Circulation or Reproduction of Elites During the Postcommnuist Transformation of Eastern Europe...

8/9/2019 Circulation or Reproduction of Elites During the Postcommnuist Transformation of Eastern Europe Szelenyi2

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Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of EasternEurope: IntroductionAuthor(s): Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja SzelenyiSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, Special Issue on Circulation vs. Reproduction ofElites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe (Oct., 1995), pp. 615-638Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657845

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Circulation or reproduction of elites during thepostcommunist transformation of Eastern EuropeIntroduction

IVAN SZELENYI and SZONJA SZELENYIUniversity of California, Los Angeles; Stanford University

This special issue of Theoryand Society reports the results of a cross-national comparative study of elite recruitment in postcommunistEastern Europe. An international team of social scientists (composedof scholars from the United States and several Eastern European coun-tries) conducted a large-scale survey under the title Social Stratificationin Eastern Europe After 1989. These surveys were conducted in Russiaand in five Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,Hungary,Poland, and Slovakia).The authors of the articles that are contained in this special issue met inErd6tarcsa (Hungary) in December 1993 for an intensive workshop.The purpose of the workshop was to analyze the first results of thestudy from Hungary, Poland, and Russia. The articles that follow areproducts of this meeting. In this introduction we: (a) explain why thestudy of postcommunist elite recruitment is of theoretical and politicalinterest; (b) describe the common conceptual framework that orientsthe articles in this special issue, (c) outline the nature of the surveyresearch that we conducted in Eastern Europe, and (d) summarize ourfindings from Hungary, Poland, and Russia.

The research puzzle: Theoretical and political controversiesCirculation versus reproductionIn this special issue, we focus our attention on a topical theoretical con-troversy in Eastern Europe and the successor states of the formerSoviet Union: what happened to socialist elites with the transition topostcommunism? Who were the people who held command positionsunder socialism, and how were these people affected by the post-Theoryand Society 24: 615-638, 1995.? 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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616communist ransformation?f there wasa change n the compositionofEasternEuropeanelites,whathappenedto the old cadresand wheredidthenewelites come from?Two competing answers have been offered to these questions sofar.The first (the elite reproduction heory) suggeststhat revolution-ary changes in Eastern Europe did not affect the social composi-tion of elites. This is because the old nomenklatura elite hasmanaged o surviveat the top of the class structureand is now becom-ing the new propertied bourgeoisie.The second argument(the elitecirculation theory) claims that the transition to postcommunismresulted in a structuralchange at the top of the class hierarchy:new people are recruited or commandpositions on the basis of newprinciples.The questionof elite recruitment s not merely of academicinterest;polemicsaround he subjectalso informpoliticalstruggles hat arecur-rently underway n EasternEurope.The politicalRight,for example,generallyadvocates he reproduction f elitetheory: t claimsthattherewas insufficientchangein elite personnelwith the transition o post-communism,and calls for another(i.e., political)revolution.By con-trast,the politicalLeft arguesthat the circulationof elites has been fartoo excessive n the last severalyears,and callsfor a muchslowerpaceof change or the future.To illustrate the political significanceof these seemingly academicdebates, recall Lech Walesa's presidentialcampaignagainstMazo-wiecki in the fall of 1991. He accused the former Prime MinisterofPoland of being "too soft" on Communistsbecause he had allowedthem to become proprietorsafter 1989. Following Walesa's example,the emergentEast European New Right often focuses its attackonformer Communistswho havesupposedlyconverted heir old politicalprivileges nto new economic ones. Thus,ideologuesof the Hungarianand Polish New Rightcall for a second revolution n EasternEurope,arguing hat the rulingconservativepartieshave"betrayed"he revolu-tion and,becauseof this,the so-called"velvet evolution" asnot led toradical enough social change. The political Left takes the oppositeposition. Former orthodox Communists, reform Communists, andcontemporary iberalswarnagainsttoo rapidchangesin elite person-nel. They worryabout politicalwitch-hunts;a new wave of "counter-selection"in which anticommunistsopenly refuse to hire competentpeople for importantpositionsin the class structuref theyweremem-bersof theCommunistPartybefore 1989.


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617Both the New Rightand the Old (or Reformed)Left touch on sympa-thetic chordsin certaincircles of the citizenry.Duringthe fall of 1993,the Polish electorate responded to the calmer voice of the formerreformCommunistsand gave an absolute majorityto partieson thepoliticalLeft in parliamentary lections.Along similar ines, the May1994 elections in Hungaryproduceda victoryfor the reform-mindedsuccessorsof the old Communists. n Russia,however, he December1993 elections have shown that both programscan mobilize people:the ultraRight-wingZhirinovskydid extremelywell in the elections,butso didtheformerCommunists.In the articlespresentedin this volume, we distinguishbetween twotheoriesof elite recruitment:he reproductionof elites theoryand thecirculationof elites theory.1The dominant view of elites in EasternEurope is one of "reproduction."he HungarianElemer Hankissandthe Polish Jadwiga Staniszkishave offered similar versions of thisapproach.As early as 1989, Hankiss suggestedthat the old nomen-klaturaelite would become the new "grandebourgeoisie"with themarketizationof the economy.2Around the same time, Staniszkisbegan to write about the emergent"politicalcapitalism"of postcom-munistEasternEurope.3 n herview,the formernomenklatura ses itspolitical power to gain private wealth. Staniszkis and Hankiss bothagreedthat the process of privatizationwould benefit the Communistpolitical class, which could retainits position at the top of the classstructurewithoutmanyconstraints.Likewise, the HungarianErzsebet Szalai offered a similar analysisof Eastern Europe. In her researchon large Hungarianfirms, shenoticed that a new technocraticstratumwas emergingin the early1980s, and that it graduallybegan to appropriatesome key prop-erty rights.4Szalai explained the dynamics of political change inHungaryduring the 1980s in terms of increasingstrugglebetweenthe "old elite" and the "new technocracy."According to her, the"old elite" was composed of members of the nomenklatura whoassumed political power after the 1956 revolution:they were nottypicallyhighlyeducated,butmost had a firmideologicalcommitmentto the cause of Communism.By contrast, he "newelite"was younger,better educated, and specificallytechnocratic n its skills and orien-tation.Not surprisingly, ivenits educationand socialbackground,henew elite increasinglydisliked the way the old guardran the country,and was, therefore,attractedto the idea that the institutionsof statesocialismmustbe radically ransformed.Surely,butgradually,he "new


