Cilr1 Digest Case

7/29/2019 Cilr1 Digest Case

1/16

CILR1 DIGESTS:PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION EL 1

VOIDDONATIONSBYTHESPOUSES:DONATIONSINCOMMONLAWMARRIAGES

MATABUENA VS.

CERVANTES

On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of

Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the

time they were living as husband and wife in a common law

relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix

died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena,

being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix,

questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban

on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to acommon-law relationship. She had the land declared on her

name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on

virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in

1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the

validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes

marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.

Whether the Article

133 of the civil code

applies to

donations between

live-in partners?

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a

donation between the spouses during the marriage,

policy considerations of the most exigent character as well

as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition

should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary

to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the

other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue

and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a

prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omissionmay be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the

language used must be remedied by an adherence to its

avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction

that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of

it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose

discernible in such codal provision would not be attained.

The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965

decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned

donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and

defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3)

remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate

disposition in accordance with the current decision; without

pronouncement as to costs.

PROPERTY RELATIONS FOR MARRIAGES BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE

DELIZO VS.DELIZO Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages. The first was with

Rosa Vilasfer, from 1891 until her death in 1909, a period of

18 years. The second with Dorotea de Ocampo, from 1911

until the death of Nicolas in 1957, or a period of 46 years.

The action for partition was instituted in 1957 by the 3

children and the heirs of the first marriage, all against their

father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de

Ocampo, and their nine 9 children, the herein petitioners-

appellants.

Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among

which are 66 hectares of agricultural lands in Caanawan, San

Jose City, Nueva Ecija; 58 hectares of riceland in Muoz of the

same province; and a lot in Manila.

It was found by both the TC and the CA that the Caanawan

lands were acquired as homesteads during the existence of

the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there

being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively

to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first

conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer.

With regards to the other properties, the CA found that these

were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage

of Nicolas Delizo. However, since these properties were

acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties

although such produce is the result of the labor and industry

of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only

eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the

second marriage should appertain to the second conjugalpartnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated

to the children of the first marriage.

Whether the

property acquired

by homestead is

conjugal property

of the 1st

or 2nd

marriage?

From the findings of the Appellate Court that 66 hectares ofthe Caanawan properties were acquired by Nicolas Delizo as

homesteads during the period of the first marriage, it does

not necessarily follow that they should be considered as

properties of the first marriage, considering that being

homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was

not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law

to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have

been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's

first wife, Rosa Villasfer. Under Act 926, which was then the

applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent

does not become absolute until after he has complied with

all the requirements of the law. The decisive factor,

therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land

acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the

first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of

the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the

fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for

the acquisition of such right to the patent. What was

transferred to Nicolas Delizo were not rights of ownership,

but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over

portions of the public domain. Having received the

homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have

perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the five-

year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in

1909. The CA erred in, holding that the entire Caanawan

properties belong to the conjugal partnership of the first

marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering,

however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated

and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to

1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said

properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion tothe extent to which the requirements of the public land

laws had been complied with during the existence of each

conjugal partnership. In connection with the other

properties, the CA held that "there is no controversy that

these were all acquired during the existence of the second

marriage of Nicolas Delizo." Since these properties were

acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties

although such produce is the result of the labor and

industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de

Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties

acquired during the second marriage should appertain to

the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent

(20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first

marriage. It would have been facile to hold that those after-

acquired properties belong to the second conjugal

partnership in view of the statutory presumptionenunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code (now Article

160, New Civil Code). There are, however, important

considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is

the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands

contributed considerably to the acquisition.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

BALLADOS VS.

COURT OFAPPEALS

Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of


2/16


JOCSON VS.COURT

OFAPPEALS

Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife.

The wife died first intestate then the husband followed.

Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is

the husband of Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3)

documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime.

These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina

Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his

properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of

his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documentsand prays that they be declared null and void and the

properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him

and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3

and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio

Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore,

cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio

Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered

in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.

WON the property

registered under

the name of Emilio

Jocson, married to

Alejandra Poblete

is conjugal property

or exclusive

property.

the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal

partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively

to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this

presumption must first prove that the property in

controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other

words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a

condition sine qua non for the operation of the

presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke

the presumption under Article 160 he must first presentproof that the disputed properties were acquired during the

marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The

certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his

claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were

registered in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to

Alejandra Poblete is no proof that the properties were

acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title

and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well

settled that registration does not confer title but merely

confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra).

It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired

by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were

registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete,

which explains why he was described in the certificates of

title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioners position, the certificates of title

show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively

Emilio Jocsons, the registered owner. This is so because the

words married to preceding Alejandra Poblete are

merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In

other words, the import from the certificates of title is that

Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same

having been registered in his name alone, and that he is

married to Alejandra Poblete.

ANSALDO VS.

SHERIFF

Appellee Angel Ansaldo stood as guarantor for Romarico

Agcaoili. He promised to indemnify the Surety Company for

any damage that they may incur from Agcaoilis credits.

Agcaoili defaulted and thus theSurety Company was forced to

pay the Philippine Trust Bank the amount of 19,065.17 pesos.

Thus, the Surety Company instituted an action to get the said

amount from Angel Ansaldo. The Sheriff of City of Manila

favored the Surety Company and levied on a property that

belongs to the conjugal property of Angel and Margarita

Ansaldo. The spouses brought an action to the Court of First

Instance of Manila and the court ruled in their favor to the

extent that the Sheriff should not have deducted from the

same property and that the Surety Company should pay the

spouses the amount of 636.80 pesos.

