Edited by Arild Angelsen, Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin and Louis V. Verchot

Analysing REDD+Challenges and choices

CIFOR

Analysing REDD+Challenges and choices

Editor Arild Angelsen

Co-editors Maria Brockhaus

William D. Sunderlin

Louis V. Verchot

Editorial assistant Therese Dokken

Language editing, project management and layout Green Ink Ltd

© 2012 by the Center for International Forestry Research. All rights reserved.

Printed in IndonesiaISBN: 978-602-8693-80-6

Angelsen, A., Brockhaus, M., Sunderlin, W.D. and Verchot, L.V. (eds) 2012 Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.

Photo credits: Cover © Cyril Ruoso/Minden PicturesParts: 1. Habtemariam Kassa, 2. Manuel Boissière, 3. Douglas SheilChapters: 1. and 10. Yayan Indriatmoko, 2. Neil Palmer/CIAT, 3. and 12. Yves Laumonier, 4. Brian Belcher, 5. Tony Cunningham, 6. and 16. Agung Prasetyo, 7. Michael Padmanaba, 8. Anne M. Larson, 9. Amy Duchelle, 11. Meyrisia Lidwina, 13. Jolien Schure, 14. César Sabogal, 15. Ryan Woo, 17. Edith Abilogo, 18. Ramadian Bachtiar

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Any views expressed in this book are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of CIFOR, the editors, the authors’ institutions, the financial sponsors or the reviewers.

Center for International Forestry ResearchCIFOR advances human wellbeing, environmental conservation and equity by conducting research to inform policies and practices that affect forests in developing countries. CIFOR is a CGIAR Consortium Research Center. CIFOR’s headquarters are in Bogor, Indonesia and it also has offices in Asia, Africa and South America.

Table of contents

Foreword ixAcknowledgements xiSummary xiiiList of authors xx

1 Introduction 1 Arild Angelsen, Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin and

Louis V. Verchot

Part 1. Understanding REDD+

2 Seeing REDD+ through 4Is: A political economy framework 15 Maria Brockhaus and Arild Angelsen

3 The evolution of REDD+ 31 Arild Angelsen and Desmond McNeill

4 REDD+ and the global economy: Competing forces and policy options 51 Pablo Pacheco, Louis Putzel, Krystof Obidzinski and George Schoneveld

Part 2. Implementing REDD+

5 Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes 69 Monica Di Gregorio, Maria Brockhaus, Tim Cronin and and Efrian Muharrom

6 Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+ 91 Kaisa Korhonen-Kurki, Maria Brockhaus, Amy E. Duchelle,

Stibniati Atmadja and Pham Thu Thuy

7 Financing REDD+ 111 Charlotte Streck and Charlie Parker

8 Who should benefit and why? Discourses on REDD+ benefit sharing 129 Cecilia Luttrell, Lasse Loft, Maria Fernanda Gebara and Demetrius Kweka

9 Tenure matters in REDD+: Lessons from the field 153 Anne M. Larson, Maria Brockhaus and William D. Sunderlin

10 REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches 177 William D. Sunderlin and Erin O. Sills

11 Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects 193 Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Amy E. Duchelle, Andini D. Ekaputri and

William D. Sunderlin

12 Site selection for forest carbon projects 209 Liwei Lin, Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Erin O. Sills and William D. Sunderlin

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Part 3. Measuring REDD+ performance

13 Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation 233 Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Desmond McNeill

14 Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects 247 Manuel Estrada and Shijo Joseph

15 Emissions factors: Converting land use change to CO2 estimates 261 Louis V. Verchot, Kamalakumari Anitha, Erika Romijn, Martin Herold and

Kristell Hergoualc’h

16 A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels 279 Martin Herold, Arild Angelsen, Louis V. Verchot, Arief Wijaya and

John Herbert Ainembabazi

17 REDD+ safeguards in national policy discourse and pilot projects 301 Pamela Jagger, Kathleen Lawlor, Maria Brockhaus,

Maria Fernanda Gebara, Denis Jean Sonwa and Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo

18 Summary and conclusions: REDD+ without regrets 317 Frances Seymour and Arild Angelsen

Appendix: CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS) 335Terms and abbreviations 365Glossary 374References 384

Table of contents | v

List of boxes, figures and tables

List of Boxes1

2.1 Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium: The politics of the possible 21 Frances Seymour2.2 Institutional path-dependencies in the Congo Basin 23 Samuel Assembe-Mvondo3.1 The role of ideologies in framing the REDD+ agenda 37 Rocio Hiraldo and Thomas M. Tanner3.2 Preconditions for a market for REDD+ credits 444.1 Biofuel markets, the EU Renewable Energy Directive and forests 55 Francis X. Johnson4.2 China’s domestic logging ban and demand for African timber 564.3 Oil palm, food and biofuels in Indonesia 584.4 Beef and soybean in the Brazilian Amazon 614.5 Biofuel, food prices and land investments in sub-Saharan Africa 645.1 REDD+ the Brazilian way: Integrating old sticks with new carrots 78 Jan Börner and Sven Wunder5.2 Linking knowledge to action: REDD+ policy making in Tanzania 81 Salla Rantala 5.3 Constraints to effective REDD+ policy making in Nepal 84 Bryan R. Bushley and Dil Bahadur Khatri5.4 A media-based analysis of the REDD+ discourse in Norway 86 Laila Borge6.1 Risks of corruption in REDD+: Lessons from Indonesia 96 Ahmad Dermawan6.2 Regional policy networks in Indonesia 102 Caleb Gallemore and Rut Dini6.3 Decentralisation or INGOisation of REDD+? Lack of national lead

in building a REDD+ strategy in Madagascar 107 Emilia Runeberg 7.1 “What does REDD+ cost?” is (almost) a meaningless question 115 Arild Angelsen7.2 Financing REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo 125 André Aquino8.1 Key concepts for REDD+ benefit sharing 1348.2 Debates over carbon rights in selected REDD+ countries 1448.3 REDD+ projects in Tanzania: Exploring options to overcome the

tension between performance and input-based benefit sharing 1479.1 Papua New Guinea: Customary rights versus carbon cowboys 157 Andrea Babon and Daniel McIntyre9.2 Myth and reality: Security of forest rights in Vietnam 160 Thu Thuy Pham, Thu-Ba Huynh and Moira Moeliono

1 If unspecified, the box is written by the chapter authors.

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9.3 Participatory forest management as an institutional foundation for REDD+ in Tanzania 169

Therese Dokken11.1 Are REDD incentives in line with local people’s perceptions?

Lessons from the Transamazon region of Brazil 204 Marina Cromberg12.1 Catalogues of REDD+ projects 212 Mrigesh Kshatriya and Liwei Lin12.2 Integrating conservation tools in the Bolsa Floresta programme,

Brazilian Amazon 217 Jan Börner and Sven Wunder13.1 Performance indicators in development aid 23713.2 Performance measurement in the Guyana–Norway REDD+ Partnership 24415.1 Using the Gain–Loss method to improve the facility of estimating

emissions factors for tropical peatlands 26815.2 Evidence of progress between FRA 2005 and FRA 2010 272 15.3 From global to local in REDD+ MRV: Linking community and

government approaches 273 Finn Danielsen, Neil D. Burgess and Martin Enghoff16.1 UNFCCC COP17 guidance and its implications 28116.2 Regression analysis to estimate deforestation drivers 28616.3 3 Phases, 3 Approaches, 3 Tiers, 3 Steps 29016.4 Developing RLs in Indonesia 29517.1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

safeguards articulated in the Cancun Agreement 30217.2 Linking Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and REDD+

biodiversity safeguards: Experience from sub-Saharan Africa 30617.3 National REDD+ safeguard policy in Brazil 309A1 Challenges of REDD+ research 359 Frances Seymour

List of figures

1.1 Structure of the book 62.1 REDD+ and the 4Is 203.1 REDD+ as an emerging idea and practice 364.1 Simplified diagram of the global economic forces and policies in

consumer and producer countries shaping land use competition with implications for REDD+ 53

5.1 Key REDD+ policy events by country 725.2 Political economy framework 747.1 Financial sources for REDD+ 1177.2 Private and public sector finance for REDD+ 1198.1 Potential structures for REDD+ financial flows to subnational levels 1409.1 Tenure reform pathways to reducing deforestation and degradation 1559.2 Meta topics in national media articles (percentage of total analysed

newspaper articles per country) 16610.1 Intervention proponents expect to have most positive impact on

carbon sequestration 188

Table of contents | vii

11.1 Local understanding of the local REDD+ project objectives 20011.2 Local hopes and worries concerning the REDD+ project 20112.1 Distribution of REDD+ projects 21112.2 Number of projects in Brazil and Indonesia pursuing different

combinations of goals and activities 21512.3 Comparison of municipalities with at least one REDD+ project to

municipalities with no REDD+ projects, subdivided into municipalities in the Legal Amazon vs. the rest of Brazil (‘outside’) 222

12.4 Comparison of districts with at least one REDD+ project to districts with no REDD+ projects, subdivided into districts on the Outer Islands (outside the provinces of Java) vs. Java 223

13.1 Options for performance indicators across REDD+ phases 24214.1 Historical remote sensing data available for GCS project sites 25815.1 Relationships between key categories and the tier levels for inventory

compilation and accuracy vs. cost tradeoffs 26515.2 Steps involved in the estimation of emission factors 26915.3 Change in capacity for 99 tropical non-Annex I countries based on the

difference between FAO/FRA 2005 and 2010 reporting on the five different forest carbon pools 272

16.1 Key elements for setting reference levels 28316.2 Predictors of deforestation in Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam 28617.1 Project motivation for obtaining FPIC: Rights, rules and success 313A1 Research design and work modules of GCS Component 1 342A2 Component 2’s BACI method 346

List of tables

5.1 Drivers of deforestation, policies that clash/support REDD+ and autonomy of state actors 76

5.2 Actors shaping the policy discourse (percentage of total actors expressing a position on REDD+ in media) 83

6.1 Core elements in REDD+ and their multilevel dimensions 946.2 Multilevel governance mechanisms, REDD+ responses and

case study examples 987.1 Global supply of emission reductions from REDD+ (GtCO2e per year) 1167.2 Current (2010) and future (2020) levels of REDD+ finance under

public and private sector mechanisms (US $ billions per annum) 1207.3 Summary of REDD+ needs 1268.1 Overview of REDD+ benefit sharing policies and practices in

five countries 1328.2 Examples of potential REDD+ beneficiaries and the costs and

benefits they may accrue 1368.3 Selection of project approaches to benefit sharing 1388.4 Proposed models for subnational REDD+ funding allocations in Brazil 1439.1 Forest tenure distribution (2008 data, in millions of hectares) 1599.2 National and project level tenure problems and initiatives 1629.3 Land conflict, insecurity and local forest rule compliance in

sampled villages by country (by number and percent) 170

Table of contentsviii |

9.4 Exclusion rights and practice in sampled villages by country (by number and percent) 171

9.5 Tenure issues, implications for REDD+ and potential solutions 17410.1 Timing of introduction of interventions at 21 REDD+ project

sites in GCS Component 2 18611.1 REDD+ projects analysed 19611.2 Project status and knowledge of REDD+ and local REDD+ project (2010) 19811.3 Local people’s recommendations for REDD+ projects 20612.1 Number of REDD+ projects in Brazil and Indonesia by goals

and activities 21412.2 Mean values of factors considered in site selection in municipalities

or districts with and without REDD+ projects 22412.3 Negative binomial models of the count of forest carbon projects in a

Brazilian municipality or Indonesian district 22512.4 Characteristics of villages located within and outside REDD+ projects

in the GCS sample 22713.1 The results chain and different types of performance indicators 23613.2 Examples of performance indicators in national REDD+ initiatives 24014.1 Overview of projects collaborating with GCS 25014.2 VCS approved methodologies for REDD projects as of March 2012 25214.3 Key data and tasks needed to establish an AUDD project’s baseline

deforestation/degradation rate and/or location 25414.4 Remote sensing data requirements for historic (baseline) forest

cover change analysis for AUDD methodologies 25514.5 Required sources of carbon stock estimates in baseline scenarios 25715.1 Examples of Tier 1 emissions factors for biomass (aboveground and

belowground) associated with the conversion of forest to grassland in Africa, calculated by means of the Stock–Difference method and using default values for carbon pools 270

16.1 Dimensions of a stepwise approach to developing reference levels 28816.2 Options for dealing with uncertainty in setting RLs 29718.1 Priority actions by type and level 328A1 Countries included in GCS research 336A2 Partners in the GCS project 337A3 Component 1 methods for analysing national REDD+ strategies:

description and key objectives 343A4 REDD+ project sites in GCS Component 2 research 347A5 Distribution of Component 2 villages by type (control/intervention)

and mode (intensive/extensive/non-BACI) where data already collected 353

A6 GCS Component 2 research instruments 354A7 Methods for analysing national REDD+ strategies: description

and key objectives 357

Foreword

I welcome this latest book from the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) ‘Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices’. It is a book that climate change negotiators, national and local policy makers, development agencies, forest institutions and organisations, and REDD+ practitioners will find interesting, relevant and useful. It provides excellent information and analysis and is released at an opportune moment as the global community gears up for the next round of climate change negotiations, which will certainly include REDD+, and perhaps will scale it up even more.

This book follows two earlier REDD+ volumes from CIFOR, ‘Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, options and implications’ (2008) and ‘Realising REDD+: National strategy and policy options’ (2009), and provides an analysis of actual REDD+ design and early implementation. It takes stock of national, subnational and local REDD+ experiences and identifies the challenges in designing and implementing effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ policies and projects. Policy choices to overcome obstacles in scaling up REDD+ are also elaborated.

As a leader in the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ and an implementer of REDD+ in the Philippines, I cannot overemphasise the importance of

Forewordx |

the authors’ analysis of both challenges and choices in REDD+. As we move forward to further elaborate the global rules, among others, on REDD+ safeguards, reference levels, measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), and finance, it is important to build on lessons learned and to understand better what works and what does not. By following a national case study approach, the authors of this book assist us to incorporate these lessons into the evolving global REDD+ architecture.

As a safeguards champion in the REDD+ negotiations, and a long time advocate of indigenous peoples and community based forest management approaches, I am especially happy that benefit sharing and carbon rights are included in this volume. I agree with the authors that “the REDD+ safeguards dialogue needs to move from high-level international discussions to actions on the ground.”

Finally, I also welcome the authors’ highlighting of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) as a potential framework for designing REDD+. Indeed, the PES idea “promises a win–win menu: local forest users will choose forest conservation if the compensation they receive is higher than potential earnings from alternative forest uses.”

Kai Lee, in his book ‘Between Compass and Gyroscope’ from 1993 wrote that “policies are experiments, learn from them!” This is particularly true for REDD+, as much of the territory we are entering is an unknown landscape. Solid analyses like those presented in this book are essential for us to learn from, and improve upon, in our implementation of REDD+.

Tony La Viña REDD+ Facilitator, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action (LCA), UNFCCC; andDean, Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, the Philippines

Acknowledgements

Producing this book within a time span of just four months was only possible due to a huge team effort involving more than 150 people. As editors, it has been a great pleasure to work with all those involved. The core of the book is 18 chapters, including a number of topical boxes, written by 66 authors. The quality of the writing, and the quick turnaround and response to many rounds of interactions, are highly appreciated.

Therese Dokken has been the hub of the wheel, keeping track of hundreds of versions of the chapters, 508 references and thousands of emails between editors, authors, reviewers and production staff. Without her dedicated and efficient efforts the book would not have met such a tight deadline.

At CIFOR headquarters, a number of people in the Information Service Group have contributed to the production of this book, including John Colmey, Romy Serfaty, Gideon Suharyanto, Mokhamad Edliadi, Sufiet Erlita, Vidya Fitrian, Catur Wahyu and Eko Prianto.

The production of the book, including very thorough language editing, graphic design and typesetting, has been done by Green Ink. We are grateful for the professionalism and flexibility provided by the team of Sophie Higman,

Acknowledgementsxii |

Paul Philpot, Ruth Raymond, Tim Woods, Erin O’Connell, Sue Parrott, Christel Chater, Becky Mitchell, Anne Downes and Jeff Walker.

The chapters have been cross-reviewed by the authors of other chapters, as well as by 60 external reviewers. The value of good reviewers in scientific publications cannot be overstated, and we thank the following people for their valuable suggestions and critiques: Patrick Anderson, Ken Andrasko, Odd Arnesen, Steve Ball, Tor A. Benjaminsen, Juergen Blaser, Anne Booth, Doug Boucher, Timothy Boyle, Gernot Broding, Jonah Busch, Gillian Cerbu, Carol Colfer, Rane Cortez, Pham Manh Cuong, Andreas Dahl-Jørgensen, Crystal Davis, Christiane Ehringhaus, Lars Ekman, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Tim Forsyth, Leif John Fosse, Edenise Garcia, Bronson W. Griscom, Jeffrey Hatcher, Signe Howell, Agus Djoko Ismanto, Peter Aarup Iversen, Tim Jessup, Ivar Jørgensen, Randi Kaarhus, David Kaimowitz, Alain Karsenty, Sjur Kasa, Yemi Katerere, Thelma Krug, Rezal Kusumaatmadja, Donna Lee, Henrik Lindhjem, Peter May, Marte Nordseth, Inger Gerd Næss, Michael Obersteiner, Steven Panfil, Jim Penman, Leo Peskett, Francis Putz, Steve Rhee, Peter Riggs, Tom Rudel, Jeffrey Sayer, Heike Schroeder, Espen Sjaastad, Margaret Skutsch, Luca Tacconi, Natalie Unterstell, Arild Vatn, Nicole R. Virgilio, Michael Wells and Pete Wood. In addition, the authors of Chapter 7 would like to thank Matthew Cranford for his contributions to this chapter.

Funding for the book has been provided by NORAD and the Ministry of Environment of Norway, AusAID (Australia), the European Commission, the Department of Energy and Climate Change and the Department for International Development (UK), FinAid (Finland), and Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial (France).

While greatly appreciating these contributions, readers should note that any views expressed in this book are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of CIFOR, the editors, the authors’ institutions, the financial sponsors or the reviewers.

Most of the chapters in this book are based on a large research project carried out by CIFOR and partners: the Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS). A complete list of the many individuals, organisations and sponsors that have contributed to that project is included in the Appendix. Without the hard work of country partners and coordinators, representatives, enumerators, encoders, field research supervisors, respondents, key informants, project proponents and others, we would not have been able to present the results of this study.

Bogor, Indonesia, and Ås, Norway31 May 2012

Arild Angelsen Maria Brockhaus William D. Sunderlin Louis V. Verchot

Summary

REDD+ is moving ahead, but at a slower pace and in a different form than we expected when it was launched at Bali in 2007. This book takes stock of REDD+ and asks a number of questions. How has REDD+ changed, and why? How is REDD+ unfolding in national policy arenas? What does REDD+ look like on the ground? What are the main challenges in designing and implementing REDD+? And, what are the choices that need to be made to enable REDD+ to become more effective, efficient and equitable? Most of the analysis is based on a large comparative research project, the Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS), undertaken by CIFOR and partners.

REDD+ – as an idea – is a success story. REDD+ has been perceived as a quick and cheap option for taking early action toward limiting global warming to 2°C. It also takes a fresh approach to the forest and climate debate, with large-scale result-based funding as a key characteristic and the hope that transformational change will happen both in and beyond the forestry sector. At the same time, REDD+ has been sufficiently broad to serve as a canopy under which a wide range of actors can pursue their own ideas of what it ought to achieve.

Summaryxiv |

REDD+ is evolving. The absence of a new international agreement on climate change means that a potentially large source of performance based and long-term finance is not yet available. At present, two thirds of international REDD+ funding is from development aid budgets. But there is a paradox: while there is currently no adequate and predictable long-term strategy on how to meet the financial needs of REDD+, short-term finance is available. However, disbursements are slow because countries cannot absorb the amounts available.

The smaller magnitude and the ‘aid-ification’ of REDD+ have had major implications for the pace of implementation and have contributed to a broadening of the scope of REDD+. Furthermore, in the absence of a strong global mechanism, wealthier developing countries with stronger institutions may opt to self-finance a significant part of REDD+. They may also choose to engage in results-based agreements with donors and international agencies. Donors and recipients may have limited interest in achieving universal REDD+ standards, and practices are likely to become increasingly diversified.

REDD+ has entered national policy arenas as an idea and with the possibility of substantial international payment for results. To study how REDD+ is being received, perceived and reconfigured, the book looks at the political economy of REDD+ through a 4Is framework: institutions, interests, ideas and information. To fully realise its mitigation potential, REDD+ requires transformational change in the form of altered economic, regulatory and governance frameworks, removal of perverse incentives and reforms of forest industry and agribusiness policies. REDD+ also has the potential – and realises this to a certain extent already – to be a game changer by offering new economic incentives (in particular, international result-based funding) as well as new information and discourses, and by bringing new actors into the arena, which may lead to new coalitions for change.

Whether the REDD+ process is able to generate transformational change, or whether business as usual policies will be maintained, depends on several factors. An analysis in seven countries suggests that a key factor for achieving transformational change lies in the autonomy of the state from key interests that drive deforestation and forest degradation, and the presence of strong coalitions that call for such change to take place. National ownership of the REDD+ policy process is also critical. Effective REDD+ strategies are least likely to be formulated and implemented in countries where international actors drive the REDD+ policy process.

Successful REDD+ strategies require strong multilevel coordination. REDD+ mechanisms must link the global need and ‘willingness to pay’ for climate action with national and subnational institutions and local people’s needs and aspirations. The challenge lies in linking effective information, incentives and

Summary | xv

institutions across levels. The book provides in-depth analysis of these three components.

First, enhancing and harmonising information flows between local and national levels are essential for effective measurement, reporting, verification (MRV) and control of emissions leakage (displaced emissions). Sound information flows across the levels can enhance the negotiating power of disadvantaged groups and ensure a more effective, efficient and equitable REDD+. The lack of common maps and mindsets and a unified framework for integrating various sources of information can be a major impediment for action. Stakeholders need to have a common understanding of ‘where we are’ before making decisions on ‘where we can go’ or ‘how to get there’.

Second, the establishment of benefit sharing mechanisms across levels and that are accepted by all stakeholders is one of the most challenging hurdles in REDD+ implementation. Benefit sharing is important for creating positive incentives to reduce carbon emissions, but the mechanism must be seen as fair or it will threaten the legitimacy of and support for REDD+. Different discourses emphasise different principles for allocating benefits and costs, and relate – fundamentally – to conflicts over the vision for REDD+. Before designing effective benefit sharing mechanisms, it is thus necessary to resolve higher-level questions about the objectives that REDD+ seeks to achieve. Negotiating tradeoffs between objectives requires ethical, political and practical judgements. Given the diversity of views, the legitimacy of the decision making institutions and processes is crucial for the effective and sustainable design and implementation of benefit sharing.

Third, national institutional structures and policies are needed to facilitate action on the ground. A prominent example relates to the question of tenure and rights. REDD+ can be used as an incentive to support forest tenure reform while, at the same time, tenure reform is a strategy to support REDD+ implementation. Tenure reform can become an important part of needed transformational change. But while REDD+ has brought much attention to tenure, national-level efforts to address land and carbon tenure issues have been limited. Project-level interventions to address tenure encounter substantial obstacles if they do not have national backing.

Tenure and rights link closely to safeguards for REDD+, a key topic in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) discussions. Policy makers, project proponents and investors value REDD+ safeguards, as evidenced by their early adoption of national and project-level social and environmental standards. At the same time, the REDD+ safeguards dialogue needs to move from high-level international discussions to actions on the ground. Achieving ‘free, prior, and informed consent’ (FPIC) remains

Summaryxvi |

a challenge for a variety of reasons. “FPIC is an impossible dream we are chasing,” notes one project proponent.

As part of the GCS, extensive surveys were done on REDD+ projects in six countries, including surveys of project proponents on their early implementation experiences. The original idea of REDD+ was to establish a results-based or payment for ecosystem services (PES) system that would make payments from the international level to individual forest users. Most of the projects that were studied intend to combine the PES approach with a more conventional integrated conservation and development project (ICDP) approach, which emphasises the enforcement of forest regulations and the provision of alternative sources of livelihoods. This hybrid approach enables proponents to make early progress on project establishment and the ICDP approach can serve as a fallback option if PES fails to materialise, e.g. due to uncertainties related to future funding. Yet the hybrid approach involves challenges, because the implementation of ICDP has been difficult in the past and because playing up ICDP while delaying the discussion of PES with local stakeholders may cause problems later on. When and if proponents eventually decide to use PES, they must go back to all local stakeholders to explain the plan.

The PES idea promises a win–win scenario: local forest users will choose forest conservation if the compensation they receive is higher than what they would obtain from alternative forest uses. In practice, REDD+ may, in using the hybrid model, be less straightforward and the outcomes uncertain. A household survey in project areas reveals that local people conceive REDD+ as being primarily about forest protection, while their main hopes and worries concern income and livelihoods. Key challenges for REDD+ projects thus include: i) to communicate to villagers how the projects work, the opportunities and risks, and the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders; ii) to involve villagers meaningfully in the design and implementation of the projects; and iii) to balance forest protection with the welfare concerns of villagers. The survey also showed that villagers depend extensively on project proponents for information about REDD+ and the local project, and there may be a need for independent knowledge brokers or legal advisers as well, e.g. when agreements are signed.

The success of REDD+ hinges not only on local support, but also on interventions being targeted to areas with high levels of deforestation and forest degradation, where they can yield real emission reductions and thereby ensure additionality. A study of project locations around the developing world found that countries with high biodiversity and more protected areas are more likely to have REDD+ projects, which fits with the assertions of project proponents that they consider biodiversity co-benefits when selecting sites. A detailed study in the two countries most deeply involved in REDD+ activities – Brazil and Indonesia – suggests that projects are more likely to be established

Summary | xvii

in areas with high deforestation rates and forest carbon densities. There were early concerns that projects might tend to be located in already well-protected forest areas, so this is an encouraging finding. Project proponents have selected areas where they have the potential to make an impact.

Nevertheless, the book argues that we probably need another 3–5 years before we can really know if REDD+ works. Besides the time needed to detect changes on the ground, measuring impacts in the form of reduced emissions is far from a trivial task. Forest carbon stocks must be monitored, and baselines or reference levels must be developed to build the counterfactual scenario of what would have happened without the REDD+ project or policy. Challenges in developing these reference levels include: the lack of data needed to estimate historical emission rates, and genuine uncertainty in predicting future emissions and how they will deviate from historical rates. Furthermore, reference levels are important to many stakeholders. There are strong incentives for making biased estimates in order to help project or policy interventions look successful or to generate higher payments when reference levels are used as the basis for results-based payments, e.g. selling REDD+ credits in a carbon market. Ensuring against this calls for international guidelines and independent verification of project/subnational and national reference levels.

Over the past few years, robust standards and methods have been developed for estimating emissions from deforestation at the project level. But because the first fully fledged REDD+ baseline and monitoring methodologies were adopted only recently, many pioneering REDD+ projects may not comply with them, running the risk of losing opportunities in carbon markets. The next generation of projects should learn from this experience by identifying or developing suitable methodologies before investing in the development of their measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) systems and baselines.

The book presents a stepwise approach to developing reference levels at the national level, in line with recent decisions by UNFCCC and building on the same logic as the tiered approach for emission factors. A stepwise approach can reflect different country circumstances and capacities and will facilitate broad participation and early startup. The availability and quality of data should determine the methods used to develop reference levels, e.g. sophisticated methods applied to poor data should be avoided as they risk multiplying errors. As improved data become available, considering the drivers and activities that cause deforestation and forest degradation will be important for adjusting reference levels to ‘national circumstances’. The uncertainty of reference levels can be reflected in a conservative adjustment factor in a result-based payment scheme. This will provide incentives for investments in measurement and monitoring capacities to reduce the uncertainty.

Summaryxviii |

Emission factors are needed to convert area estimates of deforestation and forest degradation to emissions and carbon stock changes. Current emission factors account for as much as 60% of the uncertainty in greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories. Country or region-specific emission factors are lacking for most tropical countries, making it impossible to accurately and precisely estimate emissions from sources and removals by sinks in REDD+ national programmes and demonstration activities. Significant investments and coordinated efforts are required as part of readiness financing in order to overcome data limitations and institutional insufficiencies. The constraints can be overcome if coordinated and targeted investments are made and productive partnerships are developed between the technical services in REDD+ host countries, intergovernmental agencies and advanced research institutes in developed countries.

While measuring outcomes on the form of reduced emissions to and increased removals of GHG from the atmosphere is the ultimate aim, in the medium term, most payments will be for readiness and policy reforms, rather than for proven changes in emissions or removals. Hence, good performance indicators are critical for all three REDD+ phases (readiness, policy reforms, result-based action). This is particularly true for Phase 2, where the focus is on policy performance. Limited attention has been given to developing such indicators, but the book argues that valuable lessons on governance indicators can be learned from the aid sector: avoid seeking the perfect indicator and use expert judgment extensively.

REDD+ design and implementation is extremely challenging: it aims to break long historical trends, build political consensus by satisfying key actors in policy arenas, generate transformational change, achieve multilevel coordination (from global to faraway local communities) and manage complex flows of information and payments, all in the midst of large uncertainties for the future climate mitigation regime and a strong global appetite for more land for food, fuel and fibre.

The changing context, the political and economic battles and the challenges on the ground present dilemmas. REDD+ promised to bring a new and fresh approach: large-scale funding and performance-based support. This was supposed to make REDD+ different and more successful than past conservation efforts. But there is not yet enough financing to change the fundamental equation of the costs and benefits of forest conversion, and thereby to make everyone winners. Thus, REDD+ needs to deliver on many fronts in villages, cities and capitals. In particular, it has to meet development aspirations. REDD+ needs to establish and strengthen broad coalitions and serve diverse interests in order to secure strong and sustained political support. The question is this: how should REDD+ be modified to generate

Summary | xix

the necessary political support without losing focus and pulverising the idea that made it so attractive in the first place?

REDD+ not only presents challenges but also choices, as is pointed out throughout the book. Uncertainty should not lead to inaction. Regardless of what happens to REDD+ as a global mechanism in the UNFCCC process, priority should be given to three sets of actions: i) building broad political support for REDD+, e.g. by coalition building and focusing on REDD+ as an objective; ii) laying the foundations for eventual REDD+ success, e.g. by investing in stronger information systems; and iii) implementing ‘no regrets’ policy reforms that can reduce deforestation and forest degradation but which are desirable regardless of climate objectives, e.g. removal of perverse and costly subsidies and strengthening tenure and governance.

John Herbert AinembabaziPhD Scholar, UMB School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway – john.ainembabazi@umb.no

Arild AngelsenProfessor, UMB School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway; Senior Associate, CIFOR, Indonesia – arild.angelsen@umb.no

Kamalakumari AnithaPostdoctoral Fellow, CIFOR, Indonesia – a.kamalakumari@cgiar.org

André AquinoEnvironmental Specialist, World Bank, Washington, DC – adeaquino@worldbank.org

Samuel Assembe-MvondoResearch Fellow, CIFOR, Cameroon – s.assembe@cgiar.org

List of authors

List of authors | xxi

Stibniati AtmadjaResearch Fellow, CIFOR, Indonesia – s.atmadja@cgiar.org

Andrea Babon Intern, CIFOR, Australia – a.babon@cgiar.org

Laila BorgeMSc Student, Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo, Norway – laila.borge@gmail.com

Maria BrockhausScientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – m.brockhaus@cgiar.org

Neil D. BurgessProfessor, Centre for Macroecology, Evolution and Climate, Biology Department, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Scientist, World Wildlife Fund, USA – nburgess@wwf.org.uk

Bryan R. BushleyResearcher, University of Hawai’i and East-West Center, USA – bushley@hawaii.edu

Jan BörnerResearch Fellow, CIFOR, Brazil – j.borner@cgiar.org

Marina CrombergMSc Student, Center of Human Science and Education, Santa Catarina State University, Brazil – mcromberg@gmail.com

Tim CroninManager, Sustainable Forests and Palm Oil, World Wildlife Fund-Australia; Consultant, CIFOR – timpcronin@hotmail.com

Finn DanielsenSenior Ecologist, Nordisk Fond for Miljø og Udvikling, Denmark – fd@nordeco.dk

Ahmad Dermawan Researcher, CIFOR, Indonesia – a.dermawan@cgiar.org

Monica Di GregorioLecturer, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, United Kingdom – M.DiGregorio@leeds.ac.uk

List of authorsxxii |

Rut DiniUndergraduate Student, Agriculture Faculty, University of Palangkaraya, Indonesia – rutdini@gmail.com

Therese DokkenPhD Scholar, UMB School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway – therese.dokken@umb.no

Amy E. DuchelleResearch Fellow, CIFOR, Brazil – a.duchelle@cgiar.org

Andini Desita EkaputriResearch Officer, CIFOR, Indonesia – a.desita@cgiar.org

Martin EnghoffRural Sociologist, Nordisk Fond for Miljø og Udvikling, Denmark – me@nordeco.dk

Manuel EstradaIndependent Climate Change Consultant, Mexico – mporruacop9@gmail.com

Caleb GallemorePhD Student, Department of Geography, Ohio State University, USA – gallemore.1@osu.edu

Maria Fernanda GebaraPhD Scholar, Getulio Vargas Foundation and Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – mfgebara@gmail.com

Kristell Hergoualc’hScientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – k.hervgoualch@cgiar.org

Martin HeroldProfessor, Center of Geo-Information, Department of Environmental Science,Wageningen University, the Netherlands – martin.herold@wur.nl

Rocio HiraldoResearcher, ENDA Energy Environment and Development, Senegal – r.hiraldo@alumni.ids.ac.uk

Thu-Ba HuynhPhD Student, University of Melbourne, Australia – ttbhuynh@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au

List of authors | xxiii

Pamela JaggerAssistant Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA; Senior Associate, CIFOR, Indonesia – pjagger@unc.edu

Francis X. JohnsonSenior Research Fellow, Energy and Climate Stockholm Environment Institute – francis.johnson@sei-international.org

Shijo JosephPostdoctoral Fellow, CIFOR, Indonesia – s.joseph@cgiar.org

Dil Bahadur KhatriForestry and Ecosystem Services Specialist, ForestAction, Nepal – dil@forestaction.org

Kaisa Korhonen-Kurki Scientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – k.korhonen-kurki@cgiar.org

Mrigesh KshatriyaResearch Fellow, CIFOR, Indonesia – m.kshatriya@cgiar.org

Demetrius KwekaConsultant, CIFOR, Tanzania – demetrius.kweka@gmail.com

Anne M. LarsonSenior Associate, CIFOR, Peru – a.larson@cgiar.org

Kathleen LawlorResearch Assistant, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA – klawlor@email.unc.edu

Liwei LinPhD Student, North Carolina State University, USA – livia1020@gmail.com

Lasse LoftScientist, Biodiversity and Climate Research Centre, Frankfurt am Main, Germany – lasse.loft@senckenberg.de

Cecilia LuttrellSenior Associate, CIFOR, Indonesia – c.luttrell@cgiar.org

Daniel McIntyreIntern, CIFOR, Australia – D.McIntyre@cgiarad.org

List of authorsxxiv |

Desmond McNeillProfessor, Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University of Oslo, Norway – desmond.mcneill@sum.uio.no

Moira Moeliono Senior Associate, CIFOR, Indonesia – m.moeliono@cgiar.org

Efrian MuharromResearch Officer, CIFOR, Indonesia – e.muharrom@cgiar.org

Krystof ObidzinskiScientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – k.obidzinski@cgiar.org

Pablo PachecoSenior Scientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – p.pacheco@cgiar.org

Charlie ParkerDeputy Director, Forests and Climate, World Wildlife Fund, Washington, DC, USA – charlie.parker@wwfus.org

Subhrendu K. PattanayakAssociate Professor, Duke University, USA – subhrendu.pattanyak@duke.edu

Pham Thu Thuy Research Fellow, CIFOR, Vietnam – t.pham@cgiar.org

Louis PutzelScientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – l.putzel@cgiar.org

Salla RantallaResearch Fellow, Sustainability Science Program, Harvard Kennedy School, USA – Salla_Rantala@hks.harvard.edu

Ida Aju Pradnja ResosudarmoScientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – d.resosudarmo@cgiar.org

Erika RomijnConsultant, CIFOR, Indonesia and the Netherlands – erika.romijn@gmail.com

Emilia RunebergMSc Student, Environmental Change and Policy, University of Helsinki, Finland – emilia.runeberg@helsinki.fi

List of authors | xxv

George SchoneveldPhD Scholar, IS Land Academy, Utrecht University, the Netherlands – g.c.schoneveld@uu.nl

Frances SeymourDirector General, CIFOR, Indonesia – f.seymour@cgiar.org

Erin O. SillsAssociate Professor, North Carolina State University, USA – sills@ncsu.edu

Denis Jean SonwaScientist, CIFOR, Cameroon – d.sonwa@cgiar.org

Charlotte StreckPresident, Climate Focus, Washington DC, USA – c.streck@climatefocus.com

William D. SunderlinPrincipal Scientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – w.sunderlin@cgiar.org

Thomas TannerResearch Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, UK – t.tanner@ids.ac.uk

Louis V. VerchotPrincipal Scientist, CIFOR, Indonesia – l.verchot@cgiar.org

Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff Senior Associate, CIFOR, Mozambique – s.wertz-kanounnikoff@cgiar.org

Arief Wijaya Postdoctoral fellow, CIFOR, Indonesia – a.wijaya@cgiar.org

Sven WunderPrincipal Scientist, CIFOR, Brazil – s.wunder@cgiar.org

1Chapter

Introduction Arild Angelsen, Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin and Louis V. Verchot

1.1 Taking stock of REDD+REDD+, as an idea, is a success story. It has generated excitement about possibilities for getting underway on climate change mitigation quickly and cheaply. REDD+ has also been broad enough to serve as a canopy under which a wide range of actors can grow their own trees. It has been through an intensive process of conceptualisation, design and implementation – even if it is still far from realising its fundamental goal, namely large-scale emission reductions. No idea for saving the world’s tropical forests has generated anywhere near the same excitement and commitment of funds as has REDD+.

However, to scientists and professionals with experience in tropical forestry, it is not surprising that REDD+ has turned out to be much harder to implement than expected. Deforestation and forest degradation have a long history and powerful interests have much at stake in their continuation. The policy arenas in many countries are battlefields between interests of ‘business as usual’ and interests of transformational change. But this is also a good sign: those who benefit from business as usual take REDD+ seriously enough to react: this indicates that REDD+, if implemented, can have an impact.

Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices2 |

REDD+ sets out to solve a fundamental collective action problem: to create a system that provides forest users with economic incentives that reflect the value of the carbon sequestered and stored in trees. Building that system is an ambitious political, economic and social engineering project. Establishing a payment for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism seeks to create a link between a global ‘willingness to pay’ and individual forest users in faraway villages. This is the challenge facing governments and project proponents trying to make live trees more valuable than dead ones.

REDD+ is evolving in the absence of a new international agreement on climate change. In the run up to COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the hope was that a strong new agreement could provide a large amount of REDD+ performance-based finance. Now, international funding for REDD+ primarily comes from development aid budgets, which gives it a different dynamic and has contributed to a broadening of the scope of REDD+ and added multiple objectives.

This changing context, the political and economic battles and the challenges on the ground present dilemmas. REDD+ promised to bring in a new and fresh approach: large scale funding and performance-based support. This was supposed to make REDD+ different from and more successful than past conservation efforts. But the problem, put simply, is this: we don’t have enough financing to change the fundamental equation of costs and benefits of forest conversion, and thereby to make everyone winners. Higher global demand for land for food, fibre, fuel and environmental services has enlarged the challenge. Thus, REDD+ needs to deliver on many fronts in villages and cities and capitals. REDD+ needs to establish and strengthen broad coalitions and serve diverse interests in order to secure strong and sustained political support. How should REDD+ be modified to generate that support, without losing focus and pulverising the original idea that made it so attractive in the first place?

1.2 Purpose of this book 1.2.1 Three generations of REDD+ research Just as REDD+ implementation has three phases (readiness, policy reforms, and result-based action), REDD+ research is also progressing through three generations:

First generation: designing REDD+ and learning from related experiences in the past. The first generation of REDD+ research is concerned with REDD+ architecture at all levels: the institutional set up, how to deal with particular challenges such as leakage, additionality and permanence and the specific policies that could become part of the REDD+ efforts. The key question that these efforts try to answer is: What should REDD+ look like to be effective, efficient and equitable?

| 3Introduction

Second generation: the political economy and implementation of REDD+. The second generation of research analyses the processes of policy formulation and decisions for early implementation of both national policy reforms and local and subnational projects. The key questions being addressed are: How is REDD+ being decided and implemented, and why? An important sub-question is: What hinders or enables decisions about and implementation of effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ policies and projects?

Third generation: assessing the impact of REDD+. The third generation of research attempts to measure and analyse the impact of REDD+, particularly on forest carbon and local livelihoods. The two basic questions to be answered in this phase are: Does REDD+ work? How can REDD+ work better? An important sub-question is: How should REDD+ outcomes be measured?

There is a natural sequencing between these generations, as they follow the actual REDD+ implementation. The first two edited REDD+ volumes from CIFOR were first generation research outputs: ‘Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, options and implications’ (2008) and ‘Realising REDD+: National strategy and policy options’ (2009). The current volume, ‘Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices’, moves us into second generation research and contains mainly an analysis of actual REDD+ design and early implementation. Some first generation research is retained; for example, the chapters in Part 3 (‘Measuring REDD+’) also address the question of how REDD+ could be designed and implemented. Indeed, moving into second and third generation research does not imply that first generation questions have been fully answered: there are still many lessons to learn, and we need to return to the questions on optimal REDD+ design as we gain lessons from answering second and third generation questions.

A characteristic of second generation research is critical distance. Recognising that there are considerable problems in moving from the idea of REDD+ to its implementation, research requires a greater detachment. There is more latitude for being appropriately and constructively critical if the researchers themselves place more emphasis on their role as evaluators and less on their role as promoters of REDD+.

The third generation research questions cannot yet be answered – at least not at the scale necessary to do them justice. The chapters in this book concerning the local implementation of REDD+ projects include findings that can provide reasons for optimism (e.g. REDD+ projects are located in high deforestation areas, Chapter 12) or pessimism (e.g. REDD+ is largely perceived as a ‘win–lose’ option, Chapter 11). However, assertions found in the public REDD+ debate about whether REDD+ does – or does not – deliver are either based on general optimism and hope or pessimism and worry. The bottom line is

Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices4 |

that we need three to five years of implementation of REDD+ policy reforms and projects before we can start answering the question: Does REDD+ work?

1.2.2 Overview of the book This book aims to take stock of REDD+ experiences to date at the national level, as well as at the subnational and local levels where projects are implemented. In the process, we ask several questions: What is happening in national policy arenas and on the ground? How has REDD+ changed? What does it really look like? Where is REDD+ heading?

The subtitle of the book – ‘Challenges and choices’ – indicates our aim to provide a better understanding of the challenges involved in designing and implementing effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ policies and projects. We want to provide comparative evidence on how the challenges materialise in different contexts and at different scales, as well as the main obstacles to success. We do not want to stop here, but also intend to suggest ways to break logjams. What choices will help us to overcome the obstacles we have identified?

While the book covers a wide range of topics, it does not pretend to provide a complete coverage of all REDD+ issues. There is limited attention paid to issues around global REDD+ architecture, for example, although some chapters touch on this, e.g. finance (Chapter 7), reference levels (Chapters 14 and 16), emission factors (Chapter 15) and safeguards (Chapter 17). Similarly, most of the national level policy analysis focuses on the politics of REDD+, and less on the adequacy of policies, their implementation and their impacts.

Most of the empirical material presented in the book is based on a major research effort by CIFOR and partners called the Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS). The project is described in the Appendix. It has yielded a wealth of information from 5–12 countries (depending on the study concerned), allowing for comparative analysis and robust conclusions. This book is the first synthesis of research results from the project.

A recurring question within the project is: What is REDD+? (see also Box 1 in Angelsen 2009). Definitions occur in two important dimensions. First, REDD+ has a vertical dimension, where it can refer to the overall idea, the objective of reduced emissions and increased removals, a set of policies or actions to achieve that objective, the outcome resulting from these or the process involving all of the aforementioned elements. Second, it has a horizontal dimension related to scope. A broad definition, based on the official definition of UNFCCC from COP13 in Bali in 2007, holds that REDD+ comprises local, subnational, national and global actions whose primary aim is to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks in developing countries. A narrower definition, used in GCS to select target REDD+ projects for research,

| 5Introduction

specifies that the primary aim is related to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and removals, and that actions should include result-based or conditional payments.

The authors of this book intend it to serve as a critical analysis of how REDD+ is unfolding in different arenas. While we try to keep our distance, we are also concerned researchers. We are worried about climate change, about the destruction of forests and about the poverty and well being of people living in forest areas in developing countries. We share the overall objective of REDD+ to reduce GHG emissions, but may have diverse views on what the key challenges are and how to realise the goals of REDD+. While the book contains some broad messages, the observant reader will also find divergent views and emphases across the chapters. That’s the way it should be.

The chapters are written in an accessible style, but are based on rigorous research. The book should provide information and critical assessments to a variety of stakeholders: REDD+ practitioners and project implementers, policy makers at national and subnational levels, international negotiators, donors, researchers, journalists and any others with an interest in the challenges and choices that come along with trying to implement the grand REDD+ idea.

1.3 Organisation of the book The book is divided into three parts. Part 1: Understanding REDD+ sets out the framework for the analysis and provides a context for much of the remainder of the book. Part 2: Implementing REDD+ provides several topical studies on REDD+ discourse at the national and local levels and considers the political economy of designing and implementing REDD+. Part 3: Measuring REDD+ tackles the challenge of how to measure results in a result-based REDD+.

1.3.1 Part 1: Understanding REDD+ Many of the chapters in this book analyse the politics of REDD+ using the 4Is framework presented in Chapter 2. The 4Is consist of: institutions (rules, path-dependency or stickiness), interests (potential material advantages), ideas (policy discourses, underlying ideologies and beliefs) and information (data and knowledge, their construction and use) (Figure 1.1). The chapter uses these concepts to discuss how transformational change can occur and argues that this might happen for three different reasons: REDD+ has the potential to change fundamental economic incentives; REDD+ brings new information and discourses; and REDD+ brings new actors into the arena and may lead to new coalitions for change.

Using this framework, Chapter 3 tracks key changes in REDD+ since it entered the global stage in 2005. First, it notes that REDD+ has been remarkably

Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices6 |

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| 7Introduction

successful as an idea and attributes this success to the idea itself and its promise to serve different actors and interests and bridge the environment and development agendas. The authors argue that REDD+ has changed in major ways: i) moving from single (carbon) to multiple objectives; ii) developing policies and practices that go well beyond result-based payments; iii) paying more attention and providing more resources to the subnational and project (rather than national) levels; and iv) being funded mainly by international aid budgets and through the efforts of REDD+ countries, rather than from carbon markets. Now, the main characteristic of REDD+ that made it different from past efforts in the forestry sector – i.e. large-scale result-based funding – is at risk of being overshadowed by other objectives and approaches, thus endangering its effectiveness.

The global economy represents an important contextual variable for REDD+ development. Chapter 4 tracks four key trends that have increased pressure on forests and have made REDD+ implementation more challenging: i) the expansion of global demand for food, energy and materials; ii) a growing integration of food, fibre and energy markets; iii) persistent price volatility in global food and agricultural markets; and iv) large-scale land acquisition. The chapter looks at how these forces shape land uses in the Brazilian Amazon, East Africa and Indonesia. The four trends increase the opportunity costs of REDD+, which, given the dim prospects of long term funding raises questions about the feasibility of PES-like schemes being able to make conservation sufficiently attractive to forest owners. The chapter concludes that relevant policies must address both the supply and demand sides in producer and consumer countries.

1.3.2 Part 2: Implementing REDD+ The largest section of the book deals with the experience of implementing REDD+, including the ways in which different facets of REDD+ are being shaped in the policy arena and what happens when REDD+ ideas meet realities on the ground. The first five chapters of this section focus on national level issues and the integration between national and subnational levels, while the last three deal exclusively with REDD+ subnational projects. Most chapters draw on the research done by the GCS.

The national policy arenas in REDD+ countries are a – or perhaps the – key arenas for determining the future of REDD+. Chapter 5 draws on political economy and media analyses in seven REDD+ countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru, Nepal and Vietnam). Using the 4Is framework, the authors seek to understand national policy processes and discourses and to identify major constraints to effective REDD+ policies. The chapter argues that four factors are critical for overcoming political-economic hurdles: i) the relative autonomy of a nation state from key interests that drive deforestation

Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices8 |

and forest degradation; ii) national ownership over REDD+ policy processes; iii) inclusiveness of REDD+ policy processes; and iv) the presence of coalitions that call for transformational change. Results from country profiles and the media-based discourse analysis indicate that all countries struggle to fulfil these criteria. In addition, formulating and implementing effective national REDD+ strategies is particularly challenging in countries where international actors are the sole force driving REDD+ policy processes.

Achieving reduced forestry emissions is inherently a multilevel puzzle. Local people face global demands for climate change mitigation, which must be met through existing and emerging national and subnational institutions and structures. Chapter 6 argues that if the interconnections between the national and subnational levels are disregarded, REDD+ could fail. The challenge is to match institutions and incentives across the levels, ensure the flow of information required to implement REDD+ and enable the negotiation of actors with different interests across all levels. The chapter provides anecdotal evidence from three countries (Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam) on the challenges and opportunities of multilevel governance in two areas: measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) and emissions leakage.

A key element of the multilevel governance challenge is the need to ensure flows of funding to the actors that undertake REDD+ actions and this is addressed in the two chapters that follow. Chapter 7 looks at the overall issue of REDD+ finance and includes a discussion about and estimates of REDD+ costs. It notes that REDD+ finance faces an inflection point: while short-term finance is available, disbursements are slow and investment opportunities scarce. At the same time, there is no adequate and predictable long-term strategy on how to meet the financial needs of REDD+. In the absence of an international climate agreement and with the slow growth of REDD+ funding from carbon markets, about two thirds of the international finance so far has come from development aid budgets. Public sector finance from international donors and REDD+ country governments is likely to dominate REDD+ financing in the short to medium term.

The distribution of REDD+ funding to different actors is one of its most important design aspects. Chapter 8 gives an overview of major debates related to the design and implementation of a REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism. Benefit sharing is important for creating positive incentives for actors to reduce carbon emissions, but it also has distributional implications and must be fair in order to build greater legitimacy and support for REDD+. While the effectiveness versus equity debate is a major discourse, there are several nuances within each of them. The chapter also provides a number of examples of planned or recently established benefit sharing mechanisms underway in REDD+ countries and in subnational projects.

| 9Introduction

Benefit sharing is related to the question of carbon rights, which in most countries is closely associated with land rights and tenure. Chapter 9 notes that REDD+ can be used as an incentive to support forest tenure reform, while at the same time, tenure reform is a strategy to support REDD+. Tenure reform can become an important part of the transformational change that REDD+ seems both to initiate and depend upon for success. The chapter provides a broad overview of critical tenure issues in six REDD+ countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru, Tanzania and Vietnam) and describes progress so far in dealing with them. While REDD+ has brought much attention to tenure, efforts at the national scale to address land and carbon tenure issues have been limited. At the same time, project-level interventions to address tenure encounter substantial obstacles if they do not have national backing.

The following three chapters focus only on local level and subnational REDD+ projects. Chapter 10 looks at projects from the proponents’ point of view and Chapter 11 from local villagers’ perspectives, while Chapter 12 takes a birds’ eye view and focuses on the location of projects.

The original, key idea of REDD+ was to establish a PES system that would make payments from the international level to individual forest users. Chapter 10 shows, based on surveys of project proponents, that most of the analysed REDD+ projects combine the PES approach with a more conventional integrated conservation and development project (ICDP) approach, emphasising the enforcement of forest regulations and providing alternative sources of livelihoods. This hybrid approach is useful, in part because of uncertainties related to the future of REDD+, the funding stream in particular. Under conditions of policy and market uncertainty, this hybrid structure enables proponents to make early progress on project establishment and the ICDP approach can serve as a fallback option if PES fails to materialise. However, this hybrid approach may also undermine what was supposed to be one of the most powerful features of REDD+, with potentially negative effectiveness and equity consequences.

The PES idea promises a win–win menu: local forest users will choose forest conservation if the compensation they receive is higher than potential earnings from alternative forest uses. In practice, REDD+ may, with the hybrid model, be less straightforward and the outcomes uncertain. Chapter 11 reports on a detailed household survey in GCS project areas on local perceptions, hopes and worries. The results are clear: local people think of REDD+ as being primarily about forest protection, while their main hopes and worries concern income and livelihoods. The study highlights the importance of incorporating local concerns about REDD+ when developing the communication and intervention strategies that are planned or undertaken by project proponents.

Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices10 |

REDD+ success hinges not only on local support, but also on interventions being targeted to areas with high levels of deforestation and forest degradation, that is, areas where they can yield real emission reductions (i.e. additionality). Chapter 12 looks at the location of projects, using various sources of information, including a global database on REDD+ projects developed by GCS. At the international level, the analysis finds that countries with high biodiversity and more protected areas are more likely to have REDD+ projects, which fits with proponents’ assertions that they consider biodiversity co-benefits when selecting sites. A detailed study in the two main REDD+ countries – Brazil and Indonesia – suggests that projects are more likely to be established in areas with high deforestation rates and forest carbon densities, a welcome conclusion from a REDD+ perspective and consistent with a focus on additionality.

1.3.3 Part 3: Measuring REDD+ A key feature of REDD+ is that it should be performance- or result-based, which, quite obviously, requires that results will have to be measured. The ultimate outcome is measured in terms of reduced emissions (or increased removals), and this requires essentially three types of information: i) activity information (e.g. area converted from primary forest to crop land); ii) emissions factors (e.g. reduction in carbon per hectare when converted from primary forest to crop land); and iii) the reference emission level, or business as usual baseline (i.e. the emissions without REDD+). These are linked as follows:

Emissions reduction = (activities * emission factors) – reference emissions

Three chapters of Part 3 address these elements. Chapter 14 concerns the measurement of activities and baselines at the local level, Chapter 15 addresses emission factors, while Chapter 16 looks at reference levels with a national-level focus.

The lack of reliable data on emissions and removals in many countries implies, however, that a performance-based system using changes in forest carbon, as the criterion will be difficult to implement for some time. Chapter 13 therefore argues that, in the medium term, most payments will be for readiness and policy reforms, rather than for proven emissions reductions. Hence, good performance indicators are critical for all three REDD+ phases, in particular for Phase 2 where the focus is on policy performance. Unfortunately, there has been little focus on such performance indicators in the REDD+ debate. The chapter argues that valuable lessons on governance indicators can be learned from the aid sector: avoid seeking the perfect indicator and use expert judgment extensively.

| 11Introduction

Chapter 14 notes that over the past few years, robust standards and methods have been developed for estimating emissions from deforestation at the project level. The chapter presents and discusses one of these standards in particular, namely the verified carbon standard (VCS). It also looks at the adoption of monitoring and baseline standards among project proponents in GCS, observing that most of these projects might face problems in complying with some of the basic VCS requirements. This is mostly due to the methods used to predict future deforestation, the lack of data for constructing historical deforestation rates and the use of non-permanent carbon stock sampling plots. The next generation of projects should learn from this experience by identifying or developing suitable methods before investing in the development of their baselines and MRV systems.

Emission factors are needed to convert area estimates of deforestation and forest degradation to emissions and carbon stock changes, both in local REDD+ projects and at the national level. Chapter 15 notes that emission factors account for as much as 60% of the uncertainty in GHG inventories. Country or region-specific emission factors are lacking for most tropical countries, making it impossible to accurately and precisely estimate emissions from sources and removals by sinks in national REDD+ programmes and REDD+ demonstration activities. Significant investments and coordinated efforts are required as part of readiness financing in order to overcome data limitations and institutional insufficiencies. The constraints can be overcome if coordinated, targeted investments are made and productive partnerships are developed between the technical services in REDD+ host countries, intergovernmental agencies and advanced research institutes in developed countries.

The issue of developing national reference levels and reference emission levels is dealt with in Chapter 16. The challenges relate to the lack of quality data in many countries, genuine uncertainties in future rates of deforestation and forest degradation, and potential incentives for biased estimates. The chapter proposes to deal with these challenges through a stepwise approach to developing forest reference levels and reference emission levels, which reflect different country circumstances and capacities. This can facilitate broad participation, early start-up and motivation to improve over time. The uncertainty of any predictions is also noted and options to deal with it are discussed.

Finally, REDD+ is not only assessed on the achieved reductions in emissions, but also on the extent to which it complies with broadly accepted safeguards. Chapter 17 observes that the early adoption of national and project-level social and environmental standards suggests that REDD+ policy makers, project proponents and investors value REDD+ safeguards. Drawing on GCS

Analysing REDD+: Challenges and choices12 |

research, the chapter discusses the safeguards, discourse and actions at the international, national and project levels. It notes that the REDD+ safeguards dialogue needs to move from high-level international discussions to actions on the ground. Achieving ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC) remains a challenge for a variety of reasons. “FPIC is an impossible dream we are chasing,” notes one project proponent.

Chapter 18 summarises the book and looks ahead. Changes in REDD+ over the last five years have led to significant shifts in the likely size and composition of financing, the likely pace and cost of implementation and the divergence of interests across actors and levels. Challenges resulting from these changes include the ‘aid-ification’ of REDD+, sequencing problems faced by project proponents and less certain rewards for REDD+ efforts by forest countries and communities. In light of the uncertainty related to the magnitude and form of REDD+ finance, the chapter proposes ‘no regrets’ policy reforms and investments. These include building broad political support for REDD+ by reframing it as an objective rather than a programme, building the foundation for successful REDD+ implementation, and undertaking policy reforms that should be pursued regardless of climate objectives. Such reforms include clarifying tenure, improving governance and removing costly subsidies that promote deforestation and forest degradation.

Understanding REDD+ 1

Part

2Chapter

Seeing REDD+ through 4IsA political economy framework Maria Brockhaus and Arild Angelsen

• AnalysingREDD+with4Is–institutionsandtheirpath-dependenciesand‘stickiness’,actorsandtheirinterests, ideasandinformation–canbeusefultounderstandwhathindersorenableschange.

• Transformational change beyond the forestry sector is required to fullyrealise the mitigation potential of REDD+, but economic interests andpowerstructuresposechallengestosuchchange.

• REDD+canalsoserve–andalreadydoestosomeextent–asagamechanger.Neweconomicincentives,newinformation,growingpublicconcernaboutclimatechange,newactorsandnewpolicycoalitionsallhavethepotentialtogeneratetransformationalchange.

2.1 Introduction This chapter introduces a conceptual framework to analyse the politics ofREDD+,aframeworkthatisthenappliedinsubsequentchapters.Throughapoliticaleconomylens,wefocusoninstitutions,interestsandideas(Hall

Understanding REDD+16 |

1997).1 In addition we introduce Information as a fourth element foreffectivepolicychange(Angelsen2010a).Welabelthisthe‘4Isframework’:Institutions (rules, path-dependencies or stickiness), Interests (potentialmaterial advantages), Ideas (policy discourses, underlying ideologies orbeliefs) and Information (data and knowledge, and their constructionanduse).While acknowledging the interdependencebetween the4Is,wewill unpack each element of this framework in the following sections.The4Isallowusto identifyandconceptualiseconstraints,challengesandopportunitiesacrossrelevanttopicsinREDD+policyarenas.

This framework also points to possibleways of breaking political logjamsandovercomingtheinherent‘chickenandegg’problemoftransformationalchange.TheREDD+ideaanditsaccompanyingeconomicincentivesshouldinitiatechangeawayfrombusinessasusual,butforREDD+tofullyachieveitsmainobjectiveofreducedemissions,thereneedtobeupfrontchangesinREDD+policyarenasatalllevels.AlthoughthisdilemmaisnotuniquetoREDD+,ithasreceivedonlylimitedattentionindebatesandtheliterature.Weseektoaddressthisbyasking,whatmotivatesorhindersactorsinREDD+policyarenastoundertaketransformationalchangeprocesses?

Section 2.2 of this chapter defines our understanding of transformationalchangeandwhyitisneededtorealisethepotentialofREDD+.InSection2.3wediscusswhatconstrainsorenableschangeforREDD+,introducethe4IsframeworkanddescribeeachoftheIs.Section2.4discussespossiblewaystoovercomethe‘chickenoregg’problemofREDD+andtransformationalchange.WeconcludewithananalysisofwhetherREDD+islaunchinganewwayforwardorisitselfbeingshapedanddilutedbyentrenchedbusinessasusualinterests.

2.2 Transformational change and the REDD+ policy arena In the contextofREDD+,wedefine transformational change asa shift in discourse,2 attitudes, power relations, and deliberate policy and protestaction that

1 Numerousframeworkshavebeenusedacrossscientificdisciplinestobetteranalysewhatwearecallinghereinstitutions,interests,ideasandinformation.Eventhoughterminologyandperspectivesvary,theydonotdifferasmuchas,forexample,whensociologistsuseconceptsofculture,knowledge,powerandhistory.Hall(1997)andGrindle(1999)applythesetothediscipline of political economy.With regard to changing strategies for action during bothsettledandunsettledperiods,Swidler(1986)provideddeepinsightsinculture’scausalroleinshapingactionandactingasatoolkitonwhichactorscandrawtorealisenewstrategies.2 Dryzek defines discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world”. Embedded inlanguage,discourseenablesthosewhosubscribetoittointerpretbitsofinformationandputthemintocoherentstudiesoraccounts.Eachdiscourserestson“assumptions,judgementsanddisagreements” (Dryzek1997:8). In theenvironmentalfield inparticular,discoursescanbehighlydisparateandconflicting.

| 17Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

leads policy formulation and implementation away from business as usual policy approaches that directly or indirectly support deforestation and forest degradation(seealsoChapter5).Suchashiftisembeddedinandtranslatedbychangesinmajorformalandinformalinstitutions3relevanttoREDD+implementation,includingchangesincoordinationandtransparencyacrossmultiplelevelsofgovernance.

Examples of transformational change in the context of REDD+ policy outcomes include: i) change in economic, regulatory and governanceframeworks, including thedevolutionof rights to localusers; ii) removalofperverseincentives,suchassubsidiesandconcessionsthatserveselectiveeconomicinterestsandstimulatedeforestationandforestdegradation;andiii)reformsofforestindustrypoliciesandregulationsthateffectivelyreduceunsustainable extraction (Kanninen et al. 2007).Suchchange is requiredespeciallywhereforestdestructionislinkedtorentseekingandrentcreation(Ross 2001) – that is, in situations where powerful groups have gainedaccesstovaluableforestland,timberorotherresources,andusetheirpowerto capture and/or enlarge the forest rent.Transformational change at thenational level thus implies changing thepolicy framework fromone thatstimulatesforestexploitationtoonethatpromotesforestconservationandsustainableuse.

TheREDD+arena, inwhich these changes are supposed to occur, canbesplitintoseveralsub-arenas:climatenegotiations,developmentaid,nationalpolicyandlocalrealities(Chapter3).HerewelookatanaggregatedREDD+arena,butwithparticularreferencetothenationalpolicyarena.4

TheREDD+arenahasmuchincommonwithother(climate)policyarenas.However, there aredistinctive characteristicsofREDD+policy arenas thatneedtobefactoredintotheanalysiswhenapplyingthe4Isandwhichmakethetaskoftransformationalchangemorechallenging:

Multilevel institutions and multilayered processes that are embedded,sequential and hierarchical in nature, are a key characteristic ofREDD+(Chapter6).Thesemultiplelevelswithininstitutionscreatebothchallengesand opportunities, particularly when decentralisation or recentralisationisunderway.Forexample,globalframeworksandagreementscanprovide

3 FollowingDouglassNorth,weunderstand institutions tobe“the rulesof thegame inasocietyastheystructureincentivesinhumanexchange,whetherpolitical,social,oreconomic....Thepurposeoftherulesistodefinethewaythegameisplayed.Buttheobjectiveoftheactoror the teamwithin that setof rules is towin thegame” (North1990:3-5).Rules areconceptuallydifferentiatedfromtheplayersinNorth’sdefinition.4 It ishowever, important tonote thatprocesses anddecisions inoneparticularnationalpolicy arena may also influence others and can create spillover effects, particularly at theregionallevel(e.g.Amazonas,CongoBasinandintheSoutheastAsianregion).

Understanding REDD+18 |

funding for local implementation, local results can provide nationalgovernmentswith revenues from the sale of carbon credits, andnationallawscanenableordisable localaction. Improvedmultilevel coordinationis requiredforREDD+successand isongoing inmanyREDD+relevantfields,includingbenefitsharing(Chapter8)andmonitoring,reportingandverification(MRV)andleakage(Chapter6).

Multiple actorswithdifferentauthoritiesandinterests,followingdivergentandcontradictorydiscourses,beliefsandmentalmodels,alsocharacterisetheREDD+arena.ThisisevidentinthepowerdynamicswithintheUNFCCCnegotiations. In national policy arenas, development and profit-makinginterestsintheformofforestryindustries,agribusiness,andevensmall-scaleagriculturalproducersclashwithconservationproponents,whowanttoseesomeforestsleftuntouched.Atthelocallevel,prospectsforemploymentinlargeplantationsor involvement inoutgrowerschemesforoilpalmoftenovershadow the benefits arising from the variety of non-timber productsandservicesthatstandingforestsprovide.Inaddition,actorswhobenefitfrom both forest exploitation and from intact forests are not necessarilythoselivingwithinoradjacenttothoseforests.

Governance structures are situated along a spectrum between marketsandthestate,andcantaketheformofhierarchies,coalitionsornetworks.REDD+ countries have political regimes ranging from democracies toauthoritarian states, and this has implications on the tradeoffs thatmustbeconsideredinequitable,effectiveandefficientREDD+implementation(Chapter 5). Another important REDD+ debate concerns the degree ofmarket linkage in REDD+ (Böhm and Dhabi 2011; Michaelowa 2011;Newell2011),andtherelativeweightsofdifferentlevelsofgovernance.

Context dependence implies thatbroaderpolicychangewellbeyondtheforestrysectorisrequiredtoachieveREDD+objectives.Thisalsopointstohindrancestotransformationalchange,astheforestrysectorinimportantREDD+countrieshas fordecadesbeen linked topolitical andeconomicpower,forexample,byallocatingforestresources(rent)toindividualsandgroupstobuildpoliticalsupportandcoalitions.

While these characteristics are not unique toREDD+, themagnitude ofthese challenges setsREDD+ apart fromother agreements. For example,typical mitigation projects under the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM),suchashydropowerorlandfillsorevenafforestation/reforestation(A/R),arerelativelysimplecomparedtoREDD+.Inthishighlycomplexarena, transformational change has to occur if deforestation and forestdegradationaregoingtobeeffectivelyaddressed.

| 19Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

2.3 The 4Is framework 2.3.1 Overview of key elements Figure2.1presents a schematicdiagramof theREDD+policyarena. It ischaracterisedbyamultitudeofinternational,nationalandsubnationalactors, including:ministries, agencies and other government bodies; developmentandenvironmentalNGOs;indigenousrightsorganisations;businessgroups;political parties; research organisations and think tanks; and participatoryvenuessuchasroundtablesandcivilsocietyforums.Groupssuchas‘forest-dependent people’ may be represented by the above groups or have self-declaredrepresentativeswhoactontheirbehalfinpolicyarenas.