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618technocracy" lost faith in socialism and began to support the project ofmarket transformation. In this process, they slowly appropriated prop-erty rights and set themselves up as the new private entrepreneurs ofthe new regime.5 But, as Szalai points out, members of the "new tech-nocracy" were not successful politically. Their political victory over theold guard was short-lived, and they were soon replaced in politicalpower by a "new ruling estate" whose members came from noncom-munist circles.6As should be clear from the above three stories, Hankiss, Staniszkis,and Szalai offer a similar diagnosis for Eastern Europe: while thesocioeconomic system changes radically, those at the top of the classstructure remain the same. In other words, the personnel do notchange, only the principles by which they legitimate their authority,power, and privilege are altered.Unlike the other two authors, however, Szalai draws an importantdistinction between the "new technocracy" and the "old elite": the lattercan be downwardly mobile with the transformation of the economy.She also points to the struggle between the excommunist "new tech-nocracy" and the anticommunist "new political elite." By extendingSzalai's argument, we proposed a "circulation of elites" hypothesis thatposited that the former elite will be able to maintain its privileged posi-tion at the top of the class structure, but there will be political limitsdetermining the extent to which they will be successful at this. Somemembers of the old elite will be downwardly mobile, some will stayin the social space they occupied before, and some will be upwardlymobile into the ranks of the old elite.7With the conceptual apparatus of Pierre Bourdieu, one may interpretHankiss and Staniszkis as offering a theory that assumes no or fewlimits to the convertibility of political capital into economic capital.8Szalai's hypothesis is more complex, however. Following her, we sug-gest that those who relied exclusively or overwhelmingly on politicalcapital for their power and privilege (i.e., the "old elite") are likelyto be downwardly mobile, while those who combined cultural andpolitical capital (i.e., the "new technocracy") are better positioned toachieve positive privileges in terms of economic capital today. The"new political elite" is likely to come from the ranks of people whowere low in political capital in the past, but high in cultural capital.It remains to be seen if the "new political elite" will occupy posi-tions of mere political authority or if they will be successful in achiev-ing economic privileges as well.


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619Cross-national variations in elite reproductionWe expect different trends in elite reproduction in the three coun-tries (Hungary, Poland, and Russia) that are included in this specialissue. Since the economic and political reforms have been moresuccessful in Hungary than in Russia (or in Poland) over the last twodecades, we think that the old elites are most likely to reproducethemselves here. This is so, in part, because of the existence of at least apartially meritocratic system of elite recruitment under the Kdairregime; this system meant that many of those in possession of culturalcapital already occupied positions concomitant with their skills in1989.By contrast, we expect a greater amount of elite circulation in Polandbecause attempts to copy the Kdair regime - by trying to reach somecompromise with the technical intelligentsia or to coopt the techno-crats at least - were fundamentally unsuccessful. The Polish bureau-cracy tried to bring the technocracy into positions of authority duringthe so-called "second industrialization of Poland" and, again, duringthe Jaruzelski regime. The response that the Polish regime received wasnot favorable: the Polish intelligentsia stayed out of power and organ-ized into a counter-elite.Russia may be more similar to Hungary, but for very differentreasons. Common wisdom suggests (although data have yet to bearthis out) that Russia may not have allowed the technical intelligentsiainto positions of power to the same degree that Hungary did. There-fore, the Russian nomenklatura may have been more similar (in1989 and in 1990) to the Polish nomenklatura than to the Hungarianone. Still, there is at least prima facie evidence of a high degreeof elite reproduction in Russia. In part, this can be attributed tothe fact that, as of the fall of 1993 when our fieldwork took place,Russia had changed last in the postcommunist direction; thus its eliteshave not yet begun to "circulate."To explain this three-way comparison, we introduce another idea: thestrength of counter-elites. While the nomenklatura may have had simi-lar characteristics in Poland and Russia, we think the circulation of theelites was facilitated in Poland by the existence of a large, well-established counter-elite. In Russia, the counter-elite was less well-developed, and in the absence of alternative cadres, the old nomen-klatura was able to hold onto the country's command positions. The


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620continued domination of elite positions by former cadres is also helpedby general social instability that is particularly evident in Russia. Sincethe character of the emergent society is still unclear, and because thenew democratic institutions do not work in a predictable way, thereare fewer "political entrepreneurs" ready to try the new game inRussia. For these reasons, the old cadres are likely to remain unchal-lenged.In general terms, then, our theory suggests that one may expect a highdegree of elite reproduction in countries where the technocracy wasco-opted by the nomenklatura, as well as in countries in which therewas no counter-elite. By contrast, we expect a high degree of elitecirculation in countries where the co-optation of the technocracy didnot take place, or in countries with a well-formed counter-elite. Thesehypotheses are summarized in Table 1.9To test the empirical validity of these hypotheses, we initiated across-national comparative study of elites in 1990.10 By mid-1994,surveys were completed in six countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-lic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia." During 1993-1994,we conducted personal interviews with about 40,000 respondentsin these countries. We worked out a complex research design;interviewing respondents from different random samples. In eachcountry, we interviewed 2,000 elite members: 1,000 of these were innomenklatura positions in 1988, 600 were members of the neweconomic elite, and 400 were part of the 1993 political or culturalelites. In addition, in each country we interviewed 5,000 randomlyselected members of the general population in order to obtain abase-line against which to compare our models of elite reproduction.We conducted life-history interviews with all of our respondents: weasked them to provide us with a full account of their activity history,educational career, and party memberships. We also asked them abouttheir parents and grandparents, and found out relevant informationabout their friends.By the end of 1993, data on the elite part of the study were available inthree of the six countries: Hungary, Poland, and Russia. A group of usfrom the United States and from the three countries met and wrote thefirst draft of the articles that are presented this special issue.


