CIR vs. Algue

11
11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 1/11 VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 17, 1988 9 Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc. No. L-28896. February 17, 1988. * COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. Taxation; Nature of taxes; Purpose of taxation; Collection of taxes should be made in accordance with law.—Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. On the other hand, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved. Same; Appeal; Appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the Court of Tax Appeals is 30 days from receipt thereof.—The above chronology shows that the petition was filed seasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125, the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision or ruling challenged. Same; Warrant of distraint and levy; Rule that the warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the finality of the assessment; Exception is where there is a letter of protest after receipt of notice of assessment.—It is true that as a rule the warrant of distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of the assessment" and "renders hopeless a request for reconsideration," being "tantamount to an outright denial thereof and makes the said request deemed rejected." But there is a special circumstance in the case at bar that prevents application of this accepted doctrine. The proven fact is that four days after the private respondent received the petitioner's notice of assessment, it filed its letter of protest. This was apparently not taken into account before the warrant of distraint and levy was issued; indeed, such protest could not be

description

tax

Transcript of CIR vs. Algue

Page 1: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 1/11

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 17, 1988 9Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

No. L-28896. February 17, 1988.*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,vs. ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,respondents.

Taxation; Nature of taxes; Purpose of taxation; Collection oftaxes should be made in accordance with law.—Taxes are thelifeblood of the government and so should be collected withoutunnecessary hindrance. On the other hand, such collection shouldbe made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negatethe very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary toreconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authoritiesand the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which isthe promotion of the common good, may be achieved.

Same; Appeal; Appeal from a decision of the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue with the Court of Tax Appeals is 30 days fromreceipt thereof.—The above chronology shows that the petitionwas filed seasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125, the appealmay be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision orruling challenged.

Same; Warrant of distraint and levy; Rule that the warrant ofdistraint and levy is proof of the finality of the assessment;Exception is where there is a letter of protest after receipt of noticeof assessment.—It is true that as a rule the warrant of distraintand levy is "proof of the finality of the assessment" and "rendershopeless a request for reconsideration," being "tantamount to anoutright denial thereof and makes the said request deemedrejected." But there is a special circumstance in the case at barthat prevents application of this accepted doctrine. The provenfact is that four days after the private respondent received thepetitioner's notice of assessment, it filed its letter of protest. Thiswas apparently not taken into account before the warrant ofdistraint and levy was issued; indeed, such protest could not be

Page 2: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 2/11

located in the office of the petitioner. It was only after Atty.Guevara gave the BIR a

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

10

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

copy of the protest that it was, if at all, considered by the taxauthorities. During the intervening period, the warrant waspremature and could therefore not be served.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Protest filed, not pro forma, andwas based on strong legal considerations; Case at bar.—As theCourt of Tax Appeals correctly noted, the protest filed by privaterespondent was not pro forma and was based on strong legalconsiderations. It thus had the effect of suspending on January18, 1965, when it was filed, the reglementary period which startedon the date the assessment was received, viz., January 14, 1965.The period started running again only on April 7, 1965, when theprivate respondent was definitely informed of the impliedrejection of the said protest and the warrant was finally served onit. Hence, when the appeal was filed on April 23, 1965, only 20days of the reglementary period had been consumed.

Same; Income Tax; Payments in promotional fees, notfictitious; Claimed deduction of P75,000 proper; Strict businessprocedures not applied in a family corporation.—We find thatthese suspicions were adequately met by the private respondentwhen its President, Alberto Guevara, and the accountant, CeciliaV. de Jesus, testified that the payments were not made in onelump sum but periodically and in different amounts as eachpayee's need arose. It should be remembered that this was afamily corporation where strict business procedures were notapplied and immediate issuance of receipts was not required.Even so, at the end of the year, when the books were to be closed,each payee made an accounting of all of the fees received by himor her, to make up the total of P75,000.00. Admittedly, everythingseemed to be informal. This arrangement was understandable,

