CITATION ANALYSIS OF HARRY J. PAARSCH January 2020hjp/cites.pdfCensored Regression Models with an...

CITATION ANALYSIS OF HARRY J. PAARSCHMay 2020

Cited papers are listed chronologically. Papers that reference the cited article are listed in reverse chrono-logical order. Self-cites (by any co-author) have been omitted. Citations in books have not been includednor have those in unpublished work, such as working papers. Sources are the Web of Science citation indexonline, 1979–2020 at the following URL:

http://isiknowledge.com

and Dialog Social Science Search, Institute for Scientific Information, 1994.

The total number of citations found to date is 846.

Cited Article:

[1] Paarsch, Harry J. “A Monte Carlo Comparison of Estimators for Censored Regression Models,”Journal of Econometrics, 24 (1984), 197–213.

Number of Citations: 55

Cited By:

1. Cizek, P. and Sadikoglu, S. “Bias-Corrected Quantile Regression Estimation of Censored RegressionModels,” Statistical Papers, 59 (2018), 215–247.

2. Zhelonkin, M., Genton, M., and Ronchetti, E. “Robust Inference in Sample Selection Models,” Journalof the Royal Statistical Society Series B – Statistical Methodology, 78 (2016), 805–827.

3. Galvao, A., Lamarche, C., and Lima, L. “Estimation of Censored Quantile Regression for Panel DataWith Fixed Effects,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 108 (2013), 1075–1089.

4. Caudill, S. “A Partially Adaptive Estimator for the Censored Regression Model Based on a Mixtureof Normal Distributions,” Statistical Methods and Applications, 21 (2012), 121–137.

5. Jonsson, R. “When Does Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Censored Data Work and When DoesIt Not?” Statistical Papers, 53 (2012), 33–49.

6. Sauer, J., Gorton, M.,Peshevski, M., Bosev, D., and Shekerinov, D. “Social Capital and the Perfor-mance of Water User Associations: Evidence from the Republic of Macedonia,” German Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 59 (2011), 30–39.

7. Vasquez, B. “Methodological Difficulties of Modeling Peer Influence,” Social Science Research, 39(2010), 950–962.

8. Gorton, M., Sauer, J., Peshevski, M., Bosev, D., and Shekerinov, D. “Water Communities in theRepublic of Macedonia: An Empirical Analysis of Membership Satisfaction and Payment Behavior,”World Development, 37 (2009), 1951–1963.

9. Schunk, D. “What Determines Household Savings Behavior? An Examination of Savings Motives andSavings Decisions,” Jahrbucher fur National Okonomie und Statistik, 229 (2009), 467–491.

10. Taylor, D., Kupper L., Johnson B., Kim, S., and Rappaport, S. “Statistical Models for Exposure-Biomarker Relationships with Measurement Error and Censoring,” Journal of Agricultural Biologicaland Environmental Statistics, 13 (2008), 367–387.

11. Furtan, W. and Sauer, J. “Determinants of Food Industry Performance: Survey Data and Regressionsfor Denmark,” Journal of Agricultural Economics, 59 (2008), 555–573.

12. Wilhelm, M. “Practical Considerations of Choosing between Tobit and SCLS or CLAD Estimators forCensored Regression Models with an Application to Charitable Giving,” Oxford Bulletin of Economicsand Statistics, 70 (2008), 559–582.

13. Zhou, X.Q. and Wang, J.D. “A Genetic Method of LAD Estimation for Models with Censored Data,”Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 48 (2005), 451–466.

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14. Marsh, T.L. and Mittelhammer, R.C. “ Generalized Maximum Entropy Estimation of a First OrderSpatial Autoregressive Model,” Advances in Econometrics: A Research Annual, 18 (2004), 199–234.

15. Lubin, J.H., Colt, J.S., Camann, D., Davis, S., Cerhan, J.R., Severson, R.K., Bernstein, L., andHartge, P. “Epidemiologic Evaluation of Measurement Data in the Presence of Detection Limits,”Environmental Health Perspectives, 112 (2004), 1691–1696.

16. Cosslett, S. “Efficient Semiparametric Estimation of Censored and Truncated Regressions via aSmoothed Self-Consistency Equation,” Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1277–1293.

17. Parsons, T., Rizzo, A., and Buckwalter, J. “Backpropagation and Regression: Comparative Utilityfor Neuropsychologists,” Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 26 (2004), 95–104.

18. Brunner E. and Sonstelie J. “School Finance Reform and Voluntary Fiscal Federalism,” Journal ofPublic Economics, 87 (2003), 2157–2185.

19. Berg, G. and Kaempfer, W. “Income Inequality and Tax Policy for South African Race Groups,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 85 (2003), 755–760.

20. Austin, P. “A Comparison of Methods for Analyzing Health-Related Quality-of-Life Measures,” ValueHealth, 5 (2002), 329–337.

21. Heckman, J.J., Tobias, J.L., and Vytlacil, E. “Four Parameters of Interest in the Evaluation of SocialPrograms,” Southern Economic Journal, 68 (2001), 211–223.

22. Taylor, D.J., Kupper, L.L., and Rappaport, S.M. “A Mixture Model for Occupation Exposure MeanTesting with a Limit of Detection,” Biometrics, 57 (2001), 681–688.

23. Khan, S. and Powell, J.L. “Two-Step Estimation of Semiparametric Censored Regression Models,”Journal of Econometrics, 103 (2001), 73–110.

24. Falk, M. and Seim, K. “Workers’ Skill Level and Information Technology: A Censored RegressionModel,” International Journal of Manpower, 22 (2001), 98–120.

25. Puhani, P.A. “The Heckman Correction for Sample Selection and Its Critique,” Journal of EconomicSurveys, 14 (2000), 53–68.

26. Mroz, T.A. “Discrete Factor Approximations in Simultaneous Equation Models: Estimating theImpact of a Dummy Endogenous Variable on a Continuous Outcome,” Journal of Econometrics,92 (1999), 233–274.

27. Ekstrand, C. and Carpenter, T.E. “Using a Tobit Regression Model to Analyze Risk Factors for Foot-Pad Dermatitis in Commercially Grown Broilers,” Preventative Veterinarial Medicine, 37 (1998),219–228.

28. Chay, K.Y. and Honore, B.E. “Estimation of Semiparametric Censored Regression Models—An Appli-cation to Changes in Black-White Earnings Inequality during the 1960s,” Journal of Human Resources,33 (1998), 4–38.

29. Stolzenberg, R.M. and Relles, D.A. “Tools for Intuition about Sample Selection Bias and Its Correc-tion,” American Sociological Review, 62 (1997), 494–507.

30. Golan, A., Judge, G., and Perloff, J. “Estimation and Inference with Censored and Ordered Multino-mial Response Data,” Journal of Econometrics, 79 (1997), 23–51.

31. Prabhala, N.R. “Conditional Methods in Event Studies and an Equilibrium Justification for StandardEvent Study Procedures,” Review of Financial Studies, 10 (1997), 1–38.

32. Yen, S.T. and Huang, C.L. “Household Demand for Finfish: A Generalized Double-Hurdle Model,”Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 21 (1996), 220–234.

33. McDonald, J.B. and Xu, Y.J. “A Comparison of Semi-Parametric and Partially Adaptive Estima-tors of the Censored Regression Model with Possibly Skewed and Leptokurtic Error Distributions,”Economics Letters, 51 (1996), 153–159.

34. Leung, S.F. and Yu. S.T. “On the Choice between Sample Selection Two-Part Models,” Journal ofEconometrics, 72 (1996), 197–229.

35. Nawata, K. “Estimation of Sample-Selection Bias Models by the Maximum-Likelihood Method,”Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 39 (1995), 299–303.

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36. Nawata, K. “Estimation of Sample Selection Bias Models by the Maximum-Likelihood Estimator andHeckman’s Two-Step Estimator,” Economics Letters, 45 (1994), 33–40.

37. Nawata, K. “A Note on the Estimation of Models with Sample-Selection Biases,” Economics Letters,42 (1993), 15–24.

38. Leigh, J.P. and Fries, J.F. “Tobit, Fixed Effects, and Cohort Analyses of the Relationship betweenSeverity and Duration of Rheumatoid Arthritis,” Social Science and Medicine, 36 (1993), 1495–1502.

39. Lemay, V.M., Kozak, A., and Marshall, P.L. “Using Limited Dependent Variable Estimators forEstimating Percent Decay,” Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 23 (1993), 266–274.

40. Hartman, R.S. “A Monte Carlo Analysis of Alternative Estimators in Models Involving Selectivity,”Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 9 (1991), 41–49.

41. Peters, S. and Smith, R.J. “Distributional Specification Tests against Semiparametric Alternatives,”Journal of Econometrics, 47 (1991), 175–194.

42. Baba, V.V. “Methodological Issues in Modeling Absence—A Comparison of Least-Squares and TobitAnalyses,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 75 (1990), 428–432.

43. Peracchi, F. “Bounded-Influence Estimators for the Tobit Model,” Journal of Econometrics, 44 (1990),107–126.

44. Stolzenberg, R.M. and Relles, D.A. “Theory Testing in a World of Constrained Research Design—The Significance of Heckman Censored Sampling Bias Correction for Nonexperimental Research,”Sociological Methods and Research, 18 (1990), 395–415.

45. Moon, C.G. “A Monte Carlo Comparison of Semiparametric Tobit Estimators,” Journal of AppliedEconometrics, 4 (1989), 361–382.

46. Laitila, T. “Asymptotic Misspecification Biases for Heckman 2 Estimator,” Communications in Statis-tics – Theory and Methods, 18 (1989), 743–753.

47. Goddeeris, J.H. “Compensating Differentials and Self-Selection—An Application to Lawyers,” Journalof Political Economy, 96 (1988), 411–428.

48. Vijverberg, W.P.M. “Non-Normality as Distributional Misspecification in Single-Equation LimitedDependent Variable Models,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 49 (1987), 417–430.

49. Hay, J.W., Leu, R., and Rohrer, P. “Ordinary Least-Squares and Sample-Selection Models of Health-Care Demand—A Monte Carlo Comparison,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 5 (1987),499–506.

50. Powell, J.L. “Symmetrically Trimmed Least-Squares Estimation for Tobit Models,” Econometrica, 54(1986), 1435–1460.

51. Fernandez, L. “Non-Parametric Maximum-Liklihood Estimation of Censored Regression Models,”Journal of Econometrics, 32 (1986), 35–57.

52. Womersley, R. “Censored Discrete Linear L1 Approximation,” SIAM Journal of Scientific and Statis-tical Computing, 7 (1986), 105–122.

53. Flood, L. “A Monte-Carlo Comparison of the Maximum-Likelihood and the Corrected OLS Estimatorsfor Tobit Models,” Economic Letters, 19 (1985), 155–163.

54. Hall, B.H. “Software for the Computation of Tobit-model Estimates,” Journal of Econometrics, 24(1984), 215-222.

55. Amemiya, T. “Tobit Models—A Survey,” Journal of Econometrics, 24 (1984), 3–61.

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Cited Article:

[2] Paarsch, Harry J. “Micro-Economic Models of Beef Supply,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 18(1985), 636–651.


Cited By:

1. Hennessy, D., Zhang, J., and Bai, N. “Animal Health Inputs, Endogenous Risk, General Infrastructure,Technology Adoption and Industrialized Animal Agriculture,” Food Policy, 83 (2019), 355–362.

2. Rossi, P. and Kagatsuma, M. “Beef Export Restrictions in Argentina: Impact on the Beef Industryand National Welfare,” Journal of Food Agriculture & Environment, 7 (2009), 122–130.

3. Chitose, A. and Weaver, R. “Dynamics of Slaughter Weight Response to Market Price Changes forJapanese Beef Cattle.” Japanese Journal of Rural Economics, 9 (2007), 1–14.

4. Hennessy, D. “Feeding and the Equilibrium Feeder Animal Price-Weight Schedule,” Journal of Agri-cultural and Resource Economics, 3 (2006), 239–261

5. Aadland, D. and Von Bailey D. “Short-Run Supply Responses in the US Beef-Cattle Industry,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83 (2001), 826–839.

6. Chavas, J.P. “On Information and Market Dynamics: The Case of the US Beef Market,” Journal ofEconomic Dynamics and Control, 24 (2000), 833–853.

7. Antonovitz, F. and Green, R. “Alternative Estimates of Fed Beef Supply Response to Risk,” AmericanJournal of Agricultural Economics, 72 (1990), 475–487.

8. Rosen, S. “Dynamic Animal Economics,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69 (1987),547–557.

Cited Article:

[3] Paarsch, Harry J. “Work Stoppages and the Theory of the Offset Factor—Evidence from the BritishColumbian Lumber Industry,” Journal of Labor Economics, 8 (1990), 387–417.


Cited By:

1. Coles, M. and Hildreth, A. “Wage, Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation,” Review of Eco-nomic Studies, 67 (2000), 273–293.

2. McDonald, J. and Bloch, H. ”The Spillover Effects of Industrial Action on Firm Profitability,” Reviewof Industrial Organization, 15 (1999), 183–200.

3. Kuhn, P. “Unions and the Economy: What We Know; What We Should Know,” Canadian Journalof Economics, 31 (1998), 1033–1056.

4. Clark, S. “Inventories and Strikes,” Economica, 64 (1997), 645–667.

5. Leach, J. “Inventories and Wage Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Theory, 75 (1997), 433–463.

6. Fisher, T. “An Empirical Study of the Adverse-Selection Model of Strikes,” Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 24 (1991), 499–516.

7. Kennan, J. and Wilson, R. “Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data.” Journalof Applied Econometrics, 4.S1 (1989), S87–S130.

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Cited Article:

[4] MaCurdy, Thomas E., Green, David A., and Paarsch, Harry J. “Assessing Empirical Approaches forAnalyzing Taxes and Labor Supply,” Journal of Human Resources, 25 (1990), 415–490.


Cited By:

1. Muroga, K. “Work or Housework? Mincer’s Hypothesis and the Labor Supply Elasticity of MarriedWomen in Japan,” Japanese Economic Review, 71 (2020), 303–347.

2. Galuscak, K. and Katay, G. “Tax-Benefit Systems and Differences in Aggregate Labour Force Par-ticipation: Comparative Evidence from the Czech Republic and Hungary,” Economic Systems, 43(2019).

3. Wang, H. “Optimal Indirect Taxes and Subsidies under Imperfect Competition,” Journal of Institu-tional and Theoretical Economics/Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Staatswisseenschaft, 174 (2018), 334–350.

4. Fuenmayor, A., Granell, R., and Mediavilla, M. “The Effects of Separate Taxation on Labor Partici-pation of Married Couples. An Empirical Analysis using Propensity Score,” Review of Economics ofthe Household, 16 (2018), 541–561.

5. Mastrogiacomo, M., Bosch, N., Gielen, M., and Jongen, E. “Heterogeneity in Labour Supply Re-sponses: Evidence from a Major Tax Reform,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 79 (2017),769–796.

6. Schiff, M. “Habit, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Americans’ Welfare Cost of Working Much More thanEuropeans,” World Economy, 40 (2017), 1708–1717.

7. Simpson, W., Mason, G., and Godwin, R. “The Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment: LessonsLearned 40 Years Later,” Canadian Public Policy, 43 (2017), 85–104.

8. Burns, S. and Ziliak, J. “Identifying the Elasticity of Taxable Income,” Economic Journal, 127 (2017),297–329.

9. Bertoli, S., Moraga, J., and Keita, S. “The Elasticity of the Migrant Labour Supply: Evidence fromTemporary Filipino Migrants,” Journal of Development Studies, 53 (2017), 1822–1834.

10. Kline, P. and Tartari, M. “Bounding the Labor Supply Responses to a Randomized Welfare Experi-ment: A Revealed Preference Approach,” American Economic Review, 106 (2016), 972–1014.

11. Kumar, A. “Lifecycle-Consistent Female Labor Supply with Nonlinear Taxes: Evidence from Unob-served Effects Panel Data Models with Censoring, Selection and Endogeneity,” Review of Economicsof the Household, 14 (2016), 207–229.