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621Table 1. Hypotheses regarding circulation/reproductionCountry Cooptation Counter-elite Circulation or reproductionHungary yes some some reproductionPoland some yes some circulationRussia none none reproduction

Empirical results: Elite reproduction in Hungary, Poland, and RussiaThe distinction between "circulation"and "reproduction" is a relativeone. Five years are long enough for one to expect some change in thepersonnel occupying key command positions under any circumstance;a complete turnover of personnel is, however, unimaginable even underthe most revolutionary conditions. When we assess "how much" cir-culation or reproduction took place in a country, therefore, we alwayshave to think about this question in relative terms.In the following analyses we examine a number of issues: (a) we explorethe destinations of the old nomenklatura elite and the origins of thenew elite, (b) we analyze cross-national variations in elite reproduction,and (c) we look at differences among economic, cultural, and politicalelites. Our main conclusions are as follows:

a. There is limited outflow from the old nomenklatura. Many of those whowere in nomenklatura positions in 1988 were found in top elite positions fiveyears later. Those who were downwardly mobile usually just "slipped" asingle step down in the status hierarchy, or the worst that happened to the oldnomenklatura elite is that they went into early retirement. In other words, the1988 nomenklatura did not fare badly with the transition to postcom-munism: it had a good chance to reproduce itself in positions of authority.However, we also find substantial inflow into the new elites; in this sense,therefore, there is substantial circulation in elite personnel in EasternEurope. There are many new faces among those who were at the top of thesocial hierarchy in 1993. Most of those who were upwardly mobile did notcome from the bottom of the class structure, but typically arrived at the topfrom upper- or from middle class backgrounds.b. In terms of our cross-national analyses, our results show that the oldnomenklatura elites in Russia were better able to survive at the top of theclass structure than elites in Poland or Hungary. Contrary to our expecta-tions, however, the circulation of elites in Hungary was greater (and faster)than in Poland.c. We find that the circulation of elites in Hungary was particularly strongamong the old and the new economic elites. The relatively high degree of


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622elite circulation in Hungary may be attributed to (what we call) "adminis-tered social mobility" right after the transition to postcommunism. Thevictory of the Socialist Party in 1994 can thus be interpreted as a vote againstsuch "administered mobility"; it was a vote favoring a more gradual trans-formation of the stratification order.d. Our overall conclusion is that changes during the postcommunist erawere (and continue to be) path-dependent 2 and involutionary,t3 rather thanrevolutionary. Where greater turbulances took place (i.e., in the politicalsphere), a "trajectory correction" seems to be taking place. The 1993-94elections support this claim. As a result of these political changes - whileCommunism is far from being restored - social structure is most likely toshift further backward toward an even more involutionary path of trans-formation.

The destinations of the old nomenklatura elite and the origins of thenew eliteIf we assess the extent of circulation/reproduction of elites by contrast-ing the destinations of the old nomenklatura elite (see Table 2) with theorigins of the new elites (see Table 3), we obtain two somewhat differ-ent stories about what happened with the transition to postcommunismin Eastern Europe.The first one of these stories suggests that the marketization of thesocialist economy has generated a considerable degree of elite repro-duction: those in elite positions in 1988 were more likely to remainin positions of authority than to leave such positions by 1993.The "old guard," n this sense, is rarely in trouble in Eastern Europe. Infact, if anything it seems to be doing quite well. Doing well, how-ever, does not necessarily mean that they were completely unharmedby the economic transformation of 1989. Many were demoted fromtheir nationally-important command posts, although most survived thistype of downward mobility reasonably well. In Hungary and in Poland,a significant percentage of the 1988 nomenklatura retired by 1993:some took early retirement, and only a few have had to accept lower-status jobs.The second story that emerges from these tables suggests that we mayhave witnessed a significant amount of elite circulation with the transi-tion to postcommunism: the majority of those who were in elite posi-tions in 1993 were not members of the nomenklatura in 1988. Thesenew faces at the top of the class structure, however, are not necessarily


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623Table2. Destinationsof the old-nomenklaturaliteClasspositionin 1993 Russia Poland HungaryElite 64.2 38.2 20.0Non-elitewith subordinates 15.5 18.4 31.5Non-elite without subordinates 10.6 16.6 15.7Retired 9.7 26.8 32.8

(N = 854) (N = 888) (N = 662)Note. Entries are percentages.Columnsmay not sum correctlybecause of roundingerror.Table3. Theclassoriginsof thenew(1993) elitesClasspositionin 1988 Russia Poland HungaryNomenklaturamember 51.0 40.7 32.7Otherofficial 33.4 37.9 47.5Non-elite 15.6 21.4 19.8

(N = 958) (N = 960) (N = 783)Note. Entriesare percentages.Columnsmaynot sum correctlybecause of roundingerror.

all that new: they often come from positions that were "next in line,"and so these individuals would probably have been promoted to anelite position within a year or so, even without a regime change.Given the seemingly contradictory nature of these results, it might beuseful to elaborate on these findings in greater detail. Table 2 shows theclass position of the old nomenklatura elite at the time of our survey(that is, in 1993). Although the dominant theme that emerges from thistable is one of reproduction, there are significant cross-national differ-ences in this pattern. If we employ a generous definition of elites (forexample, by combining what may be called "true" elite positions withthose that were not strictly speaking elite positions, but were super-visory roles), we find that the rate of reproduction is 80 percent inRussia, 57 percent in Poland, and 50 percent in Hungary. A narrowerdefinition (one that omits supervisors from its definition of elites) sup-ports the reproduction argument only in Russia: this definition pro-duces 64 percent reproduction in Russia, but only 38 percent inPoland, and 20 percent in Hungary. The real degree of reproduction ispresumably somewhere between these two (i.e., broad and narrow)


