Citizenhips Cases

7/29/2019 Citizenhips Cases

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[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing

the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner against private respondent Rosalind

Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to run

for elective office, because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly

renounced her Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in her application for

alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence that she was a

citizen or subject of Australia.

In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that private

respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of

registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship.

Renunciation must be express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. Atmost, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as

well. Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Her

filing of a certificate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and

that she will support and defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith

and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign citizenship, effectively removing

any disqualification as a dual citizen.

SYLLABUS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; RENUNCIATION MUST BE EXPRESS;

APPLYING FOR AN ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND HOLDING A

FOREIGN PASSPORT, NOT A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. In order that citizenship

may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's contention


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that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her

Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs.

COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the

case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of

a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino,and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to

renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC,

it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in

the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on

April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of

Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his

American citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez

was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not

acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her

claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of

citizenship, the same must be express.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP; AS A DISQUALIFICATION FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC

OFFICE REFERS TO CITIZENS WITH DUAL ALLEGIANCE; CASE AT BAR.

Petitioner maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dualcitizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section

40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, . . . In

the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as

used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of

the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino

citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the

conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court

explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual

allegiance. . . Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not

automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.

RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELY REMOVES ANY

DISQUALIFICATION AS A DUAL CITIZEN; CASE AT BAR. It was ruled that for


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candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon

the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual

citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign

citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because

in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/shewill support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith

and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective

renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed

her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent executed a

Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department

of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on

February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as

certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila.

As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue

of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.


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G.R. No. 157013. J uly 10, 2003.]

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official

capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the

Department of Budget and Management, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare

certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of

Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating

Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that

Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987

Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least

one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately

preceding an election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of

Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder

immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence

in the Philippines.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the

residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article. Ordinarily, an absentee is

not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an

absentee. However, under existing election laws and the countless pronouncements of the

Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the

Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the

domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the

framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require

Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of

the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the

residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could

impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified


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Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly

mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting. The Court, however,

declared certain provisions of the law unconstitutional, namely, portions of Secs. 17.1, 19

and 25, as they trampled on the constitutional mandate of independence of the

Commission on Elections. The Court also upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 withrespect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates

for Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and

proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with

Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court likewise upheld Sec.

5 (d) of the law. It also declared that pursuant to Sec. 30 of the law the rest of the

provision of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

SYLLABUS:

ELECTION LAWS; THE OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT OF 2003

(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9189); ENACTED IN OBEISANCE TO THE MANDATE OF

THE CONSTITUTION THAT CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE A SYSTEM FOR

VOTING BY QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD. As the essence of R.A. No. 9189

is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to take a holistic view

of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in

constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. InChiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to

the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with

all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in

character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different

intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the

language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the

intent of is framers through their debates in the constitutional convention. R.A. No. 9189

was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of

the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos

abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the

exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions,

Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The

Legislative Department) of the Constitution.


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SECTION 2, ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION CAME INTO BEING TO

REMOVE DOUBT AS TO THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE RESIDENCY

REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 1. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice

versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However,

under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining toelections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is

considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an

overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution

considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a

system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the

fact that while millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and

hence they contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their

voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this country's leaders is concerned. The

Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering the

novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos

with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially because the

Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters. Thus, Section 2,

Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the

inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any

problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largestnumber of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional

Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee

voting.

SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOUND IN SECTION 1 OF THE SAME ARTICLE.

It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that

they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have

not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to

young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents' domicile of origin is in the

Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of

that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency

requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory


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construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic

location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an

exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified

Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos

who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy theresidency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of

Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in

Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104,

which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor.

EXECUTION OF REQUIRED AFFIDAVIT IS NOT THE ENABLING OR

ENFRANCHISING ACT; AFFIDAVIT MERELY SERVES AS AN EXPLICIT

EXPRESSION THAT QUALIFIED ABSENTEE HAD NOT IN FACT ABANDONED

HIS OR HER DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the

coverage of the absentee voting process. Which does not require physical residency in the

Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those who are

disqualified. As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically

disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host

country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies

renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows animmigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she

executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of

the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the

Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of

suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if

actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers

of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling

or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the

intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the

Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in

fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of

the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional


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registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a

political exercise." To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent

residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have

relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the

presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DECLARATION IN CAASI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FINDS NO APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE BECAUSE IT DID NOT, FOR

OBVIOUS REASONS, CONSIDER THE ABSENTEE VOTING RIGHTS OF

FILIPINOS WHO ARE IMMIGRANTS AND PERMANENT RESIDENTS IN THEIR

HOST COUNTRIES. The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals

that green card holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application

to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the

absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their

host countries. In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189,

they may still be considered as a "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" upon

fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of

exercising their right of suffrage. It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only

require an affidavit or a promise to "resume actual physical permanent residence in the

Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration," the Filipinosabroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country.

Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause

for the removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and

his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia."

ABSENTEE VOTING PRESUPPOSES THAT THE "QUALIFIED CITIZEN OF THE

PHILIPPINES ABROAD" IS NOT PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN THE COUNTRY;

REQUIRED AFFIDAVIT GIVES THE ABSENTEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS

THAT HE HAS NOT ACTUALLY ABANDONED HIS DOMICILE IN THE

PHILIPPINES. Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the

Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting

in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that

Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the


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"qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country. The

provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee

voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the

affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to

have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become animmigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an

abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.

Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not

actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by

Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.


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G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004.]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,

vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.

FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,

vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004.]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,

vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE,

ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, J r. (hereinafter "FPJ"),

filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the

Philippines, indicating therein that, among other things, he is a natural-born Filipino

citizen, born on August 20, 1939 in the City of Manila. Petitioner Fornier initiated apetition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny

due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino

citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners. The COMELEC

dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was filed which was denied by the

COMELEC en banc. Petitioner filed a petition (G.R. No. 161824) before this Court

assailing the decision of the COMELEC. The other petitions, which were later

consolidated with G.R. No. 161824, challenged the jurisdiction of the COMELEC on the

basis of the constitutional provision that only the Supreme Court had original and

exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 161824. In ruling that FPJ is a

natural-born Filipino citizen, the Supreme Court referred to the 1935 Constitution, which


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was the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of FPJ , which

confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether

such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of

Lorenzo Poe (FPJ 's paternal grandfather) could only be drawn from the presumption that

having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his

place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could

have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo would have

benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.

The citizenship of Lorenzo would thereby extend to his son, Allan Poe, father of FPJ. The

Court further held that while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively

that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would

preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a

material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy.

The Court likewise dismissed the other petitions for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity,

both having been directly elevated to the Court in the latter's capacity as the only tribunal

to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. The

primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before (as in this

case), the elections are held.

SYLLABUS

POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTION CONTESTS; PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; HAS JURISDICTION OVER CONTESTS RELATING TO

THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT OF CANDIDATES FOR

PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT. Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest"

in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election

protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one

objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the

phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support


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this premise "Rule 12. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-

President of the Philippines. "Rule 13. How Initiated. An election contest is initiated

by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or

Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. Apetition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest. "Rule 14. Election Protest.

Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines

who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the

President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the

Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation

of the winner." The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-

President," of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A

quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who

usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the

election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a

registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number

of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election

scenario.

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1935 CONSTITUTION; THE

CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE THOSE WHOSE FATHERS ARE CITIZENS

OF THE PHILIPPINES REGARDLESS WHETHER SUCH CHILDREN ARE

LEGITIMATE OR ILLEGITIMATE; CASE AT BAR. [T]he 1935 Constitution, the

fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ , can

never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the

Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are

citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions

or distinctions where there are clearly none provided.


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Separate Opinion

COMELEC HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE IN AN

APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING WHETHER A CANDIDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE

OFFICE IS ELIGIBLE OR IS DISQUALIFIED FOR THE OFFICE FOR WHICH HEFILED HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Under the Omnibus Election Code

and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC has the original jurisdiction to

determine in an appropriate proceeding whether a candidate for an elective office is

eligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to

be a candidate or to continue such candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds

for disqualification.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; PROOF OF PATERNITY OR FILIATION

IS ENOUGH FOR THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD TO FOLLOW THE CITIZENSHIP

OF HIS PUTATIVE FILIPINO FATHER; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner Fornier never

alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ . By revolving his case around the

illegitimacy of FPJ , Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For

purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose

mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the

citizenship of his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amicicuriae. Since paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the

COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino

citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which

reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (3) Those whose fathers

are citizens of the Philippines. I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no

distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough

that filiation is established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 1, ARTICLE IV, 1935

CONSTITUTION; DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A QUALIFICATION THAT THE

CHILD BE A PRODUCT OF A LEGITIMATE UNION FOR HIM TO ACQUIRE THE

NATIONALITY OF THE FILIPINO FATHER. Section 1, Article IV of the 1935

Constitution does not provide for a qualification that the child be a product of a legitimate


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union for the child to acquire the nationality of the Filipino father. Ubi lex non distinguit

nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

There should be no distinction in the application of the fundamental law where none is

indicated. The drafters of the Constitution, in making no qualification in the use of the

general word "father" must have intended no distinction at law. The Courts could onlydistinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a

distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the

lawgiver's intent. Clearly, the framers of the 1935 Constitution simply provided that when

paternity is known or established, the child follows the father's citizenship; otherwise, the

citizenship of the mother is followed. If we concede that the framers of the Constitution

intended a qualification that the child be the product of a legitimate union, such would

lead to clear injustice, and a restricted interpretation, by creating a distinction when the

language of the law is clear and unambiguous.