12. Hansen, J. and Liu, X. “Estimating Labour Supply Responses and Welfare Participation: Using aNatural Experiment to Validate a Structural Labour Supply Model,” Canadian Journal of Economics,48 (2015), 1831–1854.

13. Ericson, P., Flood, L., and Islam, N. “Taxes, Wages, and Working Hours,” Empirical Economics, 49(2015), 503–535.

14. Pronzato, C. “Fighting Lone Mothers’ Poverty Through In-Work Benefits: Methodological Issues andPolicy Suggestions,” CESIFO Eeconomic Studies, 61 (2015), 95–122.

15. McRae, S. “Infrastructure Quality and the Subsidy Trap,” American Economic Review, 105 (2015),35–66.

16. Shun-ichiro, B. and Hayashi, M., “Intensive Margins, Extensive Margins, and Spousal Allowances inthe Japanese System of Personal Income Taxes: A Discrete Choice Analysis,” Journal of the Japaneseand International Economies, 34 (2014), 162–178.

17. Docquier, F., Ozden, C., and Peri, G. “The Labour Market Effects of Immigration and Emigration inOECD Countries,” Economic Journal, 124 (2014), 1106–1145.

18. Bargain, O., Orsini, K., and Peichl, A. “Comparing Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe and theUnited States New Results,” Journal of Human Resources, 49 (2014), 723–838.

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19. DeVaro, J. and Fung, S. “Public Bailouts, Executive Compensation and Retention: A StructuralAnalysis,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 26 (2014), 131–149.

20. Dagsvik, J., Jia, Z., Kornstad, T., and Thoresen, T. “Theoretical and Practical Arguments forModeling Labor Supply as a Choice among Latent Jobs,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 28 (2014),134–151.

21. Bargain, O. and Moreau, N. “The Impact of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Labor Supply in a SimulatedNash-Bargaining Framework,” Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 34 (2013), 77–86.

22. Hotchkiss, J., Moore R., and Rios-Avila F. “Assessing the Welfare Impact of Tax Reform: A CaseStudy of the 2001 U.S. Tax Cut,” Review of Income and Wealth, 58 (2012), 233–256.

23. Chetty, R. “Bounds on Elasticities With Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and MacroEvidence on Labor Supply,” Econometrica, 80 (2012), 969–1018.

24. Kumar, A. “Nonparametric Estimation of the Impact of Taxes on Female Labor Supply,” Journal ofApplied Econometrics, 27 (2012), 415–439.

25. Schmeiser, M. “Expanding New York State’s Earned Income Tax Credit Programme: The Effect onWork, Income and Poverty,” Applied Economics, 44 (2012), 2035–2050.

26. Keane, M. “Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 44 (2011), 961–1075.

27. Chetty, R., Friedman, J., Olsen, T., and Pistaferri, L. “Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Microvs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records,” Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 126 (2011), 749–804.

28. Low H., Meghir C., and Pistaferri, L. “Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle,” AmericanEconomic Review, 100 (2010), 1432–1467.

29. Bargain, O. “Flexible Labor Supply Models,” Economics Letters, 105 (2009), 103–105.

30. Olmstead, S. “Reduced-Form versus Structural Models of Water Demand under Nonlinear Prices,”Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 27 (2009), 84–94.

31. Aaberge, R., Colombino, U., and Wennemo, T. “Evaluating Alternative Representations of the ChoiceSets in Models of Labor Supply,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 23 (2009), 586–612.

32. Kuismanen, M. “Piece-wise or Differentiable Budget Constraint? Estimating Labour Supply Functionfor Finnish Females,” Applied Economics, 41 (2009), 1461–1472.

33. Heim, B. “Structural Estimation of Family Labor Supply with Taxes Estimating a Continuous HoursModel Using a Direct Utility Specification,” Journal of Human Resources, 44 (2009), 350–385.

34. Aaronson, D. and French, E. “The Effects of Progressive Taxation on Labor Supply when Hours andWages are Jointly Determined,” Journal of Human Resources, 44 (2009), 386–408.

35. Russo, B. “Innovation and the Long-Run Elasticity of Total Taxable Income,” Southern EconomicJournal 75 (2009), 798–828.

36. Millimet, D. and Tchernis, R. “Estimating High-Dimensional Demand Systems in the Presence ofMany Binding Non-Negativity Constraints,” Journal of Econometrics, 147 (2008), 384–395.

37. Labeaga, J., Oliver, X., and Spadaro, A. “Discrete Choice Models of Labour Supply, BehaviouralMicrosimulation and the Spanish Tax Reforms,” Journal of Economic Inequality, 6 (2008), 247–273.

38. Fuest C., Peichl, A., Schaefer, T. “Is a Flat Tax Reform Feasible in a Grown-Up Democracy of WesternEurope? A Simulation Study for Germany,” International Tax and Public Finance, 15 (2008), 620–636.

39. Bloemen, H. and Kapteyn, A. “The Estimation of Utility-Consistent Labor Supply Models by Meansof Simulated Scores,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23 (2008), 395–422.

40. Fuest C., Peichl A., Schaefer T. “Does a Simpler Income Tax Yield More Equity and Efficiency?”CESIFO Economic Studies, 54 (2008), 73–97.

41. Evers M., De Mooij R., and Van Vuuren D. “The Wage Elasticity of Labour Supply: A Synthesis ofEmpirical Estimates,” Economist–Netherlands, 156 (2008), 25–43.

42. Zhang L. “TheWay toWealth and the Way to Leisure: The Impact of College Education on Graduates’Earnings and Hours of Work,” Research in Higher Education, 49 (2008), 199–213.

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43. Kumar, A. “Labor Supply, Deadweight Loss and Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Nonparametric Evalua-tion Using Panel Data,” Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008), 236–253.

44. Bhattacharya J., Choudhry, K., and Lakdawalla, D. “Chronic Disease and Severe Disability amongWorking-Age Populations,” Medical Care, 46 (2008), 92–100.

45. Bloemen, H. “Job Search, Hours Restrictions, and Desired Hours of Work,” Journal of Labor Eco-nomics, 26 (2008), 137–179.

46. Engelhardt, G.V. and Kumar, A. “Employer Matching and 401(k) Saving: Evidence from the Healthand Retirement Study,” Journal of Public Economics, 91 (2007), 1920–1943.

47. Heim, B. “The Incredible Shrinking Elasticities—Married Female Labor Supply, 1978-2002,” Journalof Human Resources, 42 (2007), 881–918.

48. Chetty, R. “A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion,” American Economic Review, 96 (2006),1821–1834.

49. Dagsvik, J., Strom, S. “Sectoral Labour Supply, Choice Restrictions and Function Form,” Journal ofApplied Econometrics, 21 (2006), 803–826.

50. Gwartney, J. and Lawson, R. “The Impact of Tax Policy on Economic Growth, Income Distribution,and Allocation of Taxes,” Social Philosphy and Policy, 23 (2006), 28–52.

51. Creedy, J. and Kalb, G. “Discrete Hours Labour Supply Modelling: Specification, Estimation andSimulation,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 19 (2005), 697–734.

52. Ziliak, J.P. and Kniesner, T.J. “The Effect of Income Taxation on Consumption and Labor Supply,”Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (2005), 769–796.

53. Flood, L. and Islam, N. “A Monte Carlo Evaluation of Discrete Choice Labour Supply Models,”Applied Economics Letters, 12 (2005), 263–266.

54. Bhattacharya, J. “Specialty Selection and Lifetime Returns to Specialization within Medicine,” Jour-nal of Human Resources, 40 (2005), 115–143.

55. Bhattacharya, J., Cutler, D., Goldman, D., Hurd, M., Joyce, G., Lakdawalla, D., Panis, C., andShang, B. “Disability Forecasts and Future Medicare Costs,” in Frontiers in Health Policy Research,Volume 7, editted by Cutler, D. and Garber A. New York: NBER, 2004, 75–94.

56. Flood, L., Hansen, J. and Wahlberg, R. “Household Labor Supply and Welfare Participation inSweden,” Journal of Human Resources, 39 (2004), 1008–1032.

57. Fullerton, D. and Gan, L. “A Simulation-Based Welfare Loss Calculation for Labor Taxes withPiecewise-Linear Budgets,” Journal of Public Economics, 88 (2004), 2339–2359.

58. Heim, B. and Meyer, B. “Work Costs and Nonconvex Preferences in the Estimation of Labor SupplyModels,” Journal of Public Economics, 88 (2004), 2323–2338.

59. Bhattacharya, J. and Vogt, W. “A Simple Model of Pharmaceutical Price Dynamics,” Journal of Lawand Economics, 46 (2003), 599–626.

60. Gundersen C. and Ziliak J. “The Role of Food Stamps in Consumption Stabilization,” Journal ofHuman Resources, 38 (2003), 1051–1079.

61. Bhattarai, K. and Whalley, J. “Discreteness and the Welfare Cost of Labor Supply Tax Distortions,”International Economic Review, 44 (2003), 1117–1133.

62. Lakdawalla, D., Goldman, D., and Bhattacharya, J. “Forecasting the Nursing Home Population,”Medical Care, 41 (2003), 8–20.

63. Thurston, N. “Physician Behavioural Responses to Variation in Marginal Income Tax Rates: Longi-tudinal Evidence,” Applied Economics, 34 (2002), 2093–2104.

64. Kniesner, T. and Ziliak, J. “Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization,” American Economic Review,92 (2002), 590–612.

65. Gale, W. and Potter, S. “An Economic Evaluation of Economic Growth and Tax Relief ReconciliationAct of 2001,” National Tax Journal, 55 (2002), 133–186.

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66. Disney, R. and Smith, S. “The Labour Supply Effect of the Abolition of the Earnings Rule for OlderWorkers in the United Kingdom,” Economic Journal, 112 (2002), C136–C152.

67. Creedy, J. and Duncan, A. “Behavioural Microsimulation with Labour Supply Responses,” Journalof Economic Surveys, 16 (2002), 1–39.

68. Van Soest A., Das M., and Gong, X.D. “A Structural Labour Supply Model with Flexible Preferences,”Journal of Econometrics, 107 (2002), 345–374.

69. Bingley, P. and Walker I. “Household Unemployment and the Labour Supply of Married Women,”Economica, 68 (2001), 157–185.

70. Van Soest A. and Das M. “Family Labor Supply and Proposed Tax Reforms in the Netherlands,”Economist — Netherlands, 149 (2001), 191–218.

71. Ellwood, D. “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on Work,Marriage, and Living Arrangements,” National Tax Journal, 53 (2000), 1063–1105.

72. Klevmarken, N. “Did the Tax Cuts Increase Hours of Work? A Statistical Analysis of a NaturalExperiment,” Kyklos, 53 (2000), 337–361.

73. Agell, J. and Persson, M. “Tax Arbitrage and Labor Supply,” Journal of Public Economics, 78 (2000),3–24.

74. Hewitt, J.A. “A Discrete/Continuous Choice Approach to Residential Water Demand under BlockRate Pricing: Reply” Land Economics, 76 (2000), 324–331.

75. Sieg, H. “Estimating a Dynamic Model of Household Choices in the Presence of Income Taxation,”International Economic Review, 41 (2000), 637–668.

76. Klumb, P.L. and Bates, M.M. “Time Use of Old and Very Old Berliners: Productive and ConsumptiveActivities as Functions of Resources,” Journal of Gerontology and Behavioral Psychology, 54 (1999),S271–S278.

77. Eklof, M. and Sacklen, H. “The Hausman-MaCurdy Controversy Why Do the Results Differ acrossStudies?” Journal of Human Resources, 35 (2000), 204–220.

78. Van Oers, F.M., de Mooij, R.A., and Graafland, J.J. et al. “An Earned Income Tax Credit in theNetherlands: Simulations with the MIMIC Model,” Economist, 148 (2000), 19–43.

79. Friedberg, L. “The Labor Supply Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test,” Review of Economicsand Statistics, 82 (2000), 48–63.

80. Aronsson, T., Blomquist, S., and Sacklen, H. “Identifying Interdependent Behaviour in an EmpiricalModel of Labour Supply,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14 (1999), 607–626.

81. Aaberge, R., Colombino, U., and Strom, S. “Labor Supply in Italy: An Empirical Analysis of JointHousehold Decisions, with Taxes and Quantity Constraints,” Journal of Applied Economics, 14 (1999),403–422.

82. Feather, P. and Shaw, W.D. “Estimating the Cost of Leisure Time for Recreation Demand Models,”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 38 (1999), 49–65.

83. Ziliak, J.P. and Kniesner, T.J. “Estimating Life Cycle Labor Supply Tax Effects,” Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 107 (1999), 326–359.

84. Conway, K.S. “Are Workers ‘Ricardian’? Estimating the Labor Supply Effects of State Fiscal Policy,”Public Finance Review, 27 (1999), 160–193.

85. Triest, R.K. “Econometric Issues in Estimating the Behavioral Response to Taxation: A NontechnicalIntroduction,” National Tax Journal, 51 (1998) 761–772.

86. Ziliak, J.P. and Kniesner, T.J. “The Importance of Sample Attrition in Life Cycle Labor SupplyEstimation,” Journal of Human Resources, 33 (1998), 507–530.

87. Blundell, R., Duncan, A., and Meghir, C. “Estimating Labor Supply Responses using Tax Reforms,”Econometrica, 66 (1998), 827–861.

88. Berck, P., Golan, E., and Smith, B. “State Tax Policy, Labor, and Tax Revenue Feedback Effects,”Industrial Relations, 36 (1997), 399–418.

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89. Showalter, M.H. and Thurston, N.K. “Taxes and Labor Supply of High-Income Physicians,” Journalof Public Economics, 66 (1997), 73–97.

90. Bingley, P. and Walker, I. “The Labor Supply, Unemployment and Participation of Lone Mothers inIn-Work Transfer Programmes,” Economic Journal, 107 (1997), 1375–1390.

91. Averett, S.L. and Hotchkiss, J.L. “Female Labor Supply with a Discontinuous, Nonconvex BudgetConstraint: Incorporation of a Part-Time/Full-Time Wage Differential,” Review of Economics andStatistics, 79 (1997), 461–470.

92. Aronsson, T., Wikstrom, M., and Brannlund, R. “Wage Determination under Non-Linear Taxes:Estimation and an Application to Panel Data,” Oxford Economic Papers, 49 (1997), 404–418.

93. Auerbach, A.J. and Slemrod, J. “The Economic Effects of the Tax-Reform Act of 1986,” Journal ofEconomic Literature, 35 (1997), 589–632.

94. Pradhan, M. and van Soest, A. “Household Labor Supply in Urban Areas of Bolivia,” Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 79 (1997), 300–310.

95. Gensler, H.J. and Walls, W.D. “Labor Force and Welfare Program Participation: The Effects ofWelfare,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 56 (1997), 229–241.

96. Conway, K.S. “Labor Supply, Taxes, and Government Spending: A Microeconometric Analysis,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 79 (1997), 50–67.

97. Aronsson, T. and Wikstrom, M. “Local Public Expenditure in Sweden—A Model where the MedianVoter is Not Necessarily Decisive,” European Economic Review, 40 (1996), 1705–1716.

98. Engen, E. and Skinner, J. “Taxation and Economic Growth,” National Tax Journal, 49 (1996), 617–642.

99. Dankmeyer, B. “Long Run Opportunity-Costs of Children According to Education of the Mother inthe Netherlands,” Journal of Population Economics, 9 (1996), 349–361.

100. Brannas, K. and Karlsson, N. “Estimating the Perceived Tax Scale within a Labor Supply Model,”Economics Letters, 52 (1996), 75–79.

101. Gensler, H. “A Comparison of the Effect of Welfare Programme Features on Welfare Participation:One- and Two-Parent Families,” Applied Economics, 28 (1996), 791–797.

102. Aronsson, T. and Brannas, K. “The Importance of Locational Choice in an Empirical Labour SupplyModel,” Applied Economics, 28 (1996), 521–529.

103. Hoynes, H.W. “Welfare Transfers in Two-Parent Families: Labor Supply and Welfare Participationunder AFDC-UP,” Econometrica, 64 (1996), 295–332.

104. Duncan, D. and Giles, C. “Labor Supply Incentives and Recent Family Credit Reforms,” EconomicJournal, 106 (1996), 142–155.