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624definitions of elites. The broad definition is likely to err by ignoringthose downwardly mobile elites who lost some status with the transi-tion to postcommunism by moving from a nationally-important com-mand post in 1988 to a less-powerful supervisory position in 1993.The narrower definition is likely to err in the opposite direction.Beyond doubt, the relatively high degree of elite reproduction that weobserve in Table 2 was generated by the fact that outflow from 1988nomenklatura positions is more likely to be of a "sideways"rather thana "downward"type: those who left elite positions in Poland and Hun-gary were more likely to be retired by 1993 than working in rank-and-file jobs."14About one third of the old cadres retired (i.e., moved "side-ways" in the class structure) and one-sixth were "demoted" to rank-and-file jobs (i.e., were "downwardly"mobile). In and of itself, retire-ment in the postcommunist era does not necessarily mean that the oldcadres have experienced a significant loss of status. On the contrary,former members of the economic nomenklatura frequently work asconsultants for (domestic or foreign) firms even in retirement. In Hun-gary,for example, where our narrow definition of 1993 elites producedonly 20 percent reproduction, many of those who appear to have lostground are, in fact, still in positions of authority in the postcommunistera (as demonstrated by our broader definition of elites). Although wethus find considerable reproduction of elites in all three countries,without doubt, our results show that there has been much greaterturbulence at the top of the social hierarchy in Poland and in Hungary.In examining the social origins of the new elites, we find fewer cross-national differences: Table 3 reveals a striking similarity in the degreeof elite circulation across the three countries. To be sure, there appearsto be somewhat less circulation in Russia, where we find that 51 per-cent of the 1993 elites were in a nomenklatura position in 1988. More-over, Poland seems to display somewhat less evidence of circulationthan Hungary: the proportion of new elites coming from the oldnomenklatura is 41 percent in Poland, but only 33 percent in Hungary.Nevertheless, the main story that emerges from these results is thatthere has been a relatively modest inflow of rank-and-file officials intothe new elites: less than one-fifth of the new powerholders were non-elites in 1988. The real pool from which the new incumbents of com-mand posts were recruited is mid-management; that is, the new bossesare those who were already in positions of some authority in 1988.15


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625Overall, the process of upward mobility during the postcommunisttransitionseems to be quite orderly.Long-range umps in the socialhierarchyappearto be rare,and the most common way to secure apositionof authority n the postcommunistworldis by slowly climbingthe social ladder. n lookingat the rate of inflow into the new elite,onecannot ignore the impressive amount of circulation at the top ofthe class structure.But, it is equally importantnot to overempha-size the significanceof this circulation.This is because our resultsclearly show that the new ruling elite in Eastern Europe does notcome from the bottom of the class structure,but from middle layersof management.Ourtwo stories(reproductionn termsof outflow ratesandcirculationin terms of inflow rates) do not necessarilycontradictone another.After all, it is conceivable that most formernomenklaturamemberscan stayin positions of authorityeven when most new elite memberswere not nomenklaturamembers n 1988. This is not a zero-sumgame.The political and economic institutions of postcommunistsocietieschangeddramaticallybetween 1988 and 1993: while some fractionsof the elite shrunk (e.g., the political elite), others increased(e.g., the economic elite). This is particularlyso for the economicelite. In 1988, the economic elite constituted the top managersofthe largest200 firms,but in 1993, they were the CEOs of the 3,000largest enterprises.Some of the circulation that we observe in oursample,therefore,was generated by this type of structural hangeintheeconomy.Our more generalconclusion, therefore, s that the first five yearsofpostcommunist ransformation an be characterizedby relativestabil-ity in personneland a rathersignificantchangein institutional truc-ture. The dominant trend in the transformationof political and, inparticular, conomic institutionspoints toward a decentralizationofdecision-makingpower.Consequently, his results n the growthof thenumberof elite positions.Continuity n personnelandpath-dependenttransformationn economicandpolitical nstitutionsdescribethereali-tiesof postcommunist ocieties.


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626Cross-national differencesand differences across economic, cultural,and political elitesAlthough, in general we find that there are considerable similaritiesacross nations in terms of their degree of elite reproduction, we alsofind enough differences between them to conclude that our hypothesisconcerning Russia and Eastern Europe is supported by empiricalevidence. In other words, it appears that the former nomenklatura inRussia was more successful at retaining its position of power andprivilege than members of the nomenklatura in Eastern Europe.The comparison of Poland and Hungary, however, offers us counter-intuitive and unexpected findings. Indeed, our results on this compari-son are so different from what we initially expected that they force us tore-think some of our earlier theoretical assumptions about elite repro-duction. While we expected to see greater circulation in Poland andreproduction in Hungary, our results show that the opposite is, in fact,true: 57 percent of those who were in Polish nomenklatura positions in1988 survived at the top of the class structure five years later, whileonly 51 percent survived in Hungary.It is particularly interesting to see how much higher the proportion ofretirees are in Hungary than in the other two countries: 33 percent ofthose in nomenklatura positions had retired by 1993 in Hungary, com-pared with the 27 percent in Poland, and the 10 percent in Russia.These differences in retirement cannot be attributed to the age com-position of the nomenklatura elites in the three countries because theaverage age of the old Hungarian cadres was the same as that in Polandand Russia. What, then, explains this difference? Following 1989,many more people in elite positions either took or were sent into earlyretirement in Hungary. One quarter of those who held nomenklaturapositions in Hungary but retired by 1993 were less than 60 years old,and 80 percent of them were less than 70 years old. Since our surveytargeted respondents in the uppermost reaches of the social hierarchy,it is surprising that such a large percentage of our respondents retiredbefore age 60. Thus, at least some of the circulation in personnel inHungary was generated by these early retirements.A more detailed comparison of the different strata of nomenklaturaelites in Poland and Hungary offers further interesting and unanti-cipated results. Differences in the outflow rates within the economicnomenklatura in Hungary and Poland are particularly counter-intui-


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627Table4. Destinations of the old nomenklatura elite (economic elite only)Class position in 1993 Russia Poland HungaryElite 81.1 56.6 29.2Non-elite with subordinates 13.2 12.6 18.3Non-elite without subordinates 1.7 7.2 4.9Retired 3.3 23.6 47.6

(N = 60) (N = 263) (N = 82)Note. Entries are percentages. Columns may not sum correctly because of roundingerror.