Alloftheseactorsoperatewithinexisting‘rulesofthegame’orinstitutions.Norms,regulations,andotherformalandinformalinstitutionalarrangementsareshapedbyahistorythathasenabledandoftenstimulateddeforestationandforestdegradation–andwhichwere,atleastinpart,createdtoservetheinterestsofsomeoftheactorsintheREDD+policydomain.Consequentlytheseactorsmayhavelimitedinterestinchange,eventhoughthecurrentsituationmaynotleadtosociallyandenvironmentallyoptimalresults.Butinterestsandthepowertorealisethemcanalsochangeovertimeinresponsetochanginginstitutions,neweconomicopportunitiesandincentives,andnewideasandinformation.

Actors in the REDD+ policy arena adhere to specific ideas (includingideologies)andoftenholdstrongbeliefsabouthowtomanagethecountry’sforests.Theyemploydiscursivepractices to legitimise thepursuitof theirinterests. Indeed, theREDD+arena ispopulatedwithdistinct ideologiesaboutwhatREDD+isfundamentallyaboutanditspriorities(andstrategies)foraction(seeBox3.2).

AcrosslevelsandscalesintheREDD+policyarena,discoursesunfoldwithdiverseandoftenconflictinginformation.Knowledgeisusedandabusedinpoliticalnegotiationstojustifyhowandwhy–orwhynot–toimplementREDD+.Alongwiththispoliticaldimensionisthetechnicaldimension,inwhichactorshavedifferentcapacitiesinaccessing,processingandprovidinginformation.

Takentogether,the4Isshapethechoicesofwhatshouldandcouldbethecontributionofforestandforestedlandtosocial(andindividual)welfare,andtheformthatcontributioncouldtake.

InFigure2.1,anidealscenariowouldbeonewhereaREDD+ideaentersthearena,leadingtoarevisionofexistingendogenousincentivestructuresandinstitutions.Thedegreetowhichthesenewideasbecomeadoptedand

Understanding REDD+20 |

leadtodesiredpolicychangesintheshortandmediumtermdependson:i)thedynamicsinsidetheentirearena,andii)theinterplayamongthe4Isthatallowsforshiftsinincentives,discoursesandpowerrelationsinsidethenationalandsubnationalpolicyarena.Thescenariodependsoncountries’institutionalcontextsandexistingpowerrelationsaswellasthestageoftheREDD+ process (Chapter 5).The politics around the Indonesian ForestMoratorium clearly illustrate this interplay of constraining and enablingfactorsforlong-termchange(Box2.1).

Wediscusshowtoattainlong-termchangeinSection2.4.First,however,weexamineindetailhowthese4Isconstrainorenablethenegotiationofpolicyoutputsandoutcomesthatcanultimately leadtotransformationalchangeandreducedforestemissions.

InstitutionsPath-dependency and 'stickiness'

Transformational change

Business as usual

Policy process

Output: policy decision• broader polices and institutions• specific policies and measures• administrative and technical capacity

Outcome: policy impact• emissions/removals• livelihoods• biodiversity• administrative and technical capacity

Shifts in incentives, discourses and power relations

InformationData, knowledge

Actors

IdeasBeliefs, discursive

practices

InterestsMaterialistic, individual,

organised

REDD+ international policy area

REDD+ national and subnational action arena

REDD+ agenda setting: incentives + ideas

Figure 2.1 REDD+ and the 4Is

| 21Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

Box 2.1 Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium: The politics of the possible Frances Seymour

National-level REDD+ policies are initiated and crafted by a complex mix of policy actors, both domestic and international, inside and outside of government. The contours of Indonesia’s two-year moratorium on new forest concession licenses, and the process that led up to its announcement, provide an illuminating example of ‘the politics of the possible’ when constituencies for transformational change confront vested interests in business as usual.

Commitment to impose “a 2-year suspension on all new concessions for conversion of peat and natural forest” was one of the key elements in the REDD+ ‘Letter of Intent’ (LOI) signed in May 2010 between the Governments of Indonesia and Norway. Although the original target date was 1 January 2011, the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) enacting the moratorium was not issued until a week before the first anniversary of the LOI in May 2011. The delay, accompanied by swirling rumours regarding the various versions under consideration, suggest a protracted struggle among the interests seeking to influence its scope. These interests include the national REDD+ Task Force (located in the President’s Office) and its supporters in civil society, the Ministry of Forestry, and corporations with business models dependent on continuing forest conversion, including both agribusiness and mining. Because the Inpres was not retroactive and did not apply to licenses already ‘approved in principle’ by the Ministry of Forestry, the 5-month delay also enabled private interests the opportunity to obtain new licenses. Among other provinces, this occurred in Central Kalimantan, which was selected to be the REDD+ pilot province under the LOI.

A spatial analysis of the Indicative Moratorium Map that accompanied the Inpres resulted in an estimate of 22.5 million hectares of forest newly given temporary protection by this REDD+ policy instrument. This was a much smaller area than constituencies for REDD+ had hoped for, mainly due to the interpretation of ‘natural forest’ in the LOI to mean ‘primary forest’ in the Inpres, thus excluding some 46.7 million hectares of logged-over and other secondary forest, which is still rich in carbon and biodiversity. Furthermore, even the forest area covered by the Inpres is subject to exemptions for activities ‘vital’ to national development, including those for food and energy security. Such exemptions, when coupled with still-available secondary forest and already-licensed ‘land banks’ reportedly held by oil palm and other companies, suggest that the moratorium holds limited potential to constrain business as usual forest conversion.

Nevertheless, the moratorium’s broad coverage of peatland forests could result in substantial emission reductions if its enforcement in fact reduces the rate of destruction, drainage and conversion of these carbon-rich ecosystems. In addition, the Inpres commitment to regular and transparent review and revision of the Indicative Moratorium Map represents a significant step forward in Indonesian forest governance. This process prompted the release of the Ministry of Forestry’s 2009 land cover data, opening a previously closed window for public scrutiny, while periodic revisions of the Indicative Moratorium Map provide a new vehicle for civil society engagement in forest policy making.

Based on Murdiyarso et al. (2011).

Understanding REDD+22 |

2.3.2 Institutions: Path-dependencies and ‘stickiness’To understand historical change, North (1990) sees a key role played byinstitutionsandhowtheyshapeandareshapedbysocietiesthroughtime.InNorth’sframework,institutionsaresometimesdevelopedtocaptureeconomicopportunitiesforthesocietyatlarge,butgroupsmayalsohavethepowertoshapeinstitutionstoservetheirparticularinterests.Furthermore,institutionscanbeseenasapublicgood,andthereisthereforeacollectiveactionproblemtobesolvedinordertoprovideeffectiveinstitutions.

Establishedrulesandpowerrelationsrestricttheoptionsforinstitutionalchangethroughwhatiscalledpath-dependencyand‘stickiness’(seeBaumgartneret al.2011).Path-dependenciesarea reality forREDD+:what was andwhat is shapes what can be. For example, existing regime types, centralised ordecentralisedgovernancestructures,andcolonialorpostcolonialnormsoftenincludeembeddedpatternsofdeforestation(seeBox2.2).

‘Stickiness’ is characterised by the resistance to change often seen in stateorganisationsresponsibleforthemanagementofnaturalresources.Ministriesof forestry in forest-rich countries may be afraid of losing parts of theirsphere of influence, or ministries of agriculture fear that REDD+ willrestrictopportunities fornewagricultural land.Oneway toovercome thisinstitutionalstickinesswouldbetocreatenewinstitutionsandintroducenewactors,butthiscomeswithitsowntradeoffs.Formalpowertypicallyrestswiththe‘stickiest’organisations–thosewithenoughinfluencetoresistchange–whilenewinstitutionsandactorsareignoredorremainmarginalised.

2.3.3 Interests: Material, individual and organised ‘Interests’arethematerialinterestsofactorsandactorgroupsintheREDD+policyarena.Differentactorsandgroups intheREDD+policyarenahavedifferentinterestsandpotentialstorealisematerialadvantageswith,withoutandthroughREDD+.

Various interests, forexample those related toeconomicbenefits, influenceactors’ positioning in the REDD+ arena (Peskett and Brockhaus 2009).ActorsnegotiatetheirinterestsinREDD+policiesandprocesseshorizontally,vertically and across stages of the policy making process. Horizontalnegotiationstakeplace,forexample,amongministriesofforestry,agriculture,mining, planning and finance. Vertically, negotiations can take place, forexample, amongproject implementers, civil society actors andnegotiators.Coalitionbuildingamongdifferentactorsleveragespoliticalpowertorealiseinterests.Whichinterestwinsisoftenaresultofacombinationofeconomicandpoliticalpower.However,coalitionbuildingisalsohamperedsincetheseinterestsareoftenconflictingorhavetradeoffs,eveninsideactorgroups.

| 23Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

Box 2.2 Institutional path-dependencies in the Congo Basin Samuel Assembe-Mvondo

Congo Basin countries are elaborating strategies for the implementation of the REDD+ mechanism. Reforms to adapt land tenure systems to international agendas are ongoing but challenges are characterised by conflicting coexistence between a prominent statutory law and an excluded and/or marginalised customary law.

For example, during the period of German administration, large areas of land in the Bakweri tribe region of Cameroon had been allocated to German companies and individuals for the purpose of growing cocoa, bananas, rubber and oil palms. This model was followed by the British colonial administration which created the Cameroon Development Corporation, the first and biggest agro-industry in Cameroon, under state ownership. Following independence, the legislative reforms of the postcolonial administration aimed at adapting the colonial legislation to the new status of independent States. This, however, led to perpetuating the dominance of written law over customary laws. This gradually eroded customary practices for the benefit of the legal system imposed by European colonial authorities. Thus, the postcolonial land tenure system overshadowed customary land tenure systems and incorporated customary land, which was considered to be vacant and unoccupied, into State land. Local communities were almost completely stripped of their land. Customary ownership or tenure rights were replaced with user rights granted to farmers and local communities and the possibility for any operator to resort to registration. State monopoly over land was confirmed in land laws and systematic registration. Indeed, the introduction of a new land law involved the condemnation of indigenous notions of space management. In this context, the only customary user right recognised or tolerated by statutory law is the Droit de hache (wood cutting or axe rights). This term is used to describe the rights arising from clearing or cutting the forest with the agreement of the first occupier. These rights derive from and are based on continuous usage (historical precedent).

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a good illustration of such a situation. Indeed, the DRC land tenure law passed in 1973 and modified in 1980, states that all land and natural resources belong to the State. Thereby, the State does not recognise in that time any of the rules relating to access and control of land and natural resources that emanate from the local community. The postcolonial situation characterised by exclusive State ownership of land and forest resources diminished with the advent of the Rio Conference and social and democratic demands by grassroots organisations in the early 1990s. Since then, current forest legislation (2002) now recognises that local stakeholders should enjoy genuine rights to manage land and natural resources (community forest).

continued on next page

Understanding REDD+24 |

However, another trend is just starting through the adoption by the COMIFAC (Central Africa Forest Commission) Guidelines on the Participation of Local Communities and Indigenous People. This represents a break with the past colonial legal system – an innovation as the provisions of this instrument incorporate emerging mechanisms like REDD+, Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade - Voluntary Partnership Agreements (FLEGT/VPA), PES and the customary ownership of land forest and resources. Furthermore, some Congo Basin countries have also recently adopted specific national legislation on the rights of indigenous populations (e.g. Pygmies), based on the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (notably, Republic of Congo and Central Africa Republic).

The current trends in the evolution of local communities and indigenous peoples’ rights presenting an improvement are driven by both subregional (COMIFAC commitments) and international agendas (CBD, FLEGT, REDD etc.), but build on and struggle with colonial and postcolonial path-dependencies.

Box 2.2 continued

Business interests can be directed for or against REDD+, depending onthe economic activity of the industries or business involved, e.g. pulp andpaper industry representatives (who seeREDD+as a threat) versus carboninvestors(whoseeREDD+asanopportunity).Similarly,stateagenciesandtheirspheresofinterestsandinfluencecanbeinconflictoverREDD+,e.g.environmental protection agencies versus agriculturalministries. Each sidejustifies itspositionwiththestate’s interest insocialandeconomicwelfare.However, REDD+ is taking shape in countries where the state and itsbureaucratic system is often deeply intertwined with the business sector,andalackofautonomyfrombusinessintereststhatdrivedeforestationanddegradationwilllimitstate’schoicestochangecurrentpractices.Thisisvalidinparticularwhenrentseeking,fraud,collusionandcorruptionarepracticesinsidethebureaucraticsystemthatserveindividualinterestsagainstsociety’sinterests(KarsentyandOngolo2012).Conflictsordeadlockscanemergeifcoalitionsforchangedonotexistorifthereisonlylimitedparticipationofcentralactorswhoarepartofthecurrentbusinessasusualscenariosandwhocontributedirectlyorindirectlytodeforestationandforestdegradation,suchasstateandbusinessactors(Chapter5).

2.3.4 Ideas, ideologies and beliefs: Discourses for business as usual or for changeActors’actionsarenotonlyshapedbytherationalpursuitofmaterialinterests,butalsobyideasandideals.Differentactorshavespecificideas(conceptsormentalconstructions)or ideologies (anormativesetof ideas) inadditionto

| 25Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

theirmaterialinterests.Butideasandideologiesarenotanendinthemselves.Rather, asSwidler (1986) elaborates inherdiscussionof culture in action,theyformatoolkitthatindirectlyprovidesresourcesfor,ordirectlygoverns,thewayinwhichactorsconstructstrategiesofaction.

Inamultilevelandmultiactorpolicyarena,avarietyofstrategiesisnegotiatedbythedifferentactors,andpolicychangecanbearesultofthosenegotiations.Belief systems of actors in a political subsystem have different degrees ofresistance to change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). These degreesof resistance vary according to the space for negotiation: i) ‘deep core’ orfundamentalnormativebeliefs;ii)‘policycore’orbasicpoliticalpositions;iii)’secondaryaspects’ortheevaluationofanddisputesovervariousprogrammesandinstitutions,andspecificpolicypreferences.Secondaryaspectsaremorenegotiableacrosstheadvocacycoalitions,andmuchoftheREDD+actionishere.However,Bolivia’sroleintheUNFCCC–inwhichBoliviannegotiatorsrejectedtheideaofREDD+duetoitsassociationwithmarket-basedfinance– shows that aspectsofREDD+are touchingupon ’deep core‘beliefs andpoliticalpositions.

Public policy and environmental governance is fundamentally a politicalprocess,influencedbyamultitudeofinterests,beliefsanddiscursivepracticeswhichareusedtoframepolicydiscourses(Hajer1995;Forsyth2003;Jasanoff2009).REDD+isnoexception.Thenatureofdiscourseaffectspolicymaking,sincetheyframetheproblemandpresentalimitedsetofchoicesofwhatis‘reasonable’orwhatisputforwardas‘thepossible’(HajerandVersteeg2005)–orwhat is, in the contextofREDD+, ‘effective, efficient and equitable’.Chapter8onREDD+benefitsharingprovidesagoodexampleofthisprocess.

Emerging discourses and discourse coalitions are framed in support ofindividualororganisedinterests.Thosediscoursesmaylegitimiseanddominateactionandpoliciesinsupportofdeforestationandforestdegradationandcanconstraintheunfoldingofnewideas likeREDD+.TheREDD+landscapeitself is also dominated by various and partially conflicting discourses: i)‘tenurefirst thenREDD+ second’or ’No rights,noREDD+’; ii)REDD+centralisedversusREDD+decentralised;andiii)REDD+benefitsforthosewhocontributetoefficiencyandeffectiveness,versusbenefitsforthosewhohavemoral rights based on equity considerations (Chapter 8).Atnationalandgloballevels,weseeperceptionsanddiscoursesaroundsovereigntyovernatural resources; market and anti-market stances; and global equity (e.g.on theuseofREDD+credits asoffsets).NationaldevelopmentparadigmslikewiseinfluencetheREDD+ideabyfocusingontheexploitationofnaturalresourcesandtherealisationofshort-termeconomicgains.

AnimportantaspectofREDD+,furtherdiscussedinChapter3,isthattheconcept is sufficiently unspecified to be open to different interpretations,

Understanding REDD+26 |

andthereforecanfitfundamentallydifferentnormativebeliefs,suchasthosebeliefs held by environmentalmarket liberals and ‘social greens’ (Box 3.1,HiraldoandTanner2011a).NewcoalitionsintheREDD+policyarenaareresulting.YetstrongdisagreementisvisiblewhendetailsofREDD+mustbespecified,suchashowmuchitshouldrelyonfuturecarbonmarketfunding,and towhat extent tenure and rights should be addressed beforeREDD+actionsareimplemented.

2.3.5 Information: Today’s global currency Informationisourfourth‘I’intransformationalchange,yetitisinherentlya part of institutions, interests and ideas. Facts, rather than speaking forthemselves,areselected,interpreted,andputincontextinwaysthatreflecttheinterestsoftheinformationprovider.Foucaultandnumerousotherscholarshaveprovided insights into the close ties amongknowledge,discourse andpower(seeFoucault1980;ArtsandBuizer2009;Winkel2012).Aboveweenumeratedseveraloftenconflictingdiscourses.New,emerginginformationis replacing existing ‘toolkits for action’with new ones, especially inwhatSwidler (1986) called ‘unsettled situations’.The global problem of climatechangecanbeconsideredassuchanunsettledsituation.Butwhatmakesadecisionmakerreplaceadevelopmentparadigmbasedonexploitationwithanewdiscourseinfavourofstandingforests?Usingthesenewideasasaforceforlong-termchangedependsonstructuralconditions.

In addition, factors such as data disclosure, availability and credibility inREDD+allcontributetowhetherinformationservestoconstrainorenablechange.Actorshaveunevenaccesstoinformation,aswellasvaryingtechnicalcapacitiestoproduce,provideandtransformknowledgeintodirecteconomicbenefits or support for public decision making. In the REDD+ world,informationisacurrencyandasourceofpower.

ThecollectionandsharingofdataandinformationarethenutsandboltsoftheREDD+mechanism,whichisunderdevelopment.Morethanmostpolicy interventions,REDD+has a specific target – reduced emissions–whichshouldbequantified.Butnumbershavetheirownpoliticaleconomyandaresubjecttomodificationsandinterpretations(EspelandandStevens2008:411) For example, emission reductions are defined relative to abaselineorreferencelevel,andthereisnostraightforwardwaytosetthese(Chapter16).

Although in theory policymaking should be evidence based and solutionoriented, political realities rarely match these expectations, either becausethere is little interest in evidence and solution-oriented action, or becauseevidenceisnotproducedormadeavailable.TheprocessofpolicylearningforimprovedREDD+policydesign, linkedtoglobalUNFCCCguidanceand

| 27Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

localprojects,willneedevidenceandknowledgebrokers.Brokersforpolicylearning,suchasconsultingagencies,biginternationalNGOsandresearchorganisations,canalsobepartofpoliticalprocessesandshapepolicymaking.Oneexampleisthepublicationofthemarginalabatementcost(MAC)curvebyMcKinsey(McKinseyandCompany2009)andtheirroleaspolicyadvisorsinREDD+countries.

2.4 How to achieve transformational change Toachievewhatisconsideredaneffective,efficientandequitableresponsetoaglobalmitigationchallenge,transformationalchangeisneeded.Theultimateoutput of the policy processmust be change in economic, regulatory andothergovernanceframeworks,aswellasreformsofpoliciesinsideandbeyondtheforestrysector.WediscussthreewaysinwhichtransformationalchangeintheREDD+areamighttakeroot:changesineconomicincentives,newideasandinformation,andnewactorsandcoalitions.

2.4.1 Changing economic incentivesThe provision of international financial resources for the three phases ofREDD+ readiness, policy reforms and reduced emissions (Chapter 7) isexogenous to the national and subnational systems in which change issupposedtooccur.ThisisattheheartoftheoriginalREDD+idea:REDD+shouldchangethebasicbenefit–costequationsothatthevalueofastandingforestbecomeshigherthanthatofaclearedforest.Smithet al.(2004)callsthis‘purposivetransition’–adeliberatechangecausedbyoutsideactors.

Thelogiciscompelling,andevidencesuggeststhattheprospectofsignificantREDD+ financing has already been a game changer in some countries(Chapter5).But thepotential for external funding tobecomean impetusof transformational change is mitigated by several factors: who loses outcompletely; who receives less compensation than the cost incurred; whowill gain innet terms; andhow to dealwithuncertainty about the actualfuturepayments.

First, while a country in the aggregate might benefit economically afterREDD+implementationthroughinternationalfunding,noteveryoneintheREDD+arenawillbenefit.Inparticular,largeactorswhostandtobenefitfromcontinuingbusiness asusualpractices are likely to lose.Full compensationto rich and powerful groups is politically unacceptable, particularly in theinternational REDD+ arenas, and would undermine its credibility andjeopardiselong-termfundingopportunities.Moreover,mostcurrentREDD+fundingisfromdevelopmentaid,whichhaspovertyreductionasthemajoraim.ButbroadersupportforREDD+isneeded,andthiscanbeachievedbyensuringthatthereissomethingforeveryone.Butthekeydilemmaisthat

Understanding REDD+28 |

thismightresultinadilutedREDD+policywhichisineffectiveatreducingemissions.TheIndonesianForestMoratoriumcanbeviewedinthislight:itbecamepartof theUS$1billiondealbetween Indonesia andNorwayandgainedsufficientsupporttobecomeareality,butalongthewayitinvolvedsomanycompromisesthatitspotentialimpacthascometobequestioned.

Second,fullinternationalcompensationofREDD+costsisunrealisticformostcountries for several reasons.Sufficient international funding isunavailableandmiddle-incomeREDD+countriesareexpectedtobearsomeofthecoststhemselvesaspartoftheUNFCCCprincipleof“commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities”.Thismeans that countriesneedtobewillingtoacceptshort-andmid-termtradeoffsforabroaderlong-termvisionofgreendevelopmentandavertedclimatechangeimpacts.

Third,REDD+incentivesduringtheearlystagesarenotyetrealitiesbutratherpromisesaboutfutureresults-basedpayments.Thisisindeedthenatureoftheresults-basedpayments;thepaymentsshouldbemadeaftertheresults(e.g.emissionsreductions)haveoccurredandareverified.Therefore,trustneedstobebuiltinthesepromisedincentives.WithoutsomepredictabilityinhowmuchREDD+countrieswillbepaidforthechangestheymake,REDD+islesslikelytoinitiatethetransformationalchangeitsetsouttoachieve.

2.4.2 New ideas and information REDD+hasprovidedanewdiscourseonthevalueofstandingforestsandtheir role in sequestering and storing carbon (Cronin and Santoso 2010;Kengoum2011;May et al. 2011a;Pham2011).While knowledgeof thisrole is not new, REDD+ has raised awareness of the fact that greenhousegas(GHG)emissionsfromtropicaldeforestationcontribute17%ofglobalemissions(IPCC2007a),andthatreducingthisiscriticaltoachievethetargetoflimitingtemperatureincreasesto2°Cabovepre-industriallevels.Indoingso,REDD+hasalsocontributedtoincreasedawarenessofthehighrisksofglobalwarming.

REDD+hasalsoputthespotlightonanumberofoldandnewissuesthatallpointtotheneedforchangeinbusinessasusualpoliciesandpracticesinordertorealisetheREDD+potential.Examplesinclude:i)indigenousandcommunity rights,andconflictsabout forestusebetween localgroupsandlargescalecommercialforestoperations,ii)governance,corruption,andthepoliticaleconomyofforestuse;iii)inefficiencyandhighbudgetarycostsofpoliciesandpracticessupportingforest-destructiveactivities.5Newdiscoursecoalitionsthatincludenationalandlocalactorswhoarejoininginthecontext

5 Ofcourse,noneoftheseissuesarenew.RepettoandGillis(1998)wrotealandmarkstudyontheroleofpoints2and3;point1hasbeenraisedbyNGOsandresearchersfordecades.

| 29Seeing REDD+ through 4Is

of REDD+ concerns about rights, forest conservation and inequalities inforestexploitationcanmakeadifference.

Finally,anaspectnotcoveredmuchintheREDD+literatureisitspotentialtoredefineexistingrolesbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Forest-richdevelopingcountrieshavetheopportunitytoprovideaservicetodevelopedcountries,forwhichtheyarepaid.Thisturnsthetablesontheexistingroleof developing countries as dependent recipients of development assistancefromdevelopedcountries.REDD+couldbeinterpretedasamechanismforturningtables,byredefiningtherolesofforest-richdevelopingcountriesawayfromaiddependency towards support todeveloped countries inprovidingaglobalpublicgood(climatemitigation).Thus,REDD+wasperceivedbysomedevelopingcountryactorsasacontributiontonationalsovereigntythatcouldencouragedomesticactorstoengageinREDD+.

2.4.3 New actors and coalitionsChangingeconomicincentivesandnewideasanddiscoursescanleadtoshiftsinpower relations amongkey actors (Knight andSened1995;MarchandOlsen1998;MarshandSmith2000;Cleaver2002).Withtheintroductionof REDD+ and the accompanying promise of incentives in national andsubnationalpolicyarenas,de facto changesoccur.Once(orif )forestcarbonis defined, those with the rights to that carbon gain power. Possession ofinformationabouttheconceptofREDD+,thepotentialopportunitiesthatREDD+canprovide,ordata that are required to implementREDD+canbenewsourcesofpower.Theseshiftsandthechangesinbargainingpowercanpotentiallybringaboutadditionalchange–andindicatetransformationalchange(Figure2.1).

Inaddition,newactorsentertheREDD+arenaandgainpowerandinfluenceindecisionmaking(SchroederandLovell2011).Asaconsequence,theycanuse their agency to change the political representation of specific interestsand could correct existing information asymmetries. These shifts may inturn change power relations. In this way the first threshold is crossed: anexogenousideachangesendogenouspowerrelations,andprocessesofpolicyformulation and implementation should reinforce these dynamics towardstransformationalchange.

REDD+hasattractedmanyactorswithdifferentagendasandideologies,eachtrying toget apieceof theperceivedREDD+cake.Thishas resulted in adiversified and less focussedREDD+agenda,which risks losing the initialcharacteristicsofREDD+thatmadeitattractiveinthefirstplace(Chapter3).But, such broad coalitions of different interests and actors with differentideologies(seeBox3.1)canalsobeabasisfortransformationalchanges.Akeymarkerforwhichscenariowillmaterialiseiswhetherthefocusiskepton

Understanding REDD+30 |

REDD+asanobjective(Chapter18)orwhetherREDD+isdilutedintoasetofactivitiesthatfailtosignificantlyreduceemissionreductions.

REDD+hasthepotentialfortransformationalchange,butintheend:“cashisking”,and“discourseisqueen”.Shiftsinfinancialincentivesandindiscursivepractices can provide a powerfulmeans to keep the focus on the primarytarget:increasingtherelativevalueofstandingtreessothatfewerofthemwillbechoppeddown.

2.5 ConclusionsReducing emissions through avoided deforestation and forest degradationrequiresmajor institutional andpolicy changes.Weprovided a 4Is lens tounderstandthepoliticsandpowersinREDD+.Theanalysisofinstitutionsand their path-dependencies and stickiness, and actors and their interests,ideas, and information canbe useful to understandwhat induces shifts inpowerrelations,incentivesanddiscursivepractices.

Despitealltheconstraintspresented,progresshasbeenmadeinglobalandnationalpolicyarenas.REDD+hasclimbedhighoninternationalandnationalagendas,andpoliticalprocessesforbuildingREDD+architecturesareongoingeversincetheideaemergedduringCOP11inMontrealin2005.REDD+hasthepotentialtobeagamechangerbycreatingnewcoalitionsaroundthevalueofstandingforests(Chapter5).Buttransformationalchangewilldependonthestrengthofthesenewcoalitions,theextentofshiftsindiscursivepractices,andthecreationofeconomicincentivesbothinternationallyanddomesticallythatvaluestandingforestsmorethanclearedforests.

Inthischapterwehavecentredthediscussionaroundtwostylisedoutcomesof the REDD+ game: business as usual or transformational change. Inmostcountriestherealitywillbesomewhereinbetween,andthresholdsortippingpointsmustbeovercome, e.g. the formationofnewand powerfulconstituenciesforchange.

The following chapters outline key choices to increase the chances oftransformationalchange,includinghowtoovercometheconstraintsoutlinedhereandtakeadvantageofemergingopportunities.TheextentofchangewilldependontheabilityofagentsinREDD+policyarenasto:i)managediverseinterestsacross levelsandpowerfulactorcoalitions; ii)provide informationandcapacitytotransferdataintoknowledgethatleadstoashiftinattitudesamong state andnon-state agents; and iii) communicate abiggervisionofREDD+andclimatechangemitigationthatcanreplaceexistingdevelopmentparadigms.

3Chapter

The evolution of REDD+ Arild Angelsen and Desmond McNeill

• As an idea, REDD+ proved extremely popular, in part because it wassufficientlybroadtoaccommodatedifferentinterests.Buttheconcepthasevolved,drivenbytheabsenceofanewinternationalclimateagreement,strongbusinessasusualinterests,alargenumberofactorswithdivergingagendas,andexperienceinthefield.

• MajorchangesinREDD+includethefollowing:i)thefocushasmovedfromcarbononlytomultipleobjectives;ii)thepoliciesadoptedsofararenotonly,orevenprimarily,directedatachievingresult-basedpayments;iii)thesubnationalandproject,ratherthannational,levelsarereceivinga large share of resources; and iv) the funding to date is mainly frominternationalaidandthenationalbudgetsofREDD+countries,andnotfromcarbonmarkets.

• TheinitialcharacteristicofREDD+thatmadeitdifferentfrompasteffortsintheforestrysector–significantresult-basedfunding–isatriskofbeingovershadowedbyotherobjectivesandapproaches,thusendangeringtheeffectivenessofREDD+.

Understanding REDD+32 |

3.1 Introduction REDD+ has undergone drastic changes since the idea was launched atCOP11inMontrealin2005,bothintermsofhowitisperceivedandwhatithasbecomeinpractice.Whilesomeofthesechangesarosefromanaturalmaturationof the idea, aswe learned andgained experience, they are alsothe result ofREDD+being thrown into thepolitical arena and alteredbydiffering interests and ideologies (Chapter 2). The understanding of whatconstitutesREDD+hasbeenmodified,with someactors exercising strong‘definitionalpower.’Moreover, slowprogress inglobal climatenegotiationsandtheresultingdimprospectsforthelongtermfundingofREDD+,aswellas strongdomesticbusiness asusual interests (Chapter5),havehadmajorimplicationsforthepaceandformofREDD+development.

Interpretations ofREDD+vary.A broaddefinition, based on theCOP13decision inBali in2007,holds thatREDD+comprises local,nationalandglobalactionswhoseprimaryaimistoreduceemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationandenhanceforestcarbonstocksindevelopingcountries(Angelsen2009a).Anarrowerdefinition,usedtoselectprojectsforCIFOR’sGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+(GCS)(seeAppendix),specifiesthatthe primary aim is related to greenhouse gas emissions and removals, andthat actions should include result-based or conditional payments (Wertz-KanounnikoffandAngelsen2009).

ThischapterwilloutlinekeyaspectsoftheevolutionofREDD+asanideaandpracticeandreviewtheforcesbehindthechangesthathavetakenplace.REDD+is–asanidea–asuccessstoryandthereasonsforthissuccessarereviewedinSection3.2.Section3.3providesaframeworkforexamininghowandwhyREDD+haschangedinfourdifferentarenas:climatenegotiations,international aid, national policy and local reality. Section 3.4 discusseshowREDD+haschangedinfourkeyrespects:objectives,policies,scaleofimplementationandfunding.Finally,weconsidertheimplicationsofthesechangesforREDD+.

3.2 As an idea, REDD+ is a success story REDD+ has been a remarkably successful idea. Since REDwas launchedatCOP11andREDD+wasfullyintegratedintotheglobalclimateagendaat COP13 in 2007, it has come to be regarded as potentially one of themost effective and efficientmitigation strategies available today.Dozensofdevelopingcountrieshaveprepared–and somehave started to implement–REDD+policy strategies.Hundredsof localREDD+projectshavebeenstartedand researchers andothershavebeenmotivated towrite thousands

| 33The evolution of REDD+

of publications.1 Donors have pledged billions of dollars to REDD+(Chapter7)andnew internationalprogrammeshavebeencreated, suchastheWorldBank’sForestCarbonPartnershipFacility(FCPF),theUN-REDDProgrammeandtheForestInvestmentProgram(FIP)oftheWorldBank.Wewouldprobablyhavetogobacktothenotionof‘sustainabledevelopment,’promoted by the World Commission on Environment and Development(WCED1987),tofindamoresuccessfulideainthefieldofenvironmentanddevelopment.Althoughsustainabledevelopmentwasmoreofanaspirationthanaspecificsetofactions,itshareswithREDD+theattractionofmeaningdifferent things todifferentpeople.Thevagueness–orbroadness–of theideais,wesuggest,partofthereasonforitssuccess.2Also,aswithsustainabledevelopment,theattractionofREDD+derivedinitiallyfromitspromisetobe awin–win–winpolicy: combining reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG)emissionswithpovertyreductionandtheprotectionofbiodiversity.

3.2.1 REDD+ is seen as big, cheap and quick Greenhousegasemissionsfromtropicaldeforestationconstituteabout17%ofemissionsworldwide(IPCC2007b),althoughmorerecentstudiessuggestthat this sharemightonlybe around12%, inpartdue tohigh growth infossil fuel emissions (van derWerf et al. 2009). Reducing emissions fromtropicalforestsnotonlyhassignificantpotentialtoreduceoverallemissions,butreportsbyStern(2006)andothersconvincedpolicymakersthatsuchanapproachwouldnotbecostly.AccordingtotheSternreport,eliminatingmostdeforestationwouldcostonlyUS$1–2pertCO2onaverage,whichisveryinexpensivecomparedtoalmostallothermitigationoptions.Althoughtheseestimateshavebeencriticisedandsomeestimatesarehigher(e.g.Kindermannet al. 2008),ageneralimpressionwascreatedthatREDD+wouldbecheap.

ItwasalsowidelyassumedthatREDD+iseasyandcouldbedonequickly,makingitattractivetoarangeofdifferentconstituencies.SpeakingatCOP13,whentheInternationalClimateandForestInitiativeofNorwaywaslaunched,PrimeMinisterofNorway,JensStoltenbergsaid,“Througheffectivemeasuresagainstdeforestation,wecanachievelargecutsingreenhousegasemissions–quicklyandatlowcost.Thetechnologyiswellknownandhasbeenavailableforthousandsofyears.Everybodyknowshownottocutdownatree.”3

1 AGoogleScholarsearchcitescloseto18000publicationsonREDD+(accessed6March2012).2 “(T)he ideaswhich aremost successful in the policy arena are not those that aremostanalytically rigorousbut those thataremostmalleable, i.e. those thatcanbe interpreted tofitavarietyofdifferingperspectives,achievingconsensusbyconveyingdifferentmeaningstodifferentaudiences”(McNeill2006).3 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/statsministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2007-4/Tale-til-FNs-klimakonferanse-pa-Bali.html?id=493899

Understanding REDD+34 |

3.2.2 REDD+ represented a fresh approach Initially,adefiningcharacteristicofREDD+wastheuseoffinancialincentivestochange thebehaviourof forestusers: forest conservationwas tobecomemoreprofitablethanforestclearingasaresultofpaymentsforenvironmental/ecosystemservices(PES).Thelogiciscompelling.Carbonsequestrationandstorage are public goods provided by forests and forest owners. There arecurrentlynomarketsormarket-likemechanismstoincentiviseforestownersanduserstofactorthevalueoftheseservicesintotheirmanagementdecisions.Through a PES system, landowners will conserve the forest because theycanmakemoremoneybydoingso.ThisaspectmadeREDD+significantlydifferent fromprevious forest conservation efforts (Sunderlin andAtmadja2009).Aperformance-basedapproach,withpaymentsmadeonlyafterresultshavebeendemonstrated,wasalsoveryattractivetomostfinancingsources.

A seconddistinctive featureofREDD+was themagnitudeof the fundingavailable,whichdwarfedearlierforestconservationefforts,e.g.theTropicalForestActionPlaninthe1980s.AnnualtransferstoREDD+countrieswereestimated to potentially bring in tens of billions of dollars, according toauthoritativereports(e.g.Stern2006;Eliasch2008).

Finally, REDD+ aimed for reforms and transformational change beyondthe forestrysector (Chapter2).Abroad,nationalapproachwaschosen4 toenabletheuseofextrasectoralpolicies,whichcanhaveagreaterimpactthansectoralones(Kanninenet al.2007).Anationalapproachwouldalsoaddressthechallengeofleakage,amajorreasonwhyavoideddeforestationwasnotincludedintheCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)in2001.

3.2.3 REDD+ was attractive to many actors at different levels Because REDD+ was supposed to provide compensation for reducingemissions,itrepresentedawin–winsolutionformostforestactors,includinglandowners and REDD+ country governments. REDD+ was seen ascontributingtobothenvironmentanddevelopmentgoals,thusavoidingthe‘iron law of climate policy’: whenever environmental and economic goalscollide,theeconomicgoalwillwin(Pielke2010).

A key concept in the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2007) was thatREDD+shouldinvolve ‘positive incentives’, interpretedbymanytomeancompensationprovidedbyAnnexItonon-AnnexIcountriesforachievingmeasurablereductionsinforestryemissions.REDD+thereforefitwellwith

4 Whilethefocuswastobenational,anestedapproach(Pedroniet al.2007)thatstartsatthesubnationallevelcould,undercertaincircumstances,beacceptedasatemporarymeasure.

| 35The evolution of REDD+

thedivisionestablishedintheKyotoProtocol:AnnexIcountrieswouldtakeon commitments for emissions reductions, while non-Annex I countrieswould do so on a voluntary basis (more recently expressed asNAMAs –Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions: the policies and actions thatdevelopingcountriesagreetotaketoreducetheirgreenhousegasemissions).WithsomeAnnexIcountries(inparticularNorway)willingtoputrelativelybigmoneyonthetable,REDD+servedtobridgethegapbetweentheNorthand South in climate negotiations, putting it several steps ahead of otherissueson theUNFCCCagenda. Ifnegotiations failed inother areas (andtheyoftendid),REDD+becametherabbitinthehat todemonstratethatprogresscouldbemade.

Untilnow, ithasnotbeenpossible touseREDD+creditsasanoffset, i.e.tomeetobligations for emission reductionsbyAnnex I countries.But theprospectthatthiswillchangehasbeenapowerfulmotivatingfactor–bothforforested,non-AnnexIcountriesthatanticipatepotentiallylargerevenuestreams and for Annex I countries hoping to meet their commitment toemissionsreductionsatalowercost.5

SupportforREDD+remainedhigh,inpartbecauseitremainedilldefined.Many difficult issues were left unresolved, e.g. should funding go tocompensate large,commercialdeforestersorto indigenousgroupsthatareconservingforests.AslongasREDD+wasstillvague,differentinterestsandviewpointscouldapparentlybeaccommodated.Forexample,itwasagreedthat reference levels shouldbebasedon ‘nationalcircumstances,’althoughno one knows exactly how that term should be defined (Chapter 16).Similarly,thedefinitionofREDD+fromCOP13(UNFCCC2007)includes“enhancement of forest carbon stocks”; someParties have interpreted thisto include plantations (which are forests, according to the standard FAOdefinition),whileothershavenot.

Inshort,formanyactorsintheclimatearena,REDD+lookedliketheidealsolution. It couldprovidequick and cheap emissions reductions andwin–win–winopportunitiesforeveryone:largetransferstotheSouth,cheapoffsetsfortheNorthandfundingforconservationanddevelopmentprojects.ButasREDD+begantobetestedandmorepreciselydefined,problemsbegantocropup.AslongasREDD+remainedvague,abroadcoalitioncouldsupporttheidea.Butanideaisnoteffectiveuntilputintopractice,andthenpowerfulinterestscandistortanddiluteit.

5 AnexceptionwasBrazil,whichwasscepticalofthisideafromthebeginning,partlydueto sovereignty concerns and laterdue to a fearofREDD+credits crowdingoutmitigationeffortsinAnnexIcountries.Thelatterisavalidconcerniftheoverallemissioncapremainsunchanged,butakeyargumentforincludingREDD+creditsinaglobalcarbonmarketisthattheoverallcapcanbelowered(Angelsenet al.2012).

Understanding REDD+36 |

3.3 REDD+ in different arenas As noted previously, REDD+ has changed significantly since it was firstlaunched, both as an idea and as a practice. Figure 3.1 provides a simpleframework for analysing the changes toREDD+using the 4Is frameworkoutlined inChapter 2.The left side of the figure identifies four arenas ofrelevancetoREDD+:theUNFCCCclimatenegotiations,theaidarena(whichincludestheconservationarenaandhaslargebilateraldonors,multinationalorganisations and big internationalNGOs or BINGOs) and national andlocalarenas.Thelasttwo–nationalandlocalarenas–arethesubjectofmoredetaileddiscussioninChapters5and11respectively.

Wewillbeginbyanalysingtheleftsideofthefigureandwilldealwiththeright side – changes over time in objectives, policies, scale, and funding–in Section 3.4. The formal institutions that connect the global and locallevels ofREDD+policy and action are fewandweak,but the four arenasarelinkedinseveralotherways.Manyactorsoperateinmorethanonearenaandsome,liketheBINGOs,operateinallofthem.Theinterestsandideasofthevariousforestactorsarethereforeevidentinallarenasandatalllevels.Informationisthecurrencyinthesearenas:notonlytechnical informationbut also knowledge that is selected and interpreted by actors to promotetheirinterests.Anddecisionsatonelevelcanframeandconstraindiscourses,policiesandactionsatotherlevels.Globalleveldiscoursesare,forexample,stronglymirroredinnationalREDD+debates(seeChapter5).

Thesedebatesmaybeanalysedintermsofarangeofcompetingideologies,assummarisedinBox3.1.Here,theideologicalnarrativesframingREDD+positions and proposals are linked to the environmental worldviews offour main groups (after Clapp and Dauvergne 2005): market liberals,

Figure 3.1 REDD+ as an emerging idea and practice

Global

Arenas 4ls REDD+ idea and practice

Local

Climate negotiations

Institutions, ideas, interests, inform

ation

Aid arena

National policy arena

Local realities

Objectives

Type of policies

Scale

Funding

| 37The evolution of REDD+

Box 3.1 The role of ideologies in framing the REDD+ agenda Rocio Hiraldo and Thomas M. Tanner

Negotiating and developing REDD+ programmes have required the engagement of a wide range of actors. While political and financial agendas play a role in developing the REDD+ architecture, different ideological narratives underpin the positions of various actors. The way that the REDD+ debate is framed can justify one or another set of actions (Leach et al. 2010). The dominant ideological narratives framing REDD+ positions and proposals can, it is suggested, be linked to four main environmental worldviews (after Clapp and Dauvergne 2005).

1. Forests and economic growth: market liberals Market liberals favour market mechanisms and view forest products as a major source of economic growth and poverty reduction for developing countries: “Without forest concessions most of the Outer Islands would still be underdeveloped” (Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, as quoted in Gellert 2005:1351). This underpins a view often associated – correctly or not – with the World Bank: that increased private sector involvement and the use of carbon markets are essential for the future sustainability of REDD+ mechanisms.

2. Forests and governance: institutionalists The ideology of institutionalists centres on the need for strong institutions, good governance and effective laws to protect both the environment and human wellbeing. The main barriers to good governance include flawed policy and legal frameworks, minimal enforcement capacity, insufficient data, corruption and poor market conditions for wood products. This ideology is manifested in some programmes to improve country ‘readiness’ for REDD+ and make programme participation conditional on meeting standards of good governance. An example is the work of the FCPF and UN-REDD Programme, Australia’s bilateral support to Indonesia and Norway’s support to Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania.

3. The ecological value of forests: ‘bio-environmentalists’ The worldview of the bio-environmentalists is characterised by ecological limits and the need to modify human behaviour in order to solve global environmental problems. It drives ambitious targets for reductions in emissions and deforestation rates, reflected in campaigns by WWF and Fauna and Flora International. While bio-environmentalists are opposed to the business as usual model, their vision is not always incompatible with the market-liberal approach; they may see carbon markets as a means for achieving greater environmental sustainability. An example of an initiative motivated by a bio-environmentalist ideology would be the Greenpeace

continued on next page

Understanding REDD+38 |

support for a Tropical Deforestation Emissions Reduction Mechanism (TDERM), which is a hybrid market-linked fund model for REDD+ (Parker et al. 2009b).

4. Forests and rights: social greens Social greens draw primarily on radical social and economic thought and argue that society and the environment cannot be regarded as separate entities. According to this ideology, REDD+ must therefore balance emission reduction goals with the wellbeing of forest communities, including their participation, rights and knowledge. A Friends of the Earth International submission to UNFCCC sums up this notion, stating that “ensuring Indigenous Peoples’ and local communities’ rights and interests in the design of REDD is beyond a matter of state obligation. A rights-based approach will also contribute to effectiveness and permanence of REDD programmes” (FOEI 2009).

Adapted from: Hiraldo and Tanner (2011b).

Box 3.1 continued

institutionalists, bio-environmentalists and social greens.REDD+ can beinterpretedwithinthecontextofeachoftheseideologiesanddisagreementsin the specification of REDD+ can frequently be understood as a clashbetweenthem.

3.3.1 The climate negotiations RED–withoneD–cameontotheglobalstageatCOP11in2005,whenParties were invited to submit “their views on issues relating to reducingemissions from deforestation in developing countries” (UNFCCC 2005).UNFCCC’sSubsidiaryBodyforScientificandTechnicalAdvice(SBSTA),inparticular,wasaskedtoreportatitsmeetinginDecember2007(COP13inBali,Indonesia).Duringtheinterveningperiod,severalmeetingswereheldwherelong-standingconcernsrelatingtoleakage,permanence,additionalityand reference levels, scale andmonitoring, reporting and verificationwereaddressed(astock-takingoftheseandotherissuescanbefoundinAngelsen2008bandParkeret al.2009b).

ThescopeofREDD+hasbeenacontentiousissue.Forestdegradation–thesecondD–wasincludedintheUNFCCC’sdefinitionofREDD+in2007,duetothefactthatalargeshareofforestemissionsistheresultofdegradation.But the inclusion happened only aftermuch pressure, including from thecountries of the Central African Forests Commission. Furthermore, threeadditionalelementswereaddedtothedefinitionofREDD+toaccommodatedifferent interests: i) conservation, to accommodate the interests of high

| 39The evolution of REDD+

forest,lowdeforestationcountriesandenvironmentalNGOs;ii)sustainablemanagementof forests, to accommodate the interests of countrieswith anactive forest-use approach; and iii) enhancement of forest carbon stocks,toaccommodate the interestsofcountrieswithgrowing forest stocks, suchas India and China. The scope debate has largely reflected each country’sdifferent forest situation and how they can benefit from an internationalREDD+regime.

InadditiontoincludingthePartiestotheUNFCCC,REDD+negotiationshavebeencharacterisedbyaverystrongpresenceofNGOsandindigenousgroups on issues related to local and indigenous rights and safeguards(Chapter17).NGOshavedemanded,andinmanycaseshavegained,aplaceatthetableinbothglobalandcountryleveldiscussions.ThishasinfluencedthedefinitionandfocusofREDD+,e.g.makingsafeguardsamajorissue,andhasalsobroadenedtheobjectivesandscopeofREDD+(seebelow).

ThemostsignificantimpactthattheclimatenegotiationshavesofarhadonREDD+isperhapsduetowhattheydidnotachieve,namelyaglobalclimateagreementthatpromisessignificantlong-termfunding,e.g.throughacapandtradesystemwithREDD+creditsasoffsets.Thefundingtodatehasthereforebeen less thanenvisionedandhasbeendominatedbynon-market sources,whichinturnhasledREDD+tofurtherbroadenitsobjectivesandscope.

3.3.2 Aid arena In parallel with the UNFCCC negotiations, actors in the aid arena havestronglyinfluencedthedevelopmentofREDD+.Mostofthemoneyflowisbeingdecidedinthisarenathroughbilateralagreements,throughmultilateralagenciesandthroughtheoperationoflargeNGOs,whicharealsodominantinREDD+pilotprojects(seeChapter12).

Severalinitiativeshaveemergedonthemultilateralscene.FCPF,whichbecameoperationalinJune2008,hascreatedaframeworkandapolicyprocessforparticipatingcountriesthathelpsthemgetreadyforPhase3ofREDD+withresult-basedfinancialincentives.Currently,37countriesreceivesupportfromFCPF.6TheUN-REDD Programme was launched in September 2008. AcollaborationbetweenFAO,UNEPandUNDP,theprogrammeseekstoassistdevelopingcountriestoprepareandimplementnationalREDD+strategies.At present, 14 countries receive support fromUN-REDDProgramme fortheirnationalprogrammes.7FIPprovidesfundingforscalingupfinancingtoprojectsandinvestmentsidentifiedthoughnationalREDD+strategies.

6 http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org,accessed3April2012.7 www.un-redd.org,accessed3April2012.

Understanding REDD+40 |

Inadditiontofundingfrommultilateralagencies,thereareseveralbilateralinitiatives.Norwayisbyfarthelargestfinancialsupporterofsuchinitiatives,havingconcludedUS$1billionagreementswithBrazil(2009)andIndonesia(2010). Despite stated commitments to donor coherence, such as thosefrom Busan,8 donors funding REDD+ often adopt their own proceduresandpractices.

ThemultilateralREDD+partnershipwasestablishedinMay2010,afterthedisappointingCOP15inCopenhagen,toserve“asaninterimplatformforitspartnercountriestoscaleupactionsandfinancefor[REDD+]initiatives.”9The intention was to provide an informal forum for discussions, enhancedonorcoordination,maintaintheREDD+momentumandperhapsresolveoutstandingissues.Nevertheless,traditionallinesofconflicthavecarriedovertothisforum.

Having shifted in the direction of aid,REDD+has been subjected to thediversityofactors,multipleobjectivesandformsofdevelopmentassistancethatcharacterisethatarena,anissuewewillreturntoinSection3.4.1.

3.3.3 National policy arena REDD+ has generated active debate and disagreements in some recipientcountries (Chapter5).Mostgovernmentsappear tobepositive,buta few,notably Bolivia after 2009, are not.10 REDD+ countries have receivedsubstantial external support, andmultilateral agencies anddonor countrieshave,ineffect,becomepoliticalactorsonthenationalscene,whetherornottheyliketoadmitit.

Assumingthattherewasfullcompensationofopportunityandothercosts,REDD+actionswould– inprinciple–produceonlywinners. Inpractice,thisisunlikely:thevariousbenefitsharingmechanismsenvisioned(Chapter8)cannotensurethatnoonewillloseout.Indeed,atbothnationalandlocallevels,REDD+islargelyperceivedtohindereconomicgrowth(Chapter11).Powerfuleconomicandpoliticalactors involved incommercialagriculture,timberandmining seeREDD+asa threat to their interests (Brockhaus et al.2012).It is tooearlyto judgehowbusinessasusual interestswillaffectthe design and implementation of national REDD+ policies, but recentcontroversies regarding the forest conversionmoratorium in Indonesia andthe forestcode inBrazil suggest thatacentral ideaofREDD+(that itcan

8 FourthHighLevelConferenceonAidEffectiveness,Busan.December2011,seehttp://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/9 http://reddpluspartnership.org/en/10InspiteofREDD+resistance,Boliviaistakingstepstoreduceemissionsfromdeforestation,andthereforetoimplementREDD+actions,butunderadifferentname.

| 41The evolution of REDD+

bringtransformationalchangeintheformofbroadnationalpolicyreformsthatwillalterunderlyingincentives)maybeundermined.REDD+mightthenbeforcedtoretreattolessthreateningforestsectorpoliciesandlocalprojects.

3.3.4 Local realities WhileglobalREDD+discussionshavebeenintense,progressat the locallevelhasbeenrelativelyslow.Evenpilotprojects,startedonasmallscaleandusuallywithNGOinvolvement,aregenerallytakinglongertoimplementthan planned, asCIFOR’sGCS has shown (Chapter 10).This has beenpartlydue to thechallenging taskofclarifyingboundariesand landtitles(Chapter 9). The establishment of new laws and, where necessary, newinstitutionsistakingtime.Asaresult,theintendednextstage–scalingup–hasbeendelayed.

Local communities are often positive towards REDD+ in the expectationthat itmight provide themwith income.However, the findings presentedin Chapter 11 suggest that villagers largely perceive REDD+ as a forestconservation effort. The uncertainty about the magnitude and forms ofbenefitsthatREDD+willbringisnotable:thereisgenerallynoagreednationalpolicyonwhen,howmuchandbywhatmeanslocalpeoplewillbepaid.Pilotprojects canmakepayments, but there isnoguarantee that thisprecedentwillbe followed in the future.While thirdpartyverificationoftenrequiresfree,priorandinformedconsent(FPIC)bylocalcommunities(seeChapter17),inmanycasesthebasicquestion–‘consentforwhat?’–isunanswered.Untilnationalgovernmentshaveestablishedwhat,ifany,paymentsorotherbenefitslocalpeoplewillreceive,FPICseemstobeanimpossiblepreconditionto satisfy. There is a substantial risk that high expectations created at thelocallevelwillnotbesatisfied,leadingtodisenchantmentandperhapsevenrejectionofthescheme.

Insummary,thebenefitsthatREDD+willbringtothelocallevel,whereitdirectlyaffectspeople’slivelihoods,areuncertain.Atoneendofthewiderangeofpossibilities is that localpeoplewillbenefit,bothbyhaving their rightstotheforestsecuredandbyreceivingsubstantialfinancialcompensationfortheireffortstoreducedeforestationandforestdegradation.Attheotherend,a‘worstcase’scenario,fearedbysomevillagersandindigenousrightsgroups,isthatnotonlywilltheyreceivelittleornopayment,theywillevenlosetheirtraditionalrightstoforestresources.

3.4 The evolution of REDD+: Four key trends AfteraninitialgrandconsensusabouttheideaofREDD+,theconcepthasbecomeadaptedandreconfiguredasaresultofemergingconflictsofinterestandthelackofanewinternationalclimateagreement.Thissectionfocuseson

Understanding REDD+42 |

fourkeytrendsintheevolutionoftheREDD+ideaandhowithaschanged,intermsofobjectives,policy,scaleandfunding,sinceREDD+enteredtheglobalclimatediscussionsin2005.

3.4.1 From single to multiple objectives The ultimate objective of theUNFCCC, as expressed in Article 2, is the“stabilisationofgreenhousegasconcentrationsintheatmosphereatalevelthatwouldpreventdangerousanthropogenicinterferencewiththeclimatesystem”(UNFCCC1992).Initially,thiswasalsotheprincipalobjectiveofREDD+.After2005,otherobjectiveswereadded,suchasprotectingbiodiversityandreducingpoverty/enhancinglocallivelihoods.Stillmoreso-calledco-benefitshave since been added: strengthening indigenous rights, better governanceandhighercapacityforclimateadaptation.REDD+isalsoincreasinglylinkedtotheagriculture–climateagenda.Ithasthereforegonefromhavingsingletomultipleobjectives;anironicillustrationofthisisthetitleofaREDD+side-eventduringCOP17inDurbaninDecember2011:‘Carbonasaco-benefit’!

The push to include biodiversity in REDD+ has largely come from thebig international conservation NGOs.While the climate and biodiversityobjectivesarehighlyoverlapping(Strassburget al.2010),newflowsoffundingforREDD+projectsalsoprovideanopportunitytofundongoingconservationactivities(modifiedifnecessary).ThedrivetoincludedevelopmentobjectivesinREDD+hascomefromseveralsources.DevelopmentNGOshaveplayeda similar role inREDD+ areas as that playedby environmentalNGOs inbiodiversitynegotiations.Inaddition,mostinternationalfundingforREDD+isdrawnfromaidbudgets,whichhavedevelopmentandpovertyreductionastheirmaingoals.

Many fear thatREDD+ isbecomingoverloadedwithgood intentionsandthat this will reduce its effectiveness. We share this concern, but we alsoarguethatthekeytotheultimatesuccessofREDD+liesincombiningtheconservationanddevelopmentobjectivesofsustainabledevelopment.Bothinthenationalpolicyarenaandinlocalimplementation,REDD+mustdeliveronbothfrontstobesuccessful(Chapters2,5and11).

3.4.2 From PES to broader policies to forest policies and projects? REDD+ was initially envisioned as a multilevel PES system (Angelsen andWertz-Kanounnikoff2008),whichhascriticaladvantages.Theincentivesarestronganddirect(Wunder2005).SincePESisvoluntary,forestuserswilloptforconservationonlyifthenetbenefitsarehigherthanthosearisingfromforestexploitation,thusalocalwin–winoutcomeis,atleastintheory,guaranteed.

| 43The evolution of REDD+

Creating a market for environmental services presupposes four criticalelements:theexistenceofaquantifiablecommodityorservice,buyers,sellersandamarketplacewithassociatedrulesandregulations(seeBox3.2).TheseelementsarenotyetinplaceinmostREDD+countries:thecommodityishardtoquantify,thesellersarenotwelldefined,thebigbuyersdonotexistandtherulesofthegamearenotwellestablished.Designingandimplementingasystemthatdirectlyrewardsemissionreductions(andremovals)byindividuals,householdsorgroupsthereforeremainsamajorhurdle.

Besides the many practical issues related to implementing a PES system,it also has ideological opposition. Building on a tradition going back toPolanyi(1944),REDD+hasbeencriticisedasanexampleoftheincreasingprivatisationandmarketingofnature (Lohmann2012:85).For some,PESrepresentsasystemof‘capitalismintheforest,’11withthepotentialforelitestodefinecarbonrightsandbenefitsharing.

While these fears may not be fully justified, REDD+ does constitute aparadox.Itseekstoreducepovertyandimprovethelivesofpoorpeoplebycompensatingthemforreducingcarbonemissions.Yet,inreality,large-scalecommercialactors,notthepoor,accountforthelargestshareofdeforestation(Rudel2007).Thus,thelion’sshareoffundingshould–followingREDD+’scoreprinciple–gotocompaniesandpeoplewhoarenotpoor.Nevertheless,preliminary observations of REDD+ policies suggest that these largecommercialactorswillnotbefullycompensatedfortheiropportunitycosts;earlylessonsfromPESprogrammessuggestthattheyhave,ifanything,apro-poorbias(Bond et al.2009).

Projectproponentshaveadoptedahybridmodel(Chapter10),wheresomeformofpaymenttolocalpeopleisonlyoneofseveralelementsoftheirstrategy.Atthenationallevel, ithaslongbeenrecognisedthatREDD+needstogobeyondPEStoinvolveabroadsetofpolicies.ThiswasthecentralmessageinapreviousCIFORbook,‘RealisingREDD+’ (Angelsenet al.2009),whichdistinguishedamongthreebroadsetsofpoliciesseekingtocreateincentivesforforestconservation:1. Policies affecting the agricultural rent, i.e. the profitability of forest

conversion,suchasagriculturalsubsidiesandtaxes,technologicalchangeandinfrastructure

2. Policiesregulatingtheforest rentandthecapturingofthatrentbyforestusersthroughschemessuchasPESandcommunityforestmanagement

3. Direct regulations,intheformofcreationandenforcementofprotectedareas,landuseplanningandconcessionpolicies.

11Sloganonbuttonsobservedatclimatemeetings.

Understanding REDD+44 |

Box 3.2 Preconditions for a market for REDD+ credits

A market for REDD+ credits (or a PES system to reduce deforestation and forest degradation) rests on four pillars:

A quantifiable commodity: The commodity or service being traded in carbon markets is emission reductions. An emission reduction is defined as the difference between actual emissions and a business as usual baseline. Thus the commodity has two aspects: i) the actual emissions must be measured, reported and verified; and ii) a point of reference must be established through a business as usual baseline in order to allow the measurement of the impact on emission or removals as a result of REDD+ actions by the service provider. To further complicate matters, the parties may agree to set the benchmark for payments differently from the business as usual baseline, based on considerations of effective and efficient use of limited REDD+ funds or differentiated responsibilities (Chapter 16).

A number of sellers (service providers): Who are the service providers, and – more specifically – who has the rights to sell emission reductions from forests? In an idealised PES scheme, the owners of the forest carbon are the sellers, who will be defined by national law. While this raises major questions concerning benefit sharing (Chapter 8), it is at least conceptually simple. More complex issues arise when REDD+ is implemented at the national level through a broad set of policies, e.g. the establishment of protected areas or the Indonesian moratorium on land use conversion (Box 2.1). Who has the rights to any international payment for emission reductions: the smallholder farmer and the palm oil company that has lost income, the agencies implementing the policy or society at large?

A number of buyers: The buyers of REDD+ credits will come from three principal sources: i) public funding, including development aid, in a performance-based system; ii) private voluntary funding, as in voluntary markets, including corporate social responsibility purchases; and iii) public or private entities that buy REDD+ credits to comply with emissions restrictions using REDD+ as offsets. REDD+ funding so far has fallen into category i), while the potential for large-scale funding is mainly to be found in category iii) (Chapter 7).

Established market institutions: Rules and regulations provide the legal bases for a carbon market or PES. Institutions are needed to manage the flow of information on changes in forest carbon stocks and the flow of money to reward these changes. Two institutions are needed to make the system work: an independent body to verify or certify the emission reductions and a mechanism and an authority to handle REDD+ money flows that incentivise and compensate for these changes. These bodies must have some autonomy from government to ensure their objectivity and transparency. Establishing credible channels for international funding is time consuming and politically sensitive, which can explain the simultaneous existence of both a funding gap and a disbursement problem in REDD+ (Chapter 7).

| 45The evolution of REDD+

Someof thesepolicies conflictwithother objectives, including the aim toincreaseagriculturalproductionandfoodsecurityandarethereforepoliticallydifficulttoimplement(Angelsen2010b).Furthermore,evenifthenetgainto society ispositive, suchpolicy reformswouldcreatewinners and losers,withthepotential losersoftenhavingsufficientpowertoblockthereforms(Chapter5).

At thenational level, it seems too early topredictwhichREDD+policiescountrieswillpursue.Ourearlyobservations suggesta strongemphasisonstrengtheninglocallevelinstitutions,encouragingparticipationandsecuringrights,agriculturalintensificationandlanduseplanning,includingconcessionpoliciesandprotectedareas.PESschemesaremainlyatanexperimentalstage,andatalocalscale,withsomenotableexceptionsinseveralLatinAmericancountriesthatpredateREDD+(e.g.Kaimowitz2008).

Inshort,REDD+wassupposedtobedrivenmainlybyPES.AlthoughmostproponentsatthelocallevelaimtoimplementPESorPES-likesystems,thesemaytaketheformofbroadpaymentschemes,ratherthanspecificincentivestoindividualusersforreducingdeforestationandforestdegradation.Nationalpolicyreformswerealsocalledfor,butthesearecontroversial,withpowerfulpotentiallosersabletoblockthem.Thereareencouragingtrends,includingthe integration of the agriculture and forestry agendas and the nesting ofREDD+ in lowcarbondevelopmentplanning,but there is alsoa risk thatthefinaloutcomewillbeafewpolicieslimitedtowin–winsituationsandanarrowfocusonforestsectorpoliciesandlocalprojects.

3.4.3 From national to project focus – and back? A key premise of RED(D) when it was launched was its strong national,rather than subnational, focus.This was supported bymost early countrysubmissionstoUNFCCC(GuizolandAtmadja2008),notonlyongroundsofsovereignty,butalsobecausenationalapproacheswerethoughttobemoreeffective(Section2.2).REDD+wasperceivedtobeasignificantshiftfrompreviousproject-basedconservation:nownationalgovernmentswouldbetheleadingactorsinforestconservation.

So far (although theseare still earlydays),REDD+hasnotbroughtaboutsucha shift.Muchof theREDD+fundinghasbeenawarded to local andsubnationalinitiatives.Severalfactorscanexplainthisdevelopment.First,asnotedaboveandinChapter5,national-levelreformsoftenbringaboutwin–losesituations,withpowerfulgroupsstandingtolose.Second,theavailabilityofsubstantialdonorpledgescreatedthepressuretospendquickly,whichwasmatchedbyareadinessonthepartofconservationanddevelopmentNGOsto implementprojects (funding forwhich is still the ‘bread andbutter’ ofNGOs,inspiteoftheirstronginvolvementinpolicydebates).Third,donors

Understanding REDD+46 |

prefertofundconcreteprojectsorprogrammes,ratherthanpolicyreformswhereitismoredifficulttofollowthemoneyandbesureofitsenduse(seeChapter13).

PreliminaryfindingsfromCIFOR’sGCSprojectsuggest,however,thattheshiftfromanationaltoaprojectfocusmaynotcontinue.REDD+projectsare–asmanyhavedonebefore–findingthateffectiveactiononthegroundisblockedorconstrainedbynationalpoliciesand institutions.Thiscanbeillustratedbythecaseoftenure,discussedindetailinChapter9.Thepushwillthereforecontinuefornational-levelreforms,andmoreactiontoenablelinksbetweensubnationalactivitiesandnational-levelpolicydesigncanbeexpected(Chapter6).

3.4.4 Funding: From market to international public sources and national contributions IntheirsubmissionstotheUNFCCCin2007–2008,mostcountriesarguedforadualfundingapproach,wherepublicsourceswouldprovideshort-termfundingforcapacitybuilding,whilethelong-termfundingforresult-basedpaymentswouldcomefrommarkets(GuizolandAtmadja2008).The2007BaliActionPlanwas,intheviewofkeyactors,aplantomakeREDD+partofaglobalclimateagreementwhereREDD+creditscouldbeusedasoffsetsinaglobalcapandtradesystem.InCopenhagenin2009,COP15failedtodeliverthatagreement.InApril2009,attheinvitationofPrinceCharles,21worldleadersmettoestablishtheInformalWorkingGroup–InterimFinanceforREDD+ (IWG-IFR2009).ThisinitiativewasadirectresponsetotheneedforREDD+funding“untilthecarbonmarketcantakeover,”asaparticipantintheprocessremarkedtooneofthischapter’sauthors.Whileatthattimethetakeoverwasexpectedtohappenby2013,theDurbanPlatform(COP17)suggeststhatitmaynotoccurbefore2020.

TheprincipalreasonforthedelayedmarketfundingforREDD+relatestothelackofaglobalclimateagreementthatincludesREDD+credits,eitherasanoffsetmechanismorindirectlythrough,forexample,auctioningemissionallowances to generate revenues for a global REDD+ fund. Of the twopotentiallylargeregionalcarbonmarkets,theEUEmissionTradingServiceexcludesREDD+,whileaUScarbonmarketisyettomaterialise.However,smaller regional carbon markets may gradually provide some funding forREDD+(Chapter7).