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ARTICLE VII, SECTION 4 (7) OF THE

CONSTITUTION; CANNOT BE INVOKED BEFORE THE ELECTIONS; CASE AT

BAR. Two of the petitions seek a direct action for this purpose, those of petitioners

Tecson, et al., and Velez. These two petitions fail outright. The "contest" they rely on is as

yet non-existing, since it refers to a situation when someone has been proclaimed a

winner after the elections and his proclamation is challenged in a "contest." The provisionin the Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7, Constitution) that says that "the Supreme

Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,

returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President," cannot be invoked before

the elections.

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ARTICLE IV, SECTION 2 OF THE

CONSTITUTION; SPEAKS OF AN ACT HAVING TO BE DONE BY THE CHILD TO

ACQUIRE OR PERFECT HIS CITIZENSHIP AND DOES NOT COVER ACTS OF HIS

PARENTS; CASE AT BAR. As to the point that such legitimation needed an act after

birth, namely, the marriage of the parents, the same would not detract from the concept of

a natural-born citizen. For the definition in the Constitution refers to those who are

citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their

citizenship (Art. IV, Sec. 2, Constitution). Thus, it speaks of an act having to be done by


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the child, to acquire or perfect his citizenship, and does not cover acts of his parents.

From this it follows that Fornier's case falls, since he has not proven that Poe, Jr. was not

a Filipino citizen at birth, a point that as petitioner he has the burden of showing.

SECTION 1 (3), ARTICLE IV OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION; DID NOTDISTINGUISH BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILD FOR

PURPOSES OF ACQUIRING THE FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP OF THE FATHER.

Section 1 (3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution did not, by its express terms, distinguish

between a legitimate and an illegitimate child for purposes of acquiring the Filipino

citizenship of the father. It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is

made by law, the Court should not distinguish Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos

distinguere debemos. . . . To circumscribe the application of the endowed political

privilege under Section 1 (3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution only to the legitimate

children of Filipino fathers would be clearly violative of the equal protection clause of the

Constitution. There appears to be no substantial distinction between legitimate and

illegitimate children to justify their disparate treatment vis--vis the possession of the

status of and the exercise of a political privilege, including the right to run for and be

elected to public office. The legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, bears no

relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. The only

purported purpose of the "natural-born citizen" requirement is to ensure the elected publicofficer's allegiance to the Republic. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate how

legitimate or illegitimate birth affects loyalty to the Republic. Not to be overlooked is the

fact that a natural child's conception may take place under circumstances that render it

practically indistinguishable from that of a legitimate child, except for the absence of a

marriage ceremony between the parents. To hold that a child's illegitimacy can bear

significance on his right to acquire citizenship is to step from the bounds of law, into the

realm of inequitable and bigoted rationalism. . . . [T]he derivation of citizenship from a

person, or the transmission of citizenship to his child, springs from blood relationship

which, whether injected legitimately or illegitimately, is the same blood and has the same

political effect. Hence, all that is needed to be established is paternity as a manifestation

of blood relationship.


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A CANDIDATE'S CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY IS DETERMINED BY LAW, NOT BY

HIS GOOD FAITH; CASE AT BAR. [I]n this case, it does not matter that respondent

knows that he was not a natural-born Filipino citizen and, knowing such fact, proceeded

to state otherwise in his certificate of candidacy, with an intent to deceive the electorate.

A candidate's citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by law, not by his goodfaith. It was, therefore, improper for the COMELEC to dismiss the petition on the ground

that petitioner failed to prove intent to mislead on the part of respondent.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; ANY DOUBT REGARDING

CITIZENSHIP MUST BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. I am very

mindful of the Court's pronouncement that no presumption can be indulged in favor of

the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be

resolved in favor of the State. This doctrine provides the Court guidance on how to

resolve the several doubtful factual issues in the case. There may be several matters under

the law that may be liberally construed, but I believe citizenship is not one of them.

Filipino citizenship is conferred by law and nothing else, not even good faith or colorable

possession thereof. Citizenship is a privilege, and not a right. To cheapen citizenship by

according it through haphazard presumptions is tantamount to cheapening our nation's

worth and soul. Thus, any unresolved doubt cannot be adjudged in favor of Poe. His

claim to natural-born citizenship must be established by law, and evidence in accord withthe law.

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; AN ILLEGITIMATE

CHILD FOLLOWS THE NATIONALITY OF THE MOTHER. It is not rare that in

cases of children born out of wedlock, the paternity is either unknown or disputed.

Logically, the nationality of the illegitimate child cannot follow that of the father. For

States adhering to the rule of jus sanguinis, therefore, the nationality of the mother, the

child's only known parent, becomes the only basis for the child's nationality. The

principle thus benefits the child, saving him from a limbic, stateless existence.