tive. As Table 4 shows, only 48 percent of those who were in old eco-nomic command posts in Hungary remained in positions of authorityafter 1993. By contrast, almost 70 percent of the old Polish economicleaders were still in positions of authority five years later. The bettersurvival capacity of the former economic leaders in Poland is also sup-ported by data on the social origins of the new elites. According toTable 5 exactly half of the new Polish economic elite were members ofthe nomenklatura in 1988, while only one-third of the HungarianCEOs came from a similar class position. These results are particularlysurprising given that during the later stages of state socialism, it wasgenerally assumed that the Hungarian economic management was bet-ter trained, more competent, and less politically-motivated than theirPolish counterpart. But it is equally surprising that the Polish economy(in which the old economic elites survived longer) produced betterresults in the postcommunist era than the Hungarian one.16Cross-national differences in the reproduction of elites, however, werenot restricted to the economic sphere. Our data show, for example, thatthere was much greater circulation of cultural elites in Hungary than inPoland: only 56 percent of the 1988 cultural elites remained in an eliteposition in Hungary, while 61 percent survived in Poland (see Table 6).This is an unanticipated result. By 1988, it was generally believed thatHungary was ruled by ideologically liberal policies in science, tertiaryeducation, and the media. Hungarian Radio and Television and theprinted media impressed observers with their (relatively) free andobjective character, and their tertiary-educated (rather than politi-cally-motivated) administrators. Along similar lines, by the late 1980s,the Hungarian National Academy of Sciences was noted for its selec-tion of members on the basis of academic merit, rather than politi-cal credentials. By contrast, the Polish media were less free, a


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628Table5. Originsof the new(1993) elites(economicelitesonly)Classpositionin 1988 Russia Poland HungaryNomenklaturamember 52.6 50.7 34.9Other official 33.4 38.8 54.7Non-elite 14.0 10.5 10.4


Table6. Destinationsof the old nomenklatura lite(cultural liteonly)Classpositionin 1993 Russia Poland HungaryElite 49.4 43.9 9.0Non-elite with subordinates 20.8 17.1 47.5Non-elite withoutsubordinates 21.8 10.5 14.3Retired 8.0 28.5 29.2


sizablePolish samizdat(undergroundpublications)blossomed on thecensorship of the legal press, and the so-called "flyinguniversities"profitedfrom the politicalconservativismof official academicinstitu-tions(see Table7).In spite of these basicdifferences,HungaryandPoland arequitesimi-lar in termsof thefateof theirpoliticalnomenklatura nd theoriginsoftheirnewpoliticalelites.InTable8, forexample,we find that thepoliti-cal nomenklaturan both countrieswas more likelyto be downwardlymobile than either the economic or the culturalelites. This is under-standable,of course,sincethe changes n 1989 wereprincipally earedtowarda transformation f the politicalsystemin these countries.Wealso find (in Table9) that the new politicalelites in both HungaryandPolandare the onlyfractionof thenew elite thatrecruiteda largenum-ber of its members rom non-elitepositions: n both countriesabout40percentof the new politicaleliteheld non-elitejobs priorto the transi-tionto postcommunism.


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629Table 7 Origins of the new (1993) elites (cultural elites only)Class position in 1988 Russia Poland HungaryNomenklatura member 44.9 29.9 27.1Other official 14.4 45.5 47.4Non-elite 14.4 24.4 25.5

(N= 138) (N = 90) (N = 133)Note. Entries are percentages. Columns may not sum correctly because of roundingerror.

Table8. Destinations of the old nomenklatura elite (political elites only)Class position in 1993 Russia Poland HungaryElite 67.7 27.5 21.9Non-elite with subordinates 13.7 15.1 23.0Non-elite without subordinates 7.6 29.3 23.9Retired 11.0 28.1 31.2


Table 9. Origins of the new (1993) elites (political elites only)Class position in 1988 Russia Poland HungaryNomenklatura member 51.0 23.7 30.4Other official 29.4 33.3 26.1Non-elite 19.6 43.0 43.5


'Administeredmobility" in postcommunist Hungary?The faster circulation of Hungarian economic and cultural elitessuggests that our hypotheses concerning the effects of the existence ofa counter-elite may not stand up to critical scrutiny. Initially, we hypo-thesized that the larger and the better-organized Polish counter-elitewill be more inclined to take over positions of decision-making power


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630because, in the course of many years of underground activities, it wasable to obtain political expertise and thus was better prepared to stepinto the vacuum that was created at the top of the class structure in1989. In light of the data that we present here, one wonders whetherthis is not a naive assumption. Those who aspire to elite positions andwill fill power vacuums at times of system breakdown do not neces-sarily have to be particularly competent; it is enough for them to beambitious. In retrospect, we are inclined to believe that the greater cir-culation of elites in Hungary can thus be explained by the relativeadministrative and political inexperience of the new political elite thatcame to power in 1990. The less experience the new political office-holders had, the more likely it was that they did not trust those sub-ordinates who carried over from the Communist regime. They thuswanted to work with people they could trust. Under these circum-stances, postcommunist elites (particularly in Hungary) were tempt-ed to think about Communist conspiracies and to suspect that sur-vivors of the ancien regime would try to sabotage the reform policiesof the new era. Ironically, not unlike their Communist predecessorsduring the late 1940s, these postcommunist political elites were in-clined to cast doubt on what some of them believed to be the mytholo-gy of competence. It was argued that anticommunists did not have achance to gain appropriate expertise during the Communist epoch, andthat it is unfair to discriminate against them only because (on paper)they are less qualified for the job. Furthermore, they argued, that exces-sive emphasis on experience only serves the reproduction of the oldCommunist elite and is likely to block the revolutionary transformationof society. While during the late 1940s the old Communist elites optedfor "reds"over the "experts" the 1989 elites in Hungary were similarlyinclined to choose their political allies (although now the old patriotswere the anticommunists). Guided by such ideological considerations,the new political elite occasionally tried to eliminate subordinates(even if they had the appropriate credentials) and replace them withtheir "own" clients; that is, people they knew personally and peoplethey felt they could trust. Relatives, schoolmates, and neighbors werethus promoted to jobs primarily on the basis of their personalloyalty.The greater degree of circulation of the Hungarian cultural elite isparticularly instructive. We are inclined to explain this in terms of thesocial characteristics of the new Hungarian political elite. The newpolitical elite in Hungary is quite different from the Russian and thePolish elite in terms of its social background, education, and occupa-tional history.