Marketfundingiscontroversial,especiallywhenREDD+creditsareusedasoffsets (i.e. to allow a country or company to count them as part of theirmandatoryemissionreductions).Theoppositionhaspartlybeenideological,arguing that it is immoral to pay others to allow oneself to continue topollute.Arelatedconcernismarketflooding,i.e.cheapREDD+creditsthat

| 47The evolution of REDD+

couldlowerthecarbonmarketpriceandcrowdoutmitigationinfossilfuelsectors.AmajorchallengeistoregulatetherateofintroductionofREDD+creditsintocarbonmarketsbyadjustingtheoverallcapastheyareintroduced(Angelsen et al.2012).

Expectationsofprivate fundinghavealsobeenhigh;but again, thesewerebased on unfounded assumptions. Private funding can be split into threecategories: i) corporate social responsibility; ii) investments for profit; andiii)offsetstocomplywithgovernmentregulations.TheamountofcorporatesocialresponsibilityfundingforREDD+hasbeenlimited,andfarlessthanthe public relations andmedia coveragewould suggest.Voluntarymarketsarerelativelyhealthy,buttheoverallvolumeistinyandlikelytoremainso(Diazet al.2011).Profitablebusinessopportunitiesinavoideddeforestationandforestdegradationmayexistintheformofnon-consumptiveforestuses(e.g. ecotourism) or green products (e.g. shade-grown coffee), but are not‘lowhanging fruits’.Themain potential source of private funding is fromoffsetting,but,asnoted,thatpresupposestheexistenceoftightemissionscapsandanopeningforREDD+offsetting.

ThemajorinternationalfundingforREDD+intheshorttomediumtermmustthereforecomefrompublicsourcesinAnnexIcountries.Twothirdsofthe internationalpublic fundingprovidedso farhasbeendevelopmentaidthroughbilateralandmultilateralchannels(seeChapter7foranoverviewoffundingsources).

Asidefromtheshiftinfocusfrommarketstothepublicsector,thesecondmajordevelopmentinthethinkingonREDD+fundingisashiftfromNorthto South, fromAnnex 1 to non-Annex 1 countries.TheBali Action Plan(UNFCCC2007)stressedthatREDD+isconcernedwith“policyapproachesandpositiveincentives…”,withpositiveincentivesinterpretedbymanytoimplyfullcompensationtodevelopingcountries.Thismarkedlydiffersfromthe Durban Platform (UNFCCC 2011d), which “…decides to launch aprocesstodevelopaprotocol,anotherlegalinstrumentoranagreedoutcomewith legal forceunder theUNFCCCapplicable to all Parties…” (emphasisadded).Thisdecisioncouldendupbeingawatershedinclimatenegotiations,includingforREDD+.TheshiftfromREDD+beingpredominantlyasystemofpaymentsfromNorthtoSouthforreducedforestemissions,toonethatisperceivedasasharedresponsibility,isduetoanumberoffactors.

First,thedistinctionbetweenAnnexIandnon-Annex1isoutdated.Dozensofnon-AnnexIcountriestodayhavehigherper capitaincomesthanthepoorestAnnex1country.China,anon-Annex1country,nowoccupiesthefirstpositioninGHGemissionsandmanyothernon-AnnexIcountrieshavehigheremissionsper capitathanthelowestemittingAnnexIcountries(IEA2011).Mostfuturegrowthinemissionswillcomefromfastgrowing,middle-incomenon-AnnexI

Understanding REDD+48 |

countriesanditishighlyunlikelythatthetargetoflimitingglobaltemperatureincrease to two degrees will be reached without strong commitments fromthese countries. Second,manymiddle income countries havemade pledgesanddevelopedstrategiesforreducingemissionsascomparedtoabusinessasusualscenario.12REDD+isbeingincorporatedintothesenationallow-carbondevelopmentstrategies.Third,internationalmechanismsareunlikelytobeableto fully compensatedevelopingcountries forREDD+costs.Notonly is thefundinginadequate,butthere isa lackofwillingness–atbothnationalandinternationallevels–tofullycompensateagroindustriesforlostincomefromstoppingbusinessasusualforestconversions.Alargeshareoftheopportunitycostsofa successfulREDD+ is therefore likely tobeborneby, forexample,oilpalmandsoyproducers.Fourth,REDD+cannotsucceedwithoutastrongcommitmentfromtheREDD+countries.

Insum,manyofthecostsofREDD+willhavetobebornebydomesticactors,includinggovernmentsatvariouslevels,whoareresponsibleforplanningandimplementingREDD+ and perhaps also for paying compensation for lostopportunities.Inaddition,itislikelythatanumberofdomesticactors–suchasagroindustriesandminingcompanies–willnotbecompensatedfortheiropportunitycosts.

3.5 Why does it matter if REDD+ has changed? REDD+ has undergone significant changes for three main reasons. First,therehasbeenalearningandmaturationprocess.Someinitialideasprovedunrealistic,e.g.therapidcreationofPESsystemsthatcouldfullyincentiviseand compensate forest users for their reduced emissions. These ideasnevertheless spurred the initial REDD+ enthusiasm, and this optimism –borderingonnaivety–mayhave ledtothecreationofnewcoalitionsandinnovativesolutionstoburningclimateproblems.

Second, REDD+ was optimistically expected to become part of aninternationalclimateagreementthatwouldpromptmajorsourcesoffundingthroughcarbonmarkets.Thateventualityhasbeenpostponeduntilatleast2020, which means that international REDD+ funding may never reachthescaleoriginallyenvisioned.Asaresult,REDD+policieswillnecessarilyhave to reflect the fact that full compensation will be too expensive andmostinternationalfundingintheshorttomediumtermwillcomefromaidbudgets,withtheirownobjectivesandlogic,andfromdomesticsources.

Third, two forces have modified the idea of REDD+: business as usualinterestshaveformedastrongoppositiontopolicyreformsandhavelimited

12http://www.unep.org/climatepledges/

| 49The evolution of REDD+

thepoliticalactionspace.Atthesametime,supportersofREDD+havehadsuchdiffering interests thatboth theendsand themeansofREDD+havebeenreconfigured;someNGOs,forexamplehavepromoteditprimarilyasameanstosecureindigenouslandrights.

REDD+isnotaclearlydefined,consistentidea.Ifitweretrulymarket-based,therewouldnecessarilybeanagreeddefinition: everyonebuyingor sellingwouldhavetohaveacommonunderstandingandastandardisedcommodityto trade. Because that is not the case, the meaning of REDD+ can beinterpretedindifferentwaysand,asaresult,isbeingcontinuallynegotiatedbydifferentinterestsatinternational,nationalandlocallevels.RichcountriesmayhaveaninterestintryingtoreachagreementonwhatREDD+shoulddo,buttheprocessofreachingsuchanagreementisflawed.Countriesbeingpaidtoreducetheiremissionsmay,arguably,haveaninterestinnotcomingtoacommonunderstandingandtheycertainlyhavevaryingdegreesofpowertodeterminehowREDD+isputintopractice.Aslongasoneorafewrichcountries (or foundationsorcompanies)arewilling topay themto reduceemissions,whyshouldtheyneedtoagreeonacommonpracticeforall?

Where does this leave us? REDD+ seems to have lost some of the initialcharacteristicsthatmadeitsuchanoveltyandencouragedsuchhighhopes.Nowitriskslosingtheessentialfeatureofresult-basedpaymentsandnational-levelreformsandbecomingmerelyanotherformofdevelopmentassistanceinsupportofconventionalforestmanagementprojectswithabroadrangeofobjectives.Themostbasicquestionremains:canREDD+significantlyreduceemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationandwhatwillittaketomakeitdifferentfrompastefforts?

4Chapter

REDD+ and the global economyCompeting forces and policy options Pablo Pacheco, Louis Putzel, Krystof Obidzinski and George Schoneveld

• Globalisation and market and financial liberalisation have increased theexposureofforeststoglobaltradeandinvestment,whichhasaggravatedthehistoricaltrendsofdeforestationandforestdegradation.

• ThemainforcesthatcompetewithREDD+includeagrowingintegrationoffood,energyandfinancialmarkets,anincreasinglevelandvolatilityofcommodityprices,andanewwaveoflarge-scaleinvestmentsinagriculture.

• ForREDD+toreducepressuresonforests,whilestimulatingthetransitiontomoreequitableandsustainabledevelopment,measuresareneededonthesupplyanddemandsidetostimulatetheadoptionofforest-conservinglanduses,de-incentivisetheconversionofforestlands,andincentiviseincreasedproductiononnon-forestlands.

4.1 Introduction Thechallengesofreducinggreenhousegas(GHG)emissions,whilefeedingagrowingpopulationandmeetingglobaldemandforfibreandenergy,areattractingincreasingattention(Kissinger2011;Wollenberget al.2011).Thischapterpresentsanoverviewofcurrenttradeandinvestment-relateddrivers

Understanding REDD+52 |

ofdeforestationandforestdegradationinthetropicsandthewaysinwhichthey serve as obstacles to REDD+ implementation, with a closer look atthreeregions.Inaddition,wesuggestpolicyoptionsthatcouldhelptackletheseglobaldriversbymakingeconomicgrowthmorecompatiblewithforestconservation.

Thediscussionisorganisedaroundthreequestions:1. What are themain economicdrivers and trends shapingdeforestation

and forest degradation in the tropics that represent major obstaclestoREDD+?

2. Whichaspectsoftheseeconomicdriversrepresentthegreatestchallengesto reducing deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia, theBrazilianAmazonandEastAfrica?

3. WhatpolicyapproacheswouldbemosteffectiveforreducingtheeffectsoftheseforcesonforestsandwhataretheimplicationsforREDD+?

Deforestation has historically been linked to economic development,populationgrowthandtheassociateddemandsforfood,fibreandenergy.Wearguethatthereareanumberofcontemporarydrivers,stronglyrelatedto globalmarkets and investment, that lead to increased competition forland,includingforestlandinthetropics.Thesedriversincludetheincreasedintegrationoffood,fibre,energyandfinancialmarkets;highpricevolatilityandhigher commodity prices; and a transnational land rush.Theymakeattempts to reduce carbon emissions through REDD+more challengingsince, directly and indirectly, these drivers stimulate the conversion offorestlandtoagriculturaluseandincreaseloggingactivitiesthatoftenleadtoforestdegradation.Nonetheless,thereareimportantregionalvariationsinhowthesedriversaffectforests,asourassessmentsfromIndonesia, theBrazilianAmazonandEastAfricashow.

WeadoptabroaddefinitionofREDD+tomeanthearrayofpolicies thatprimarily aim to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forestdegradationandmayalsoincluderesult-basedincentivesandcompensation(see Chapter 1). Many factors affect the implementation of REDD+. Inthischapter,wefocusontheglobaleconomicdriversandtrendsshapedbymarkets and public policies – in consumer and producer countries – thatbringaboutchanges in landuse, thusaffecting forestcoverandquality. Inorder to make REDD+ policies more effective, we must consider globaleconomic dynamics and their interactions with political and institutionalconditionsatthenationallevel.Onthesupplyside,arealignmentofmarketincentives and regulations is needed to reorient economic development intropicaldevelopingcountriesinordertoreconcilefoodandenergyprovisionwithforestconservation,alongwithpolicyactionsonthedemandside.

| 53REDD+ and the global economy

4.2 Economic drivers and trends competing with REDD+Anumberoffactorsandconditionsatdifferentscalesinfluencethedynamicsof deforestation and forest degradation. Figure 4.1 shows themain globaleconomic forces and the economic and environmental policies in bothconsumerandproducercountriesthatshapecompetitionbetweenlandusesandhaveimplicationsforREDD+.Theseforcesrepresentdifferenteconomic

Figure 4.1 Simplified diagram of the global economic forces and policies in consumer and producer countries shaping land use competition with implications for REDD+

Markets

Policies

Outcomes

Responses

Notes:

Policies in consumer countries• Economic incentives to expand

biofuel supply (+/–)• Procurement policies for

ensuring sustainable supply (+)• Incentives for investments

abroad to secure supply (–)

Policies in producer countries• Land allocation (+/–)• Incentives for agriculture (+/–)• Investment policies (+/-)• Land use regulations (+)• Infrastructure development (-)

Outcomes with effects on REDD+• Increased land use competition

in tropical forest landscapes (–)• Higher opportunity costs for

REDD+ implementation (–)• Growing economic benefits

with unequal benefit sharing (+/–)

Core causality interactionsIndirect interactions

(+) Factor expected to contribute positively to REDD+(–) Factor expected to contribute negatively to REDD+

Triggers of land use competition • Greater market integration of

food, energy and finance (+/–)• Price increases, price volatility

and financial speculation (–)• Large-scale investments linked

to plantation models (–)

Main structural market conditions• Liberalisation of global trade (+/–)• Expansion of global demand and

changes in demand composition (–)• Multipolarity with changes in

production centers (+/–)

Actions to be supported by REDD+• Supply side: compensate for

forest-conserving and forest expanding uses, and incentivise production in non-forest lands

• Demand side: procurement policies linked to certification and responsible investment policies

Understanding REDD+54 |

intereststhatcontributetotheconfigurationoftheinstitutionalandpoliticalarrangementsshapinglandandforestuse,andthushavedirectimplicationsforlanduseopportunitycosts.REDD+policiesneedtoaddresstheseforcesinordertoeffectivelyreducedeforestationanddegradationandthuscarbonemissions.

Overtime,therehasbeenamajorgrowthinthehumanpressureonforeststomeetdemandsforfoodandfibreinassociationwiththeriseofeconomiesandsocieties(Lambinet al.2003).Whileforestscoveredabout50%oftheearth’slandarea8000yearsago,todayonly30%oflandisforested(Ball2001).Inthelastthreedecades,globalisationandmarketliberalisationhavestimulatedgreaterinterconnectednessofmarketsandintensifiedtradeandcapitalflows,notonlybetweentheNorthandtheSouth,butalsoamongsoutherncountries(Khor2000).Thelatterhastakenplaceinthecontextofasteadyexpansionof global demand for food, energy and materials associated with increasedconsumer demand (Tilman et al. 2011), largely influenced by emergingeconomiessuchasBrazil,Russia,IndiaandChina(BRIC).Furthermore,themigrationofindustrialproductiontoemergingeconomies(especiallyinAsia)hasincreasedmultipolarityintheglobaleconomicsystem,redirectingglobalnaturalresourcesupplychains(WorldBank2011),whichhasimplicationsforgloballanduse(Rudelet al.2009).

The impacts of global economicprocesses on landuse change, and thusonforestconversion,arebothdirectandindirect,andincreasinglyinfluencedbyregional interdependenciesmediatedby international trade (Meyfroidt et al.2010,PfaffandWalker2010).Higher consumption in somecountriesmaylead to greater land use change in other countries. Land use dynamics areinfluencedbypolicydecisionsinconsumerandproducercountries.Boxes4.1and4.2illustratetheeffectsofpolicydecisionsinconsumercountries,suchastherenewableenergypolicyintheEuropeanUnion(EU),andthedomesticloggingbaninChina.Examplesofpoliciesimplementedbyproducercountries(e.g. landtenure,incentivesforagriculture,investmentpoliciesandlanduseregulations)arediscussedindetailinSection4.3.

Thestructuralmarkettrendsdescribedabove,intheirinteractionswithpoliciesinbothconsumerandproducercountries,havecontributedtotheemergenceofthreeglobaltrendsthatconstitutethemaineconomictriggersofcontemporarylandusechange:• A growing integration of food, fibre and energy markets causing changes

in supply and demand in one market to affect others (Roberts 2008;Naylor2011)

• Persistentprice volatilityinglobalfoodandagriculturalmarketsthatoccurswithinageneraltrendofincreasingprices,whichisinpartassociatedwiththe‘financialisation’ofcommoditymarkets(UNCTAD2009;Falkowski2011)

• Atrendoflarge-scaleland acquisition,whichisstronglyassociatedwiththetwoprecedingtrends(HLPE2011;Anseeuw et al.2012).

| 55REDD+ and the global economy

Box 4.1 Biofuel markets, the EU Renewable Energy Directive and forestsFrancis X. Johnson

The EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU-RED) established targets for 2020, including a target of 10% renewable energy in the transport sector in all Member States (EC 2009). Biofuels used to achieve the target must meet specific sustainability criteria. These include restrictions on the types of land used for production, minimum GHG reduction levels and a prohibition on clearing forests or using lands with high carbon stocks or high biodiversity for biofuel production. Biofuel certification schemes recognised by the EC include provisions to prevent the conversion of such lands into feedstocks for biofuels.

The EU-RED does address deforestation due to direct land use change. However, indirect land use change (iLUC) is not yet explicitly considered. ILUC results from the physical and economic effects of increased demand for land associated with biofuel production. For example, when biofuel feedstocks are grown on agricultural land, food production may be displaced to other parts of the world. The iLUC impacts on GHG emissions resulting from the EU-RED directive are likely to be the most contentious aspect of incentives for biofuel development as part of renewable energy policies. In 2011, the European Commission delayed a decision on whether to address iLUC factors.

Most studies suggest that biofuel development places greater pressures on land as result of iLUC (e.g. Edwards et al. 2010). A recent estimate indicates that an additional 5.2 million hectares of cropland will be needed globally by 2020, as compared to a baseline scenario without the EU-RED directive. About 11% of this additional expansion is estimated to take place in open forests and 30% in closed forestlands (Fonseca et al. 2010).

Expanding biofuel markets offer economic opportunities for developing countries to export to the EU and to develop their domestic markets. The high productivity of biomass in tropical and subtropical regions can result in lower land use impacts and lower GHG emissions than result from biofuels produced in the EU. Biofuel incentives in developing countries could be linked to REDD+, providing livelihoods for poor rural communities and stabilising the agricultural frontier, while reducing land use change and GHG emissions (Killeen et al. 2011). Developing countries may, however, face higher costs in meeting the sustainability criteria, due to the lack of technical, financial and human resources to support certification (Johnson et al. 2012).

Understanding REDD+56 |

Box 4.2 China’s domestic logging ban and demand for African timber

In 1998, China instituted a domestic logging ban to protect its natural forests (Liu and Diamond 2005; Wang et al. 2007; Laurance 2008). Around the same time, the Asian financial crisis resulted in cash shortfalls in Japan and elsewhere and China soon became the world’s largest consumer of tropical logs and semi-processed timber. New supply chains were established connecting China to timber supplies in Southeast Asia, Africa and South America. Lower tariffs on imported wood and the revocation of import license requirements facilitated this trend and attracted foreign direct investment, which resulted in increased demand for timber (Lang and Chan 2006).

While China’s logging ban reduced domestic production by 30% between 1995 and 2003 (Lang and Chan 2006), it displaced deforestation and logging-related forest disturbance to other countries (Mayer et al. 2005). China’s increasing demand for logs and sawnwood has been particularly evident in Africa, where it now exceeds that of all developed nations combined. The demand for African timber results not only in higher export volumes, but also in other changes that are likely to cause an intensification of logging. The aggregate figures indicate a shift towards imports of more highly processed wood by developed countries and a continued preference for less processed wood by the Chinese market, although imports of processed wood are increasing.

Between 1991 and 2006, timber exports from Gabon to China increased by over 8000% while exports to France, formerly the largest market, fell by more than half. Gabon’s log production increased to an all time high of 2.5 million cubic metres annually (Terheggen 2010). At the same time, the Chinese market demands a greater number of species than do other markets (Putzel 2010; Terheggen 2010; Cerutti et al. 2011). This combination of increased volume and greater harvest intensity has several consequences. First, while less selectivity alone might mean a slower expansion of logging, in combination with higher demand it is more likely to result in greater forest degradation. Second, until both exporting and importing countries control illegal logging and timber exports, higher demand for a greater number of species may result in pressure on forests that are not allocated for logging, complicating the implementation of REDD+.

These trends place pressures on land, with impacts on forests throughcomplexinteractions.Estimatesonhowmuchdeforestationforagriculturalexpansioncontributestoglobalfoodandenergysupplyarestillcontroversial.Forexample,Gibbset al.(2010),usingremotesensinganalysisacrossmajortropicalregions,suggestthatabout55%ofthe100millionhectaresoflandconverted to agriculture in the 1980s and 1990s were at the expense of

| 57REDD+ and the global economy

‘intact’ forests. In turn,Angelsen (2010b), based ondata from theFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations(FAO),suggeststhat,at the global level, less than 10%of total crop and livestock productionbetween 1985 and 2004was on newly deforested lands.Taken together,theseestimatessuggestthatalthoughhistorically,clearingforestsprobablyaccountsforarelativelysmallportionoftheincreasedglobalfoodsupply,muchofthenewagriculturallandtendstooccurattheexpenseofforests.Globaldemandforfoodandenergyisexpectedtofurther increaseastheworldpopulationgrows from its current level of7billion in2011 to anestimated9billionin2050(RoyalSociety2012).

4.3 A regional look at the forces shaping land use dynamicsThis section examines the trends introduced in Section 4.2 and theirimplicationsfordeforestationanddegradationandREDD+implementationinthreeregions:IndonesiainSoutheastAsia,theBrazilianAmazonandEastAfrica.Weemphasise the influence that interactions among economic andpolicy factors and global markets and investments have on increasing ordecreasing pressure on forestlands.We also assess the opportunity costs ofalternativelandusesinthesethreeregionsinordertoindicatethepotentialcostsofaperformance-basedcompensationsystem(i.e.aPES-likescheme)under aREDD+ policy framework. Finally, we look at some of themainpolicyresponsesadoptedbythesecountriestotackledeforestation.

4.3.1 Forces shaping land use dynamics in IndonesiaInIndonesia,largescaleprojectsinforestry,oilpalmandfoodproductionare expected to expand to about 17 million hectares in order to meetgovernmenttargets.Anadditional3millionhectareswillberequiredifcoalproductiondoubles, as predicted, by2025 (Bahroeny2009; Suparno andAfrida 2009; Tragistina 2011). The expected economic gains from theseinvestmentsaresignificant.Forexample,in2011,exportofpulpandpaper,crudepalmoilandcoalrepresentedaboutUS$35billion(US$4billion,US$9billion,andUS$22billionrespectively),orabout20%oftotalexportvalue(COMTRADE2012).

Thegrowingdemandforpalmoil(bothforfoodandbiofuel)isakeydriverof deforestation in Indonesia (Box 4.3), but large-scale land investmentsalsotargetothercommodities,suchastimberorcoal,underatrendofpriceincreasesintheinternationalmarkets(Inamuraet al.2011).Inrecentyears,coalmininghasbecomeanimportantdriveroflarge-scalelandacquisitioninIndonesia.Coalproductionhasalmostquadrupledoverthelasttenyearsandtheareaoccupiedbyminingconcessionshasexpandedrapidly(MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources2010;Tragistina2011).Currently,miningconcessions cover about 5 million hectares in Kalimantan and Sumatra;

Understanding REDD+58 |

Box 4.3 Oil palm, food and biofuels in Indonesia

Over the past decade, Indonesia’s oil palm sector has experienced tremendous growth. Between 1990 and 2010, the area occupied by plantations increased seven-fold from 1.1 million hectares to 7.8 million hectares (Sheil et al. 2009; Direktorat Jenderal Perkebunan 2011). At the end of 2011, Indonesia’s production of crude palm oil (CPO) reached 23.6 million tonnes, which accounts for approximately 45% of global output (Slette and Wiyono 2011). Annually, the export of CPO and derivatives generates over US $12 billion in foreign exchange earnings (Bahroeny 2009; World Bank 2010). The oil palm sector is also seen as a potential key to securing Indonesia’s energy needs through CPO-based biofuel production and an important source of employment in rural Indonesia.

Anticipating a doubling of global demand for palm oil by 2025, the Indonesian government plans to double its current CPO production of 23 million tonnes over the next decade, through intensification and by developing an additional 4 million hectares of oil palm plantation estates (Bahroeny 2009; Suparno and Afrida 2009; Kongsager and Reenberg 2012). There is concern that new expansion will target the secondary forest zone, which is exempt from the forest conversion moratorium in effect since 2011 (Boucher et al. 2011; Colchester and Chao 2011). While new investments are expected to work in partnership with local communities through outgrower schemes, questions remain about their value and effectiveness (McCarthy 2010).

Speculation about the expansion of both oil palm and timber plantations has led to concerns about national food security (Rusastra et al. 2008; Basuno and Weinberger 2011). Government planners estimate that over the next two decades at least 2 million hectares of new land will be needed to grow food for Indonesia’s growing population (Jakarta Post 2010). Early indications show that food estate investments are targeting significant areas of forested lands (Colchester and Chao 2011). This is likely to weaken the income and food security of forest-dependent people, cause resistance and conflict and contribute to increased levels of GHG emissions in Indonesia.

The negative outcomes of oil palm expansion can be minimised. Government planners need to enforce the forest conversion moratorium and ensure that new oil palm plantations are developed on non-forest lands. The concessions already allocated and found to contain significant forest cover should be subject to legal review. If the legal standing of these concessions is sound, the government should offer land swaps and tax incentives in order to exclude forested lands from them. Similar incentives should be used to support the intensification of production of CPO on existing plantations, rather than promoting their expansion. Wider adoption of Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) certification by companies would be particularly helpful, as it includes a carbon stock threshold above which forest clearance is not permitted.

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abouthalfofthemarelocatedinforestlands.Whilebylawonlyabout20%ofthetotalconcessionarea,or1millionhectares,maybeclearedtoenabletheextractionofcoal,thislimitisrarelyrespected.

Timberplantationshaveexpandedrapidlyaswell.In2006,thegovernmentlaunchedanewpolicyseekingtoestablish9millionhectaresofnewtimberplantationsby2016.Although implementationhasbeenslow,due to landallocation problems and limited interest from small holders (ObidzinskiandDermawan2010),apositivemarketoutlookforpulpisdrivingfurtherinvestments.InApril2011,Indonesia’sMinistryofForestryannouncedlargenew investments in the pulp and timber plantation sector. The projectedinvestmentsincludesevennewpulpmills,withacapacityofnearly5milliontonnesandnearly2millionhectaresofnewtimberplantations,atanoverallcostofUS$14billion.Theseinvestmentsarelikelytoresultinmajorcarbonemissions(KoranKaltim2011).Whilethesetargetsmaybeambitious,theexistingpulpandpapermillshavecontinuedtoexpandtheircapacityand,asof2010,havereliedonnaturalforestsforhalfoftheirrawmaterialneeds(IWGFF2010).

ThedifficultiesofmakingREDD+economicallycompetitivecanbeillustratedby comparing it to oil palm plantations. Oil palm is among the fastestexpandingcommoditiesinthetropicsand,inIndonesia,oilpalmestatesaregrowingbyabout400000hectaresper annum (SletteandWiyono2011).EstimatesofthenetpresentvalueofoilpalmplantationsvarywidelyfromUS$4000toUS$29000perhectare(PerssonandAzar2009;WorldBank2010),althoughmost estimates converge in the range ofUS$6000–US$9000perhectare(Butler et al.2009).KeepingthesameareaforestedgeneratesUS$614–US$994incarboncredits(Butleret al.2009).Thisdisparityroughlydoublesifthevalueoftimberclearedintheprocessofestablishingplantationsis included in the calculationof foregonebenefits (Fisher et al.2011).Onaprojectbasis, it isunlikelythatcarbonpaymentscouldcompetewiththecombinedbenefitsfromtimberandoilpalmattheircurrentprices.However,therecouldbescopeforsynergywithREDD+.Thisisparticularlythecaseifgrowthintheplantationsectorismainlyachievedthoughtheintensificationofexistingplantationareas,iflandswapsareusedtomovesomeconcessionsontonon-forestland,andiflimitsonforestclearanceinminingconcessionsareenforced.

4.3.2 Forces shaping land use dynamics in the Brazilian AmazonBy 2010, the Brazilian Amazon had undergone deforestation equivalentto 75 million hectares, or about 18% of its original forest cover (INPE2011).Currently,44.6millionhectaresareunderpasture(62%ofthetotaldeforested area), while 3.5 million hectares constitute annual crops (5%

Understanding REDD+60 |

of the total deforested area),much ofwhich is under soybean production(EMBRAPA/INPE 2011). Since the early 1970s, forest clearing has beenrelatedtotheexpansionoflarge-scaleandextensivecattleranching(Margulis2004). In addition, since the early 2000s, there has been an expansion oflarge-scaleandcapital intensiveagriculture,mainly for soybeanproduction(Nepstadet al.2006).Selective logginghasoftenprecededagricultureoverlarge areas of primary forest (Chomitz et al. 2007). Deforestation peakedat 2.7 million hectares per year in 2004, decreasing gradually thereafterto 700 000hectares in 2010 (INPE2011).Deforestation in theBrazilianAmazonisrelatedtotheintegrationoftheregionintothenationaleconomy,connecting itmore strongly todemandand investment from the southernstates,aswellasfromglobalmarkets(Nepstadet al.2006;Walkeret al.2009).

Increasesininternationalpriceshavestimulatedtheproductionofbeefandsoybean(Box4.4).Othervariables,suchasexchangerates,havealsohadanimportant influenceonexportdynamics.Richards et al. (2012) argue thataboutathirdofcurrentsoybeanproductioninSouthAmerica,includinginBrazil,isaresponsetothedevaluationoflocalcurrenciesinthelate1990s.Incontrast,amorerecentdepreciationofthedollarandappreciationoftheBrazilian realmayhave counteracted a rise in global soybeanprices.Thus,deforestation tends to increase and decrease in line with oscillations ininternationalprices and exchange rates (Macedo et al. 2012).Governmentincentives for the expansion of biofuel supplies have also contributed togrowth in themarket for soybeans produced in Brazil, although still to aproportionatelylesserdegree(deAndradeandMiccolis2011).Forexample,estimatessuggestthat13–18%oftotaldeforestationinMatoGrossoisdueto soybeanproduction, although less than6%of this canbe attributed tobiodiesel,sincemostsoybeanisusedforotherproducts(Limaet al.2011).

Inthelate1990sandearly2000s,theintegrationoftheBrazilianAmazonwithnationalandglobalmarkets,atatimeofhigherpricesforagriculturalcommodities,increasedthepressureonforestsfromthecattleandsoysectors.Thisforestlosswasexacerbatedbyeconomicpoliciespromotingagriculturalmodernisation and agribusiness development (Chomitz et al. 2007).Furthermore,theexpansionofranchingandcommercialagriculturenotonlystimulated fragmentation of large-scale landholdings, but also contributedtoencroachmentonpubliclandsbyprivatelandholders,whoacquiredlandthrough semi-legalmeans, inpartdrivenby speculativepurposes (Pachecoand Poccard-Chapuis 2012). In response, the government expanded theareaofpublic forests assigned tovariousconservationcategories, includingsustainabledevelopmentreservesandprotectedareas(Mayet al.2011b).

Therateofdeforestationhasdecreasedsincethemid2000s.Severalfactorsexplainthistrend,includingthegrowingenforcementofenvironmentallaws,fluctuatingpricesofagriculturalcommodities,theimplementationofprivate

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Box 4.4 Beef and soybean in the Brazilian Amazon

Pasture development for beef production in the Amazon was, in the past, strongly related to the dynamics of the local markets. However, it now supplies more distant markets, reaching other regions in Brazil and global markets (da Veiga et al. 2004). The expansion of beef production has closely tracked population growth and increasing per capita beef consumption. In addition, Brazilian exports of beef have grown from 123 000 tonnes in 1990 to 1.4 million tonnes in 2008 (FAO Statistics 2012). In 2011, two-thirds of the exports went to Russia, Iran, Egypt and China. Although the Amazon region contributed only 15.4% to total beef exports in 2006, this share is increasing rapidly (Pacheco and Poccard-Chapuis 2012). While most beef exports originate in southeast and west-central Brazil, the growth in exports has created a gap in the domestic market, which is filled by beef from the Amazon (Kaimowitz et al. 2004). In recent years, there has been an important expansion of slaughterhouses in the Amazon region, due to the arrival of the main corporate actors in the Brazilian beef sector (Smeraldi and May 2009; Pacheco and Poccard-Chapuis 2012).

Soybean production in Brazil grew from 11.5 to 23.3 million hectares between 1990 and 2010. This growth is centred on Mato Grosso on the southwestern border of the Amazon, which had 10.4 million hectares under soy cultivation in 2010, a major portion in the cerrado (IBGE 2011). This growth was driven by the availability of cheap land, road expansion and access to new cultivation technologies (Kaimowitz and Smith 2001). The arrival of corporate traders (e.g. Archer Daniels Midland and Louis Dreyfus) and a large-scale Brazilian corporation (Grupo Maggi) have contributed to integrating the region in global markets (Baker 2004). While the domestic market is important in Brazil, a significant and increasing portion of production is devoted to export markets. About 70% of the soybean grain is processed in the country and the rest is exported; 47% of soybean cake and 60% of soybean oil are consumed inside Brazil. In 2011, 67% of Brazil’s soybean exports went to China and 69% of soybean cake to the EU (COMTRADE 2012). About 23% of soybean expansion in the period 2001–2004 occurred on cleared forestland, while the remainder was on established pastures (Morton et al. 2006). Nonetheless, soy expansion has displaced livestock further to the forest fringes (Barona et al. 2010, Arima et al. 2011) and expanding demand for biofuels could intensify this effect (Lapola et al. 2010).

Pacheco and Poccard-Chapuis (2012) suggest that several policy mechanisms could limit the expansion of extensive cattle ranching and help to close the frontier: i) designating public lands as protected areas and production forest. This has already effectively halted the expansion of extensive ranching into public forestland; ii) land use constraints defined through economic and ecological zoning. This has proven to be an effective deterrent to expansion in recent years; iii) intensification of existing ranching activities, with sufficient economic incentives; and iv) promotion of cattle ranching outside the Amazon biome. This will, however, displace the problem to the cerrado ecosystem, which is also under intense pressure from deforestation. These policies could be combined with the certification of beef production systems that comply with environmental regulations and use more sustainable production practices. Policy options i) and ii) also apply to soybean expansion. In addition, the moratorium on soybean production introduced in 2006 has been instrumental in inhibiting the expansion of the soybean frontier into forestlands (Rudorff et al. 2011).

Understanding REDD+62 |

initiatives to reduce deforestation (e.g. a soymoratorium inMatoGrossoandabanbysupermarketsinsouthernBrazilonbeeforiginatingonillegallyclearedlands)andpressuresfromsocialmovements(Hecht2012).AtighterenforcementofBrazilianenvironmentallawbetween2005and2009couldhavehelpedpreserveabouthalfoftheforestareathatwouldotherwisehavebeencleared(AssunçãoandGandour2012).

AnalysisoftheprospectsforREDD+implementationintheAmazonregionsuggests that some forest conversion in the Brazilian Amazon – such aslands under extensive cattle ranching – exhibits low per-hectare returns,whichcouldbecompensatedbycarbonoffsets.Börneret al.(2010)suggestthat roughlyhalf of projected forest loss in theperiod2009–2018 (55%or12.5millionhectares) exhibitsnet returns that couldbe compensatedby payments reflecting the current prices of temporary carbon creditsonvoluntarymarkets.The latterdoesnot take intoaccount the fact thatproductivityandprofitsfrombeefproductionhavebeengrowingovertime,thusincreasingtheopportunitycostsforlandusesthatleadtodeforestation(PachecoandPoccard-Chapuis2012).Thisisalsothecasefordeforestationprompted by soybean expansion, which is much more profitable thanextensive cattle ranching. Despite the low direct pressure from soybeanexpansiononprimaryforests,itindirectlyleadstosomeforestconversion(Lapolaet al.2010;Arimaet al.2011).

Acombinationoflawenforcementandeconomicincentivesarerequiredtoeffectively‘closethefrontier’intheBrazilianAmazoninordertoinfluencetheneedsandinterestsofdiverseactors,includingagro-extractivecommunities,smallholders and large-scale landholders.No ‘one size fits all’ approach toREDD+candeliverbothcosteffectivenessandequitywhendisparateactorswithdifferentneedsshapelandscapesinmultipleways(Pachecoet al.2011).

4.3.3 Forces shaping land use dynamics in East AfricaEast Africa currently faces one of the highest deforestation rates on thecontinent, exceeding 1% per year (FAO 2010). Deforestation has beenparticularly intense in Ethiopia, Kenya and Madagascar. Agriculturalexpansion,logging,charcoalproductionandovergrazinginthesemi-aridareasareconsideredtocontributetoforestloss(Bishaw2001;FAO2003;Olsonet al.2004;Taboret al.2010).Insub-SaharanAfrica,increasesinproductionaretypicallyassociatedwithanexpansionoftheareaundercultivationratherthangains in landuseefficiency(FAO2003).AccordingtoChomitzet al.(2007),directconversionofforestareatosmall-scalepermanentagricultureisassociatedwithpopulationincreaseandaccountsforapproximately60%oflandusechangeinAfrica.Inaddition,charcoalproduction,whichaccountsformorethan80%ofurbanhouseholdenergyconsumption,alsohasimpactsonforestdegradation(UNDESA2004).

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Globalmarketforcesmayincreasetheintensityoflandusecompetition.Forexample, despite dwindling timber reserves,Tanzania – East Africa’smostforestedcountry–reportsarapidriseintimberexportsbyalmost1300%inthedecade2000–2010,mostlydestinedfortheIndianandChinesemarkets(COMTRADE 2012). Milledge et al. (2007) estimate that, in the mainloggingareasofCoastalTanzania,between77and96%ofhighvaluetimberspecies are harvested illegally, primarily as a result of corruption and poorgovernmentcapacitytoenforceforestrylaws.Besidesgrowinginternationaldemand,greateraccessibilityasaresultofinfrastructuredevelopmentisarguedtobeacriticalenablingfactorforillegalharvesting(Taboret al.2010).SimilartrendshavebeenobservedinneighbouringMozambique(MacKenzie2006).

Additionally,asaresultoftherecentrushforAfrica’sland(Box4.5),largeareasofforestedandagriculturallandriskconversiontoplantationmonocultures.Duetotheavailabilityofcheap,agro-ecologicallysuitableland,sub-SaharanAfricahasbecometheleadingdestinationforlarge-scalefarmlandinvestments–accordingtosome–accountingforovertwo-thirdsthetotalgloballandareaacquiredforthispurposesincetheearly2000s(DeiningerandByerlee2011;HLPE 2011; Anseeuw et al. 2012).This is accompanied by an increasing‘financialisation’ofglobalcommoditymarketsandariseindedicatedfarmlandinvestment funds, illustrating the role of financial institutions speculatingonhighfuturereturnsinthesesectors(MerianResearchandCRBM2010;Knopfel 2011).Despite potential economic gains for host countries, theseinvestmentflowscompetedirectlywithconservation.Thereare indicationsthat commercial plantations on lands acquired for investors in Ethiopia,Kenya,TanzaniaandUgandawillexpand,tothedetrimentofforests(WWF2009;Mortimer2011).

Thesetypesofinvestmentsareenabledbyadomesticpoliticaleconomythatfavoursforeigndirectinvestment(FDI).TheopportunitycostsforREDD+arehigh,consideringthenetpresentvalueofcropssuchassugarcaneandoilpalm(Butleret al.2009;PerssonandAzar2010).Furthermore,whileFDIflowsto theagricultural sector threatentheeconomicviabilityofREDD+,higheconomicdependenceonestablisheddomesticcashcrops,suchascoffee,tea,cottonandcloves,willfurtherundermineeffortstocurbdeforestation.InEthiopia,Madagascar andTanzania, for example, theagricultural sectoraccountsformorethan80%ofexportearnings.WithrapidlyrisingdemandforEastAfricancashcropsfromlargeemergingeconomiesandexpectationsthat new agricultural FDI flows will add value by enhancing domesticprocessingcapacity,technologytransfersandimprovingsmallholderaccesstoglobalmarketingchannels,theremaybelittlelong-termpoliticaltractionforschemesthatrestrictexpansionoptions.

Understanding REDD+64 |

Box 4.5 Biofuel, food prices and land investments in sub-Saharan Africa

A significant process of large-scale farmland acquisition is underway in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Reliable empirical evidence as to its magnitude, distribution and underlying drivers is still scant. To address these knowledge gaps, Schoneveld (2011) verified 353 large-scale farmland projects exceeding 2000 hectares in size and established between 2005 and 2011. The analysis documents plantation agriculture and forestry projects across 32 countries in SSA, covering an area of 18.1 million hectares. A high level of geographic concentration was observed, with just seven countries accounting for almost two-thirds of the total acquired area (Zambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Liberia). In Ethiopia and Ghana, the threat that these acquisitions will compete with socially and environmentally valuable land uses is particularly high, as 43% (Ethiopia) and 62% (Ghana) of suitable and ‘available’ land has been transferred to investors since 2005. These threats are facilitated by weak domestic regulatory enforcement of investment and the fact that most of the acquired land originates from the customary land domain.

Sub-Saharan Africa is an attractive investment destination, due to the abundance of agroecologically suitable land and the possibility of leasing land at low rental rates (typically <5% of the rates in other countries with strong plantation agriculture sectors, such as Malaysia and Indonesia). This unprecedented rush for Africa’s farmland is also driven by exogenous factors. First, blending mandates in industrialised countries have guaranteed a stable market for biofuel. The resulting economic opportunities have encouraged investors to seek access to vast areas of land for cultivating biofuel feedstocks, such as Jatropha Curcas L. and sugarcane. European and North American proponents are responsible for more than 53% of the total area acquired in SSA and 71% of that area was acquired for biofuel feedstock cultivation.

The second main driver is the 2007–2008 increase in international food prices. This created two types of investors: those that are motivated by the profit potential of high food prices and supply constraints and actors, such as parastatals and sovereign wealth funds, that are more closely linked to the policy objective of their governments to reduce national exposure to food price fluctuations. The food projects they lead tend to be initiated by southern countries, whose domestic expansion capacity is especially constrained by the limited availability of suitable land. Southeast Asian oil palm producers and South Asian staple crop producers are therefore particularly prominent. The second largest investor group, Asia, accounts for 21% of the total area acquired, 78% of which is for the cultivation of food crops. These observations highlight how strongly transboundary investment flows are influenced by domestic policies and market conditions. Thus, both supply and demand-side regulations are required.

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4.4 Exploring policy options: What implications for REDD+?Theprevioustwosectionssuggestthatlong-termtrendsinpopulationgrowth,higherconsumerdemandand,morerecently,majorshiftsinglobalproduction,trade and technology are key to understanding the current dynamics ofdeforestationandforestdegradationintropicalcountries.Toworkeffectively,REDD+needstotackletheforest-relatedeffectsofthesetrendsandaddresseconomic drivers and policies in both consumer and producer countries,acknowledgingthattheymanifestthemselvesdifferentlyindifferentregions.Ingeneral,theseeconomicforceshaveincreasedpressureonthelandtomeetthegrowingdemandforfood,fibreandenergy.Thisdirectlyandindirectlyplaces pressure on the forestmargins, particularly in the tropics.Thus, inorderforREDD+policiestoachievetheirgoals,pathwaysmustbeadoptedthatreducepressuresonforests,butsupporteconomicgrowth.

Becauseofthefinancialmagnitudeandvolatilenatureoftheforcesatplay,we remain sceptical about the feasibility of overcoming the opportunitycosts of REDD+ through financial offsets, such as PES-like schemes orcarbonmarkets alone.There is growing recognitionof the importanceofregulations and institutions for effective law enforcement, clarificationoftenurerights,landuseplanningandinfrastructuredevelopmentinproducercountries.

Whilemarket-basedapproachesmaywork to somedegree incaseswhereeconomicactivitiesrequiringdeforestationbringlimitedprofits,national-level regulatory approaches in producer countries will still be needed torebalancetheeconomicbenefitsassociatedwithvariouslanduses.Improvedregulations in consumer countries could also complement initiativesfrom non-state actors, such as voluntary certification, and promote theconsumptionofcommoditiesfromsustainablesourcesasawaytoreducepressures on the forests. The equity implications of market-based andregulatoryinitiativesshouldbeexaminedcarefully,whetherinproducerorconsumercountries.

REDD+ policies aim to contribute to a transition towards developmentthat reconciles economic growth and forest conservation, but they facelarge challenges.To address these, we argue that a combination of stateregulationsandinitiativesbynon-stateactorsisrequiredatbothglobalandnationallevels.Thesepolicyactionsneedtobeimplementedonbothsupplyanddemandsides,inordertoreducedeforestationandforestdegradationmoreeffectively.WhiletheseactionscouldbeconsideredaspartofREDD+implementation,itisrequiredtoadoptadifferentparadigmofdevelopment,which prioritises low carbon goals based on supportingmore sustainableandinclusivebusinessmodelsandpolicies.

Understanding REDD+66 |

On the supply side,policy actions could include thepromotionof land-useoptimisation from an economic, social and technological standpoint by:i)providingadequatecompensationforforest-conservingandforest-expandinguses;ii)de-incentivisingtheclearingofforestlandsinareaswithhighecologicalvalue;andiii)incentivisingincreasedproductiononnon-forestlands,includingdegradedlands,aspartofbroaderprocessesofagriculturalintensificationandsupport for smallholder agriculture.Different policy combinations could beadoptedinordertoachievetheseaims(Angelsen2010b).Ontheonehand,therentfromlarge-scaleandextensiveagriculturecouldbereducedby,forexample,reforminglandtenureorneglectinginfrastructuredevelopmentonnewfrontierlands.Ontheotherhand,therentderivedfromextractiveorprotectiveforestactivitiescouldbeincreased,eitherbysupportingexistingeffortsoflocalforestuserstomanagetheirforestsorbypromotingmarketsthroughPESschemes.

Nonetheless, measures on the supply side only will not be sufficient toaddress pressures on forests. It is also necessary to address issues on thedemandside.Anumberofpolicyactionscouldbewidelyadoptedbymajorconsumer countries,which should also involve emerging economies, giventheirincreasingroleinshapingglobaltradeandconsumption.Suchactionsinclude the adoption of regulations that support sustainable procurementpolicies,possiblylinkedtovoluntarycertificationschemes,andaccompaniedbytheremovalofbarriersthatdistortglobaltrade.Governmentsandprivateactorsalsoneedtostimulateprivateandpublicfinancialinstitutionstoadoptresponsible investment policies in order to enhance the accountability ofinvestors.

ThepolicyoptionsdiscussedhereimplythatREDD+shouldberethoughtaspartofabroaderinstitutionalarchitecture,notonlytoreducepressuresonforests,butalsotopromotethedevelopmentofmoresustainableandequitableeconomies,whichareabletocombinegoalsofGHGemissionreductionsandadequatefoodandenergysupply.Policyactionsforenhancinggovernanceandreducingtheimpactsoftradeandinvestmentshouldaddressboththesupplyanddemandsidesandinvolveeffortsbyproducerandconsumercountries,aswellascombinedinitiativesbystateandnon-stateactors.Theseeffortsmustbeconceivedaspartofabroaderprocessofeconomictransformation,whichbrings together theobjectives of economic growth,poverty alleviation andforestconservationinthecontextofclimatechange.

Implementing REDD+ 2

Part

5Chapter

Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes Monica Di Gregorio, Maria Brockhaus, Tim Cronin and Efrian Muharrom

• Achieving emission reductions through REDD+ requires fourpreconditions for overcoming politico-economic hurdles: i) the relativeautonomyofnationstatesfromkeyintereststhatdrivedeforestationandforestdegradation;ii)nationalownershipoverREDD+policyprocesses;iii)inclusiveREDD+policyprocesses;andiv)thepresenceofcoalitionsthatcallfortransformationalchange.

• Formulating and implementing effective national REDD+ strategies ismostchallenginginthosecountrieswhereinternationalactorsarethesoleforcedrivingREDD+policyprocesses.

• New coalitions capable of breaking up institutional and political path-dependencieswillneedtheparticipationofstateelitesandtheengagementofbusinessactorstoaffectthepoliticalagendainasignificantway.

5.1 Introduction Thischapterpresentsananalysisofthepolicyprocessesontheformulationand proposed implementation of national (and federal)REDD+ strategiesin seven countries: Bolivia, Brazil,Cameroon, Indonesia,Nepal, Peru and

Implementing REDD+70 |

Vietnam.Using a political economy lens,we identifymajor constraints toeffectivepolicymaking.Startingfromthemaindriversofdeforestationandtheparticularcontextsineachcountry,wefirstidentifykeyfeaturesofnationalpolicy processes, including the structural conditions, the dominant policyactors and the processes that aid or hamper the development of effective,efficient and equitable REDD+ policies. While the state of internationalclimatenegotiations certainly affectsnationalpolicyprocessesonREDD+,inthischapterwedonotdiscusstherelationshipbetweenthetwo,butfocusinsteadonthenationallevel.

Countries engaged inREDD+policy development are progressing at verydifferent paces and are involved to different degrees with internationalpartnersinmultilateralorbilateralarrangementsforREDD+policydesign,withaparticularemphasisoncapacitybuilding(Chapter3).Theirpoliticalregimesarediverse,spanningdemocraciestoauthoritarianstates.Aswouldbe expected, democratic regimes present more open and inclusive policyprocesses (Johannsen andPedersen 2008). In all countries, amultitude ofactorsfromthesubnational,nationalandinternationallevelareinvolvedinnationalREDD+policyprocesses(HiraldoandTanner2011a).Contentiouspoliticsareattheheartofanypolicyprocess,andtheREDD+policyarenaisnoexception.

EachofthesevencountrieshasseenmajorpolicyeventslinkedtoREDD+policy formulation (Figure 5.1). The main policy outputs relate to theestablishmentofnewinstitutions,proceduresandcapacitybuildinglinkedtoreadinessactivities–concretepolicy formulationand implementationhavebeen limited to date.The slowprogress overallmight reflect the delays inobtaining financing from global climate negotiations, but domestic powerstrugglesalsofactorin.

This chapter uses as a political economy analysis framework based on the‘fourIs’outlinedinChapter2:institutions,ideas,interestsandinformation,focussing in particular on the first three. We investigate institutional andpoliticalpath-dependencies, the interestsofactorsdrivingdeforestationandforestdegradation,andthewayinwhichtheirideastranslateintodiscursivepractices(Figure5.2).Allthesefactorsaffectthepowerofdominantcoalitionsthatenableorlimittransformationalchangeinthispolicydomain.Wedefinetransformationalchangeasachangeinattitudes,discourse,powerrelationsanddeliberate(policyand/orprotest)actionnecessarytoleadpolicyformulationand implementation away from business as usual policy approaches andtoward supporting (directly or indirectly) reduction of emissions fromdeforestationandforestdegradationandenhancementofforestcarbonstocks(Chapter2).Wearguethatfourpreconditionsmustbeinplacetofacilitatetransformational change: in terms of interests transformational changerequires:i)ahighlevelofautonomyofthestatevis-à-vispowerfuleconomic

| 71Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

interests that contribute to the main drivers of deforestation and forestdegradationintermsofinstitutionalandpoliticalpreconditionsitrequires;ii)nationalgovernmentownershipofREDD+policyprocesses;iii)inclusionofstakeholdersinREDD+policyprocesses;andiv)intermsofpolicydynamicsitrequiresthepresenceofdominantcoalitionsthatwanttobreakofffrompracticesassociatedwithbusinessasusual(Figure5.2).

5.2 Methods ThefollowinganalysisisbasedonthefindingsfromtworesearchmodulesofthepolicyanalysiscomponentoftheongoingGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+(GCS)ledbyCIFOR(seeAppendix).

The first module is a policy analysis that investigates the political contextinwhichnationalREDD+ strategies aredeveloping and identifiespossiblepath-dependencies and obstacles to REDD+ actions. Itsmain focus is onpolitico-economic,institutionalandgovernanceconditionsineachcountry.Theinvestigationineachcountryincludeddesktopresearch,expertinterviewsandreviewsofpolicydocuments.

Thesecondmoduleisamedia analysisofpolicydiscourses,whichinvestigatesthecompositionofthepolicydomain,thepositionstatements(stances)ofkeyactorsandthepotentialfortheformationofcoalitionsfortransformationalchange.We look at howREDD+ policy debates are framed in themediaandcomparethedominantdiscoursewithcounter-discourses(Hajer1995;Boykoff 2008). Media frames are “patterns of cognition, interpretation,and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, bywhich symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse” (Gitlin 1980:7). The coding andsystematic analysis of the media frames identified the key policy actorssupportingtheframespresentinthearticles,theirattitudestowardsREDD+andtheirdiscursivepractices.ArticlesfromthreemajornationalnewspapersfromDecember2005toDecember2009are includedinthisanalysis.Thecomparative analysis is based on the media data collected by the singlecasestudies.

5.3 Institutional context, path-dependencies and interests The factors constraining transformational change are determined by theinterplay of the institutional arrangements, past policies and consolidatedintereststhatoperateinsectorsdrivingdeforestationandforestdegradation.Together these build path-dependencies that are difficult to overcome. Anumberofcausesofdeforestationanddegradationhavebeenhighlightedinthe literature,which span fromdirect causes suchas large- and small-scale

Implementing REDD+72 |

International events

Bolivia

Brazil

Cameroon

Indonesia

Nepal

Vietnam

Peru

December 2007Launch of World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

March 2007Creation of REDD+ Political and Technical Committee(Starting readiness of REDD+, R-PIN, etc.)

June 2007Amazonas state

law of CC

2007Interministerial committee on climate change at federal level

July 2008R-PIN Cameroon submission to FCPF

January 2009Decision No09/MINEP – Creation of REDD Cameroon pilot steering Committee

December 2008Ministry of Forestry Regulation 68/2008 on REDD DA

April 2009R-PP finalisation

January 2009• Establishment of REDD Cell• Formation of REDD Working

Group

July 2008Establishment of DNPI

July 2008FCPF R-PIN is approved

May 2008Foundation of Group REDD

May 2009Creation of REDD technical group within national council on CC

December 2009Announcement of reduction of net deforestation to 0% by 2021

March 2010Accepted as FIP pilot country

September 2009National REDD network and technical working group

October 2008Prime Minister Decision 380/QD-T Tg on PES

July 2009UN-REDD Vietnam programme phase 1

March 2010National REDD+ Strategy

April 2011National workshop “Climate Crisis, REDD+ and Indigenous REDD” and the Declaration of Quitos

July 2011New national forest law approved (regulations and norms still pending)

July 2010Proposed Amendments to Forest Act 1993

September 2009Indonesia 26% emission target commitment at G-20 Meeting

September 2011Presidential Decree no. 61/2011 on National Plan to reduce GHGs

May 2009Ministry of Forestry Decree 36/2009 on carbon sequestration license

September 2009Validation of meeting document on Cameroon position in CC

December 2009Presidential decree on (National Observatory of Climate Change) ONACC

December 2009Feedback meeting on REPAR participation in Copenhagen Conference

May 2010Letter of Intent between Indonesia and Norway

May 2011Presidential Instruction 10/2011 on moratorium of new licenses

December 2009Cabinet meeting in Kalapathar, near Mount Everest Base Camp

March 2011R-PP approved by FCPF

July 2011National MRV framework is

January 2011Establishment of NRS and VRO

October 2010PFES Government decree

December 2008NTP-RCC

July 2007The “Zero Deforestation Pact”

August 2008Amazon Fund

June 2009The Tocantins Letter of the “Forum of Amazonian Governors”

October 2009Brazilian participation in the COP-15 (Interministerial meeting with President Lula)

July 2009Consultation workshops for the formulation of forest and climate change strategy

2011National REDD+ strategyformulation by interministerial

2010Regulation of NPCC and economy wide goal of 2 GT reduction of emissions by 2020

2010Multiple actors dialogue on National REDD+ strategy

2009NPCC and voluntary commitments 80% REDD in Amazon and 40% in Cerrado

December 2010Agreement between UN and the Government of Bolivia for UN REDD+ Bolivia

April 2010World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change

September 2007Forest 11 meeting in New York

May 2010The interim REDD+ partnership

December 2008COP14 in Poznań

December 2009COP15 in Copenhagen

November/December 2010COP16 in Cancun

December 2011COP17 in Durban

December 2007COP13 in Bali

2007 20112008 2009 2010

September 2008Launch of UN-REDD Programme

committee

endorsed

and PES

Figure 5.1 Key REDD+ policy events by country

| 73Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

International events

Bolivia

Brazil

Cameroon

Indonesia

Nepal

Vietnam

Peru

December 2007Launch of World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

March 2007Creation of REDD+ Political and Technical Committee(Starting readiness of REDD+, R-PIN, etc.)

June 2007Amazonas state

law of CC

2007Interministerial committee on climate change at federal level

July 2008R-PIN Cameroon submission to FCPF

January 2009Decision No09/MINEP – Creation of REDD Cameroon pilot steering Committee

December 2008Ministry of Forestry Regulation 68/2008 on REDD DA

April 2009R-PP finalisation

January 2009• Establishment of REDD Cell• Formation of REDD Working

Group

July 2008Establishment of DNPI

July 2008FCPF R-PIN is approved

May 2008Foundation of Group REDD

May 2009Creation of REDD technical group within national council on CC

December 2009Announcement of reduction of net deforestation to 0% by 2021

March 2010Accepted as FIP pilot country

September 2009National REDD network and technical working group

October 2008Prime Minister Decision 380/QD-T Tg on PES

July 2009UN-REDD Vietnam programme phase 1

March 2010National REDD+ Strategy

April 2011National workshop “Climate Crisis, REDD+ and Indigenous REDD” and the Declaration of Quitos

July 2011New national forest law approved (regulations and norms still pending)

July 2010Proposed Amendments to Forest Act 1993

September 2009Indonesia 26% emission target commitment at G-20 Meeting

September 2011Presidential Decree no. 61/2011 on National Plan to reduce GHGs

May 2009Ministry of Forestry Decree 36/2009 on carbon sequestration license

September 2009Validation of meeting document on Cameroon position in CC

December 2009Presidential decree on (National Observatory of Climate Change) ONACC

December 2009Feedback meeting on REPAR participation in Copenhagen Conference

May 2010Letter of Intent between Indonesia and Norway

May 2011Presidential Instruction 10/2011 on moratorium of new licenses

December 2009Cabinet meeting in Kalapathar, near Mount Everest Base Camp

March 2011R-PP approved by FCPF

July 2011National MRV framework is

January 2011Establishment of NRS and VRO

October 2010PFES Government decree

December 2008NTP-RCC

July 2007The “Zero Deforestation Pact”

August 2008Amazon Fund

June 2009The Tocantins Letter of the “Forum of Amazonian Governors”

October 2009Brazilian participation in the COP-15 (Interministerial meeting with President Lula)

July 2009Consultation workshops for the formulation of forest and climate change strategy

2011National REDD+ strategyformulation by interministerial

2010Regulation of NPCC and economy wide goal of 2 GT reduction of emissions by 2020

2010Multiple actors dialogue on National REDD+ strategy

2009NPCC and voluntary commitments 80% REDD in Amazon and 40% in Cerrado

December 2010Agreement between UN and the Government of Bolivia for UN REDD+ Bolivia

April 2010World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change

September 2007Forest 11 meeting in New York

May 2010The interim REDD+ partnership

December 2008COP14 in Poznań

December 2009COP15 in Copenhagen

November/December 2010COP16 in Cancun

December 2011COP17 in Durban

December 2007COP13 in Bali

2007 20112008 2009 2010

September 2008Launch of UN-REDD Programme

committee

endorsed

and PES

Implementing REDD+74 |

Institutional and political path-dependencies• Institutional arrangements (especially related to land use)• Past policies supporting or clashing with REDD+• Level of inclusion of political processes

Policy process Political coalitions, cooperation or

contention to move from:

Business as usual• State capture by DD sectors• Low inclusiveness in policy

processes• International actors dominate

national policy processes

Transformational change • State autonomy from DD

sectors• Inclusive policy processes• State leads policy processes

* DD: deforestation and forest degradation

Actors’ interests• Sectors driving DD*• State: level of autonomy• Civil society• International actors

Actors’ ideas• Beliefs and ideology• Development model

Figure 5.2 Political economy framework

agricultural expansion, to more indirect drivers such as state policies andwealthybusinessinterestswithinandoutsidetheforestrysector(Rudel2007;Brockhauset al.2012).Powerfuleconomic incentivesareoftenbehindthemostrelevantdrivers,usuallyactingin‘tandem’(Lambinet al.2001).

Transformationalchangerequiresastatethatcanoperatewithsomeautonomyfrom the sectors driving deforestation and forest degradation andwork inthe interest of society at large (Karsenty andOngolo 2012). Autonomy ofthestatereferstothedegreetowhichstateactorscanmakepolicydecisionsindependently from various sectors. The form that autonomy takes is theproduct of the specific history of nation states. A state must be able towithstandlobbyingpressurefromsectorsthatbenefitfromforestexploitationandlandusechanges,fortransformationalchangetooccur.Butautonomyhastogohandinhandwithinclusivepolicyprocesses,whichtranslateintoaformofembeddedautonomy(Evans1995).Themoreinclusivethepoliticalsystem,themorelikelythestatewillserveabroadersectionofsociety,because

| 75Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

demands from less powerful interests – such as civil society – find betterrepresentationinsuchsystems(Jenkins1995).

Thereissubstantialevidenceoflackofautonomyofthestatevis-à-vissectorsdrivingdeforestationandforestdegradation.Collusionandcorruptionmaybepresent,orsimplyweakforestgovernance,whichareconsideredthemainchallenges in thedevelopment and effective implementationofpolicies onREDD+ (Kanninen et al. 2007). Illegal logging and unenforced laws areendemicinmanytropicalforestedcountries(Brack2005).Ongoinganalysisindicates strong links between forest governance and general governanceconditionsandtheirimpactontheREDD+policyprocess(WRI2009).

Thefollowinganalysisconsidersfourmainpolitico-economicandinstitutionalconditions: i) the main drivers of deforestation, which represent interestssupporting business as usual; ii) policies enabling or hindering REDD+objectives and related institutional arrangements; iii) the autonomy of thestatevis-à-viseconomicactorsdrivingdeforestationandforestdegradation;andiv)thelevelofinclusivenessofpolicyprocesses(Table5.1).

Thefirstconditionreferstothedrivers of deforestation and forest degradation.Agricultural expansion, including cattle ranching, is the main cause ofdeforestation, although the relative impact of large- versus small-scale andsubsistence agriculture varies. This is followed by logging, mining andinfrastructuredevelopment(Table5.1).Consequently,inordertoeffectivelytackledeforestation and forest degradation, policymakersneed to identifythemainpolicyconstraintsintheforestry,agricultural,cattleranchingandminingsectorsanddevisenewincentivestructures(seeBox5.1foradiscussiononBrazil).Thehighrents that these sectorscommandmake itparticularlydifficulttoredesignincentives.Whilethesectorsthatdrivedeforestationandforest degradation arewell known, quantifying the impacts of these singlesectorsondeforestationandforestdegradationremainsachallengeinmostcountries.

Policies that support drivers of deforestation and related institutional arrangements hamper transformational change and create path-dependenciesthataredifficulttoescape.Inmostcountriestaxregimesfavourexploitationofforestsforeconomicdevelopment,suchassupportforruralcreditforcattleranchinginBrazil(althoughtheyarenowlowerandlinkedtoenvironmentalsustainabilitymeasures)andtaxbreaksforbiofuelsandplantationdevelopmentinIndonesia(Table5.1).Publicfundingforinfrastructuredevelopmentisalsokeytosupportingtheexpansionofsuchactivities.Overtimethesepoliciescreateinstitutionalstructuresthatdriveuptheprofitabilityofcompetinglanduses,effectivelyconsolidatingthepowerofkeysectorsdrivingdeforestationand forest degradation. The challenge is to break free from such path-dependencies.Inallcountriestherearealsopoliciesinplacethatcanenable

Implementing REDD+76 |Ta

ble

5.1

Dri

vers

of d

efor

esta

tion

, pol

icie

s th

at c

lash

/sup

por

t RED

D+

an

d a

uton

omy

of s

tate

act

ors

Co

un

try

Dri

vers

of

def

ore

stat

ion

an

d fo

rest

d

egra

dat

ion

Polic

ies

that

cla

sh w

ith

R

EDD

+ a

ims

Polic

ies

that

su

pp

ort

RED

D+

La

ck o

f au

ton

om

y o

r p

oss

ible

cap

ture

b

y sp

ecia

l in

tere

sts

Dem

ocr

acy

cate

go

ry s

core

(i

nd

ex)*

Leve

l of

cen

tral

isat

ion

Bra

zil

Ranc

hing

; ag

ricul

ture

(la

rge-

and

sm

all-s

cale

); in

fras

truc

ture

; se

lect

ive

logg

ing;

min

ing;

fir

e

Rura

l cre

dit f

or c

attl

e ra

nchi

ng

(alt

houg

h m

ore

limite

d th

an

in th

e p

ast)

or i

nfra

stru

ctur

e de

velo

pm

ent (

road

s an

d da

ms)

; poo

r enf

orce

men

t of

tenu

re ru

les

Fore

st C

ode

cons

erva

tion

requ

irem

ent o

n p

rivat

e la

nd;

imp

rove

d en

forc

emen

t of l

and

use

pol

icie

s (in

clud

ing

pro

tect

ed

area

s); e

cono

mic

and

eco

logi

cal

zoni

ng; e

ffor

ts to

cer

tify

pro

duce

r le

galit

y co

mm

erci

al c

hain

s (b

eef,

soy)

; lan

d re

gula

risat

ion

pro

cess

an

d de

mar

catio

n of

indi

geno

us

land

; rea

l-tim

e m

onito

ring

of

defo

rest

atio

n

Med

ium

–hig

h (la

nd

spec

ulat

ion;

ille

gal

logg

ing;

cat

tle

ranc

hing

; tax

eva

sion

; dr

ug tr

affick

ing;

p

atro

n–cl

ient

re

latio

nshi

ps

and

elec

tora

l cam

pai

gns)

Flaw

ed

dem

ocra

cy

(7.1

2)

Fede

ral s

yste

m

Peru

Agr

icul

ture

(p

redo

min

antl

y sm

all-s

cale

); in

fras

truc

ture

; ill

egal

logg

ing;

m

inin

g

Tax

regi

mes

and

pol

icie

s su

pp

ortin

g m

igra

tion

and

agric

ultu

ral e

xpan

sion

; roa

d in

fras

truc

ture

pro

ject

s; e

nerg

y in

fras

truc

ture

pro

ject

s (o

il,

bio

fuel

s an

d hy

droe

lect

ric);

sup

por

t for

exp

ansi

on o

f m

inin

g; la

ck o

f env

ironm

enta

l p

olic

ies

and

sust

aina

ble

de

velo

pm

ent p

olic

ies

in th

e A

maz

on

Ley

2976

3 Le

y Fo

rest

al y

de

Faun

a Si

lves

tre

(New

For

est

and

Wild

life

Act

) ap

pro

ved

but

no

t yet

in fo

rce;

Per

u–U

S tr

ade

agre

emen

t; fr

ee tr

ade

agre

emen

t w

ith C

hina

on

fore

stry

and

en

viro

nmen

tal p

rote

ctio

n; tr

ade

agre

emen

t Per

u–EU

(RED

D+

, fo

rest

cer

tifica

tion,

sus

tain

able

fo

rest

man

agem

ent)

; Ley

297

85

Ley

de C

onsu

lta P

revi

a (p

rior

cons

ulta

tion

law

); na

tiona

l for

est

cons

erva

tion

pro

gram

me

Med

ium

–hig

h (c

orru

ptio

n of

p

ublic

offi

cial

s an

d p

rofe

ssio

nals

); p

ower

ful c

arte

ls th

at

favo

ur il

lega

l log

ging

, co

ca a

nd c

ocai

ne

pro

duct

ion

and

info

rmal

min

ing

Flaw

ed

dem

ocra

cy

(6.5

9)

Cen

tral

ised

Ind

on

esia

Agr

icul

ture

(la

rge-

scal

e in

clud

ing

fore

st

pla

ntat

ions

su

ch a

s oi

l pal

m,

smal

l-sca

le a

nd

sub

sist

ence

); lo

ggin

g; m

inin

g

Tax

dep

ende

nce

on fo

rest

an

d m

inin

g; ta

x b

reak

s fo

r fo

rest

pro

duct

s, fa

rmin

g p

rodu

ce, p

ulp

and

pap

er;

min

ing

per

mits

in p

rote

cted

ar

eas;

fisc

al a

nd n

on-fi

scal

co

nces

sion

s fo

r foo

d es

tate

and

ene

rgy

esta

te

deve

lop

men

t; b

iofu

el

deve

lop

men

t; la

nd a

lloca

tion

for o

il p

alm

pla

ntat

ions

Mor

ator

ium

on

gran

ting

of

new

lice

nses

and

imp

rove

men

t of

nat

ural

prim

ary

fore

st a

nd

pea

tlan

d go

vern

ance

(alt

houg

h co

nsid

ered

a w

eak

pol

icy

due

to th

e in

fluen

ce o

f bus

ines

s on

go

vern

men

t)

Med

ium

–hig

h (p

ress

ure

from

larg

e-sc

ale

pla

ntat

ions

and

lo

ggin

g, p

ulp

and

p

aper

, min

ing

and

elec

tora

l cam

pai

gns)

Flaw

ed

dem

ocra

cy

(6.5

3)

Dec

entr

alis

ed

with

tens

ions

| 77Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

Bo

livia

Agr

icul

ture

(s

mal

l- an

d la

rge-

scal

e);

colo

nisa

tion

and

soyb

ean

pro

duct

ion;

in

fras

truc

ture

de

velo

pm

ent;

(ille

gal)

logg

ing;

m

inin

g

Polit

ical

and

eco

nom

ic

ince

ntiv

es in

agr

icul

tura

l se

ctor

(soy

bea

n an

d su

garc

ane

agro

bus

ines

s);

upco

min

g in

fras

truc

ture

p

roje

cts

(roa

ds, d

ams)

; su

pp

ort f

or c

olon

isat

ion

of th

e no

rthe

rn A

maz

on

Imp

rove

d fo

rest

mon

itorin

g of

ille

gal l

oggi

ng; i

ncre

ased

re

cogn

ition

of l

ocal

tenu

re

right

s; le

gal f

ram

ewor

k on

su

stai

nab

le fo

rest

man

agem

ent;

dece

ntra

lisat

ion

of fo

rest

m

anag

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Implementing REDD+78 |

Box 5.1 REDD+ the Brazilian way: Integrating old sticks with new carrotsJan Börner and Sven Wunder

Implementing REDD+ requires policies that effectively change land and forest use decisions. In most settings, such changes imply foregone economic benefits for land users, at least in the short term. Apart from implementation costs, any effective REDD+ policy will thus inevitably have distributional consequences. Ideally, REDD+ would maximise both cost effectiveness and equity. In practice, however, policy makers tend to face hard tradeoffs between these two objectives.