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G.R. No. 162759. August 4, 2006.

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, ET AL., petitioners,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

D E C I S I O NGARCIA, J p:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as

"duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine

citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-

Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided

under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission

on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as

absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

The facts:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A.

9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before

the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification

as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the UnitedStates that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September

23, 20032 , they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-

year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however,

urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter's

registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely

certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.

Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in

Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in

response:

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality . . ., it is the

Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of

suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for them.

Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September 2003


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at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular voters

who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1, Article 5

of the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the

COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and

mandamus.

A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the

COMELEC filed a Comment, 6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be

expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in

Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual

citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so", observing, however, that

the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. 7

The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the

petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners' participation in such political

exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the

petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in

future elections, however, remains unresolved.

Observing the petitioners' and the COMELEC's respective formulations of the issues, thesame may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who

might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.

9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.

In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the

right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.

We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as

follows:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in

the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at

least six months immediately preceding the election. . . . .

SEC 2. The Congress shall provide . . . a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos


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abroad.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general

eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to

devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an

exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 the OAVL 8

identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot,

as follows:

Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise

disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote

for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under

this Act:

(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have

pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

(c) Those who have . . . [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of

an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who

have . . . been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised

Penal Code, . . . .;(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host

country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose

by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent

residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her

registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for

citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the

name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee

Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent

by competent authority . . . . (Words in bracket added.)

Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting

mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants

and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the


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disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge on the

ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it

. . . violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter

must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he

proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [Thechallenger] cites . . . Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to support his claim [where] the Court

held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his

domicile and residence in the Philippines.

[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not

allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be

qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to

circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a

condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to

qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be

granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications

provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. 10 (Words in bracket added.)

As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189

mainly on the strength of the following premises:

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an

immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" becauseimmigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's

residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and

permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit

to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional

intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that

Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical

residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the

Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not the

enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of

the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in

the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not


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in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution

of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional

registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a

political exercise." 11

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congressenacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that

all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to

have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their

Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are

hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath

of allegiance to the Republic:

xxx xxx xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become

citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the

aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquirePhilippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the

Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-

acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and

be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the

Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements

under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known

as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the

qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing

laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and

sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship . . .;


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3) . . . ;

(4) . . . ;

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines

cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed

forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship

under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy . . . political rights,

specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.

Opposing the petitioners' bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the

same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to

political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the

Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the

clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat,

requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a

Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights, 12 COMELEC argues:

4. 'DUALS' MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/RESIDENCE IN THE

PHILIPPINES4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical.

The 'duals,' upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign

citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal

ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a second

citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, 'duals' must, for purposes of voting, first of all, decisively

and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13

The Court disagrees.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law R.A. 9225

requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines

first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit

acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1)

the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be


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overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all

overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter

under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:

It is clear from these discussions of the . . . Constitutional Commission that [it] intended

to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandonedtheir domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who

reach voting age abroad whose parents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and

consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 [Article V]

immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary

implication in statutory construction, . . ., the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that

the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency

requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same

Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines

may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in

Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency

requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when

Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate

floor, thus:Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the

constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the Constitution is

supreme in any statute that we may enact.

Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, "who shall have resided in the Philippines."

They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so they are barred under

the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact

does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?

Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora.

This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of "residence" is

synonymous with "domicile."

As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, "domicile" is the intent to return to one's


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home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the Philippines

and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent

to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under

this law.

This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we thatCongress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.

If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical

presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting to our offshore

kababayan, Mr. President.

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it

reads: "The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the

ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad."

The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is "qualified." In other words, anything that

we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition

that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And "residents" (sic) is

a qualification.

xxx xxx xxx

Look at what the Constitution says "In the place wherein they propose to vote for at

least six months immediately preceding the election."

Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . . . . We are separated only by a creek. But one

who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months.

That is how restrictive our Constitution is. . . . .

As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But

he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he is not

qualified to vote.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-

debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of

Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement is

to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an

exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr.

President, that one must remember.


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The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence . . . "residency" has

been interpreted as synonymous with "domicile."

But the third more practical reason, . . . is, if we follow the interpretation of the

gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to

overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculousbecause that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and

empower them to vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship

Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting.

According to the poll body:

1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been

consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries,

subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA

9225; 15

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the

scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals"

may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas

absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:

"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines

abroad exercise their right to vote;"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to

register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the

day of elections;

While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded

thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals".

This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A.

9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire

Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the

Philippines.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen

(18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of


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"duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights

under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners

and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1,

Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as

an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurdsituation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so

holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.

9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right

to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas

Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

SO ORDERED.

Citizenhips Cases

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