Page 3: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 3/11

however, in view of the close relationship among the persons inthe family corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Amount of promotional fees, notexcessive.—We agree with the respondent court that the amountof the promotional fees was not excessive. The total commissionpaid by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to theprivate respondent was P1 25,000.00. After deducting the saidfees, Algue still had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit fromthe transaction. The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the totalcommission. This was a reasonable proportion, considering that itwas the payees who did practically everything, from the formationof the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actualpurchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden on taxpayer to provevalidity of the claimed deduction, successfully discharged;Payment of the fees was

11

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 17, 1988 11

Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

necessary and reasonable.—The Solicitor General is correct whenhe says that the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity ofthe claimed deduction. In the present case, however, we find thatthe onus has been discharged satisfactorily. The privaterespondent has proved that the payment of the fees was necessaryand reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees ininducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in anexperimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new businessrequiring millions of pesos. This was no mean feat and should be,as it was, sufficiently recompensed.

Same; Same; Rationale of taxation.—It is said that taxes arewhat we pay for civilized society. Without taxes, the governmentwould be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate andoperate it. Hence, despite the natural reluctance to surrender partof one's hard-earned income to the taxing authorities, everyperson who is able to must contribute his share in the running ofthe government. The government, for its part, is expected torespond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intendedto improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral andmaterial values, This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of

Page 4: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 4/11

taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that it is anarbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CRUZ, J.:

Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should becollected without unnecessary hindrance. On the otherhand, such collection should be made in accordance withlaw as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason forgovernment itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile theapparently conflicting interests of the authorities and thetaxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is thepromotion of the common good, may be achieved.

The main issue in this case is whether or not theCollector of Internal Revenue correctly disallowed theP75,000.00 deduction claimed by private respondent Algueas legitimate business expenses in its income tax returns.The corollary issue is whether or not the appeal of theprivate respondent from the decision of the Collector ofInternal Revenue was made on time and in accordancewith law.

12

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCommissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

We deal first with the procedural question.The record shows that on January 14, 1965, the private

respondent, a domestic corporation engaged in engineering,construction and other allied activities, received a letterfrom the petitioner assessing it in the total amount ofP83,183.85 as delinquency income taxes for the years 1958and 1959.

1 On January 18, 1965, Algue filed a letter of

protest or request for reconsideration, which letter wasstamp-received on the same day in the office of thepetitioner.

2 On March 12, 1965, a warrant of distraint and

levy was presented to the private respondent, through itscounsel, Atty. Alberto Guevara, Jr., who refused to receiveit on the ground of the pending protest.

3 A search of the

protest in the dockets of the case proved fruitless. Atty.

Page 5: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 5/11

Guevara produced his file copy and gave a photostat to BIRagent Ramon Reyes, who deferred service of the warrant.

4

On April 7, 1965, Atty. Guevara was finally informed thatthe BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it wasonly then that he accepted the warrant of distraint andlevy earlier sought to be served.

5 Sixteen days later, on

April 23, 1965, Algue filed a petition for review of thedecision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with theCourt of Tax Appeals.

6

The above chronology shows that the petition was filedseasonably. According to Rep. Act No. 1125, the appeal maybe made within thirty days after receipt of the decision orruling challenged.

7 It is true that as a rule the warrant of

distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of theassessment"

8 and "renders hopeless a request for

reconsideration,"9 being "tantamount to an outright denial

thereof and makes the said request deemed rejected."10

______________

1 Rollo, pp. 28-29.2 Ibid., pp. 29; 42.3 Id., p. 29.4 Respondent's Brief, p. 11.5 Id., p. 29.6 Id.7 Sec. 11.8 Phil. Planters Investment Co. Inc. v. Acting Comm. of Internal

Revenue, CTA Case No. 1266, Nov. 11,1962; Rollo, p. 30.9 Vicente Hilado v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 1256,

Oct. 22,1962; Rollo, p. 30.10 Ibid.

13

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 17, 1988 13Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

But there is a special circumstance in the case at bar thatprevents application of this accepted doctrine.