105. Scholz, J.K. “In-Work Benefits in the United States: The Earned Income Tax Credit,” EconomicJournal, 106 (1996), 156–169.

106. Blomquist, S. “Estimation Methods for Male Labor Supply Functions—How to Take Account ofNonlinear Taxes,” Journal of Econometrics, 70 (1996), 383–405.

107. Randolph, W.C. and Rogers, D.L. “The Implications for Tax Policy of Uncertainty about Labor-Supply and Savings Responses,” National Tax Journal, 48 (1995), 429–446.

108. Feldstein, M. “The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income—A Panel Study of the 1986Tax-Reform Act,” Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995), 551-572.

109. Bingley, P., Lanot, G., and Symons, E. “Child-Support Reform and the Labor Supply of Lone Mothersin the United Kingdom,” Journal of Human Resources, 30 (1995), 256–279.

110. Van Soest, A. “Structural Models of Family Labor Supply—A Discrete-Choice Approach,” Journal ofHuman Resources, 30 (1995), 63–88.

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112. Herriges, J.A. and King, K.K. “Residential Demand for Electricity under Inverted Block Rates—Evidence from a Controlled Experiment,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 12 (1994),419–430.

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114. Conway, K.S. and Kniesner, T.J. “Estimating Labor Supply with Panel Data,” Economics Letters, 44(1994), 27–33.

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116. Hum, D. and Simpson, W. “Economic Response to a Guaranteed Annual Income—Experience fromCanada and the United States,” Journal of Labor Economics, 11 (1993), S263–S296.

117. Aronsson, T. “Nonlinear Taxes and Intertemporal Resources Management—The Case of Timber,”Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 95 (1993), 195–207.

118. Van Soest, A., Kapteyn, A., and Kooreman, P. “Coherency and Regularity of Demand Systems withEquality and Inequality Constraints,” Journal of Econometrics, 57 (1993), 161–188.

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[5] Paarsch, Harry J. “Deciding between the Common and Private Value Paradigms in Empirical Modelsof Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 51 (1992), 191–215.


Cited By:

1. Enache, A. and Florens, J.-P. “Identification and Estimation in a Third-Price Auction Model,”Econometric Theory, 36 (2020), 386–409.

2. Lu, Y., Gupta, A., Keller, W., and van Heck, E. “Dynamic Decision Making in Sequential Business-to-Business Auctions: A Structural Econometric Approach,” Management Science, 65 (2019), 3853–3876.

3. Weyl, E. “Price Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature, 57 (2019), 329–384.

4. Onur, I. and Tas, B. “Optimal Bidder Participation in Public Procurement Auctions,” InternationalTax and Public Finance, 26 (2019), 595–617.

5. Takahashi, H. “Strategic Design under Uncertain Evaluations: Structural Analysis of Design-BuildAuctions,” RAND Journal of Economics, 49 (2018), 594–618.

10

6. Copeland, B. and Taylor, M. “Environmental and Resource Economics: A Canadian Retrospective,”Canadian Journal of Economics, 50 (2017), 1381–1413.

7. Aguirregabiria, V. and Slade, M. “Empirical Models of Firms and Industries,” Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 50 (2017), 1445–1488.

8. Gimenes, N. “Econometrics of Ascending Auctions by Quantile Regression,” Review of Economicsand Statistics, 99 (2017), 944–953.

9. Quint, D. “Common Values and Low Reserve Prices,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 65 (2017),363–396.

10. Hong, Y., Wang, C. and Pavlou, P. “Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from OnlineLabor Markets,” Information Systems Research, 27 (2016), 49–69.

11. Li, T. and Zhang, B. “Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: AnAnalysis of Merger Effects,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (2015), 188–214.

12. Byun, H. “The Size of the Affiliation Effect.” Global Economic Review, 44 (2015), 202–218.

13. Wegmann, B. “Bayesian Comparison of Private and Common Values in Structural Second-PriceAuctions,” Journal of Applied Statistics, 42 (2015), 380–397.

14. Dimopoulos, T. and Sacchetto, S. “Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums,”Journal of Financial Economics, 114 (2014) 444–447.

15. Bajari, P., Houghton, S., and Tadelis, S. “Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysisof Adaptation Costs.” American Economic Review, 104 (2014), 1288–1319.

16. Iimi, A. “Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement,” Review of Industrial Organiza-tion, 43 (2013), 243–261.

17. Boyer, C. and Brorsen, B. “Changes in Beef Packers Market Power after the Livestock MandatoryPrice Reporting Act: An Agent-Based Auction,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(2013), 859–876.

18. Hill, J. and Shneyerov, A. “Are There Common Values in First-Price Auctions? A Tail-IndexNonparametric Test,” Journal of Econometrics, 174 (2013), 144–164.

19. Hammond, R. and Zheng, X. “Heterogeneity in Tournaments with Incomplete Information: AnExperimental Analysis,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31 (2013), 248–260.

20. Hammond, R. “A Structural Model of Competing Sellers: Auctions and Posted Prices,” EuropeanEconomic Review, 60 (2013), 52–68.

21. Nakabayashi, J. “Small Business Set-Asides in Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Analysis,”Journal of Public Economics, 100 (2013), 28–44.

22. Hickman, B., Hubbard, T., and Saglam, Y. “Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guideto the Literature,” Journal of Econometric Methods, 1 (2012), 67–106.

23. Estache, A. and Iimi, A. “Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement,”Public Finance Review, 40 (2012), 435–469.

24. Onur, I., Ozcan, R., and Tas Bedri K.O. “Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey,”Review of Industrial Organization, 40 (2012), 207–223.

25. Henderson, D., List, J., Millimet, D., Parmeter, C., and Price, M. “Empirical Implementation ofNonparametric First-Price Auction Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 168 (2012), 17–28.

26. Kumbhakar, S., Parmeter, C., and Tsionas, E. “Bayesian Estimation Approaches to First-PriceAuctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 168 (2012), 47–59.

27. An, X., Liu, S., and Xu, S. “Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Risk AversionCase in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction,” Computational Economics, 38 (2011), 439–463.

28. Wegmann, B. and Villani, M. “Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Common Value Auc-tions,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 29 (2011), 382–396.

29. Estache, A. and Iimi, A. “(Un)bundling Infrastructure Procurement: Evidence from Water Supplyand Sewerage Projects,” Utilities Policy, 19 (2011), 104–114.

11

30. Easley, R., Wood, C., and Barkataki, S. “Bidding Patterns, Experience, and Avoiding the Winner’sCurse in Online Auctions,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 27 (2010), 241–268.

31. Hortacsu, A. and McAdams, D. “Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions:An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market,” Journal of Political Economy, 118(2010), 833–865.

32. Florens, J.P. and Sbaı, E. “Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information,”Econometric Theory, 26 (2010), 1638–1662.

33. Hasker, K. and Sickles, R. “eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace,”Review of Industrial Organization, 37 (2010), 3–42.

34. Haley, M. R. “Bounding Revenue Leakages at Scale-Bid Timber Auctions: Evidence from WisconsinState Forest Auctions,” Empirical Economics, 39 (2010), 427–437.

35. Li, T. and Zhang, B. “Testing for Affiliation in First-Price Auctions using Entry Behavior,” Interna-tional Economic Review, 51 (2010), 837–850.

36. Li, T. “Indirect Inference in Structural Econometric Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 157 (2010),120–128.

37. de Haan, L., de Vries, C. and Zhou, C. “The Expected Payoff to Internet Auctions,” Extremes, 12(2009), 219–238.

38. An, X., Liu, S., and Xu, S. “Assess the Goodness of Fit for Risk Aversion Parameter of First PriceAuction via Nonparametric Method,” Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on IntelligentTechnologies, (2009) 334–339.

39. Boatwright, P., Borle, S. and Kadane, J. “Common Values vs. Private Value Categories in OnlineAuctions: A Distinction without a Difference?” Decision Analysis, 7 (2010), 86–98.

40. Horowitz J., Lynch, L., and Stocking. A. “Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis ofFarmland Preservation in Maryland,” Land Economics, 85 (2009), 555–576.

41. Hall, P. and van Keilegom, I. “Nonparametric ‘Regression’ when Errors are Positioned at End-Points,”Bernoulli, 15 (2009), 614–633.

42. Li, T. and Zheng, X.Y. “Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidencefrom Procurement Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 76 (2009), 1397–1429.

43. Zheng, X.Y. “Quantifying the Cost of Excess Market Thickness in Timber Sale Auction,” InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 27 (2009), 553–566.

44. Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-PriceAuctions under Exclusion Restrictions,” Econometrica, 77 (2009), 1193–1227.

45. Li, T. “Review of ‘An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data’,” EconometricsReviews, 28 (2009), 388–392.

46. Rezende, L. “Econometrics of Auctions by Least Squares,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23 (2008),925–948.

47. Tukiainen, J. “Testing for Common Costs in the City of Helsinki Bus Transit Auctions,” InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 26 (2008), 1308–1322.

48. Yao, S. and Mela, C. “Online Auction Demand,” Marketing Science, 27 (2008), 861–885.

49. Raviv, Y. “The Role of the Bidding Process in Price Determination: Jump Bidding in SequentialEnglish Auctions,” Economic Inquiry, 46 (2008), 325–341.

50. Banerji, A. and Meenakshi, J.V. “Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Markets:Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India,” BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume8, Issue 1, (2008), Article 4.

51. Li, H.G. and Riley, J.G. “Auction Choice,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25 (2007),84–108.

52. Chen, X.H., Hong H., and Shum, M. “Nonparametric Likelihood Ratio Model Selection Tests betweenParametric Likelihood and Moment Condition Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 141 (2007), 109–140.

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53. Shneyerov, A. “An Empirical Study of Auction Revenue Rankings: The Case of Municipal Bonds,”RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (2006), 1005–1022.

54. Zheng, X.Y. and Vukina, T. “Efficiency Gains from Organizational Innovation: Comparing Ordinaland Cardinal Tournament Games in Broiler Contracts,” International Journal of Industrial Organi-zation, 25 (2007), 843–859.

55. Flambard V., Lasserre P., and Mohnen P. “Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, InformationalRents, and Procurement Management,” Candadian Journal of Economics, 40 (2007), 245–277.

56. Armantier, O., Sbaı, E. “Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders areAsymmetric,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21 (2006), 745–779.

57. Fang, H.M. “Disentangling the College Wage Premium: Estimating a Model with Endogenous Edu-cation Choices,” International Economic Review, 47 (2006), 1151–1185.

58. Bapna, R., Goes, P., Gopal, R., Marden, J. “Moving from Data-Constrained to Data-Enabled Re-search: Experience and Challenges in Collecting, Validating, and Analyzing Large-Scale E-CommerceData,” Statistical Science, 21 (2006), 116–130.

59. Borle, S., Boatwright, P., Kadane, J. “The Timing of Bid Placement and Extent of Multiple Bidding:An Empirical Investigation using eBay Online Auctions,” Statistical Science, 21 (2006), 194–205.

60. Eklof, M. “Assessing Social Costs of Inefficient Procurement Design,” Journal of the European Eco-nomic Association, 3 (2005), 826–850.

61. Iimi, A. “Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance,” Review of Industrial Orga-nization, 28 (2006), 109–128.

62. Bajari, P. and Hortacsu, A. “Are Structural Estimates of Auctions Models Reasonable? Evidencefrom Experimental Data,” Journal of Political Economy, 113 (2005), 703–741.

63. Gasmi F., Meddahi N., and Vuong Q.H. “The Applied Side of Jean-Jacques Laffont’s Economics,”Revue d’Economie Politique, 115 (2005), 309–336.

64. Li, T. “Econometrics of First-Price Auctions with Entry and Binding Reservation Prices,” Journal ofEconometrics, 126 (2005), 173–200.

65. Meenaskshi, J.V. and Banerji, A. “The Unsupportable Support Price: An Analysis of Collusionand Government Intervention in Paddy Auction Markets in North India,” Journal of DevelopmentEconomics, 76 (2005), 377-403.

66. Chernozhukov, V. and Hong, H. “Likelihood Estimation and Inference in a Class of NonregularEconometric Models,” Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1445–1480.

67. Bajari, P. and Hortacsu, A. “Economic Insights from Internet Auctions,” Journal of Economic Liter-ature, 42 (2004), 457–486.

68. Albano, G.-L. and Jouneau-Sion, F. “Bayesian Inference in Repeated English Auctions,” TEST, 13(2004), 193–211.

69. Bapna, R., Goes, P., Gupta, A, and Jin, Y. “User Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Electronic AuctionMarket Design: An Empirical Exploration,” MIS Quarterly, 28 (2004), 21–43.

70. Banerji, A. and Meenakshi, J. “Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in WheatMarkets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis,” American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 86 (2004), 236–253.

71. Bajari, P. and Ye, L. “Deciding between Competition and Collusion,” Review of Economics andStatistics, 85 (2003), 971–989.

72. Pesendorfer, M. “Horizontal Mergers in the Paper Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2003),495–515.

73. Hirano, K. and Porter, J. “Asymptotic Efficiency in Parametric Structural Models with Parameter-Dependent Support,” Econometrica, 71 (2003), 1307–1338.

74. Jofre-Bonet, M. and Pesendorfer, M. “Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game,” Econometrica, 71(2003), 1443–1489.

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75. Bapna, R., Goes, P., and Gupta, A. “Replicating Online Yankee Auctions to Analyze Auctioneers’and Bidders’ Stategies,” Information Systems Research, 14 (2003), 244–268.

76. Goeree, J. and Offerman, T. “Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values,”Economic Journal, 113 (2003), 598–613.

77. Bajari, P. and Hortacsu, A. “The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: EmpiricalInsights from eBay Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2003), 329–355.

78. Li, T., Perrigne, I. and Wong, Q. “Semiparametric Estimation of the Optimal Reserve Price in First-Price Auctions,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21 (2003), 53–64.

79. Campo, S., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Asymmetry in First-Price Auctions with Affiliated PrivateValues,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18 (2003), 179–207.

80. Bapna, R., Goes, P., and Gupta, A. “Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytic,Empirical, and Computational Insights,” Decision Science, 33 (2002), 557–577.

81. Sareen, S. “Reference Bayesian Inference in Nonregular Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 113 (2003),265–288.

82. Li, T. and Perrigne, I. “Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices,” Review of Economicsand Statistics, 85 (2003), 189–200.

83. Haile, P. and Tamer, E. “Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions,” Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 111 (2003), 1–51.

84. Hong, H. and Shum, M. “Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions,” Journal ofEconometrics, 112 (2003), 327–358.

85. Hong, H. and Shum, M. “Increasing Competition and the Winner’s Curse: Evidence from Procure-ment,” Review of Economic Studies, 69 (2002), 871–898.

86. Miravete, E. “Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information andOptional Calling Plans,” Review of Economic Studies, 69 (2002), 943–971.

87. Athey, S. and Haile, P. “Identification of Standard Auction Models,” Econometrica, 70 (2002), 2107–2140.

88. Armantier, O. “Deciding between the Common and Private Values Paradigm: An Application toExperimental Data,” International Economic Review, 43 (2002), 783–801.

89. Li, T., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Structural Estimation of the Affiliated Private Value AuctionModel,” RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (2002), 171–193.

90. Deltas, G. “Determining Damages from the Operation of Bidding Rings: An Analysis of the Post-Auction ‘Knockout’ Sale,” Economic Theory, 19 (2002), 243–269.

91. Engers, M. and Stern, S. “Long-Term Care and Family Bargaining,” International Economic Review,43 (2002), 73–114.

92. Bourgeon, J. and LeRoux, Y. “Traders’ Bidding Strategies on European Grain Export Refunds: AnAnalysis with Affiliated Signals,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83 (2001), 563–575.

93. Haile, P. “Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to US Forest Service Timber Sales,”American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 399–427.

94. Li, T., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Conditionally Independent Private Information in OCS WildcatAuctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 98 (2000), 129–161.

95. Jofre-Bonet, M. and Pesendorfer, M. “Bidding Behavior in a Repeated Preocurement Auction: ASummary,” European Economic Review, 44 (2000), 1006–1020.

96. Brannman, L. and Froeb, L.M. “Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in AsymmetricOral Auctions,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 82 (2000), 283–290.

97. Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions,”Econometrica, 68 (2000), 525–574.

98. Perrigne, I. and Vuong, Q. “Structural Econometrics of First-Price Auctions: A Survey of Methods,”Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 47 (1999), 203–223.

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99. Sareen, S. “Posterior Odds Comparison of a Symmetric Low-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction within theCommon-Value and the Independent-Private-Values Paradigm,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 14(1999), 651–676.

100. Carter, D.R. and Newman, D.H. “The Impact of Reserve Prices in Sealed Bid Federal Timber SaleAuctions,” Forestry Science, 44 (1998), 485–495.

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102. Laffont, J.J. “Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data,” European Eco-nomic Review, 41 (1997), 1–35.

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107. Porter, R.H. “The Role of Information in United-States Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions,”Econometrica, 63 (1995), 1–27.

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Cited Article:

[6] Donald, Stephen G. and Paarsch, Harry J. “Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation inEmpirical-Models of Auctions,” International Economic Review, 34 (1993), 121–148.


Cited By:


2. Luo, Y. “Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions under Restricted Stochastic Dominance,” Journal ofEconometrics, 216 (2020), 354–374.

3. Blevins, J. and Senney, G. “Dynamic Selection and Distributional Bounds on Search Costs in DynamicUnit-Demand Models,” Quantitative Economics, 10 (2019), 891–929.

4. Hortacsu, A. and McAdams, D. “Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects,” Journal ofEconomic Literature, 56 (2018), 157–182.


15

6. Merlo, A. and De Paula, A. “Identification and Estimation of Preference Distributions When VotersAre Ideological,” Review of Economic Studies, 84 (2017), 1238–1263.

7. Lorentziadis, P. “Optimal Bidding in Auctions from a Game Theoretic Perspective,” European Journalof Operations Research, 248 (2016), 347–371.

8. Kim, D.-H. “Flexible Bayesian Analysis of First Price Auctions using Simulated Likelihood,” Quan-titative Economics, 6 (2015), 429–461.

9. Bajari, P., Houghton, S., and Tadelis, S. “Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysisof Adaptation Costs.” American Economic Review, 104 (2014), 1288–1319.

10. Jirak, M., Meister, A., and Reiss, M. “Adaptive Function Estimation in Nonparametric Regressionwith One-Sided Errors,” Annals of Statistics, 42 (2014), 1970–2002.

11. Moraga-Gonzalez, J., Sandor, Z., Wildenbeest, M. “Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of ConsumerSearch Costs,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 28 (2013), 1205–1223.

12. Fox, J. and Bajari, P. “Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction,” American EconomicJournal—Microeconomics, 5 (2013), 100–146.


14. Krasnokutskaya, E. “Identification and Estimation of Auction Model with Two-Dimensional Unob-served Heterogeneity,” International Economic Review, 53 (2012), 659–692.

15. Li, T. and Zheng, X. “Information Acquisition and/or Bid Preparation: A Structural Analysis ofEntry and Bidding in Timber Sale Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 168 (2012), 29–46.



18. Ando, T. and Tsay, R. “Quantile Regression Models with Factor-Augmented Predictors and Informa-tion Criterion,” Econometrics Journal, 14 (2011), 1–24.

19. Krasnokutskaya, E. “Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogene-ity,” Review of Economics Studies, 78 (2011), 293–327.

20. An, Y., Hu, Y., and Shum, M. “Estimating First-Price Auction with an Unknown Number of Bidders:A Misclassification Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 157 (2010), 328–341.



23. An, X., Liu, S., and Xu, S. “Assess the Goodness of Fit for Risk Aversion Parameter of First PriceAuction via Nonparametric Method,” Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on IntelligentTechnologies, (2009) 334–339.




27. Gonzalez, R., Hasker, K., and Sickles, R. “An Analysis of Strategic Behavior in eBay Auctions,”Singapore Economic Review, 54 (2009), 441–472.

28. Li, T. “Simulation Based Selection of Competing Structural Econometric Models,” Journal of Econo-metrics, 148 (2009), 114–123.

16



31. Vukina, T., Zheng, X.Y., Marra, M., and Levy, A. “Do Farmers Value the Environment? Evidencefrom a Conservation Reserve Program Auction,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(2008), 1323–1332.

32. Kang, B. and Puller, S. “The Effect of Auction Format on Efficiency and Revenue in Divisible GoodsAuctions: A Test using Korean Treasury Auctions,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 56 (2008),290–332.

33. Moraga-Gonzales, J. and Wildenbeest, M. “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Search Costs,” Euro-pean Economic Review, 52 (2008), 820–848.

34. Chen, X.H., Hong H., and Shum, M. “Nonparametric Likelihood Ratio Model Selection Tests betweenParametric Likelihood and Moment Condition Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 141 (2007), 109–140.


36. Hong, H., Shum, M. “Using Price Distributions to Estimate Search Costs,” RAND Journal of Eco-nomics, 37 (2006), 257–275.

37. Armantier, O., Sbaı, E. “Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders areAsymmetric,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21 (2006), 745–779.

38. Lavergne P., Thomas A. “Semiparametric Estimation and Testing in a Model of EnvironmentalRegulation with Adverse Selection,” Empirical Economics, 30 (2005), 171–192.

39. Hall, P., Wang, J.-Z. “Bayesian Likelihood Methods for Estimating the End Point of a Distribution,”Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B – Statistical Methodology, 67 (2005), 717–729.

40. Fevrier P., Roos W., Visser M. “The Buyer’s Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case ofWine Auctions at Drouot,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14 (2005), 813–847.


42. Schnedler W. “Likelihood Estimation for Censored Random Vectors,” Econometric Reviews, 24 (2005),195–217.

43. Chernozhukov, V. “Extremal Quantile Regression,” Annals of Statistics, 33 (2005), 806–839.



46. Jofre-Bonet, M. and Pesendorfer, M. “Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game,” Econometrica, 71(2003), 1443–1489.

47. Bajari, P. and Hortacsu, A. “The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: EmpiricalInsights from eBay Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2003), 329–355.


49. Hendricks, H., Pinkse, J., and Porter, R. “Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 70 (2003), 115–145.



17

52. Margiotta, M.M. and Miller, R.A. “Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard,” Inter-national Economic Review, 41 (2000), 669–719.



55. Li, T. and Vuong, Q. “Using All Bids in Parametric Estimation of First Price Auctions,” EconomicLetters, 55 (1997), 321–325.

56. Rugen, P. and Callahan, B. “An Overview of Monte Carlo, a Fifty Year Perspective,” Human Ecologyand Risk Assessment, 2 (1996), 671–680.

57. Laffont, J.J. “Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data,” European Eco-nomic Review, 41 (1997), 1–35.

58. Shearer, B. “Piece-Rates, Principal-Agent Models, and Productivity Profiles—Parametric and Semi-Parametric Evidence from Payroll Records,” Journal of Human Resources, 31 (1996), 275–303.

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1. Reep, N., Blinn, C., and Kilgore, M. “Assessment of Stumpage Payment Methods Used by State andCounty Timber Sale Programs in the United States,” Journal of Forestry, 115 (2017), 513–521.

2. Bogle, T. and van Kooten, G. “Protecting Timber Supply on Public Land in Response to CatastrophicNatural Disturbance: A Principal-Agent Problem,” Forest Science, 61 (2015), 83–92.

3. Tatoutchoup, F. “Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information.” ScandinavianJournal of Economics, 117 (2015), 84–107.


5. Niquidet, K. “Revitalized? An Event Study of Forest Policy Reform in British Columbia,” Journal ofForest Economics, 14 (2008), 227–241.

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2. Silk, J. “TSP 4.4: A Review,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 12 (1997), 445–453.

18

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1. Haile, P. and Kitamura, Y. “Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions,” Econometrics Journal, 22 (2019),C1–C19.

2. Zincenko, F. “Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders,” Journalof Econometrics, 205 (2018), 303–335.

3. Gugler, K., Weichselbaumer, M., and Zulehner, C. “Competition in the Economic Crisis: Analysis ofProcurement Auctions,” European Economic Review, 73 (2015), 35–57.

4. Canals-Cerda, J. and Pearcy, J. “Arriving in Time: Estimation of English Auctions with a StochasticNumber of Bidders,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 31 (2013), 125–135.

5. Lin, C., Chou, S., Weng, S., and Hsieh, Y. “A Final Price Prediction Model for English Auctions: ANeuro-Fuzzy Approach,” Quality and Quantity, 47 (2013), 599–613.


7. Bandyopadhyay, S. and Bandyopadhyay, S. “Estimating Time Required to Reach Bid Levels in OnlineAuctions,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 26 (2009), 275–301.

8. Jank, W. and Shmueli, G. “Studying Heterogeneity of Price Evolution in eBay Auctions via FunctionalClustering,” Business Computing, 3 (2009), 237–261.

9. Zulehner, C. “Bidding Behavior in Sequential Cattle Auctions,” International Journal of IndustrialOrganization, 27 (2009), 33–42.

10. Ho, J. “Inter-Brand Comparison of Online Auction Markets,” Electronic Commerce Research, 8 (2008),103–114.

11. Kang, B. and Puller, S. “The Effect of Auction Format on Efficiency and Revenue in Divisible GoodsAuctions: A Test using Korean Treasury Auctions,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 56 (2008),290–332.

12. Mithas, S. and Jones, J. “Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E-Auctions for Procure-ment?” Production and Operations Management, 16 (2007), 455–470.

13. Lucking-Reiley, D., Bryan, D., Prasad, N., and Reeves, D. “Pennies from eBay: The Determinants ofPrice in Online Auctions,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 55 (2007), 223–233.

14. Reiley, D. “Field Experiments on the Effects of Reserve Price in Auctions: More Magic on theInternet,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (2006), 195–211.

15. Greenleaf, E. “Reserves, Regret, and Rejoicing in Open English Auctions,” Journal of ConsumerResearch, 31 (2004), 264–273.

16. Chu, S. Koh, W. and Tse, Y. “Expectations Formation and Forecasting of Vehicle Demand: AnEmpirical Study of the Vehicle Quota Auctions in Singapore,” Transportation Research, Part A,Policy and Practice, 38 (2004), 367–281.

17. Milne, R. and Wright, R. “Competition and Costs: Evidence from Competitive Tendering in ScottishNational Health Service,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 51 (2004), 1–23.

18. Gilkeson, J. and Reynolds, K. “Determinants of Internet Auction Success and Closing Price: AnExploratory Study,” Psychology and Marketing, 20 (2003), 537–566

19. Li, T., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Semiparametric Estimation of the Optimal Reserve Price inFirst-Price Auctions,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21 (2003), 53–64.

20. Eklof, M. and Lunander, A. “Open Outcry Auctions with Secret Reserve Prices: An Empirical Ap-plication to Executive Auctions of Tenant Owner’s Apartments in Sweden,” Journal of Econometrics,114 (2003), 243–260.

19

21. Haile, P. and Tamer, E. “Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions,” Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 111 (2003), 1-51.


23. Ward, S. and J. Clark. “Bidding Behavior in On-Line Auctions: An Examination of the eBay PokemonCard Market,” International Journal of Electronic Communication, 6 (2002), 139–155.

24. Boyd, J. “Virtual Orality: How eBay Controls Auctions without the Auctioneer’s Voice,” AmericanSpeech, 76 (2001), 286–300.

25. Chen, Y.Y., Kao, M.Y., and Lu, H.I. “Optimal Bid Sequences for Multi-Object Auctions with UnequalBudget,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1969 (2001), 84–95.

26. Armstrong, C.W. “Theory and Practice of Why Auctions Differ—A Study of Two Fish Auctions inNorway,” Marketing Policy, 25 (2001), 209–214.


28. Gomez-Lobo, A. and Szymanski, S. “A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory CompetitiveTendering for Refuse Collection Contracts,” Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (2001), 105–113.

29. Garcia, M. and Rezende, L. “Leiloes de Tıtulos da Dıvida Publica pelo Banco Central do Brasil: UmEstudo dos Fatores Condicionantes da Dispersao das Propostas para os BBCs,” Revısta de EconomiaPolitica, 20 (2000), 8–25.

30. Lundberg, S. “Child Auctions in Nineteenth Century Sweden: An Analysis of Price Differences,”Journal of Human Resources, 35 (2000), 279–298.


32. Salanie, B. “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Contracts,” Review of Economics, 50 (1999),611–620.

33. Kao, M.Y., Qi, J.F., and Tan, L. “Optimal Bidding Algorithms against Cheating in Multiple-ObjectAuctions,” SIAM Journal of Computation, 28 (1999), 955–969.

34. Wang, R.Q. “Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations,”Canadian Journal of Economics, 31 (1998), 395–410.

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3. Horowitz, J. “Bootstrap Methods in Econometrics,” Annual Review of Economics, 11 (2019), 193–224.

4. Gorbenko, A. “How Do Valuations Impact Outcomes of Asset Sales with Heterogeneous Bidders?”Journal of Financial Economics, 131 (2019), 88–117.


6. Bajari, P., Hong, H., Park, M., and Town, R. “Estimating Price Sensitivity of Economic Agents usingDiscontinuity in Nonlinear Contracts,” Quantitative Economics, 8 (2017), 397–433.

20

7. Fang, R. and Li, X. “Nonparametric Tests for Strictly Increasing Virtual Valuations,” Journal ofApplied Statistics, 44 (2017), 1122–1136.


9. Banerji, A. and Gupta, N. “Detection, Identification, and Estimation of Loss Aversion: Evidence froman Auction Experiment,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (2014), 91–133.


11. Aradillas–Lopez, A., Gandhi, A., and Quint, D. “Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctionswith Correlated Private Values,” Econometrica, 81 (2013), 489–534.


13. Krasnokutskaya, E. “Identification and Estimation of Auction Model with Two-Dimensional Unob-served Heterogeneity,” International Economic Review, 53 (2012), 659–692.



16. Shneyerov, A. and Wong, A.C.L. “Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions when the Numberof Potential Bidders is Unobservable,” Games and Economic Behavior, 72 (2011), 574–582.

17. Tostao, E., Chung, C., and Brorsen B. “Integrating Auction Theory With Traditional Measures ofMarket Power,” Agribusiness, 27 (2011), 162–178.

18. Campo, S, Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctionswith Risk-Averse Bidders,” Review of Economics Studies, 78 (2011), 112–147.

19. Krasnokutskaya, E. “Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogene-ity,” Review of Economics Studies, 78 (2011), 293–327.

20. Florens, J.P. and Sbaı, E. “Local Identification in Empirical Games of Incomplete Information,”Econometric Theory, 26 (2010), 1638–1662.



23. Vukina, T., Zheng, X.Y., Marra, M., and Levy, A. “Do Farmers Value the Environment? Evidencefrom a Conservation Reserve Program Auction,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26(2008), 1323–1332.

24. Gayle, W.R. and Richard, J.F. “Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent PrivateValues Auctions,” Computational Economics, 32 (2008), 245–278.


26. Li, H.G. and Riley, J.G. “Auction Choice,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25 (2007),84–108.


28. Armantier, O. and Sbaı, E. “Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Biddersare Asymmetric,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21 (2006), 745–779.

29. Fang, H.M. “Disentangling the College Wage Premium: Estimating a Model with Endogenous Edu-cation Choices,” International Economic Review, 47 (2006), 1151–1185.

21

30. Park, Y.H. and Bradlow, E.D. “An Integrated Model for Bidding Behavior in Internet Auctions:Whether, Who, When, and How Much,” Journal of Marketing Research, 42 (2005), 470–482.


32. Meenaskshi, J.V. and Banerji, A. “The Unsupportable Support Price: An Analysis of Collusionand Government Intervention in Paddy Auction Markets in North India,” Journal of DevelopmentEconomics, 76 (2005), 377-403.


34. Plott, C. and Salmon, T. “The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment inExperiments and in the UK3G Spectrum Auction,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,53 (2004), 353–383.


36. Sareen, S. “Reference Bayesian Inference in Nonregular Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 113 (2003),265–288.







43. Bikhchandani, S., Haile, P.A., and Riley, J.G. “Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions,”Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002), 19–27.

44. Heckman, J. “Micro Data, Heterogeneity, and the Evaluation of Public Policy: Nobel Lecture,” Journalof Political Economy, 109 (2001), 673–748.