Whether or not the

Sheriff was right in

deducting from the

conjugal property

of the Spouses

NO. The decision of the lower court is affirmed by the

Supreme Court

Ratio: The Civil Code provision, in Article 1408, that the

conjugal property of the spouses should be liable for all the

debts and obligations contracted by either spouses during

the marriage, should be construed in line and be reconciled

with Articles 1385 and 1386 of the same code. Construing

the 3articles together leads to the conclusion that the

conjugal property should be held liable only when the said

debt or obligation contracted by either party was proved to

have produced some level of benefit for the family. It not

being showed to be such, the Sheriff could not have levied

from the said property. The issue of the spouses is not that

the said property was part of their conjugal property but

that whether it could be subject to the levy of the Sheriff or

whether it falls under the purview of 1408.

CASTRO VS.MIAT

Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978),

originally intended his two properties, one in Paco and the

other in Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping

the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified theoriginal agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984.

Proof of this was given by Moises brother, Cerefino Miat,

who said testified the original agreement that Paco would go

to Moises sons. This was reiterated at the death bed of

Moises wife and affirmed upon Moises return to the

Philippines.

The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on

an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14,

1984. Full payment was made on the latter date and title was

secured under Moises name as widower.

Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property

with their wives and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance

premiums. Alexander and his wife, however, left the propertyin August 1985 for personal reasons.

February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding

that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who

happens to be Romeos neighbor, that the Paco property was

being sold to VC. A thirty thousand peso downpayment was

made by godmother to Moises for her son.

April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco

property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the

sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a

deed of assignment in favor of his brother because he had

lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeos

possession.

(1) WON Paco

property is conjugal

or capital

(2) WON valid oralpartition between

Moises and his sons

involving the said

property is valid

(3) WON Castro

spouses were

buyers in good

faith.

(1) Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by

Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had long been

dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code

(which was applicable because marriage was celebratedbefore FC):

Art 153 (1) -

The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at

the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition

be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x.

Records show that property was acquired by onerous title

during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly

conjugal property.

Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code.

It provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to

belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that

it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Thisarticle does not require proof that the property was

acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption

applies even when the manner in which the property was

acquired does not appear.

In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioners reliance on

Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco

property during their marriage Moises did not bring it

into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as

conjugal.

(2)Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter

of the father to his sons (the one which stated that he didnt

favor any of his sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of


3/16


Downpayment information corroborated by Virgilio Miat

(brother of Moises) and Pedro Miranda (who worked with

Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but

Alexander later said that he did not consider the money to be

a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo.

Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it

from his father when he mortgaged the land to his friend

Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into financial difficulties, he

mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to parents ofpetitioner VC.

December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to

discuss status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from

petitioners lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco property

had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale

dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC

admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but

bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that hed be

able to retrieve it from his son.

Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel

Moises and Alexander to execute deed of

conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay

the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to

recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendantscounterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both

parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by

saying that: (1) the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and

Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for

defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the

petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.

Moises brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement between

the brothers to divide the property between themselves

(attested to by extended Family members).

We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and

Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is

enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted

the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as

downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco

property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino

Miat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale ofAlexanders share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by

petitioners counsel.

(3)In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual

knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The

most protuberant index that they are not buyers in good

faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with

Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that

together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they

went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if

Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in

that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property

by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even

admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title

and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the

property.

x x x

Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession

of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who

was fully aware of another persons possession of the lot he

purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent

purchaser for value.

WHEN CPG COMMENCES AND APPLIES?

PNB VS.QUINTOS

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY

LAPERAL VS.

KATIGBAK

1. The Laperals instituted a complaint against

Katigbak and Kalaw seeking the recovery of P14000 evidenced

by various promissory notes and for the return of jewelry

delivered to Katigbak for sale on commission.

2. Upon confession of judgment by Katigbak, the

court rendered judgment against him to pay the Laperals the

said sum and return of jewelry.

3. About a month after the decision was rendered,

Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak for

judicial separation of property and separate administration

4. Court granted the said complaint.

5. Laperals filed another complaint against Kalaw and

Katigbak seeking the annulment of the proceedings for the

above complaint, to enforce judgment secured by the

Laperals on the fruits of Kalaws paraphernal property and to

secure a ruling declaring the real property as conjugal

property of Katigbak and Kalaw.6. Court dismissed the complaint and rendered the

property as paraphernal.

a. Ramon and Evelina got married in 1938.

b. The subject property was registered in the name of

Evelina Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak on December6,

1939 only two years after the marriage.

c. Evelina declares that her mother Pua was the one

that had bought the property for her

WON the property

in question

constitutes the

paraphernal

property of Evelina.

Whether or not

Evelina may be held

liable for the debts

of her husband

against the spouses

Laperal.

NO

Indeed, all properties acquired during the marriage are, by

law, presumed conjugal. The presumption however is not

conclusive but merely rebuttable. This is a case where the

presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly proven.

1. The land in question was purchased for the wife

with her own separate funds. Other than invoking the

presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so

presented was shifted to the appellant.

2. Deed to the disputed land is in the name of the

wife.

3. At the time of its purchase, the property was

already of such substantial value as admittedly, the

husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy,

considering that singular source of income then was his

P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank.

BARCILLES VS.GSIS Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. His retirement

benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal

leave and representation and transportation allowances are

being contested in this case by two families. Iluminada Ponce

Berciles and her four children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione

(lawful heirs) allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the

deceased. Iluminada presents as proof, evidence of hermarriage with the deceased which entitled her and their

legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. On the

other hand, Flor Fuentebella and her four children Pascual

Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda (contending

claimants) also claim a share in the benefits.

The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following

proportion:

77/134 for Iluminada as surviving spouse;

10/134 each for the legitimate children Ilona,

Ellery, England and Ione;

5/134 for Pascual Voltaire as acknowledged natural

child;

Is the GSIS decision

valid?

NO

The marriage between Iluminada and the deceased was

sufficiently proved and ruled upon by this court, fully

supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil

registry therefore the four children begotten by said

spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. They

are entitled to their share in the benefits. The marriage

between Flor and the deceased was not proved. She only

presented a certification that their marriage records couldnot be found or located in the civil registry. As to Pascual

Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proved. His

birth certificate was not signed by either the father or

mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not

intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by

the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Pascual

Voltaire therefore cannot be considered as an

acknowledged natural child. Under the law, illegitimate

children are entitled to support and such successional rights

so long as there is admission or recognition of paternity. As

a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the

benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased

was not sufficiently proved and paternity was not


4/16


4/134 each for the illegitimate children Maria

Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda.