Land ownership and forest use rights in the Brazilian Amazon are highly concentrated. The Brazilian Senate is now considering far-reaching liberalisations of currently restrictive land use legislation, in an attempt to catch up with a reality of widespread non-compliance. Effectively enforcing the current Brazilian Forest Code – for example, mandating the conservation of 80% of on-farm forests – would cost the country’s fast-growing, land-expansive agroindustry. On the other hand, purely incentive-based REDD+ approaches would mean compensating landholders for not breaking existing conservation regulations, which is politically sensitive. At COP15 in 2009, Brazil therefore proposed a REDD+ approach that combines more rigid regulatory enforcement with a compensatory national programme of payments for environmental services (PES).

Finding the optimal mix of regulatory sticks and PES carrots has implications not only for equity, but also for implementation costs. Enforcing conservation laws requires costly field operations, but it can also produce fine revenues that may partially offset implementation costs. PES, in contrast, entails considerable budget outlays, which have political opportunity costs vis-à-vis other government spending. Adding fairness to REDD+ by compensating landholders’ opportunity costs – whether legal or illegal but tolerated – thus comes at significant costs, especially if past good forest stewards (e.g. many Amazon indigenous people and traditional forest dwellers) are also to be rewarded.

Mixed stick-and-carrot approaches have their pros and cons. As a stand-alone instrument, PES can be enforced simply by suspending payments to non-compliant land users. PES recipients will then expect to receive at least their opportunity costs in compensation. In conjunction with pre-existing regulations, however, PES become compliance subsidies, which typically will not fully compensate land users for abiding by conservation laws. Under such a policy mix, suspending payments may not suffice to effectively encourage conservation if the regulatory threat is perceived to be improbable, e.g. in remote frontier areas. Imperfect enforcement of the complementary stick component may also induce land users to pocket PES and continue business as usual. Policy makers who effectively integrate stick-and-carrot-based REDD+ policies will thus depend on planning tools that can anticipate spatially heterogeneous implementation costs and welfare effects of synergistically operating conservation tools. In partially decentralised environmental governance systems like Brazil’s, the costs of implementing environmental policies are shared between national and subnational governments. New benefit and cost sharing mechanisms will thus also be needed across administrative entities to achieve effective and equitable outcomes.

Source: Börner et al. (2011)

| 79Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

REDD+policy formulationand implementation.They includepoliciesonpaymentsforenvironmentalservices;forestregulationsthatfostersustainableforest management; conservation, reforestation and afforestation; andgovernmentexpendituresthataimtoincreaseenergyefficiencyandprovidealternatives to forestproducts.Butgenerally thesepoliciescommandfewerresources and cover very limited areas, compared to policies that supportdriversofdeforestation(Table5.1).

Apart from the business sector, the state itself has economic and politicalinterests in the exploitation and conversion of forest, as these activitiescontributetoeconomicdevelopmentgoalsandprovidefinancialresourcesforthestateintheformoftaxesandotherlevies.Inordertoprovideincentivestructuresitisessentialthatthestateholdsasufficientlevel of autonomyfromeconomicactorsdrivingdeforestation(KarsentyandOngolo2012).Lackofautonomycanalsoberevealedbyhighlevelsofcollusionbetweenstateandsocialactors.All sevencountries facechallenges in this respect (Table5.1).NepalandPerufacechallengesintheapplicationofforestrylawsinparticularatthelocallevelwherepatron–clientnetworksoperate.InBrazilandIndonesia,powerfulagri-businesses,cattleranchinglandowners,andloggingcompaniesconstantlyputpressureongovernmenttoprotecttheirsourcesofrents.ThisisevidentintheattackfrombusinessinterestsontheBrazilForestCodeandthe IndonesianMoratorium.Most lobbying occurs behind the scenes, butitseffectsarevisible infinalpolicyformulation, limited implementationofpoliciesandlowlevelsofcompliancewithexistingpolicies(Coen2004).InrecentyearsBrazilhasdemonstratedan increasedability towithstandsuchpressurecompared to Indonesia,whichhasa longhistoryofcosy relationsbetweengovernmentofficialsandbusinessinterestsatalllevels.Illegallogginglicensing isalso routinelyused toraise resources forelectoralcampaigns inmanyofthesecountries.InVietnamthemainchallengerelatestocorruptionandcollusion in state enterprises, local government andcivil service.Highlevels of capture of parts of the state by interests driving deforestation arevisibleinCameroonwheremorethan90%ofillegalloggingactivitiesinvolvelocalandnationallevelelites.Innoneofthesevencountriesisautonomyofthestatesufficienttosupportboldpolicychangessignallingafundamentalbreak from the traditionaldevelopmentmodel of relyingonunsustainableexploitationofnaturalresources.StateactorsinVietnam,followedbyBrazil,areprobably in thebestposition to independently support such a change.In all other cases, transformational change will require broader alliancesbetweenpartsofthestateandotherforcesabletobreakpath-dependencies.Internationalactorsandcivil societycancontribute inpartbypushing forsuchchanges.Norway isoneof themajor internationaldonors supportingtheseefforts(seeBox5.4).

Finally, the more inclusive policy processes are, the more likely REDD+policieswillincludeconsiderationsaboutequityandthelesslikelypotential

Implementing REDD+80 |

tensionsandopenconflictwilloccuramongpolicyactorsandstakeholders.Inclusivenessinpolicyprocessesisaffectedbythetypeofpoliticalregimeandbyitsdegreeofcentralisation.Weusedemocracyindicesandthedegreeofactualcentralisationofthepoliticalsystemasproxiesforinclusiveness(Table5.1).The political regimes in the seven countries vary widely from democraticto authoritarian, as does the level of centralisation, from very centralised(Vietnam) to federal and decentralised states (Brazil, Indonesia). Overall,moreauthoritarianregimessuchasVietnamandCameroontendtobemorecentralisedandhaveexclusiveformsofparticipationinpolicyprocesses.ButsomeregimeslikePeruarebothdemocraticandrelativelycentralised.Moredemocraticstatesareexpectedtobemoreinclusiveinpolicydecisionmaking.Countries suchas IndonesiaandCameroonhavebeensubject tochangingprocessesofdecentralisationandrecentralisation(Ribot2003;Oyono2004).OverallVietnamandCameroonrepresentexclusivepoliticalregimes,whileBrazil,PeruandIndonesiaaremoreinclusive.BoliviaandNepalhavehybridregimesthathavebothdemocraticandauthoritarianfeatures,characterisedbylimitedinclusiveness.Theinclusivenessofpoliticalregimeswilllikelyimpacttheinclusivenessofspecificpolicyprocesses,includingREDD+(seeBox5.2for amoredetailedanalysisof inclusiveness in theconsultationprocessonREDD+inTanzania).

5.4 Policy discourse and coalitions for change Themediacanbe seenasamirrorofongoingpolicyprocesses, andmedia analysis is used here to identify the dominant policy discourses and theextent towhich such discourses are shared across actors.Transformationalcoalitionsusediscursivepractices that challengebusiness asusual scenariosandcall forchanges in institutions,policiesand incentive structuresof thetraditionaleconomicdevelopmentmodel,whichisbasedonexploitationofforestresources.However,themirroringofpolicyprocessesbythemediaisonlypartial.Notallactorsusethemediaasanoutlettoinfluencepolicyandpublic opinion; business interests are particularlymedia shy and prefer tolobbythegovernmentinmorediscreteways(Coen2004).Thesameistrueforscientists,althoughresearchinstitutesarerepresentedmorethanbusinessesinthemedia.

REDD+mediacoverageinthesevencountriestookoffaftertheBaliRoadMapwaslaunchedatCOP13in2007.Sincethen,mediaarticleshaveincreasedinnumber, but the level of coveragediffers substantially among countries.BetweenDecember 2005 and 2009, threemajor newspapers in Indonesiaand Brazil contained around 190 and 250 articles, respectively, discussingREDD+,whileintheothercountriescoverageremainedatunder15articles(Cronin andSantoso2010;CEDLAandCIFOR2011b;Kengoum2011;Mayet al.2011a;Pham2011;ForestActionandCIFOR2012;LibelulaandCIFOR2012).

| 81Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

Box 5.2 Linking knowledge to action: REDD+ policy making in TanzaniaSalla Rantala

Drawing from different types of relevant knowledge in ways that increase the effectiveness, efficiency and equitability of policy making is a pressing challenge for countries as they prepare their national REDD+ policies. Policy makers are increasingly dependent on brokers of the complex scientific knowledge related to climate change and the required regimes to address it. At the same time, policy outputs often reflect political bargaining processes between various policy actors that differ in their resources and capacities, rather than linear processes of evidence-based policy making.

In Tanzania, the government-led REDD+ Task Force has welcomed contributions by civil society, research institutions, local governments and international partners to national REDD+ strategy development. Organisations with a strong mandate to disseminate information relevant to REDD+ shared their experiences in engaging with the policy process. While formal means often included workshops and training, the most frequently mentioned successful entry points to influencing policy were finding the right organisational allies within and outside of government for joint advocacy efforts, as well as subtle diplomacy with individuals high up in the line of command across different sectors. There was also considerable consensus regarding the need to showcase real local success stories in order to convince policy makers. The most salient challenge to linking relevant knowledge to REDD+ policy making was the high cost of getting the attention of key officials. Conveners of information-sharing events have to compete for the target participants’ limited time. Faced with an overwhelming choice of events, officials may end up basing their choice of attending an event on the resources available for expenses such as allowances, rather than on the information content of the event.

This challenge illustrates how the channels of resources and information in policy making may be intertwined. Other barriers mentioned by interviewees in Tanzania relate to the capacity and willingness of decision makers to consider recommendations that diverge from their pre-existing views, as well as the sluggishness of the bureaucratic system in responding to evidence. Limiting interaction to junior officials and executive branches of government instead of the ‘real decision makers’ was also said to account for some of the failures in effectively linking knowledge to action.

Implementing REDD+82 |

5.4.1 Ownership InorderforgovernmentstoleadsustainedchangeinthenationalREDD+policydomain,theyneedtobeincontrolofpolicyprocessesanddisplaythepoliticalwilltoimplementthesestrategies.Analysingtheextenttowhichnationalstateactorsareactiveinshapingpolicydiscourseinthemediacanprovidean indicationofthedegreeofgovernmentownershipofREDD+policyprocesses.Thedatapresentedhererefertothecountsofpolicyactors(Table 5.2) and their REDD+ discursive practices, as mentioned in themediaframes.

Infourofthesevencountries,stateactorsdominatemediadiscourse.WhileinBoliviamoststateactorsunderstandREDD+asanoffsettingmechanismandunilaterallyrejectit,nationalstateactorsinVietnamandIndonesiashowstrongpro-REDD+ attitudes. Policy discourse inBrazil is dominated by nationallevel state actors (26%),but ahighdiversityof stakeholders is representedin the media, notably international environmental nongovernmentalorganisations (NGOs), research institutesanddomesticcivil societyactors.Indonesia also presents a high diversity of actors, especially internationalNGOs.ApeculiarityofdecentralisedIndonesiaistherelativelyhighnumberof subnational actors,whichmirrors ongoingnegotiations between centralandlocalgovernmentregardingthecontroloverREDD+resourcesandpolicydecisions(CroninandSantoso2010;seealsoBox6.2).BrazilandBolivia–afederalandadecentralisedstate,respectively–aretheonlyothercountrieswheresubnationalactorsarepresentinmediareports.

Nepalshowsahighpresenceofcivil societyactors inthemedia,whichfarexceedsthatofstateactors.Intergovernmentalbodiesandinternationalresearchinstitutes follow.Butwhile theywork in conjunctionwith government inmostcountries,theycompletelydominatepolicydiscourseinCameroonandinPeru.Infact,Cameroonpresentstheweakestlevelofgovernmentcontrolover policy discourse. It seems that REDD+ strategies are predominantlypushedby international actors, and similar conditions are evident inPeru.While in part this might indicate a lack of state capacity to engage withcomplextechnicalissuessuchasREDD+,itcanalsobeanindicatorofslowprogressinpolicyprocessesandlackofpoliticalwilltodevoteresourcesandeffortstotheformulationandimplementationofanationalREDD+strategy.InCameroon,thissuggeststhatsustainedandeffectivepolicyactionaroundREDD+mightbecomelimitedinthenearfuture.Nepalpresentsadifferentprofile,inwhichcivilsocietyhasmorerepresentationinthemediathanthegovernmentandisthemainsupporterofREDD+policies(seeBox5.3).

Overall,governmentsinBrazil,IndonesiaandVietnamhavestrongownershipofnationallevelREDD+policyprocessesandareproactivelysupportingpolicyactiononREDD+,althoughinIndonesiaandVietnamthisisundertakenin

| 83Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

Table 5.2 Actors shaping the policy discourse (percentage of total actors expressing a position on REDD+ in media)

Actor group Indonesia Brazil Bolivia Vietnam Nepal Cameroon Peru

State (national) 45 26 50 67 17 8 12

State (subnational) 7 2 3 0 6 0 0

Corporate 3 4 10 6 6 0 0

Intergovernmental 8 7 9 27 6 17 25

Research (international)

5 11 0 0 6 42 25

NGO and environ–mental NGO (international)

16 17 10 0 0 0 25

Research (national)

6 13 3 0 12 25 0

Civil society actors (national and environmental NGOs)

10 20 15 0 47 8 13

TOTAL% of organisations

100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Total number of organisations

219 113 60 32 17 12 8

strongalliancewith internationaldonors.AnanalysisofNorwegianmediamirrorsthis,asthedebateisalsolargelyshapedbytheNorwegiangovernmentand domestic environmental NGOs (for the view from a donor country,seeBox5.4).InNepal,governmentcontrolismorelimitedandREDD+isdiscussedmainlybyforestuserassociationsinthemedia.InCameroonandPeru,thevoiceandpositionofgovernmentisalmostabsent,indicatingalowlevelofnationalownershipofREDD+policyprocesses.InternationalactorsmaybepushingforREDD+policyformulation,butREDD+policyprogressislikelytosufferfromthisabsenceofnationalownership.

5.4.2 Absent voices and hidden discourse Stateautonomyvis-à-visagentsdrivingdeforestation,governmentownershipofpolicyprocessesandapositiveattitudetowardREDD+arepreconditionsfor policy advances; but these conditions are by no means sufficient toensure effective and equitable formulation of national REDD+ strategies.Transformational change requires policy actors and coalitions to be ableto leadpolicydiscussions innewdirections compared tobusiness asusualscenarios, thereby breaking away from institutional and politico-economic

Implementing REDD+84 |

Box 5.3 Constraints to effective REDD+ policy making in Nepal Bryan R. Bushley and Dil Bahadur Khatri

Since the late 1970s, Nepal’s forestry sector has undergone a process of steady decentralisation toward increased local autonomy and community-based forest management, and a more inclusive national policy making process. In recent years, however, government and forestry officials have attempted to restrict the autonomy of forest user groups and capture more economic value from forests through legislation, directives and discretionary measures. Simultaneously, the government, international NGOs, donors and civil society have embraced REDD+ and are engaged in policy making and piloting processes.

Yet, REDD+ discourses and policies have been influenced by interactions among a limited set of actors in the government, donor/international NGO and civil society sectors, with a few noticeable trends. First, the exchange of information and resources related to REDD+ is controlled by a few international and national NGOs implementing specific pilot projects, whereas government organisations are most influential in terms of shaping specific policies. Second, the participation of civil society actors in policy formulation is limited to the involvement of relatively few actors, whereas the interests of some marginalised groups, such as women and Dalits (low-caste ‘untouchables’), are underrepresented. Third, there has been no direct involvement of private sector entities in piloting or policy making processes. Despite these deficiencies, new configurations of actors are emerging around piloting and awareness-raising efforts and advocacy campaigns for the rights of forest-dependent communities.

There are also a number of specific policy constraints that could threaten the long-term viability of REDD+ in Nepal. First and foremost is the lack of a clear legal basis for the establishment of carbon rights. Related to this is the issue of weak and ambiguous land tenure rights, especially for forest-dependent communities. Without either of these, it will be difficult to garner strong internal or external financial and political support for REDD+. Lack of clarity and consensus on adopting a fund-based vs. a market-based approach to REDD+ is also a major constraint. Another significant barrier is the lack of an inclusive, just and marketable benefit-sharing mechanism. A benefit-sharing pilot was carried out in three REDD+ piloting sites, with a minority (40%) of the criteria for benefits based on carbon stocks and a majority (60%) based on various social factors, such as the proportion of indigenous people, women, and disadvantaged groups in each community. But such an approach has no basis in existing carbon markets, may not be viable in a global carbon-trading scheme, and excludes other land managers besides community forest user groups. Finally, there is a need for an overarching democratic governance framework that would improve benefit-sharing mechanisms, oversee monitoring, reporting and verification, and address conflict resolution related to REDD+ implementation.

In Nepal, it appears that REDD+ may be reinforcing the centralising tendencies of the state while marginalising other important stakeholders. However, new modes of collaboration are also emerging, with the potential to transform existing institutions of forest governance. If these collaborations can successfully address the constraints outlined above, they may contribute to the realisation of a more effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ mechanism.

| 85Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

path-dependencies (Laumann and Knoke 1987). Inevitably, they will faceresistancefromconservativecoalitionsdefendingthestatus quo.Whethersuchtransformational changeoccursdependsonwhichcoalitionwillultimatelygaindominanceinpolicycircles.Dominanceusuallyrequiresbuy-inatleastinpart from state elites andbusiness interests.Coalitions canbebasedoncommon interest, ideological beliefs or a common discourse (Hajer 1995;Sabatier1999;BenfordandSnow2000;DiGregorio2012).

Itisnotjustdominantvoicesinthemediathatrevealthepositionofpolicyactors–voicesthatareabsentcanbeastelling.Theaboveanalysisindicatesthat business views and business–state relations are barely explored in themedia.ThisisthecaseevenincountriessuchasBrazilandIndonesia,wheretheroleofthebusinesssectorisquitesignificant.Ingeneral,businesstendsto lobbypolicymakersbehind the scenes (Coen2004).This is auniversalphenomenon,andmoresowheresuchlobbyingisperceivedasproblematicbythepublic.Whensuchpressureentails illegalactivities,secrecybecomesevenmore important.Wehave already seenhowcorruptionand collusionbetweenstateandlegal–aswellasillegal–businessinterestsisamajorconcerninmostofthecountriesstudied(Table5.1).Suchcollusionformslow-visibilitycoalitionswhichcanbeverypowerfulinresistingtransformationalchangeandcaninfluencenotjusttheimplementation,butalsotheformulationofpolicies.

Thereare,however, indications thateven if suchcoalitions tendtooperatediscretely,theirvoicescanbereflectedinthemedia.Supportforabusinessasusualscenariobystateactors,inconditionswherestateautonomyislow,isalikelyindicatoroftheexistenceofsuchdominantcoalitions.ThereluctanceofgovernmenttotakestrongactionwithrespecttoREDD+whenthismightthreatenestablishedrentslinkedtodeforestationandforestdegradationisacaseinpoint.

Apart from identifying key actors, themedia analysis helps to characterisethe REDD+ policy positions of these actors.Their single policy positionshave been aggregated into broader categories to identify coalitions fortransformation change, and those resisting such change.The results of theanalysisarepresentednext.1

5.4.3 Business as usual coalitions and coalitions for transformational change Inthemedia,powerfulcoalitionssupportingkeysectorsdrivingdeforestationandforestdegradationareevidentinbothBrazilandIndonesia.Indonesianactors stress the need forREDD+policies to compensate the opportunity

1 GiventheoppositionofgovernmenttowardREDD+andtheabsenceofpositionsthatseektransformationalchange,Boliviaisomittedfromtheanalysisthatfollows.

Implementing REDD+86 |

Box 5.4 A media-based analysis of the REDD+ discourse in NorwayLaila Borge

In 2010, the well-known climate scientist James E. Hansen said that the main effect of Norway’s funding of forest protection would be a clearer conscience for members of that oil nation. Norwegian environmental minister Erik Solheim quickly retorted in a letter to Aftenposten (the leading Norwegian newspaper): “Norway supports efforts to prevent deforestation because this is the quickest and most cost efficient way to achieve deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. (...) Norway has shown international leadership with its climate and forest initiative, and we have made several other countries support this important work”. This latter view has been the most widely expressed in the Norwegian media.

In 2007, during the international climate negotiations in Bali, Norway pledged NOK 15 billion (US $2.6 billion) towards efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative was established in 2008 to implement that pledge. The initiative had broad political support and the Norwegian media were overwhelmingly optimistic about the initiative. Rainforest protection was presented as a simple, inexpensive and effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Several commentators also pointed out that, by funding forest conservation, Norway could quickly become carbon neutral.

Critical voices have grown louder in recent years, mainly from the research community and civil society. No one denies the value of the initiative’s purpose, but many question whether it is possible to measure and control its effects and point out that most of the money has not yet been released. The Norwegian government is also being criticised for financing projects that destroy rainforests through the Government Pension Fund. Some media have brandished some unintended negative consequences of REDD+. In addition, the Norwegian government is criticised for buying its way out of less popular domestic CO2 reductions.

Overall, however, the Norwegian media have remained positive, and Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative is seen as the most successful of the government’s efforts to reduce emissions. The Norwegian debate is largely shaped by the government and domestic environmental NGOs. The Brazilian government has also been quite visible in the Norwegian press. The most cited actors are the (former) Norwegian Minister of the Environment and Minister of Development Cooperation, Erik Solheim, and the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg.

| 87Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

costsoflarge-scalebusinessesrelatedforestconversionandwarnthatREDD+should not undermine economic development. Given the low level ofautonomyofstateactorsillustratedearlier,suchstatementsareconsistentwithasituationinwhichpartofthestateapparatussideswithbusinessintereststhat profit from rents from ranching, plantation development, loggingand mining. But opinions of state actors are not uniform. For example,in Indonesia, the conservation branch of theMinistry of Forestry and theMinistry of Environment recognise that REDD+ policy development willrequireextensivepolicyandinstitutionalreforms.

TherearealsodivisionsonREDD+policydesignthathampercoalitionwork.InBrazil,bothstateactorsandinternationalenvironmentalorganisationsaredividedaboutthepossibilityoffinancingREDD+throughmarketmechanisms.The same debate is visible in Nepal, where indigenous organisations anddomesticenvironmentalgroupsareinfavourofmarketmechanismsbutvoiceconcernsaboutthelackofinclusionoflocalusersinREDD+policydecisions.Theycallforproceduralchangesinpolicydecisionmaking.Butstateactorsdonotengagewithissuesofsocialinclusioninthemedia.

InVietnam,thedebateaboutcompensationreferstotheregulationsrequiringdomesticstate-ownedenterprises(hydroelectricplants)torewardforestusersfor providing forest-related environmental services, since the VietnamesegovernmentissubsumingforestPESunderREDD+policies.Themediareporttwoinstancesinwhichstate-ownedenterprisesdisagreewiththeVietnamesegovernment. Despite this resistance, it would appear that inVietnam thenationalgovernmentistryingtoimposeachangeindirectioninbusinessasusualvis-à-vissomestate-ownedbusinessinterests(Phamet al.2012).

Overall stances and coalitions calling for transformational change are lessprominentinthemediathanbusinessasusualorneutralstances.Thisindicatesthat,overall,transformationalcoalitionsareminoritycoalitionsopposingmorepowerfulcoalitionssupportingthestatusquo.InIndonesia,partsofdomesticcivilsocietyopposetheinclusionofplantationsinREDD+schemes,whichrepresentsadirectattacktothedominantbusinessasusualcoalition.Yet,thereisno indicationofabroader transformationalcoalition thatmight includeother actors such as representatives of business or government. A numberof international environmental NGOs side with domestic civil society inexpressingtheirconcernsaboutthepotentialofREDD+tolimitforestaccessforlocalusersorevendispossessforest-dependentgroups.Butthisattempttopushpolicymakerstoreconsider local forest tenurearrangementsdoesnotfindaresponseinthediscourseofthedominantcoalition.

Concerns about weak governance and corruption are voiced by bothinternationalanddomesticcivilsocietyactorsinIndonesia.Inparticular,theystress thedanger that corruptionmight lead to ineffective implementation

Implementing REDD+88 |

ofREDD+.Suchapositioncanbeunderstoodasacallfortransformationalchange and adenunciationof collusion and capture,whichoftenunderliebusinessasusualcoalitions.Yet,suchconcernsremainunaddressedinmostother countries, despite the fact that weak governance is amajor politicalconstraintinmostcountries.

ThemaindemandofthedominantdomesticcivilsocietycoalitioninNepalis for a stronger role of local forest user groups in accessing benefits fromREDD+.Thisviewisopposedbylocalgovernment,whilestategovernmentseemsunengagedwithREDD+issuesinmediadebates.Forestuserfederationsform theonlyREDD+coalition engagingwith themedia in this country.Suchaprominentposition is inpart linkedwiththe longhistoryof forestusergroupsandcommunity forestry inNepal.This is theonlycase inourstudywherepath-dependenciesseemtolendstrengthtocivilsociety.Yet,intheabsenceofabroadercoalitionthatincludesalliesfromwithintheelite,itseffectivenessinpushingforchangeremainsindoubt.

InPeru,internationalenvironmentalNGOsdominatemediadebatesandsharewith indigenous organisations a concern about the inclusion of plantationforestry in REDD+ schemes. However, state actors are hardly engaged indiscussionsaroundREDD+inthemedia,whilebusinessactorscallforthestrengtheningofprivatepropertyarrangementstoensureaccesstocreditandsecurityofinvestments.Businessasusualcoalitions,corruptionandcollusionremainhiddenfrompublicscrutiny.ThesameistrueforCameroon,wherethemediadonotmentionanyspecificstateactorsprovidingapositionstatementonREDD+,althoughitissuggestedthatCameroonasacountryisinfavourofthedevelopmentofREDD+programmes.Theabsenceoftransformationalcoalitionsinthemediamightcontributetothelackofengagementofstateactors,whoarenotcalledtotakeapositiononREDD+,andindicatesthatREDD+policydevelopmentsareataveryearlystage.

Insummary,Indonesianstateactors,althoughsupportiveofREDD+intheirrhetoric,areopenindefendingbusinessasusualpolicies.InBrazil,stateactorshavetakenstepstosupportREDD+butentrenchedinterestslinkedtodriversof deforestation are powerful players and try to influencepolicy decisions.InVietnam, thegovernment isexplicit indefying suchpath-dependencies,althoughresistancefrombusinessinterestsisevident.InallcountriesexceptNepal,coalitionsfortransformationalchange,ifpresentatall,areminoritycoalitions.Only inNepaldoes suchacoalitiondominatemediadiscourse,inlargepartthankstothelackofengagementofstateactorswithREDD+policydiscussions.PeruandCameroonlackanyevidenceoftransformationalchangecoalitions.

| 89Politics and power in national REDD+ policy processes

5.5 Conclusions Theabove evidence illustrateshow four important factors,which canhelpovercome the politico-economic constraints to policy reform and lead toeffectiveandequitableREDD+policydesign,operateindifferentcountries.Theyare:ahighlevelofautonomyofstateactorsfrombusinessinterestslinkedto forest exploitation and conversion; ownership and control by nationalgovernments of nationalREDD+ strategies; a high degree of inclusivenessinpolicyprocesses;andthepresenceofcoalitionsfortransformationchange.

Thefindingsillustratethatinmostcountriesthesefactorswereneitherpresentbefore the introduction ofREDD+,nor are they currently being achieved–insteadcountriesstrugglewithreformprocessesinandbeyondtheforestsector.Onecommonchallengeinallsevencountriesisthelevelofautonomyof state actors.While state rhetoric, expressed inmedia stances, illustrates‘win–win’ scenarios where economic objectives go hand in hand withenvironmentalprotection,stateactors seemtofinditextremelydifficult toembracesuchaviewinpractice.Highdependenceofeconomicdevelopmenton unsustainable exploitation of natural resources is deeply engrainedin politico-economic structures. This remains the major challenge in allsevencountries.

Noneofthecountriesdemonstratesveryinclusivepolicyprocesses,expressedbydemocracyindicesandeffectivedecentralisation,althoughIndonesiaandBrazilfarebetterthantheothers.CameroonandVietnampresentthemostexclusiveprocesses,raisingconcernsthatlatentconflictsandtensionsamongstakeholdersmightoccurintheREDD+domainandmightworsenovertime.Yet,inanumberofcountries,thelackofengagementofnationalstateactorsraisesseriousquestionsaboutwhoisdrivingpolicyprocesses.Inthreeoutofsevencountries,nationalownershipoverREDD+policydevelopmentsandrelatedreformsisweak.Inthesecountriesthesignificantroleofinternationalplayersinthefinancinganddesignofpolicies–intheabsenceofanationalgovernmentthattakeschargeofsuchprocesses–leadstoslowprogressandlikelyproblemsinimplementation.

Proactiveefforts,predominantlyonthepartofcivilsocietyorganisations,tobuild domestic constituencies that challenge powerful interests are evidentinthemediadebateinsomecountries,buttheseremainminoritycoalitions.Further advances areneeded ifREDD+ is tobeperceivednotas adonor-drivenactivity,butasa trulynationalpolicy,onewhichserves thebroaderinterestofforest-richdevelopingcountriesandisnotperceivedasconflictingwithnationaldevelopment.EvenincountriesthataremostadvancedintheformulationofnationalREDD+strategies,relatedpoliciesareoftenperceivedas a threat to economic development. Consequently, powerful economic

Implementing REDD+90 |

interests lobby governments to adopt policies that reduce the effectivenessofREDD+orfurtherslowdecisionmaking,asevidentfromtheexperienceof the IndonesiaMoratoriumonForestConversionand the current threatinBrazil to revise theForestryCode to reduce the requirements for forestprotection.

What is needed now are coalitions capable of breaking up such path-dependencies:new,broadandinclusivealliancesthatusescientificexpertiseand technical and institutional capacity to overcome a traditional policymodel that isunable to envisionhowREDD+policies canbeharmonisedwithdevelopmentgoals.Theparticipationofstateelitesandtheengagementofbusinessactorsinthesecoalitionsarekeytoinfluencingthepoliticalagendainasignificantway.Inmostcountriesthiswillrequiretheriseofacounter-discoursefortransformationalchangethatcanchallengetheolddevelopmentmodel, disband dominant coalitions and attract support from state andbusinessactorswillingtotakeonthesechallenges.

6Chapter

Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+ Kaisa Korhonen-Kurki, Maria Brockhaus, Amy E. Duchelle, Stibniati Atmadja and Pham Thu Thuy

• REDD+isamultilevelendeavourthatmustensurethatglobaldemands,nationalandsubnational structures, localpeople’sneedsandaspirationsarealllinkedineffortstoreduceemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradation.Iftheseinterconnectionsaredisregarded,REDD+couldfail.

• Enhancingandharmonisinginformationflowsbetweenlocalandnationallevelsareessentialforaccountablemeasurement,reportingandverificationandemissionsleakagecontrol.Soundinformationflowsacrossthelevelscan also enhance the negotiation power of disadvantaged groups andensureamoreeffective,efficientandequitableREDD+.

• Toreducetheriskofconflict,REDD+multilevelgovernancesystemsmustmatchincentivesandinterestswithtransparentinstitutions.

6.1 IntroductionAchieving the objective of reducing emissions from deforestation anddegradation (REDD+) is inherently amultilevel puzzle. Local people faceglobaldemandsforclimatechangemitigationthatmustbeeffectedthroughexistingandemergingnationalandsubnational institutionsandstructures.

Implementing REDD+92 |

REDD+ requires an integrated approach involving both international andlocal governance levels, with challenges every step of the way. Externalorganisations and structures are also needed to ensure independent andcrediblereportingandverificationandtoguaranteeaccountability.

Initially,REDD+emphasisedanationalapproachsinceitcanhelptomanageemissionsleakage,encouragepermanenceandprovidereliablemeasurement,reporting and verification (MRV) (Phelps et al. 2010b). But nationalgovernmentsstrugglewithmultilevelchallengesandhavefacedenforcementproblemsinthelandusesectorfordecades(CorberaandSchroeder2011).

Therehavebeenvarious theoretical reflectionsaboutmultilevelgovernanceandREDD+(Armitage2008;SkutschandVanLaake2008;Forsyth2009).ThischaptercontributestothedebatebymovingbeyondtheorytoprovideexamplesofhowmultilevelgovernancemechanismsareusedtorespondtochallengesinREDD+coreelementsindifferentcountriesaswellasidentifyingthemainobstaclesandopportunitiesincurrentREDD+realities.

LarsonandPetkova(2011)definegovernanceasfollows:“Governancerefersto who makes decisions and how decisions are made, from national to localscales,includingformalandinformalinstitutionsandrules,powerrelationsandpracticesofdecisionmaking.”InthischapterweapplyForsyth’s(2009)broad definition for multilevel governance (MLG) as the implementationofpublicpolicies acrossdiverse spatial scales andby actorswithdissimilarinfluenceandvalues.

Currently,REDD+progressisfragmentedbetweenandwithininternational,national and subnational governance levels, and mechanisms formultilevelgovernance provide specific strategies for better integration. Pahl-Wostl(2009)considersthreeprocessesthatenablethisintegration.First,actorsfromone level canparticipate in processes at another level. Second, institutionscreated at one level can influence processes or institutions at other levels.Third,knowledgeproducedatonelevelcaninfluenceprocessesatotherlevels.

Togofurther,basedonthe4Isframework1presentedinChapter2ofthisvolume,governancesystems inREDD+must: i)ensure thematchof institutions and incentives across the levels involvedinREDD+;ii)ensuretheflowofinformationrequiredtoimplementREDD+(includinglocalinformation);andiii)enablethenegotiationofactorswithdifferentinterestsacrosslevels.

This chapter argues for theneed to identify andunderstand themultilevelgovernancemechanismsthatarebeingimplementedwithinREDD+andthebenefitsandrisksassociatedwitha lackofmultilevelgovernance. Itpoints

1 The4thIrefersto‘Ideas’thatarenotexplicitlyconsideredhere.

| 93Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

outthatpolicymakers,negotiators,stateagenciesandnonstateactors,projectproponents and local organisations need to understand how multilevelgovernancecanhelpREDD+tobemoreeffective,efficientandequitableandhowtostrengthengovernancemechanismsinexistingREDD+policiesandprogrammes.Thereare encouragingexamples showing that steps arebeingtakentowardsvertical integration.Whilemultilevelgovernanceandrelatedissues have been debated in the conservation and development literature,asourpreliminaryresultswill show,therearestillchallenges in integratingmultilevelthinkingandactionintotheREDD+policyprocess.

OuranalysisconsidersthemultileveldimensionsofREDD+coreelements.Tosupportit,weprovideanecdotalevidenceofchallengesandopportunitiesthrough a focus on measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) andemissionsleakageinthreecountriesinvolvedinCIFOR’sGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+(seeAppendix):Brazil,VietnamandIndonesia.Wefocusonthemultilevelnatureoftheseelementswithinthethreecountriesandnotbetweeninternationalandnationallevels.

6.2 Framework: Dimensions of multilevel governanceAngelsenet al.(2009)andKanninenet al.(2010)identifiedanumberofkeyissuesinREDD+implementation,includingthechallengesofMRVsystemimplementation, leakage control, permanence, financial mechanisms andbenefitsharingaswellastheparticipationandrightsofindigenouspeopleandlocalcommunities.Mostoftheseelementshaveexplicitmultileveldimensionsand,ifdisregarded,poserisksforREDD+.InTable6.1,wegiveexamplesofmultileveldimensionsofREDD+issuesandriskfactorsifthesedimensionsaretakenintoconsideration.

Inthefollowingsections,wewillfocusontwokeyissues:MRVandleakagecontrol.ManyoftheotherissueslistedinTable6.1arecoveredinseparatechapters of the book, e.g. benefit sharing (8), tenure (9), and referencelevels (16). In this chapter we will present existing multilevel governancemechanisms,existingREDD+responsesandexamples fromcasestudies inBrazil, Vietnam and Indonesia. Finally, we highlight challenges related tothe4Is.

6.3 Multilevel governance and REDD+ response: Preliminary evidence REDD+ includes various multilevel governance challenges as seen inTable6.1.Mostofthesechallengesrelatetoconnectingactionsatthelocaland subnational and national levels to ensure the flow and consistency ofinformation and themanagement of interests across levels. Evidence from

Implementing REDD+94 |

Tab

le 6

.1 C

ore

elem

ents

in R

EDD

+ a

nd

thei

r mul

tile

vel d

imen

sion

s

Co

re

elem

ents

in

RED

D+

Mu

ltile

vel d

imen

sio

nR

isk

if m

ult

ileve

l dim

ensi

on

dis

reg

ard

ed

Mea

surin

g Re

por

ting

and

Verifi

catio

n (M

RV)

•Fl

ow o

f inf

orm

atio

n an

d ve

rifica

tion

acro

ss le

vels

•In

tegr

atio

n of

spat

ial a

nd fi

eld-

base

d da

ta

•Te

chni

cal c

apac

ity to

use

info

rmat

ion

acro

ss le

vels

•O

verla

ppin

g ju

risdi

ctio

nal p

ower

ove

r lan

d us

e da

ta b

y na

tiona

l and

su

bnat

iona

l age

ncie

s

•Ag

greg

atio

n an

d st

anda

rdis

atio

n of

dat

a ac

ross

leve

ls

•Po

tent

ial c

onfli

ct b

etw

een

subn

atio

nal a

nd n

atio

nal a

genc

ies o

n re

spon

sibi

lity

for l

and

cove

r dat

a

•D

atas

ets o

f diff

erin

g qu

antit

y an

d qu

ality

and

bas

ed o

n di

ffere

nt

met

hods

, mak

ing

aggr

egat

ion

diffi

cult

Refe

renc

e le

vels

(RLs

) •

Vario

us se

ctor

s, m

arke

ts a

nd p

olic

ies d

rive

defo

rest

atio

n in

diff

eren

t w

ays w

ithin

the

sam

e co

untr

y

•Va

riatio

n in

met

hods

to e

stab

lish

RLs f

or sa

me

area

•In

cons

iste

ncy

betw

een

subn

atio

nal a

nd n

atio

nal R

Ls

•La

ck o

f ow

ners

hip

amon

g su

bnat

iona

l act

ors i

f loc

al c

onte

xt a

nd la

nd

use

driv

ers n

ot ta

ken

into

acc

ount

at n

atio

nal l

evel

•Po

or a

ccur

acy

of R

L if

regi

onal

RLs

are

not

mod

ified

bas

ed o

n lo

cal

driv

ers a

nd c

onte

xt

Leak

age

•Le

akag

e m

anag

emen

t tas

ks c

an b

e as

sign

ed a

t the

subn

atio

nal l

evel

; na

tiona

l-lev

el c

arbo

n m

onito

ring

syst

ems m

ust a

ssig

n lia

bilit

y fo

r le

akag

e ac

ross

subn

atio

nal b

ound

arie

s

•G

uide

lines

for s

ubna

tiona

l gov

ernm

ents

to su

ppor

t and

neg

otia

te

sett

lem

ent o

f lea

kage

-rela

ted

disp

utes

with

oth

er su

bnat

iona

l go

vern

men

ts

•Ri

sk if

no

legi

timat

e as

sign

men

t of l

iabi

lity

to su

bnat

iona

l go

vern

men

ts

•Ri

sk o

f def

ores

tatio

n an

d de

grad

atio

n sh

ifts t

o ar

eas t

hat h

ave

low

er

capa

city

to m

onito

r em

issi

ons a

nd e

nfor

ce R

EDD

+ po

licie

s

Perm

anen

ce •

Vary

ing

inte

rest

s at d

iffer

ent l

evel

s ope

rate

at d

iffer

ent t

ime

horiz

ons,

crea

ting

diffi

culti

es in

ach

ievi

ng p

erm

anen

t em

issi

ons r

educ

tions

•Es

tabl

ishm

ent o

f nat

iona

l/int

erna

tiona

l mec

hani

sms t

o se

ttle

di

sput

es a

mon

g di

ffere

nt e

ntiti

es in

ass

igni

ng li

abili

ty o

ver e

mis

sion

s in

the

futu

re

•Es

tabl

ishm

ent o

f ins

uran

ce sy

stem

s tha

t acc

ount

for v

aria

ble

subn

atio

nal f

ores

t con

ditio

ns/t

rend

s to

help

pro

vide

cer

tain

ty w

here

ris

k of

em

issi

ons e

xist

s

•D

iffer

ent l

ife sp

ans (

proj

ect c

ycle

s, el

ectio

n cy

cles

, sus

tain

abili

ty

need

s) c

an le

ad to

inco

nsis

tent

dec

isio

n m

akin

g ov

er ti

me

•Ri

sk o

f dis

tort

ed e

ffort

s for

em

issi

ons r

educ

tions

whe

n po

litic

al a

nd

com

mod

ity m

arke

t con

ditio

ns c

hang

e

•D

oubt

ful a

dditi

onal

ity w

hen

clai

ms f

or c

redi

ts a

re b

ased

on

emis

sion

s re

duct

ions

due

to e

xoge

nous

fact

ors

| 95Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

Bene

fit

shar

ing

and

finan

cial

m

echa

nism

s

•Be

nefit

sha

ring

syst

ems

are

ofte

n na

tiona

l but

affe

ct lo

cal r

ight

s (c

olon

ial /

post

col

onia

l ten

ure

regi

mes

, cus

tom

ary

right

s, lo

cal

prac

tices

, see

tenu

re)

•D

istr

ibut

ion

of fi

nanc

ial r

esou

rces

and

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

acro

ss

the

leve

ls to

sup

port

read

ines

s an

d on

goin

g ac

tiviti

es

•D

ecis

ions

ove

r per

form

ance

and

rele

ase

of fu

nds

acro

ss le

vels

•Ri

sk o

f elit

e ca

ptur

e be

caus

e of

une

qual

pow

er re

latio

ns b

etw

een

dono

r and

ben

efici

ary

acro

ss le

vels

and

sca

les

•Ri

sk o

f cor

rupt

ion

(See

Box

6.1

)

Part

icip

atio

n an

d rig

hts

of

indi

geno

us

peo

ple

an

d lo

cal

com

mun

ities

•Ri

ghts

of l

ocal

com

mun

ities

to p

artic

ipat

e

•Fl

ow o

f int

eres

ts a

nd in

form

atio

n fr

om lo

cal t

o gl

obal

leve

l

•In

dica

tors

of p

artic

ipat

ion

mus

t rec

ogni

se p

ossi

bilit

y of

elit

e ca

ptur

e at

all

leve

ls.

•D

ecis

ions

at n

atio

nal l

evel

hav

e lo

cal c

onse

quen

ces

•Ri

sk o

f elit

e ca

ptur

e ac

ross

leve

ls

•Ri

sk o

f mis

sing

lear

ning

opp

ortu

nitie

s fr

om p

ast f

ailu

res/

succ

esse

s as

cla

ims

of b

enefi

ts to

com

mun

ities

and

real

em

issi

on

redu

ctio

ns m

ade

at h

ighe

r lev

els,

des

pite

lack

of/

cont

rary

ev

iden

ce in

the

field

Co-

ben

efits

(p

over

ty

alle

viat

ion,

b

iodi

vers

ity

cons

erva

tion)

•In

tere

st in

co-

bene

fits

vs. e

mis

sion

redu

ctio

ns d

iffer

s ac

ross

leve

ls:

emis

sion

s re

duct

ion

is m

ain

conc

ern

at th

e in

tern

atio

nal l

evel

bu

t pov

erty

alle

viat

ion

is m

ain

conc

ern

at s

ubna

tiona

l/loc

al le

vel.

Nat

iona

l lev

els

may

try

to b

alan

ce b

oth.

•In

suffi

cien

t att

entio

n to

diff

erin

g in

tere

sts

coul

d ca

use

dise

ngag

emen

t of s

ubna

tiona

l/loc

al a

ctor

s, w

ho a

re c

ruci

al in

im

plem

enta

tion

succ

ess

Tenu

re •

Unc

lear

land

tenu

re s

yste

ms

are

furt

her c

ompl

icat

ed b

y RE

DD

+,

whi

ch o

pera

tes

unde

r add

ition

al d

imen

sion

s (c

arbo

n rig

hts,

w

hich

are

stil

l und

efine

d in

mos

t cou

ntrie

s)

•Ri

ghts

and

resp

onsi

bilit

ies

for R

EDD

+ a

mon

g la

nd ri

ghts

hol

ders

(o

wne

rshi

p an

d us

e rig

hts)

at d

iffer

ent l

evel

s ar

e ge

nera

lly u

ncle

ar

and

new

lega

l fra

mew

orks

und

er R

EDD

+ m

ay le

ad to

usu

rpat

ion

of tr

aditi

onal

righ

ts

•La

ck o

f cla

rity

on ri

ghts

to c

arbo

n an

d la

nd c

reat

e in

just

ice

acro

ss

leve

ls.

•Ri

sks

of in

secu

rity

of la

nd c

laim

s an

d el

ite c

aptu

re d

ue to

lega

l pl

ural

ism

•If

peop

le q

uest

ion

thei

r ow

ners

hip

over

RED

D+

ben

efits

, the

ir in

cent

ive

to re

duce

em

issi

ons

will

be

dim

inis

hed

Implementing REDD+96 |

Box 6.1 Risks of corruption in REDD+: Lessons from Indonesia Ahmad Dermawan

The REDD+ readiness phase in Indonesia already involves large and growing public funding as well as private investment. It also involves complex interactions among actors from the global to local levels. The successful use of these funds for policy reform and reducing carbon emissions will require cooperation among agencies. However, the situation is still far from ideal.

One of the challenges is the poorly defined boundaries of areas under state forest. Licensing regulations require applicants for any concessions, including REDD+ project concessions, to meet certain criteria and ascertain that the area is free from any existing rights. Yet there are challenges to meet these criteria. For example, although timber plantation and ecosystem restoration permits should be issued only for degraded forests and must be free from competing claims, there are still applications for land either with good forest conditions or which have other claims on them. This could allow REDD+ concession holders to deforest before the accounting period begins. Also, since subnational governments have the authority to issue permits for plantations and mining, unclear forest boundaries would provide opportunities for them to issue permits within state forests.

Another challenge is the reconciliation of timber production and tax reports to ensure that forest concessions pay their dues. Actors from district to central government levels are involved in reconciling timber production and tax payment reports with strict timelines. Yet the Supreme Audit Agency found that reconciliation is not always carried out on a regular basis. As a result, the Supreme Audit Agency found discrepancies between the amount of tax actually received by the government, and the amount it should receive. If replicated under the REDD+, it will undermine accurate credit accounting and foster corruption.

Corruption and fraud could also affect the distribution of revenues at different levels of government. Past experience shows that there have been delays in disbursing and spending shared revenues from forestry across government levels. Under the existing fiscal balancing law in Indonesia, it is not possible to share money directly across government levels and communities. Depending on how REDD+ revenues are treated in the fiscal system, the approval of future REDD+ revenues levels and the allocation of these revenues will involve much negotiation between districts, provinces and central agencies, therefore increasing transaction costs and opening the door to corruption and bribes.

After each level of government receives its share of forest revenues, past experience shows that poor financial management capacity, elites who act outside the rule of law without being penalised and the absence of accountability mechanisms have led to corruption and misuse of forest funds. This could create significant risks for corruption in climate finance in Indonesia. Failing to anticipate these risks could compromise the ability of REDD+ to meet its emission reduction and revenue targets.

Source: Dermawan et al. (2011)

| 97Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

Brazil,VietnamandIndonesiaindicatesthemultilevelneedsandmechanismsthatmustbeaddressedtoachievekeyREDD+objectives(seeTable6.2).

Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) isasystemforprovidingquantitative estimates of greenhouse gas fluxes (emissions reductions andremovals). The primary focus is on monitoring changes in forest carbonstocks and/or flows, reporting those changes in a transparent and timelymanner and verifying those estimates through an independent third party(Herold and Skutsch 2009).MRV faces challenges in integrating differenttypesofinformationacrosslevels(globalmonitoringsystems,establishmentof national MRV systems and MRV techniques used by subnationalREDD+projects).

Leakage occurs when interventions to reduce emission on one area(subnational or national) lead to higher emissions in another area (seeWunder2008).Ifleakageisnotaccountedfor,reportedemissionreductionswillbeoverestimated.2Leakagewithinnationalboundariescanbereportedunderanationalcarbonaccounting systembutmay suggest theneed forfinancial compensation between the subnational leakage source (whereemissionreductionsoccur)andthesink(whereemissionsaredisplaced).

6.4 MRVMostcountriesstilllacknationalREDD+frameworksandpolicies,althoughvariousREDD+pilotprojectshavebeeninitiatedandsubnationaldecisionshavebeenmadeonREDD+strategies.Asaresult,manysubnationalprojectproponentsaresettingreferencelevelsfortheirprojectsitesanddevelopingtheirownMRVsystems.Linksbetweenlevelsareessentialtodeterminehowemissions reductions from these subnational initiatives will be accountedforat thenational level.Furthermore, externalorganisationsareneeded toensure independent and credible reporting and verification, and to ensureaccountability.Weelaborateoneachofthesechallengesbelow.

6.4.1 Challenge: The lack of framework In Brazil, interactions between government agencies and civil society atmultiple levels have influenced the development of REDD+, includingthroughproposalsforsettingreferencelevelsandMRVatthenationallevel.Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research is well poised to measure,report and verify emissions from deforestation and degradation in the

2 Theterm‘leakage’refersto‘negativeleakage’,i.e.whenreductionsinemissionsinonearealeadtoincreasedemissionsinanother.Thisisonlyforsimplificationasweacknowledgethat‘positiveleakage’(i.e.reductionsinemissionsinonearealeadtoreducedemissionsinanother)couldalsohappen.

Implementing REDD+98 |

Tab

le 6

.2 M

ulti

leve

l gov

ern

ance

mec

han

ism

s, R

EDD

+ re

spon

ses

and

cas

e st

udy

exam

ple

s

Co

re is

sue

in R

EDD

+M

ult

ileve

l gov

ern

ance

m

ech

anis

ms

RED

D+

res

po

nse

Prel

imin

ary

evid

ence

fro

m G

CS

Pote

nti

al o

pti

on

s

MRV

•C

apab

le, c

onne

cted

bod

ies

at a

ll le

vels

that

hav

e ex

plic

it m

anda

te, p

ower

and

bud

get t

o co

llect

and

sha

re in

form

atio

n fr

om v

ario

us s

ecto

rs to

es

timat

e ca

rbon

em

issi

ons

from

la

nd u

se c

hang

e •

Diff

eren

t for

ms

of in

form

atio

n (s

atel

lite

imag

ery,

GIS

, fiel

d da

ta, l

ocal

kno

wle

dge

etc.

)

•N

atio

nal c

arb

on a

ccou

ntin

g sy

stem

s •

MRV

cap

acit

y-b

uild

ing

at

natio

nal a

nd s

ubna

tiona

l lev

els

•Pa

rtic

ipat

ory

MRV

•Pr

ojec

ts a

nd g

over

nmen

tal

agen

cies

out

sour

ce M

RV

serv

ices

as

need

ed •

RED

D p

roje

ct re

gist

ry •

Dev

elop

men

t of M

RV

guid

elin

es fo

r RED

D+

pro

ject

s

Braz

il

Adva

nced

tech

niqu

es u

sed;

pr

ojec

t-le

vel M

RV sy

stem

s in

plac

e un

derg

oing

third

par

ty v

erifi

catio

n;

natio

nal f

ram

ewor

k st

ill n

eede

dVi

etna

mD

ata

are

scat

tere

d an

d fra

gmen

ted;

na

tiona

l MRV

fram

ewor

k es

tabl

ishe

d bu

t stil

l nee

ds to

be

loca

lised

Indo

nesi

aEff

orts

to re

conc

ile sp

atia

l dat

a on

la

nd c

over

, con

cess

ion

bord

ers a

nd

adm

inis

trat

ive

boun

darie

s

•Si

mp

lify

inte

rnat

iona

l ve

rifica

tion

stan

dard

s an

d m

etho

ds to

be

mor

e at

tain

able

by

sub

natio

nal i

nitia

tives

•Es

tab

lish

legi

slat

ion

on

rep

ortin

g re

spon

sib

ilitie

s to

ce

ntra

lise

data

und

er n

atio

nal

mon

itorin

g ag

enci

es •

Esta

blis

h un

iform

regu

latio

ns

on th

e rig

hts,

resp

onsi

bili

ties

and

pro

cedu

res

for M

RV a

cros

s su

bna

tiona

l gov

ernm

ents

•Es

tab

lish

fund

s an

d tr

ansp

aren

t m

echa

nism

for a

lloca

ting

reso

urce

s to

sup

por

t su

bna

tiona

l MRV

Leak

age

•Ve

rtic

al a

nd s

ecto

ral

coor

dina

tion

bet

wee

n lo

cal/

cros

s-p

rovi

nce/

cros

s-na

tiona

l le

vels

to a

void

leak

age,

whi

ch

can

occu

r with

sho

rt o

r lon

g tim

e la

gs, a

nd c

ome

from

di

ffer

ent s

ecto

rs

•Po

licie

s to

add

ress

the

mix

of

mul

tiple

sp

atia

l, te

mp

oral

and

se

ctor

al is

sues

•

Broa

der a

reas

for R

EDD

+

•N

atio

nal c

arb

on a

ccou

ntin

g sy

stem

s •

Dom

estic

dis

cuss

ion

of tr

ade/

bor

der-

bas

ed p

olic

ies

to a

void

le

akag

e fr

om/t

o ot

her c

ount

ries

•D

evel

opm

ent o

f lea

kage

m

onito

ring

guid

elin

es a

t the

p

roje

ct le

vel

•St

udie

s on

trad

e-b

ased

car

bon

b

alan

ces

acro

ss c

ount

ries

•Im

pro

ved

regi

onal

trad

e an

d se

curit

y di

alog

ues

Braz

ilPr

omis

ing

subn

atio

nal l

evel

ex

perie

nce

in c

reat

ing

broa

der

RED

D+

area

s; ex

perie

nce

in

addr

essi

ng p

oten

tial l

eaka

ge a

cros

s in

tern

atio

nal b

orde

rsVi

etna

mW

eak

coor

dina

tion

amon

g re

leva

nt

agen

cies

, pol

itica

l rel

atio

nshi

p am

ong

Laos

, Cam

bodi

a an

d Vi

etna

mIn

done

sia

Regi

onal

and

loca

l pol

itica

l gam

es

affec

ting

subn

atio

nal l

eaka

ge

•M

anda

te a

nat

iona

l em

issi

ons

mon

itorin

g b

ody

•C

larif

y th

e sy

stem

for

dist

ribut

ing

RED

D+

ben

efits

an

d re

spon

sib

ilitie

s ac

ross

le

vels

•Es

tab

lish

lega

l pro

cedu

res

for

sett

ling

disp

utes

ove

r lea

kage

ac

ross

sub

natio

nal b

ound

arie

s •

Cre

ate

regi

onal

dia

logu

es a

nd

regi

onal

agr

eem

ents

am

ong

neig

hbou

ring

coun

trie

s

| 99Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

AmazonthroughtheuseofstateoftheartremotesensingandGIS.SeveralREDD+ project proponents in Brazil have drawn on these national dataand regionalmodelling effortswhen establishing reference emissions levelsfor theirproject sitesbasedonhistorical ratesofdeforestation.Proponentsplantouseadvancedremotesensingtechniques,includingairborneLiDARdata(Asner et al.2010)andnewalgorithmsfordetectingforestfires(Alencar et al. 2011) tomonitor deforestation and degradation.That said, there isstillmuchuncertaintythatmustbeaddressedinestablishingMRVsystemsin Brazil. Carbon emissions from degradation should be incorporated inbaseline-setting,monitoring conducted on an annual basis, and remotely-senseddata integratedwith robust fieldmeasurements (Souza Jr., personalcommunication,9March2012.SeealsoChapter15concerninguncertaintyaboutemissionsfactors).Brazilcanclaimatleasttwoexamplesoflocallevelintegration inMRV systems of REDD+ projects where community-basedmonitoringislinkedtospatialanalyses.Despitetheseadvances,givenBrazil’slarge size, isolated subnational REDD+ projects will have little effect onreducingemissionsiftheyarenotlinkedtoabroadernationalframework.Inaddition,thecomplexityofinternationalverificationstandardsandmethodsformeasuringunplanneddeforestationcouldbesimplifiedtoallowforgreateraccessibility byREDD+project proponents, especially prior to finalisationof the jurisdictional andnestedREDD+ approachby theVerifiedCarbonStandard(VCS)andnationalMRVframeworks.

6.4.2 Challenge: Conflict or lack of interest In Vietnam, conflict of interests and the various land classifications usedby different ministries, and even within ministries, increase the challengeof obtaining accurate information and data on forestry lands and forestryresources.Dataarescatteredandfragmentedacrossdifferentdepartmentsandunitsandareneither sharednoravailable to thepublic.NumerousdonorshavetriedtoassistthegovernmenttodevelopandimprovethecurrentMRVsystem.However, theseeffortshavebeenthwartedbythefactthat internalstakeholdersoftendonotsharedataandresourceswitheachother,resultinginoverlappingandduplicatedactions.ItisworthnotingthatcurrentMRVinitiatives fail toaddressthesocial impactassessment(SIA),astherelevantministriesforSIAareabsentfromthediscussion.

InVietnam,thereareproblemsinarrangingadditionalandindependentbodiesforMRVbecauseofhightransactioncosts,conflictswithexistinggovernmentpolicy(e.g.withregardtonationalsecurity)disagreementbetweencentralandlocalauthoritiesandamongdonorsand lackof support fromlocalagencies.The local governments challenge the central government and donors onthepracticality and realismof these independentbodies andcall for amorerealistic and cost effective approach. If the potential for payment is small,

Implementing REDD+100 |

local governments may prefer to use existing mechanism and institutionalarrangementwithadditionalfunctions.While participatoryMRV remains a controversial issue inVietnam,manyprojectshavepilotedparticipatorycarbonmonitoring.TheWorldAgroforestryCenter conducted themost significant test, in collaborationwith nationalpartnersinBacKan,ThaiNguyenandThuaThienHueprovince.Thenewmethod,knownasRaCSA(rapidcarbonstockappraisal),wastestedforitspotentialtohelpcommunitiesbecomeinvolvedinreportingandmonitoringpayments for ecosystem services (PES) contracts (Kurniatun et al. 2001),toexplore localknowledgeand investigateactivities thatcan improve locallivelihoods(VanNoordwijk2007).ExperiencewiththismethodshowsthatRaCSAcan indeedhelp localpeople toactivelyparticipate inMRV.TheselessonslearnedfromthispilotstudycouldpotentiallybenefitthediscussionanddesignofMRVsysteminVietnam.However,thefindingshavenotbeenwidelysharedamongstakeholdersnorfedintocurrentpolicydebates,onceagain highlighting the disconnect between project-level activities and thenationalREDD+programme.

6.4.3 Opportunity: Voluntary working groupsIndonesia provides an interesting example of an attempt to improveinstitutionallinkages.Ad hocREDD+workinggroupsinCentralKalimantan,EastKalimantanandAceh,togetherwiththenationalREDD+taskforce,arehelpingtoimprovestakeholderparticipationanddialoguebetweenministries,privatesector,civilsocietyandacademia.Theworkinggroupsaretemporarymeasure toaddress the lackof institutional linksbetweensectors,and–atleastinIndonesia–areafamiliarmechanismforaddressingemergingissues.Theimmediategoalistoimprovedialogue,buildinformalnetworks,formaunifiedvisionofREDD+andcreateapolicyandimplementationspaceforREDD+inrelevantinstitutions(seeBox6.2).

6.4.4 Challenge: The lack of matching maps and mindsetsInIndonesiaandVietnam,themainprobleminestablishinganationalMRVsystemisthelackofreliable,harmonisedandcentralisedspatialdataonlanduses,suchasforestry/mining/agricultureconcessions,conservationareasandeconomicdevelopmentzones.InIndonesia,stepshavebeentakentoincreasedata transparency and to harmonise land use maps across provinces andsectors.TheREDD+TaskforceWorkingGroupunderthePresident’sUnitforDevelopmentControlandMonitoring(UKP4)haspostedspatialdataontheInternetandhasinvitedpublicanalysisandinput.ThiswasdoneinresponsetothedeforestationmoratoriumspurredbytheLetterofIntentbetweenthegovernmentsofIndonesiaandNorwayonREDD+cooperation(seeBox2.1inChapter2).Backing fromthe Indonesiapresidentwaskey to legitimise

| 101Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

themappingprocess.Thisprocesshasgeneratedinterestatthedistrictlevel.InKapuasdistrict,aREDD+modeldistrict,spatialdatareconciliationhasbecomepartoftheREDD+strategy(FieldobservationsbyAtmadja2011).A multiagency initiative – the Indonesian National Carbon AccountingSystem(INCAS)–isestablishingmethodsfornationalcarbonaccounting.ItcomplieswithIPCCrequirements,contributingtoreliableandstandardiseddata.However,actiontocentralisedatacurrentlyhousedinvariousagenciesisstilllimited.

ThepeopleandorganisationsresponsibleforimplementingREDD+projectsoftentrytoengagelocalpolicymakersinunderstandingthegoalsandobjectivesoftheiractivities.ButsincetheREDD+paymentmechanismisunclear,interestinREDD+activitiesisverylimited.OneoftheexceptionsistheKalimantanForestCarbonPartnership(KFCP),agovernment-to-governmentpartnershipbetween Indonesia and Australia (The Government of Australia and TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofIndonesia2007).Institutionalpresenceandlong-term funding for the partnership have helped to engage local policymakersinregulardialoguesandcollaborativedecisionmaking.(SeeBox6.2foradditionalcross-scalegovernancelinkagesinCentralKalimantan.)

6.5 LeakageTherearetwoissuesrelatedtoleakage:i)thetechnicalapproachtomonitoringandmeasuringleakage;andii)theproceduresandactionsneededtomanageorminimiseit.

REDD+interventionscancauselocal/cross-province/cross-nationalleakage,involve short or long time lags and come from different sectors (e.g.agricultural, mining, forestry and infrastructure; Wunder 2008). The mixof spatial, temporal and sectoral issues implies that multilevel governancemechanismsarenecessarytoensureoverallemissionsreductions.Transnationalleakageisstillunregulated,possiblybecausestrategiestolimititcouldincludecontentious trade measures that might impinge on international law andsovereignty concerns (see review in Droege 2011). Solving these disputesrequiresestablishedinstitutionstodeterminetheliabilityandlegalityoftheselectedleakagepolicies.

6.5.1 Opportunity: Learning from subnational experiences AnimportantwaytocontrolleakageistoconsolidateaREDD+frameworkatasbroadofa scaleaspossible.TheREDD+leadershipobservedat thesubnational level in the Brazilian Amazon, through the Amazonian stategovernments’participationintheGovernors’ClimateandForestsTaskforce(GCF), isan important strategy fordecreasing the risksof leakage in the

Implementing REDD+102 |

Box 6.2 Regional policy networks in Indonesia Caleb Gallemore and Rut Dini

CIFOR is undertaking research in Central Kalimantan (Kalteng), Indonesia to better understand how public, private, and civil society organisations interact in the process of constructing REDD+ policy on a provincial scale. Using a policy network analysis approach, CIFOR is studying patterns of information sharing, cooperation, funding and disagreement among approximately forty key organisations working on REDD+ policy in the province. While the research is ongoing, there is already clear evidence of the importance of cross-scale connections for understanding policy development – or lack of policy development – in Kalteng. The province entered the international spotlight when it was chosen as the first pilot province to benefit from a $1 billion agreement with Norway, which requires Kalteng to develop a subnational REDD+ policy within the context of Indonesia’s own national REDD+ strategy, adapting policy developed in Jakarta to local conditions. Organisations with an interest in REDD+ policy in Kalteng report confusion about REDD+’s legal status, both locally and in Jakarta. Lacking a firm legal basis for REDD+, the province’s activities – and its REDD+ institutions – remain ad hoc.