45. Li, T., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q. “Conditionally Independent Private Information in OCS WildcatAuctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 98 (2000), 129–161.



48. Avery, C. “Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 65 (1998),185–210.

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1. Tatoutchoup, F. and Njiki, P. “Optimal Forestry Contract with Interdependent Costs,” B.E. Journalof Theoretical Economics, 20 (2020).

22

2. Liu, T. and Bernhardt, D. “Optimal Equity Auctions with Two-Dimensional Types,” Journal ofEconomic Theory, 184 (2019).

3. Hu, A., Matthews, S., and Zou, L. “Low Reserve Prices in Auctions,” Economic Journal, 129 (2019),2563–2580.

4. Ma, J., Marmer, V., and Shneyerov, A. “Inference for First-Price Auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, andVuong’s Estimator,” Journal of Econometrics, 211 (2019), 507–538.

5. Coey, D., Larsen, B., and Sweeney, K. “The Bidder Exclusion Effect,” RAND Journal of Economics,50 (2019), 93–120.

6. Han, X., Kant, S., and Xie, Y. “Bidder’s Private Value Distributions in Standing Timber Auctions inthe Jiangxi Province of China,” Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 48 (2018), 1441–1455.



9. Holzer, J., DePiper, G., and Lipton, D. “Buybacks with Costly Participation,” Journal of Environ-mental Economics and Management, 85 (2017), 130–145.

10. Quint, D. “Common Values and Low Reserve Prices,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 65 (2017),363–396.

11. Farnia, F., Frayret, J.-M., LeBel, L., and Beaudry, C. Agent-based Simulation of Multiple-roundTimber Combinatorial Auction, Canadian Journal of Forest Research, 47 (2017), 1–9.

12. Roberts, J. and Sweeting, A. “Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition: The Case of the FederalTimber Contract Payment Modification Act,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (2016),257–288.

13. Choi, S., Nesheim, L., and Rasul, I. “Reserve Price Effects in Auctions: Estimates from MultipleRegression-Discontinuity Designs,” Economic Inquiry, 54 (2016), 294–314.


15. Stevenson, S. and Young, J. “The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions,”Real Estate Economics, 43 (2015), 375–402.

16. Tatoutchoup, F. “Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information.” ScandinavianJournal of Economics, 117 (2015), 84–107.

17. Lazzati, N. and van Essen, M. “A Nearly Optimal Auction for an Uninformed Seller,” EconomicsLetters, 122 (2014), 396–399.

18. Boyer, C. and Brorsen, B. “Implications of a Reserve Price in an Agent-Based Common-ValueAuction,” Computational Economics, 43 (2014), 33–51.

19. Roberts, J. “Unobserved Heterogeneity and Reserve Prices in Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics,44 (2013), 712–732.

20. Farnia, F., Frayret, J.-M., LeBel, L., and Beaudry, C. “Multiple-Round Timber Auction Design andSimulation,” International Journal of Production Economics, 146 (2013), 129–141.

21. Iimi, A. “Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement,” Review of Industrial Organiza-tion, 43 (2013), 243–261.

22. Aryal, G. and Kim, D.-H. “A Point Decision for Partially Identified Auction Models,” Journal ofBusiness and Economic Statistics, 31 (2013), 384–397.

23. Kim, D.-H. “Optimal Choice of a Reserve Price under Uncertainty,” International Journal of IndustrialOrganziation, 31 (2013), 587–602.

24. Marmer, V., Shneyerov, A., and Xu, P. “What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonpara-metric Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 176 (2013), 46–58.

23

25. Roberts, J. and Sweeting, A. “When Should Sellers Use Auctions?” American Economic Review, 103(2013), 1830–1861.

26. Brown, R., Kilgore, M., Blinn, C., and Coggins, J. “The Impact of Reserve Prices and ContractLength on Stumpage Bid Prices: An Empirical Assessment,” Northern Journal of Applied Forestry,30 (2013), 85–91.

27. Hill, J. and Shneyerov, A. “Are There Common Values in First-Price Auctions? A Tail-IndexNonparametric Test,” Journal of Econometrics, 174 (2013), 144–164.


29. Aradillas–Lopez, A., Gandhi, A., and Quint, D. “Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctionswith Correlated Private Values,” Econometrica, 81 (2013), 489–534.

30. Carbone, F., Scarelli, A., and Varga, Z. “Mathematical Modeling for Evaluating Gain of LoggingCompanies in the Timber Market,” Forest Science and Practice, 15 (2013), 41–48.


32. Preget, R. and Waelbroeck, P. “What is the Cost of Low Participation in French Timber Auctions?,”Applied Economics, 44 (2012), 1337–1346.

33. Li, T. and Zheng, X. “Information Acquisition and/or Bid Preparation: A Structural Analysis ofEntry and Bidding in Timber Sale Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 168 (2012), 29–46.

34. Marmer, V. and Shneyerov, A. “Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions,”Journal of Econometrics, 167 (2012), 345–357.

35. Shi, X. “Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition,” Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2012),666–686.


37. Estache, A. and Iimi, A. “(Un)bundling Infrastructure Procurement: Evidence from Water Supplyand Sewerage Projects,” Utilities Policy, 19 (2011), 104–114.

38. Liu Y.W., Wei K.K., Chen H.P. “: A Meta-Analysis on the Effects of Online Auction Design Options:The Moderating Effect of Value Uncertainty,” Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 9(2010), 507–521.


40. Li, T. and Zhang, B. “Testing for Affiliation in First-Price Auctions using Entry Behavior,” Interna-tional Economic Review, 51 (2010), 837–850.

41. An, Y., Hu, Y., and Shum, M. “Estimating First-Price Auction with an Unknown Number of Bidders:A Misclassification Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 157 (2010), 328–341.





46. Ji, L. and Li, T. “Multi-Round Procurement Auctions with Secret Reserve Prices: Theory andEvidence,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23 (2008), 897–923.

47. Brendstrup, B. “Non-Parametric Estimation of Sequential English Auctions,” Journal of Economet-rics, 141 (2007), 460–481.

24

48. Skitmore R., Pettitt A., and McVinish R. “Gates’ Bidding Model,” Journal of Construction Engi-neering and Management–ASCE, 133 (2007), 855–863.

49. Reiley, D. “Field Experiments on the Effects of Reserve Price in Auctions: More Magic on theInternet,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (2006), 195–211.

50. Houser, D. and Wooders J. “Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay,” Journal ofEconomics & Management Strategy, 15 (2006), 353–369.

51. Fevrier, P., Roos, W., and Visser, M. “The Buyer’s Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: TheCase of Wine Auctions at Drouot,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14 (2005),813–847.


53. Li, T., Perrigne, I. and Vuong, Q. “Semiparametric Estimation of the Optimal Reserve Price in First-Price Auctions,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21 (2003), 53–64.

54. Eklof, M. and Lunander, A. “Open Outcry Auctions with Secret Reserve Prices: An Empirical Ap-plication to Executive Auctions of Tenant Owner’s Apartments in Sweden,” Journal of Econometrics,114 (2003), 243–260.

55. Rose, S. and Chapman, D. “Timber Harvest Adjacency Economies, Hunting, Species Protection, andOld Growth Value: Seeking the Dynamic Optimum,” Ecological Economics, 44 (2003), 325–344.

56. Kant, S. “Extending the Boundaries of Forest Economics,” Forest Policy and Economics, 5 (2003),39–56.






62. Bikhchandani, S., Haile, P.A., and Riley, J.G. “Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions,”Games and Economic Behavior, 38 (2002), 19–27.


64. Haile, P. “Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities,” Games andEconomic Behavior, 33 (2000), 231–248.


66. Burnes, E., Thomann, E., and Waymire, E.C. “Arbitrage-Free Valuation of a Federal Timber Lease,”Forestry Science, 45 (1999), 473–483.

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1. Kapoor, S. “Inefficient Incentives and Nonprice Allocations: Experimental Evidence from Big-BoxRestaurants,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 29 (2020), 401–419.

25

2. Choudhury, P., Khanna, T., and Makridis, C. “Do Managers Matter? A Natural Experiment from 42R& D Labs in India,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 36 (2020), 47–83.

3. Wang, Q. “A Nonparametric Analysis of Insufficient Wage Incentives in the Chinese Health Industry,”Applied Economics, 52 (2020), 951–969.

4. Makridis, C. “Do Right-to-Work Laws Work? Evidence on Individuals’ Well-Being and EconomicSentiment,” Journal of Law & Economics, 62 (2019), 713–745.

5. Ku, H. “The Effect of Wage Subsidies on Piece Rate Workers: Evidence from the Penny Per Poundprogram in Florida,” Journal of Development Economics, 139 (2019), 122–134.

6. Corgnet, B. and Hernan-Gonzalez, R. “Revisiting the Trade-off between Risk and Incentives: TheShocking Effect of Random Shocks?” Management Science, 65 (2019), 1096–1114.

7. Huffman, D. and Bognanno, M. “High-Powered Performance Pay and Crowding Out of NonmonetaryMotives,” Management Science, 64 (2018), 4669–4680.

8. Castek, O. “Performance Factors of Czech Companies Identified using Statistical Pattern Recognition:Interpretation of Results,” Prague Economic Papers, 27 (2018), 397–416.

9. Guiteras, R. and Jack, B. “Productivity in Piece-Rate Labor Markets: Evidence from Rural Malawi,”Journal of Development Economics, 131 (2018), 42–61.

10. Cardella, E. and Depew, B. “Output Restriction and the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-EffortWork Task,” Games and Economic Behavior, 107 (2018), 182–202.


12. Fischbacher, U., Kairies-Schwarz, N., and Stefani, U. “Non-additivity and the Salience of MarginalProductivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness,” Economica, 84 (2017), 587–610.

13. Wendimu, M., Henningsen, A., and Czekaj, T. “Incentives and Moral Hazard: Plot Level Produc-tivity of Factory-Operated and Outgrower-Operated Sugarcane Production in Ethiopia,” AgriculturalEconomics, 48 (2017), 549–560.

14. Chung, D. and Narayandas, D. “Incentives Versus Reciprocity: Insights from a Field Experiment,”Journal of Marketing Research, 54 (2017), 511–524.

15. Mills, B. “Technological Innovations in Monitoring and Evaluation: Evidence of Performance Impactsamong Major League Baseball Umpires,” Labour Economics, 46 (2017), 189–199.

16. Fuchs, W. “Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility,” AmericanEconomic Journal–Microecnomics, 7 (2015), 99–108.

17. Flory, J., Leibbrandt, A., and List, J. “Do Competitive Work Places Deter Female Workers? A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Job-Entry Decisions,” Review of Economic Studies, 82 (2015),122–155.

18. Frank, D. and Obloj, T. “Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs:Evidence from Retail Banking,” Strategic Management Journal, 35 (2014), 1279–1301.

19. Chang, T. and Gross, T. “How Many Pears Would a Pear Packer Pack If a Pear Packer Could PackPears at Quasi-Exogenously Varying Piece Pates?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,99 (2014), 1–17.

20. Frick, B., Goetzen, U., and Simmons, R. “The Hidden Costs of High-Performance Work Practices:Evidence from a Large German Steel Company” ILR Review, 66 (2013), 198–224.

21. Lee, C. “Team Characteristics, Peer Competition Threats and Individual Performance within aWorking Team: An Analysis of Realtor Agents,” South African Journal of Economic and ManagementSciences, 17 (2014), 140–156.

22. Larkin, I. “The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales,”Journal of Labor Economics, 32 (2014), 199–227.

23. Obloj, T. and Sengul, M. “Incentive Life-Cycles: Learning and the Division of Value in Firms,”Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012), 305–347.

26

24. Zivin, J. and Neidell, M. “The Impact of Pollution on Worker Productivity,” American EconomicReview, 102 (2012), 652–3673.

25. Cottini, E., Kato, T., and Westergaard-Nielsen, N. “Adverse Workplace Conditions, High-InvolvementWork Practices and Labor Turnover: Evidence from Danish Linked Employer-Employee Data,” LabourEconomics, 18 (2011), 872–880.

26. Bae, K.S., Chuma H., Kato T., Kim D.B., and Ohashi, I. “High Performance Work Practices andEmployee Voice: A Comparison of Japanese and Korean Workers,” Industrial Relations, 50 (2011),1–29.

27. Hochberg, Y. and Lindsey, L. “Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-executive Stock Options,” Review of Financial Studies, 23 (2010), 4148–4186.

28. Shi, L. “Incentive Effect of Piece-Rate Contracts: Evidence from Two Small Field Experiments,” BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10 (2010), Article No. 61.

29. Thiele, V. “Task-Specific Abilities in Multi-Task Principal-Agent Relationships,” Labour Economics,17 (2010), 690–698.

30. Garvey, R. and Wu, F. “Payday Effects: An Examination of Trader Behavior within EvaluationPeriods,” Journal of Behavioral Finance, 11 (2010) 114–128.

31. Zahran, S., Brody, S., Highfield, W., and Vedlitz, A. “Non-Linear Incentives, Plan Design, and FloodMitigation: The Case of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Community Rating System,”Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 53 (2010), 219–239.

32. Coffey, B. and Maloney, M. “The Thrill of Victory: Measuring the Incentive to Win,” Journal ofLabor Economics, 28 (2010), 87–112.

33. Mas, A. and Moretti, E. “Peers at Work,” American Economic Review, 99 (2009), 112–145.

34. Tsuru, T. “Transforming Incentives: Analysis of Personnel and Employee Output Data in a LargeJapanese Auto Sales Firm,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 49 (2008), 109–132.

35. Eriksson, T. and Villeval M. “Performance-Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation,” Journal EconomicBehavior & Organization, 68 (2008), 412–421.

36. Cho, S.J. and Rust, J. “Is Econometrics Useful for Private Policy Making? A Case Study of Replace-ment Policy at an Auto Rental Company,” Journal of Econometrics, 145 (2008), 243–257.

37. Pokorny, K. “Pay — But Do Bot Pay Too Much. An Experimental Study on the Impact of Incentives,”Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66 (2008), 252–264.

38. Dohmen, T. “Do Professionals Choke under Pressure?” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-tion, 65 (2008), 636–653.

39. Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., and Rasul, I. “Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers:Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (2007), 729–773.

40. Helm, C., Holladay C.L., and Tortorella F.R. “The Performance Management System: Applying andEvaluating a Pay-for-Performance Initiative,” Journal of Healthcare Management, 52 (2007), 49–62.

41. Jones, D.C., Kalmi, P., and Kauhanen, A. “Human Resource Management Policies and Productivity:New Evidence from an Econometric Case Study,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22 (2006),526–538.

42. Rosenthal, M.B. and Frank, R.G. “What is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality in HealthCare?” Medical Care Research and Review, 63 (2006), 135–157.

43. Frey, B.S. and Benz, M. “Can Private Learn from Public Governance?” Economic Journal, 115 (2005),F377–F396.

44. Heywood, J. and O’Halloran P. “Racial Earnings Differentials and Performance Pay,” Journal ofHuman Resources, 40 (2005), 435–452.

45. Treble, J. “Intertemporal Substitution of Effort: Some Empirical Evidence,” Economica, 70 (2003),579–595.

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Cited By:

1. Choudhury, P., Khanna, T., and Makridis, C. “Do Managers Matter? A Natural Experiment from 42R& D Labs in India,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 36 (2020), 47–83.

2. Hill, A. and Jones, D. “The Impacts of Performance Pay on Teacher Effectiveness and Retention aDoes Teacher Gender Matter?” Journal of Human Resources, 55 (2020), 349–385.

3. D’Haultfouille, X. and Fevrier, P. “The Provision of Wage Incentives: A Structural Estimation usingContracts Variation,” Quantitative Economics, 11 (2020), 349–397.

4. Makridis, C. “Do Right-to-Work Laws Work? Evidence on Individuals’ Well-Being and EconomicSentiment,” Journal of Law & Economics, 62 (2019), 713–745.

5. Chi, W., Liu, T., Qian, X., and Qing, Y. “An Experimental Study of Incentive Contracts for Short-and Long-term Employees,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 159 (2019), 366–383.