Both parties appealed. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS

ruling is erroneous, that they are the only legal heirs under

the law. The contending claimants also appealed claiming that

they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits.

established. The retirement benefits and the terminal leave

pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased

shall be distributed equally to the 5 heirs: Iluminada, Ilona,

Ellery, England and Ione. As to the retirement premiums,

the same is presumed conjugal, there being no proof that

the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the

deceased. One half belongs to the wife as her property in

the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the

estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs.

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITIONS BY GRATUITOUS TITLE DURING THE MARRIAGE

VELOSO VS.

MARTINEZ

Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and

administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo died, he

borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry.

Veloso claims the husband pawned the jewelry to him with

full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that

the jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from

her mother.

Who is entitled to

the jewelry?

MARTINEZ.

The record shows that the jewels were the sole and

separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother,

and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that

they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such

paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the

same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive

control and management of the same, until and unless she

had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with

the intent that the husband might administer it properly.

(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record

that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any

manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not

be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without

her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of

the Civil Code above cited.

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITION BY REDEMPTION

PLATA VS.YATCO Amalia Plata while single, sold a parcel of land to Celso

Saldaa. The latter again resold the property to Amalia Plata,

married to Gaudencio Begosa. In consideration of a Php

3,000 loan, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to

Gaudencio Begosa" mortgaged the identical property to

Cesarea Villanueva, signed by Gaudencio Begosa as co-

mortgagor. The mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially and

Villanueva obtained said property by being the highest bidder.

Villanueva sued Begosa for illegal detainer and obtained

judgment that became final. A writ of execution was issued

but Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from her property

and filed a claim averring ownership of the property.

Is Plata bound by

the

detainer/judgment

against Begosa?

NO

She had acquired the property while still single. Evidence

before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia Plata to

Gaudencio Begosa is weak. The subsequent conveyance

thereof to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her

several months afterward of the same property, did not

transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there

being no proof that the money paid to Saldaa came from

common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor

of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the

petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and

so does the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her. Since the

property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers

were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the land

records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was

not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer

judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect

the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she

holds and administers independently, and which she may

even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or

consent.

LIM VS.GARCIA Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving

a widow (Isabela Garcia) and nine children and an interest in

an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos EXCEPT:

1. A house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga,and the sum of 10,000 pesos which, it was

admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the

said Hilario Lim

2. 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim fora certain lot which it was also admitted had beenbrought by him to his marriage, and which was

sold in the course of the administration of his

estate, together with improvements

TC - the entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by

the administrator was conjugal property.

Counsel for the administrator,surviving children - none of the

said property should be treated as the property of the

conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased

Hilario Lim, brought to the marriage property worth more

than double the amount of the intestate estate, and the

defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the conjugal

partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time

thereafter.

Should the property

be considered

conjugal?

YES

The TC was of opinion that the evidence offered in support

of this contention was not sufficient to overcome the

presumption established in article 1407 of the Civil Code,

which provides that all the estate of the married couple

will be considered as conjugal partnership property (bienes

gananciales) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of

the separate estate of the husband or the wife, and we

think after a careful examination of the record that this

finding must be sustained. The setting aside of 700 pesos(which appears to have been taken as the value of the lot

sold during the administration) as the separate property of

the husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the

treatment of the balance of the price received for this lot,

together with the buildings thereon, as conjugal partnership

property, it appearing from the record that these buildings

were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds,

was in entire accordance with the provisions of article 1404,

which provides that "the buildings erected during

coverture on land belonging to one of the married couple

will be considered as conjugal partnership property, after

allowing the owner of the land the value thereof." The

foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for

the appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in

refusing to order the inclusion in the inventory of the estate

of the deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name ofthe appellee and claimed as her separate estate. It is

contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were

conveyed to the appellee during the coverture (thats

marriage, incase youre wondering) by the said Hilario Lim

either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in

either event such conveyance was void under the provisions

of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code. It appears from

the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not

acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband,

and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties

by way of exchange for certain property inherited by her

from her father's estate during the coverture, and they

are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions


5/16


of paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property

acquired by exchange for other property belonging

separately to one of the married couple is the separate

property of the owner of the property for which it is

exchanged. The trial court speaks of this property as dowry

of the appellee, but there is nothing in the record which

tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of her dowry,

and indeed the evidence strongly supports the

presumption that it was and continued to be a part of her

separate estate (paraphernalia) which never acquired the

"dotal" character.

CPG: ADMINISTRATION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY BY THE OTHER SPOUSE

VELOSO VS.

MARTINEZ

Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and

administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo died, he

borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry.

Veloso claims the husband pawned the jewelry to him with

full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that

the jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from

her mother.

Who is entitled to

the jewelry?

MARTINEZ.

The record shows that the jewels were the sole and

separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother,

and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that

they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such

paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the

same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive

control and management of the same, until and unless she

had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with

the intent that the husband might administer it properly.

(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record

that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any

manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not

be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without

her consent, and without compliance with the provisions ofthe Civil Code above cited.

MANOTOKREALTY

VS.COURT OF

APPEALS

Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a

parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda

Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from

Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the

understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the

lot.

Apr 2,50 - the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and

her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which

covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were

placed under custodia legis.

Apr 28,50 - Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special

administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private

respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.