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631In Russia, there was a clear trend toward the creation of a bureaucraticcaste, which was likely to reproduce itself across generations. Childrenof the nomenklatura were more likely to become nomenklatura them-selves in Russia than in either Poland or Hungary; and this pattern ofreproduction seems to continue in the postcommunist world. To a sig-nificant degree, the new elites also come from the former caste of thecadre or the nomenklatura. In socialist Russia, a much smaller percent-age of the nomenklatura elite had working-class or peasant origins. Bycontrast, the Polish and the Hungarian nomenklatura were more opento members of the lower classes; this was particularly true for the firstperiod of socialism. In Hungary, for example, it was only after 1970that children from professional families began to enter the nomen-klatura in larger numbers, and in the last few decades of socialism(probably because of the financial opportunities that have emerged forentrepreneurs in the second economy), cadre children were not par-ticularly attracted to the occupational careers of their parents. InPoland, the elite continued to draw heavily on the working class for itsmembers until the very end of the socialist period.In 1989, there was an abrupt change in the social origins of the newpolitical elite. In both Hungary and Poland, the proportion of childrenfrom professional backgrounds who are entering elite positions is onthe increase. In Poland, children from working-class background con-tinue to play an important role in the formation of the new politicalelite; this is probably due to the important role that the Solidaritymovement played in the Polish transformation in 1989-90. In Hun-gary, however, the new political elite is recruited almost exclusivelyfrom professional families. This was particularly true in 1990-94 forthe parliamentary representatives of the Center-right parties. Thepolitical cadres of the ruling Hungarian Christian-nationalist partytypically came from multi-generational professional families and,hence, were direct descendants of the so-called Hungarian genteelmiddle class (magyar keresztenyuri kozeposztdly). The new Hungarianpolitical elite and, in particular, the members of the first ruling Hun-garian coalition were humanistic intellectuals (e.g., historians, novelists,poets), while the old nomenklatura was dominated by the technicalintelligentsia. The greater degree of circulation within the Hungariancultural elite, therefore, was probably due to the fact the this new politi-cal elite was especially likely to believe in the importance of culturebecause they were humanistic intellectuals themselves. As a result, theywere likely to have clients and former colleagues who aspired to com-mand positions in the area of culture, science, and media.


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632Between 1988 and 1993 therefore, Hungary has experienced what onemight call administered mobility or circulation. The new Hungarianpolitical elite - being insecure in its own competence - pushed for afaster than functional change in personnel. This change was imple-mented in an administered fashion; in other words, dismissals andappointments were guided by considerations of personal or politicalloyalty rather than meritocratic criteria. This has triggered off a specifi-cally postcommunist process of counter-selection that placed greatervalue on patronage than individual competence.The dynamics of electoral campaigns in 1993-94 and the eventual out-comes of parliamentary elections in both Poland and Hungary are con-sistent with our administered mobility hypothesis. In May 1994, theHungarian electorate gave the absolute majority of parliamentary seatsto the reconstituted party of the old Communists. It is notable that thekey slogan of these elections was "competence." The socialists won theconfidence of the electorate by presenting themselves as more com-petent experts, who are knowledgeable about politics and who knowhow to run the country. In so doing, they discredited the former rulingparty (i.e., the Christian-Nationalist coalition) as a group of arrogantamateurs. In an indirect way, during these elections the Hungarianelectorate also cast a vote about the question of circulation versusreproduction of elites. If we think that people took campaign rhetoricseriously, then the results can be interpreted as a vote against theadministered circulation of elite personnel. The September 1993Polish elections can be interpreted in a similar way. These electionswere also won by the two successor parties of the former CommunistParty. Although the question of "competence" was not raised as anexplicit issue during these elections, the election results suggest that -in an indirect fashion at least - this was important in Poland as well.It is one thing to say, of course, that these reconstituted Communistswon on the basis of "competence," yet it is quite another to assess justhow competent they really are. In Hungary, for example, the newlyformed government can hardly be called a "government of experts."Most new ministers and their deputies are people who were rewardedfor their political loyalty either to the Socialist or the Liberal parties.The new government did not waste much time in firing people whowere placed in their positions of authority by the former government: itquickly dismissed them so that the new government could begin tobuild its own clientele. It is thus possible that only the colors of thegovernment changed, but the old logic of patronage remains the same.


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633Wecompletedour data collectionin the three countriesby the summerof 1993. The second round of the elections in Hungary(May 1994),Poland (September1993), and Russia (December 1993) representedan importantchange in all three countries. It is reasonable to hypo-thesize that our datafromthe summerof 1993 overestimatehowmuchcirculationof elites actuallytook place. In Hungaryand Poland, inparticular,hese electionsappearto have"corrected"he administeredcirculationof the immediatepostcommunistregimeand moved backinto positions of authoritypeople who were temporarilyon "parkingorbits"between 1989 and 1994. This is particularly ikely to be thecasewiththepoliticalelite.Duringthe summerof 1993, thenewpoliti-cal elite was the onlystratumnto whichthere was a substantialupwardmobility rom1988 rank-and-file ositions.

Meta-theoretical mplicationsAfter the fall of the Berlin Wall,most commentatorsargued that arevolutionary reakwithinthe old Communistregimewastakingplacein Eastern Europe. It did not take much time, however,before onebeganto notice continuitiesat least in the workingsof economic insti-tutions. As early as 1992, in fact, David Stark wrote about path-dependentchangeof economic institutionsas distinct from transitionfrom redistribution o market economies - emphasizingthe stronginvolutionary rends both in economic managementand in propertyrelations.As Starkput it: the changewas from "plan" o "clan":whatwaspresentedas "privatization" aybe moreaccuratelydescribedas amore gradualreshufflingof propertyrightswithinpublicownership;17what was presentedas transitionof redistribution o marketmay bemore an involution of redistributednstitutions,often probably ust adecentralization f redistribution.18When we began to formulate the hypotheses for our elite study,wekept in mind the idea that the post-1989 developmentsin EasternEurope may have been uneven: economic change is possibly path-dependent and involutionary,while political transformations morelikelyto be revolutionary.The differencebetweenthe transition romcapitalism o socialism(in 1949) and the transition rom socialism tocapitalism in 1989) is thatwhile in theformercase the smashingof thecapitalisteconomy required he smashingof the capitaliststate,in thelattercase the smashingof the socialiststateand its replacementwithdemocratic nstitutionsprevents hepossibilityof a revolutionary reak