6. Bordley, R. and Karnani, A. “Using Incentives to Address Cannibalization,” Long Range Planning,51 (2018), 641–648.

7. Rubin, J., Samek, A., and Sheremeta, R. “Loss Aversion and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff,” Exper-imental Economics, 21 (2018), 292–315.

8. Hoppe, E. and Schmitz, P. “Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test ofMoral Hazard Theory,” Games and Economic Behavior, 109 (2018), 544–564.

9. Hong, F., Hossain, T., List, J., and Tanaka, M. “Testing the Theory of Multitasking: Evidence from aNatural Field Experiment in Chinese Factories,” International Economic Review, 59 (2018), 511–536.

10. Baek, J. and Park, W. “Firms’ Adjustments to Employment Protection Legislation: Evidence fromSouth Korea,” ILR Review, 71 (2018), 733–759.

11. Ledic, M. “Performance Pay Jobs and Job Satisfaction,” CESIFO Economic Studies, 64 (2018), 78–102.

12. Friedl, A., Neyseb, L., and Schmidt, U. “Payment Scheme Changes and Effort Adjustment: The Roleof 2D:4D Digit Ratio,” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 72 (2018), 86–94.



15. Englmaier, F., Roider, A., and Sunde, U. “The Role of Communication of Performance Schemes:Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Management Science, 63 (2017), 4061–4080.

16. Burgess, S., Propper, C., Ratto, M., and Tominey, E. “Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence froma Government Agency,” Economic Journal, 127 (2017), F117–F141.

17. Wendimu, M., Henningsen, A., and Czekaj, T. “Incentives and Moral Hazard: Plot Level Produc-tivity of Factory-Operated and Outgrower-Operated Sugarcane Production in Ethiopia,” AgriculturalEconomics, 48 (2017), 549–560.

18. Tymula, A. “Competitive Screening of a Heterogeneous Labor Force and Corporate Teamwork At-titude,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics – Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Staatswis-senschaft, 173 (2017), 523–547.

19. Chung, D., and Narayandas, D. “Incentives versus Reciprocity: Insights from a Field Experiment,”Journal of Marketing Research, 54 (2017), 511–524.

20. DeVaro, J. and Heywood, J. “Performance Pay and Work-Related Health Problems: A LongitudinalStudy of Establishments,” ILR Review, 70 (2017), 670–703.

28

21. Ren, T., Fang, R., and Yang, Z. “The Impact of Pay-for-Performance Perception and Pay LevelSatisfaction on Employee Work Attitudes and Extra-Role Behaviors: An Investigation of ModeratingEffects,” Journal of Chinese Human Resource Management, 8 (2017), 94–113.

22. Choi, S. and Whitford, A. “Employee Satisfaction in Agencies with Merit-Based Pay: DifferentialEffects for Three Measures,” International Public Management Journal, 20 (2017), 442–466.

23. Jirjahn, U. “Performance Pay and Productivity: A Note on the Moderating Role of a High-WagePolicy,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 37 (2016), 507–511.

24. Ioannou, I., Li, S. and Serafeim, G. “The Effect of Target Difficulty on Target Completion: The Caseof Reducing Carbon Emissions,” Accounting Review, 91 (2016), 1467–1492.

25. Demir, I. “The Firm Size, Farm Size, and Transactions Costs: The Case of Hazelnut Farms in Turkey,”Agricultural Economics, 47 (2016), 81–90.

26. Chaudry, T. and Faran, M. “Organization, Management, and Wage Practices in Pakistan’s ElectricalFan and Readymade Garment Sectors,” Lahore Journal of Economics, 20 (2015), 183–204.

27. Gayle, G.-L. and Miller, R. “Identifying and Testing Models of Managerial Compensation,” Reviewof Economics Studies, 82 (2015), 1074–11118.

28. Al-Ubayadli, O., Andersen, S., Gneezy, U., and List, J. “Carrots That Look Like Sticks: Toward anUnderstanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes,” Southern Economic Journal, 81 (2015), 538–561.

29. Chiou, J. and Droge, C. “The Effects of Standardization and Trust on Franchisee’s Performanceand Satisfaction: A Study on Franchise Systems in the Growth Stage,” Journal of Small BusinessManagement, 53 (2015), 129–144.

30. Owan, H., Tsuru, T., and Uehara, K. “Incentives and Gaming in a Nonlinear Compensation Scheme:Evidence from North American Auto Dealership Transaction Data,” Evidence-Based HRM–A GlobalForum for Empirical Scholarship, 3 (2015), 222–243.

31. Damiani, M. and Ricci, A. “Managers Education and the Choice of Different Variable Pay Schemes:Evidence from Italian Firms,” European Management Journal, 32 (2014) 891–902.

32. Pfeifer, C. “Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence Among Managers in a GermanCompany,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 61 (2014), 523–536.

33. Chung, D., Steenburgh, T. and Sudhir, K. “Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A DynamicStructural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans,” Marketing Science, 33 (2014), 165–187.

34. Lee, C. “Team Characteristics, Peer Competition Threats and Individual Performance within aWorking Team: An Analysis of Realtor Agents,” South African Journal of Economic and ManagementSciences, 17 (2014), 140–156.

35. Anik, L., Aknin, L., Norton, M., Dunn, E., and Quoidbach, J. “Prosocial Bonuses Increase EmployeeSatisfaction and Team Performance,” PLOS ONE, 8 (2013), e75509.

36. Kishore, S. Rao, R., Narasimhan, O. and John, G. “Bonuses Versus Commissions: A Field Study,”Journal of Marketing Research, 50 (2013), 317–333.

37. Manthei, K. and Mohnen, A. “The Incentive Impact of the Fixed Wage—A Real Effort Experiment,”Zeitschrift fu Personalforschung, 27 (2013), 331–353.

38. Frick, B., Goetzen, U., and Simmons, R. “The Hidden Costs of High-Performance Work Practices:Evidence from a Large German Steel Company,” ILR Review, 66 (2013), 198–224.

39. Cloutier, J., Morin, D., and Renaud, S. “How Does Variable Pay Relate to Pay Satisfaction amongCanadian Workers?” International Journal of Manpower, 34 (2013), 465–485.

40. Rahim, M., Daud, W., and Norhayate W. “Rewards and Motivation among Administrators of Uni-versiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UNISZA): An Empirical Study,” International Journal of Business andSociety, 14 (2013), 265–286.

41. Zivin, J. and Neidell, M. “The Impact of Pollution on Worker Productivity,” American EconomicReview, 102 (2012), 652–3673.

42. Larkin, I., Pierce, L., and Gino, F. “The Psychological Costs of Pay-for-Performance: Implicationsfor the Strategic Compensation of Employees,” Strategic Management Journal, 33 (2012), 1194–1214.

29

43. Heywood, J., Wei, X. and Ye, G. “Piece Rates for Professors,” Economics Letters, 113 (2011), 285–287.

44. Vukina, T. and Zheng, X. “Homogenous and Heterogenous Contestants in Piece Rate Tournaments:Theory and Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29 (2011), 506–517

45. Perrigne, I. and Vuong, Q. “Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model with Adverse Selectionand Moral Hazard,” Econometrica, 79 (2011), 1499–1539.

46. Misra, S. and Nair, H., “A Structural Model of Sales-Force Compensation Dynamics: Estimation andField Implementation,” QME-Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 9 (2011), 211–257.

47. Cornelissen, T., Heywood, J., and Jirjahn, U. “Performance Pay, Risk Attitudes and Job Satisfaction,”Labour Economics, 18 (2011), 229–239.

48. Harkness, P. and Schier, M. “Performance Related Pay in Australian Universities: The Case ofSwinburne University,” Australian Universities Review, 53 (2011), 50–58.

49. Shi, L. “Incentive Effect of Piece-Rate Contracts: Evidence from Two Small Field Experiments,” BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10 (2010), Article No. 61.

50. Pena, A. “Poverty, Legal Status, and Pay Basis: The Case of US Agriculture,” Industrial Relations,49 (2010), 429–456.

51. Bose, A., Pal, D., and Sappington, D. “On the Design of Piece-Rate Contracts,” Economics Letters,107 (2010), 330–332.

52. Franceschelli, I., Galiani, S. and Gulmez, E. “Performance Pay and Productivity of Low- and High-Ability Workers,” Labour Economics, 17 (2010), 317–322.

53. Gielen, A., Kerkhofs, M., and van Ours, J. “How Performance Related Pay Affects Productivity andEmployment,” Journal of Population Economics, 23 (2010), 291–301.

54. Dubois, P. and Vukina, T. “Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents:Evindence from Production Contracts Data,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2009), 489–500.

55. Roman, F. “An Analysis of Changes to a Team-Based Incentive Plan and its Effects on Productivity,Product Quality, and Absenteeism,” Accounting Organizations and Society, 34 (2009), 589–618.

56. Origo, F. “Flexible Pay, Firm Performance, and the Role of Unions. New Evidence from Italy,” LabourEconomics, 16 (2009), 64–78.

57. Copeland A. and Monnet, C. “The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes,” Review of Economic Studies,76 (2009), 93–113.

58. Tsuru, T. “Transforming Incentives: Analysis of Personnel and Employee Output Data in a LargeJapanese Auto Sales Firm,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 49 (2008), 109–132.

59. Ross, S. and Zenou, Y. “Are Shirking and Leisure Substitutable? An Empirical Test of EfficiencyWages Based on Urban Economic Theory,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 38 (2008), 498–517.

60. Green, C. and Heywood, J. “Does Performance Pay Increase Job Satisfaction?,” Economica, 75 (2008),710–728.

61. Artz, B. “The Role of Firm Size and Performance Pay in Determining Employee Job SatisfactionBrief: Firm Size, Performance Pay, and Job Satisfaction,” Labour-England, 22 (2008), 315–343.

62. Vukina, T. and Zheng, X.Y. “Structural Estimation of Rank-Order Tournament Games with PrivateInformation,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89 (2007), 651–664.

63. Zheng, X.Y. and Vukina, T. “Efficiency Gains from Organizational Innovation: Comparing Ordinaland Cardinal Tournament Games in Broiler Contracts,” International Journal of Industrial Organi-zation, 25 (2007), 843–859.

64. Bandiera O., Barankay I., and Rasul I. “Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers:Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (2007), 729–773.

65. Subadar U., Fowdar S., Sannasse R.V., and Torap, L.K.S., “Productivity in the Mauritian Textileand Apparel Sector: The Case of Mauritian and Chinese Workers,” Journal of the Textile Institute,98 (2007), 47–55.

30

66. Stiroh K. “Playing for Keeps: Pay and Performance in the NBA,” Economic Inquiry, 45 (2007),145–161.

67. Jones, D.C., Kalmi, P., and Kauhanen, A. “Human Resource Management Policies and Productivity:New Evidence from an Econometric Case Study,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22 (2006),526–538.

68. Bacache-Beauvallet, M. “How Incentives Increase Inequality,” Labour-England, 20 (2006), 383–391

69. Mayer, B., Pfeiffer T., and Reichel, A. “Standards and Design Principles for Incentive Systems froman Agency-Theoretical Viewpoint,” Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 57 (2005), 12–29.

70. Freeman, R. and Kleiner M. “The Last American Shoe Manufacturer: Decreasing Productivity andIncreasing Profits in the Shift from Piece Rates to Continuous Flow Production,” Industrial Relations,44 (2005), 307–330.

71. Dubois, P. and Vukina, T. “Grower Risk Aversion and the Marginal Cost of Moral Hazard in LivestockProduction Contracts,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86 (2004), 835–841.

72. Vera-Hernandez, M. “Structural Estimation of a Principal-Agent Model: Moral Hazard in MedicalInsurance,” RAND Journal of Economics, 34 (2003), 670–693.

73. Treble, J. “Intertemporal Substitution of Effort: Some Empirical Evidence,” Economica, 70 (2003),579–595.

74. Chen, P. and Edin, P. “Efficiency Wages and Industry Wage Differentials: A Comparison acrossMethods of Pay,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 84 (2002), 617–631.

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1. Bui, T. and Imai, K. “Determinants of Rural-Urban Inequality in Vietnam: Detailed DecompositionAnalyses Based on Unconditional Quantile Regressions,” Journal of Development Studies, 55 (2019),2610–2625.

2. Oliver, X. and Sard, M. “The Wage Gap in Spain for Temporary Workers: The Effects of the GreatRecession,” International Journal of Manpower, 40 (2019), 1319–1346.

3. Azam, M. “Accounting for Growing Urban-Rural Welfare Paps in India,” World Development, 122(2019), 410–432.

4. Erreygers, G. and Bui, T. “The Eye of the Beholder. Reconsidering the Notions of Pro-Poor Growthand Progressivity, with an Application to Vietnam,” Review of Development Economics, 23 (2019),922-939.

5. Ferreira, F., Firpo, S. and Galvao, A. “Actual and Counterfactual Growth Incidence and Delta LorenzCurves: Estimation and Inference,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 34 (2019), 385–402.

6. Castellano, R., Musella, G., and Punzo, G. “The Effect of Environmental Attitudes and Policies onSeparate Waste Collection: the Case of Insular Italy,” Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 12(2019), 63–85.

7. Landmesser, J. and Orlowski, A. “Measuring and Explaining Income Inequalities in Poland: anEstimation of Lorenz Curves using Hazard Function Approach,” Acta Physica Polonica A, 133 (2018),1445–1449.

8. Behr, A. and Theune, K. “The Gender Pay Gap at Labour Market Entrance: Evidence from Germany,”International Labour Review, 157 (2018), 83–100.

31

9. Anglade, B., Useche, P., and Deere, C. “Decomposing the Gender Wealth Gap in Ecuador,” WorldDevelopment, 96 (2017), 19–31.

10. Sorensen, K. “Active Labour Market Programmes and Reservation Wages: It is a Hazard,” AppliedEconomics Letters, 24 (2017), 589–593.

11. Goraus, K., Tyrowicz, J., and van der Velde, L. “Which Gender Wage Gap Estimates to Trust? AComparative Analysis,” Review of Income and Wealth, 63 (2017), 118–146.

12. Roemer, J. and Trannoy, A. “Equality of Opportunity: Theory and Measurement,” Journal ofEconomic Literature, 54 (2016), 1288–1332.

13. Carrillo, P. and Rothbaum, J. “Counterfactual Spatial Distributions,” Journal of Regional Science,2016 (2106), 868–894.

14. Van Kerm, P., Yu, S., and Choe, C. “Decomposing Quantile Wage Gaps: A Conditional LikelihoodApproach,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series C – Applied Statistics, 65 (2016), 507–527.

15. Landmesser, J. “Decomposition of Differences in Income Distributions using Quantile Regression,”Statistics in Transition new series, 17 (2016), 1–18.

16. Firpo, S. and Pinto, C. “Identification and Estimation of Distributional Impacts of Interventions UsingChanges in Inequality Measures,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 31 (2016), 457–486.

17. Lommerud, K., Straume, O., and Vagstad, S. “Mommy Tracks and Public Policy: On Self-FulfillingProphecies and Gender Gaps in Hiring and Promotion,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi-zation, 116 (2015), 540–554.

18. Rothe, C. “Decomposing the Composition Effect: The Role of Covariates in Determining Between-Group Differences in Economic Outcomes,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 33 (2015),323–337.

19. Klein, N., Kneib, T., Lang, S., and Sohn, A. “Bayesian Structured Additive Distributional Regressionwith an Application to Regional Income Inequality in Germany,” Annals of Applied Statistics, 9 (2015),1024–1052.

20. Lesner, R. “Does Labor Market History Matter?” Empirical Economics, 48 (2015), 1327–1364.

21. Cai, L. and Liu, A. “Wage Determination and Distribution in Urban China and Vietnam: A Com-parative Analysis,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 43 (2015), 186–203.

22. Chi, W. and Li, B. “Trends in China’s Gender Employment and Pay Gap: Estimating Gender PayGaps with Employment Selection,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 42 (2014), 708–725.

23. Ghosh, P. “The Contribution of Human Capital Variables to Changes in the Wage DistributionFunction,” Labour Economics 28 (2014), 58–69.

24. Mussida, C. and Picchio, M. “The Trend over Time of the Gender Wage Gap in Italy,” EmpiricalEconomics, 46 (2014), 1081–1110.