Mar 13,20,59 - Manotok Raealty became the successful

bidder and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision

pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the

Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate

Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was

one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale, among

others, provided for the following terms and conditions:

The VENDEE renounces the right to warranty incase of eviction with the knowledge of the risks of

eviction and assumes its consequences with

respect not only to the lots subject-of the above

mentioned cases and claims but also with respect

to any other lots subject of contracts of sale or

promises to sell that may have been executed bythe deceased, Clara Tambunting de Legarda and/or

Vicente L. Legarda, and it hereby relieves the

estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda and the

Philippine Trust Company, in its capacity as

Administrator thereof, of any and all liability with

respect thereto in case of eviction.

The VENDEE assumes the risk and expenses ofejecting the tenants or squatters on the said

parcels of land if it decides to eject them

In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its

squatters and occupants, the Manotok Realty caused the

publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the

Taliba advising the occupants to vacate their respective

premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow.

Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused tovacate the lots they were occupying

TC dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only

right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the collection of

the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of

its predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda).

Manotok Realty - Court of Appeals committed a reversible

error in holding that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in favor

of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable

against the petitioner. Since there is no dispute that the

property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara

Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had

Whether Don

Vicente Legarda

could vlidly dispose

of the paraphernal

property?

NO

There is nothing in the records that will show that Don

Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal

properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of

the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was

entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente

Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara

Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and

on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after

her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have

validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing

administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara

Tambunting.

Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the

ownership of the paraphernal

property.

Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the

administration of the paraphernal

property, unless she delivers the

same to the husband by means of a

public instrument empowering him to

administer it.

In this case, the public instrument

shall be recorded in the Registry of

Property. As for the movables, the

husband shall give adequate security.

We are, therefore, led to the inevitable conclusion that the

sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private

respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither anowner nor administrator of the subject property. Such

being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the

ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the

probate court.

Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court(143 SCRA 40, 49) -

Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is

inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither

can the right to set up the defense of its illegality be

waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code).

After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as

administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he

should have applied before the probate court for authority

to sell the disputed property in favor of the private

respondent. If the probate court approved the request,then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute

a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent.

Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the

administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of

procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his

interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the

court appointed administrator.


6/16


no authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the

private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was

appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting

only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could

not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the

vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner nor the

administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale

took place.

Madlangawa - the provisions of the deed of sale are a

declaration or admission against the interest of the petitioner,and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda had been ratified

by the Philippine Trust Company and approved by the probate

court. The petitioner, therefore, is allegedly estopped from

questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the

property in dispute.

CPG: ENCUMBRANCE / DISPOSITION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY

PALANCA VS.SMITH

BELL

Smith, Bell , pending in the Court of First Instance of the city

of Manila obtained a judgment against the said Emiliano

Boncan for a sum of money. Later the said Smith, Bell & Co.

obtained an execution out of said court which was levied

upon the property in question in this case, which property

was known as No. 16, situated in an alley without name

running toward the old Santa Mesa race track, upon property

belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co. After said

execution was levied upon the property in question, theplaintiff and appellant herein commenced an action in the

Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the

defendant herein, asking that said court dictate a sentence

declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the

property described in the complaint, with a right to the

possession of the same, and that said attachment be

dissolved. To this petition the defendants filed a general

denial. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of

the cause, the lower court denied the prayer of the petition of

the plaintiff and appellant, absolving the defendants

therefrom and charged the plaintiff with the costs. From this

decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the

following assignment of error - The court erred in not allowing

as proven the transfer of property No. 16, above described,

made on September 20, 1904, by Emiliano Boncan Yap in

favor of his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, and in not

finding that she is the sole and exclusive owner thereof,

Emiliano Boncan Yap having no interest whatever in the

property in question.

Is the property

conjugal property?

YES

An examination of the evidence brought to this court shows

that the said Alejandra Palanca was the owner of certain

property in the city of Manila, which was given by the said

Emiliano Boncan, with the consent of the said Alejandra

Palanca, as a guaranty for the payment of the sum of

P14,000, which Emiliano Boncan borrowed from the

International Banking Corporation. With the money so

borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house

in question, and later, by a public document executed onthe 20th of September, 1904, conveyed the house in

question to the plaintiff and appellant herein as a guaranty

for the payment of the debt to the International Banking

Corporation, for the guaranty of the payment of which the

said plaintiff and appellant had given her private property.

This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon

the credit of the property of his wife, became conjugal

property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and when the

same was reinvested in the construction of a house, the

house became conjugal property and was liable for the

payment of the debts of the husband. (Art. 1408, Civil

Code.) Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect

answer the assignments of error made by the appellant, and

without discussing the same in detail, we are of the opinion,

and so hold, that the judgment of the lower court should be

affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

LIM QUENCO VS.

CARTAGENE

SPANISH

PRESUMPTION OF CPG

TORELA VS.TORELA

Decree 440157 was issued by the CFI of Negros Occidental in

favor of Felimon Torela, married to Gallego, decreeing that he

is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 3770), and ordering that

the same be registered. Consequently, OCT 29257 covering

lot was issued in favor of Felimon. As the certificate of title

was either lost or destroyed during the last world war, he fileda verified petition for reconstitution praying that after due

publication in the Official Gazette, an order be issued setting

the petition for hearing. Thereafter the court, orders the

Register of Deeds to reconstitute the original as well as the

owners duplicate of OCT 29257. Thus, OCT 6898 was in favor

of Felimon, in lieu of the lost and/or destroyed one. Torela,

filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot. 3770 having been

acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to

his first wife, Graciana Galeego, the Cadastral court ordered

that land be registered in the name of Torela, married to

Graciana Galeego, that his first wife died many years ago; and

that he is married by second nuptial to Marciana Gepanago.

He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of

Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movants) civil

status, appearing on the face of OCT, from Felimon, married

to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torella married to MarcianaGepango. The court, finding no opposition thereto and with

the conformity of Clara Torela, daughter of Felimon by First

marriage, granted the motion and ordered the Register of

Deeds to change the civil status of the movant from Felimon

Torela, married to Marciana Gepanto which is the actual civil

status of the movant, upon payment of the required fees.