Organisations that are active in REDD+ activities in the province cooperate with local groups, as well as with institutions in Jakarta or further afield, but historically this cooperation has bypassed the provincial government, meaning that efforts to manage cross-scale relationships are a central task for organisations like the governor’s office, which in 2009 established the ad hoc Area Committee on REDD and its administrative arm, the Sekretariat REDD+ Bersama, as well as the United Nations Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia (UNORCID). These organisations act as bridges between the province and the national government and are also undertaking a concerted effort to combine local REDD+ initiatives into a provincial-scale strategy: a challenging task given broad local powers granted under decentralisation.

Our respondents report that cross-scale relationships present a challenge and a source of confusion. Unsure about the legal basis of their roles in REDD+ implementation, provincial policy makers sometimes feel like they are waiting for something that will never happen. Within the province, much activity remains focused on specific REDD+ projects, as regency governments hold considerable authority over land use. While connections between national and provincial policy discussions are relatively common, there are few direct or indirect connections between the village and regency scales and the networks of organisations involved in policy discussion at the provincial scale. Several organisations in the provincial policy network, however, are working to find ways to build such connections. Initiatives like www.borneoclimate.info an SMS micro-

| 103Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

blogging platform for discussions about REDD+ and other forest issues, provide one way to use Indonesia’s widespread mobile phone usage to its advantage. There are also discussions about the possibility of establishing one or more multistakeholder forums to provide an institutionalised setting for discussions about REDD+ between government, civil society, and traditional leaders, among others. Providing an environment in which connections between these scales can emerge, however, may also require a clear legal basis for REDD+ that delineates roles at all levels.

region.Basedonthisforum,andwithsupportfromnationalNGOsandtheAmazonFund,sevenoutofnineAmazonianstateshaveinitiatedstateplanstocontroldeforestationwithintheframeworkoftheNationalPlanforthePreventionandControlofDeforestationintheAmazonsince2008(May et al.2011b).ThestatesofAmazonasandAcrehavepassedlawsdesignedto reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation: the Amazonas’Climate andConservationLaw (3135/2007), passed in 2007, andAcre’sStateSystemforEnvironmentalServicesLaw(GovernmentofAcre2010;Law2308/2010)transformedstateinstitutionswhenitwaspassedin2010.With the assistance of environmentalNGOs,Acre’s governmenthas alsoconsidered how to control international leakage through informationexchanges and capacity building with the regional government ofneighbouringMadredeDios,Peru.

6.5.2 Challenge: Transboundary leakage from mismatched domestic supply and demand for wood Leakageissuesremaindifficultintermsofdatacollectionandpoliticaldebatein Vietnam. Despite the commitment of the government to address theissues,researchshowschallenges(MeyfroidtandLambin2009),particularlyrelated to amismatch between economic development goals and the lownationalproductionoftimber.Becauseofitssignificantcontributiontothenationaleconomy,thewoodprocessingindustryhasbecomeagovernmentpriority.Yetthetimberindustrycurrentlydependsonimportsfor80%ofitsrawmaterials(Doanet al.2005;GSO2009;ForestTrends2010).Toaddresstheproblem,theVietnamForestryDevelopmentStrategy2006–2020aimstoreducedependenceonimportedtimbersto20%.However,asProForest(2009)noted,thisgoalisambitiousduetotheunplannedconversionoflandtootherpurposesandlimitedcooperationbetweenenterprises.Asaresult,Vietnam is likely to remain dependent on imports from other countries,entailingahighriskofbuyingproductsfromunknownandpossiblyillegalsourcesincountriessuchasLaoPDRandCambodia(GSO2009;ProForest2009;ForestTrends2010).Inaddition,whiletheforestcover inVietnamhas increasedover thepast fewyears,mainlydue to the rapid increaseof

Implementing REDD+104 |

forest plantation area, the quality of forest has decreased, leading to lowcarbonstock.

To address the problem, the UN-REDD Programme aims to quantifydisplacementprobabilitiesacrosscountrybordersbycompilingandanalyzingexistingdataaswellasbyestablishingregionaldialogues.Vietnamalsoplanstoestablishaninter-governmentalpartnershipofMekongRivercountriestoavoidtheriskofemissionsdisplacementunderREDD.Aprojectconceptnoteaimingtocreateatechnicalsupportbodywasdraftedandsubmittedtothe2ndMeetingoftheParticipantsCommitteeoftheForestCarbonPartnershipFacility in Panama in March 2009. Discussions have continued but anagreement has not yet been reached between the four potentialmembers:Cambodia,Vietnam,LaoPDRandThailand(Scheyvens2010).

6.5.3 Challenge: Local politics as a factor in subnational leakageIn Indonesia, decentralisation has given new rights and responsibilities todistrictson landandnatural resourcemanagementand revenuecollection.LocalpoliticsintroducesanextraelementtoREDD+:politicalparty-basedfinancing,andfundraisingforelectioncampaigns.TheeffectofsubnationalemissionsdisplacementonREDD+implementationissignificant.Ifadistrictis strict on curbing deforestation and degradation, it risks losing potentialrevenues and investments by deterring industries that may bring aboutland conversion.Those industriesmay instead choose to conduct businessinneighbouringdistricts,whosegovernmenthasset lessrigourouspolicies.Districtsrelyontaxrevenuesandemploymentgeneratedbyindustries;thedistrictelitesrelyoninformalmoneyconnectedtodoingbusinesstofinancepoliticalcampaignsandmaintainpatronage.Hence,thereisastrongincentivetopreventinterestedinvestorsfromleavingthedistricts.Ontheonehand,thisreduces leakagefromhighlyprofitable large-scale landuses.But italsocompromisesemissionreductionsgoalsandcausesdistrictstobelesslikelytoimplementREDD+.

Inachievingglobalgreenhousegasemissionsreductiongoals,leakageisanaccounting and attributionproblem.Accounting isdone at thenationallevel, yet emissions can shift from country to country. It is difficult toascertainhowcarbonemissionsaredisplacedfromanothercountryandtowhatextentonecountryisresponsibleforcarbondisplacementintoanother(Wunder2008).Mostliteraturefocusesoninternationalleakage(AtmadjaandVerchot2012),wheretherearestillnoinstitutionalstructurestodealwith it. Like the subnational leakage story described here, cutting backonleakagecouldleadtolimitingeconomicgrowthledbyindustrieswithalternativeusesforforestland,attheriskofbeinguncompetitivewithothercountriesthatapplylessrigourousREDD+policies.Theissuerubsagainst

| 105Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

sensitivetopicssuchassovereigntyandrightstoeconomicdevelopment.Bilateral approaches couldbe a place to start butmaybe toopiecemealto guarantee emissions do not shift elsewhere.Hence, in implementingREDD+ at the global level, leakage becomes an economic and politicalproblemthatneedstostrikeabalancebetweenensuringeffectiveemissionreductions through mitigation leakage and the geopolitical concerns ofindividualcountries

6.6 Institutions, interests and information: Obstacles and opportunitiesBased on the anecdotal evidence above and the theoretical frameworksconsidered(4IsinChapter2;Pahl-Wostl2009),weidentifythefollowingkeyaspectsrequiringspecificattentionbyREDD+decisionmakers:i)matchingflows of information and incentives with transparency and accountability;andii)matchinginterestsandinstitutionsacrossscales.

6.6.1 The flow of information and incentivesWeoutlinevariouschallengesformultilevelgovernancefromourcasestudies,but also observe promising opportunities. The lack of national REDD+frameworksisacriticalchallengethataffectseffortstobuildanaccountablenational MRV system and to harmonise REDD+ activities. Improvingcommunication and flows of information between subnational REDD+projects and thenational level is an importantway to create amultilevelgovernancesysteminREDD.

ItisimportanttonotethatinformationispowerintheREDD+worldandtheinstitutionsthatholdthepowerandcapacitytodeliverinformationatbothattheprojectandnationallevelsplayacrucialroleinshapingnationalREDD+politics.ItisalsoimportanttointegratelocalknowledgeintoMRVsystems,asrecentinitiativesinBrazilandVietnamhaveattemptedtodo.Furthermore,knowledgeisaproductofpowerrelationsandsocialconcernsand it isequally importanttoaskwhatknowledge isnotbeingproducedand disseminated.The definition of anMRV system and the knowledgeuponwhichitisbasedarethustechnicalaswellaspoliticalissues.

Designing a system for distributingREDD+benefits and responsibilitiesrequires sound information flows.Mechanisms formultilevel governanceenable the equitable flowof incentives fromnational to subnational andlocal levels. The relationship between national and local governmentsand allowing local governments the flexibility to implement broaderREDD+ interventions are key elements in the benefit sharing discussion(seeChapter8).

Implementing REDD+106 |

6.6.2 Matching issues and institutions to scaleTheintegrationofinstitutionsoperatingatdifferentlevelsmayalsohelptoharmonisespatialplanning.NewinstitutionalarrangementsareneededtocreateorbuildonexistingbodiesforaccountableMRV,withaspecialfocuson tools for overcoming the obstacles to information flow across levels.In the countries studied, however, there are still political and economicchallenges to creating such institutions.This task also requires new skillsandabilitiestotacklevarioustypesofinformation,e.g.localandspatialdataofvaryingquality.

Inmanycountries,subnationalgovernmentscanplayapivotalroleinREDD+implementation.InIndonesiaandBrazil,forexample,decentralisationhasputthepoweroflandandnaturalresourcemanagementinthehandsofsubnationalgovernments, making them key players in REDD+ implementation. Insuchcountries,itisessentialtoestablishcoherentregulationsontherights,responsibilities and procedures forMRV by subnational governments andto establish funds and transparent mechanisms for allocating resources tosubnational REDD+ actors. In Indonesia, voluntary working groups arehelpingtoovercomethelackofinstitutionallinksbetweensectorsandscalesandareprovidinganexampleofinstitutionalintegrationacrosslevels.

AsseeninbothVietnamandBrazil,althoughcoherentMRVatthenationallevel is important, leakage management should be trans-boundary.Trans-boundary supply and demand gaps can be overcome through multilevelinstitutional integration and horizontal coordination, as demonstratedby the promising initiatives of the Mekong REDD Commission forIntergovernmental Partnership and Acre’s collaboration with the regionalgovernmentofMadredeDiosinPeru.

6.6.3 The need for participationWhile REDD+ is commonly criticised for being implemented throughtop-down approaches, a multilevel governance approach that focuses ontheflowandmatchofinterestsacrosslevelscanresultinstrongstakeholderparticipation.EvidencefromREDD+countriesshowsthatparticipationinREDD+canbegreatly improved(Indrartoet al. 2012;Phamet al.2012).Theparticipationofactorsfromonelevelinprocessesatotherlevelsiskeytoimprovingverticalcoordination(Pahl-Wostl2009).Itisworthnotingthatthe legal framework forREDD+inallcountries requiresparticipationandconsultationwithdifferentgroups,butthisisrarelyappliedinpractice.(SeealsoBox6.3forREDD+processinMadagascar.)

Nevertheless, in Brazil, due to the recognition of potential challengesassociated with fair engagement in REDD+, there has been substantial

| 107Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

Box 6.3 Decentralisation or INGOisation of REDD+? Lack of national lead in building a REDD+ strategy in Madagascar Emilia Runeberg

Madagascar, an island state in the Indian Ocean renowned as a biodiversity hot spot, engaged with the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2008 in a REDD+ readiness process aimed at preparing a national REDD+ strategy. In parallel, international NGO-led REDD+ pilot projects have been established in different regions of the country with the goal of informing the national REDD+ policy formulation process. Attempts to build a coherent national REDD+ strategy are struggling in a situation where a lack of national leadership in synchronising experience from individual pilots hinders the transition from fragmented INGO-driven activities to a national, nested REDD+ governance system.

Community forest management (CFM), an envisaged backbone governance arrangement for a Malagasy REDD+, can be used to map ongoing governance activities on different levels. On the grassroot level, all REDD+ pilot projects have established CFM associations, known as COBAs, by transferring forest management rights from the state to community groups under time bound contracts. On the local level, COBAs contract with the local municipality and forest service. The management transfer is often entirely led by an environmental mediator, which in the case of major REDD+ projects has been an INGO. The role of the mediator in CFM contract design and related activities, such as attempts to create alternative livelihood activities for COBAs, cannot be overstated. At the regional level, some REDD+ projects are organising COBAs in federations, but a functional regional level governance structure remains a missing link, presently filled by the INGOs.

National level coordination of REDD+ activities has been channelled through an ad hoc committee known as the CT-REDD, composed of state, nonstate and para-state actors. Before its work was (temporarily?) disrupted in early 2011, CT-REDD communicated with stakeholders in order to integrate ongoing REDD+ experiences and organised regional consultations for the elaboration of a Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) to be presented for the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Apart from the R-PP document, any national level multiactor efforts to jointly outline a direction for REDD+ have been stagnated and unfunded. On the supra-national level, Madagascar has struggled to receive funding for its R-PP vision, partly due to the national political crisis that started with a coup d’état in 2009. Instead, international donors support INGOs to continue developing REDD+ methodologies in separate project areas.

Individual projects form microcosms, making information and capacity flows highly reliant on the INGOs, individual actors with the technical capacity required for MRV and individual actors present on the governance levels described above. Control and participation in REDD+ by state actors can be expected to remain weak. The possible hidden motivations for maintaining a project-driven situation of INGO-dominance needs careful attention. Tensions between state and nonstate actors’ views and interests reveal problems of state sovereignty, legitimacy and transparency. Early observation suggests that REDD+ could further increase the power of external, nonstate REDD+ beneficiaries and strengthen a transnational governance project that has shaped natural resource management in Madagascar since the 1980s (Duffy 2006).

Implementing REDD+108 |

mobilisation by indigenous groups and forest-based communities topromotelocalparticipationintheprocess.Thesegroups,recognisingboththepotentialbenefitsandrisksassociatedwithREDD+,havetakenactiontopromote inclusionof socialandenvironmental safeguards forREDD+actions(Gomes et al.2010;seealsoChapter17onsafeguards).MostNGOand government REDD+ project proponents have held or plan to holdpublic consultationswith target actors at theproject sites topresent andobtainfeedback.

InVietnam,limitedparticipationinREDD+canbeexplainedbyapoliticalprocess characterised by ineffective consultation mechanisms and weakrepresentation by different groups. Also, as Pham et al. (2010) highlight,intermediariesareoftenhiredbydonorstocarryoutconsultationsbutduetopressure(time,donors’prioritiesandcost)theseconsultationsareinadequate.AsapreliminaryexamplefromVietnamshows,localparticipationispossibleand could enhance the MRV system, but the evidence is not efficientlydisseminatedacrossthelevels.

In Indonesia, much of the weak interest in participating in REDD+discussions stem fromparticipation fatigue, lack of proof thatREDD+can work and strong vested interests in other land uses that couldcause emissions. Even where successful voluntary working groups wereestablished to enhance stakeholder participation, there were too manyREDD+workshops, stakeholders’discussionsand seminars, resulting inREDD+fatigue.

6.6.4 The negotiation of interestsThe information flow across levels can be impeded by conflict or a lackof interest in sharing information with other actors, as seen in the casesof Vietnam and Indonesia. Institutional stickiness and established powerstructures hinder the flow and match of different types of informationacrosslevels.Itisimportanttorecognisethepowerofinformalrelationshipsand networks in bridging the gap between agencies at different levels. InVietnam,most stakeholders share information through informalchannels,e.g.basedonpersonal relationshipsor informalnetworks.However, theseinformalnetworks are rarely knownor recognised, they lack transparencyandareabsolutelyexclusive.

BuildingacoherentnationalREDD+frameworkwouldhelptotacklemanymultilevelgovernancechallenges.AsseeninBrazil,however,stronggovernanceatthesubnationallevelhasbeenimportantforadvancingREDD+atlocalandnationallevels.ExperiencefromBrazilprovidesanillustrativeexampleof the stepsneeded forvertical coordinationandmultilevelgovernance inREDD+,eventhoughthereisstillsomewaytogobeforeacoherentnational

| 109Multiple levels and multiple challenges for REDD+

framework isdefinedfor thecountry.Althoughthenational framework isessential foroverallcoordination,amultilevelgovernance systemisa shifttowards accepting the reality that all aspectsof environmental governancecaninvolvedisagreementsanddifferentobjectivesthathavetobereconciledor accepted as different. Mechanisms of multilevel governance, however,providetoolstomakethemtomatchacrosslevelstoagreaterdegree.

REDD+canneveroperateinapoliticalandsocietalvacuumbutisintertwinedwithexistingpoliticalprocessesandsocietalstructures.InIndonesia,REDD+has tightened the regional and localpolitical games and itsoutcomeswillaffect the structureof theMRVsystemaswellasemission leakages insidethe country. Multilevel governance, including the establishment of legalprocedures, is needed to settle disputes in implementation. REDD+ willrequire design elements to complement existing forest related policiesand should be informed by the experience of decades of local and globalinitiatives.Thatwouldbeconsistentwithproposalsforthedevelopmentof‘nested’climategovernanceregimes(Forsyth2009).

6.7 ConclusionsIt is obvious that REDD+ is a multilevel undertaking. As a result, itrequires amultilevel governance system that is unique in the history ofenvironmental policy (Skutsch and Van Laake 2008). The dimensionsandmechanismsforsuchasystemvarystronglyamongdifferentREDD+elements.Thecasestudiesalsoshowthattheappropriatemechanismsvarysignificantlyacrosscountries.

MultilevelgovernanceinREDD+,particularlyforleakageandMRV,isaboutharmonising informationand incentives across all levels.This is, inpart, apracticalandtechnicalproblem:informationanddataforREDD+areformedthrough various processes and according to different standards, making itdifficult toaggregateat thenational level.Furthermore,differences indataqualityandquantityacrossdatasourcesprovideloopholesforundetectedandunaccountedleakage.

However,informationandincentiveflowsinREDD+canleadtoconflictsbetween subnational and national actors, which stem from conflictinginterests at different levels. Information and incentives are the twomaincurrenciesinthecomplexREDD+worldrelatingbacktothedifferencesinpowerrelationsamongtheactorswhocontrolthem.Multilevelgovernancesystems inREDD+ should be designedwith two aims: they should seekways tohelp actors atdifferent levels tobettermatch their interests, andat the same time they should adjust anddiversifyREDD+ toworkwithdifferentinterests.

Implementing REDD+110 |

Insummary,policyandinstitutionalreformstoredefineexistinginformation,incentive and power structures are needed to ensure successful REDD+implementation.REDD+canactasagamechangerforwidertransformationalchangeandmechanismsformultilevelgovernancewillplayapivotalroleinthisprocess.Thesoundflowof informationand incentivesacrossdifferentlevels,togetherwithtransparentinstitutions,willbeakeytoeffective,efficientandequitableREDD+implementation.

7Chapter

Financing REDD+ Charlotte Streck and Charlie Parker

• REDD+ finance is at an inflection point: while short-term finance isavailable,disbursementsareslowandinvestmentopportunitiesscarce;atthesametime,thereisnoadequateandpredictablelong-termstrategytomeetthefinancialneedsofREDD+.

• In the absence of ambitious climate change mitigation goals, for theforeseeablefuturemostREDD+financewillbemobilisedbythepublicsector.Duringthisinterimphase,inwhichfinancingforREDD+islikelyto be fragmented and channelled through various agencies, it will beimportanttotestavarietyoffinancingoptionsthatleverageprivatesectorfinanceanddirectlyaddressthedriversofdeforestation.

• WealthierREDD+countrieswith stronger institutionsmayopt to self-financeasignificantpartofREDD+.Theymayalsochoosetoengageinresults-basedagreementswithdonorsandinternationalagencies.Themorefragilestatesarelikelytorelyonofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)-typefinance,whichcombinesfinancialsupportwithtechnicalassistanceandpolicyguidance.

Implementing REDD+112 |

7.1 Introduction Reducingemissionsfromdeforestationcomesatacost,sincetheprotectionofforestimpliesforegonerevenuesfromtimber,cropsandlivestock.Withoutlegalandeconomicmechanismstoenforceorcompensateactionbyownersand users, forests will continue to be worth more dead than alive. Theemerging incentive framework to reduce emissions fromdeforestation andforestdegradation(andtheroleofconservation,sustainablemanagementandenhancementofforest),referredtoasREDD+,seekstopromoteeconomicdevelopment and growthwithoutdestroying valuablenatural resources. Inthe contextofREDD+, countrieshave agreed to “collectively aim to slow,haltandreverseforestcoverandcarbonloss”,andtodothis“inthecontextoftheprovisionofadequateandpredictablesupporttodevelopingcountryParties”(UNFCCC2011a).Withincountries,thosethatsuffereconomicloss(formerforestusersandbeneficiaries)andcurrentprotectorsorstewardsofthe forestmay be compensated for loss or receive reward for action. Suchpaymentmay originate from international or national sources andwill bechannelledthroughnationalinstitutions.Privatefinancemayalsogodirectlytothebeneficiariesthroughmarket-basedmechanisms.

Reflecting the principle of ‘common-but-differentiated responsibilities’,allocation of the costs of REDD+ implementation has been an integralpartoftheREDD+negotiationsundertheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC).Financeappearsimplicitlywithinthecontextoftechnicalissues,suchasmeasurementandreferencelevelsdiscussedbytheSubsidiaryBodyforScientificandTechnologicalAdviceor,explicitly,withinthecontextofthefinancialnegotiationsundertheAd-HocWorkingGrouponLong-TermCooperativeAction.InDecember2011,atthe17thsessionoftheConferenceofthePartiestotheUNFCCC(COP17),partiesagreedthat“results-basedfinanceprovidedtodevelopingcountryPartiesthatisnew,additionalandpredictablemaycomefromawidevarietyofsources,publicandprivate,bilateralandmultilateral,includingalternativesources”andthat“appropriatemarket-basedapproaches […]tosupport results-basedactionsbydevelopingcountries”couldbedeveloped(UNFCCC2012).PartiesalsoadoptedguidanceonreferencelevelstoaccountforemissionreductionsfromREDD+activities.However, it remainsunclear if andhow these referencelevelsmightbe tied tofinancial ‘results-based’ incentives in the future (seealsoChapter16).

TherearefourmajorchallengesassociatedwithREDD+finance:• DefiningREDD+costsandestimatingthefinancialneedsofREDD+• Mobilisingsufficientinternationalandnationalfinancetocoverthecosts

ofREDD+policiesandmeasures• Allocating and disbursing REDD+ finance efficiently, effectively and

equitablytoproduceclearandmeasurableresults

| 113Financing REDD+

• Matching the requirements and needs of policy makers and otherstakeholdersindevelopingcountrieswiththoseofdonorsorinvestorsinREDD+, and creating and/or strengthening the institutions needed toimplementpoliciesandmanageREDD+funds.

This chapter sheds lighton these challenges anddiscusses the implicationsfor REDD+ implementation. Section 7.2 summarises the most commonwaystocalculateREDD+costsandpresentstherangeofcostestimatesthathave been put forward to significantly reduce forest-related emissions indevelopingcountries.Section7.3discussesthevariousoptionsthatexisttomobiliseREDD+financeintheshortandlongterm.Section7.4describesthedisbursementchallengesfromREDD+countryanddonorperspectives.Thechapterconcludeswithadiscussionofdifferentinstitutionalandpolicyoptionsthatcanhelptoovercomecurrentandfuturefundingchallenges.

7.2 REDD+ costs7.2.1 Estimating REDD+ costsMostestimatesofthecostsofREDD+useanopportunitycostapproach(seee.g.Kindermann et al.2006;BlaserandRobledo2007;Kindermann et al.2008;Simula2010).Governmentexpertsandconsultantshaveproposedvariationsto this approach (e.g.Republic ofGuyana2008;UNDPandPresident ofEcuador2011).Opportunity costs are the foregone revenue from thebestalternativelanduse.Forestlandindifferentlocationshasvaryingproductivityandcarboncontent,andsuchanalysescalculatethemarginalcostsofforestprotection,concludinghowmuchforestcanbeprotectedatacertaincarbonpricelevel.Thesemodelsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheincentiverequiredforthecountrytoreachaparticularemissionreductiontarget(IWG-IFR2009),neitherdotheytakeintoaccountthepoliticalcontextofdecisionmaking.Insomeinstances(e.g.wherecostlystructuralreformshavetobeimplemented),thecostsofREDD+tosocietymaybemuchhigherthancalculated,butinothersituationstheymaybelower,e.g.whereREDD+canbeimplementedthrough lawenforcement andcommand-and-controlmeasures thatbenefitsociety(WhiteandMinang2011).Inmostcases,policiesthatyieldREDD+benefitswillalsopursueother–sometimesprimary–objectives, suchasareformofagricultureorlandtenure.Inthesecases,itisdifficulttodistributecostsamongthecomplementarygoals.

AnalternativeapproachistoestimatethebudgetarycostsofREDD+.Thisinvolves assessing the implementation costs of policies andmeasures, andtheinstitutionalreformsneededinacountry.However,thisapproachonlyshiftstheproblemtoanotherlevel,namelytoexpressthecostsandbenefitsof public policies in comparable terms (Heinzerling andAckerman2002).Toachievesuchcomparability,anycostanalyseswouldhavetoquantifythe

Implementing REDD+114 |

valuetosocietyofacertainpolicythatresults inapublicgood(i.e.robustinfrastructure, good governance or environmental protection). It is verydifficult to capture andprice theunique featuresof a forest, including theirreversibility of its primary loss as well as its non-monetary values, e.g.recreation,enjoymentandbeauty(OstromandOstrom1977).

Therefore, while cost assessments can inform REDD+ policies, they havesignificant shortcomings.Theirunderlyingassumptionsdonotcapture thefull costs andbenefits of protecting a country’s forest estate and theymayunderestimateoroverestimatecosts,dependingonthepolicycontext.Inmanycases,particularlywheretheyhavebeenproposedbynationalgovernmentsorotherinterestedstakeholders,costestimatesaredrivenmorebyadesiredresultthanbyrationalanalysis(seeBox7.1).

7.2.2 Global cost estimatesThe Eliasch Review estimated the global costs of REDD+ to be betweenUS$17and33billionperyear,assuminga50%abatementofforest-relatedemissions by 2020 (Eliasch 2008). Kindermann et al. (2008) estimatedthe costs to be between €13 and 21 billion per year,1 while the EuropeanCommission established an annual price tag of €15–25 billion (EC 2008;ONFI2008).ThesestudiesestimatethetotaleconomicabatementpotentialfromREDD+activities, assuming a certainprice level per tonneof carbondioxideandacertaincostassociatedwithlanduseconversion.Thefigureforactualabatementpotential,however,islikelytobesmallerthanthis,duetothevariousconstraintsongeneratingemissionreductionsthroughREDD+.Assuch,globalcostestimatesillustratethemaximumpotentialofforestsandotherlanduseactivitiestoremoveorretaingreenhousegasesatacertainpricepointratherthanarealisticpotentialforemissionreductionsintheshorttomediumterm(Lubowski2008).ToillustratethesupplyofemissionsreductionsfromREDD+,Table7.1showstheestimatedglobalsupplyofemissionreductionsfromreduceddeforestationunderdifferentpricescenarios.

Lookingatthecountrylevel,REDD+costsdependonthecarboncontentoftheforestaswellasthelocaldriverofdeforestation.Forexample,thehighestopportunitycostofREDD+inIndonesiaoccurswhere forestconservationcompetes with palm oil production. Here, opportunity costs range fromUS$0.49/tonCO2e for smallholder farming in Sumatra toUS$19.6/tonCO2eforconversionofdegradedforestlandtopalmoil(OlsenandBishop2009). Meanwhile, Nepstad et al. (2007) calculated that eliminatingdeforestationcompletelyintheBrazilianAmazonwouldcostUS$1.49/tonCO2e,butreducingdeforestationto94%ofprojectedlevelswouldcostonlyhalfthatamount(US$0.76/tonCO2e).

1 InApril2012,1Euro=1.32USDollars.

| 115Financing REDD+

Box 7.1 “What does REDD+ cost?” is (almost) a meaningless questionArild Angelsen

What does REDD+ cost? At least since the influential Stern Review was published in 2006, many have argued that REDD+ is one of the cheapest options available to mitigate climate change. Others see the REDD+ mechanism as a costly effort with unpredictable results, for both the climate and forest people. So who is right?

Asking “what does REDD+ cost?” is about as precise as posing the question “what do cars cost?” It all depends on the type of car, how many cars, whether the cost of producing, buying and operating them is included, and so on. Most REDD+ cost estimates – including those of the Stern Review – focus on opportunity costs, which refer to the profit foregone from the best alternative land use, i.e. the lost benefits from not conserving forestland. A country implementing REDD+ will also face transaction and implementation costs, e.g. the costs of setting up a REDD+ system and implementing the necessary policies to achieve REDD+. The sum of opportunity costs, implementation costs (except those directly compensating opportunity costs) and transaction costs (to governments and forest users) therefore provides an estimate of the total cost to a country of avoided deforestation and degradation.

But governments of REDD+ countries might be equally interested in a variation on this question: what are the budgetary costs of REDD+? Opportunity costs can be a poor indicator of these, as they depend on the policies chosen and their effectiveness. Only in one special case would the budgetary costs be identical to the opportunity costs, namely in the hypothetical ‘perfect’ system of Payment for Environmental Services (PES). This implies zero transaction costs, targeting only those forest users who plan to apply their chainsaws to the forest in coming years, and requires complete information about these users’ opportunity costs. These assumptions are, of course, quite unrealistic and, in practice, the cost of a PES system will be much higher, even when land tenure and other preconditions allow for it.

Many other REDD+ policies are available. Governments can stop issuing licenses for forest conversion, establish forest-protected areas, and increase the enforcement of forest laws and regulations, without any compensation to the current or prospective forest users. The budgetary costs then may be lower than the opportunity costs. Or they can reduce the profitability of agricultural encroachment by removing government subsidies, which should save money in government budgets. Other agricultural policies, such as agricultural intensification, can have costs in excess of the opportunity costs, but they may achieve additional goals, such as increased production and food security.

So, the question “what does REDD+ cost?” must be made more precise and contextual before it can be answered. First, it depends on whose costs we look at: the society at large, the government, the local forest users, or commodity traders. Second, it depends on the mix of policy instruments chosen to implement REDD+ and their effectiveness. Third, it depends on the scale of emission reductions required and how fast you want them.

Implementing REDD+116 |

Table 7.1 Global supply of emission reductions from REDD+ (GtCO2e per year) (Meridian Institute 2009)

Avoided deforestation (RED) REDD+

No price specified

3.5–4.9 (Grieg-Gran 2008)

<US $10/tCO2e 1.8 (Murray et al. 2009) 2.7 (McKinsey and Company 2009) [3.6*]

<US $20/tCO2e 2.5 (Murray et al. 2009) 4.3 (McKinsey and Company 2009) [5.2*]

1.6–4.3 (Kindermann et al. 2008)

<US $30/tCO2e 2.8 (Kindermann et al. 2008) 4.6 (Sohngen 2009)

2.8 (Sohngen 2009)

2.9 (Murray et al. 2009)

>US $100/tCO2e or potential

4.5 (Tavoni et al. 2007) 7.2 (Tavoni et al. 2007)

3.1–4.7 (Kindermann et al. 2008)

7.8 (McKinsey and Company 2009)*

*Includes emissions reductions from peatland

7.3 Mobilising finance for REDD+7.3.1 Current sources of finance for REDD+Currently,REDD+financehasseveralsources–public,private,nationalandinternational – aswell as differentmechanisms (e.g. taxes, carbonmarketsand auctioning of allowances). Public sector finance is defined here asrevenuegeneratedthroughamechanismcontrolledbyapublicbody,whileprivate sectorfinancedoesnot enter thehandsof thepublic sector.Usingthesedefinitions,fourcategoriesofREDD+financeemerge(seeFigure7.1).InternationalpublicfinancecurrentlyaccountsforaroundUS$3billionperannum,includingpledgesmadeinthecontextoftheUNFCCCaswellasfunding through other channels, such as theGlobal Environment Facility(GEF)andtheConventiononBiologicalDiversity(Parkeret al.2012).Thesefundsarebeingdisbursedprimarilythroughbilateralandmultilateralchannelsasgrantsandloans,withsomelimiteduseofperformance-basedpayments.

Bilateral country programmes and projects currently fund two-thirds ofall internationally supported REDD+ activities, with multilateral sourcesmakinguptheremainder(Simula2010;PWC2011).Thisincludesreadinessprogrammesand,toalesserextent,policysupportandpilotsforresults-basedpayments.Atthecountrylevel,NorwayisthemostprominentREDD+donor.AtCOP13in2007,theGovernmentofNorwaylauncheditsInternational

| 117Financing REDD+

Climate andForest Initiative, pledgingNOK15 billion (US$2.6 billion)over 5 years. Since then, Norway has entered into bilateral agreementswithBrazil,Guyana, Indonesia,Mexico andTanzania, and contributed tovariousmultilateralfunds.WithitsbilateralagreementswithBrazil,GuyanaandIndonesia,Norwayhaspursueda ‘payment-for-performance’approachto REDD+. Other major donors include Australia, France, the EuropeanCommission, Germany, Japan, UK and USA. Until now, these donorshave mostly supported readiness programmes, policy development anddemonstrationprojects. So far, noother countryhas entered intobilateralagreementsfollowingtheperformance-basedpaymentlogicoftheNorwegianagreements.

Data on domestic or national finance for REDD+ is still lacking, sincedeveloping countries have little consistent reporting on fund allocationfor REDD+. However, it is clear that domestic financing is significant,particularly in emerging andmiddle-income economies,where it surpassesinternationalcontributions forREDD+.Brazil reportsanhistorical annualaverage of US $500 million for monitoring and inventory work, lawenforcement and tenure reform, as well as for national and local plans toreducedeforestation.Mexicospendsasimilarsum(US$460million)peryearonarangeofprogrammesincludingitsProArbolafforestationprogramme,greensubsidies,demonstrationactivitiesandmeasurementsystems.Indonesiaclaims to have spentUS $1.5 billion on the protection of forests and therehabilitation of degraded land, amongst other forest protection activities

Forest management, investments addressing deforesta

tion

driv

ers

Budgetary support

Polic

y support

Read

iness support

Extra-budgetary fundsResu

lts-b

ased payments

Carbon project developmentPES-triggered investments

Nationalpublic

Internationalpublic

Internationalprivate

Nationalprivate

Cross-support

Policy incentives and standards

Figure 7.1 Financial sources for REDD+

Implementing REDD+118 |

(PWC2011).Meanwhile,ChinahasdeliveredaroundUS$7billionannuallyforafforestationactivitiestoprotectwatershedsandother‘eco-compensationmechanisms’underarangeofgovernment-mediatedprogrammes,includingthe‘GrainforGreen’programme(Parkeret al.2012).

ItisexpectedthattheprivatesectorwillneedtocontributeasignificantportionofREDD+financeinthefuture.However,thecurrentpolicyenvironmentprovides only limited incentives for private sector investment in REDD+.Some investment isbeing triggeredbya combinationof factors, includingcorporate social responsibility and pre-compliance, into voluntary carbonmarkets(aboutUS$140millionin2010)(Diazet al. 2011).Indirectmarketmechanisms,suchascertifiedcocoa,coffee,timber,palmoilandsoy,whichaimtocombatthedriversofdeforestation,alsoprovideascalablesourceofprivate sector finance for REDD+. These mechanisms currently generatepremiumsupwardsofUS$1billionannuallytowardsforestconservationindevelopingcountries.

7.3.2 Future scale of finance for REDD+ EstimatesofthefuturerequiredscaleofREDD+financingvarygreatlyanddependlargelyonthesourcesoffinanceincluded.Withinthecategoriesofpublic and private sector finance outlined above, REDD+ finance can bedivided into four key groups: direct and indirect private investments, andmarket-linked and non-market public finance (see Figure 7.2). Differentmethodsandtoolsarerequiredtoscaleupfinancefromthesevarioussources.

Direct market mechanismsareprivatesectorsourcesoffinancethatgeneraterevenue directly for emissions reductions and include the voluntary andcompliancecarbonmarkets.Thesemechanismscangeneratefinancethroughregulationand increaseddemand for forest carboncredits andotherdirectforest services (e.g. biodiversity offsets). The amount of finance availablewill be determined by the number of countries that can participate inthesemechanisms,theambitionofthetargets,theconditionsforacceptingcarbon credits and other factors that generate demand for forest-basedecosystemservices.

Indirect market mechanisms raise finance by linking the value of forestconservationtotraditionalmarketssuchascoffee,soyandbeef.Byloweringthe ‘forest footprint’ of these associated markets, finance can be deliveredto reduce deforestation but not necessarily in exchange for an emissionsreduction (e.g. sustainable coffeemarkets or the commodity roundtables).Indirect market mechanisms can be scaled up by implementing demand-side regulation for green commodities. For example, legislationwithin theEuropeanUnion(EU)orChina(thetwolargest importersofsoyglobally)requiringsustainableproductionofsoybeanswouldcreateastrongsignalfor‘zerodeforestation’soy.

| 119Financing REDD+

Market-linkedandnon-marketmechanismsarebothformsofpublicsectorfinance; although finance will be generated from a variety of public andprivate bodies (e.g. through taxes or other fees), the revenue is aggregatedand disbursed by a public sector institution. Market-linked mechanismsgenerate finance from markets that are unrelated to forests (e.g. auctionsofemissionsallowancesorafinancial transactiontax).Thescaleoffinancemobilisedviathesemechanismswilldependonthepoliticalcoordinationofcompetingagendas.Forexample,revenuefromafinancialtransactiontaxiscurrentlybeingadvocatedforunderavarietyofworthyagendas, includingpovertyreduction,biodiversityconservationandthestabilisationofregionaleconomies.Politicalcoordinationbetweentheseagendascanhelptoensurethattheybenefitcollectivelyfromthesesourcesofrevenue.

Finally,thecategoryofnon-marketmechanismscaptures‘traditional’formsof public finance, such as official development assistance and domesticgovernmentspendingallocatedthroughgeneralpublicbudgets.Sincenon-market mechanisms are purely government-driven, the level of financegeneratedwillbemainlyaquestionofthestrengthofthepoliticalwillandnationalagendaforforestconservationwithinindividualgovernments.Evenunder international regulation (e.g. theMonterreyConsensusonFinancingforDevelopment),thereisnoguaranteethatcommitmentswillbeadheredto.

Figure 7.2 Private and public sector finance for REDD+Adapted from Parker et al. (2009a) and Parker et al. (2012)

Private sector Public sector

Market-linked• Auctioning of

allowances• Financial transaction tax• Carbon taxes and fees

Non-market• ODA and budgetary

international climate finance allocations

• Domestic budgetary allocations

Direct• Voluntary and

compliance carbon markets

• Payments for watershed services

• Biodiversity offsets

Indirect• Green commodities• Certified timber

Implementing REDD+120 |

Table7.2summarisesthemostimportantmechanismsformobilisingREDD+finance.Mostofthesecanbeappliednationallyandinternationally.ThescaleoffinanceachievedthroughanymechanismwilldependupontheextenttowhichREDD+,andforestconservationmorebroadly,maintainsapoliticallycompellingmandatewithinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.

Over the shortandmediumterm(up to2020),public sectormechanismsare the largest potential source of finance forREDD+,with an additionalUS $9 billion per annum coming from non-market mechanisms and apotentialUS$7billion frommarket-linkedmechanisms.The largest shareismost likely tocomefromnationalgovernments indevelopingcountries.WhiletheyhavepotentialtogeneratesignificantfinanceforREDD+,financefrom market-linked mechanisms remains elusive. With the exception ofauctioningofallowances,thesemechanismstendtobepoliticallyinfeasibleastheyresideoutsideofthemandateofREDD+proponents.

Table 7.2 Current (2010) and future (2020) levels of REDD+ finance under public and private sector mechanisms (US $ billions per annum)

Sector Market Scale Current (2010)

Future (2020)

Private Direct Compliance market - 7.5a

Voluntary market 0.14b 0.6

Indirect Greening commodities 1c 5d

Total private 1.1 13.1

Public Market-linked and other

Auctioning of allowances 0.04 1.5e

Maritime tax or levy - 1.7

Financial transaction tax - 3.8f

Levy on insurance premiums - 1.7g

Non-market Domestic government spending 10h 13i

Official development assistance 4.4j 10g

‘Debt for nature’ swaps 0.02 0.36k

Total public 14.5 32.1

Notes: Table adapted from Parker et al. (2009a) and Parker et al. (2012) a) assuming a forest carbon market emerges and global supply of 3 GtCO2 at US $25/tCO2 ; b) Diaz et al. (2011); c) US $300 million from certified timber and US $700 million equivalent to 30% of all green commodities; d) based on continued 15–20% growth in market in developing countries; e) 40% of potential auction revenues to climate activities, 50% in developing countries, 28% ecosystem-based; f ) low-end assumption: 5% of EU-wide tax on financial transactions goes to REDD+; g) based on continued growth in aid budget of 3% per year, of which 5% goes towards forest protection; h) includes recent pledges under the REDD+ Partnership Voluntary REDD+ Database, see http://reddplusdatabase.org/; i) based on projected increases in protected area funding; j) from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee database www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions; k) based on continued annual growth of 30% per year.

| 121Financing REDD+

TheprivatesectorcouldbecomeanimportantsourceoffinanceforREDD+,withthepotentialtodeliveranadditionalUS$13billionperannumby2020.Carbonmarkets have longbeenproposed as a strategy tomobilise privatefinanceandachieveREDD+.UsingestimatesfromTable7.1forabatementpotential(atacarbonpriceofUS$25/tCO2),carbonmarketscoulddeliverUS $7.5 billion by 2020. Angelsen et al. (2012) found that, if REDD+creditsareallowedtobetradedintheglobalcarbonmarket,emissionsfromdeforestationwillbereducedby22–62%comparedtobusinessasusuallevels(i.e.42–71%comparedto2005levels),dependingonthescenario.However,theestablishmentofeffectivecarbonmarketsdependsontheacceptanceofREDD+offsetsinglobalcarbonmarkets.

At present, however, there is no global carbonmarket, neither is there anemergingglobalsystem.SinceUSlawmakersarenotcontemplatingclimatelegislationand theEUwill consider linking its emission trading system toREDD+onlyafter2020,carbonmarketsholdlimitedpromiseintheshortterm. In addition, linking REDD+ to carbon markets will need carefulevaluation,relyingontestedREDD+creditingframeworksaccompaniedbysafeguardsandregulationofsupplyanddemand.IntheabsenceofREDD+specific finance instruments, strategies seeking long-termfinancial stabilityfor REDD+ are turning to incentives for investment at the national (andregional)level.

TheotherkeysourceofprivatesectorfinanceforREDD+wouldcomethroughindirect market mechanisms. With limited data it is difficult to estimatethe scale of finance that could be generated through green commodities.However, conservative estimates for the growth in certified commoditiesthroughinitiativessuchastheroundtablesforresponsiblesoy,palmoilandsugar,suggestthatindirectmarketmechanismscouldgenerateanadditionalUS$5billionperannumby2020.

7.4 Spending REDD+ finance7.4.1 Allocation of financeThemobilisationofREDD+finance is relatedclosely to its allocationanddisbursement.AllocationreferstothedistributionofREDD+financeamongcountries as well as among relevant policies, strategies and programmeswithin a country. Some resourcemobilisationmechanisms already includeapreferenceforaparticularallocationoffinance.ExperiencewiththeCleanDevelopmentMechanism (CDM) shows that carbonmarkets channel themajorityoffinance tocountrieswitha favourable investmentclimate, thatare characterised by a well functioning government administration andjudiciary,andthathavehighemissions.Investmentsthroughcarbonmarketmechanisms directly to projects will also favour areas with high levels of

Implementing REDD+122 |

deforestation,forestswithhighcarboncontent,andclearlyidentifiable,localdrivers of deforestation, where leakage and permanence can bemonitoredandmanagedwithin theproject context.Experiencewithnational systemsrelying on payments for ecosystem services also shows that clear land titleand ownership are additional conditions that encourage investment intoafforestationorconservationschemes.

Bilateral donors tend to prefer making payments to preselected partnercountries.REDD+financeflowingintopubliclymanagedfundsorbudgetsthenhastobeallocatedamongthesectorsthatworktocounterforestcarbonloss. Such allocation generally follows a national prioritisation of activitiesreflecting emission reduction potential and cost, political acceptabilityand commitment, and stakeholder input. Budgetsmay create an enablingenvironment,suchasengaginginintegratedlanduseplanning,clarifyinglandtitlesandpropertyrights,strengtheninginstitutionsandbuildingcapacities.Theseactivitiesservemultiplepurposes,arelengthyundertakingsandaddressunderlyingratherthandirectdriversofdeforestation.WhileODAsourcesmaysupporttheseprocesses,dedicatedinternationalclimatefinancewillprobablygravitatetowardsmoredirectactiontocounterthedriversofdeforestation.Thismightincludeinvestinginagriculturetoincreaseproductivity,financingalternative infrastructure solutions, and creating alternative income sourcesforlocalcommunities.

At present, the largest portion of REDD+ finance goes to Brazil, theDemocraticRepublicofCongoandIndonesia(REDD+Partnership2011).Thesecountriesrepresentasignificantportionofthethreemost importanttropicalforestbasins(thoseoftheAmazon,CongoBasinandSoutheastAsia)andareresponsibleformorethanhalfoftheglobalforest-relatedemissions.Theallocationoffinancetothesecountriesreflectstheiremissionsreductionpotential, although it does not necessarily reflect greater readiness than insmallerandmoreengagedcountries.Norway’sdecisiontoenterintoastrategicpartnershipwithGuyana,incontrast,rewardsthepoliticalcommitmentofasmallforestnationwithlowemissions.

7.4.2 Disbursement of REDD+ financeDisbursement of REDD+ finance uses international and national funds2,bilateralprogrammesanddirectprivatesectorincentivestochannelREDD+financetocountriesandwithincountriestotheultimatebeneficiaries.

International and regional funds are administered by multilateral financeorganisations,suchastheForestCarbonPartnershipFacility(FCPF),theUN

2 See,forexample,theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeproposaltosetupNationalClimateFunds(UNDP2011).

| 123Financing REDD+

REDD+programme,andtheCongoBasinFund.SincedisbursingREDD+finance tonational actors is a lengthyprocess, the allocationoffinance tointernational programmes has great appeal for donors, but there can be asignificantdelaybeforethefundsareputtouse.InanevaluationofFCPF,67%ofthestakeholdersintervieweddisagreedwiththestatementthatfinancewasdisbursedinatimelymanner(NORDECO2011).

Disbursing finance via bilateral agencies (e.g. Agence française dudéveloppement, Kreditanstalt fürWiederaufbau andUnited States Agencyfor InternationalDevelopment)maybe less strategic than supportingnew,dedicatedREDD+programmes, but it can be quicker, in particularwhenfinance is disbursed via existing programmes, institutional arrangementsandappraisalmechanisms.Norway’spartnershipwithIndonesiashowsthatinnovativegovernanceanddisbursementmechanismsrequirelongleadtimes,which may be underestimated. Even when countries administer funds byproven and professional local institutions, such as the Amazon Fund, thenoveltyofREDD+anditsneedfornewactorsandperformancemetricsislikely to cause delays and frustrate expectations (although frustrationmaybe less when actors are used to the slow disbursement cycles of existingenvironmentalprogrammessuchasGEF).

Additionalbarriers in theflowoffinanceare causedby inefficiencywithinintermediaryorganisations,alackofabsorptivecapacityandnatural‘growingpains’inaperiodoflearning(ThePrince’sRainforestProject2011).TakingintoaccountthelevelofpoliticalandstakeholdersupportthatisneededforsuccessfulREDD+implementation,thetimerequiredforconsultationsandconsensusbuildinghasoftenbeenunderestimated.Addedtolongbureaucraticchains and the lack ofREDD+programmes ready to receive investments,these delaysmean that disbursement of international REDD+finance hasfallensharplybehindtheREDD+pledges.

Furthermore, there is clear evidence that lessons learned from efforts toimprovedevelopment aid effectiveness arenotbeing transferred to climatefinanceingeneralandtoREDD+financeinparticular.Atthesametime,theprojectbasisandearmarkednatureofREDD+financialmechanismsmeansthatcountrieshavetoestablishspecialmanagementarrangementsinsteadofusingexistingnationalsystems.

Insummary,itisevidentthatbothrecipientanddonorcountrieswouldbenefitfrom the development of REDD+ finance strategies, closer coordination,institutionalstrengtheningandcapacitybuilding.ThereisaparticularneedtorespondtonationalcircumstancesaswellastosatisfytherequirementsofexternalcontributorsfortransparentandaccountableuseofREDD+finance.

Implementing REDD+124 |

7.4.3 Role of national institutionsThesuccessofREDD+dependsonhavingnationalpoliciesandinstitutionsthatcandeliverREDD+emissionreductionsatalargescaleandineffective,efficient and equitable ways. There is need for an effective channel fordisbursementandabsorptivecapacity,bothunderpinnedbyrules,processesandsafeguardsthataretransparentandsimplewhilealsobeingappropriateandflexibletolocalneedsandscales(ThePrince’sRainforestProject2011).

National disbursement mechanisms can be linked to general governancereform,sectormeasuresanddirectfiscalincentiveprogrammes.Inthecaseofgovernancereform,financewillbeusedlargelytosupportthepublicsectorbyaddingcapacitiesandresources.Sectormeasuresseektoaddressthedriversofforestcarbonlossandincludetheremovalofperverseincentivesandtheintroduction of planning and safeguards.They can also define direct fiscalincentives, in which targeted groups are paid for undertaking a particularactivity (e.g. treeplanting,monitoringandconserving)or stoppingcertainactions(e.g.landconversionandlogging).

Intheshortterm,internationalorbilateralintermediarieswillcontinuetoplayanimportantroleindisbursingreadinessfunds.However,long-termREDD+financewillneedtobeallocatedanddisbursedbynationalinstitutions.Whileinternationalfinancialsupportmayhelptoinducepolicychanges,itisessentialthat REDD+ strategies are country driven, taking into account nationalneedsandpriorities.National institutionsareessentialagents inmobilisingand distributing finance andmust comply with internationally recognisedfiduciarystandards.Brazil’sAmazonFundisanexampleofanationalfundthatperformsmanyfinancialandtechnicalrolesthatinothercaseswouldbelefttointernationalinstitutions.Countrieswithweakerinstitutionswilltakelonger to reduce their dependence on such international intermediaries astheWorldBankandUN,orbilateralassistanceprogrammes,tomanageandallocateREDD+finance(seeBox7.2).

7.5 Conclusions: Linking REDD+ finance with policies and programmesIn2009,theCopenhagenAccordcommitteddevelopedcountriestoatotalofUS $3.5 billion of fast-start finance to be disbursed during the 2010–2012 readinessphaseofREDD+ (seeTable7.3 for thephasesofREDD+implementation and finance). However, by the end of 2011 (when thepledges had reached US $4.17 billion), only US $446 million had beenallocated and approved toparticular countries and funds (Nakhooda et al.2011).A largeproportionof themoney is stillbeingheld in internationaltrustfunds,nationalbudgetsandrecipientcountryfunds,anditisunlikely

| 125Financing REDD+

Box 7.2 Financing REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of CongoAndré Aquino

The REDD+ process in DRC is led by the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism through a dedicated national REDD+ coordination unit, staffed by national and expatriate experts. The national REDD+ strategy is still under construction, so the overall costs of achieving REDD+ are not yet known. Virtually all finance for REDD+ comes from international donors and there has been little private sector engagement so far, although an agroforestry CDM project led by a private Congolese company provides a noteworthy exception. REDD+ readiness needs are estimated at US $23 million and funded mainly by FCPF and the UN REDD+ Programme. The Congo Basin Forest Fund will provide around US $35 million to a series of pilot REDD+ projects, while the Forest Investment Program, executed by the World Bank and the African Development Bank, will provide US $60 million to fund REDD+ investments in three large Congolese cities (Kinshasa, Kisangani and Mbuji Mayi – Kananga). Results-based payments for emission reductions are still a future goal, but the country has shown interest in accessing the Carbon Fund of the FCPF through a sub-national REDD+ programme.

There are several major disbursement challenges. Overall coordination is costly due to the multitude of sources of finance and different fiduciary and reporting procedures required by the different donors. Uncertainty at the global level on applying REDD+ finance at the national level, including how to deal with safeguards, has led to disbursement delays. Insufficient national fiduciary management capacity adds to the challenge. DRC has been dealing with disbursement delays by ensuring the national REDD+ unit has the mandate to coordinate different sources of finance, outsourcing fiduciary management to an existing fiduciary unit with the Ministry of Environment, and building the capacity of key staff.

Looking ahead, DRC is planning to establish an independent national REDD+ fund, embedded in a participatory fund allocation mechanism and with strong institutional capacity to deliver national finance in line with the emerging national strategy. International donors are expected to provide the majority of finance and, at first, these should be conditioned to policy reforms, institutional capacity building and proxy intermediary indicators. Over time, as institutional capacity is built, the fund could evolve into a verifiable emission reductions payment scheme. Parallel to the fund, DRC is allowing carbon transactions targeted at different markets (these are voluntary, emerging and regulated), within a national institutional framework to regulate carbon transactions, including the establishment of a transparent national registry.

Implementing REDD+126 |

Table 7.3 Summary of REDD+ needs (adapted from Meridian Institute 2009)

REDD+ preparation costs REDD+ implementation costs

Phase 1: Readiness and upfront costs, and ongoing capacity building and institutional strengthening costs

Phase 2: Policies and measures

Phase 3: Results-based payments

Objectives Enable participation in REDD+, appraising policy options, establishing strategy and consensus

Establish and maintain the ability to successfully implement and monitor REDD+ activities

Create enabling environments, improve forest governance and forest management, address drivers of deforestation through investments

Compensate for emissions reductions

Emissions reductions

No or little direct effect on land use emissions

Effect on emissions less direct and there may be some delay

Should have clear link to emissions reductions

Funding needs

Upfront finance required, most likely non-market based

A blend of finance will be used.

Payment can be ex-post

Direct market and indirect market finance

tobedisbursedbytheendof2012.Thus,whileinternationalpledgesremainwellshortofcostestimates,thereisamajorproblemindisbursingthefinancealreadycommitted.

The overall cost of reducing emissions from deforestation depends onthe types of expenditures considered, and the type and effectiveness ofthe chosen policy mix. The vast majority of countries – developed anddeveloping–lackconcretestrategiesonhowtoimplementREDD+.It istherefore difficult to define global and national REDD+ financial needs.However, it is clear that the long-term mobilisation of REDD+ financeremains unresolved. Even the most conservative calculation of the costsassociatedwithimplementationofREDD+iswellinexcessoftheUS$4.17billion pledged as fast-start finance. The development of disbursementmethodsandchannels,thebuildingandstrengtheningofinternationalandnationalinstitutions,andtheformulationofrobustfinancingmechanisms

| 127Financing REDD+

andpolicieswillthereforebekeymeasuresofprogressforREDD+intheshorttermaswellasaconditionforitslong-termsuccess.

In the short andmedium term (until 2020 at least),REDD+financewillcome frommultiple sources that followdifferent rules and target differentactors. A large proportion of finance will need to come from developedcountrybudgets.Thescaleofsuchfinancewilldependonsustainedpoliticalwillindevelopedcountries,thelevelofambitionofnationalandinternationalclimatetargets,andtheabilitytoadoptmechanismsthatmobilisefinancefromnew sources.Wealthier developing countrieswill continue tofinance theirownREDD+programmes. Payments for fragile states could be structuredto create incentives to invest innewpolicies and reforms aimed at criticalsocio-economictransformations.Incentiveswouldbetargetedtothoselikelyto respond to them, i.e. economic agents in the field, including farmers,communities andprivate entities (Karsenty andOngolo2012).AdditionalsupportforgeneratingREDD+activitiesatnationalandlocallevelmaycomefrom voluntary carbon market transactions. The Governor’s Climate andForestsTaskforce,initiatedbytheStateofCalifornia,andemergingregionalcarbonmarketsinAsiaprovideinterestingexamplesofsub-nationalinitiatives.

Insummary,REDD+isunlikelytodeliverdirectfinanceforquickorcheapemissionreductions.Nevertheless,itprovidesanimportantopportunityforcountriestoaddressthestructuralcausesofdeforestationandstartaprocessoftransformationalchangeinconsideringforestresources.Wheretheyareabletoactwithout international support,governmentsmayprefer results-basedpaymentsatthenationalscale(Phase3).However,manycountrieswillneedsupportinbothprojectsetupandpolicyreform(Phase2).Inthenextyears,whenREDD+implementationscalesupbutalegallybindinginternationalpolicyframeworkforREDD+isstillabsent,financewillneedtocomefromavarietyofsourcesthatdirectlyengagewiththeprivatesectortocombatthedriversofdeforestation.

8Chapter

Who should benefit and why? Discourses on REDD+ benefit sharingCecilia Luttrell, Lasse Loft, Maria Fernanda Gebara and Demetrius Kweka

• Before designing effective benefit sharing mechanisms for REDD+, itis necessary to resolve the question of what REDD+ seeks to achieve.The objectives profoundly affect the design of benefit and cost sharingmechanisms.

• Benefitsarenotonlyfinancial.FewREDD+projectsareprovidingdirectfinancialtransferstohouseholdsintheirearlystages,thusbenefitsharingrequiresattentiontoawiderangeofactivities.

• Thelegitimacyofthedecisionmakinginstitutionsandprocessesiscritical.Legalclarityisneeded,as isconsensusastowhichinstitutionshavetherighttomakedecisionsandattentiontoproceduralrights.

8.1 IntroductionThedistributionofbenefitshasbeenidentifiedas“oneofthemostchallenginghurdles”facingREDD+(Costenbader2011).Benefitsharingisimportantforcreatingpositiveincentivesforreducingcarbonemissions,butitmustbeseenasfairoritwillthreatenthelegitimacyofandsupportforREDD+.Moreover,

Implementing REDD+130 |

benefit sharing canhelp to avoid the leakage associatedwithREDD+andensurepermanenceofemissionreductions(Peskett2011a).

Benefit sharing is not a concept that is unique toREDD+.Many naturalresource sectors (e.g. mining, oil, conservation and development projects)andmostgovernmentshavedealtwithbenefitsharingthroughtaxationandsubsidies.Thereismuchtobelearnedfromtheseexperiences(see,forexample,thereviewbyLindhjemet al.2010).Ashasbeenthecase inothersectors,thebenefit sharingdebate inREDD+ raises anumberof issues, includingthe definition of benefits, the identification of legitimate beneficiaries, theefficientdistributionofcosts,theinstitutionalstructuresneededforfinancialtransfers and the processes for decision making and implementation (seeLindhjem2010;Peskett2011a;VatnandVedeld2011).

Chapter8setsoutproposedpoliciesandsystemsforthedistributionofbenefitsandcostsatnationalandsubnational levelsacrossarangeofcountriesandprojects.Itfocusesprimarilyonthemaindiscoursesaroundthequestionofhowbenefitsandcostsshouldbedistributed.Wedefine‘discourse’as“asharedwayofapprehendingtheworld”(followingDryzek,1997:8).Section8.2setsthesceneforthediscussionbydefiningkeyconceptsanddescribinginstitutionalarrangementsforallocatingfunds.Section8.3laysoutthemaindiscoursesonhowbenefitsandcostsshouldbedistributedandexplorestheimplicationsofthedifferentdiscoursesforthedesignofbenefitsharingmechanisms.Section8.4discussestheimportanceoflegitimacyindecisionmakingprocessesanddescribeshowtonavigatethetradeoffsbetweeneffectiveness,efficiencyandequity concerns that liebehind thesediscourses.Thechapter concludesbysummarisingthetradeoffsbetweendifferentdiscoursesaroundbenefitsharingandbyunderscoringtheimportanceoflegitimisingthedesignprocess.

The chapter draws from CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study (GCS) onREDD+andusesinformationfrom22projectsitesinsevencountries(seeAppendix).Table 8.1 sets out the current status of policies andpracticesconcerningnationalandsubnationalbenefitsharingmechanismsinselectedcountries.Datausedinthischapterwerecollectedatthenational,projectand village levels in each of the project sites andwere supplemented bysecondaryreviewsofliterature,informantinterviewsandpolicyanalysisatthenationallevel.

8.2 Setting the scene 8.2.1 Defining REDD+ benefits and costsInthischapterwedefinebenefitsharingunderREDD+asthedistributionof direct and indirect net gains from the implementation ofREDD+.Wedistinguish between two types of benefits. First, there are monetary gains

| 131Who should benefit and why?

frominternationalandnationalfinancerelatedtoREDD+,includingfromthesaleofforestcarboncreditsordonorfundslinkedtoREDD-readiness,policy reforms and or payments based on emission reductions. Second, asREDD+ increases the sustainability of forest management, it is likely togeneratebenefits through the increasedavailabilityof some forestproducts(e.g.non-timber forestproducts)andbyprovidingbenefitsrelatedtonon-carbonecosystemservices.Box8.1clarifieskeytermsandconceptsrelatedtoREDD+benefitsharing.

REDD+implementationalsocomeswithcosts,whicharebornebydifferentactors and at different levels.Again, a conceptual distinction canbemadebetweendirectfinancialoutlaysrelatedtoREDD+implementationandthecostsarisingfromchangesinhowforestlandsandforestresourcesareusedunderREDD+.Thelatteraretypicallyreferredtoasopportunitycosts:theincomethatisforgonebyusingforestsinwaysthatreduceemissions.Directcosts include transaction and implementation costs. Implementation costscan include costs incurred by governments or proponents to compensateactors for opportunity costs, so care should be taken not to double count(Box8.1;seealsoBox7.1).

Anotherdistinctioncanbemadebetween:i)coststoacountry;ii)coststoindividualactors;andiii)budgetarycoststogovernmentagencies(seeTable8.2).Inappropriatelymixingdifferenttypesofcosts,differentactorsandscalescanresult inmisleadingestimatesofnetbenefits(seeChapter7, includingBox7.1).

Inthischapter,weusethetermbenefitsharingmechanismtorefertothevarietyofinstitutionalmeans,governancestructuresandinstrumentsthatdistributefinanceandothernetbenefitsfromREDD+programmes(followingVhugenet al.2011).ThesemayincludecashtransfersinPESsystems,participatoryforest management (PFM) and integrated conservation and developmentprojects (ICDPs) (IUCN 2009). Other benefit sharing mechanisms areassociatedwithpolicyprocesses,suchasgovernancereforms,fiscalincentivesandpoliciesthataddressparticulardriversofdeforestationanddegradation(Chagaset al.2011).

Lindhjem et al. (2010) characterise benefit sharing as having two essentialdimensions:vertical benefit sharing,which involvesbenefit sharingbetweennationalandlocallevelstakeholdersandhorizontal benefit sharingbetweenandwithincommunities,householdsandotherlocalstakeholders.Anemergingquestionrelatedtoverticalbenefitsharingconcernstheappropriatebalancebetween benefits used as direct incentives for reducing deforestation anddegradationandbenefitsusedtoenhancethegovernanceandpolicycontextneededforsuccessfulREDD+implementation(asarguedbyGregersenet al. 2010;KarsentyandOngolo2012).

Implementing REDD+132 |

Tab

le 8

.1 O

verv

iew

of R

EDD

+ b

enefi

t sh

arin

g p

olic

ies

and

pra

ctic

es in

five

cou

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Rel

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leg

isla

tio

n a

nd

nat

ion

al le

vel

pro

po

sals

RED

D+

imp

lem

enta

tio

n a

nd

act

ivit

ies

Pro

po

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for

inst

itu

tio

nal

fin

anci

al

arra

ng

emen

ts

Bra

zil

Fore

st A

ct a

nd R

EDD

+ N

atio

nal S

trat

egy

in p

rogr

ess;

no

clea

r pos

ition

on

ben

efit

shar

ing

but

prim

arily

trea

ted

as a

saf

egua

rd;

no n

atio

nal c

arb

on ri

ghts

legi

slat

ion

has

bee

n ra

tified

but

sel

ecte

d st

ates

hav

e p

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d le

gisl

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n.

A n

umb

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te a

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s ar

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ben

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ts, i

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a fe

w d

irect

p

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nviro

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(PES

) sc

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es.

Pub

lic fu

ndin

g p

rovi

ded

thro

ugh

the

Am

azon

Fun

d (A

F) a

nd B

olsa

Ver

de; t

he A

F m

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dis

bur

sed

thro

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the

Nat

iona

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nk fo

r Eco

nom

ic a

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men

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ND

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Fore

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(F

IP) r

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thro

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the

Min

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Fin

ance

.

Ind

ones

iaM

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try

of F

ores

try

(MoF

) 201

2 an

d 20

09

regu

latio

ns re

quire

RED

D+

pro

ject

s to

ob

tain

min

iste

rial a

pp

rova

l; no

pro

ject

s ha

ve a

pp

lied

for s

uch

app

rova

l to

date

. M

inis

try

of F

inan

ce (2

009)

sug

gest

s se

ttin

g na

tiona

l and

sub

natio

nal e

mis

sion

s re

fere

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leve

ls; t

he M

oF h

as is

sued

som

e Ec

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tem

Res

tora

tion

Con

cess

ions

that

co

uld

be

fund

ed th

roug

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rbon

cre

dits

; it

is s

till u

ncle

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s to

whe

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car

bon

is a

na

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wne

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hich

sho

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be

regu

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d by

the

stat

e.

A n

umb

er o

f pro

ject

s (p

ublic

ly a

nd p

rivat

ely

fund

ed) a

re m

ovin

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ead

of n

atio

nal

deci

sion

s, s

ome

with

out t

he e

ndor

sem

ent

of th

e M

oF; U

lu M

asen

, Ace

h is

an

exam

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tern

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ourc

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ithou

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th

roug

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l gov

ernm

ent (

Pesk

ett

2011

b).

Proc

ess

to d

raft

RED

D+

Nat

iona

l Str

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pro

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s; a

wor

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gro

up u

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RED

D+

Pre

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kfor

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des

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fund

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inst

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such

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asur

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not

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th

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m; r

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DD

+ p

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the

regu

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2012

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by

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min

g le

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| 133Who should benefit and why?

Vie

tnam

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l aut

horit

ies,

fo

rest

com

mun

ities

, nat

ural

reso

urce

m

anag

emen

t boa

rds

and

fore

st p

rote

ctio

n or

gani

satio

ns; a

mul

tista

keho

lder

wor

king

gr

oup

on

ben

efit s

harin

g ha

s b

een

esta

blis

hed;

pro

vinc

ial l

evel

PES

has

bee

n tr

ialle

d un

der D

ecis

ion

380

and

Dec

ree

99.