25. Mussida, C. and Picchio, M. “The Gender Gap by Education in Italy,” Journal of Economic Inequality,12 (2014), 117–147.

26. Xiu, L. and Gunderson, M. “Glass Ceiling or Sticky Floor? Quantile Regression Decomposition of theGender Pay Gap in China,” International Journal of Manpower, 35 (2014), 306–326.

27. Arni, P., Lalive, R., Van Ours, J. “How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? LookingBeyond Unemployment Exit,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 28 (2013), 1153–1178.

28. Chernozhukov, V., Fernandez-Val, I., and Melly, B. “Inference on Counterfactual Distribution,”Econometrica, 81 (2013), 2205–2268.

29. Cockx, B. and Picchio, M. “Scarring Effects of Remaining Unemployed for Long-Term UnemployedSchool-Leavers,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A – Statistics in Society, 176 (2013),951–980.

30. Van Kerm, P. “Generalized Measures of Wage Differentials,” Empirical Economics, 45 (2013), 465–482.

31. DeWit, E. and van der Klaauw, B. “Asymmetric Information and List-Price Reductions in the HousingMarket,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 43 (2013), 507–520.

32

32. Osikominu, A. “Quick Job Entry or Long-Term Human Capital Development? The Dynamic Effectsof Alternative Training Schemes,” Review of Economics Studies, 80 (2013), 313–342.

33. Rothe, C. “Partial Distributional Policy Effects,” Econometrica, 80 (2012) 2269–2301.

34. Mroz, T. “A Simple, Flexible Estimator for Count and Other Ordered Discrete Data,” Journal ofApplied Econometrics, 27 (2012), 646–665.

35. Nicodemo, C. and Ramos, R. “Wage Differentials between Native and Immigrant Women in SpainAccounting for Differences in Support,” International Journal of Manpower, 33 (2012), 118–136.

36. Picchio, M. and Mussida, C. “Gender Wage Gap: A Semi-Parametric Approach with Sample SelectionCorrection,” Labour Economics, 18 (2011), 564–578.

37. Chi, W., Li, B., and Yu, Q. “Decomposition of the Increase in Earnings Inequality in Urban China:A Distributional Approach,” China Economic Review, 22 (2011), 299–312.

38. del Rio, C., Gradin, C., and Canto, O. “The Measurement of Gender Wage Discrimination: TheDistributional Approach Revisited,” Journal of Economic Inequality, 9 (2011), 57–86.

39. Baron, J. and Cobb-Clark, D. “Occupational Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap in Private- andPublic-Sector Employment: A Distributional Analysis,” Economic Record, 86 (2010) 227–246.

40. Rothe, C. “Nonparametric Estimation of Distributional Policy Effect,” Journal of Econometrics, 155(2010), 56–70.

41. Behr, A. and Potter, U. “What Determines Wage Differentials across the EU,” Journal of EconomicInequality, 8 (2010), 101–120.

42. Pistolesi, N. “Inequality of Opportunity in the Land of Opportunities, 1968–2001,” Journal of Eco-nomic Inequality, 7 (2009), 411–433.

43. Basu, A. and Manning, W. “Issues for the Next Generation of Health Care Cost Analyses,” MedicalCare, 47 (2009), S109–S114.

44. Bargain, O., Bhaumik, S., Chakraborty, M., and Zhao, Z. “Earnings Differences between Chinese andIndian Wage Earners, 1987–2004,” Review of Income and Wealth, 55 (2009), 562–587.

45. Albrecht, J., van Vuuren, A., and Vroman, S. “Counterfactual Distributions with Sample SelectionAdjustments: Econometric Theory and an Application to the Netherlands,” Labour Economics, 16(2009), 383–396.

46. Corak, M. and Lauzon, D. “Differences in the Distribution of High School Achievement: The Role ofClass-Size and Time-in-Term,” Economics of Education Review, 28 (2009), 189–198.

47. Febrer, A. and Mora, J. “Flexible Estimation of Wages Distributions in the Presence of Covariates,”Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 53 (2009), 2189–2200.

48. Bourguignon, F., Ferreira, F., and Leite P. “Beyond Oaxaca–Blinder: Accounting for Differences inHousehold Income Distributions,” Journal of Economic Inequality, 6 (2008), 117–148.

49. Chi, W. and Li, B. “Glass Ceiling or Sticky Floor? Examining the Gender Earnings Differential acrossthe Earnings Distribution in Urban China, 1987–2004,” Journal of Comparaitve Economics, 36 (2008),243–263.

50. Nopo, H. “Matching as a Tool to Decompose Wage Gaps,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2008), 290–299.

51. Skuterud, M. “Identifying the Potential of Work-Sharing as a Job-Creation Strategy,” Journal ofLabor Economics, 25 (2007), 265–287.

52. Lucifora. C. and Meurs, D. “The Public Sector Pay Gap in France, Great Britain and Italy,” Reviewof Income and Wealth, 1 (2006), 43–59.

53. Machado, J.A.F. and Mata, J. “Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in Wage Distributions usingQuantile Regression,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20 (2005), 445–465.

54. Lemieux, T. “Decomposing Changes in Wage Distributions: A Unified Approach,” Canadian Journalof Economics, 35 (2002), 646–688.

33

55. Friesen, J. “The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Weekly Hours of Work in Canada,” CanadianJournal of Economics, 35 (2002), 363–384.

56. Friesen, J. “Overtime Pay Regulation and Weekly Hours of Work in Canada,” Labour Economics, 8(2001), 691–720.

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[15] Donald, Stephen G. and Paarsch, Harry J. “Superconsistent Estimation and Inference in StructuralEconometric Models using Extreme Order Statistics,” Journal of Econometrics, 109 (2002), 305–340.


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3. Bajari, P., Hong, H., Park, M., and Town, R. “Estimating Price Sensitivity of Economic Agents usingDiscontinuity in Nonlinear Contracts,” Quantitative Economics, 8 (2017), 397–433.

4. Mohsenipour, A. and Provost, S. “On Approximating the Distribution of Quadratic Forms in GammaRandom Variables and Exponential Order Statistics,” Journal of Statistical Theory and Applications,12 (2013), 173–184.



7. Chernozhukov V. and Fernandez-Val, I. “Inference for Extremal Conditional Quantile Models, withan Application to Market and Birthweight Risks,” Review of Economic Studies, 78 (2011), 559–589.


9. Muller, U. and Wefelmeyer, W. “Estimation in Nonparametric Regression with Non-Regular Errors,”Communications in Statistics—Theory and Methods, 39 (2010), 1619–1629.



12. Li, T. “Simulation Based Selection of Competing Structural Econometric Models,” Journal of Econo-metrics, 148 (2009), 114–123.



15. Knight, K. “Asymptotic Theory for M-Estimators of Boundaries,” Art of Semiparametrics, Contribu-tions to Statistics, Semiparametrics Conference 2003, Berlin, 2006, 1–21.


17. Hirano, K. and Porter, J. “Asymptotic Efficiency in Parametric Structural Models with Parameter-Dependent Support,” Econometrica, 71 (2003), 1307–1338.

34

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[16] Haley, M. Ryan and Paarsch, Harry J. “The Stochastic Implications of Rent Maximization: AnApplication to Stumpage Rates for Timber in British Columbia,” Journal of Applied Econometrics,19 (2004), 25–48.


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1. Ning, Z. and Sun, C. “Vertical Price Transmission in Timber and Lumber Markets,” Journal of ForestEconomics, 20 (2014), 17–32.

Cited Article:

[17] Donald, Stephen G., Paarsch, Harry J., and Robert, Jacques “An Empirical Model of the Multi-Unit,Sequential, Clock Auction,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21 (2006), 1221–1247.


Cited By:


2. Salant, D. and Cabral, L. “Sequential Auctions and Auction Revenue,” Economics Letters, 176 (2019),1–4.


4. Carare, O. “Reserve Prices in Repeated Auctions,” Review of Industrial Organization, 40 (2012),225–247.

5. Cason, T., Kannan, K., and Siebert R. “An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policiesin Sequential Auctions,” Management Science, 57 (2011), 667–688.

6. Perrigne, I. “An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data,” Journal of AppliedEconometrics, 25 (2010), 1215–1222.



9. Haruvy, E., Leszczyc, P., Carare, O., Cox, J., Greenleaf, E., Jank, W., Jap, S., Park, Y.H., andRothkopf, M. “Competition between Auctions,” Marketing Letters, 19 (2008), 3–4.

10. Brendstrup, B. “Non-Parametric Estimation of Sequential English Auctions,” Journal of Economet-rics, 141 (2007), 460–481.

11. Perrigne, I. “An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data,” Journal of EconomicLiterature, 45 (2007), 746–751.

Cited Article:

[18] Brendstrup, Bjarne, and Paarsch, Harry J. “Identification and Estimation in Sequential, Asymmetric,English Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 134 (2006), 69–94.


Cited By:

1. Freyberger, J. and Masten, M. “A Practical Guide to Compact Infinite Dimensional ParameterSpaces,” Econometric Reviews, 38 (2019), 979–1006.

2. Karabag, O. and Tan, B. “An Empirical Analysis of the Main Drivers Affecting the Buyer Surplus inE-auctions,” International Journal of Production Research, 57 (2019), 3435–3465.

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3. Adachi, A. “Competition in a Dynamic Auction Market: Identification, Structural Estimation, andMarket Efficiency,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 64 (2016), 621–655.

4. Overby, E. and Kannan, K. “How Reduced Search Costs and the Distribution of Bidder ParticipationAffect Auction Prices,” Managment Science, 61 (2015), 1398–1420.

5. Moraga-Gonzalez, J., Sandor, Z., Wildenbeest, M. “Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of ConsumerSearch Costs,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 28 (2013), 1205–1223.

6. Komarova, T. “A New Approach to Identifying Generalized Competing Risks Models with Applicationto Second-Price Auctions,” Quantitative Economics, 4 (2013), 269–328.

7. Komarova, T. “Partial Identification in Asymmetric Auctions in the Absence of Independence,”Econometric Journal, 16 (2013), S60–S92.


9. Carare, O. “Reserve Prices in Repeated Auctions,” Review of Industrial Organization, 40 (2012),225–247.


11. Lu, J.F. and Perrigne, I. “Estimating Risk Aversion from Ascending and Sealed-Bid Auctions: TheCase of Timber Auction Data,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23 (2008), 871–896.


Cited Article:

[19] Paarsch, Harry J. and Shearer, Bruce “Do Women React Differently to Incentives? Evidence fromExperimental Data and Payroll Records,” European Economic Review, 51 (2007), 1682–1707.


Cited By:

1. Hill, A. and Jones, D. “The Impacts of Performance Pay on Teacher Effectiveness and Retention aDoes Teacher Gender Matter?” Journal of Human Resources, 55 (2020), 349–385.

2. Beugnot, J., Fortin, B., Lacroix, G., and Villeval, M.C. “Gender and Peer Effects on Performance inSocial Networks,” European Economics Review, 113 (2019), 207–224.

3. Mahastanti, L. and Hariady, E. “Determining the Factors which Affect the Stock Investment Deci-sions of Potential Female Investors in Indonesia,” International Journal of Process Management andBenchmarking, 4 (2014), 186–197.

4. Lavy, V. “Gender Differences in Market Competitiveness in a Real Workplace: Evidence fromPerformance-based Pay Tournaments among Teachers,” Economic Journal, 123 (2013), 540–573.

5. Frick, B. “Gender Differences in Competitiveness: Empirical Evidence from Professional DistanceRunning,” Labour Economics, 18 (2011), 389–398.

6. Manning, A. and Saidi, F. “Understanding the Gender Pay Gap: What’s Competition Got to Do withIt?” Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 63 (2010), 681–698.

7. Dubois, P. and Vukina, T. “Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents:Evidence from Production Contracts Data,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2009), 489–500.

8. Pekkarinen, T. and Riddell, C. “Performance Pay and Earnings: Evidence from Payroll Records,”Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 61 (2008), 297–319.

9. Beckmann, D. and Menkhoff, L. “Will Women Be Women? Analyzing the Gender Difference amongFinancial Experts,” Kyklos, 61 (2008), 364–384.

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Cited Article:

[20] Brendstrup, Bjarne, and Paarsch, Harry J. “Semiparametric Identification and Estimation in Multi-Object, English Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 141 (2007), 84–108.


Cited By:

1. Jayech, S. “The Contagion Channels of July–August–2011 Stock Market Crash: A DAG-Copula BasedApproach,” European Journal of Operational Research, 249 (2016), 631–646.

2. Fan, Y. and Patton, A. “Copulas in Econometrics,” Annual Review of Economics, 6 (2014), 179–200.

3. Komarova, T. “A New Approach to Identifying Generalized Competing Risks Models with Applicationto Second-Price Auctions,” Quantitative Economics, 4 (2013), 269–328.

4. Oh, D. and Patton, A. “Simulated Method of Moments Estimation for Copula-Based MultivariateModels,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 108 (2013), 689–700.

5. Ji, L. and Li, T. “Multi-Round Procurement Auctions with Secret Reserve Prices: Theory andEvidence,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23 (2008), 897–923.

6. Djebbari, H. and Smith, J. “Heterogeneous Impacts in PROGRESA,” Journal of Econometrics, 145(2008), 64–80.

Cited Article:

[21] Chapman, James T. E., McAdams, David, and Paarsch, Harry J. “Bounding Revenue Comparisonsacross Multi-Unit Auction Formats under Epsilon-Best Response,” American Economic Review, 97(2007), 455–458.


Cited By:

1. Hortacsu, A., Kastl, J., and Zhang, A. “Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury AuctionSystem,” American Economic Review, 108 (2018), 147–169.

2. Ausubel, L., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., Weretka, M. “Demand Reduction and Inefficiencyin Multi-Unit Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 81 (2014), 1366–1400.

3. Reguant, M. “Complementary Bidding Mechanisms and Startup Costs in Electricity Markets,” Reviewof Economic Studies, 81 (2014), 1708–1742.

4. Cassola, N., Hortacsu, A., and Kastl, J. “The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis through the Lens ofEuropean Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds,” Econometrica, 81 (2013), 1309–1345.

5. Fox, J. and Bajari, P. “Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction,” American EconomicJournal—Microeconomics, 5 (2013), 100–146.

6. Hortacsu, A. and Kastl, J. “Valuing Dealers’ Informational Advantage: A Study of Canadian TreasuryAuctions,” Econometrica, 80 (2012), 2511–2542.

Cited Article:

[22] Paarsch, Harry J. and Shearer, Bruce “The Response to Incentives and Contractual Efficiency:Evidence from a Field Experiment,” European Economic Review, 53 (2009), 481–494.


Cited By:

1. Jang, D., Elfenbein, H., and Bottom, W. “More than a Phase: Form and Features of a General Theoryof Negotiation,” Academy of Management Annals, 12 (2018), 318–356.


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3. Gilchrist, D., Luca, M., and Malhotra, D. “When 3 + 1 > 4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in theField,” Management Science 62 (2016), 2639–2650.

4. Cao, Y., Turvey, C., Ma, J., Kong, R., He, G., and Yan, J. “Incentive Mechanisms, Loan Decisionsand Policy Rationing: A Framed Field Experiment on Rural Credit,” Agricultural Finance Review,76 (2016), 326–347.

5. Levitt, S. and Neckermann, S. “What Field Experiments Have and Have Not Taught Us aboutManaging Workers,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 30 (2014), 639–657.

6. Dubeau, D., LeBel, L., Imbeau, D., and Auger, I. “Impacts of Vegetation Abundance and TerrainObstacles on Brushcutter Performance During Regeneration Release,” Northern Journal of AppliedForestry, 29 (2012), 173–181.

7. Bose, A., Pal, D., and Sappington, D. “On the Design of Piece-Rate Contracts,” Economics Letters,107 (2010), 330–332.

Cited Article:

[23] Hubbard, Timothy P. and Paarsch, Harry J. “Investigating Bid Preferences at Low-Price, Sealed-BidAuctions with Endogenous Participation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27 (2009),1–14.