Felimon executed a definite deed of sale, whereby, for and in

consideration of P3,000.00, he sold said lot to Marcos and

Maria Luna Mahilum, He also stated in the deed of sale that

he was a widower by first marriage to Graciana Gallego, and

now married to Marcina Gepango, that he is the registered

owner of lot, having acquired it by inheritance from his

parents before his marriage to Graciana Gallego, deceased.

Whether or not the

parcel of land

herein involved is a

conjugal property

of the spousesFelimon Torela and

Graciana Gallego

(plaintiffs mother).

The property question is one of those documented in Article

1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was

inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the

marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his

separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For thesereasons, defendant Felimon had lawfully disposed of his

property to the exclusion of his children by his first

marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint was correctly

dismissed by the court below. Petitioners claim that since

the lot in questions was registered in the name of Felimon

Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to

be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that

one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their

inheritance from their mother. While it is rule that all

property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as

above stated, nonetheless the party who invoke the

presumption must first prove that the property was

acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine

qua not for the application of the presumption. In the

instant case there in is nothing in the record to show that

the lot in question was acquired during the marriage ofFelimon Torela and Graciana gallego. On the contrary, the

factual finding of the CA is to the effect that Felimon

acquired the land through inheritance and this conclusion is

bolstered by that fact that no one of the petitioners herein,

Clara Torela, gave her conformity to her fathers Ex-Parte

Motion, wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon had

acquired the property by way of inheritance prior to his

marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego. The

circumstances that Decree 440157 of the CFI of Negros

Occidental which confirmed the ownership of Felimon over

the land in question described him as married to Graciana

Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time

and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired


7/16


The document was acknowledged before Notary Public. Upon

its registration, Transfer Certificate was issued to spouses.

According, however, to the plaintiffs while in their youth they

had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana

clean the lot in question, and when their mother died, their

father married Marcina Gepango. In other words, the

plaintiffs want us to believe that the parcel of land is a status

and in conveying the land to another, they now assert their

right to the estate appertaining to their mother. Alleging that

they were deprived of their corresponding share from the

property thus sold.

during their coverture. The further circumstances that the

land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself

constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage

for land registration under Act. 496 does not confer title; it

confirms a title already existing and which is registerable.

PNB VS.COURT OF

APPEALS

Clodualdo Vitug died intestate so his estate was settled and

distributed in special Proceeding 422 in the CFI of Pampanga

wherein Donata Montemayor, his second wife, was the

Administratrix.

Meanwhile, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease

of Lot 24, which is covered by TCT 2887-R in favor of her

children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This

lease was extended. By virtue of a general power od attorney

executed by Donata Montemayor in favor of Pragmacio Vitug,

the latter executed a contract of lease of the said lot in favor

of Maximo Vitug.

Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for

partition and reconveyance with damages in the CFI ofPampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of

the estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus

Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencio all surnamed Vitug,

Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon,

Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesusand Luz all surnamed Fajardo

and the PNB.

The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they

claim to be conjugal property of the spouses Donata

Motemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share

of 2/11 of thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB

and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They

invoked the case of Vitug vs. Motemayor, decided on Oct. 20,

1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the

said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to

be conjugal in nature.

Does the

presumption of

conjugal life of

properties acquired

by the spouses

during coverture

provided for in

Article 160 of the

Civil Code apply to

properties covered

by a Torrens

certificate of title in

the name of the

widow?

When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they

were registered in the name of Donata Montemayor,

widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering

properties, the mortgage loan applications of Donata were

granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted

and registered in the office of the Registered of Deeds. In

processing the loan applications of Donata Montemaor, the

PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates

of title and no more. On its face the properties owned by

Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to

doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and

her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and

encumbrances covering the same. The well known rule in

this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered

land gas a right to rely upon the face of the torrenscertificate of title and to dispose with the need if inquiring

further, except when the party concerned has actual

knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a

reasonably cautions man make such inquiry. Article 160:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the

conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains

exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption

applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the

husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the

title that the properties were acquired by Donata

Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the

property is registered in the name of a spouse only and

there is no showing as to when the property was acquired

by said spouse, this is an indication that the property

belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption

under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the

title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent

third parties are involved. The PNB had no reason to rely on

what appears on the certificates of the title of the

properties mortgaged. For all legal purpose, the PNB is a

mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgage

covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not

aware to any flow of the title of the mortgagor. At any rate,

although actions for recovery of real property and partitions

are real actions, however, they are actions in personal that

bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto.

The PNB not being a party in said is not bound by the said

decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the

said decisions when it extended the above descriptive

mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal

nature of said properties it would not have approved themortgage applications covering said properties of Donata

Montemayor without requiring the consent of all other

heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties

were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for

value in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond question.

MAGALLON VS.

MONTEJO

The petition seeks the annulment of a writ of execution issued

by the respondent Judge. Case was instituted by the plaintiffs

(private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to

compel partition of parcel of land in Magsaysay, Davao del

Sur, to which defendant had perfected a claim by homestead.

The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin

and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, asserted a right to one-half of

the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership

with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted

marriage with Eustaquia although he admitted living withher without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned

him as well as paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he

claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial Court gave his

denials no credence. The Trial Court further found that Martin

had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent

to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. The

plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land

claimed by them. The IAC affirmed.

It appears that at the time the case was brought, no

certificate of title to the land had yet been issued to Martin

Lacerna, although he had already complied with all the

conditions necessary to a grant thereof. OCT P-11 568 was

issued only while Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC.

Is petitioner bound

by final judgment

rendered in an

action to which she

was not made a

party? YES

This ruling presumes that petitioner is the legal wife of

Lacerna though no marriage contract was presented by

Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either

before or after the death of Eustaquia. Indeed, it is clear

that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other

than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a

mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right to it.

The petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact thatthe certificate of title to the land carries her name as the

"wife" of the owner Martin. Such entry on the certificate of

title has been established by evidence no longer disputable

as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured

through fraud. Moreover, the phrase "married to Epifania

written after the name of Martin in said certificate of title is

merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin and does not

necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property.

Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established

in Article 160 that property acquired during the marriage

belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of

her alleged marriage to Martin except that which arises by

implication from the entry in the certificate of title and for

the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim


8/16


While it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to

the same land homesteaded by Lacerna during his coverture

with Eustaquia, for reasons to which the record before the

Court offers no clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued

in the name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA married to Epifania

Magallon," the latter being the present petitioner.

After the confirmative Decision of the IAC had become final

and executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the

plaintiffs issued an alias writ of execution commanding the

Provincial Sheriff to order the defendant Martin to divide andpartition the property, of which is the share of Eustaquia in

the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children

are also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5 hectares of

the lot to the plaintiffs as their share to satisfy the said

judgment and your fees thereon.

Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin and

petitioner, the latter filed with the Trial Court a "Motion for

Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the land

subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and

Martin under a certificate of title issued way back 1978

without legal impediments, and now incontestable," as well

as valid, binding and legal unless declared otherwise in an

independent proceedings, and praying that the property of

herein intervenor be excluded from the enforcement of the

writ of execution." Said motion was denied.

The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the

finality of the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court

and can no longer be controverted, as when as the pertinent

allegations of the petition, leave no doubt that the land,

which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of

Martin and Eustaquia, the plaintiff's mother, and should have

been titled in the names of said spouses, was, through fraud

or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin and petitioner

Epifania. In such a situation, the property should be regarded

as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the

party rightfully entitled thereto.

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person

obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an

implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the

property comes. Clearly, the petitioner, as the trustee of a

constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private

respondents that part of the land to which she now claims an

ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the

respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal

partnership with Martin.

on the land was shown to have been perfected during

Martin's marriage to Eustaquia, mother of the private

respondents.

The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though

not for the reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of

the respondent Trial Court merely declared the private

respondents entitled to one-half of the land, without

specifically ordering partition and delivery to them the

same. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the

judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief differentfrom, or not clearly included in, what is awarded by

judgment.

Both the lower courts appear to have overlooked the fact

that the surviving spouse is the legal and compulsory heir of

the deceased husband or wife; otherwise, consistent with

the finding that the half portion of the land sued for

pertained to the late Eustaquia as her share in the conjugal

partnership with Martin, they should have ruled that Martin

concurred with the three private respondents in the

succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal

share. Unfortunately, said error is beyond review because

Martin allowed the judgment to become final and executory

without raising that point of law, even on appeal.

The writ of execution is set aside. Instead of enforcing saidwrit, the respondent Trial Court is ordered to effect the

partition of the land in accordance with the terms of its now

final and executory decision and the provisions of Rule 69.

CUENCA VS.

CUENCA

Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca filed a

complaint for recovery of real property and damages against

the petitioners before the then CFI of Davao del Norte. The

lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners.

The lower court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court

reversed the decision of the lower court. It rendered a

decision in favor of the private respondents.

This Case involves parcels of land which were claimed by two

sets of families. Private respondents Restituto and Meladora

Cuenca claimed ownership on the ground that they are the

legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon,

both deceased. They alleged that some of the parcels are

paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are

conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino. They also alleged

that Agripino and Engracia Basadre were not legally married

because at the time they lived together Agripino was married

to a certain Jesusa Pagar.

The petitioners (defendants below) denied the legitimacy of

the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the

legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children. They claimed that

Agripino and their mother Engracia were legally married and

that they are the legitimate children of the couple. Theycontend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal

properties of Agripino and Engracia.

The documents presented are proofs that the properties

belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property, a

fact declared by the husband in a declaration against his

interest. It was error for the trial court to brush aside the

importance of the declaration in the extrajudicial settlement

of the estate of Maria. These public documents carry

sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the

properties and the nature of their ownership as properties

brought into the marriage by Maria to Agripino as against the

bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses.

These, and other, pieces of evidence established that the

The appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving

spouse. There was, therefore no need to prove the legality

of marriage between petitioners Engracia and Agripino

much less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners

who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino and Engracia.

The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered

evidence to prove that the lands were conjugal propertiesof Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The petitioners alleged

that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved

when Agripino was already married to Engracia as indicated

in the documents, hence, there is the presumption that

these are conjugal properties and therefore petitioners

have hereditary rights over these properties.

Article 160: "All property of the marriage is presumed to

belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that

it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," this

Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the

property acquired during marriage and does not operate

when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be

conjugal was acquired.

The documents sought to be presented as newly discovered

evidence do not show that the claims to the parcels wereperfected during the marriage of Agripino and petitioner

Engracia. The perfection of the homestead claims is

considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The

fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and

approved during their marriage is not determinative of the

issue as to whether or not the parcels were conjugal

properties. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8

parcels are titled in the name of either respondent

Meladora or Restituto. The presumption cannot prevail

"when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the

rights of innocent third parties are involved. The non-

applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld. The

petition DISMISSED. The resolutions of the appellate court

are AFFIRMED.


9/16


plaintiffs are the forced heirs of Maria and Agripino, who by

law should succeed to the possession and ownership. On the

other hand, defendants' evidence consist only of the oral

testimonies which proved nothing concrete as they merely

are inferences conveniently tailored to support their claim.

Agripino and Maria were legally married with Restituto and

Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon

brought properties into her marriage; that the couple

acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the

extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and hischildren, Restituto is the absolute owner of the land; that one

half of the land belongs to Agripino and the other half to

Maria the same having been acquired by them during their

marriage-conjugal partnership property. Upon the dissolution

of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses, one half

goes to Agripino which portion after the death of Agripino

goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca

together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino.

The petitioners attached to their motion an alleged newly

discovered evidence consisting of a certified true copy of the

Register of Birth of petitioner first child of Agripino and

petitioner Engracia which discloses that he is a legitimate

child of the couple and a notarized public document which

discloses that Jesusa Pagar was married to someone

disproving the respondents' evidence. The dispositive portionof the CA decision states that petitioner Engracia Basadre was

entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca together with the

latter's legitimate children by Maria, the private respondents

herein.