Proj

ects

are

mov

ing

away

from

an

exp

ecta

tion

of a

vol

unta

ry m

arke

t; U

N-

RED

D a

nd th

e N

GO

SN

V ar

e te

stin

g di

ffer

ent

app

roac

hes

to b

enefi

t sha

ring,

usi

ng g

ame

scen

ario

s w

ith c

omm

uniti

es to

com

par

e th

e ac

cep

tab

ility

of d

iffer

ent o

ptio

ns a

nd

are

exp

lorin

g th

e us

e of

an

‘R c

oeffi

cien

t’,

whi

ch h

elp

s to

cal

cula

te p

aym

ents

b

ased

bot

h on

em

issi

on re

duct

ions

and

so

cial

env

ironm

enta

l im

pac

ts (U

N-R

EDD

Pr

ogra

mm

e 20

10).

UN

-RED

D P

rogr

amm

e (2

010)

pro

pos

es a

na

tiona

l fun

d (r

athe

r tha

n tr

ansf

ers

thro

ugh

the

stat

e b

udge

tary

sys

tem

) ove

rsee

n by

a

mul

tista

keho

lder

bod

y; re

venu

es w

ould

b

e di

strib

uted

pro

por

tiona

lly a

ccor

ding

to

pro

vinc

ial p

erfo

rman

ce.

Tan

zan

iaTh

e Ta

nzan

ia N

atio

nal R

EDD

+ F

ram

ewor

k p

rese

nts

optio

ns fo

r: i)

hand

ing

over

fu

nds

to th

e co

mm

uniti

es in

pro

por

tion

to

emis

sion

redu

ctio

ns; i

i) di

strib

utin

g b

enefi

ts

acco

rdin

g to

inp

uts

to a

llow

for e

colo

gica

l di

ffer

ence

s an

d to

add

ress

equ

ity

conc

erns

. Th

e Fr

amew

ork

pro

pos

es in

-kin

d ra

ther

th

an fi

nanc

ial b

enefi

ts.

Mor

e th

an h

alf o

f RED

D+

pro

ject

s ar

e un

der

com

mun

ity

bas

ed fo

rest

man

agem

ent

(CBF

M) o

n vi

llage

fore

st re

serv

es w

here

b

enefi

t sha

ring

is li

kely

to fo

llow

CBF

M

guid

elin

es a

nd c

omm

uniti

es w

ill re

ceiv

e 10

0% o

f the

reve

nue;

on

stat

e la

nd th

e b

enefi

ts w

ill b

e di

strib

uted

bet

wee

n go

vern

men

t and

com

mun

ities

thro

ugh

Join

t For

est M

anag

emen

t (JF

M) g

uide

lines

(n

ot y

et fi

nalis

ed).

The

Nat

iona

l RED

D+

Fra

mew

ork

pro

pos

es

the

crea

tion

of a

Nat

iona

l Tru

st F

und

that

will

rece

ive

fund

s fr

om b

uyer

s an

d di

strib

ute

fund

s to

com

mun

ities

/im

ple

men

ters

; the

RED

D+

Str

ateg

y fa

vour

s th

is n

on-m

arke

t ap

pro

ach,

how

ever

p

rop

onen

ts a

re a

dvoc

atin

g fo

r bot

h a

trus

t fu

nd a

nd th

e m

arke

t ap

pro

ach

as o

ptio

ns.

Pap

ua

New

G

uin

ea

(PN

G)

Des

ign

of n

atio

nal R

EDD

+ p

rogr

amm

es

in p

rogr

ess;

ben

efit s

harin

g m

odel

s ha

ve

bee

n de

laye

d; n

o cl

arifi

catio

n as

to w

heth

er

carb

on ri

ghts

will

follo

w c

usto

mar

y te

nure

: dr

aft r

egul

atio

ns s

ugge

st g

over

nmen

t may

re

gula

te s

ale

of c

arb

on b

ut ri

ghts

to c

arb

on

stay

with

land

hol

der (

Cov

ingt

on a

nd

Bake

r&M

cKen

zie

2009

).

No

offici

al p

roje

cts

to d

ate

but

som

e N

GO

an

d vo

lunt

ary

mar

ket p

roje

cts

are

defin

ing

thei

r ow

n ar

rang

emen

ts.

Trus

t fun

d or

don

or c

oord

inat

ion

com

mitt

ee

not y

et d

evel

oped

; CSO

s su

gges

t RED

D+

fu

ndin

g b

ody

mus

t be

inde

pen

dent

, m

ultis

take

hold

er; P

ES m

odel

pro

pos

al

by e

xper

t con

sult

atio

n gr

oup

(ECG

201

1)

sugg

ests

two

flow

s (E

CG 2

011)

: con

tinua

tion

of v

olun

tary

mar

ket a

nd P

ES u

nder

a

natio

nal c

omm

itmen

t (w

ith e

arly

vol

unta

ry

mar

ket a

rran

gem

ents

inco

rpor

ated

).

Implementing REDD+134 |

Box 8.1 Key concepts for REDD+ benefit sharing

Most definitions of benefit in the REDD+ literature refer only to monetary benefits provided for emission reductions and carbon stock enhancements (Streck 2009; Lindhjem et al. 2010; Peskett 2011a). However, the implementation of REDD+ activities at the national and local levels can give rise to a wide range of benefits in addition to direct monetary benefits (see Table 8.2 for examples). These include:

• Direct benefits arising from REDD+ implementation. These include employment, livelihood improvements and direct ecosystem benefits, which include NTFPs, fuelwood, fodder etc.

• Indirect benefits, which comprise improved governance such as the strengthening of tenure rights and law enforcement, which may be related to the REDD+ readiness phase) and enhanced participation in decision making as well as benefits from infrastructure provision. Indirect ecosystem benefits include the protection of soil and water quality, biodiversity protection and climate stabilisation.

Direct and indirect benefits can occur as monetary or non-monetary benefits. Monetary benefits are those which can be quantified and valued in financial terms, and non-monetary benefits are those which are difficult to value in financial terms (e.g. enhanced natural assets, increased skills and knowledge).

Implementing REDD+ also carries costs. These include:

• Opportunity costs: the net benefits forgone by not converting forests to other land uses (Börner et al. 2010). Opportunity costs vary according to the drivers of deforestation in a particular region or country.

• Transaction costs: the costs necessary to perform a transaction involving a REDD+ payment, including the costs to external parties, such as market regulators or payment system administrators to determine that the REDD+ programme has achieved emission reductions (Pagiola and Bosquet 2009).

• Implementation costs: the costs “directly associated with the actions leading to reduced deforestation, and hence to reduced emissions” (Pagiola and Bosquet 2009:3). These include, for example, the costs of guarding a forest to prevent illegal logging and relocating timber harvesting activities away from natural forests. Implementation costs may, in part, involve compensating actors for their opportunity and transaction costs, thus the three different costs might overlap.

A key distinction, according to some authors, should be made between cost recovery (compensation) and the distribution of any surplus once costs have been recovered (the REDD+ rent). Others argue that a REDD+ system where full costs are accurately compensated should not, in theory, generate

| 135Who should benefit and why?

surplus rent. This argument raises a conceptual dilemma for benefit sharing, since pursuing effectiveness in a global mechanism where funding is limited implies minimising REDD+ rents (Meridian Institute 2009). Thus, conceptualising REDD+ as an extractive resource that yields net benefits may well be problematic.

Omitting the value of co-benefits from forest conservation in the calculation of net opportunity costs makes them appear to be higher than they are (Pagiola and Bosquet 2009:15). Including the various non-carbon benefits suggests, perhaps surprisingly to some, that less monetary compensation is needed to make, for example, local communities better off under REDD+.

Governance enhancement might include tenure clarification andstrengtheninglawenforcement.Inpractice,allcountriesaregivingattentionto both types of benefit sharing, recognising that a conducive policyenvironment is required to make PES or related compensation schemeswork.Therelativeemphasisgiventothetwodimensionsvariesdependingonthespecificcountrycontextanddriversofdeforestation.InIndonesiaand Cameroon, for example, much deforestation and forest degradationoccursillegallyorsemi-legallyandoftentakesplaceonstateorgovernment-owned property where there is weak enforcement of land rights. Thus,strongerlawenforcement,theclarificationoftenurerightsandagriculturalintensificationwillberequiredbeforeperformance-basedmechanismswillbe viable.Braziliannationalpolicy is also focusingon the importanceofstrengtheningpolicyandenforcement,whilecountriessuchasVietnamarecurrentlypayingmoreattentiontothePESapproach.

Table8.3presentsaselectionofREDD+projectsandtheirproposedandactualbenefitsharingmechanismstodate.Atthetimeofourreview,onlyone project was providing direct financial transfers to households.Noneof thecurrentbenefitsharingmechanisms in thefiveIndonesianprojectsreviewed involved cash payments. The proponents preferred to definebenefits as activities, such as capacity building, alternative livelihoodsenhancementandthestrengtheningoftenurerights,whichareviewedasnecessarybeforePESsystemscanbesuccessfully introduced.ThisimpliesthatthetypeofbenefitsharingmechanisminplaceislikelytochangeastheprojectsmovefromREDD+readinesstowardspaymentsforactualemissionreductions.

8.2.2 Institutional structures for financial flows The distribution of net benefits and costs from the implementation ofREDD+ among different actors has two aspects: themonetary gains from

Implementing REDD+136 |

Tab

le 8

.2 E

xam

ple

s of

pot

enti

al R

EDD

+ b

enefi

ciar

ies

and

the

cost

s an

d b

enefi

ts th

ey m

ay a

ccru

e

Pote

nti

al R

EDD

+ b

enefi

ciar

ies

Poss

ible

ro

les

and

co

sts

incu

rred

Exam

ple

s o

f ben

efits

Prov

ider

s of

RED

D+

ser

vice

s an

d co

-ben

efits

(t

radi

tiona

l com

mun

ities

, ind

igen

ous

peo

ple

, la

ndho

lder

s, e

tc.)

Dire

ct p

rovi

ders

of c

arb

on re

duct

ions

and

st

ocks

, nor

mal

ly re

spon

sib

le fo

r lan

d us

e ch

ange

an

d RE

DD

+ a

ctiv

ities

on

the

grou

nd

Dire

ct b

enefi

ts; i

n-ki

nd b

enefi

ts; i

ncom

e fr

om s

ale

of p

rodu

cts

from

RED

D+

act

iviti

es;

tech

nolo

gy tr

ansf

er; s

tren

gthe

ning

of r

ight

s;

job

s; g

ener

atio

n of

non

-car

bon

eco

syst

em

serv

ices

Villa

ge a

ssoc

iatio

ns a

nd c

omm

unit

y gr

oup

sM

ay b

e in

volv

ed in

the

imp

lem

enta

tion

of R

EDD

+ a

ctiv

ities

on

the

grou

nd s

uch

as

man

agin

g an

d m

onito

ring

the

dist

ribut

ion

of

ben

efits

Dire

ct in

cent

ive

pay

men

ts; i

n-ki

nd b

enefi

ts; j

obs

and

othe

r mul

tiplie

r eff

ects

Mun

icip

al/l

ocal

gov

ernm

ent a

nd a

genc

ies

Invo

lved

in th

e im

ple

men

tatio

n of

RED

D+

ne

cess

ary

inte

rven

tions

, suc

h as

defi

nitio

n of

la

nd te

nure

, ap

pro

val/

eval

uatio

n of

act

iviti

es

and

defin

ing

elig

ible

act

ors

Job

s; lo

cal i

nfra

stru

ctur

e im

pro

vem

ents

; ca

pac

ity

bui

ldin

g; fi

scal

tran

sfer

s; g

ener

atio

n of

no

n-ca

rbon

eco

syst

em s

ervi

ces

Proj

ect d

evel

oper

s/im

ple

men

ters

(loc

al o

r su

bna

tiona

l)Re

spon

sib

le fo

r the

des

ign

and

imp

lem

enta

tion

of R

EDD

+ p

roje

cts;

mos

t lik

ely

to m

anag

e fu

nds

for R

EDD

+ a

ctio

ns

Job

s; c

apac

ity

bui

ldin

g; in

crea

se in

ass

ets;

te

chni

cal i

mp

rove

men

ts

Loca

l age

ncie

s an

d in

divi

dual

s re

spon

sib

le fo

r la

w e

nfor

cem

ent

Inst

itutio

ns a

nd in

divi

dual

s in

cha

rge

of la

w

enfo

rcem

ent a

ctiv

ities

, suc

h as

mon

itorin

g de

fore

stat

ion

and

app

lyin

g sa

nctio

ns a

nd fi

nes

Job

s; n

et in

com

e; c

apac

ity

bui

ldin

g; te

chno

logy

tr

ansf

er

Cen

tral

gov

ernm

ent

Des

ign

and

imp

lem

enta

tion

of p

olic

ies

and

mea

sure

s (e

.g. r

emov

al o

f sub

sidi

es, i

ntro

duct

ion

of lo

ggin

g m

orat

oria

)

RED

D+

read

ines

s p

aym

ents

; co-

ben

efits

acc

rued

fr

om fo

rest

s; ta

xes

and

roya

ltie

s; m

ultip

lier

effec

ts o

n th

e ec

onom

y an

d in

stitu

tions

; ge

nera

tion

of n

on-c

arb

on e

cosy

stem

ser

vice

s

Pub

licA

ctiv

ities

and

inco

mes

fore

gone

In

terg

ener

atio

nal b

enefi

ts in

term

s of

nat

ural

as

sets

; co-

ben

efits

acc

rued

from

fore

sts

| 137Who should benefit and why?

international finance and the benefits related to improved sustainability offorestmanagement.Thus,theterm‘benefitsharingmechanisms’encompassesa variety of institutional means, governance structures and instrumentsneeded to distribute both the finance and the net benefits from REDD+implementation. In the caseof the former themechanismdependson theinstitutionalarrangementsinplaceforallocatinginternationalandnationalfunding. In thecaseof the latter, itdependson theparticularmechanismschosen forREDD+ implementation, including the rules for howfinancialbenefitswillbeallocated.Mostof thischapter focusesonthe latteraspect;however,tosetthesceneforthatdiscussion,thissectiondiscussesproposalsforthegovernanceandinstitutionalarrangementsneededtoallocatefinancefromnationaltosubnationallevelsanddescribestheirimplicationsforbenefitsharing.

Theproposalscanbedividedintofourmaincategories(basedonVatnandAngelsen2009;VatnandVedeld2011)(seeFigure8.1andTable8.1):1. Project-basedmechanisms,suchastheCleanDevelopmentMechanism

(CDM)orvoluntarymarketstandardsorprojects,suchasthoseinPeruandTanzania

2. Fundsoperatingindependentlyoutsidethenationaladministration,suchasexistingconservationtrustfundsortheproposedNationalTrustFundinTanzania(seeTable8.1)

3. Fundsthatrelyonthecapacityofthestateadministrationandcandirectfinance to the state sector,butwithdecisionsonfinancialbeneficiariesmadebyindependentcommittees.ExamplesincludetheAmazonFundinBrazil,theNationalFundforEnvironment(FONAM)inPeruandtheForestProtectionandDevelopmentFundsinVietnam.

4. Theconditionaldistributionofpaymentsthroughthestate’sfiscaltransfersystems,suchasthatproposedbytheMinistryofFinanceinIndonesia(MinistryofFinance2009).Thismightinvolvetheregulargovernmentbudget,atargetedfundoradecentralisedapproachinvolvingdecisionsoverallocationof fundsby the localgovernmentandtaxespaid to thecentralgovernment,asinVietnam(UN-REDDProgramme2010).

These proposed approaches to financial transfers have implications forbenefit sharing. Project-based mechanisms involve a contract betweentheproviderandthebuyer,butareusuallysomewhatremovedfromstatestructures,whereasmorecomplexnational systemshaveawider rangeofplayers and layers of subnational systems to accommodate (UN-REDDProgramme 2010). Table 8.1 shows that, with the possible exceptionofBrazil, there is little clarity in any of the countries about institutionalgovernancearrangementsforREDD+financetransferandmanycountrieshaveanumberofdifferentproposalsonthetable.Forexample, thedraftTanzanian REDD+ Strategy proposes a centralised national system with

Implementing REDD+138 |

Tab

le 8

.3 S

elec

tio

n o

f pro

ject

ap

pro

ach

es to

ben

efit s

har

ing

a

Proj

ectb

Typ

e of

ben

efit s

har

ing

arr

ang

emen

tcD

etai

ls

Tanz

ania

– T

FCG

- Ki

losa

and

Lin

di

Hou

seho

ld (H

H):

alte

rnat

ive

livel

ihoo

ds*;

ca

paci

ty b

uild

ing*

; im

prov

ed

agric

ultu

re*;

PES

Div

iden

ds fr

om R

EDD

+ p

aid

to e

very

qua

lifyi

ng m

embe

r of t

he v

illag

e as

det

erm

ined

by

villa

ge b

y-la

ws;

up

-fro

nt fu

nds

and

indi

vidu

al p

aym

ents

bas

ed o

n th

e po

tent

ial a

vera

ge

avoi

ded

emis

sion

s pe

r yea

r; vi

llage

ass

embl

ies

deci

de w

heth

er to

use

div

iden

ds o

n co

mm

unity

pro

ject

sTa

nzan

ia –

Mpi

ngo

HH

: PES

Com

mun

ity: t

enur

e se

curit

y*;

cert

ifica

tion*

Acq

uirin

g la

nd c

ertifi

cate

s; b

ound

ary

clar

ifica

tion*

; sel

ling

timbe

r thr

ough

FSC

; lan

d us

e an

d m

anag

emen

t pla

ns. O

rigin

ally

the

proj

ect p

lann

ed to

pas

s on

pro

fits

to c

omm

uniti

es

afte

r ded

uctin

g co

sts

but t

his

was

con

trov

ersi

al s

o no

w th

ey a

re d

iscu

ssin

g a

perc

enta

ge

arra

ngem

ent.

Tanz

ania

– C

ARE

Com

mun

ity: a

ltern

ativ

e co

okin

g en

ergy

*;

alte

rnat

ive

livel

ihoo

ds*

and

capa

city

bu

ildin

g*; P

ES

Dis

trib

utio

n of

car

bon

reve

nues

will

use

exi

stin

g vi

llage

sav

ings

and

loan

sys

tem

s. T

he

right

s to

car

bon

will

be

nego

tiate

d be

twee

n C

ARE

and

the

com

mun

ity th

roug

h an

ag

greg

atio

n en

tity.

Br

azil

– Tr

ansa

maz

on

HH

: PES

; alte

rnat

ive

prod

uctio

n st

rate

gies

*; la

nd te

nure

regu

laris

atio

n*;

Com

mun

ity: o

rgan

isat

iona

l st

reng

then

ing

Cond

ition

al b

enefi

ts fo

r 350

fam

ilies

(bas

ed o

n th

e re

duct

ion

of c

arbo

n em

issi

ons,

as

soci

ated

with

redu

ced

defo

rest

atio

n)

Braz

il –

SFX

H

H: l

and

tenu

re re

gula

risat

ion*

; liv

elih

ood

alte

rnat

ives

*; c

apac

ity

bui

ldin

g

Cond

ition

al a

nd u

p-f

ront

pay

men

ts fo

r priv

ate

land

hold

ers

(larg

e an

d sm

all),

indi

geno

us

grou

ps a

nd p

rote

cted

are

a m

anag

ers

incl

udin

g fo

r: i)

land

hold

ers:

str

engt

heni

ng

com

man

d an

d co

ntro

l, in

tegr

ated

sys

tem

for e

nviro

nmen

tal l

icen

sing

and

mon

itorin

g,

incr

easi

ng c

attle

pro

duct

ivity

, lar

ge-s

cale

refo

rest

atio

n w

ith h

igh

valu

e sp

ecie

s; ii

) in

dige

nous

land

s: s

usta

inab

le in

com

e al

tern

ativ

es, c

ode

for m

anag

emen

t of n

atur

al

reso

urce

s; ii

i) co

nser

vatio

n un

its: f

orm

atio

n of

man

agem

ent c

ounc

il an

d m

anag

emen

t pl

an, i

mpr

ovin

g pr

otec

tion

and

mon

itorin

g Br

azil

– Co

trig

uaçu

HH

: sus

tain

able

fore

st m

anag

emen

t*;

catt

le a

nd d

airy

pro

duct

ion*

; alte

rnat

ive

prod

uctio

n st

rate

gies

; lan

d te

nure

re

gula

risat

ion*

; cap

acity

bui

ldin

g

Bene

fits

to a

ll re

leva

nt a

ctor

s: p

rivat

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| 139Who should benefit and why?

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Implementing REDD+140 |

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| 141Who should benefit and why?

paymentintoaNationalTrustFund,whereasprojects(andtheReadinessPreparationProposal[R-PP])areproposinganestedapproachthatallowsfor direct international payments to projects. In some countries, such asIndonesia,multiple processes of defining benefit sharingmechanisms areunderway,althoughthelegalityofthearrangementsbeingproposedisnotclear.Thefact thatmanyREDD+projectsareoperating in insecure legaland policy frameworksmeans that existing benefit sharing arrangementscouldbesubjecttoupheavaloncethenationallevelpolicyisformalised.

8.3 Discourses on who should benefitAmajorquestiondominatingthebenefitsharingdebateatboththenationalandprojectlevelsiswhoshouldreceivethebenefitsassociatedwithREDD+.Thissectionfocusesonthemaindiscoursesonthisquestion,thetradeoffsinvolved in the choices arising from each discourse and the implicationsof the choice for the design of a benefit sharing mechanism. Differentdiscourseshavedifferenteffectsonpolicymaking,astheyframetheproblemandpresentchoicesindifferentways(HajerandVersteeg2005).

Abroaddistinctioncanbemadebetweeneffectivenessandefficiencyontheonehandandequity(andco-benefits)ontheother.1. The effectiveness and efficiency discourse focuses on the goal of carbon

emission reductions. It suggests that benefits should be used as anincentive and distributed to the people or communities that bringaboutareductioninemissionsbychangingtheirbehaviouroractions.ThisargumentfollowsthelogicofPES:REDD+servesasamechanismforpayingforestusersandownerstoreduceemissions.Consequently,financialbenefits shouldprincipally go to thepeopleproviding theseservicestoensurethattheservicesareactuallydelivered.Italsocanbeconsidered fair practice, since these actorsmay incur themain costsfromreducedforestuse.

2. Equity-related discourses, on the other hand, focus on the questionof which actors have the right to benefit from REDD+, with lessattention given to their contributions to reducing carbon emissions.Thisapproachhasemergedfromaconcernthatafocusoneffectivenessandefficiencycouldresultinunfairincentives(e.g.rewardingwealthyactors for reducing their illegal behaviour), increasing inequality andunderminingthemoralandpoliticallegitimacyofREDD+.Theequitydiscoursehasfourmainstrands,whicharediscussedbelow.

Atthenationallevel,therelativeemphasisgiventothevariousdiscoursesvariesdependingonthestakeholdersinvolvedinthedesignofthemechanism,thenatureoftheREDD+fundingthatisenvisagedandthetypeofREDD+activity concerned. For example, inVietnam, there is concern about the

Implementing REDD+142 |

development of performance-based payments that can accommodate co-benefits. In Indonesia, there is an emphasisonputting inplace adequateincentivestructurestoensurethatprojectdevelopersremaininvolvedandinTanzania,thereisaconcerntoensurethatupfrontpaymentsarepossible,inordertomaintainearlycommitment.

Table 8.4 describes proposed models for subnational funding allocations,whichweredevelopedtoinfluencetheformulationofthenationalREDD+strategyinBrazil.ThesemodelsweredevelopedbytheAmazonEnvironmentalResearch Institute (IPAM) (Moutinho et al. 2011) and a working grouporganisedby theMinistryofEnvironment (MMA2012).Thetable showshowthemodelsvaryaccordingtotheweightgiventothedifferentobjectivesofeffectivenessandefficiencyorequityandhowthismighthaveimplicationsforhowbenefitsaredistributed.

Inpractice,mostbenefit sharingmechanismswillbedesigned to addressnumerousobjectives,butforeachonetherearesignificanttradeoffs.Thesetradeoffs raise hard questions forREDD+design, since theywill requiredecisionsthatriskunderminingsupportforREDD+implementation.

Inthefollowingsections,wediscussthekeytradeoffsinvolvedinvariousequity discourses and describe how each of these tradeoffs interactswitheffectiveness and efficiency discourses to influence the design of benefitsharingmechanisms.

8.3.1 Equity discourse I: Benefits should go to actors with legal rights Adominantdiscourseinthebenefitsharingdebateisthatbenefitsshouldbedistributedtothosewiththelegalclaimsorrights(whetherstatutoryorcustomary) to thosebenefits.Legal rightsare rights thatarebestowedonapersonorentitybyaparticularlegalsystem,asopposedtowidermoralor ethical rights, which are covered below. However, in most countries,including those occupied bymany of the project sites, establishing theselegal rights is not straightforward. None of the countries reviewed havenational legislation concerning property rights over carbon emissionreductions (see Box 8.2) and most REDD+ projects are operating in avacuumofuncertaintyoverthelegalstatusofcarbonrights.Indonesia,PeruandTanzania,inparticular,haveanumberofREDD+projectswithbenefitsharingmechanismsthatweredevelopedbeforetheirnationalpoliciesoncarbon rights had been clarified. Lacking that clarity,many forest actorsassumethatexistinglandandforesttenure,andcurrentpolicyinstrumentsfor sharingbenefits from the forests,will serve as thebasis for allocatingpaymentsforcarbonemissionreductions(CotulaandMayers2009).Landtenure is important for influencing how benefits are shared in forests,

| 143Who should benefit and why?

becauseithelpsdeterminewhichactorshavetherighttocarryoutactivitiesandclaimbenefitsfromaparticularareaoflandanditsassociatednaturalresources(Peskett2011a).However,akeyissueinthecarbonrightsdebateis thatmany small-scale forest users donotpossess formal rights to landand/ortoforestproducts(seeChapter9)andthususetheforestillegally.Targetingbenefitsonly to those individualsor entitieswith formal rightsmayworkagainstthepoorestpeople,raisingthequestionofwhetherornotareductioninde jureillegalusesshouldalsobecompensated.

Table 8.4 Proposed models for subnational REDD+ funding allocations in Brazil (based on Moutinho et al. (2011) [i] and MMA (2012) [ii])

Proposal for funding allocation Implications

Model 1 [i; ii]

Based on subnational reference emission levels, federal states would be compensated according to three criteria: i) contribution to reducing emissions; ii) the forest stock; and iii) performance against state targets for reducing deforestation.

Performance-based benefit sharing provides the greatest effectiveness, due to high accountability over GHG reductions at the national level. Equity is addressed by considering stocks and this could help to benefit indigenous people. However, the fact that funds are allocated at the state level raises some challenges for reaching local people.

Model 2 [i; ii]

Separate funds for the contribution of specific land use categories (e.g. indigenous lands, protected areas and extractive reserves, settlements and public lands) to reducing deforestation and conserving the forest stock.

Effectiveness and efficiency may be enhanced, since the model allows for the allocation of financial resources based on the needs of the different areas. Equity is enhanced by allocating finance directly to the area concerned. In addition indigenous people should benefit from the allocation of funds to specific landholding groups.

Model 3 [ii]

The allocation of funds is based on local level emission reductions (carbon allocated units). Reference levels are allocated directly to the actors responsible for reducing deforestation and promoting forest conservation.

Effectiveness may be increased, since transaction costs are low and no new institutions are needed. However allocating reference levels directly to local people is a challenge.

Implementing REDD+144 |

Box 8.2 Debates over carbon rights in selected REDD+ countries

Rights over carbon can belong to an individual, a group, such as a community or the state, depending on national legislation. Tracking ongoing debates on this issue in a number of countries reflects the complexity of defining the legal right to benefit from carbon emission reductions.

CameroonCameroon’s legal system does not distinguish between rights over trees and the elements (such as carbon) stored inside them. According to Sama and Tawah (2009), the separable right to trade and benefit from carbon should be treated like other natural resource ownership and thus depends on the type of forest in question. In Cameroon, the natural resources found in state or communal forests belong to the state, those on national land, which is administered by the state, belong to the Cameroonian nation (Karsenty and Assembe 2011), those found in council forests belong to the council and the resources in private forests are owned by individuals. Some argue that a carbon credit could be categorised as an intangible asset (Correa 2009, as cited in Dkamela 2011) and take the form of a monetary asset representing the result of an action. Ownership of carbon credits would be granted to forest actors who prove that they are behind the action. This claim would not necessarily be based on land tenure, but could also include ancestral rights, operating rights, use rights or capital investment.

BrazilAccording to the federal legal opinion number AGU-AFC-1/2011, the provision of environmental services could be subject to commercial agreements with indigenous groups; the carbon credits generated in indigenous lands would belong to indigenous people under article 231 of the Federal Constitution. At the subnational level, Acre, Amazonas and Tocantins have passed climate and conservation laws, which state that carbon rights belong to the state. Under these laws, the providers of ecosystem services can gain access to financial resources, assuming they receive approval and are legally based in the area where the services are being provided (Gebara 2011). In the case of Amazonas, this right may be donated to the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (FAS), which is responsible for managing conservation sites in the state (Art.8, Law 3135/2007).

VietnamThe Vietnamese Constitution states that all land and forest resources belong to the state, which allocates them to organisations and individuals for “stable long-term use”. Accordingly, the 2004 Forest Protection and Development Law recognises the principle that buyers may purchase forest goods and services, delivering payments to those who protect and regenerate the forests. Decision 178 (2001) specifies the ways in which households and individuals can be allocated or leased land, or contracted to manage forest and details the payments they can receive for these services. Thus, individuals and organisations may have the right to benefit from providing ecosystem services. However, according to Article 84 of the 2005 Law on Environmental Protection, carbon emission transactions with international buyers would have to be approved by the Prime Minister.

| 145Who should benefit and why?

Owninglandortreesdoesnotnecessarilymeantheownerhasalegalrighttobenefitfromcarbonsequestrationorreductionsincarbonemissions.Thoughsomeauthorsdonotmakethisdistinction,PeskettandBrodnig(2011)argue(followingStrecnandO’Sullivan2007;Takacs2009)thatthetermcarbonrightshastwofundamentallydifferentaspects:1. Thepropertyrighttosequesteredcarbon,whichisphysicallycontained

in land, trees and soil, does not necessarily have to coincidewith thepropertyrightsoverthephysicalresources.

2. The property right to sequestered carbon is distinct from the right tobenefitfromsellingcarboncredits.Wherethereisnoexplicitlawontherighttosequestercarbon,legalrightscanbeassociatedwiththerighttotheunderlyingasset,activityorresource.Ifthelegalstatusisnotclear,contracts become important for clarifying rights and responsibilities(NortonRose2010).

Oneofthemainconsiderationsinthedesignofbenefitsharingmechanismsiswhetherornot central governmentswill claim separate rights tobenefitfrom trading carbon credits. This decision is rooted in the fundamentalquestionofwhetherforestandassociatedproductsareviewedasnationally-ownedgoodsandtheextenttowhich, if this isdeterminedtobethecase,there is political consensus around the decision. InTanzania, for example,themajorityofREDD+projectsaretakingplaceonlandregisteredasVillageForest Reserves, which means that there is no legal requirement for theincomefromtheseprojectstogotothecentralgovernment.ThisisbecausetheCBFMguidelines andTanzanianForestActof1998 (revised in2002)givecommunitiesthatownVillageForestReservestherighttotherevenueand benefits arising from them (UnitedRepublic ofTanzania 1998).Thishas implications forhow theseprojects areviewedby thegovernment andthewiderpublic,sinceanyrevenuestheyraisewillnotcontributetowidernationaldevelopment.Alatentresistancetoreformsthathaveshiftedcontrolover land and forest away from the state to communities still exists at thenationallevel,wheresomecontinuetoperceivenaturalresourcesasnationallyownedgoods(interviewswithnationalstakeholders2012).Thisperceptionhas led to recommendations that REDD+ revenues should be channelledthroughtheNationalTrustFundtoenablethegovernmenttomanageanddistributethefundstothecommunities(UnitedRepublicofTanzania2010).

Ifgovernmentsassumetheownershipofcarbon,thedesignofnationalbenefitsharingmechanismneedstoaddresshowthebenefitsobtainedfromsellingcarbonwouldbedistributednationally.Iftherighttocarbonwereprivatised,theownerof thoseresourceswouldgovernthebenefitsharingmechanism.Howeverinthatcase,furtherattentionmayberequiredinordertoactuallytacklethedriversofcarbonemissions,sincethosewithlegalrightsmaynotberesponsibleforhighemittingbehaviour.

Implementing REDD+146 |

8.3.2 Equity discourse II: Benefits should go to low-emitting forest stewards Fromanequitystandpoint,itcanbearguedthatREDD+benefitsshouldnotonlygototheactorsthathavebeencausinghighemissionsbutalsotoindigenousgroupsorotherforestusersthathavearecordofresponsibleforestmanagement.Forexample,takingthisapproach,acommunitywhosecustomaryrightsarenotlegallyrecognised,butthathasbeenprotectingtheforestsforalongtime,wouldhavestrongclaimstobenefitsfromREDD+.The effectiveness–equity dilemma is that inmany of these low-emissionsituations,additionalitycannotbeprovenbecausetherearenoemissionsto reduce in the first place.However, somewould argue that emissionsare likely to increase in the future, i.e. the realisticbaseline is above thehistoricalone,andthereforepaymentscanbeconsideredasadditional.

Recognitionofgoodforeststewardshipcanbeseeninsomeoftheprojectsreviewed,where benefits are being distributed to actors that are not thedirect drivers of deforestation, in order to encourage collaboration andcreateincentivesforprotectingthearea.Thiscanbeseen,forexample,intheBAMprojectinMadredeDios,PeruwheretheownersofBrazilnutconcessionsaregiven incentives toprotect the forest, although themaincontributors to deforestation, agricultural clearance and illegal loggingare different actors altogether. In the best case scenario, payments tocommunitiesmayleadthemtoguardtheforestagainstexternalagentsofdeforestation.

8.3.3 Equity discourse III: Benefits should go to those incurring costs Animportantdiscourseinthebenefitsharingdebateholdsthattheforestactors that shoulder implementation, transaction and opportunity costsshouldreceiveREDD+benefits.Thisdiscoursereflectsequityconcernstoensurethatthepeoplewhohaveincurredcostsarecompensatedforthem,regardless of the carbon emission reductions forwhich they are directlyresponsible.

Thetensionbetweenemission-basedapproaches,andtheneedtorewardeffortandinputsprovidedforREDD+implementation,isreflectedinthedesignofmanyemergingbenefitsharingarrangements(seeBox8.3).Thistension not only relates to the fact that inputs are easier to define andmeasurethanareemissionreductions(seeChapter13),butalsothatmostREDD+projectsare intheearlystagesof implementationandrecognisetheneedtogiveactorsincentivesforgettinginvolved.

| 147Who should benefit and why?

Box 8.3 REDD+ projects in Tanzania: Exploring options to overcome the tension between performance and input-based benefit sharing

A key question in the design of benefit sharing mechanisms for REDD+ projects in Tanzania concerns the basis for making payments. Two clear options are to make payments based on i) effort and input or on ii) performance and output. In the first case, rewards will be given to communities as long as they implement activities that improve forest conditions and hence carbon stock (e.g. through the development of land use plans, participatory forest management, law enforcement or the implementation of forest management plans). This method has low transaction costs, because the activities can easily be verified, requiring less empirical evidence. The approach, however, has several drawbacks. For example, there is not necessarily a direct link between payments and reductions in the deforestation rate. The approach does not account for variability in the performance of forest managers nor does it create strong incentives for good forest management since forest managers are paid regardless of forest management outcomes (TFWG 2010). However, the approach does recognise the fact that some communities might work as hard as others but have lesser outcomes, due to different circumstances.

Nevertheless, an effort-based payment system does not take into account the differences in opportunity costs among communities. The communities that succeed in halting charcoal production or shifting cultivation will forego more farming and other economic activities than those that try to halt these activities and ultimately fail (TFWG 2010). Communities with high carbon forests (in the highland areas) will incur greater opportunity costs than communities in low carbon forests (like miombo in Southern Tanzania and coral-rag in Zanzibar) (United Republic of Tanzania 2009). This is because there are more valuable economic opportunities in areas where forests have higher carbon content (TFWG 2010). If the cost of these opportunities and other costs, such as varying access to markets, are not factored in, or are assumed to be constant, effort-based systems can be inequitable.

In an output or performance-based payment system, communities and forest managers are paid for their actual performance in terms of improving forest conditions and reducing degradation in ways that can be empirically verified though higher forest carbon stocks, as compared to reference emission levels. This system provides a direct link between REDD+ payments and effective forest conservation activities. However, the performance-based system has higher transaction costs because of the need for carbon measurement and third party verification methods.

Implementing REDD+148 |

8.3.4 Equity discourse IV: Benefits should go to effective implementersFinally,thereisastrongdiscoursethataproportionofREDD+benefitsshouldbe shared with the forest actors that are essential for the implementationof REDD+, whether private sector, NGO or central or local government(Table 8.2). However, the determination of the exact proportion of thebenefitsthatshouldaccruetotheseactorsisakeyissuefordebateinmanycountries.Thechallengeistoensurethatprojectimplementersreceiveenoughincentive to guarantee effective implementation, while at the same timeguardingagainstthemgettingwindfallprofits(asisdiscussedintheIndonesiaMinistryofFinance’sGreenPaper[MinistryofFinance,2009]).Forexample,inPNG,despitecleartenure,customarylandownersgainlittleprofitfromtheextractionoftimber,duetothetermsoftimberextractionbetweenlandowners,thestateandcontractors,wherebythepricepaidtolandownersfortimberisfixed,regardlessofincreasesinthemarketprice.InIndonesia,privatesectorprojectdevelopers are lobbying to influence the contentofnationalpolicyaround the settingofbenefit sharing rules, arguing thatprojectdevelopersrequireadequatecompensationtocovertheimplementationandtransactioncoststheyareincurringasaresultofREDD+readinessactivities.InTanzania,allREDD+projectproponentsareNGOsandthelevelofrentthatcould,orshould,accruetothemhasnotbeendebatedatthenationallevel.However,itisakeyissuetheyfaceinnegotiatingwithcommunities.

Thisquestionalsoappliestotherightsofgovernmentstoretainsomerevenueto cover any implementation and transaction costs they have incurred.As with revenue gathered from any forest commodity, central and localgovernmentsmight retain revenue for admissible costs, such as setting upMRVandenforcementsystems(IrawanandTacconi2009).TheUN-REDDProgramme (2010) recommends that the amount retained by governmentshouldbeperformance-basedanddirectlyrelatedtothecostsincurred.

ArelatedquestionintheverticalbenefitsharingdebateishowtodistributeREDD+rentortaxesbetweenlevelsofgovernment,includingthedegreetowhichlocalgovernmentsshouldkeeplocallyderivedrevenues.Theprincipleofsubsidiaritysuggeststhatgreaterefficiencyisachievedbylocatingpowersandtasksatthelowestpossibleadministrativelevel(Foellesdal1998),butinthecaseofREDD+,someactivitiesmaybebesthandledatthecentrallevel,e.g.tocontainleakage(IrawanandTacconi2009).

8.4 Negotiating choices and legitimacy of processAcommonconstraintinthecountriesreviewedisalackofclarityaboutwhichisthecompetentagencytomakedecisionsonbenefitsharingarrangements.Insomecases,thislackofclaritystallsthedevelopmentofbenefitsharing

| 149Who should benefit and why?

mechanisms and therefore of REDD+ implementation. For example, inIndonesia,theREDD+benefitsharingregulationdevelopedbytheMinistryofForestryhasbeenchallengedbytheMinistryofFinance,whichcontendsthattheMinistryofForestrydoesnothavethelegalauthoritytomakefiscaldecisions.Atthesametime,theREDD+TaskForceisdevelopingparallelproposals for benefit sharing in connectionwith theNorwegian fundingforREDD+. InTanzania, there are similardebatesoverwhichministrieshave the authority to make decisions about REDD+ implementation.TheDepartmentofEnvironment in theVicePresident’sOfficeholds theauthorityfordecisionmakingconcerningtheimplementationofREDD+,but the implementation of REDD+ projects falls under the Ministry ofNaturalResourcesandTourism(UnitedRepublicofTanzania2010),whiletheMinistryofFinanceisresponsibleformonitoringandensuringrevenuecollection.Atthesametime,theMinistryofLandmakesdecisionsaboutlandownership,titlingandboundariesforvillageforestland(wheremostREDD+projectsarelocated),whilethelocalgovernmentauthorityatthedistrict level has the mandate to approve the land use plans, which arerequiredforestablishingVillageForestReserves.

On the one hand, project level initiatives have the advantage of servingas test cases, yielding innovative lessons for benefit sharingmechanisms,whichcanthenbeincorporatedintonationalpolicies(ashappenedinthecaseoftheSNVprojectinCatTien,Vietnamforexample).Ontheotherhand,projectlevelautonomyrunstheriskofprojectinitiativesdevelopinginparalleltonationalpolicies,possiblyoutsideofthelegitimatedemocraticspace, thus failing tohelp tobuild thecapacityofgovernment structuresandprocesses.

Overcomingthesehazardsrequiresaprocessthatbringslegitimacytoanydecisionsthataremade.Legitimacyisnotonlyafunctionoftheeffectiveness,efficiencyandequityoutcomesofthebenefitsharingsystem,butalsooftheprocesstodesignandimplementthesystem.Legitimacycanbeenhancedby ensuring that decisions about benefit sharing mechanisms are takenbythosewhohavethe legalmandatetodosoandbygivingattentiontoestablishingdueprocesstoensurethatacceptableandaccountabledecisionsaremade.Ourreviewshowsthatsuchaprocessisnoteasyandthat,inmostcountries,themandateandresponsibilityofvariousgovernmentinstitutionsisnotnecessarilyclear.Overcomingthisrequiresallgovernmentandnon-governmentorganisationsthatareinvolvedinthedesignofbenefitsharingpoliciesandmechanismstoplayaroleinresolvingthelackofclarity.Donoragenciesshouldencouragethisclarificationtotakeplaceandshouldworkthroughthemandateddecisionmakingprocessesandinstitutions.NGOsandprivatesectorimplementerscanencouragethisprocessbylobbyingfortheclarificationofrolesandresponsibilities.

Implementing REDD+150 |

8.5 Conclusions and recommendationsWehaveshownthatmanyoftheconflictsoverthevisionofREDD+appeartorelatetothedesignofbenefitsharingmechanismsandthatdesigndecisionsoften involve a tradeoff between the effectiveness, efficiency and equity ofREDD+mechanisms.Thediscourses, ideologies anddefinitions associatedwithbenefitsharingconcernavarietyofobjectives,rangingfromtheneedtoprovidecompensationforcostsincurred,theneedtoensureco-benefits,suchasbiodiversity,andtheneedtorecogniselegalrightsandensurefairoutcomes.The decision to emphasise either effectiveness and efficiency or equity hassignificantimplicationsforthedesignofbenefitsharingmechanisms.

ThismultiplicityofobjectivesisduetothefactthatREDD+itselfishighlyloadedwithexpectationswithregard tooutcomesbeyondcarbonemissionreductions.Managingtheseexpectationsrequiresclarityatboththenationalandproject levels concerning: i) theprimaryobjectiveofREDD+; and ii)thedegreetowhichco-benefitsshouldbeaddressedandcanand/orshouldbepaidforbyREDD+.However,ouranalysisofthestateofplayofbenefitsharingdesignatboth thenational and theproject levels shows that thesefundamentalquestionshaveyet tobe resolved.ManyREDD+projectsareoperating in a vacuum of uncertainty over what form of benefit sharingmechanismswillbeultimatelyclassedas legalandthereforewhat levelandtypeofbenefitswillbeavailabletobeshared.

There isanargument tobemade forurgentattentiontodesigningbenefitsharingmechanismsandthus,intheshortterm,itmightbenecessarytoworkwithintherealityofasuboptimalnationalpolicycontextratherthanwaitingforreformstohappen.Forexample,becausegettinglegalclarityovercarbonrightsmaynotberealisticinthenearfuture,thebenefitsharingmechanismmightneedtorelyoncontractsthatspecifylegalrightsandresponsibilities.However,givingtoomuchattentiontominordetailsofthedesignofbenefitsharingmechanismsbeforefundamentalquestions(suchasthedueprocessformakingdecisions aboutbenefit sharing andwhatbodieshave the legalrighttodoso)areresolvedcanbeproblematic.

Weconcludethatthemajorissuetobeaddressedishowtoensurethelegitimacyof the process for addressing fundamental questions andmaking decisionsabout the design of benefit sharingmechanisms.This requires legal clarityandconsensusabouttheinstitutionwiththepowerstomakesuchdecisionsandattentiontoproceduralrights,suchastransparency,participationandfreepriorandinformedconsent.Therearefewabsoluterightsorwrongsinthedesignofbenefit sharingandthus theresolutionof fundamentalquestionsrequiresmakingethical,politicalandpracticaljudgements.Thesejudgementsconcernquestionssuchaswhoshouldbenefit fromREDD+and legalandconstitutional considerations concerning the right of the state to retain

| 151Who should benefit and why?

revenuefromprivateandnationallyownedgoods.Wesuggest,therefore,thateffectivebenefitsharingmechanismsarenotjustabouthavingclearprinciplesfor design, since these alone cannot hope to satisfy the interests of allstakeholders,but,moreimportantly,abouttheprocessformakingdecisionsondesignandimplementation.

9Chapter

Tenure matters in REDD+Lessons from the field Anne M. Larson, Maria Brockhaus and William D. Sunderlin

• Atthenationallevel,effortstoaddresslandandcarbontenureissueshavebeenlimited,althoughREDD+hasbroughtunprecedentedinternationalattentiontotenureandotherrightsofforestpeoples.

• Project level interventions to address tenure encounter substantialobstaclesiftheydonothavenationalbacking;atthesametime,nationallandregistrationinstitutionsareofteninadequateforeffectivelyaddressingthecentral,underlyingissueofcustomarytenurerights.

• REDD+policymakerscanmoveforwardonmacrolevelapproachesbyattacking the underlying drivers of deforestation, while proceeding inparalleltotargetsolutionstospecifictenureproblems;both,however,arelikelytofaceresistance.

9.1 Challenges to forest tenure reform In many countries, tenure reform goes hand-in-hand with REDD+.Tenure reform processes support REDD+ implementation; at the sametime REDD+ can provide an incentive to push forward tenure reform.Both processes, however, face substantial constraints. The challenges

Implementing REDD+154 |

to forest tenure reform have been discussed extensively in the literature.Sunderlin(2011)brieflytracesthehistoryof localcontrolandcustomaryrights,throughthesuppressionofrightsandtheappropriationofforests,particularlyundercolonialism,tothecurrent‘globalforesttenuretransition’,underwhichmanygovernmentshavebeguntorecognise–tosomeextent–communityclaims.Theformsandextentofrightsrecognitionhasbeenvaried,insomecasesinvolvingthetitlingoflargeindigenousterritories,inothers,landgrantstosmallercommunityforests,whileinthemosttimidreformscommunitieshavereceivednew, temporaryuserights thatareanimprovementonthepastbutarefarfromconstitutingsubstantialreform(Larson et al.2010).

Althoughtherestorationandformalisationofcustomaryrightshavereceivedsubstantial international attention, this shift is not seen in all countries.Evenwherepolicieshavebeenimplemented,theyhaveoftenbeenfraughtwithproblemsandmetwithresistance(Larson2011);andsomecountriesthathavemade significant strides in recognising community forest rightshavetriedtorollbackthesepoliciesmorerecently(RRI2012).

Tenure reforms take time and resources, both for thepolitical process ofnegotiatingcompromisesandpassingnewlawsandforthetechnicalaspects,such as reforming cadastres, and demarcating and titling land. Larson(2011) identifies three types of obstacles to tenure reforms in favour ofindigenousandothercommunitieslivinginforests,correspondinglargelywiththe4IsframeworkintroducedinChapter2:limitedtechnical,humanandeconomiccapacitytocarryoutaccurateandeffectivedemarcationandtitling(Information);politicalandeconomicinterestsofactorscompetingfor forest land and resources, including some state actors (Interests); andideologicalbarriers,suchasoppositionto,orconcernsabout,theideathatforestdwellerscanbeeffective forest stewards (Ideas).Theseobstaclesaredeeplyrootedinnationalinstitutionalstructures(Institutions).

Inspiteoftheseobstacles,therehasbeenunprecedentedattentiontoforesttenureunderREDD+.Businessasusualpressuretoclearforestsisindirectconflict with the awareness that standing forests are crucial for climatechange mitigation (Sunderlin and Atmadja 2009). The cases studied inthischapterdemonstratebothlargeleapsand,morecommonly,smallstepsforward in the recognitionof forest tenure rights. Inall cases there is farmoretobedone.

Thischapterassesses theexperienceso far inaddressingtenurechallengesat national and project levels and considersways forward for tenure andREDD+.Whataretheprimarytenureproblemsfacedineachcountryandto what extent are these recognised and addressed at the national level?How are REDD+ project interventions resolving tenure problems, and

| 155Tenure matters in REDD+

whatare theobstacles todoingso?Pastresearchonforest tenurereformsdemonstrates thateven if localrightsarerecognisedby law,theabilitytoexercisethoserightsisoftenchallengedbycompetingactorsandinterests.Given these difficulties, how canREDD+move forward on policies andinterventionsthatworkforbothforestsandlocalpeople?

The research findings presented here are drawn from CIFOR’s GlobalComparativeStudy(GCS)onREDD+,focusingonthesixcountriesstudiedat both national and project levels (see Appendix for a full description ofmethods).Thoseare:Brazil,Cameroon, Indonesia,TanzaniaandVietnam;nationalscaledataareavailableforPeru,butprojectlevelinformationisonlypreliminary.

9.2 Why tenure matters for REDD+ Clearandsecuretenurerightstoland,forestsandcarbonhavebeenidentifiedaskeyelements forsuccessfulREDD+strategies (seeFigure9.1).Ontheonehand,clarifying1andstrengtheningtenurecan,initself,contributetodecreasingdeforestationanddegradation.Manyresearchershavefoundthat

1 Simply ‘clarifying’ rights in light of REDD+, without taking into accountcustomaryrightsandissuesofsocialjustice,couldhaveseriousequityimplications.Inourresearchsites,however,mostprojectproponentshaveajusticeorientedagenda.

Tenure reforms• clarify holders of rights

and obligations• secure customary rights

Pathways• increase legitimacy of

REDD+• effective challenge to

’business as usual’

Pathways• decrease open access• increase incentive for

long term investment• increase exclusion

rights and capacity

Increased scope, equity and effectiveness of REDD policies

Reduced deforestation and degradation

Figure 9.1 Tenure reform pathways to reducing deforestation and degradation

Implementing REDD+156 |

tenure insecurity commonly fosters forest clearing, open access dynamicsandlandgrabbingandhaveargued,therefore,thatsecurelandtenurerightsaremorelikelytoleadtoforestconservationandlong-terminvestmentinforests.Forexample,farmershaveoftenclearedforeststoestablishrights–sometimesasrequiredbylaw,butcommonlyforcustomaryclaimsaswell.Wherelong-termrightsarenotsecure,theriskofinvestinginslow-growingproductsliketimberistoohigh;andtheestablishmentofclearborderswiththerightandabilitytoexcludeoutsidersreducesincursionsandoverlappingclaims. In some cases, however, insecurity has been associated withconservation(duetothefearoflosinginvestments)andsecurerightsbynomeansguaranteethatlandholderswillnotclearforestsformoreprofitablealternatives(Angelsen2007).Nonetheless,securetenuregenerallyappearstobebetterforforeststhaninsecuretenure,althoughonitsown,itmaybeinsufficienttoguaranteebetterforestmanagement.

Clarifyingtenure,andsecuringrightsforforest-basedpeople,alsoincreasestheviabilityofREDD+policiesandassuresgreaterequity,effectivenessandefficiency.SpecificpoliciesthatsupportREDD+includethosethatreduceagriculturalrent,increaseforestrent,andcreateorregulateprotectedareas,as well as cross-cutting policies such as decentralisation or governancereforms (Angelsen 2009b; Angelsen 2010b). Not every policy requiresattention to tenure. For example, creating off-farm opportunities andsupporting agricultural intensification in key locationswhile abandoningnew road construction in forests could slow forest colonisation and evenstimulateout-migrationfromforests.Thiscouldbesignificantforforestsifmigrationofsmallandmediumproducersisthemaincauseofdeforestationanddegradation.

Addressingtenuresubstantiallyincreasestheoptionsavailable.Theseincludeotherpoliciestoreduceagriculturalrents,suchasestablishingroadsinforestswith strict regulations; or policies to increase forest rents, such as betterprices for forest products, community forestmanagement or payment forenvironmentalservicesschemes.Protectedarearegulationrequiresclarityandenforcementofborders.

Disregarding tenure limits the scope and potential of REDD+, placesforest-based people at risk and may engender such opposition that itguaranteesfailure(LarsonandPetkova2011).Thepotentialrisksoflandgrabbingbyoutsidersandlossoflocaluserrightstoforestsandforestlandisoneofthemain(thoughnotonly)reasonsthatmanyindigenousandotherlocalpeopleshavepubliclythreatenedtoopposeREDD+,bringingsubstantialinternationalattentiontotheseconcernsunderthebanner“Norights,noREDD”(Tauli-Corpuzet al.2009;Box9.1).Theimplicationsof tenure forREDD+canbe summarisedas follows (seealsoSunderlinet al.2011):

| 157Tenure matters in REDD+

Effectiveness • TheessenceofREDD+istorewardthosewhomaintainorenhancethe

carbonsequestrationofforestsandcompensatethemforlostopportunities;thiscouldincludedirectpaymentschemestolandholders,whichwouldrequireaclearrightholderwhohasrightstoexcludeothers(seeBörneret al.2010).

• Theholders of rights to forest carbonmust beheld accountable in theevent that they fail to fulfil their obligation – the ‘conditional’ part ofconditionalincentives.

Efficiency • Clear tenure rights reduce transaction costs, such as time and funds

requiredforconflictresolution.• Secure tenure rights increase the policy options available, and thereby

enablegovernmentsandprojectproponentstochoosemorecosteffectiveimplementationstrategies.

Equity • Whentenureisunclearornotformalised,forestpeoplemaybeexcluded

fromforestsand/orfromparticipationinREDD+benefits;inparticular,ifREDD+increasesthevalueofstandingforests,itmayleadtoaresourcerushthatplacestherightsofcurrentresidentsatrisk.

• REDD+ will inevitably prohibit certain uses of forest resources; thismustbedonewithdueprocessandcompensation,andwithoutincreasedhardship,forpoorforestpeoples.

Box 9.1 Papua New Guinea: Customary rights versus carbon cowboys Andrea Babon and Daniel McIntyre

Papua New Guinea is unique among REDD+ countries as around 97% of its land area, and virtually all of its forest, is owned by customary landowners and regulated by custom, not by the state. Customary land ownership is enshrined in the Constitution; and customary landowners must be consulted and give their informed consent for any developments on their land. Indeed, landowners can veto any developments of which they disapprove. With reference to the ‘bundle of rights’, customary landowners have rights of access, use, management, and exclusion. However, customary land cannot be ‘sold’.

The seemingly strong de jure tenure rights in Papua New Guinea make the country an interesting case study for REDD+. In many ways, landowners

continued on next page

Implementing REDD+158 |

in Papua New Guinea are in an extremely powerful position, as resource owners, to participate in REDD+ on their own terms. However, in practice, many landowners are not aware of their rights – leaving them vulnerable to exploitation. This has perhaps been most obvious in the granting and renewal of logging concessions, and the recent increase in the granting of Special Agriculture and Business Leases (SABLs) over vast areas of land. REDD+ is proving to be no different.

In 2008–2009, media reports began to emerge of landowners signing over carbon rights to so-called ‘carbon cowboys’ – unscrupulous local agents often working for foreign carbon project developers – with virtually no awareness of what they were doing and no legal framework within which to do it. At one stage, one of the most notorious ‘carbon cowboys’ claimed to have negotiated about 90 different carbon deals with landowners, despite the absence of a national REDD+ strategy.

The government of Papua New Guinea tried to control this ‘carbon rush’ by requiring any groups interested in carbon trading to have written authority to operate in the country and to be registered with the Office of Climate Change. The government also urged landowners not to sign up to any carbon deals with outside project developers until there was a policy and legal framework in place, and that there would be no legal recourse for landowners who did.

The confusion and scandal surrounding the ‘carbon cowboys’ highlighted the need for general awareness raising and information on REDD+ for landowners. In response, the government and NGOs have held a number of provincial consultation meetings and disseminated information through various media. However, it has been difficult to get information out to remote communities that were often the target of carbon project developers.

Negative attention from the international media, combined with pressure from NGOs and donors, appears to have brought substantial attention to the challenges of achieving effective, efficient and equitable REDD+ within the context of customary land tenure. The ‘carbon cowboys’ have largely disappeared from the REDD+ landscape in Papua New Guinea, and the contracts they signed are generally seen as having no validity. However, stakeholders continue to grapple with how best to engage landowners in REDD+ policy design and implementation; secure free, prior and informed consent; and ensure landowners receive meaningful benefits. Working through all these issues will take time if it is to be done effectively – something the ‘carbon cowboys’ failed to understand.

Box 9.1 continued

| 159Tenure matters in REDD+

9.3 REDD+ and tenure: Evidence from the field Infiveofthesixcountriesstudied,forestsareprimarilypublicandformallyadministered by the state (Table 9.1).The exception isBrazil,where 73%of forestswere owned2 by individuals, firms, communities and indigenouspeoplein2008;officialdatashowashiftofalmost200millionhectaresfrompublictoprivatehandsbetween2002and2008(Sunderlinet al.2008).Theothercountrieshavefarlessprivateland.Infiveofthesixcountries,aportionof public land has been assigned for temporary use by communities andindigenouspeople,aswellastoindividualsinBrazil.

9.3.1 National level problems and policy Researchatthenationallevelidentifiedseriousproblemswithlandtenureinallofthecountriesstudied(Table9.2).Commonissuesincludeoverlappingtitlesorclaims,landgrabbingandelitecapture,andoutdatedornonexistentlandcadastres,amongothers.Inparticular,inCameroon,Indonesia,Tanzania,Vietnam,andtosomedegreeinPeru,thereisasubstantialdifferencebetween

2 ‘Ownership’accordingtoRRIandinthisresearchincludestitledlandsandthosegrantedunconditionallythroughsecuremechanismsotherthantitles(seeSunderlinet al.2008).

Table 9.1 Forest tenure distribution (2008 data, in millions of hectares)

Country Public (millions of ha, %) Private (millions of ha, %)

Administered by government

Designated for use by communities and indigenous people

Owned by communities and indigenous people

Owned by individuals and firms

Brazil* 88.6 (21%) 25.6 (6%) 109.1 (26%) 198.0 (47%)

Peru 42.3 (67%) 2.9 (5%) 12.6 (20%) 5.3 (8%)

Cameroon 20.1 (95%) 1.1 (5%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%)

Tanzania 31.8 (89%) 1.6 (4%) 2.1 (6%) 0.1 (0%)

Indonesia 121.9 (98%) 0.2 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 1.7 (1%)

Vietnam 9.7 (73%) 0.0 (0%) 3.5 (26%) 0.1 (0%)

Source: Sunderlin et al. 2008, except for Vietnam (Dahal et al. 2011)

*Other sources have found that 24% of the Brazilian Amazon is unclassified public land and 13% comprises land settlement projects for individual landholders (Börner et al. 2010).

Implementing REDD+160 |

whatlocalpeopleviewastheircustomaryrightsandtheirformalrightsfromthestate’sperspective.Manyproblemsforpeopleandcommunitieslivinginandnear forests stem from the senseof insecurity generatedby thepublicnatureoflandandforestownership.

Despite the apparent importance of forest tenure, research so far suggeststhatthereislittlereasontobelieveREDD+strategiesaremakingsignificantchangestothestatusquo.Analysisbasedonaprofilingexerciseinthecountriesdiscussedhereshowsfewimportantnewtenureinitiativesinrelationtotheproblemsidentified.Although90%ofREDD+PreparationProposals(RPPs)and National Programs from UNREDD highlight tenure insecurity as aconcern(WhiteandHatcher2012),andalthoughtenurewasapopulartopicduring the stakeholder interviews conducted for the country profiles, thedebateremainsatarhetoricallevel(seealsoWilliamset al.2011).Thepolicymeasures listed inTable9.2mostoften refer topolicies thatarealready inplaceandareinsufficienttosolvetheproblem,orinsomecasesareasourceofothertenureproblems.Forexample,existinglandallocationandregistrationinitiativeshavesometimesgeneratedinsecurityasaresultofalackoftechnicalcapacityandfinancial resources, inconsistentrulesandprocedures,andthefailureto‘match’thepolicywithon-the-groundreality.

Among the cases, Brazil is clearly an exception.TheBrazilian governmentlaunched an important land regularisation (allocation and registration)programmethatlinkslandtenurereformandenvironmentalcomplianceintheAmazon.Ithasalsorecognisedanddelineatedcustomarylands,andthisprocesscontinues,althoughitisslowandproblematic.Theothercountrieshave at best taken small steps. In Vietnam, the Forest Land Allocation(FLA)processhasreceivedmixedreviews(Phamet al.2012)andisfarfromrecognising customary rights (Box 9.2). The same is true for communityforests inCameroon.Arecent,high levelcall forrecognitionofcustomaryrightstoforestsinIndonesiaisunprecedented,butitisfarfromclearwhatthiswillmeaninpractice.

Box 9.2 Myth and reality: Security of forest rights in Vietnam Thu Thuy Pham, Thu-Ba Huynh and Moira Moeliono

The forest land tenure system in Vietnam is mainly governed by the Land Law (1993, 2003) and Law of Forest Protection and Development (2004). The Land Law provides farming families with stable and long-term rights: 20 years for land planted with annual crops, and 50 years for perennials. According to the law, the land and natural resources belong to the ‘people’ as a whole and are managed by the ‘state’ on their behalf. The state, therefore, has exclusive management and decision making rights over natural forest; it then

| 161Tenure matters in REDD+

allocates use rights to the people. Since 1999 (Decree 163), land use rights, issued through a land use certificate called a Red Book, can be transferred, mortgaged, rented, exchanged, or inherited and are valid for 50 years.

In 2004, the Forest Protection and Development Law was passed, granting forest users management rights over the forest, as well as the right to generate income and other benefits from their labour and investments in forest land. A key highlight of this law is the state’s recognition of the role and rights of communities as one type of forest land manager.

These laws provide an important legal foundation for the future implementation of REDD+. Nevertheless, two major issues have emerged that need attention from decision makers and REDD+ strategists.

First, more than 50% of the country’s forests and often the highest-quality forests are managed by state companies (SFEs) and management boards, whereas households manage 18% and communities only 1%, of mostly poorer-quality and degraded forests (Hoang et al. 2010). Although SFEs are required to contract forest land under their control to third parties for long-term use or protection, in practice they often contract third parties on an annual basis. Furthermore, it is almost impossible for communities to enter into legal contracts due to the excessive requirements under Vietnam’s 2005 Civil Code for establishing their legal status. In effect, then, communities cannot sign REDD+ contracts. This means that future REDD+ funds might be retained at the government level, with only very limited payments and carbon benefits accruing to the households and communities who are the actual forest managers.

Second, experience from implementation of the Land Law and Forest Protection and Development Law, as well as other national programmes such as Forest Land Allocation (FLA), shows mixed results. In some places these programmes have had a positive effect on poor farmers, while the overall impact is unclear. Households and communities still do not control their forests, as they still need to seek permission from the relevant agencies to use forest land or fell trees. Moreover, three problems interfere with customary and even recognised owners and might in fact create open access conditions: i) the gap between national law and traditional land use practices, ii) capital accumulation for households that have access to political power and social networks, and iii) poor enforcement of regulations affecting the effectiveness of the FLA. Allocated forest land is often infertile and, in the absence of financial and technical support from the government, lands are often simply abandoned. More seriously, land classified by the government as ‘unused’ is in fact under customary tenure, which is not formally recognised by law. FLA does not permit joint ownership at the household and community levels, which limits the rights of women and undermines upland production systems that are based on joint property approaches.

Implementing REDD+162 |

Tab

le 9

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rig

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cust

omar

y cl

aim

s

•C

onfli

ctin

g cl

aim

s

•N

egot

iatio

n w

ith g

over

nmen

t at

all

leve

ls

•Va

riety

of m

echa

nism

s to

p

rovi

de v

illag

e co

mm

uniti

es

with

cle

ar te

nure

•N

egot

iatio

n w

ith c

once

ssio

n ho

lder

s

•La

nd u

se p

lann

ing

| 163Tenure matters in REDD+

Vie

tnam

•G

ap b

etw

een

natio

nal a

nd

cust

omar

y la

ws,

cus

tom

ary

tenu

re n

ot re

cogn

ised

•O

verl

aps

bet

wee

n in

dige

nous

an

d co

loni

st la

nd c

laim

s

•La

ck o

f hum

an a

nd fi

nanc

ial

reso

urce

s fo

r for

est l

and

allo

catio

n (F

LA)

•Te

chno

logi

cal p

rob

lem

s le

adin

g to

inac

cura

te m

aps

•In

equi

ty in

fore

st a

lloca

tion;

la

nd g

rab

bin

g

•Li

mite

d un

ders

tand

ing

by

fore

st u

sers

of r

ight

s an

d re

spon

sib

ilitie

s as

soci

ated

w

ith F

LA

•Fo

rest

Lan

d A

lloca

tion

(FLA

) pro

cess

(sin

ce 1

983)

to

allo

cate

land

use

rs u

p

to 3

0 ha

of f

ores

t lan

d in

p

rodu

ctio

n an

d p

rote

ctio

n fo

rest

s fo

r up

to 5

0 ye

ars

•La

nd L

aw 2

003

•U

pco

min

g N

atio

nal F

ores

t In

vent

ory

•C

onfli

ctin

g co

mm

unit

y ve

rsus

hou

seho

ld fo

rest

m

anag

emen

t

•N

otab

le d

iscr

epan

cy b

etw

een

loca

l peo

ple

’s p

erce

ptio

ns/

cust

omar

y rig

hts

and

the

gove

rnm

ent’s

per

cep

tions

•U

ncle

ar la

nd b

ound

arie

s

•A

mb

iguo

us la

nd ri

ghts

and

la

ck o

f und

erst

andi

ng o

f the

m

eani

ng o

f Red

Boo

k tit

les

•Br

eakd

own

of tr

aditi

onal

liv

ing

styl

es in

fluen

cing

land

te

nure

arr

ange

men

ts

•Es

tab

lishm

ent o

f a te

chni

cal

wor

king

gro

up o

n la

nd is

sues

at

pro

vinc

ial a

nd d

istr

ict

leve

ls

•Lo

cal f

und

on p

artic

ipat

ory

fore

st m

anag

emen

t will

di

scus

s ho

w to

dis

trib

ute

pay

men

t

•Ex

plo

ring

mec

hani

sms

to te

st

how

to in

tegr

ate

tenu

re a

nd

carb

on

•C

ontr

ibut

ions

to la

nd u

se

pla

nnin

g at

com

mun

e an

d di

stric

t lev

els

Tan

zan

ia •

Gov

ernm

ent i

nter

pre

ts fo

rmal

la

nd c

ateg

orie

s in

suc

h a

way

th

at it

ow

ns m

uch

of v

illag

e la

nd

•C

onfli

cts

bet

wee

n fa

rmer

s an

d p

asto

ralis

ts

•C

onfli

cts

over

evi

ctio

ns o

f p

asto

ralis

ts fo

r env

ironm

enta

l p

urp

oses

•C

onte

sted

and

ove

rlap

pin

g te

nure

regi

mes

and

risk

of

elite

cap

ture

•Vi

llage

Lan

d A

ct (1

999)

re

cogn

isin

g cu

stom

ary

tenu

re w

heth

er o

r not

land

is

regi

ster

ed

•D

raft

nat

iona

l RED

D+

str

ateg

y cl

assi

fyin

g vi

llage

land

as

stat

e la

nd (‘

gene

ral l

and

’) if

not r

egis

tere

d

•C

arb

on ri

ghts

not

add

ress

ed

at n

atio

nal l

evel

•Vi

llage

land

cla

ssifi

ed a

s ge

nera

l lan

d, la

ck o

f lan

d ce

rtifi

cate

s

•Bo

unda

ry d

isp

utes

am

ong

villa

ges

•U

ncle

ar o

r ins

ecur

e in

divi

dual

rig

hts

•Sh

ort o

r unc

lear

tim

e fr

ame

for m

anag

emen

t rig

hts

•Bo

rder

cla

rifica

tion

•In

pro

cess

of o

bta

inin

g vi

llage

la

nd c

ertifi

cate

s

•Se

ekin

g to

mod

ify

Com

mun

ity

Fore

st

Man

agem

ent (

CFM

) tem

pla

te

from

5 to

20

year

s

•(L

ittle

att

entio

n to

indi

vidu

al

clai

ms)

cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

Implementing REDD+164 |

Co

un

try

Nat

ion

al te

nu

re p

rob

lem

s N

atio

nal

po

licie

sPr

oje

ct le

vel p

rob

lem

s Pr

oje

ct le

vel i

nit

iati

ves

Cam

eroo

n •

Con

flict

bet

wee

n cu

stom

ary

and

form

al la

w; f

orm

al la

w

limits

loca

l rig

hts

to u

se ri

ghts

•C

omm

unit

y fo

rest

ry

rep

rese

nts

an a

ttem

pt t

o m

ake

a fo

rmal

link

bet

wee

n co

mm

uniti

es a

nd fo

rest

s w

ithou

t rec

ogni

sing

cu

stom

ary

clai

ms

•O

nly

the

elite

hav

e th

e m

eans

to

regi

ster

land

, whi

ch is

the

only

form

ally

reco

gnis

ed

owne

rshi

p ri

ght

•Zo

ning

has

resu

lted

in

cons

tant

con

flict

am

ong

stak

ehol

ders

•St

ate

auth

oris

es o

verl

app

ing

right

s an

d ob

ligat

ions

am

ong

sect

ors

(fore

st, t

enur

e,

min

ing,

wat

er, e

tc.)