The proven fact is that four days after the privaterespondent received the petitioner's notice of assessment, itfiled its letter of protest. This was apparently not takeninto account before the warrant of distraint and levy wasissued; indeed, such protest could not be located in the

Page 6: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 6/11

office of the petitioner. It was only after Atty. Guevara gavethe BIR a copy of the protest that it was, if at all,considered by the tax authorities. During the interveningperiod, the warrant was premature and could therefore notbe served.

As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted,11 the protest

filed by private respondent was not pro forma and wasbased on strong legal considerations. It thus had the effectof suspending on January 18, 1965, when it was filed, thereglementary period which started on the date theassessment was received, viz., Jaauary 14, 1965. Theperiod started running again only on Ap 7, 1965, when theprivate respondent was definitely informed of the impliedrejection of the said protest and the warrant was finallyserved on it. Hence, when the appeal was filed on April 23,1965, only 20 days of the reglementary period had beenconsumed.

Now for the substantive question.The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of

P75,000.00 was properly disallowed because it was not anordinary, reasonable or necessary business expense. TheCourt of Tax Appeals had seen it differently. Agreeing withAlgue, it held that the said amount had been legitimatelypaid by the private respondent for actual services rendered.The payment was in the form of promotional fees. Thesewere collected by the payees for their work in the creationof the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of thePhilippines and its subsequent purchase of the propertiesof the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company.

Parenthetically, it may be observed that the petitionerhad originally claimed these promotional fees to bepersonal holding

_______________

11 Penned by Associate Judge Estanislao R. Alvarez, concurred byPresiding Judge Ramon M. Umali and Associate Judge Ramon L.Avanceña.

14

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCommissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

company income12 but later conformed to the decision of the

Page 7: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 7/11

respondent court rejecting this assertion.13 In fact, as the

said court found, the amount was earned through the jointefforts of the persons among whom it was distributed. Ithas been established that the Philippine Sugar EstateDevelopment Company had earlier appointed Algue as itsagent, authorizing it to sell its land. factories and oilmanufacturing process. Pursuant to such authority,Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo Guevara, Isabel Guevara,Edith O'Farell, and Pablo Sanchez worked for theformation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation,inducing other persons to invest in it.

14 Ultimately, after its

incorporation largely through the promotion of the saidpersons, this new corporation purchased the PSEDCproperties.

15 For this sale, Algue received as agent a

commission of P125,000.00, and it was from thiscommission that the P75,000.00 promotional fees were paidto the aforenamed individuals.

16

There is no dispute that the payees duly reported theirrespective shares of the fees in their income tax returnsand paid the corresponding taxes thereon.

17 The Court of

Tax Appeals also found, after examining the evidence, thatno distribution of dividends was involved.

18

The petitioner claims that these payments are fictitiousbecause most of the payees are members of the same familyin control of Algue. It is argued that no indication wasmade as to how such payments were made, whether bycheck or in cash, and there is not enough substantiation ofsuch payments. In short, the petitioner suggests a taxdodge, an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment byinvolving an imaginary deduction.

We find that these suspicions were adequately met bythe private respondent when its President, AlbertoGuevara, and the accountant, Cecilia V. de Jesus, testifiedthat the payments were not made in one lump sum butperiodically and in different

_______________

12 Rollo, p, 33,13 Ibid., pp. 7-8; Petition, pp. 2-3.14 Id., p. 37.15 Id.16 Id.17 Id.18 Id.

Page 8: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 8/11

(a)

(1)

15

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 17, 1988 15Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

amounts as each payee's need arose.19 It should be

remembered that this was a family corporation where strictbusiness procedures were not applied and immediateissuance of receipts was not required. Even so, at the end ofthe year, when the books were to be closed, each payeemade an accounting of all of the fees received by him orher, to make up the total of P75,000.00.

20 Admittedly,

everything seemed to be informal. This arrangement wasunderstandable, however, in view of the close relationshipamong the persons in the family corporation.