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN CPG?

ZULUETA VS.PAN-

AM

In an action for damage against Pan-am, plaintiff, his wife and

their daughter were awarded moral and exemplary damage

as well as attorneys fee. Said action was based on a breach of

contract of carriage coupled with quasi-delict. Pending appeal,

Mrs. Zulueta separated from the case insofar into

compromise agreement with Pan-am wherein she settled for

P50,000.00. A motion to dismiss the case insofar as Mrs.

Zulueta is concerned was filed, but was denied in the ground

that a wife cannot bind conjugal partnership without the

husband consent, except in cases provided by law. Hence this

motion for reconsideration.

Whether or not the

damages involved

in the present case

are among those

forming the part of

the conjugal

partnership.

The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiffs

contract of carriage with defendant, for which plaintiff paid

their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal

property. Said damages, therere fall under Article 153(1),

the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title

during the marriage. The damages in the case at bar do not

come also under any of the provisions of Article 148 NCC or

other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I

NCC, which chapter is entitled Paraphernal Property.

What is more if that which is acquired by right of

redemption or by exchange with other property belonging

to only one of the spouses and that which is purchased

with the exclusive money of the wife or of the husband:

belonging exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows

necessarily that which is acquired with money of conjugal

partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof.

Motion denied.

MENDOZA VS.

REYES

This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano

S. Reyes with the CFI of Rizal, for the annulment of a deed of

sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements, executed by

his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V.

Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees. Ponciano

S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties

of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to

petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge orconsent. Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De

Mendoza alleged in their answer that the properties were

paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had

purchased the same in good faith and for adequate

consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De

Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions. CFI

dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in

question exclusive and paraphernal properties of petitioner

Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly dispose of the

same without the consent of her husband and that the

Mendozas are innocent purchasers. CA reversed the decision.

Hence, this petition.

Whether the

properties are the

conjugal properties

of the spouses?

YES

The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil

Code which provides: The following are conjugal

partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous

title during the marriage at the expense of the common

fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for

only one of the spouses;

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must

also be overcome by one who contends that the disputedproperty is paraphernal Article 160 provides: All property of

the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal

partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively

to the husband or to the wife. There is no question that the

disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the

marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build

the improvements at the expense of the common fund? The

records show that the funds came from loans obtained by

the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.

Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations

contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of

the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. If

the fact that property acquired during marriage was

registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect

its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of

the wife. Any person who buys land registered in themarried name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal

nature. Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to

the mere lease of the properties was demanded by the

Mendozas allegedly for their own protection, yet when it

came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater transfer

of rights such consent was not required.

CA ruling affirmed that properties are conjugal properties.

IMPROVEMENTS ON CPG PROPERTY

CALIMLIM VS.

FORTUN

Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas (petitioner) and Fernando

Canullas were married Dec 19, 1962. They begot 5 kids. They

lived in a house on the residential land in question, located at

Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After Fernandos dad died in

1965, he inherited the land. In 1978, Fernando abandoned

(1) WON the

construction of a

conjugal house on

the exclusive

(1)Yes. A correct interpretation of Art 158 yields that: Both

the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership

but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for


10/16


this family and lived with Corazon Daguines (private

Respondent) During the pendency of this appeal, they were

convicted of concubinage by the CFI, which judgment had

become final. On april 15, 1980, Fernando sold the subject

property with the house thereon to Corazon Daguines for the

sum of P2000. In the deed of sale, Fernando described the

house as also inherited by me from my deceased parents.

Corazon however was unable to take possession of the house

and lot because of Mercedes, so she initiated a complaint

against Mercedes for the quieting of title and for damages.

Mercedes claims that the house in dispute where she and herchildren were residing, including the coconut trees on the

land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through

her industry; she also claims that the sale of land together

with the house and improvements to Corazon was null and

void because they are CONJUGAL PROPERTIES and she had

NOT GIVEN CONSENT to the sale.

The original judgment declared Corazon as the lawful owner

of the land in question as well as the of the house erected

on said lands. Upon reconsideration prayed for by Mercedes,

respondent court amended the prior decision and resolved

that the plaintiff (Corazon) is (still) the true owner of the land

in question and the 10 coconut trees, (but) declared the sale

of the conjugal house to plaintiff including 3 coconut trees

and other crops planted during the conjugal relation between

Fernando Canullas and his legitimate wife (Mercedes). Hencethis case:

property of the

husband ipso facto

gave the land the

character of

conjugal property

(2) WON the sale of

the lot together

with the house and

improvementsthereon was valid

under the

circumstances

surrounding the

transaction

the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a

creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot,

which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the

conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated

the house lot to Corazon since Mercedes had not given her

consent to said sale.

(2)No, the contract of sale was null and void for being

contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by

a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandonedhis family and left the conjugal home where his wife and

children lived and from whence they derived their support.

The sale was subversive of the stability of the family. As

provided by Art 1409, contracts such as this shall be void

and inexistent. Also, art 1352 states contracts with unlawful

cause, produce no effect whatsoever. Additionally, the law

emphatically prohibits the spouses from donating or selling

property to each other subject to certain exceptions. This

applies even to couples who are not married but are living

as husbandand wife

Wherefore, the decision of respondent judge and his

resolution on petitioners motion for reconsideration are

hereby set aside and the sale of the lot, house and

improvements in question, is hereby declared null and void.

MARAMBA VS.

LOZANO

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITH CONSENT

JAVIER VS.OSMENA

In 1890, Petrona Javier (Javier), daughter of FJ and MC,

married Florentino Collantes.

Before 1892, Florentino, husband, was employed by his

father-in-law, FJ, in a commission business. One of their

clients was Osmena who consigned tobacco to them from

Cebu. Upon retirement of FJ, Florentino took over the

commission business as an independent commission

merchant (broker). He also assumed the debt owed by FJ to

Osmena.

