
that
all
states have to distribute
carce
resources
among
competing
nations,
ethnic
groups,
and so on.
(3)
The normative
deal of ethnic
neutrality
itself has
to
be reformulated:
relational
thnic neutrality in analogy to the
reformulation f
objectivity
n
philosophy
of
science,
cf.
Bader
1988);
the
institutional ranslationwould
certainly
nclude
the
recognition
of
specific
group-rights,
roportional
epresentation,nd so
on
(cf. Kymlicka
1994).
I do not
want to continue the
symptomatic
black-box f most liberal
theories
that
ignore
the
space
between
individual nd state
completely
or
do
recognize
only
voluntary
associations
not allowing
institutional, rganizational,
nd
juridicalspace for ethnic
andother
collective
communitiesapart
rom the so-called
political
ommunity.
62. See already
Karl
Mannheim
beforethe second WorldWar;
ee
Amy
Gutman 1987).
63. Habermas's
heory
leaves room for more detailedproposals
n all threerespects, but ts
most
disappointing
spect
s thathe does not makeany
step
in
elaboratingwhatthat
would mean
(see
Bader
1993a;
also
Unger
1987;
Hirst
1994).
Walzer's
Spheres
(1983) nearly neglects the
problem
of how to tame the
ugly
external consequences,
but
is,
obviously,
much richer in
institutionaldetail.
64. See Stolcke
(1993),
Bader(1985).
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246 POLITICAL
THEORY
May
1995
Young, I. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
VeitMichael
Bader
s
Professor
f
PhilosophySocialPhilosophy)ndof
Sociology t
the
Universityf
Amsterdam.e teaches
heoretical
ociology
nd
theories
f society
and
heirhistory,
s well
as
critical ndmarxist
hilosophy;
heories
fjustice.
His
main
research
reas are social
inequalities
nd collective
ctionand
programmaticnd
strategic
pproaches
o the
politicsof
a
libertarian,
emocratic
ocialism.