•Fo

rest

pol

icy

refo

rm p

roce

ss

beg

un in

199

3, in

clud

ing

the

crea

tion

of c

omm

unit

y fo

rest

s

•Fo

rest

law

refo

rm p

roce

ss

unde

rway

•C

onsu

ltat

ions

with

st

akeh

olde

rs o

n la

nd u

se

incl

udin

g b

ound

ary

defin

ition

•Sh

ift fr

om a

d ho

c p

rogr

amm

es to

pos

sib

le

natio

nal p

olic

y on

m

argi

nalis

ed p

opul

atio

ns

•N

o gu

aran

tee

of c

arb

on ri

ghts

on

cus

tom

ary

land

•M

ism

atch

bet

wee

n st

atut

ory

com

mun

ity

fore

st a

nd

cust

omar

y rig

hts

lead

ing

to

confl

ict

•Ba

ntu

trad

ition

al c

laim

s an

d in

curs

ions

•Te

nuou

s na

ture

of c

omm

unit

y fo

rest

righ

ts

•Bo

rder

con

flict

s w

ith n

atio

nal

par

k

•C

onfli

cts

bet

wee

n in

dige

nous

an

d m

igra

nt p

opul

atio

ns

•H

elp

ing

com

mun

ity

deve

lop

com

mun

ity

fore

st

man

agem

ent p

lan

and

stre

ngth

en lo

cal i

nstit

utio

ns

•Im

ple

men

ting

a te

nure

st

rate

gy w

ith s

take

hold

ers

cons

iste

nt w

ith n

atio

nal

pol

icy

•Su

pp

ortin

g at

tem

pts

to

imp

rove

com

mun

ity

right

s to

fo

rest

s (r

evis

ion

of th

e fo

rest

la

w)

Tab

le 9

.2 c

ontin

ued

| 165Tenure matters in REDD+

Peru

•N

ativ

e p

eop

les

have

alie

nab

le

land

righ

ts ra

ther

than

b

road

er in

alie

nab

le te

rrito

ry

right

s

•O

verl

app

ing

title

s an

d la

ck o

f la

nd c

adas

tre

•St

ate

auth

oris

es o

verl

app

ing

right

s an

d ob

ligat

ions

am

ong

sect

ors

(fore

st, t

enur

e,

min

ing,

wat

er, e

tc)

•Re

serv

es a

nd o

ther

fore

st

cate

gorie

s de

clar

ed o

n p

aper

b

ut w

ithou

t defi

ned

bor

ders

•N

ew L

aw o

f For

ests

and

W

ildlif

e ap

pro

ved

and

awai

ting

imp

lem

entin

g re

gula

tions

•N

o le

gal w

ay to

ob

tain

righ

ts

in p

rote

cted

are

a

•Fe

w o

r no

excl

usio

n rig

hts

•Po

sses

sion

con

trac

t is

tem

por

ary

and

easi

ly

reve

rsib

le

•O

verl

app

ing

conc

essi

ons

by

diff

eren

t gov

ernm

ent o

ffice

s

•D

emar

catin

g an

d re

gist

erin

g co

nces

sion

are

as

Sour

ces:

Aw

ono

(201

1),

Dka

mel

a (2

011)

, D

okke

n et

al.

(201

1),

Duc

helle

et

al. (

2011

b),

Indr

arto

et

al. (

2012

), Ja

mb

iya

et a

l. (2

011)

, M

ay e

t al

. (2

011b

), Ph

am e

t al

. (2

012)

, D

AR

and

CIF

OR

(201

2), R

esos

udar

mo

et a

l. (2

011)

, Sun

derl

in e

t al

. (2

011)

; GC

S RE

DD

+ C

omp

onen

t 1

Wor

ksho

p a

nd L

earn

ing

Even

t Re

por

t A

pril

12-

14, 2

011,

GC

S RE

DD

+

Com

pon

ent 2

Mee

ting

Barc

elon

a Fe

bru

ary

8-10

, 201

2 (p

rese

ntat

ions

), Pr

opon

ent a

pp

rais

al, p

rop

onen

t sur

vey

on p

artic

ipat

ion

and

tenu

re.

Implementing REDD+166 |

Governance and tenure issues are largely absent fromREDD+coverage innational media in most of the researched countries. An analysis of morethan500nationalnewspaper articlesonREDD+publishedbetween2005and2009infiveofthesixcountries(dataonTanzaniaarenotyetavailable)demonstratesthatgovernanceissuesdidnotfeatureprominentlyinthewaymedia articles were framed in any of the countries (Figure 9.2).3 A closerlookatsubtopicsrelatedspecificallytotenurereformandcarbonrightsunderthemetatopic‘Politicsandpolicymaking’confirmedtheirabsence.OnlyinIndonesiaandBrazilweremediaarticlesexplicitlyframedaroundtheseissues:inBrazil,in11articlesthesubtopic‘REDD+andindigenousrightspolicies’wasadvocatedbyrepresentativesofrightsorganisationsandsubnationalstateactors;inIndonesiaonearticleusedthisframeaswellandwasadvocatedbyaninternationalresearchorganisation,whileasecondarticlewasconcernedwith the establishment of carbon rights and was supported by a nationallevelgovernmentactor.Preliminaryanalysisofarticles from2010–2011 inIndonesia,VietnamandPerushownosignificantchanges.

3 Amediaframeis“abroadorganizingthemeforselecting,emphasizing,andlinkingtheelementsofastorysuchasthescenes,thecharacters,theiractions,andsupportingdocumentation”(Bennett1996,ascitedinBoykoff2008:555).Inpracticeaframeisaconceptuallensthatbringscertainaspectsofrealityintosharperfocus(emphasisingaparticularwaytounderstandanissue)whilerelegatingotherstothebackground.

%

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Governance

context

Civil socie

ty

Ecology

Economics

and markets

Science

Politics

and policy m

akingOth

er

Culture

Brazil

Peru

Cameroon

Indonesia

Vietnam

Figure 9.2 Meta topics in national media articles (percentage of total analysed newspaper articles per country)

| 167Tenure matters in REDD+

Nevertheless, by examining individual position statements by advocates oradversarieswhorespondedtotheissuesframedinthesearticles,weidentifieda number of stances related to governance. In Indonesia, Brazil and Peru,actors stated thatREDD+will requiremajor governance and institutionalreform.InIndonesiamorethan10%ofallpositionsexpressed(27of258)demonstratedconcernthatREDD+risksdispossessingorreducingaccesstoforest resourcesandharmingtraditional forestusers (seeChapter5).Thesepreliminaryfindingsindicatethatalthougharticlesarerarelyframedaroundtheseconcerns,anumberofactorspositionthemselvesaroundthem.

The organisations that are concerned about tenure aremainly actors frominternational environmental nongovernmental organisations and domesticcivil society organisations. An actor-level analysis showed, however, thatneither of these groups is perceived by other actors in the policy arena asinfluential in most of the national policy networks, where Ministries ofForestryandotherstateentitiesareatthecentreofdecisionmaking.

9.3.2 Project level tenure TheGCSresearchassessedtenureproblemsattheprojectandvillagelevelsthrough interviewswithproponents, andvillage level interviews and focusgroups.Proponentsreportedonthemaintenurechallengesattheirsites,andvillagefocusgroupswereaskedaboutlandtenureconflictandinsecurity,thepresenceofexternalforestusersandthedegreeofrulecompliance,regardingtheirvillagespecifically.

MostofthelandintheREDD+projectresearchsitesisformallyownedbythestate.InIndonesia,CameroonandPeru,thevastmajorityoflandinthevillages studied is owned and administered by the government but underthede factocontrolofhouseholdsandvillages.InIndonesia,problemsstemfrom overlapping claims, including abandoned logging concessions, small-scale loggers, and larger oil palm,mining and logging interests.Oil palminterests threaten a number of project sites. One site each in Cameroonand Peru is located in a protected area where legal land rights are notpermitted for local people.The other site inCameroon is focusing on anareadesignatedascommunityforest(CF).Tenureissuesincludetheinsecurenatureofcommunityrights(renewableevery5years),overlappingclaimsandconflictsbetweenvillagememberswhofallinandoutsidetheCFarea.UsersinthesecondsiteinPeruhavea40-yearconcessioncontractforBrazilnutproduction.Governmentpolicyisasourceofconflict,asdifferentgovernmentagenciesgiveoutoverlappingconcessionsforthesameforestareatodifferentstakeholders(Selayapersonalcommunication).

InBrazil,almostallofthelandsinthestudyvillagesarestatelandsformallyassignedtoindividualswhoresideinlandreformsettlementprojectsoroccupy

Implementing REDD+168 |

unclassifiedpubliclands.Twooftheprojectsitesareinareaswithahistoryofseriouslandandresourceconflicts,butsettlementandregistrationprojectshavebeenunderwayforseveralyears.Inthethirdsite,regularisationisanewactivityunderREDD+readinessprogrammes.Whiletherearestillconflicts,overlappingclaimsandhouseholdswithoutformalrightsortitle,thecentraltenure-related problems revolve around the logistics of regularisation – aprocessthatiscostly,slow,bureaucraticandsometimesfailstorespectexistingcustomaryorlocallylegitimateclaims(Duchelleet al.2011b).

InVietnam,inthefourvillagesstudiedatoneprojectsite,mostforestshavebeengrantedto individuals through landcertificatesknownasRedBooks.Thesecertificateshavegeneratedproblems,asrightholdersdonotunderstandtheirlimitations.Thereisanimportantillegallandmarketandproblemswithunclearboundaries(Huynh,personalcommunication).Customarylandrightsarestrong,buttherearesignificantdifferencesbetweenthegovernment’sandvillagers’perceptionsandunderstanding.

In Tanzania, REDD+ projects are being developed in areas where animportant portion of the land is in the process of being assigned to oris owned by communities (see Box 9.3).Tenure problems at the projectsitesstemprimarilyfromthelackofformalvillagelandcertificatesintheassigned lands, which leaves lands formally under state ownership, andborderdisputes.

Tables 9.3 and 9.4 summarise the results of village-level focus groupson questions about tenure clarity and security. These questions were notaskedinrelationtoREDD+ortheproject interventionbutwereaimedataddressing the overall tenure situation prior to the intervention.Table 9.3shows responseson thepresenceof land conflict, perceptionsof insecurityand forest rule complianceby villagers.Thepresenceof conflict isnotableespeciallyinthestudysitesinCameroon(83%),Indonesia(55%)andBrazil(44%),althoughanimportantportionofvillagesinTanzaniaalsohavelandsinconflict(24%).Adirectquestionaboutinsecurityfoundproblemsinevenmoreof thevillagesstudied,rangingfrom100%inCameroon,to85%inIndonesia,50%inBraziland32%inTanzania.OnlyinVietnamwastherenoreportatthevillagelevelofeitherconflictorinsecurity.Compliancewithforestuseruleswasproblematicatthestudyvillagesinallcountries,however,withVietnamreportinglowormoderaterulecompliancein100%ofvillages,Brazilin75%ofvillagesandtheotherthreecountriesin50–55%.

Table9.4addressesexclusionrights–therightandabilitytoexcludeunwantedoutsideforestusers.Interestingly,almostallofthevillagesreporthavingtherighttoexcludeoutsiders fromtheir land(88–100%).What isparticularlynotable,however, isthat inBrazil,Cameroon,TanzaniaandIndonesia,thevastmajorityofvillagesstatedthatthebasisofthatrightwascustom,whereas

| 169Tenure matters in REDD+

Box 9.3 Participatory forest management as an institutional foundation for REDD+ in Tanzania Therese Dokken

Since the 1990s, Tanzania has promoted Participatory Forest Management (PFM) as a strategy for conservation and sustainable management of their forests. By 2006 approximately one-tenth of the forested land was under PFM agreement. In the Tanzania National Strategy, PFM is identified as an institutional foundation for REDD+, and access to REDD+ finances can potentially facilitate and speed up its implementation.

The main objectives of PFM are to improve rural livelihoods, conserve and regenerate forest resources, and promote good governance. There are two different approaches to PFM that differ in the level of decentralisation of rights and responsibility. The first approach is community based forest management (CBFM). CBFM takes place on land which is registered under the Village Land Act (1999) and is managed by the village council. The village has the full ownership rights and management responsibility and retains all forest-generated revenue. The second approach is a collaborative management approach, called joint forest management (JFM). It takes place on national or local government forest reserves. Land ownership remains with the state while forest management responsibility and revenues are divided between the state and the community and formalised through a JFM agreement.

Evaluations indicate that both PFM approaches contribute to improved forest management, but CBFM appears to be more effective than JFM (Blomley et al. 2011). Property rights are exclusive and enforceable, providing incentives for communities to invest in long-term management. In contrast, under JFM rights are unclear and local use and harvest of forest products is highly restricted. The same is true for the benefit sharing mechanisms and equity aspect of the two PFM approaches. While all benefits are transferred to the community under CBFM, there is no agreement on the portion of forest management benefits that should be transferred to communities involved in JFM. Both effectiveness and equity are important considerations for choosing which PFM strategy to pursue under REDD+ projects. Improvements and clarifications of tenure and benefit sharing mechanisms are needed, particularly under JFM, to ensure sufficient incentives for sustainable forest management.

only6–20%ofvillagesinthesecountriesstatedthattherightwasbasedinformallaw.4Again,incontrast,thevillagesinVietnamallemphasisedtheirformalrights.

4 Thesequestionswereaskedwiththeenumeratorreadingtheoptions,andmorethanoneanswerwaspermitted.

Implementing REDD+170 |

ThelastthreequestionsinTable9.4refertotheactualpresenceofexternalusers, whether that use is prohibited, and whether unsuccessful attemptshavebeenmade toexcludeexternalusers.Thereare externalusers in44%(Tanzania)to90%(Indonesia)ofvillagesstudied.ExternaluseisprohibitedinmostorallcasesinTanzaniaandCameroon,andinabouthalfinBrazil.Inaddition,thefactthatsomeusershave‘permission’doesnotnecessarilymeantheyhavethevillage’spermission.Forexample,thoughonly28%ofvillagesin Indonesia report that the external use is prohibited, in the other 72%,seasonalandcustomaryusersarelikelytohavepermissionfromthevillage,whileplantations,agroindustrialfirmsandloggingconcessionsaremorelikelytohavepermission fromanofficeofgovernmentbutnot from thevillage.Finally, somevillages in eachcountry, exceptVietnam,haveunsuccessfullytried to excludeoutsideusers (16–19% inBrazil,CameroonandTanzaniaand40%inIndonesia).

9.3.3 Project level solutions Virtuallyallprojectproponentsidentifiedtenureproblemsattheirsitesandsee their resolution as central for moving forward with REDD+ projects(Table9.2).Theytookearlyactionstoidentifythesourcesofinsecurityandconflict,andtoaddressthecauseswherepossible;bysecuringlandtitlesforlocalstakeholderswherethiswasappropriateandpossible;clarifyingvillageandforestboundariesifneeded;andidentifyinganddelimitingtheforestareatobesetaside(Sunderlinet al.2011).Securinglandtenurerightshasoften

Table 9.3 Land conflict, insecurity and local forest rule compliance in sampled villages by country (by number and percent)

Country Villages with an area of land in conflict

Villages with tenure insecurity over at least a portion of village lands

Villages with low or moderate forest rule compliance by villagers

Total number of villages in sample

Brazil 7 (44%) 8 (50%) 12 (75%) 16

Cameroon 5 (83%) 6 (100%) 3 (50%) 6

Tanzania 6 (24%) 8 (32%) 13 (52%) 25

Indonesia 11 (55%) 17 (85%) 11 (55%) 20

Vietnam 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (100%) 4 Note: includes all project sites except Berau, Indonesia and Peru

Source: Sunderlin et al. (2011) and village survey database

| 171Tenure matters in REDD+

Tab

le 9

.4 E

xclu

sion

rig

hts

and

pra

ctic

e in

sam

ple

d v

illag

es b

y co

untr

y (b

y n

umb

er a

nd

per

cent

)

Coun

try

Vill

ages

wit

h

the

rig

ht

to e

xclu

de

outs

ider

s

Bas

is o

f th

e ri

ght

* V

illag

es w

ith

cu

rren

t ext

ern

al

use

of fo

rest

s

Vill

ages

wh

ere

exte

rnal

use

is

pro

hib

ited

(% o

f th

ose

wit

h

curr

ent e

xter

nal

us

e)

Vill

ages

wit

h

unsu

cces

sful

at

tem

pt

to e

xclu

de

exte

rnal

use

rs

Tot

al n

umb

er

of v

illag

es in

sa

mp

le

Cust

om/

cust

omar

y la

wFo

rmal

law

Bra

zil

14 (8

8%)

14 (8

8%)

1 (6

%)

11 (6

9%)

5 (4

5%)

3 (1

9%)

16

Cam

ero

on

6 (1

00%

)6

(100

%)

1 (1

7%)

3 (5

0%)

3 (1

00%

)1

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Implementing REDD+172 |

involvednegotiatingorworkingcloselywithgovernmententities5inchargeofland,andsometimessupportingthoseagenciesthroughtechnicalassistanceorfunding.

Whenexistingmechanismstosecurerightsareinadequate,someproponentshaveplayedanadvocacyrole,suchaslobbyingtoreformthecommunityforestconcessionsinCameroon,whichonlyproviderightsfor5-yearintervals.Afewarepromotingstrategiestoclarifycarbonrights,andinsomecasesalsoadvocatingforvillagerights.Insiteswherethereareimportantoverlappingclaims – such aswith palmoil concessions in Indonesia – proponents aredevoting an important part of their energy on tenure to addressing thesecontradictions.

Onlyabouthalfoftheproponents interviewed(9outof19)weresatisfiedwiththeoutcomeofattemptstoaddresstenureissuesattheirsites,threewereboth satisfied and dissatisfied, and fivewere unsatisfied (two did not haveanopinion).Eventhosewhoweresatisfied,however,statedthatthereisstillmuchmoretobedone.Insomesites,suchasoneinTanzania,theproponentstatedthattheyhadbeenforcedtoexcludesomeareasbecauseproblemswithtenurewerenotresolvable(Sunderlinet al.2011).

9.4 Overcoming obstacles Tenure problems present obstacles for the effectiveness, efficiency andequity outcomes ofREDD+.At the site level, project proponents havealmostallgivenseriousattentiontotenureandsoughttoaddressproblemstothebestoftheirability.Nevertheless,theyarelargelylimitedtoworkingthroughexistinggovernmentbureaucraciesandundertheconstraintsofcurrentpolicies.Hence inmostcasesproponenteffortsarerestrictedbythe lack of serious attention to tenure at the national policy level (seeChapter6).

ThisisnotthecaseinBrazil,wherelandregularisationpre-datesREDD+,but REDD+ has generated additional incentives to move forward withreforms,throughactivitiessuchassupportfortheTerraLegalprogrammeat project sites. Proponents are able towork closelywith government toaddresstenureissues(Duchelleet al.2011b).EveninBrazil,however,theexisting systemof regularisationdoesnot solveallproblemsand in somecasescreatesnewones.

Inmostoftheothercountriesstudied,substantialreformstocurrenttenurepolicyappearunlikely.InVietnam,proposalsforreformofRedBookpolicies

5 Notethatinafewcasestheproponentsaregovernmententities,asinAcre,Brazil.

| 173Tenure matters in REDD+

havemetresistance.Similarly,thereislittleindicationthattheapproachtocustomaryrightsinTanzaniaorCameroonwillundergoradicalchange.InIndonesia,therecent,boldstatementsofahigh-levelgovernmentleaderinsupportofcustomaryforesttenurerightsdemonstratehowthemobilisationof evidence and courageous stakeholders throughREDD+ initiatives hasprovided support fornew tenurepolicies.Nevertheless, although the callforreformhascomefromahighlevel,therearemanylayersofgovernmentandmanyotherpowerful stakeholderswhohaveresistedall suchreformsinthepast.

Under these circumstances, how canREDD+move forward?The tenureproblemsdiscussedabovecanbegroupedintoafewmainissues.Table9.5summarises these, their implications forREDD+andpotential solutions.Someproblemsclearly require land regularisationor reform, suchas lackofclarityofownershipandoverlappingclaimsortheresolutionofconflictsbetween customary rights and state ownership. Other problems includeencroachmentby external actors,multiple concessionson the same land,poor rule enforcement, problems with land regularisation processes andunaccountablelocalrepresentation.Theseproblemscouldbeaddressedbyotherkindsofinstitutionalreforms,includingstrengtheningstateandlocalinstitutions,harmonisingstatepoliciesandtheuseofparticipatorymethodsandfreepriorandinformedconsent(FPIC)processes.

It isnotable thatallof thesepolicies–whether theyaimto resolve tenureproblemsspecificallyoradvanceREDD+initiativesgenerally–challengethedeep-rootedeconomicandpoliticalinterestsof‘businessasusual’.Businessasusualinforestsreferstotheconstellationofintereststhatseektoperpetuateprivilegedcommercialaccesstoforestlandsandresourcesandthus,often,toforestconversion.REDD+constitutesaninstitutionalisedefforttoconfrontbusinessasusualandarrest theprocessesofdeforestationanddegradation,andthereforefacesthesamechallengesasforesttenurereform.

Implementing REDD+174 |

Table 9.5 Tenure issues, implications for REDD+ and potential solutions

Tenure issue Implications for REDD+ Potential solutions

Lack of clarity on ownership, overlapping claims

Limits to policy options and lower potential for success; lack of clarity regarding benefits and accountability in performance-based payments

Land allocation and registration (regularisation)

Customary rights versus state ownership

Tenure insecurity and/or failure to respect villagers rights can lead to conflict, compliance problems, local hardship and unjust benefit distribution

Ensure FPIC

Rights recognition

Conflicting land use decisions/ concessions across levels and state institutions

Failure to decrease carbon emissions

Harmonise state policies

Strengthen multilevel governance institutions

Lack of right and/or ability to exclude (including colonisation of indigenous lands)

Local stakeholders in REDD+ (right holder/accountable party) potentially unable to fulfil obligation in performance-based arrangements; failure to decrease emissions

Grant and enforce exclusion rights

Secure the borders of indigenous and village lands (local and state institutions)

Develop alternative economic opportunities for colonists

Poor rule enforcement, monitoring and sanction; failure to implement land use planning

Failure to decrease carbon emissions

Strengthen local and state institutions for planning and regulation

Implement participatory land use planning processes, FPIC

Technical issues in regularisation processes; mismatch between new, formal rights and previous de facto or customary rights

Inaccurate maps leading to mismatch between land area and landholder; elite capture

Strengthen institutes in charge of land registration

Greater stakeholder participation in mapping processes

Undemocratic collective land representation; decisions without broad local agreement*

Compliance problems and hence failure to decrease emissions; elite capture of benefits

Ensure FPIC including community members, not just ‘representatives’

* Problem not identified in the project sites but in other cases, such as Papua New Guinea (Box 9.1) and elsewhere.

| 175Tenure matters in REDD+

9.5 Conclusions Atbothnationalandprojectlevels,tenureissueshavebeenwidelyrecognisedas relevant to REDD+. Project proponents have sought to increase thesecurity of local forest rights,whereas national level concernhas remainedlargelyrhetorical.Atthelocallevel,mostproponentsareworking“throughtheirowninitiativeandwithlittleexternalassistance”(Sunderlinet al. 2011).Thesepiecemealprojectinterventionsareinsufficientontheirowntosecurelocal rights,or toaddress theparamount issueof formalexclusionrights–whichfewcommunitiesinthisstudyhavebeengranted.

CanREDD+onlyproceedwheretenureisclearandsecure?Aretheobstaclesto improving tenure elsewhere insurmountable? Clearly, addressing tenurevastlyexpandsthefieldofpolicyoptionsandismorelikelytoleadtosuccess,whileonlyworkingwheretenureisalreadyresolvedplacesdrasticlimitsonthepotentialofREDD+.TenuremaybeseenaspartofthetransformationalchangethatisneededforREDD+inthelong-term.WearguethataddressingtenurerightsisnomorechallengingthantheotherpolicyreformsthatwoulddemonstrateaseriouscommitmenttoREDD+,andthattheunprecedentedattention to tenure issues under REDD+ suggests room for optimism.REDD+ policy makers can move forward on macro level approaches toattack the underlying drivers of deforestation,while proceeding in paralleltotargetsolutionstospecifictenureproblems.Progresswilldependonthedevelopmentofbroadalliancestoovercomeresistance.

10Chapter

REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches William D. Sunderlin and Erin O. Sills

• Most REDD+ subnational projects intend to combine the integratedconservationanddevelopmentproject(ICDP)approachwithpaymentsforecosystemservices(PES).

• Underconditionsofpolicyandmarketuncertainty,thishybridstructureenablesproponentstomakeearlyprogressonprojectestablishment,andtheICDPapproachcanserveasafallbackoptionifPESfailstomaterialise.

• Yet this hybrid structure is a challenge because ICDP has oftenunderperformed,andbecauseproponentstendtoplayupICDPandplaydownPESinconsultationswithlocalstakeholders,withpotentialnegativeconsequencesforeffectivenessandequity.

10.1 IntroductionREDD+,definedbroadly,isanumbrellatermfor“local,nationalandglobalactionsthatreduceemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradation,andenhanceforestcarbonstocksindevelopingcountries”(Angelsen2009a:2).AsnotedbySills et al.(2009),REDD+isoftenconceivedmorenarrowlyasasystemofconditionalperformance-basedpayments.Thesepaymentscanbe

Implementing REDD+178 |

appliedatvariousscales,fromthelevelofnationalgovernmentsallthewaydowntothehousehold.Inthischapter,weexaminethecoreattributesandinterventionsofREDD+atthescaleoftheprojectsite.Ourfindingsrevealthattheseprojectsaremostlyahybridofmoretraditionalforestconservationstrategies and performance-based payments, or payments for ecosystemservices(PES).1

REDD+becameanintegratedpartoftheglobalmitigationagendain2007attheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)COP13.WhiletherewerenoprojectslabelledREDD+atthattime,therewasalreadyahistoryofavoideddeforestationprojects,manyofwhichbeganwhentheCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)wasnegotiated(Caplow et al. 2011). There are now more than 200 subnational projects underdevelopmentorimplementation(Kshatriya et al.2011).

AmongtheseREDD+projects, thereareveryfewinwhichperformance-based payments have actually been implemented. Action on conditionalincentives in projects has been hampered by three main factors: i) slowdevelopment of international architecture under UNFCCC, associatedwithlackofagreementonafinancemechanismandmobilisationoffunds;ii) delays in the establishment of a robust forest carbonmarket; and iii)national policies that are not yet sufficiently amenable to the goals ofREDD+(seeChapter5).

This chapter describes the emerging hybrid structure of REDD+ at theproject scale.Manyprojectscombineelementsof integratedconservationand development projects (ICDP) andPES.We begin by describing themethods applied in Component 2 of CIFOR’s Global ComparativeStudy on REDD+ (GCS), our main source of evidence on this hybridcharacteristic ofREDD+ (Section10.2). Section10.3describes the logicandutilityof thehybridapproachtoREDD+proponentsandspeculateson the reasons for its existence. We then describe conditions of policyandmarket uncertainty that characteriseREDD+ and explain the delaysinintroducingperformance-basedpayments(Section10.4).ThisprovidesthebackgroundfordemonstratingthewaysthehybridmodelservesasanopportunityforREDD+proponents(Section10.5)butalsoendsupposingchallenges(Section10.6).Weclosewithobservationsonthesignificanceofourfindings(Section10.7).

1 WedefineaREDD+projectasanactivitythat:“i)intend(s)toquantifyandreportchangesinforestcarbonstocks,followingIPCCand/orotherbroadlyacceptedguidelines,andpossiblytransactforestcarboncredits;andii)operate(s)inageographicallydefinedsiteorsites,withpredeterminedboundariesassuggestedbyUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)guidelines,includingactivitiesthataimtoincorporatecarbonintolandusedecisionsandplanningacrossheterogeneouslandscapesatasubnationalscale”(Sillset al.2009:266–267).

| 179REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

10.2 Data and methodsThe source information for this chapter is a combination of the generalliteratureonREDD+andfielddatafromComponent2ofCIFOR’sGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+(GCS).Foradescriptionoftheaims,scopeandmethodsofComponent2,andforalistofthe22projectsstudied,seetheAppendix.

Thefieldinformationisdrawnfrom19ofthe22Component2projectsiteswherefielddatahadalreadybeencollectedinearly2012.Someofthedataarefromasurveyinterviewwithprojectproponentstitled‘UpdateofinformationonREDD+interventions’,administeredfromApriltoOctober2011.Itsoughttodetermineif,assuspected,theintroductionofREDD+incentivesatprojectsites was delayed.The findings describe the deployment of interventions ofvariouskinds(bothREDD+andnon-REDD+)atprojectsites.

Thedata in this chapter are also drawn from another survey administeredduring the same period titled ‘Supplementary survey on participationand tenure’. It gives insights on various challenges facedbyproponents inestablishingREDD+projectsandhowtheyaddressedthosechallenges.

OursampleofREDD+projectsitesmaybebiasedtowardthosethatwereearlyintheirpreparations.WeselectedprojectsiteswheretherewasnoriskthatREDD+interventionswouldstartbeforewehadachancetocompletethe ‘before’ (prior to the introduction of REDD+ incentives) baselinedatacollection.Thus,our resultsmightoverstate the slowrateofprogress.Nevertheless,thereareveryfewREDD+projectsthathavebegunintroducingperformance-basedpayments.JumainBrazil,oneofthehigh-profileprojectsalreadyunderway,isanexception(seeBox12.2).

WedonotknowtowhatextentthehybridpatternevidentinallComponent2studysitesisrepresentativeofREDD+asawhole.AlmostalloftheREDD+projectsinBrazilandIndonesiaplanningtoimplementPESarealsoplanninginterventionstoimproveenforcementofforestlawsand/orfunctionfullyinthe ICDPmode (seeChapter 12).We suspect the hybrid pattern appearsinmostREDD+projectswherePES is intendedas aproject intervention,howeverthisremainstobeprovenasthedataarenotnecessarilyrepresentativeofallprojects.

10.3 A hybrid of ICDP and PES approachesAllREDD+projectsintheCIFORstudysampleinvolveamixoftwoverydifferentsetsofinterventions.First,thereisatandemofrestrictingforestaccessandintroducingalternativelivelihoodsandotherdevelopmentprojects;thisisbasedontheassumptionthatsuchalternativelivelihoodswillreducethe

Implementing REDD+180 |

needtorelyonforestincome,andwillalsomaketherestrictionsintroducedmoreacceptabletolocalpopulations(WellsandBrandon1992;BrandonandWells 2009;Blom et al. 2010).Brandon andWells (2009) point out thatwhereas in ICDPs these interventions always take place in protected areas(bydefinition), inREDD+ they can takeplace inmanydifferentkindsoflandscapes,includingprotectedareas.

These ICDP interventions can be characterised as ‘pre-REDD+’ in thesense that they have a long history that predates REDD+. Other similarinterventionscommonlyfoundintheComponent2sampleare:participatorylandusemapping,boundarydetermination,formulationofavillagelanduseplan,clarificationoftenure,andintroductionofalternativesto,orimprovedtechnologyfor,firewoodandcharcoal(e.g.energyefficientstoves).

In addition to these ICDPandother pre-REDD+ interventions, there areplans for initiatives that are characteristic of REDD+. These are theperformance-based payments conditional on the successful protection orimprovementofthecarbonsequestrationpotentialoflocalforests.Essentially,thesearePES.Theyareproportionaltotheamountofcarbonsequesteredinameasurableandverifiableway.

WhyisthisintendedcombinationofICDPandPESincentivesevidentatallComponent2projectsites?Whydidproponentschoosethishybridmodel?The explanation must be pieced together from evidence and conjecturebecause we did not pose the question systematically in our surveys.WeposedthequestiontoTimJessupoftheIndonesia-AustraliaForestCarbonPartnership,whoworkedontheprojectdesignoftheKalimantanForestsandClimatePartnership(KFCP)project inCentralKalimantaninIndonesia.Hesaidtherewasnoconsciouschoicetocombinethetwomodels.Insteadhementioned an ‘on-site logic’ thatmakes the combination convenient.Thereneeded to be timely action to showproject benefits early on.Thiswasintheformofrubberdevelopmentprojectsthatpartiallycompensatedforrestrictedforestaccess(byclosingcanalsthatfacilitateddeforestationinpeatswamps).Heemphasisedthattherestrictionsimposedmustbebasedon local consent. Later, it will be important to have performance-basedREDD+ payments; if there is no conditionality, the forest managementproblemswillnotbefullyovercome.JessupnotedthattheconditionalityattachedtoREDD+mustbebuiltinfromthebeginning,eventhoughtheresults linkedtogreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsreductions–onwhichpaymentswilleventuallybebased–willnotbeseenimmediately(Jessup,personalcommunication).

Themessage from Jessup is that thepre-REDD+andREDD+approachescomplementeachother.ICDPinterventionsprovideawaytoactearlyandgain favourwith the community, while REDD+ as PES provides leverage

| 181REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

thatisnotnecessarilyavailableintheICDPmodel.Thecombinationofpre-REDD+andREDD+incentivespotentiallycomprisesawellintegratedandoptimalmanagement strategy that supports fulfilmentofprojectgoals andreducestheriskofREDD+interventionfailure.

Our knowledge of approaches to forest management and conservation indevelopingcountries,aswellassomeevidencefromfieldresearch,helpstofilloutourunderstandingoftheutilityoftheICDP/PEScombination.Thereareseveralpossibleexplanationsforthishybridapproach:

Repackaging of ongoing efforts. Many REDD+ projects are actually acontinuation of pre-existing forest management and conservation effortsthat may or may not have included ICDP. It makes complete sense thatprojectproponentshaveembracedREDD+asanewforestmanagementideaandblendeditwiththeirongoingefforts,especiallyifpasteffortshavenotproducedall thedesired results.At13of18GCSproject sites,proponentactivities at the site predate REDD+ becoming part of the global climatemitigationagendain2007.Atthese13sites,theaverageproponentpresenceat the siteprior to the launchingofREDD+in2007 is5.2years.VillagesincludedinREDD+projectsaresignificantlymorelikelytohavehadaforestconservationNGOactiveinthepast5years(seeChapter12).

REDD+ potentially provides a long-term funding source that ICDP cannot. REDD+ is intended to involve a sustained, long-term source offunding, whereas ICDPs are by definition time-bound projects whosefundingiseventuallyphasedout.REDD+conditionalpaymentsareintendedtoprovideasubstantialcompensationandincentiveforrestrictedforestuse,ideallyatahigherlevelthantheinitialmeasures.ItishopedthattheREDD+revenue stream, acting as a conditional incentive, will provide the crucialdifferenceandsucceedwherepasteffortsatforestconservationandrestoration(e.g. ICDP)havenot.The recordof failure in ICDPs iswell documented(WellsandBrandon1992;Wells et al.1999;Brooks et al.2006;Garnettet al.2007).Thepre-REDD+incentivesareafoundationuponwhichtheREDD+edificewillrest.AtsomeoftheGCSprojects,itisexpectedthattheREDD+revenuestreamwillserveasthefundingsourceoflocalalternativelivelihoodsand/or indirect wellbeing improvements, superseding the role played byprojectstart-upfunds.ProponentsexpectthestreamofREDD+incomewillallowtheproject tobreak freeof seed fundingandbecomeself-sustaining.As explained by Steve Ball of the Mpingo project in Tanzania: “Carbonmarketswillcoverourtransactioncosts.It’shardtogetdonorfunding.Wehaveaninvestmentbarrierandwewanttoovercomeitviacarbonmarkets”(Ball,personal communication).Andas explainedbyNikeDoggartof theTFCGKilosasiteinTanzania:“Thesourceof(initial)fundingwillbecapitalfromtheproject.Carboncreditswillreplenishthefund”(Doggart,personalcommunication).

Implementing REDD+182 |

In the event REDD+ cannot provide funding, pre-REDD+ approaches might have to compensate to fill the gap.AlthoughitishopedthatREDD+will generate a substantial stream of funding, unless funding sources areassured,thereisariskthatREDD+couldrepeatwhathashappenedinCDMafforestation/reforestation projects.As explained byEcosecurities (2007:6):“CarbonrevenuesgenerallyconstituteasmallpartoftotalrevenuesformostCDMprojecttypes.ThismeansthatmostCDMprojectshavetogeneratesubstantial additional finance – through the sale of renewable energy, forexample.SinceREDDprojectscannotusuallybeexpectedtoproducesuchby-products,carbonsaleswillneedtocovermostoftheimplementationandtransactioncosts. Insomecases,additional incomemaybegenerated fromsustainabletimberproductionfromtheprojectareaorfromefficiencygainsinagriculturalproductionthroughimprovedplanning.”

PES alone is not enough. ThispointreinforceswhatissaidabovebyTimJessup. REDD+ as PES cannot be a stand-alone process in subnationalprojects.Fromthepointofviewoftheproponent,itmustbeaccompaniednotjustbyforestaccessrestrictionsandlivelihoodcompensations,butalsobypoliciesandmeasuresatthenationallevelthatareaimedatrestraininglarge-scaleactorsandaddressingtheunderlyingcausesofdeforestation.

The ‘additionality’ of reducing illegal deforestation through REDD+ payments is problematic. Performance-basedpaymentsforreducingillegaldeforestationhavebeenquestionedasacomponentofREDD+.Forexample,BörnerandWunder(2008)pointoutthatintheBrazilianAmazon,itwouldbe legally questionable to pay for reduced deforestation in protected areasor in violation of theForestCode.This legal ambiguity of paying to stopillegal deforestation has sparked debate over the role of protected areas inREDD+ in general (Boucher 2009; Dudley 2010). First, for REDD+projects, certification systems such as Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)allow for unplanned and unsanctioned deforestation in baseline scenariosbut require supporting evidence that laws are not effectively enforced.Second, there is concern that payments to reduce illegal deforestation areparticularlylikelytocreateperverseincentives,contributingtothetendencyto ignoreenvironmental laws.However, the factremainsthat inregionsofrapid deforestation, environmental laws are widely ignored and much ofthedeforestation is illegal.Thus,REDD+projectsmust find someway toaddressthisdeforestation,despitequestionsaboutthelegalbasisandperverseincentives createdbydirect payments.One response is to collaboratewithlocalauthoritiestoimprovemonitoringandenforcementofexistinglaws–anapproachthatischaracteristicofICDPs.

Combining of ICDP and PES helps avoid off-site leakage.Finally,ICDPand PES are an optimal combination at the local level for preventing thedisplacementofdeforestationanddegradationfromwithintooutsideREDD+

| 183REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

projectboundaries.Thosepreventedfromdeforestationbylocalforestaccessrestrictions are motivated not to simply shift to another place by havingtheirlabourtimeabsorbedinnewactivities.Intheeventthatthealternativelivelihoodofferedisnotsufficienttodeterthisleakage,theadditionalfundingstreamofferedviaREDD+asPEShelpsassurethereareadditionalincentives(bothintheformofrewardsandsanctions)toassureprojectgoalsaremet.

Risk management. Under conditions of REDD+ policy and marketuncertainty (see the next section), it makes sense to diversify forestmanagementstrategies.

10.4 Policy and market uncertaintyInthissectionweexplainhowREDD+policyandmarketuncertaintyhaveaffectedtheoutlookandactionsofREDD+proponents.Thisisapreludetoexplaininghowthisuncertaintyinfluencesthewaythecombinationofpre-REDD+andREDD+incentivesaredeployed.

Whyhavesubnationalprojectstakenmoretimetomaterialisethanexpected,and what are the consequences for REDD+ on the ground? There areessentiallythreeperspectivesatthreedifferentscales:international,nationalandprojectlevel.

First,proponentsareinsomecaseswaitingforclearerpolicyandmarketsignalsattheinternationallevel.ThefailuretoreachaclimatechangeagreementinCopenhagenin2009disheartenedmanyproponents.TherelativesuccessesinCancunandDurban in reachinganagreementon someREDD+ issuesrevivedproponentinterestandmorale,thoughitremainsfrustratingtosomeproponentsthatthearchitectureandguidelinesforREDD+(e.g.safeguards)remainunclear.

Second,thoseproponentswhoaimtorelyonmarketingofforestcarbonareeager for reassuring signals.Therehas been a boom in the voluntary forestcarbonmarketinrecentyears,withREDD+playingaparticularlystrongrole.ForestcarboncreditsfromREDD+grewfrom1.2MtCO2ein2007to19.5MtCO2e in 2010, accounting for two-thirds of the total 29.0MtCO2e offorestcarboncreditstradedin2010(Diaz et al.2011:ii–iii).LatinAmericahasplayedaparticularlystrongroleinthistrend(Diaz et al.2011:iii).Whilethevoluntarymarketisrelativelyhealthy,itrestsincreasinglyoncorporatesocialresponsibilityandothergreenbrandingmotivations,ratherthanpreparationforafuturecompliancemarket.Andwhilethevoluntarymarketisrelativelyhealthy,thepre-compliancemarketisstagnant.Theboominvoluntaryforestcarbon credits notwithstanding, market drivers are uncertain and futuredemandwilldependonregulatorydriversandpoliticaldecisionsthatremaintobemade (Diaz et al. 2011:viii).Lackof long-term security about future

Implementing REDD+184 |

demandandpricesinthecarbonmarketunderminestheabilityofproponentstoguaranteepaymentstolocalstakeholdersinthelongterm.Thisunderliesproponentfearofraisingexpectationsaboutincomeforlocalparticipantsthatcannotberealised.2Weexaminethischallengeindepthlaterinthechapter.

Third, thepolicyenvironment invariouscountries isnotyet conducive formaking confident steps in establishingREDD+on the ground.TheForestCodeinBrazilandtheMoratoriuminIndonesiaarecasesinpoint.Itisunclearwhether revisions of the Forest Code in 2011 will motivate private forestprotectionthroughmarketincentives,orincreaseincentivesfordeforestation(Sparovek et al.2012).TheIndonesianForestMoratorium,begun in2011,boldlyaimedtostopdeforestationonalargescale,buthasyieldedtolobbyingpressure and now exempts secondary forests and logged-over forests fromconversion(Murdiyarso et al.2011; seealsoBox2.1 fora summary).Withsomuchasyetunresolvedinbasicforestlandusepolicy,andwithsomanyoverlapping forest land use claims, there continues to be uncertainty thatproponentscanreapdividendsfrominvestmentstheyhavemade.InIndonesia,therehasbeenmuchattentiontothecaseoftheRimbaRayaprojectinCentralKalimantan,wheretheproponentargueshehasplayedbytherules,yettheydonotyethaveagovernmentlicensetoproceed(Fogarty2011).

Policy and market factors are not the only obstacles to the establishmentofREDD+projects. Some project-specific factors have slowed proponentsdown. Laying the groundwork for REDD+ demonstration sites has beenmorecomplexthanexpectedintermsofresolvinglocallanduseandtenureissues,3definingprojectgoals,writingprojectdesigndocuments,applyingforandgettingthirdpartycertification,conductingstakeholderconsultations(inparticularconductingfreepriorandinformedconsent)andoutreach,amongotherissues.

10.5 The hybrid model as an opportunityEarlierwediscussed the reasonswhyprojectproponents embrace ahybridmodel. In the context of policy and market uncertainty, it appears thereare two aspects of thismodel that areparticularlyuseful toproponents: i)proponentscanmoveaheadinlayingthegroundworkforREDD+evenwiththe delays and policy andmarket uncertainty; and ii) proponents can useICDPasafallbackmeasureintheeventREDD+conditionalincentivesfailtomaterialiseorareinsufficient.

2 SeeforexamplethecaseofSetulanginEastKalimantan,Indonesia,wherepotentialbuyersofbiodiversityservicesdidnotengageinaPESschememainlybecauseoftheirlimitedtimehorizonanduneasinessabouttheconditionalityprinciple(Wunderet al.2008).3 Forexample,inIndonesia,ateveryoneofourprojectsitesalargecompanyhasaclaimonapartoftheprojectland.

| 185REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

10.5.1 Opportunity to move aheadThere are good reasons for proponents tomove ahead early. Ideally, pre-REDD+ andREDD+ interventionswould bemade at roughly the sametime,amongotherreasonssothattheREDD+fundingstreamcanrelievetheprojectofdependenceonterminalstart-upfunds.Inreality,attheREDD+projectsitesintheGCSstudy,theintroductionofpre-REDD+incentiveshasbegunbefore the introductionofREDD+conditional incentives (seeTable10.1).Thereareseveralreasonsforthis.

First, the pre-REDD+ incentives can proceed on a timetable that is notdictatedbytheestablishmentoftheREDD+fundingmechanisms.Theseinterventions(forestuserestrictions,alternativelivelihoods,etc.)generallydo not require REDD+ architecture, national policies or a viable forestcarbonmarketinordertobeimplemented.Constraintsonimplementationofthesemeasuresareproponentorganisationplanninghorizonsandfunding.Conventional forestconservationinterventionsarepredicatedontheideathataninitialinterventionthatprovidesnewknowledge,infrastructureorinstitutionscanleadtoself-sustainingchangeinforestmanagement.Thus,short-termfundingisconsistentwiththelogicoftheseinterventions,eventhoughexperienceshowsthatithasbeenaserioushindrancetoachievingimpact.ThelogicofPES,ontheotherhand,isoneofongoingpaymentsforaflowofecosystemservices,requiringeithersufficientfundstoestablishaprojecttrustfundorsufficientcertaintyaboutthefuturemarketforthoseecosystemservices.

Second, many pilot projects are expected to move ahead in conductingactivities on the ground within a limited time frame, and pre-REDD+interventions are a feasible use of project funds. Results in the form ofreduced emissions cannot be delivered in the near term, but only afterseveralyears.Localpopulationsneedtohavebenefitsearly.

Third, as noted above, uncertainty and delays in the formulation ofREDD+policiesandmechanismsmeansomeproponentseithercannotor are hesitant to introduce REDD+ incentives. As explained by RajaJarrah of the Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili (HIMA) project inTanzania:“‘Tasters’willbepaidoutofprojectfundswhentheagreementissigned.Otherwise PES payments will not begin for years.” (Jarrah, personalcommunication)

Fourth, there are some functional reasons for moving ahead with pre-REDD+activities.Forexampledemarcationofvillageandforestboundariesandformulationofavillagelandusestrategyoftenneedstohappenbeforeapplying forest access restrictions, and before monitoring and rewardingperformance.

Implementing REDD+186 |

Tab

le 1

0.1

Tim

ing

of i

ntro

duc

tion

of i

nter

vent

ion

s at

21

RED

D+

pro

ject

sit

es in

GC

S C

omp

onen

t 2

Co

un

try

Pro

ject

sit

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me

of b

egin

nin

g o

f res

tric

tio

ns

on

fore

st u

seTi

me

of i

ntr

od

uct

ion

of

alte

rnat

ive

livel

iho

od

sEs

tim

ated

tim

e o

f in

tro

du

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| 187REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

10.5.2 ICDP interventions as a fallback option This can happen in the event that the preconditions for REDD+ fail tomaterialise, if proponents decide they cannot or will not go ahead withREDD+orifREDD+paymentsstop.AsexplainedbyDharsonoHartonooftheP.T.RimbaMakmurUtamasiteinCentralKalimantan,Indonesia:“Wedon’twanttobeover-dependentonREDD.WewanttobeabletobeversatileintheeventthatREDDisnotthemainsourceofincome.Perhapsecotourismwill be themain source of income in the future.” (Hartono,personalcommunication)

Severalofthe19proponentsinoursamplehavevoicedworriesaboutwhetherthey are prepared to introduce conditional incentives based on emissionreductions.One suchproject (TNCBerau in Indonesia) is unsure aboutusingtheseincentivesbecausethecarbonmethodsfordistrict-levelpaymentsmaynotbedevelopedintime,ortheemergingnationalprogrammemaynotinvolvesubnationalpaymentsatthedistrictlevel.Anotherproject(ICVinBrazil)hasdecidednottopursueREDD+conditionalincomebecauseitisaversetodealingwiththeforestcarbonmarket.

We asked proponents at the 19 project sites which among all projectincentives is likely tohave thestrongestpositiveeffectonmaintainingorincreasing the capacity of forests in the project boundaries to sequestercarbon.TheiranswersaredisplayedinFigure10.1.

The answers should be treated cautiously because of the possibility ofconfounding variables. At some projects, the stream of PES income isintendedas the long-termsourceof livelihoodalternatives.Nevertheless,the responses are an indication of the degree to which proponents arefocused on alternative livelihoods rather than PES as a keymeasure forattaining the goals of the project. This may reflect both the enduringpopularity of the ICDPmodel, and disillusionmentwith the near-termprospectsofREDD+.

10.6 The hybrid model as a challengeWhile the hybrid model provides the opportunities described above, italsointroducestwopossiblechallengesinthecontextofpolicyandmarketuncertainty.These relate to the liability of relyingwholly on ICDP if thisprovesnecessary,anddelayedorincompletelocaloutreachaboutREDD+.

10.6.1 Reliance on ICDP can be a liability Asnotedearlier,ICDPapproachestoforestmanagementhaveencounteredahostofproblems.IfREDD+projectproponentseitherchooseorareforced

Implementing REDD+188 |

to abandon their efforts to introduceperformance-basedpayments, theyriskreplicatingthedesignandimplementationerrorsencounteredinpastICDPefforts.AmongthekeyproblemsencounteredinICDPswere:lackof clarity in objectives; ineffective efforts in involving local populations;overlyambitiousplans;limitedcapacityofdevelopingcountryinstitutionsengaged to implement ICDPs; inability to create viable alternativelivelihoodsandincreaseincomesinandaroundprotectedareas;tendencytounder-appreciatethethreatposedbyexternalactorssuchlargeenterprisesand infrastructure;and inadequateenforcementof forestprotection laws(BrandonandWells2009).

IfprojectproponentsfocuswhollyonICDP,theirrisksmaybelowiftheexpectationistoinstitutionalisemanagementchangethroughaone-timeengagementwiththecommunity.Conversely,therisksmaybehighiftheexpectationfromtheoutsetwasthatadurableREDD+streamofincomewouldberequiredtoachieveandsustaintheforestmanagementchangesenvisioned.

Figure 10.1 Intervention proponents expect to have most positive impact on carbon sequestration

Note: Based on the following question, posed to 19 proponents in the GCS: “Which of these incentives (livelihood alternatives, increased enforcement, PES, other) is likely to have the strongest positive effect on maintaining or increasing the capacity of forests in the project boundaries to sequester carbon?”

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| 189REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

10.6.2 Some proponents delay or do not complete outreach on REDD+All REDD+ proponents must conduct outreach at the local level aboutclimate change and about how the project aims to contribute to climatechangemitigation, aswell as how local people can contribute to this goalandwhat the livelihoodgainsandrisksare.Thisoutreach isessentially the‘informed’partoffreepriorandinformedconsent(FPIC).FPICissupportedbyinternationalconventions,isinsomecasesrequiredbynationallaw,andisapreconditionforthirdpartycertificationandmeetingsocialsafeguards.AllprojectshavesetasidefundsforconductingthemassiveFPICundertaking,which often involves conducting meetings in all villages within projectboundaries,andinsomecasesatthesub-villagelevel.

Amongthe19projectsstudied,sixaredeliberatelydelayingoutreachaboutREDD+atthelocallevel.Atsomeofthesesites,thelocalparticipantshaveno idea that conditional REDD+ payments are being contemplated (seealsoChapter11).Oneofthemainreasonsforthedelayisthatproponentswant to avoid raising expectations about an income source thatmight failto materialise. It may be no accident that project sites where outreach isdelayedareall inthehumidforestzone.Thecarboncontentandthereforethe potential additionality and income stream are higher in humid foreststhanindryforests.Indryforestprojectsthereisnotendencyinoursampletodelayoutreach,perhapsbecausetheforestcarbonincomestreamwillbesmall, and therefore the adverse consequences of dashed expectations arecorrespondinglysmall.

In explaining the reasons for inadequate or delayed outreach of localstakeholdersaboutREDD+,theproponentssaidthefollowing:

• [Concerningwhy theymight not be able to educate villagers in placeswhere ithasnot yetbeendone:] “Themain reason is lackof time andhumanresources…Therewasalsoaconcernaboutraisingexpectations.”(MonicadelosRiosoftheAcreprojectinBrazil).

• “Wehavenot shared enough information early enough.There arenowmisconceptionsandmisunderstandingsaboutREDD.Weourselvesdon’thaveenoughinformationtoexplainREDDindetail…Welackspecificsbecauseweourselveshavenotdonethemath.”(RajaJarrahoftheHIMAprojectinTanzania).

• “VillagersmaynotunderstandREDDaswedo.Theterm‘REDD’isnotused.Itistooconfusingforthemtounderstand.Wehavetoavoidjargon.Besides,ourgoalisrestoration.Wedon’twanttoraisehopes…Wehavetograduallyintroducetheidea.”(DharsonoHartonoattheKatingansiteinIndonesia).

Implementing REDD+190 |

• “The situation is too complex for us to effectively convey to localcommunitiesourREDDplaninfulldetail.It ispossibletospendalotofmoneyonthisandstillnotreachfullcommunityunderstanding.Webudgetedwhat seemeda reasonable amount andarehoping to stick tothat.”(SteveBalloftheMpingositeinTanzania).

Fromonepoint of view, the delay of outreach is entirely reasonable andinnocent.Itmakescompletesensenottoraiseexpectationsunnecessarily.Andtheproponentsfullyintendtoconductthisoutreachoncethepolicyand market signals are conducive, and once they have overcome delaysgeneratedbyobstacles in theproject itself.On theotherhand, there aresome latent dangers. In some cases, FPIC activities have already beenconductedwithoutdoingoutreachonREDD+,meaningthatatsomepointinthefutureproponentswillhavetogobacktothevillagesandconductthis outreach and reframe the conditions for informed consent. This isan expensive proposition. Some projects are at the end of their availablefundsanditisdifficulttoseehowtheywillaffordtoconductthisoutreachwiththeiravailablebudget.Intheworstcasescenario,REDD+wouldgetunderwayintheseprojectswithoutfullyinformedconsent.

10.7 ConclusionsREDD+subnationalprojectsplantocombinepre-REDD+(mainlyICDP)and distinctively REDD+ (performance-based payments) managementapproaches to realise theirgoals.This approachconfers clear advantages toprojectproponentsincluding:awaytocontinuewithwhatproponentscanandhavedone;on-sitesynergiesthatoptimisethetwomodels(achievingwithonemodelwhattheothercannot);awaytocopewithfundinguncertainties;andawaytominimiseoff-siteleakage.

We have seen that pre-REDD+ interventions have moved ahead whileREDD+interventionsareslowtomaterialise,inpartbecauseofpolicyandmarketuncertaintiesrelatedtoREDD+.Thedecisionsofproponentsinthecontextofthisuncertaintyhighlightthebenefitsandliabilitiesofthehybridapproach.Ontheonehand,anICDPapproachallowsprojectpioneers tomoveaheadbefore thepolicyandmarketconditions forREDD+are fullyready,andtohaveafallbackintheeventthatenablingconditionsforREDD+failtomaterialiseinwaysthatconvinceproponentsthatrisksareworththebenefits.Ontheotherhand,theICDPmodelinandofitselfhasatroubledhistory, and the gapbetween early implementationof ICDP interventionsanddelayoftheintroductionofPESmeansproponentstendtodelaybeingfully openwith local stakeholders about the nature and scope of plannedREDD+interventions.

| 191REDD+ projects as a hybrid of old and new forest conservation approaches

WhatneedstohappensothatREDD+canmoveaheadatthesubnationalproject level inawaythatoptimises thepotential synergiesbetweenICDPandPES?Akeystartingpointistolearnfromthepast.BrandonandWells(2009:232–235)andBlom et al.(2010:167–170)provideusefulguidanceonhowtoplanandimplementbetterICDPprojects.

Thesestepsarelargelywithintherealmofcontroloftheproponentsthemselves,whereasmuchofwhatneedstohappenisatascalehigherthantheprojectlevel.InorderforREDD+tomoveaheadontheground,policyandmarketinertiawillhavetobeovercome.ThisrequiresafinalisationofREDD+internationalarchitectureandfinancemechanisms,developmentofaregulatoryframeworkforthedevelopmentofaviableforestcarbonmarket,andthecreationofthecreationofnational laws and regulations related toREDD+ thatprioritiseforestprotectionandthewellbeingoflocalstakeholders.

11Chapter

Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Amy E. Duchelle, Andini D. Ekaputri and William D. Sunderlin

• LocalforestusersinsampledREDD+projectareasunderstoodREDD+tobefundamentallyaboutforestprotection;simultaneously,theyhopedthatlocalREDD+projectswouldimprovetheirincomesandworriedthattheycouldnegativelyaffecttheirlivelihoods.

• VillagersdependextensivelyonproponentsforinformationaboutREDD+andthelocalREDD+project,andtheremaybeaneedforindependentknowledgebrokersorlegaladvisers.

• ThekeychallengesforREDD+projectsare:i)tocommunicatetovillagershowREDD+projectswork, theopportunitiesandrisks, and the rightsandresponsibilities;ii)toinvolvevillagersmeaningfullyinthedesignandimplementationoftheproject;andiii)tobalanceforestprotectionwiththewelfareconcernsofvillagers.

11.1 IntroductionHaltingdeforestationandforestdegradationindevelopingcountriesinvolvespotentialtrade-offsbetweenconservationandlivelihooddevelopment.Duetotheiroftenheavydependenceonlandandforestresources,localforestusersmaysufferfrominterventionstoprotectforests,unlesstheyreceiveadequate

Implementing REDD+194 |

compensationforchangingtheirlivelihoodstrategies.OneofthereasonsthatREDD+hasbecomesuchapopularideasoquicklyisitspotentialtogenerateasufficientlylargefundingstreamtofullycompensatetheopportunitycostsincurredbylocalforestusersoverthelongterm.REDD+canthusbeviewedasapotentialwin–winsolutionformaintainingstandingforestsandsupportinglocallivelihoods(Brownet al.2008;Phelpset al.Inpress;seealsoChapter3).

As a climate changemitigation initiative,REDD+canbe implemented indifferent ways, including through a subnational project-based approach.REDD+subnationalprojectsinvariousstagesofdevelopmentandformsarebeing initiated inmany countries (Kshatriya et al. 2011; see alsoChapter10).Theseprojects involvestakeholdersthatrangefromlocalcommunitiestolarge-scaleprivateorstateentities.Localforestuserswhocurrentlyare,orcouldbe,engagedinactivitiesthatcontributetogreenhousegasemissionsaretheprincipaltargetsofREDD+projects,sincetheywillhelpdeterminehowprojectsareimplementedwhilealsobeingdirectlyaffectedbythem.

Policymakersandresearchersalikehavestressedtheimportanceofgenuinelyengaginglocalpeopleindecisionmakingandsupportinglocallivelihoodstopromotepositiveforestmanagementoutcomes(e.g.OstromandNagendra2006). Forest conservation efforts are believed to have a greater chance ofsuccess when local economic concerns are taken into account (FerrarroandHanauer2011). Inpractice,however,aligningconservationgoalswithimprovedlocallivelihoodshasoftenfacedsubstantialchallenges(Sunderlandet al.2007;McShaneet al.2011).Villagers’meaningful involvement in and support ofREDD+projects canhelpensurethatprojectsachievetheirgoaloflong-termemissionreductions(Harvey et al. 2010b; Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation et al. 2011). Suchinvolvement requires project proponents (i.e. the organisations thatcoordinate theREDD+projects) toengage local stakeholders inallprojectphases, from ensuring the basic right of free, prior and informed consent(FPIC)attheproject’soutsettoestablishingmechanismsfortransparencyandequitythroughout(Mayet al.2004).ThroughtheFPICprocess,proponentsengageinoutreachactivitiesinprojectareacommunities,duringwhichtheycanexplainthefundamentalconceptofREDD+alongwithspecificprojectstrategies. REDD+ projectsmust be designed and implemented in such awaythatlocallivelihoodconcernsareaddressedinordertomovetowardsawin–winoutcome.

An important precondition for meaningful community participation inREDD+is localknowledgeaboutclimatechangeand theREDD+project(Sunderlinet al.2011).Toobtaininformedconsent,itisespeciallyimportantthat local people understand why forests are important in the context ofclimate change, howREDD+ projects will be organised and administered

| 195Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

asameanstoachieveclimatechangemitigation,andhowtheinterventionswill affect their lives.This information includesbenefitdistribution, rightsand responsibilities, aswell as risks andcosts associatedwith localpeople’sinvolvementintheREDD+project.Withoutthiskindofoutreach,REDD+risksrepeatingpasterrorsofconservationinitiativesthathaveoftenbypassedandmarginalisedlocalpeopleandconsequentlylosttheirsupport.Moreover,onmoralgrounds,localpeopleshouldhaveavoice–andthatvoiceshouldbeheard–inprojectdesignandimplementation(NewellandWheeler2006).Itisthuscriticallyimportanttounderstandlocalpeople’sknowledge,expectationsandconcernsaboutREDD+projects,alongwiththeirrecommendationsforhowtoimprovethem.

Given the potential win–win character of REDD+, in this chapter we askthefollowingquestion:Dolocalpeople’sunderstandingofandexpectationsfor REDD+ projects reflect broader win–win objectives of REDD+ tosimultaneouslypromoteconservationandimprovelocallivelihoods?Toanswerthisquestion,wedrawonresearchincommunitiesatnineREDD+projectsites located in fourcountries:Brazil,Cameroon, IndonesiaandTanzania.1Forthisstudy,wefocusonlocalcommunitiesorgroupsofsmallholdersandnotonotherpotentiallyimportantstakeholdersinlocalREDD+projects.

The chapter is composed of three parts: in Section 11.2 we explain themethodsandfielddataofthestudy;inSection11.3wepresentthefindingsand discuss their relevance; and in Section 11.4 we offer conclusions andproposestepsforward.

11.2 Field data ThenineREDD+projectsanalysedarelocatedinBrazil(2),Cameroon(2),Indonesia(3)andTanzania(2).Theyvaryintermsofdriversofdeforestationand degradation, project objectives, interventionmechanisms, and projectdevelopment stage (Table 11.1).While all projects (by definition) aim toavoid deforestation and forest degradation, most projects have additionalspecific objectives for conservation, sustainable resource use, improvinglocal livelihoods or alleviating poverty. Project proponents at these sitesinclude government agencies, private entities and/or NGOs. Interventionmechanisms include combinations of increased enforcement, support forlivelihoodalternativesandpaymentsforenvironmentalservices(PES).

The analysis is primarily based on data from quantitative surveys with1243householdsinthenineprojectareas.Wecarriedoutfielddatacollection

1 Thesenineprojectswereselectedoutofthe22(intensiveandextensive)sitesacrosssixcountries(seeAppendix).Theanalysisreliesheavilyonhouseholddataandthereforefocusesonintensivesitesonly.Inaddition,datafromothersiteswerenotavailableatthetimeofwritingbecausethefieldworkhadnotyetbeendoneorbecausewewerenotabletoposetherelevantquestionsatthosesites.

Implementing REDD+196 |

Table 11.1 REDD+ projects analysed

REDD+ Projects

Main drivers of deforestation or degradation in project area

Specific project objectives (in addition to REDD+)

Leading proponent(s)

Brazil – Acre

Swidden agriculture

Timber harvesting

Cattle ranching

Road building

Implementation of State Plan for Control and Prevention of Deforestation

State government

Brazil – Transamazon

Swidden agriculture

Timber harvesting

Cattle ranching

Reconciliation of smallholder production systems and natural resource conservation

Research NGO

Cameroon – CED

Swidden agriculture

Timber harvesting

Environmental protection and livelihood improvement

Environment and development NGO

Cameroon – Mount Cameroon

Swidden agriculture

Permanent agriculture (cocoa and palm oil)

Responsible use of forest resources

Provincial government

Indonesia – Ulu Masen

Timber harvest

Swidden agriculture

Permanent agriculture (cocoa)

Water conservation Provincial government

Indonesia – KCCP

Permanent agriculture (incoming oil palm plantation)

Forest concession

Illegal mining

Secure village forest management rights

Conservation NGO

Village communities

Indonesia – KFCP

Peat drainage and peat fires* Peat rehabilitation and revegetation

Donor country – national government

Tanzania – TaTEDO

Clearing land for settlement

Subsistence fuel wood; commercial charcoal

Access to sustainable modern energy technologies in marginalised communities; poverty reduction; conservation; self-reliance

NGO working on energy issues

Tanzania – TFCG Kilosa

Drought and wildfires

Swidden agriculture

Timber harvest

Subsistence fuel wood; commercial charcoal

Cattle ranching

Conservation of high biodiversity forests

Conservation NGO

Note: *Most emissions from KFCP are not from deforestation and forest degradation, as the area emitting the most GHG is peatland already deforested/degraded

| 197Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

frommid-JunethroughOctober2010,atatimewhenmostprojectswereintheirearlystagesofdevelopment.Thehouseholdsurveyswerecomplementedby interviewswithREDD+projectproponents about specific interventionmechanisms.Importantly,werecognisethatnineprojectsitesisfartoosmallasampletofullyrepresentthemanyincipientREDD+projectsitesacrossthetropics,andthisisnotnecessarilyrepresentativeofthecountriesinwhichtheprojectsarelocated.