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634in the economy.One could have arguedthat such a path-dependentreadjustmentn the economy is necessarywithin a democraticpolity.The shock therapy approachto reform,even if it were economicallyrational, s politicallysuicidalbecause it does not take into considera-tion the brief nature of political cycles and, thus, it miscalculatesthe amount of time needed to implementradicaleconomic reform.Politicalelitesthatattempt o implementshocktherapy n theeconomyareunlikelyto have sufficient imeto completethe process:before thepolicy could possibly produceresults,new elections are held and theelites areinvariably oted out of office.In thisway,democraticpolitiesnecessarily low downthepaceof economicchange nEasternEurope.The politicalevents since the summerof 1993 and the unanticipatedresultsof the Hungarian urveyare leadingus to the conclusionthat,even in politics,the revolutionwas moreapparent hanreal.Withonlyone cycle of politicalchange,we alreadysee a majorcorrection n thepolitical rajectory f postcommunist ocieties.The eventsof 1989 maybe more radicaland more revolutionary n the rhetoric of the newpolitical elites that came to power with the disintegrationof statesocialism.This new politicalelite hada vested interest n presenting hechanges n a revolutionaryight.Publicopinion probablyneveraccept-ed much of this radicalismand even if it acceptedit for a while,it didnot taketoo longfor it to correct tself.The discrepancy n the rhetoricof the new politicalelite andthe valuesystem of the society became apparentearly in the game. Public-opinion polls showedas earlyas 1990 that therewasstrongpublicsup-port for egalitarianvalues and for a strong welfare state. The newpoliticalelite - whichincidentallywas more "reformist"han"revolu-tionary"while in opposition duringthe 1970s and 1980s - was radi-calized fast.Itbeganto pushhardfor a freemarket, ndividualrespon-sibility,privatization, ndeliminationof thewelfarestateonlyin recentyears. For a while, this new elite assumed that public opinion wasmerely"laggingbehind" he times and that it would eventually"catchup"withthe leadingviewsof thepoliticalelite.But the oppositeturnedout to be the case:as the public saw the disintegrationof the welfarestate, t beganto turnagainstprivatization.nsteadof learning romthenew elite, the Polish and the Hungarianelectorategavean instructionto its new political eaders n 1993-94: it ejectedthemfromtheirposi-tionof powerfor theirnon-prudent adicalism.


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635During 1989-90, modernization theory returned to Eastern Europewith a vengeance.19 At first it appeared as if the fall of Communismbrought with it the end of history and that all societies were convergingaround models of liberal capitalism. With the events of 1994, however,the direction that these societies are taking is becoming less clear.Postcommunist societies, even under the leadership of socialist govern-ments, are undoubtedly in the process of capitalist transformation. Thevictory of socialist parties in Poland and in Hungary did not bring areturn to state socialism. As the first socialist prime minister ofpostcommunist Hungary (Gyula Horn) claimed shortly after his party'svictory: Hungary is now in the process of "building capitalism." Thesocialist parties are fundamentally different from the old Communistsand, in terms of western politics, they tend to be on the right wing ofsocial-democratic movements. Still, the path-dependent nature orinvoluntary character of change is apparent. What the character of thenew societies will be after the transformation was consolidated is lessclear today than it appeared in 1989-90. Arguably, strong forcesoperate that point in the direction of continuity both within the Com-munist and even with the precommunist past. Where does this path-dependent, involuntary character of postcommunist transformationleave us?In assessing the prospects of postcommunism and the value of mod-ernization theory, Michael Burawoy arrives at the somewhat bleakprognosis that the laws of postcommunist societies "willnot be the lawsof modern capitalism, but more likely, of a merchant capitalism orsome might say of a feudal capitalism - plowing a third road to theThird World.... Modernization theory conspires in obscuring the everwidening gap between ideology and reality. It fosters a false optimismabout the future."20One does not have to share the gloom of Burawoy's diagnosis in orderto appreciate his theoretical insights. Burawoy's desperation is motivat-ed by his disappointment that Eastern Europe abandoned the socialistpath, and by his desire to sustain hope in the possibility of democraticsocialism.21In light of what we have learned about social change of thepast five years of postcommunism, one does not have to share Bura-woy's political agenda in order to share his doubts about the inevitabil-ity of historical convergence around the model of "First World"liberalcapitalism and appreciate how powerful those forces are that keepsocieties on developmental trajectories both in terms of the economicinstitutions or logic of stratification systems.


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636Burawoy is undoubtedly right:there is no guarantee that EasternEurope or the post-Sovietstates are sailingsmoothlytoward moderncapitalism; hey can just as easily move into the Third World instead.Nor is there a guarantee hat their social structure s being "modern-ized": nsteadof socialist counter-selectionbeing replacedby a meri-tocraticsystemof selection,one sees thefunctioningof postcommunistpatronageor counter-selection,be it of the patriotic-Christianype orthepostcommunist ocialistversion.

ConclusionsWhat, then, have we learned so far about the reproductionand thecirculationof elitesduring he postcommunist ransformation? irst, tis clear that our data do not supporta simple elite reproductionorpowerconversiontheory.The changesof politicaland economicinsti-tutionsunderpostcommunism reconsequential:ome of the old elitesarepushedout of theirpositionsof powerandprivilege,andso there ssubstantial hangeat thetop of theclassstructure.Second, it is equally naccurate o think aboutthese changesas if theyrepresentsome revolutionarybreak. What we can reporton is path-dependent transformationboth of political, economic, and culturalinstitutionsand in the compositionof incumbentsof commandposi-tions in those institutions.The dominanttrend was a somewhataccel-erated move from the "middle" o the "top."Occasionally,the newpolitical elites may have taken their own revolutionaryrhetoric tooseriously(this could have been the case in Hungaryduringthe 1990and 1994 elections)- but this backfiredbecause as soon as someadministeredmobility nto/out of elite positionswas attempted, t wasquickly"corrected."These analyses offer substantialsupport for Erzsebet Szalai'ssober"elite circulation" heory:the bureaucratic raction of the old com-munistelites were shiftingout fromtop powerpositions.Manytakingearly retirementor taking minor but decent jobs; the technocraticfractionof late state socialist elites, in particulareconomic managersand middle managers,on the whole retainedor even improvedtheirpositions.And, finally, ome newspacewas created or thosewhowere(usually noncommunistparty members) rank-and-fileprofessionalsmainly n politics,but alsoin cultureandin theeconomy.