In 1901, MC, mother of Petrona died. FJ subsequently married

one PS. In 1908, however, FJ dies as well, allowing Javier to

inherit two properties. For purpose of consolidating full

ownership of the properties, Javier secured a loan and then

purchased from FJs second wife, PS, the latters usufructory

rights.

In 1913, FC, husband of Javier, was ordered by the court to

pay his debt to Osmena . The sheriff was thereby ordered to

auction rights, title, interests, and shares of the property of FC

(including the inherited properties of his wife and the

usufructory rights purchased in 1911.) Notwithstanding

protests from Javier, the two properties were sold to theestate of Osmena for P500 each. This included the usufructory

rights.

Javier filed a complaint against Osmena alleging that the

inherited properties, as well as the usufructory rights were

exclusive and not part of conjugal property and thus prayed

for the sale to be annulled.

Respondent estate of Osmena, admitting that the properties

involved were indeed exclusive, still claimed that the

usufructory rights, being purchased from the conjungal funds,

should be deemed conjugal in nature. He also claimed that

the payment due should come from the fruits of the said

properties and thus, a receiver should be appointed to

manage such revenues due to the respondent.

CFI annulled the sale and cancelled the registration of

property in the name of respondent Osmena.

Osmena then appealed to the SC.

(1) WON sum owed

to Osmena estate

can/should be paid

from

fruits/revenues of

the exclusive

properties of the

wife, PJ.

(2) WON a receiver

should be assigned

to collect fruits of

exclusive properties

as prayed for by

Osmena estate.

(1) Yes. The court delved into the nature of the debt. It

stated that there was a presumption in fact that family

expenses come from salaries for services rendered. Since

debt was incurred by the husband during the marriage (by

virtue of him assuming the debt from his father-in-law) and

such a debt was for the support of the family fruits and

revenues of separate properties, being conjugal in nature,

should answer the obligation . These debts are not personal

or private debts at all.

(2)No. Art. 1984 of the CC says that the wife has the right to

manage her paraphernal property and Art. 1412 says that

the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property.

Appointment of a receiver shall deprive both the husband

and the wife of these rights. There is therefore no need for

such an appointment.

VDA.DESTA.

ROMANA VS.PCIB

DBPVS.ADIL Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte

obtained a P2k agricultural loan from the

Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now the

Whether the

execution of the

2nd

PN by the

Prescription has set in as to the 1st

PN as of February 10, 1940. However,

when Confesor executed the 2nd

PN on April 11, 1961 whereby he

promised to pay the amount covered by the previous PN on or before June


11/16


Development Bank, as evidenced by a PN

whereby they bound themselves solidarily to pay

in 10 equal yearly amortizations. But the

obligation remained unpaid and had prescribed.

Confesor, then a member of Congress, executed

a 2nd

PN acknowledging the loan and promising

to pay on or before June 15, 1961 otherwise he

would agree to the foreclosure his mortgage and

he would pay the amount if he can secure a

certificate of indebtedness from the government

of his back pay. Still, the amount remainedunpaid. DBP sued the spouses for the payment of

the loan.

MTC ORDERED the spouses to pay P5,760.96

plus additional daily interest of P1.04 from

September 17, 1970 (date of filing of complaint),

P576 equivalent to 10% of the total claim by way

of AF and incidental expenses plus interest at the

legal rate as of September 17, 1970, until fully

paid and the costs of the suit.

CFI REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint

and counter-claim, holding that Confessor cannot

bind the CPG without his wifes consent under

Art. 166, NCC. DENIED DBPs MR.

DBP: Judge Midpanto Adil refused to recognize

that the right to prescription may be renounced

or waived; and that in signing the 2nd

PN, Patricio

Confesor can bind the conjugal partnership or

otherwise became liable in his personal capacity.

husband alone,

confirming the

loan by the

spouses, can bind

the CPG?

YES

15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the

mortgage, he thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his

right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note.

This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed

but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new PN is the

pre-existing obligation under the 1st

PN. The statutory limitation bars the

remedy but does not discharge the debt.

Under Art. 165, CC, the husband is the administrator of the CPG. As such

administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the

benefit of the CPG are chargeable thereto. Confesor signed the 2

nd

PN forthe benefit of the CPG. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this

obligation.

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITHOUT CONSENT

LUZON SURETY VS.

DEGARCIA

Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety

Co. executed a surety bond in favor of the PNB to

guaranty a crop loan of P9k to Chavez. Vicente

Garcia, together with Chavez and Ramon Lacson,

as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement

binding themselves solidarily for any and all

damages and other burdens Luzon Surety Co.

may at any time sustain. The PNB sued Chavez

and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of

P4,577.95. Luzon Surety Co. filed a third-party

complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia,

based on the indemnity agreement.

CFI ORDERED Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to

pay and likewise ordered Chavez, Garcia, and

Lacson, to pay Luzon Surety Co. the total amount

to be paid by it to PNB. Then, it issued a writ of

execution against Garcia for the satisfaction of

the claim of Luzon Surety Co. Thereafter, the

sugar quedans of the Sps. Garcia were levied and

garnished from their sugar plantation. The Sps.

Garcia filed for preliminary injunction, which was

made permanent

CA AFFIRMED the permanent preliminary

injunction.

Whether the CPG,

in the absence of

any showing of

benefits received,

could be held

liable on an

indemnity

agreement

executed by the

husband to

accommodate a

third party in

favor of a surety

company?

NO

The husband, as such administrator, the only obligations incurred by him

that are chargeable against the CPG are those incurred in the legitimate

pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he

is doing right for the benefit of the family. The husband in acting as

guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement did not act for

the benefit of the CPG. There must be the requisite showing then of some

advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is no

proof that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received

consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the CPG.

Cilr1 Digest Case

Documents

Transcript of Cilr1 Digest Case