Cited By:

1. Chu, C. and Rysman, M. “Competition and Strategic Incentives in the Market for Credit Ratings:Empirics of the Financial Crisis of 2007,” American Economic Review, 109 (2019), 3514–3555.

2. Cole, M., Davies, R., and Kaplan, T. “Protection in Government Procurement Auctions,” Journal ofInternational Economics, 106 (2017), 134–142.

3. Sweeting, A. and Bhattacharya, V. “Selective Entry and Auction Design.” International Journal ofIndustrial Organization, 43 (2015) 189–207.

4. Colucci, D., Doni, N., and Valori, V. “Information Policies in Procurement Auctions with Heteroge-neous Suppliers,” Journal of Economics, 114 (2015), 211–238.

5. Reis, P. and Cabral, S. “Public Procurement Strategy: The Impacts of a Preference Programme forSmall and Micro Businesses,” Public Money and Management, 35 (2015), 103–110.

6. Bhattacharya, V., Roberts, J., and Sweeting, A. “Regulating Bidder Participation in Auctions,”RAND Journal of Economics, 45 (2014), 675–704.

7. Shafahi, A. and Haghani, A. “Modeling Contractors’ Project Selection and Markup Decisions Influ-enced by Eminence,” International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), 1481–1493.

8. Hirata, D. “A Model of a Two-Stage All-Pay Auction,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 68 (2014), 5–13.

9. Muner, W., Baharom, F., Yasin, A., Mohd, H., Darus, N., Marzuki, Z., and Robie, M. “A New Modelfor Multicriteria Risk-Based Tender Evaluation,” Advanced Science Letters, 20 (2014), 326–330.

10. Ridlon, R. and Shin, J. “Favoring the Winner or Loser in Repeated Contests,” Marketing Science, 32(2013), 768–785.

11. Roberts, J. and Sweeting, A. “When Should Sellers Use Auctions?” American Economic Review, 103(2013), 1830–1861.

12. Alcalde, J. and Dahm, M. “Competition for Procurement Shares,” Games and Economic Behavior,80, (2013), 193–208.

13. Aryal, G. and Gabrielli, M. “Testing for Collusion in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions,” InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 31 (2013), 26–35.

14. Saini, V. “Endogenous Asymmetry in a Dynamic Procurement Auction,” RAND Journal of Eco-nomics, 43 (2012), 726–760.

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15. De Silva, D., Dunne, T., Kosmopoulou, G., and Lamarche, C. “Disadvantaged Business EnterpriseGoals in Government Procurement Contracting: An Analysis of Bidding Behavior and Costs,” Inter-national Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (2012), 377–388.

16. Colucci, D., Doni, N., and Valori, V. “Preferential Treatment in Procurement Auctions throughInformation Revelation,” Economics Letters, 117 (2012), 883–886.


18. Li, S., Dogan, K., and Haruvy, E. “Group Identity in Markets,” International Journal of IndustrialOrganization, 29 (2011), 104–115.

Cited Article:

[24] Paarsch, Harry J. and John Rust, “Valuing Programs with Deterministic and Stochastic Cycles,”Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 33 (2009), 614–623.


Cited By:

1. Bray, R. “Markov Decision Processes with Exogenous Variables,” Management Science, 65 (2019),4598–4606.

Cited Article:

[25] de Castro Luciano I. and Paarsch, Harry J. “Testing Affiliation in Private-Values Models of First-PriceAuctions using Grid Distributions,” Annals of Applied Statistics, 4 (2010), 2073–2098.


Cited By:


2. Li, T., Lu, J., and Zhao, L. “Auctions with Selective Entry and Risk Averse Bidders: Theory andEvidence,” RAND Journal of Economics, 46 (2015), 524–545.

3. Armstrong, T. “Bounds in Auctions with Unobserved Heterogeneity,” Quantitative Economics, 4(2013), 377–415.

4. Roughgarden, T. and Talgam-Cohen, I. “Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Inter-dependent Values,” Proceeding of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, (2013), 767–784.


6. Lamy, L. “The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders,” Journal of Econo-metrics, 167 (2012), 113–132.

Cited Article:

[26] Brendstrup, Bjarne O., Harry J. Paarsch, and John L. Solow, “Estimating Market Power in thePresence of Capacity Constraints: An Application to High-Fructose Corn Sweetener,” InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 24 (2006), 251–267.


Cited By:

1. Nardi P. “Transmission Network Unbundling and Grid Investments: Evidence from the UCTE Coun-tries,” Utilities Policy, 23 (2012), 50–58.


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Cited Article:

[27] Hubbard, Timothy P., Tong Li, and Harry J. Paarsch, “Semiparametric Estimation in Models ofFirst-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions with Affiliation,” Journal of Econometrics, 168 (2012), 4–16.


Cited By:


2. Kobus, M. and Kurek, R. “Copula-Based Measurement of Interdependence for Discrete Distributions,”Journal of Mathematical Economics, 79 (2018), 27–39.

3. Bonomo, F., Catalan, J., Duran, G., Epstein, R., Guajardo, M., Jawtuschenko, A., and Marenco, J.“An Asymmetric Multi-Item Auction with Quantity Discounts Applied to Internet Service Procure-ment in Buenos Aires Public Schools,” Annals of Operations Research, 258 (2017), 569–585.

4. Seres, G. “Auction Cartels and the Absence of Efficient Communication,” International Journal ofIndustrial Organization, 52 (2017), 282–306.


6. Li, T. and Zhang, B. “Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: AnAnalysis of Merger Effects,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (2015), 188–214.

7. Fan, Y. and Patton, A. “Copulas in Econometrics,” Annual Review of Economics, 6 (2015), 179–200.

Cited Article:

[28] Halldorson, Jeffrey B., Harry J. Paarsch, Jennifer Dodge, Alberto M. Segre, Jennifer Lai, and JohnP. Roberts, “Center Competition and Outcomes Following Liver Transplantation,” Liver Transplan-tation, 19 (2013), 96–104.


Cited By:

1. Bababekov, Y., Hung, Y.-C., Chang, D., Rickert, C., Adler, J., Bethea, E., Pomfret, E., Pomposelli,J., Yeh, H. “Do Social Determinants Define ‘Too Sick’ to Transplant in Patients with End-stage LiverDisease?” Transplantation, 104 (2020), 280–284.

2. Dickert-Conlin, S., Elder, T., and Teltser, K. “Allocating Scarce Organs: How a Change in SupplyAffects Transplant Waiting Lists and Transplant Recipients,” American Economic Journal—AppliedEconomics, 11 (2019), 210–239.

3. Samstein, B. and McElro, L. “Agree on Much, Except It is Time for Change,” American Journal ofTransplantation, 19 (2019), 1912–1916.

4. Arikan, M., Ata, B., Friedewald, J., and Parker, R. “Enhancing Kidney Supply Through GeographicSharing in the United States,” Production and Operation Management, 27 (2018), 2103–2121.

5. Mathur, A., Xing, J., Dickinson, D., Warren, P., Gifford, K., Hong, B., Ojo, A., and Merion, R.“Return on Investment for Financial Assistance for Living Kidney Donors in the United States,”Clinical Transplantion, 32 (2018).

6. Nekrasov, V., Matsuoka, L., Kaur, N., Pita, A., Whang, G., Cao, S., Groshen, S., and Alexopoulos, S.“Improvement in the Outcomes of MELD ≥ 40 Liver Transplantation: An Analysis of 207 ConsecutiveTransplants in a Highly Competitive DSA,” Transplantation, 101 (2017), 2360–2367.

7. Flores, A. and Asrani, S. “The Donor Risk Index: A Decade of Experience,” Liver Transplantation,23 (2017), 1216–1225.

8. Adler, J., Bababekov, Y., Markmann, J., Change, D. and Ye, H. “Distance is Associated with Mortalityon the Waitlist in Pediatric Liver Transplantation,” Pediatric Transplantation, 21 (2017),

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9. Mehta, S., Logan, C., Kotton, C., Kumar, D., and Aslam, S. “Use of Organs from Donors with Blood-stream Infection, Pneumonia, and Influenza: Results of a Survey of Infectious Diseases Practitioners,”Transplant Infectious Disease, 19 (2017).

10. Wadstrom, J., Ericzon, B., Halloran, P., Bechstein, W., Opelz, G., Seron, D., Grinyo, J., Loupy, A.,Kuypers, D., Mariat, C., Clancy, M., Jardine, A., Guirado, L., Fellstrom, B. O’Grady, J., Pirenne, J.,O’Leary, J., Jacqueline G., Aluvihare, V., Trunecka, P., Baccarani, U., Neuberger, J., Soto-Gutierrez,A., Geissler, E., Metzger, M., and Gray, M. “Advancing Transplantation: New Questions, NewPossibilities in Kidney and Liver Transplantation,” Transplantation, 101 (2017).

11. Axelrod, D. and Lentine, K., “Improving Access to Liver Care Across the Continuum of Care:Opportunities and Challenges,” American Journal of Transplantation, 16 (2016), 2777–2778.

12. Nguyen, V., Givens, R, Cheng, R., Mokadam, N., Levy, W., Stempien-Otero, A., Schulze, C., andDardas, T., “The Effect of Regional Competition on Heart Transplant Waitlist Outcomes,” Journalof Heart and Lung Transplantation, 35 (2016), 986–994.

13. Mattei, P. and Feiler, T., “Moral Values and Responsible Administration: Live Organs TransplantSystems in the United States and Germany,” International Journal of Public Administration, 39(2016), 194–204.

14. Emond, J., “Measuring Access to Liver Transplantation: An Overdue Metric for Center Quality andPerformance,” Journal of Hepatology, 64 (2016), 843–851.

15. Adler, J., Yeh, H., Markmann, J., and Nguyen, L. “Market Competition and Density in LiverTransplantation: Relationship to Volume and Outcomes,” Journal of American College of Surgeons,221 (2015), 524–531.

16. Adler, J., Dong, N., Markmann, J., Schoenfeld, D., and Yeh, H. “Role of Patient Factors and PracticePatterns in Determining Access to Liver Waitlist,” American Journal of Transplantation, 15 (2015),1836–1842.

17. Gentry, S., Chow, E., Massie, A., and Segev, D. “Gerrymandering for Justice: Redistricting U.S. LiverAllocation,” Interfaces, 45, 2015, 462–480.

18. Cho, P., Saidi, R., Cutie, C., and Ko, D. “Competitive Market Analysis of Transplant Centers andDiscrepancy of Wait-Listing of Recipients for Kidney Transplantation,” International Journal of OrganTransplantation Medicine, 6 (2015), 141–149.

19. Neuberger, J. “Organisational Structure of Liver Transplantation in the UK,” Langenbecks Archivesof Surgery, 400 (2015), 559–566.

20. Adler, J., Sethi, R., Yeh, H., Markmann, J., and Nguyen, L. “Market Competition Influences RenalTransplantation Risk and Outcomes,” Transplantation, 99 (2015), 461–461.

21. Saidi, R., Razavi, M., Cosimi, A., and Ko, D. “Competition in Liver Transplantation: Helpful orHarmful?,” Liver Transplantation, 21 (2015), 145–150.

22. Neuberger, J. and Mulligan, D. “Liver Allocation: Can We Ever Get It Right and Should We EverGet It Right?” Hepatology, 61 (2015), 28–31.

23. Buccini, L., Segev, D., Fung, J., Miller, C., Kelly, D., Quintini, C., and Schold, J. “Association BetweenLiver Transplant Center Performance Evaluations and Transplant Volume,” American Journal ofTransplantation, 14 (2014), 2097–2105.

24. Guba, M. “Center Volume, Competition, and Outcome in German Liver Transplant Centers,” Trans-plantation Research, 3 (2014), 6.

25. Yeh, H. and Hunsiker, L. “Deceased Donor Liver Allocation: Cutting the Gordian Know,” AmericanJournal of Transplantation, 13 (2013), 1949–1950.

26. Davis A., Mehrotra S., McElroy L., Friedewald J., Skaro A., Lapin B., Kang R., Holl J., AbecassisM., and Ladner D. “The Extent and Predictors of Waiting Time Geographic Disparity in KidneyTransplantation in the United States,” Transplantation, 97 (2014), 1049–1057.

27. Goldberg, D., Makar, G., Bittermann, T., and Benjamin, F. “Center Variation in the Use of Non-Standardized MELD Exception Points,” Liver Transplantation, 19 (2013), 1330–1342.

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28. Asrani, S., Kim, W., Edward, E., Larson, J., Thabut, G., Kremer, W., Therneau, T., and Heimbach,J. “Impact of the Center on Graft Failure after Liver Transplantation,” Liver Transplantation, 19(2013), 957–964.

29. Zarrinpar, A. and Busuttil, R. “TIMELINE Liver Transplantation: Past, Present, and Future,” NatureReviews Gastroenterology and Hepatology, 10 (2013), 434–440.

30. Seehofer, D., Schoening, W., and Neuhaus, P. “Deceased Donor Liver Transplantation,” Chirurg, 84(2013), 391–397.

31. Neuberger, J. and Murphy, P. “Comment on ‘Lessons from the German Organ Donation Scandal,”Journal of the Intensive Care Society, 14 (2013), 201–203.

32. Reich, D. “Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement in Transplantation: Hype or Hope?”Current Opionion in Organ Transplantation, 18 (2013), 216–221.

Cited Article:

[29] Hubbard, Timothy P., Rene Kirkegaard, and Harry J. Paarsch, “Using Economic Theory to GuideNumerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions,” Compu-tational Economics, 42 (2013), 241–266.


Cited By:

1. Lorentziadis, P. “Competitive Bidding in Asymmetric Multidimensional Public Procurement,” Euro-pean Journal of Operations Research, 282 (2020), 211–220.

2. Fibich, G., Gavious, A., and Gavish, N. “Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions,” SIAMJournal on Applied Mathematics, 78 (2018), 1489–1510.

3. Cohensius, G. and Segev, E. “Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions,” B E Journalof Theoretical Economics, 18 (2018), article number 20160196.


5. Gavious, A. and Minchuk, Y. “Ranking Asymmetric Auctions,” International Journal of GameTheory, 43 (2014), 369–393.

Cited Article:

[30] Cho, Sung-Jin, Harry J. Paarsch, and John Rust, “Is the ‘Linkage Principle’ Valid?: Evidence fromthe Field,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 62 (2014), 346–375.


Cited By:

1. Lu, Y., Gupta, A., Ketter, W., and van Heckd, E. “Information Transparency in Business-to-BusinessAuction Markets: The Role of Winner Identity Disclosure,” Management Science, 65 (2019), 4261–4279.

2. Hong, Y., Wang, C. and Pavlou, P. “Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from OnlineLabor Markets,” Information Systems Research, 27 (2016), 49–69.

3. Tadelis, S. and Zettelmeyer, F. “Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory andEvidence from a Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 105 (2015), 886–905.

Cited Article:

[31] Haley, M. Ryan, Harry J. Paarsch, and Charles H. Whiteman, “Smoothed Safety First and the Holdingof Assets,” Quantitative Finance, 13 (2013) 167–176.


Cited By:

1. Ha, M., Yang, Y., and Wang, C. “A Portfolio Optimization Model for Minimizing Soft Margin-BasedGeneralization Bound,” Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, 28 (2017), 759–766.

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Cited Article:

[32] Hubbard, Timothy P. and Harry J. Paarsch, “On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in AuctionModels with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm.” Chapter 2 in the Handbook ofComputational Economics, Volume 3, edited by Kenneth L. Judd and Karl Schmedders. New York:Elsevier, 2014, pages 35–111.


Cited By:

1. Lorentziadis, P. “Competitive Bidding in Asymmetric Multidimensional Public Procurement,” Euro-pean Journal of Operations Research, 282 (2020), 211–220.

2. Khezr, P. and MacKenzie, I. “Permit Market Auctions with Allowance Reserves,” InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization, 61 (2018), 283–306.

3. Bonomo, F., Catalan, J., Duran, G., Epstein, R., Guajardo, M., Jawtuschenko, A., and Marenco, J.“An Asymmetric Multi-Item Auction with Quantity Discounts Applied to Internet Service Procure-ment in Buenos Aires Public Schools,” Annals of Operations Research, 258 (2017), 569–585.

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