We agree with the respondent court that the amount ofthe promotional fees was not excessive. The totalcommission paid by the Philippine Sugar EstateDevelopment Co. to the private respondent wasP125,000.00.

21 After deducting the said fees, Algue still had

a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from the transaction.The amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the totalcommission. This was a reasonable proportion, consideringthat it was the payees who did practically everything, fromthe formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporationto the actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate properties.

This finding of the respondent court is in accord with thefollowing provision of the Tax Code:

"SEC. 30. Deductions from gross income.—In computing netincome there shall be allowed as deductions—

Expenses:

In general.—All the ordinary and necessary expenses paidor incurred during the taxable year in carrying on anytrade or business, including a reasonable allowance forsalaries or other compensation for personal servicesactually rendered; x x x"

22

and Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 70 (1), reading asfollows:

"SEC. 70. Compensation for personal services.—Among theordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on

Page 9: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 9/11

any trade or business may be included a reasonable allowance forsalaries or other compensation for personal services actuallyrendered. The test of

_______________

19 Respondent's Brief, pp. 25-32.20 Ibid., pp. 30-32.21 Rollo, p. 37.22 Now Sec. 30, (a) (1)—(A.), National Internal Revenue Code.

16

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCommissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whetherthey are reasonable and are, in fact, payments purely for service.This test and its practical application may be further stated andillustrated as follows:

"Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in factas the purchase price of services, is not deductible. (a) Anostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of adividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of acorporation having few stockholders, practically all of whom drawsalaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of thoseordinarily paid for similar services, and the excessive paymentcorrespond or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of theofficers of employees, it would seem likely that the salaries arenot paid wholly for services rendered, but the excessive paymentsare a distribution of earnings upon the stock. x x x" (PromulgatedFeb. 11, 1931, 30 O.G. No. 18, 325.)

It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees werenot in the regular employ of Algue nor were they itscontrolling stockholders.

23

The Solicitor General is correct when he says that theburden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of theclaimed deduction. In the present case, however, we findthat the onus has been discharged satisfactorily. Theprivate respondent has proved that the payment of the feeswas necessary and reasonable in the light of the effortsexerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominentbusinessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise andinvolve themselves in a new business requiring millions ofpesos. This was no mean feat and should be, as it was,

Page 10: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 10/11

sufficiently recompensed.It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilized society.

Without taxes, the government would be paralyzed for lackof the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence,despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one'shard-earned income to the taxing authorities, every personwho is able to must contribute his share in the running ofthe government. The government for its part, is expected torespond in the form of tangible and intangible benefitsintended to improve the lives of the people and enhancetheir moral and material values. This symbioticrelationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispelthe erroneous notion that it is an arbitrary method of

_______________

23 Respondent's Brief, p. 35.

17

VOL. 158, FEBRUARY 17, 1988 17Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc.

exaction by those in the seat of power.But even as we concede the inevitability and

indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in alldemocratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and inaccordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, thenthe taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts willthen come to his succor. For all the awesome power of thetax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if thetaxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the law hasnot been observed.

We hold that the appeal of the private respondent fromthe decision of the petitioner was filed on time with therespondent court in accordance with Rep. Act No. 1125.And we also find that the claimed deduction by the privaterespondent was permitted under the Internal RevenueCode and should therefore not have been disallowed by thepetitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court ofTax Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-

Page 11: CIR vs. Algue

11/5/2014 CentralBooks:Reader

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001497db22949df0918df000a0082004500cc/t/?o=False 11/11

Aquino, JJ., concur.

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Tax assessment by tax examiners arepresumed correct and made in good faith. Taxpayer hasduty to prove otherwise. (Commissioner of lnternal Revenuevs. Construction Resources of Asia, Inc., 145 SCRA 671.)

Commission on Audit cannot make a final decision ontax questions, (Phil, Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs,Commission on Audit, 146 SCRA 190.)

——o0o——

18

© Copyright 2014 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.