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637AcknowledgmentsAn earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting ofthe American Sociological Association in Miami in August 1993. Thisresearch was supported by grants from the American Council ofLearned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the NationalScience Foundation, the National Council for Soviet and East Euro-pean Research, the Dutch National Science Foundation, the HungarianNational Science Foundation, and the Polish National Science Founda-tion. We are grateful for the productive comments of Richard Ander-son, J6zsef Borocz, Gil Eyal, 1Iva Fodor, Eric Hanley, Akos R6na-Tas,W. Richard Scott, Andrew Walder, Jacek Wasilewski, Edmund Wnuk-Lipiriski, and Natasha Yershova. The opinions expressed in this articleare those of the authors.

Notes1. See Ivan Szel6nyi and Szonja Szel6nyi, "Az elit cirkulaci6ja?" [Circulation of

Elites?], Kritika, No. 9 (1990): 8-10.2. Elem6r Hankiss, "Reform and conversion of power," Paper presented at the con-ference "Mittel-Europa: Herausforderungen der Reformen," organized by the Kon-rad Adenauer Stiftung, 29-31 May 1989; Elemer Hankiss, East European Alterna-tives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).3. Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1991).4. Erzsebet Szalai, "Az iij elft" [The New Elite], pages 169-177 in Gazdasdg es Hata-lom [Economy and Power], ed. Erzsebet Szalai (Budapest: Aula Kiad6, 1990). Formore on the concept of the "new technocracy," see Erzsebet Szalai, "A HatalomMetamorf6zisa" [the Transformation of Power], pages 61-114 in Uteldgazds[Cross-Roads], ed. Erzsebet Szalai (Budapest: Pesti Szalon Konyvkiad6).5. Erzsebet Szalai, "A Hatalom Metamorf6zisa," 84-85.6. Erzs6bet Szalai calls this social group "the new elite." See Szalai, "Ismet az lTjEli-tr6l" [The New Elite Revisited], 181-186 in Gazdagsdg es Hatalom [Economy andPower]. In "A Hatalom Megamorf6zisa," she introduces the more appealing term:"new ruling estate." Here we use the term "new ruling estate" and "new politicalelite" interchangeably.7. There is an analogous discussion concerning the social implications of marketreform in China, known as "the market transition debate." This was initiated byVictor Nee in "The Theory of Market Transition," American Sociological Review54 (1989): 663-681. There, as in two subsequent papers ["Social inequality inreforming state socialism," American Sociological Review 56 (1991): 267-282, and"The emergence of market society," American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming],Nee offers a radical circulation of elites hypothesis, arguing that market reformbenefits new economic actors and former cadres lose out. This position has beenchallenged by several China specialists, in particular by Andrew Walder ["CareerMobility and Communist Political Order." American Sociological Review, forth-coming]. There, Walder takes a position similar to Szalai's, claiming that the tech-nocratic fraction of the old elite benefits from market transformation.


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6388. Pierre Bourdieu, "The forms of capital," in J. G. Richardson, editor, Handbook of

Theoryand Research of Education (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). Bourdieuoffers a multi-dimensional analysis of social structure. In his view, social spaces inwhich social actors are located are shaped by three types of capital: economic, cul-tural, and social. In this and other articles of this special issue, we use the terms eco-nomic and cultural capital in a way similar to Bourdieu's. But, we frequently substi-tute the term "political capital" for his concept of "social capital." By "political capi-tal," we mean a highly institutionalized sub-type of social capital that can be meas-ured by membership in the Communist Party.9. We are grateful to Tamis Kolosi; these hypotheses were developed in the course ofseveral conversations with him.

10. At the 1990 World Congress of Sociology, a group of scholars from the UnitedStates and from several Eastern European countries met to initiate such a survey.The project team was headed by Ivan Szelenyi and Donald Treiman.11. A similar survey is being carried out in China in 1995, under the direction of IvanSzelenyi, Donald Treiman, and Andrew Walder.12. For the concept of "path-dependent development," see David Stark, "Pathdepend-ence and privatization strategies in East Central Europe," East European Politicsand Societies 6 (1992): 17-51; and David Stark, "Recombinant property and EastEuropean capitalism," American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming.13. Philip Huang adopted this term to explain socioeconomic change in China. SeeHuang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta - 1350 to1988 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

14. This is consistent with Szalai's observation that "members of the 'old ruling class'mainly opted for retirement." See Szalai, "A Hatalom Metamorf6zisa," 98.

15. This suggests that Szalai was correct in observing that "among those new techno-crats who retained their power position, an important group comes from the 'for-mer deputy department heads."' See "A Hatalom Metamorf6zisa," 102.

16. We have to note that the differential survival rates of economic elites in Poland andHungary may be an artifact of methodological differences in our surveys. In thePolish case, a larger number of economic managers were interviewed and it is like-ly, therefore, that there were fewer CEOs in the 1988 economic nomenclature inthe sample. Non-CEOs may have a better chance for survival, thus this may explainthe greater survival rate of the Polish economic nomenklatura.

17. See David Stark, "Path dependence and privatization strategies in East CentralEurope," also David Stark, "Privatization in Hungary - From plan to market orfrom plan to clan?" East European Politics and Societies 4 (Fall, 1990): 351-392.

18. This point was made by Jean Oi, "Fiscal reform and the economic foundation oflocal state corporatism in China," World Politics 45 (1992): 99-126 and Nan Lin,"Local market socialism - Local corporatism in action in rural China," Theory andSociety, 24/3 (1995) for China. The survival of redistributive mechanisms in a newguise may be true for Eastern Europe as well. See Erzsebet Szalai, "Perpetuummobile," (1992) in Uteldgazds, 115-169. See also Eva Voszka, Privatizdci6es Szer-vezeti Decentralizdci6 [Privatization and Organizational Decentralization], (Buda-pest: Penziigykutat6 Int6zet, 1991), and l~va Voszka, Tulajdonreform [PropertyReform], (Budapest: P6nziigykutat6 Intezet, 1991).19. See Michael Burawoy, "The end of Sovietology and the renaissance of moderniza-tion theory," Contemporary Sociology (1992): 774-785.

20. Ibid., 784.21. Ibid., 788.

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