In applying the survey, we first inquired about villagers’ knowledge aboutREDD+ in general, and about the localREDD+project, inparticular, byposingthequestions:i)“HaveyouheardofREDD+priortothisinterview?”andii)“Haveyouheardof(the local REDD+ project)priortothisinterview?”Forthosewhoansweredaffirmativelytoatleastoneofthequestionsabove,we then asked for a short explanation of REDD+ and/or of the REDD+project to get a sense of theirunderstanding of these concepts.Thesewereopen-endedquestions,andmultipleresponseswereallowed.Iftherespondentcorrectly stated at least one characteristic ofREDD+or the localREDD+project,thatpersonwasjudgedtohaveabasicunderstandingofREDD+orthe localREDD+project.Thesequestionswere simplyusedasa screeningmechanismtoassesstheappropriatenessofaskingfurtherquestionsrelatedtolocalhopesandworriesforREDD+andwerenotdesignedtogetafullviewofrespondents’understandingofREDD+.

To thosewho had heard of the localREDD+project and showed a basicunderstanding of REDD+ or the local REDD+ project, we posed thefollowingquestions: i)“Whatareyourhopesabouthow(the local REDD+ project)willbenefityourhousehold?”ii)“Whatareyourworriesabouthow(the local REDD+ project) will affect your household?” and iii) “What areyour recommendations on how the implementation of (the local REDD+ project)inyourvillageshouldbeimproved?RespondentswhowereunabletodemonstrateabasicunderstandingofREDD+orofthelocalREDD+projectwerenotaskedthesequestions.

11.3 Findings and discussion 11.3.1 Local knowledge of REDD+ Villagers’ knowledge, or familiarity, with REDD+ and/or with the localREDD+projectwasgenerallylow.Ofthetotal1243householdsinterviewed,only327(26%)hadheardabouttheconceptofREDD+and502(41%)hadheardaboutthelocalREDD+project(Table11.2).Onlyattwositesweremorethanhalfofall respondents familiarwithREDD+,andonlyat threesites weremore than half familiar with the REDD+ project in their area.Theselownumberspartlyreflectthetimeatwhichweposedthequestions;

Implementing REDD+198 |

Table 11.2 Project status and knowledge of REDD+ and local REDD+ project (2010)

Project Project status at time of fieldwork (2010)

Knowledge of REDD+ in general (% respondents)

Knowledge of local REDD+ project (% respondents)

Brazil – Acre

Implementation of monetary incentive for sustainable agriculture

15 92*

Brazil – Transamazon

Village meetings to introduce proposed REDD+ project

30 39

Cameroon – CED

Participatory livelihood analysis in two villages; organisational training in one village; participatory mapping and carbon baseline in one village

74 72

Cameroon – Mount Cameroon

Improved farming techniques; capacity building for village forest management committees; law enforcement

25 63

Indonesia – Ulu Masen

Consultation at level of village clusters

2 6

Indonesia – KCCP

Preparatory activities for development of Village Forests, including consultations with key stakeholders, strengthening village capacity, village mapping of High Conservation Value Forests

5 23

Indonesia – KFCP

Village meetings to introduce proposed REDD+ project; instalment of facilitators in villages, detailed design of dams for canals in peatlands, hydrology monitoring

13 27

Tanzania – TaTEDO

Collection of socioeconomic baseline information; land tenure regularisation

52 28

Tanzania – TFCG Kilosa

Village meetings to introduce proposed REDD+ project

18 11

Average 26 41

Note: *Villagers at this site were not asked about the statewide REDD+ programme as a whole, but rather about a specific project within the larger programme, which focused on incentives for sustainable agriculture and was the first action to be implemented in the project area.

| 199Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

some proponents had not yet begun or concluded their outreachwork toexplaintheREDD+project.Inothercases,theoutreachworkmayhavebeenperformedbuttherespondents(forwhateverreason)werenotreachedordidnotinternalisetheknowledgeconveyed.

Asexpected,wefoundtheprojectproponenttobethesinglemostimportantsource from which villagers heard about REDD+ or the local REDD+project. At seven of the nine sites, more villagers heard about REDD+from the proponent than from any other source. Similarly, at six of theninesites,villagersheardofthelocalREDD+projectfromtheproponents.At the remaining three sites, information about the REDD+ project wasmostlyobtainedfrom:anNGOthat,atthetime,supportedtheproponent(IndonesiaUluMasen);thevillageleader(TanzaniaTFCGKilosa);orseveralothersources(IndonesiaKCCP).Thegovernmentorextensionagents(wheretheywerenotproponents)wereaminorsourceof informationaboutbothREDD+andtheREDD+project.Strikingly,inoneofthetwocaseswherethe proponents were themselves the government (Indonesia Ulu Masen),villagershadheardaboutREDD+andtheREDD+projectfromanNGOoperatingintheareainsteadoffromgovernmentofficials.

ItmakessensethatproponentsarethemainsourceofinformationabouttheREDD+projects,becausetheycanspeakmostconfidentlyonbehalfoftheirrespectiveprojects.TheoveralllackoflocalfamiliaritywithREDD+andlocalREDD+projects thatwasobserved in this studysuggests that informationcommunicatedtovillagersmayhavefocusedonspecificprojectactivitiesandwas not necessarily tied to the broaderREDD+project or the concept ofREDD+ingeneral.Interestingly,attheTanzaniansites,understandingoftheconceptofREDD+wasgreaterthanofthespecificprojectitself.

TherearevariousreasonsforwhatappearstobeinadequatecommunicationofREDD+ingeneralandthelocalREDD+projectatprojectsites.Importantly,thepaceofinternationalnegotiationshassloweddowntheestablishmentofnationalpoliciesandinstitutionsrelatedtoREDD+,whichhasaffectedtheprogress of subnationalREDD+projects (seeChapter 10). In this climateofuncertainty, someproponents fearunnecessarily raising the expectationsoflocalstakeholdersandhavethusdecidedtopostponecommunicatingtheconceptofREDD+andtodelaydisseminatinginformationaboutthelocalREDD+projecttolocalvillagersintheprojectarea(Sunderlinet al.2011).Importantly,sinceweconductedourfieldresearch,severalproponentshaveconductedbasicREDD+outreachat their sites,whichhas likely increasedlocalknowledgeintheseplaces.Forinstance,atIndonesiaKCCPandKFCP,asactivitiesadvanceandastheprojectattractsmoreattention,morevillagersseemtobefamiliarwithREDD+.

Implementing REDD+200 |

11.3.2 Local understanding of REDD+ projectsHouseholds’understandingoftheobjectivesoftheREDD+projectsinsitesinBrazil,CameroonandIndonesiaaresummarisedinFigure11.1.Theresultsfromthe twoproject sites inTanzaniaweredroppeddue toa lownumberofresponses.

% o

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100

80

60

40

20

0Brazil (n=202) Cameroon (n=242) Indonesia (n=76)

Forest/environmental protection

Income generation

Respondent does not know

Others

Figure 11.1 Local understanding of the local REDD+ project objectives

Inallthreecountries,householdsoverwhelminglyperceivedREDD+and/orthelocalREDD+projecttobefocusedonforest/environmentalprotection.Theemphasisonforestprotectionmaybeexplainedbyobservingvillagers’sourceofinformationaboutREDD+/thelocalREDD+project.Asdescribedabove,themostfrequentsourceofpeople’sinformationaboutREDD+/thelocalREDD+projectwastheproponentsortheirpartners,andseveraloftheproponentorganisationshaveaconservationfocus.Furthermore,proponentsmighthavebeenreluctanttotalkaboutoremphasisepotentialincomestreamsorlivelihoodissues,forfearofunnecessarilyraisinghopesandexpectationsbeforeprojectplanningwasmoreadvanced.Responsesinthe‘others’categoryincludedperceptionsthattheobjectiveof the localREDD+projectwastochangeagriculturalpracticesorempowercommunities.

Households expressed a range of hopes and worries related to the localREDD+ project (Figure 11.2). Most responses can be grouped into fivethemes: income improvement, forest protection, reduction of threats fromclimatechange,tenuresecurityandprojectrealisation.Localhopesreflecttherealisationofthesethemes(i.e.incomeimprovement,forestprotection,etc.),whereasworriesreflectthefearthattheprojectwillfailinmeetingthosegoals(i.e.inabilitytoimproveincome,inabilitytoprotectforests,etc.).

| 201Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

Income improvement: ingeneral, income-relatedoutcomeswere themostfrequentlyexpressedhopesandworriesrelatedtolocalREDD+projects.Thetypeof income improvementsvariedamongsites. InBrazil andIndonesia,providing alternative or supplementary income was considered a moreimportant hope than compensation from lost forest income, emphasisingthatvillagerswantednewlanduseopportunities,asopposedtosimplybeingpreventedfromusingforests.Incontrast,compensationforlostforestincomewasthehopeofalargeproportionofrespondentsatbothoftheCameroonsites,suggestingthatrespondentsalreadyimaginedthattheirforestusewouldbelimited.InCameroonCED,itispossiblethattheproject’sshifttoestablishcommunityforestryisseenaspotentiallylimitingcurrenttimberexploitationandclearingoflandforagriculture.InCameroonMountCameroon,villagersareclearingforestsinanationalparkforagriculture,whichwouldlikelyberestrictedby theREDD+project. In general, compared to theother threecountries,villagersinCameroonappearedtobegenerallymorewaryoftheirlocalprojects.

Forest protection: whilemost villagersunderstoodREDD+projects focusonforestprotection,thiswassecondarytoincomeimprovementsasahopedforoutcome.Thisfindingimpliesthatvillagersweredifferentiatingbetweenprojectaimsandthepotentialpersonalbenefitsthattheycouldderivefromtheproject. It also suggests that the ideaof improved income in exchangeforforestprotection(i.e.theREDD+conceptofcompensationforreducedemissions)mayhavebeenunderstoodbysomepeopleatthelocallevel.Our

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ses

by c

ount

ry250

200

150

100

50

0

Income improvement

Forest protection

Reduction of threats from

climate change

Tenure security

Project realisation

Tanzania (n=30)

Indonesia (n=117)

Cameroon (n=614)

Brazil (n=294)

H W H W H W H W H W

Figure 11.2 Local hopes and worries concerning the REDD+ project

Implementing REDD+202 |

findingsuggeststhatoutof295respondentswhosaidtheREDD+projectwasaboutforestprotection,197ofthemhadhopesfor–amongotherthings–incomeimprovement.

InoneprojectinIndonesia(KCCP),thehopeforincreasedforestprotectionwasprobablyrelatedtotheexpresseddesiresthattheprojectwouldhaltbigcompanies from deforesting community lands and allow continued localaccess to forestgoodsandservices.Consistentwiththehopesexpressedbyvillagers in Brazil Acre, Cameroon (CED and Mount Cameroon) and inIndonesia(UluMasenandKCCP),inabilitytopreventbigcompaniesfromconvertinglocalforestswasanimportantworryintheseplaces.InIndonesia,villagersprimarilyrefertolarge-scaleagriculturalactivitiesasresponsibleforconversionofneighbouringforests,alongwithloggingactivities.Thisfindingisconsistentwiththetrendofpressuresforoilpalmdevelopmentandforestconversion in nearby villages in the area. Similarly, some villagers at theBrazilianandCameroonsitesrelatetheirdesiresforforestprotectiontothepresenceof largecompanies thataredegradingcommunity forests, suchasloggingcompanies,consideredamaindriverofdegradationintheseprojectareas(Table11.1).

Reduction of threats from climate change: this themewasmentioned asahopeinallbuttwoprojectssites,butwasconsideredlessimportantthanimprovedincomeandforestprotection.Thisfindingisprobablyduetothelack of a perceived connection at the local level between REDD+ projectactionsandtheconceptofREDD+asaclimatechangemitigationtool.

Tenure security: the idea that the REDD+ project might limit rights tolandorforestswasanimportantworryinIndonesia,aswastheideathatitcouldcreateuncertaintyovertenureinTanzania.InIndonesia,respondentsmayhaveerroneouslyrelatedtheREDD+projecttopastfailuresinalargegovernmentagriculturalproject,whichledtoforestconversion,ortoamorerecent conservation project that prevented villagers from continued accesstotheirforests.Inmostprojectsites,hopesforrights-relatedoutcomes,i.e.improvedlandtenure,respectforlocalrights,andaccesstoforestgoodsandservicesdidnotemergestrongly.Thisfindingcanbeinterpretedindifferentways,includingthatlocalpeoplewerenotconfidentintheabilityofREDD+to resolve these issues, or that more immediate income-related concernsdominated.AnexceptiontothegeneralfindingwasatBrazilAcrewherelandregularisationefforts,aspartofREDD-readinessactivities,fosteredhopeforacquiringlandtitles.

Project realisation: the worry that the project would not go ahead wasnotableatacoupleofsitesinBrazilandCameroon.ThiswasamajorconcernatBrazilTransamazon,whereapreviousPES-likeprojectendedprematurely.

| 203Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

Similarly, inCameroonCED, villagerswereworried that project promiseswouldnotberealisedorthattheywouldbecheatedbyproponents.Unlikethevillagerswhoownlandoutsideofthecommunityforestthattheprojectisworkingtoestablish,villagerswithpropertyinsidetheforestcannolongerfreelyexploit their land.Asa result, the lattergrouphas feltpenalisedandfrustratedastheiraccesshasbeenlimitedwithouthavingseenanyconcreteresultsoftheREDD+project.Althoughtheproponenthadstartedtocarryoutcertainactivities,villagerswereanxioustoseeREDD+investmentsthatwoulddistinguishREDD+fromotherconventionalconservationactivities.

11.3.3 Other responsesIn addition to thefivemain categoriesof responsesdiscussed earlier, therewere also a number of diverse and site-specific responses. For instance, inbothoftheBraziliansites,provisionoftechnicalassistanceandtrainingwereimportant for promoting sustainable agricultural practices (see Box 11.1).Otherhopesincludedtheprovisionofgovernmentalservicesandenhancedwellbeingingeneral.InIndonesiasupportforchildren’seducation(KCCP)andrespectforlocalrights(KCCPandKFCP)werenotedashopes,whileinCameroonCEDsupportforbetterhousingwasexpressed.

InBrazil,therewasaparticularconcernrelatedtohavingtoabandonswiddenagriculture.ThisconcernwasdirectlyrelatedtotheproponentinterventionsatBrazilAcre,wherefarmerswereaskedtogiveupusingfireandengageinmore sustainableagriculturalpractices through theuseof anitrogen-fixinglegumeinordertoqualifyforadirectcashpayment.

No hopes or worries to express: AsubstantialproportionofrespondentswhohadabasicunderstandingabouttheREDD+projectdidnothaveanyhopesorworries to express.There are at least twoplausible explanations for thisfinding.First,ourcriterionformeasuringpeople’sunderstandingofREDD+or the local REDD+ projectwas kept at aminimum, becausewewantedtocaptureasmanyperspectivesaspossible,includingthosewithverybasicunderstanding.Therefore,oursetofrespondentsmayhaveincludedvillagerswhohadlittlebasicunderstandingofREDD+ortheprojectandwhothusdidnotyethaveacriticalviewonwhethertheREDD+projectwasbeneficialoraliabilitytotheirinterests.

Second, we posed the question at an early stage of REDD+ projectdevelopment,longbeforemostoftheprojectinterventionswereintroducedandperhapseven talkedabout, for reasonsdiscussedearlier.At theprojectsites where there was little project-related information or action, itmakessensethattherewouldbefewhopesandworriesexpressedbylocalpeople.

Implementing REDD+204 |

Box 11.1 Are REDD incentives in line with local people’s perceptions? Lessons from the Transamazon region of BrazilMarina Cromberg

Over the last decade, there has been much enthusiasm over the concept of payment for environmental services (PES), which is viewed as a complement to integrated conservation and development programme (ICDP) and command and control approaches. In the context of REDD+, PES schemes have been adopted by proponents of multiple subnational pilot REDD+ projects across the tropics. In many cases, however, the choice of this incentive type may be more in line with technical objectives than with the needs of local participants.

The pilot REDD+ project ’Sustainable Settlements in the Amazon: The challenge of transition from family production on the frontier to a low carbon economy’, proposed by the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) has three levels of action, one of which targets 350 families in the Brazilian Transamazon region that participated in Proambiente (a governmental programme that aimed to conciliate smallholder production with natural resource conservation). For these families, IPAM seeks to provide a package of incentives to conserve forests and increase agricultural production in deforested areas, including direct cash payments and investments in sustainable production techniques.

To understand if the REDD+ project incentives are in line with people’s interests and needs, we interviewed 137 families in the project site in July and August 2010. We first asked if the families had heard about the REDD+ project, and if so, if they could describe it. For the families that were able to accurately describe the project (43 families; 31%), we asked about their hopes and recommendations for it.

The results indicate that the majority of the families (26) hoped the project would improve their incomes. The second most commonly listed hope was that the project would contribute to sustainable production (14), and the third was that it would help protect forests (10). The main recommendation of local farmers was that the project should help make production systems more sustainable, through access to technical assistance, machinery and training (17). Other recommendations included providing benefits in accordance with farmers’ needs (8), receiving adequate/higher payments (6), avoiding false promises (4), and investing in infrastructure (3).

While almost all respondents hoped that the REDD+ project would increase household incomes, their recommendations revealed that non-monetary forms of compensation, used to enhance production systems, may be more important than direct cash payments. Indeed, farmers stated that current slash-and-burn agricultural practices have low economic returns and negative environmental impacts, but that they lacked the resources and skills to change these practices. Therefore, increasing household incomes indirectly through improved production techniques, as IPAM has contemplated in their REDD+ project, may be more effective than PES alone in terms of reducing emissions from deforestation. That said, such new agricultural practices and production alternatives must be introduced in accordance with local realities and knowledge to avoid interventions that are overly difficult for local producers to implement. REDD+ projects with incentive structures that are closely aligned with local needs may likely result in greater project effectiveness, efficiency and equitability.

| 205Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

11.3.4 Local recommendations for REDD+ projectsVillagers’ recommendations across thenineproject sites encompass awiderangeofissuesandcanbegroupedintosixmajorcategories(Table11.3).

Localrecommendationsforproject improvementvaried,butingeneralthethemeswereconsistentwithpeople’shopesandworries.Again,improvementand/ormaintenanceof income stoodout as themost frequent response atthemajorityofsites,referringtoincreasedincome,betterlivelihoodmeansto obtain income, and increased wellbeing. That said, there were varyingopinionsabouthowtoimproveincome.Somerespondentsoptedfordirectcash payments, others for in-kind compensation, and yet others preferredindirect support such as technical assistance in improving agriculturalproduction systems. Forest protection and reforestation of degraded landswereincludedasrecommendationsandweresuggestedtobelargelylinkedtothefunctionofforestsinsustainingpeople’swelfare.

Other important issues thatdidnot surface in thehopesandworrieswerecaptured clearly in villagers’ recommendations. Notably, villagers wantedproponentstocommunicatebetterabouttheirprojectsanddemonstratemoretransparency.Peoplealsowantedtoengageandparticipatemeaningfullyintheimplementationoftheproject.Importantly,villagers’recommendationsstrongly reflect the expectation that REDD+ projects respect and upholdcommunities’rights.

11.3.5 Putting the findings togetherThe findings clearly reveal that, from the perspective of villagers, positiveincome-relatedoutcomesareatoppriority.TheprocessofestablishingandimplementingREDD+projectsisalsoofimportancetovillagers.Forinstance,localpeoplewant tobe informedof theproject,participate in theproject,andwantittobeimplementedinatransparentmanner.Thisrelatestothe’Information’inthe4IsdiscussedinChapter2.InadequateinformationflowaboutREDD+ and theREDD+project – at least at the timeof thefieldresearch–wasreflectedinvillagers’limitedknowledgeandunderstandingofREDD+.ThisinturnexplainsaratherhighnumberofrespondentshavingnohopesandworriestoexpressaboutthelocalREDD+project.WhilemanyproponentsplantoconductREDD+outreachandtheFPICprocess, localpeoplemustbeabletogivetheirconsentto,orconversely,rejectaproject,basedonsufficientandaccurateinformation.

Onemayargue that there isnoneed toburdenvillagerswithoutreachonthebroad,complexandratherabstractconceptofREDD+,insofarasitmaynotdirectlyaffect theattainmentofemissionreductionsand improvementoflocallivelihoods.Weargue,however,thatlocalforestusersshouldknowabout the basic concept of REDD+ in order to understand howREDD+

Implementing REDD+206 |

Table 11.3 Local people’s recommendations for REDD+ projects

Villagers’ recommendations

Improved income and welfare

Improve, or at least not limit, local livelihoods

Support for local production systems such as provision of agricultural inputs, irrigation, soil improvement, reduction of transport costs, pest prevention, improved efficiency of agricultural production in fallows and expansion of agricultural land to increase income. Project should not be too restrictive on local land uses or livelihoods.

Increase income Government assistance to supplement income; direct cash payments; regular and larger payments from project

Improve services and infrastructure

Support to improve local utilities (water, electricity) and infrastructure (roads, schools, health centres, dams)

Provide incentives or compensation to not deforest

Provision of diversified income if people are no longer allowed to cut trees; compensation for protecting forests

Community engagement in the REDD+ process and implementation

Provide better information/community awareness about the project

Better presentation of the project by proponents to enhance community awareness; clarification of project goals with local people; openness and transparency about project; information on project updates; capacity building

Encourage community participation

Involvement of local people in project and project management; promotion of equitable participation; sufficient consultation with villagers before decisions are made; inclusion of villagers in decision making

Encourage community–government collaboration in managing forests

Increased enforcement and adherence to rules

Sustainable land use practices and forest protection

Strengthen sustainable agriculture

More sustainable and conservation friendly agricultural practices; ban on use of fire

Conserve or maintain existing forests

Maintenance of forest reserves for people’s livelihoods; protection of rubber gardens from large-scale agribusiness and timber plantations; education for conservation; imposition of sanctions on people who cleared too much land by requiring them to replant, reforest and protect and preserve forests

Benefits accrued at local level; equitable and transparent benefit distribution

Money must reach the community and increase value of direct cash payments; compensation should be in kind and not in cash; benefits to communities should be ongoing/continuous, particularly when people have to stop their activities; benefits should be shared accordingly among villagers; there should be a participatory management of funds and transparency

Strengthened community rights

Establishment of clear village management rights; joint efforts to claim communities’ rights; maintenance of villagers’ customary rights; land titles; establishment of clear village boundaries; promotion of tenure rights for the interests of the community

Realisation of project promises

Realisation of concrete results of the project; greater efficiency in projects so that they are not simply experimental, but definitive as well

| 207Local hopes and worries about REDD+ projects

projectswork,theopportunitiesandrisks,aswellasrightsandresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththeirparticipation,beforetheycangivetheirconsenttoacceptor rejectaREDD+projectwithin the frameworkofFPIC.Nonetheless, itmay be difficult to implement FPIC properly, especially since it has beensuggested thatFPIC isnotaone-offprocess, and shouldbecyclical as theproject advances and changes (Chapter 17), requiringmultiple knowledgesharingmomentsduringthecourseoftheprojectlifetime.

Towhatextentcanprojects’interventionsbeintunewithlocaldesires?Allof the projects analysed are planning to provide livelihood alternatives forvillagers,whichpotentiallyaddresssomeoftheexpectationsandconcernsofthelocalcommunities.Althoughrespondingtolocalconcernsisimportantto gain the support of these stakeholders, expecting a REDD+ project tocompletely fulfil people’s desires and needs is likely beyond the project’scapacityandmaynotberealistic,especiallygiventhatthebasicobjectiveofREDD+istoreducegreenhousegasemissions.

There are also major risks and costs associated with the implementationof REDD+ projects that must be internalised by the project proponents.Furthermore, the architecture of REDD+ projects is complex, thetechnological dimensions are intricate, and monitoring involves consciousefforts.Forexample,eventualbenefitsthatcanbedistributedtolocalpeoplewilldependonthecarbonproceedsthattheprojectisabletosecure.Ensuringfullandequitableparticipationcanbecostlyfortheprojectintermsoftimeandresources.ThequestionistowhatextentprojectswillremainsufficientlyattractiveforlocalcommunitiestochooseREDD+vis-à-visotherinitiativesthat are detrimental to forests, but more promising in terms of incomegenerationorlivelihood.Thekeychallengeistofulfiltheneedsanddesiresoflocalforestuserswithintheproject’sconstraintsandlimitations.

11.4 Conclusions and ways forwardPart of what makes REDD+ different from conventional conservationapproaches is thepossibilityof large income streams that couldpromote awin–winoutcomeofforestprotectionandimprovedlivelihoods.Thischapterexamines whether local forest users’ views of REDD+ projects reflect thiswin–winassertion.ThefindingshighlightthefactthatwherevillagerswereawareofREDD+and/orthelocalREDD+project,theyunderstoodthemainobjectivetobeforestprotection.However,theydidnotlinkforestprotectiontoimprovedincomesintermsofREDD+projectobjectives,despitethefactthat all projectsplan to support alternative livelihoods, and in some cases,apply PES. Further participation in REDD+ projects hinges on incomeimprovements,andproponentsneedtoaddressthelivelihoodandwellbeingconcernsoflocalstakeholders.

Implementing REDD+208 |

AnotherchallengefortheoverallREDD+effortisthatvillagersdependonproponents for information aboutREDD+and the localREDD+project;proponentsthereforehaveacriticalroleinfosteringlocalknowledgeaboutREDD+interventions.Itisexpectedthatproponentswouldstrivetoensurethatlocalpeople’sconcernsareobservedandrespectedinREDD+projects,butconflictsofinterestandpowerimbalancescanmakeproponents’effortstoprovideunbiasedinformationdifficult.Theremaybeaneedforindependentknowledgebrokers or legal advisers for the community, for examplewhenlegalagreementsaresigned,toallowthemtomakeinformeddecisions.

In summary, this study highlights the importance of incorporating localhopes and concerns into the design and implementation of REDD+. Italso underscores the need to improve the communication between projectproponentsandlocalstakeholders.Thehopes,worriesandrecommendationsexpressedbylocalpeopleinthesampledsitesseemedtoreflectexperiencesanddisappointmentswithpreviousconservationanddevelopmentinitiatives.SinceREDD+holdspromiseforbolsteringforestconservationaswellaslocallivelihoods,localpeoplepotentiallyhavemuchtogain,butalsomuchtoloseifthisnewforestmanagementregimefails.GiventhehighstakesofREDD+,itiscriticalthatlocalvoicesareheard,notonlybyprojectproponents,butalsobynationalandinternationaldecisionmakers.

12Chapter

Site selection for forest carbon projects Liwei Lin, Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Erin O. Sills and William D. Sunderlin

• Countrieswithahigherbiodiversityindexandjurisdictionswithmoreprotectedareaaremorelikelytohaveforestcarbonprojects,corroboratingproponents’assertionsthattheyconsiderbiodiversityco-benefitswhenselectingsites.

• JurisdictionswithhigherdeforestationratesandforestcarbondensitiesinBrazilandIndonesiaaremore likely tohave forestcarbonprojects,consistentwithafocusonadditionality.However,projectsalsotendtobelocatedinmoreremote(andpossiblylessthreatened)areasinBrazil.

• Villages inside project boundaries (in a sample of REDD+ projectsstudied by CIFOR) depend largely on agriculture, emphasising thechallenge of reducing deforestation without undermining agriculture-basedlivelihoods.

12.1 IntroductionProjectsareakeypartoftheREDD+landscape.Over200projectsarebeingimplementedordevelopedinaround40countries(Kshatriyaet al.2011).In2010,REDD+projectsaccountedforthelargestshareoftransactionsinthe

Implementing REDD+210 |

voluntarycarbonmarket (Peters-Stanleyet al.2011).As themostconcreteembodimentoftheongoinginternationalpolicydiscussionsaboutREDD+,projectsareakeyreferencepointforunderstandinghowREDD+willunfoldontheground.TheyarealsoavaluablesourceoflessonsforfutureREDD+implementation,asdiscussedinChapters9,10,11and14(tenure,proponentchallenges,hopesandworries, andMRVin localprojects) aswell asotherliterature(e.g.Harveyet al.2010b;Hajeket al.2011).

Previous research assessing the distribution of REDD+ initiatives acrosscountriesfoundbiasesagainst Africaandtowards countrieswithhigherforestcarbon stocks (Wertz-KanounnikoffandKongphan-Apirak2009;Cerbu et al.2011).Inaddition,Cerbuet al.(2011)foundthathigherbiodiversityandgovernanceindicatorsincreasetheprobabilityofacountryhavingREDD+projects. But to date there has been no attempt to assess the subnationalgeographyofREDD+projects.Thisismorechallengingduetothelackofconsolidated information on the boundaries of REDD+ projects (unlikeprotectedareas,forexample)andbecausetheirpreciseboundariesareofteninfluxand/orconfidentialuntiltheyarepresentedforvalidationbyacarbonoffsetstandard.

Inthischapter,weusedataonthe jurisdictions(countries,municipalitiesordistricts, and villages)where projects are located to obtain insights into siteselection.Thelocationofprojectsisimportantbecauseitshapesthepossibilitiesforadditionalityandfor learningfromexperience.First,however,wediscusssourcesofinformationonforestcarbonprojectsandupdateinformationfoundinSillset al.(2009)onwhoandwhatareinvolvedintheseprojects.

12.2 Information sources on projectsThischapterdrawsonthreesourcesofinformationaboutREDD+projects(Figure 12.1). The first is a catalogue of global forest carbon projectsdeveloped under theGlobalComparative Study (GCS) onREDD+ (seeAppendix)(Kshatriyaet al.2011).Thiscataloguebuildsonandcomplementsothereffortstotrackprojects,asdescribedinBox12.1.Thecataloguewascompiled through internet searches (including thewebsites listed inBox12.1), email correspondence and interviews with project proponents, areviewofthegreyliteratureoncarbonoffsetprojects,andexpertinputonindividual countries. It includes projects in all stages of implementation,frominitialplanningtothosethataresellingverifiedcarboncredits.

Second, with the assistance of CIFOR staff and associates in Brazil andIndonesia, we were able to obtain more detailed information on theproponents and jurisdictions (municipality ordistrict)whereprojects arelocatedinthesecountries.Wealsocontactedmanyoftheproponents–33(75%)ofprojectsinIndonesiaand20(56%)inBrazil–forinformationon

| 211Site selection for forest carbon projects

Figure 12.1 Distribution of REDD+ projects

0

1

2

3 0 1 2 3 4 5

0 4–6 10–19 >35

1–3 7–9 20–34 GCS research sites

Brazil

Number of REDD+ projects by municipality

Distribution of REDD+ projects by country

Number of REDD+ projects by district

Indonesia

theirbasicstrategies.OurfocusonBrazilandIndonesiaismotivatedbythefactthattheygeneratemorethanhalfofglobalemissionsfromdeforestation(Murray and Olander 2008), have the largest numbers of forest carbonprojects (Kshatriyaet al.2011)andareamongthe top threecountries intermsoftotalforestcarbonstock(Saatchiet al.2011).

Third, for 20 projects in theGCS (in six countries), we also have basicinformation on villages located both inside and adjacent to the projects,gathered as part of the sample selection process for the before-after-control-impact(BACI)evaluationmethoddescribedintheAppendix.Thisinformationwasgatheredfromkeyinformants,secondarystatisticsandfieldvisits.1Thedatabaseincludes148villageslocatedwithintheboundariesofREDD+projectsand170villageslocatedoutsideoftheprojectboundariesbutinthesameregion.Whilethisdoesnotrepresentarandomsampleofvillages,itbroadlycharacterisesthetypesofvillagesinREDD+projects.

12.3 Overview of forest carbon projectsWe define REDD+ projects as interventions to increase, quantify andreport forest carbon stocks relative to business as usual reference scenarios

1 ThisGCSresearchinstrumentanddatabasearecalledthe’VillageAppraisalForm’.

Implementing REDD+212 |

Box 12.1 Catalogues of REDD+ projectsMrigesh Kshatriya and Liwei Lin

There are several platforms that catalogue and present information on REDD+ projects. In 2011, CIFOR launched a global catalogue of forest carbon projects with a map interface and links to further information on the projects, available at http://www.forestsclimatechange.org/redd-map. Other organisations that are tracking the development of REDD+ projects or forest carbon projects can be categorised into the following:

• Standard-setting organisations such as CCBA, VCS and Plan Vivo

• Environmental NGOs such as the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM), Global Canopy Programme, and Forest Trends (including Forest Carbon Portal and Carbon Catalog)

• Research organisations such as CIFOR and IGES (see below)

• Intergovernmental organisations such as UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and World Bank Carbon Finance Unit.

In addition to the CIFOR catalogue, the following websites are good starting points for information on REDD+ projects:

The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) (http://www.climate-standards.org)The CCBA is a consortium of environmental NGOs and IGOs that have developed standards for evaluating forest carbon projects. Of the 75 projects that have been, and are currently being, audited, 20 are in Africa, 17 in Asia, and 25 in Latin America, with the rest in the USA and Europe.

Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) (http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.org)The VCS was founded to provide quality assurance in the certification of projects in the voluntary carbon market. The website contains information on over 750 projects from forest conservation to the waste disposal sector, but only 22 that fall within the agriculture, forestry or land use category in developing countries.

Plan Vivo(http://www.planvivo.org/projects/registeredprojects/) Plan Vivo Foundation is a registered UK NGO that has created standards for designing and certifying community-based forest projects. The Plan Vivo project registry has 17 projects, 10 operating in Africa, 3 in Asia and 4 in Latin America.

Forest Carbon Portal (http://www.forestcarbonportal.com)Developed by Ecosystem Marketplace, a programme of the US-based NGO Forest Trends, Forest Carbon Portal has a searchable database of forest carbon offset projects around the world. The aim of this inventory is to link

| 213Site selection for forest carbon projects

forest carbon projects to carbon markets, and it is designed for a broad range of stakeholders. Of the 40 REDD+ projects on this platform, 11 are in Africa, 2 in Asia and 21 in Latin America, with the remainder in North America and Europe.

Carbon Catalog (http://www.carboncatalog.org/)Carbon Catalog is an independent directory of carbon credits, also recently acquired by Ecosystem Marketplace. It lists 136 carbon providers from nonprofit and commercial organisations, and includes 627 projects worldwide. Of the projects in the forestry sector, 27 are in Africa, 16 in Asia and 22 in Latin America.

The REDD Countries Database (RCD)(http://www.theredddesk.org/countries)The RCD – part of the REDD desk platform – is an independent database of activities on the ground, which has been developed by the Global Canopy Programme and the Forum on Readiness for REDD in collaboration with in country research organisations. Currently, the RCD includes information on 144 REDD+ initiatives (subnational projects and readiness activities) in seven countries.

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) (http://redd-database.iges.or.jp/redd/)The IGES is an international research institute established under the Japanese government. The IGES REDD+ online database describes projects and country readiness activities. With a total of 29 projects, 3 are in Africa, 17 in Asia and 9 in Latin America.

inageographicallydefinedsubnationalareaofadeveloping(non-AnnexI)country.Thereisoftenambiguityaboutwhetherthe‘plus’inREDD+includesaf/reforestation (AR). In existing compliance markets, there is a distinctline between REDD projects (which intend to reduce deforestation orforestdegradation)andARprojects (whichcreatenewforests).Accordingto the rules laidoutunder theKyotoprotocol,only the latter are eligibleto participate in the CDM. This line is blurred, however, with REDD+projects.Manyprojects self-labelled asREDD+ include some componentoftreeplanting,whethermotivatedbyadesiretoensurethesupplyofwoodproducts,orgenerateemploymentormarketcredits thatcanbe linkedtonewtreesinthelandscape.Weincludeafforestationprojectsthatareplantingtreesonlyoutsideexistingforestswithinthebroadercategoryof‘forestcarbon’projects.Wedefine‘REDD+projects’asforestcarbonprojectsthatincludeatleastsomeinterventioninexistingforestareas,beitavoidingdeforestation,avoiding degradation, restoring forest or improving forest management.

Implementing REDD+214 |

Table 12.1 Number of REDD+ projects in Brazil and Indonesia by goals and activities

Number of projects pursuing each goal/activity

Brazil Indonesia

Goals

Avoided deforestation (AD) 20 28

Avoided degradation (Adg) 14 23

Restoration (RS) 13 21

Activities

Community forest management (CFM) 12 18

Monitoring and enforcement (Enforcement) 15 22

Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP)

16 23

Payment for ecosystem services (PES) 14 20

Total REDD+ projects contacted 20 33

Thisincludesearlieravoideddeforestationprojects(cataloguedinCaplowet al.2011)launchedpriortoREDD+butwhichhaveremainedactivesinceitsadvent.

12.3.1 Goals and activitiesFocusingonBrazilandIndonesia,nearlyall(48outof53)oftheREDD+project proponents whom we contacted cited reduced deforestation asone of their goals, and of these, over 40 also cited reduced degradationor restoration of forests (Table 12.1). Many proponents indicated thattheywerepursuingallofourlistedgoals:avoidingdeforestation,avoidingdegradation, restoring forest and afforestation (Figure 12.2). We askedthe proponents whether they were accomplishing these goals throughcommunityforestmanagement,monitoringandenforcementofforestlawsandregulations,integratedconservationanddevelopmentinitiativesaroundprotected areas (ICDP), and/orpayments for ecosystem services (PES, ascash or in-kind rewards). A few proponents noted additional activities,like dissemination of new technologies such as improved cookstoves andreduced-impactlogging.Table12.1andFigure12.2summarisetheresults,whichconfirmthatmostbutnotallproponentsareplanningconditional,performance-basedpaymentsinthespiritofpaymentforecosystemservices(PES).AlloftheIndonesianprojectsplanningPESandnearlyall(13)ofthe

| 215Site selection for forest carbon projects

BrazilianprojectsplanningPESarealsoinvestinginimprovedmonitoringand enforcementor ICDP-type interventions, consistentwith thehybridmodeldiscussedinChapter10.

Thismixofstrategiesisalsoconsistentwiththerangeofdeforestationpressurestakenonbyprojects.InIndonesia,theproponentswecontactedindicatedinroughlyequalnumbersthattheyarefocusedprimarilyon“changingthebehaviourof actorswhoare currentlydeforestingordegrading the forestinthespecificlocalareaoftheproject”oron“preventingorpre-emptinganticipatedfuturedeforestationordegradationthreats”(e.g.developmentof palm oil plantations by companies from outside the project area). InBrazil,proponentswereslightlymorelikelytosaythattheirprojectsfocusedonpreventingfuturethreatsratherthanchangingthebehaviourofcurrentactors. Better enforcementmay be themost commonly cited strategy inpart because it is relevant to both types of threats, whereas communityforestmanagement,integratedconservationanddevelopment,andPESaretypically implementedwithlocalpopulationswhohavesometraditionofusing (andhave traditionalproperty rights to) the local forest. Inproject

Figure 12.2 Number of projects in Brazil and Indonesia pursuing different combinations of goals and activities

AD + Adg + RS + AF

AD: avoided deforestation Adg: avoided degradation AF: a�orestationRS: restoration

CFM: community forest managementEnforcement: monitoring and enforcementICDP: integrated conservation and

development projectsPES: Payment for ecosystem services

PES + CFM + Enforcement + ICDP

Any two of the strategies

ICDP

CFM + PES + Enforcement

PES + Enforcement + ICDP

Other combination of three strategies

Number of projects

A: Project goals

Any two of the goals

AD

Adg

AD + RS + AF in BrazilAD + Adg + RS in Indonesia

20151050

Number of projects

B: Project strategies

20151050

Implementing REDD+216 |

siteswhereoutsideactors(whodonothaveatraditionoforrightstoforestuse) are themain deforestation threat, it ismore challenging to counterthisthreatwithperformance-basedpayments,integratedconservationanddevelopment, or community forestmanagement.Another type of hybridstrategyemployedbyprojectsistousethesestrategiestobuildlocalalliancesandsupportforwardingoffexternalthreatsofdeforestation(seeBox12.2).

12.3.2 Key playersForest carbon projects are being implemented by governments,nongovernmentalorganisationsandtheprivatesector,resultinginsignificantvariationinemphasisandeffectiveness(Agrawalet al.2011).Themajorityof forest carbon projects that we catalogued are being implemented byNGOs,typicallywithenvironmentalorsustainabledevelopmentmissions(seeVirgilioet al.2010).TheGCSsampleillustratesthistrend,withprojectsled by international environmental organisations such as ConservationInternational,TheNatureConservancy,FaunaandFloraInternational,andtheJaneGoodallInstitute;internationaldevelopmentorganisationssuchasCAREandSNV;andnationalenvironmentalorganisationssuchasAmazonEnvironmentalResearchInstitute,TanzaniaForestConservationGroupandtheCentreforEnvironmentandDevelopment(seelistofCIFORprojectsites in theAppendixon theGCS).Outof107 forestcarbonprojects inBrazilandIndonesia,65(61%)areledbyNGOs.Ofthese,20(30%)areled byNGOs based in theUnited States,with others fromEurope (e.g.Germany, Switzerland and UK), Asia (e.g. Australia and Japan) and thehostcountries.InBrazilandIndonesia,thereisaprivatesectorproponentin 43% of projects. Examples from theGCS sample of projects includeprivate consulting groups like Mazars Starling Resources in Indonesiaand GFA Consulting Group in Cameroon. Finally, local governmentsareoftenpartners inproject implementationandare taking the lead rolein jurisdictional projects (e.g. the Brazilian state of Acre and IndonesianprovinceofAceh).

Otherkeyplayers in theproject landscape include fundersand standardsorganisations,alongwiththecertifiersorauditorswhoverifycompliancewiththosestandards.AsdiscussedinChapter7,fundersincludephilanthropicdonors,theprivate(forprofit)sector,andgovernmentsthroughmultilateralinitiatives (UN-REDD Programme, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility,Forest Investment Program andCongo Basin Forest Fund) and bilateralaid.Themost prominent donor of bilateral aid has been theNorwegiangovernmentthroughitsInternationalClimateandForestsInitiative,whichhaspledgedoverUS$680million forREDD+(Tipper2011), includingbothREDD+ projects and readiness activities.The next biggest bilateraldonortoREDD+istheUnitedKingdom(ClimateFundsUpdate2012).

| 217Site selection for forest carbon projects

Box 12.2 Integrating conservation tools in the Bolsa Floresta programme, Brazilian AmazonJan Börner and Sven Wunder

The Juma Sustainable Development Reserve (SDR Juma) REDD project started in 2007 as part of the Bolsa Floresta programme in the largest Brazilian state, Amazonas. Bolsa Floresta is an ambitious conservation programme covering over 1 million hectares in 15 of Amazonas State’s protected areas. The SDR Juma lies relatively close to the rapidly expanding agricultural frontier of Apuí, in the southeastern corner of Amazonas. Its population consists mainly of traditional small-scale producers who, apart from staple crop production, rely heavily on forest product use and fishing for subsistence. Projected future deforestation is nonetheless high for Juma, as cattle production is expected to gradually encroach onto its southern and eastern boundaries.

The Bolsa Floresta programme engages primarily with the local population in the protected areas and intends to promote good forest stewardship through conditional conservation incentives and interventions aimed at improving quality of life. As such, it innovatively combines different conservation policies, including ICDPs and PES. First, direct PES under Bolsa Floresta is a well-disseminated and locally popular innovation in Amazonas, but represents only a small share of total programme spending. Second, Bolsa Floresta improves local health services and education, thus compensating for the general underprovision of public services in these remote protected areas. Third, local resident associations are being strengthened, including for example, in SDR Juma through improved river transport offered to residents through local associations. Fourth, Bolsa Floresta promotes alternative production strategies in the villages through ICDP-type interventions (e.g. small animal husbandry, on-farm processing for value-added products) in order to make production systems more intensive and sustainable.

The programme thus aims to address a well-known Achilles heel of the recently quite successful Brazilian strategy for reducing Amazon deforestation through establishment of protected areas and enforcement of other conservation regulations. Effective regulation hinges on frequent and expensive field presence and may have local livelihood costs. In response, Bolsa Floresta is designed to buffer local household-level income losses resulting from compliance with protected area rules (PES component), provide improved organisation and compensatory collective benefits (association and social components) and reduce local dependence on forest degrading activities (alternative income component). Hence, the programme implementer Sustainable Amazon Foundation (FAS) hopes to enhance conservation alliances with local residents through the integration of these components, and thus bolster the integrity of protected areas even if pressure from outside increases as the agricultural frontier gradually approaches. Evidence from older Amazon colonisation frontiers suggests that stable forest-agriculture mosaics can emerge from smallholder-dominated landscapes, thus avoiding the more common conversion to extensive pasturelands. Bolsa Floresta is an attempt to move in that direction, and time will tell the extent of its success.

Implementing REDD+218 |

The leading standards for REDD+ projects are the Climate, CommunityandBiodiversityProjectDesignStandards(CCBStandards)andtheVerifiedCarbonStandard(VCS)(Diazet al.2011),discussedfurtherinChapters14and17.Winrock’sAmericanCarbonRegistryalsohasastandardforforestcarbonprojects,includingamethodforREDD+basedonavoidingplanneddeforestation,andisdevelopingastandardforprojectsnestedinjurisdictionalREDD+systems.California’sClimateActionReserveincludesforestcarbonprojectsintheUSandisdevelopingaprotocolforREDD+projectsinMexico.Plan Vivo has been used primarily for agroforestry and af/reforestationprojectsbuthasREDD+projectsinitscertificationpipeline.OtherstandardsincludeCarbonFixforaf/reforestationprojectsandtherelativelynewGlobalConservation Standard for carbon stocks in protected areas (Merger et al.2011).BoththeorganisationscoordinatingdevelopmentofthesestandardsandmostoftheauditorsthatcertifycompliancewiththestandardsarefromthesamegroupofOECDcountriesasthedonors.However,Brazilisapartialexceptiontothisrule,withtwonationalstandards(SocialCarbonmanagedbytheEcologicaInstituteandBrasil Mata Vivamanagedbythe Bolsa de Títulos e Ativos Ambientais do Brasil),aswellasSocialandEnvironmentalPrinciplesandCriteriadevelopedbyBrazilianNGOsasguidelines for implementingREDD+intheBrazilianAmazon.

12.4 Project location12.4.1 Why location mattersInordertoachieveadditionality,itwouldbelogicaltolocateprojectswheresignificant deforestation or forest degradation is expected.As suggested bythe literature on PES in Costa Rica, an intervention cannot have muchincremental impacton reducingdeforestationwheredeforestation ratesarealreadylow(Sánchez-Azofeifaet al.2007).However,thisdoesnotruleoutthe possibility that interventions could encourage forest regeneration and/orbettermanagementofforests(Danielset al.2010;Arriagadaet al.2012),especially in a setting likeCostaRicawith relatively clear land tenure andgoodgovernance(Pagiola2008).ExtendingthistoREDD+,anecessary–butnotsufficient–conditionforreducingemissionsfromdeforestation(RED)is the presence of a significant stock of forest carbon threatenedby futuredeforestation,asindicatedbyrecentdeforestationtrendsandthepresenceofdeforestationdrivers(e.g.roads).Ifthisconditionisnotmet,thenREDD+interventionsmustachieveadditionalitythroughtheD+(avoideddegradationorenhancementofforestcarbonstocks).

Some have questioned “how many REDD+ projects would truly fallwithin…theagriculturalfrontier,where,intheabsenceofREDD+,mostdeforestation is likely tooccur and thus the greatest additionality canbeachieved. An examination of some cases in Mexico and Honduras, for

| 219Site selection for forest carbon projects

example, reveals the highest deforestation in areas where governmentalforestryandenvironmentalagencieshaveleastaccessduetosocialconflictsand where no REDD+ activities are being planned” (Louman et al. 2011:368). This highlights the tradeoff between locating projects wherethere is the most deforestation to be avoided and locating them whereeffective interventions canbe implemented realistically.Thisdependsnotonlyongovernanceconditions,butalsoontheopportunitycostsofforestconservationandtheoperatingcostsforprojects.TheanalysisbyBuschet al. (2012) suggests likely site selection forREDD+projects in Indonesiabased on a given carbonprice and the distributionof opportunity costs.Agrawal and co-authors suggest that existingREDD+projectshavebeentailored primarily to provide social and ecological co-benefits valued byearly investors, while in the future, “the segment of the carbon marketlikely to expand themostmaybe theone inwhich social andecologicalco-benefitsreceivelesserattention”(Agrawalet al. 2011:384).Wethereforeconsiderforestcarbonstocks,deforestationratesanddrivers,andindicatorsofgovernance,opportunitycostsandco-benefitsaspotentialdeterminantsofoptimalsiteselection.Understandingpatternsinsiteselectiontodateisafirststeptowardsmeetingthechallengesofidentifyingoptimalsitesforfutureprojects,designingnestedREDD+systemsthatincludeprojects,andgeneralisingortransferringlessonsfromREDD+projects.

12.4.2 Cross-country distributionThe two countries with the highest emissions from land use changeare Brazil and Indonesia (Houghton 2009). As reported by Houghton(2009), different methods suggest somewhat different rankings of othercountries,butinadditiontoBrazilandIndonesia,topemittersmayincludeDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Myanmar,NigeriaandVenezuela.Thecross-countrydistributionofREDD+projectscanalsobecomparedtothedistributionoftotalforestcarbonstocks,whichhavebeenestimatedtobehighestinBrazil,Colombia,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,IndonesiaandPeru(Saatchiet al.2011).However,thereissignificantvariationacrossstudies(Gibbset al.2007).

AsofNovember2011,CIFOR’sglobalcataloguelistedforestcarbonprojectsin 51 non-Annex I countries.Of these, nine countries only have projectsengaged exclusively inAR, but there are 43 countrieswith at least one ofthemorethan200REDD+projectsworldwide.ThiswidespreadofprojectsacrossmanycountriesisimportantforinformingthedevelopmentofafutureREDD+regime,whichwillhavetobeinclusivetoavoidbeingunderminedbyinternationalleakage(MurrayandOlander2008).However,whilemanycountries have one or two projects, most are highly concentrated in justthreecountries:Brazil,IndonesiaandPeru.Weexaminethesecross-countrypatternsandtheirpossibleunderlyingcauses.

Implementing REDD+220 |

In Indonesia, there are51 forest carbonprojects, ofwhich seven appearto be exclusively engaged in AR. The other 44 (many in Kalimantan)involvesomecombinationofreduceddeforestation,reduceddegradation,restoration, reforestation and forest management. We have catalogued56projectsinBrazil,whichcanbedividedinto20thatinvolveonlyAR,mostlylocatedintheAtlanticcoastalforestregion,and36thatinvolvesomecombinationofstrategiesthatcouldbelabelledREDD+,mostlylocatedintheAmazon.Peruhas41forestcarbonprojects,including22thatappeartobepursuingonlyAR.TheconcentrationofprojectsinBrazilandIndonesiais consistentwith their global importance as sources ofGHGemissionsfromlandusechange(MurrayandOlander2008).However,assuggestedbyPhelpset al.(2010a)andCalmelet al.(2010),factorsotherthanforestcarbonclearlyalsoplayanimportantroleintheselectionofcountriesforREDD+ projects.Democratic Republic of theCongo, for example, hasjust11projects(fourfocusedexclusivelyonAR),despiteitsimportanceintermsofbothforestcarbonemissionsandstocks.Similarly,Colombiahasahighforestcarbonstockyetonly10projects(fiveexclusivelyAR),andwehaveidentifiedonlyoneprojecteachinVenezuelaandNigeriaandnoneinMyanmar.

Lin(forthcoming)examinesthedistributionofREDD+projectsacrosstropicaldevelopingcountries(asubsetofthenon-AnnexIcountriesundertheKyotoProtocol).Of these86countries inAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmerica,48haveatleastoneforestcarbonproject.Aftercontrollingforlandarea,population,GDP,governance indexandrateof forest loss, shefinds that theprobabilityof forest carbon projects in a country is positively related to the country’sbiodiversity (asmeasured by theGlobalEnvironment FacilityBenefit IndexforBiodiversity(Pandeyet al.2008)),thepercentofthecountryinterrestrialprotected areas (from the World Database on Protected Areas (IUCN andUNEP2010)),andtheexperienceofthecountrywithremotesensingandtheCDM(fromResourcesfortheFuture[RFF]’sForestCarbonIndex(Devenyet al.2009)).Thisisconsistentwiththestatedprioritygiventobiodiversityinprojectdocuments,asreportedbyCerbuet al.(2011).ItmaypartlyexplainthelargenumberofprojectsinPeru,whichhasahighbiodiversityindex(7thoutofthe86countries)inadditiontoalargeforestcarbonstockandsupportivegovernmentpolicy.

12.4.3 Subnational geographyToassess subnationalpatterns in site selection,we identified thenumberof projects in eachmunicipality in Brazil and district in Indonesia.Thisallowedustoevaluatewhetherprojectshavebeentargetedtojurisdictionswithsignificantcarbonemissionsfromdeforestationthatcouldpotentiallybe reduced by project interventions. We obtained data on deforestationratesfromHansenet al.(2008),whomapgrossforestcoverlossbetween

| 221Site selection for forest carbon projects

2000 and2005; forest carbon fromRFF’s ForestCarbon Index (Devenyet al.2009);andpercent forestcover in2000 fromtheglobal landcoverdatabase(EC2003).

Figures12.3and12.4 showboxandwhiskerplots2 fordeforestationrates,forestcarbondensity,andforestcovercomparingmunicipalitiesinBrazilanddistrictsinIndonesiawithandwithoutREDD+projects.Wehavesubdividedeachcountryintotheforestfrontierregions(theBrazilianLegalAmazonandIndonesia’sOuter Islands, shown in lightgrey)and themoreeconomicallydevelopedregions(BraziloutsideoftheAmazonandtheislandofJava,shownindarkgrey).FortheLegalAmazonandtheOuterIslands,theboxplotsshowthatprojectstendtobelocatedinplaceswithhigherforestcoverandhigherforest carbon content, but not necessarily higher deforestation rates. Thissuggeststhatprojectsaretargetedtoplaceswithlargestocksofforestcarbon,butwhicharenotnecessarilyfacingthreatstothosestocks.However,whilethemedianforestcoverandforestcarbondensityarehigherformunicipalitiesanddistrictswithREDD+projects,theinner-quartilerangesoverlap.Inotherwords, there is also great variability in all threemeasures of forest carbon,indicatingthatthereareotherfactorsdrivingsiteselection.Controllingforthese factors couldprovideaclearerpictureofhowsite selection relates toforestcarbon.

InselectingsitesforREDD+projects,proponentsarelikelytoalsoconsiderthe costs or difficulty of reducing emissions and the potential for co-benefits(seelistofproxymeasuresinTable12.2).Manyofthefactorsthatencourage deforestation are also likely to increase the difficulty and costof project implementation, e.g. high opportunity costs, high populationdensity, unclear tenure and poor governance. Thus, factors such as roador population density could either increase the likelihood of projects bycreatingthepotentialforadditionality,ordecreasethelikelihoodbymakingitdifficulttoeffectivelyreducedeforestation.Wecompilesubnationaldataonpopulationdensityfromnationalcensusagencies,andonroaddensityfromtheDigitalChartoftheWorld(totalmetersofroadsdividedbythesizeoftheadministrativeunitinsquaremeters)(DMA1992).RFF’sForestCarbonIndexalsoincludesadirectmeasureofopportunitycost(Naidooand Iwamura 2007). Key co-benefits expected from REDD+ includebiodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation.We proxy for potentialbiodiversityco-benefitswithpercentoflandinprotectedareas(IUCNandUNEP2010)andforpotentialpovertyalleviationco-benefitswithpovertyindices(fromnationalcensusagencies).

2 Boxplotsshowthedistributionofthedataset.Thelineinsidetherectanglerepresentsthemedianofthedistribution.Theupperandlowerboundariesoftherectangleindicatetheupperquartile(25%)andthelowerquartile(25%),respectively.Thetwolinesoutsideoftherectanglearelowerextremeandupperextremevalues.

Implementing REDD+222 |

Figure 12.3 Comparison of municipalities with at least one REDD+ project to municipalities with no REDD+ projects, subdivided into municipalities in the Legal Amazon vs. the rest of Brazil (‘outside’)

% F

ores

t cov

er

100

80

60

40

20

0

Excludes outside values

Excludes outside values

Without project With project

Fore

st c

arbo

n (t

C/ha

)

250

200

150

100

50

0

Without project With project

% F

ores

t los

s 20

00–2

005

10

8

6

4

2

0

Without project With project

Amazon Outside

Amazon Outside

Amazon Outside

| 223Site selection for forest carbon projects

Figure 12.4 Comparison of districts with at least one REDD+ project to districts with no REDD+ projects, subdivided into districts on the Outer Islands (outside the provinces of Java) vs. Java

% F

ores

t cov

er

100

80

60

40

20

0

Excludes outside values

Without project With project

Outer Islands Java

Fore

st c

arbo

n (t

C/ha

)

250

200

150

100

50

0

Without project With project

Outer Islands Java

Excludes outside values

% F

ores

t los

s 20

00–2

005

5

4

3

2

1

0

Without project With project

Outer Islands Java

Implementing REDD+224 |

Table 12.2 Mean values of factors considered in site selection in municipalities or districts with and without REDD+ projects

Brazil Indonesia

With REDD+

Without REDD+

With REDD+

Without REDD+

Forest carbon (tC/ha) 145 117 153 116

Deforestation rate (% of forest cover)

2.4 0.9 2.3 1.3

Opportunity cost (US $/ha) 915 833 547 788

Land in protected areas (%) 28.2 8.3 25.9 11.8

Poverty (headcount ratio) 0.39 0.41 0.14 0.17

Population density (per km2) 112 105 98.7 959

Road density (per km2) 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.11

Area (km2) 12 132 1262 10 191 3923

Observations 155 5414 48 392

Table12.3reports the resultsofacount regressionmodelof thenumberofforestcarbonprojectsinaBrazilianmunicipalityorIndonesiandistricton these explanatory variables.The number of projects is positively andsignificantly related to both forest carbon density and the deforestationrate, controlling for other factors in thismultivariatemodel.There is nostatisticallysignificantrelationshipwithopportunitycosts,butroaddensityis negatively related to the number of projects inBrazil.Controlling fordeforestationrate,projectsaremorelikelytobeplacedininaccessibleareas,perhapsbecauseof theexpectationthat itwillbeeasierand lesscostly toreduceactivitiesthatinvolvedeforestationordegradationinareasthatarefarfrommarkets.Populationdensityandpovertyratesareonlystatisticallysignificant in Brazil, with more projects expected in municipalities withhigher population density but lower poverty (all else equal). Thus, theevidence ismixed on the role of expected poverty alleviation co-benefitsinsiteselection.However,thecoefficientsonpercentoflandinprotectedareas are positively and strongly significant in both models, suggestingthat proponents and donors are attracted by the potential biodiversitybenefits of conserving forest near protected areas.This could be becausebothprojectsandprotectedareasarelocatedinbiodiversity-richforests,orbecauseproponentsprefertoestablishprojectsnearprotectedareas,whichsignal biodiversity co-benefits to themarket and perhaps also offer someadvantagesinmonitoringandenforcement.

| 225Site selection for forest carbon projects

Manyofthesamefactorsaresignificant indifferentversionsofthemodel.For example,we canestimate themodelonly forREDD+(rather thanallforestcarbon)projects,includingonlymunicipalitiesordistrictsintheforestfrontier (Amazon andOuter Islands) and considering only the probabilityofhavingatleastoneproject(ratherthanthecountofprojects).Acrossthevariouspossible combinations, the results that aremost robust arepositiveassociationswithpercentageoflandinprotectedareas,deforestationrateandforestcarbon.3

3 Forexample,inlogisticregressionsoftheprobabilityofatleastoneREDD+projectinamunicipalityintheAmazonordistrictintheOuterIslandsofIndonesia(estimationresultsnotreportedhere),mostvariablesretaintheirsignandstatisticalsignificance.TheonlynotablechangeinsignofacoefficientisondeforestationintheBrazilianAmazon:higherdeforestationratesareassociatedwithalowerprobabilityofaREDD+project,perhapsbecausethoseareasareconsideredlostcausesandthereforedonotattractprojects.

Table 12.3 Negative binomial models of the count of forest carbon projects in a Brazilian municipality or Indonesian district

Brazil Indonesia

Variable Coefficient Mean Coefficient Mean

Forest carbon (in 100s of tC/ha)

0.970*** 1.18 0.487** 1.21

Deforestation rate 0.087*** 1.06 0.104** 1.46

Opportunity cost (in 1000s US $)

0.121 0.83 −0.191 0.76

% of land in protected area 0.586*** 9.95 1.877*** 13.38

Poverty rate (Poverty headcount ratio)

−1.162* 0.41 1.472 0.17

Population density (in 1000s per km2)

0.411*** 0.07 −1.581 0.87

Road density −10.850*** 0.08 −2.047 0.11

Area (in 10 000 km2) 0.428*** 0.18 0.568*** 0.48

Constant −4.061*** −3.181***

Observations 4134 391

Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% (*) level.

Note: In the negative binomial model, an additional overdispersion parameter is estimated. As expected, this parameter is significantly different from zero in the models for both Brazil and Indonesia.

Implementing REDD+226 |

Finally,wenotethatthereareimportantfactorsomittedfromthismodelduetolackofdata.BasedoninterviewswithREDD+projectproponents4duringUNFCCCCOP15inDecember2009,Linet al.(2012)foundthatthetopfivefactorsinproponentdecisionsaboutwheretolocateREDD+projectswithincountriesarethedeforestationrate,forestcarboncontent,biodiversity,interestof donors and governance. Our model confirms that the first three factorshavebeenimportantinsiteselectionforREDD+projects,butwecannottestgovernanceorthegeographicalinterestofdonorsduetolackofdata.

12.4.4 Local boundariesFor REDD+ projects in theGCS sample, we gain further insight on siteselectionbycharacterisingvillageslocatedwithinprojectboundaries(whichwelabel‘REDD+villages’)incomparisontovillagesinthesameregionbutoutside project boundaries. Again, we have larger samples for Brazil andIndonesia,sowereportresultsforthosecountriesseparately,inadditiontooverallresultsforprojectsinallsixcountrieswheretheGCSisconductingresearchattheprojectscale(Table12.4).

This comparison suggests that villages are significantly more likely to beselectedforREDD+projectsifforestconservationNGOswereactiveinthevillageinthepast5years.ThisisconsistentwiththecommonperceptionofREDD+as anew sourceof funds for existing forest conservationprojects,raisingpotentialadditionalityconcerns(Ingramet al.2009;Sillset al.2009).However, it could also be interpreted as a sign that REDD+ projects aremorelikelytosucceed,sincetheyarebuildingonpreviouseffortsbyforestconservation organisations. InBrazil, this is consistentwith the pattern insocialcapital: thereareonaveragemorefunctionalgroupsororganisations(e.g. farmers groups, credit groups and education committees) inREDD+villages as compared toothervillages in the region.However, theoppositeis true in Indonesia and in the global sample: there are statistically fewerfunctionalgroupsinREDD+villages.

Onaverage,REDD+villagesaremoreremote,asmeasuredbydistancefromthenearest roadused by four-wheel vehicles.This difference is statisticallysignificantintheglobalsampleandmarginallysignificantinBrazil,butnotinIndonesia.Whileestimatedforestcoverisnotstatisticallydifferentandwewerenotabletoobtaingoodqualityestimatesofdeforestationrates,thefactthatREDD+villagesaresystematicallyfurtherfromroadssuggeststhattheyareunderrelativelylessdeforestationpressureandhaveloweropportunitycostsfromavoideddeforestation.ThisisconsistentwiththefindingsthatBrazilianmunicipalitieswithhigherroaddensityarelesslikelytohaveREDD+projects

4 TheprojectproponentsinterviewedatCOP15werefromNGOs(72%),theprivatesector(16%)andOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(12%).

| 227Site selection for forest carbon projects

Tab

le 1

2.4

Ch

arac

teri

stic

s o

f vill

ages

loca

ted

wit

hin

an

d o

uts

ide

RED

D+

pro

ject

s in

the

GC

S sa

mp

le

Ove

rall

mea

nP-

valu

e fo

r d

iffer

ence

in

mea

ns

Mea

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r B

razi

lP-

valu

e fo

r D

iff in

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ean

s.

Mea

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nes

ia

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ean

s

RED

D+

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RED

D+

Ou

tsid

e

Num

ber

of v

illag

es14

817

049

51

6445

Num

ber

km

to n

eare

st

road

pas

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le b

y 4-

whe

el v

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le

2111

0.02

**13

80.

16†

3428

0.58

% fo

rest

48%

49%

0.70

47%

50%

0.38

47%

46%

0.90

% w

here

con

serv

atio

n N

GO

had

bee

n ac

tive

58%

34%

0.00

***

69%

43%

0.00

***

64%

11%

0.00

*

Num

ber

of c

omm

unit

y gr

oup

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14.

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00**

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02**

3.4

4.9

0.04

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% s

tron

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re51

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08*

78%

75%

0.73

16%

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0.99

Def

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ion

pre

ssu

re fr

om

:

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ale

agric

ultu

re24

%21

%0.

5129

%8%

0.01

***

31%

44%

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†

Smal

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llage

s in

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d Vi

etna

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s Br

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and

Indo

nesi

a. O

vera

ll di

strib

utio

n of

vill

age

char

acte

ristic

s is

sig

nific

antl

y di

ffer

ent

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ss R

EDD

+ a

nd o

ther

vill

ages

bot

h in

the

over

all s

amp

le a

nd in

Bra

zil a

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done

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For

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le, d

iffer

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s in

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ay b

e si

gnifi

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at *

** (9

9%),

** (9

5%),

*(90

%)

or † (8

0%) l

evel

.

Implementing REDD+228 |

andhave fewer forest carbonprojectsoverall.That is,whilemanyof theseREDD+projectsare inregionsunderdeforestationpressure(confirmedbythepositiveandstatisticallysignificantcoefficientsondeforestationinTable12.2),itappearsthatproponentsarechoosingtoworkinmoreremotecornersof these regions.Thismay be because REDD+ interventions are expectedto be more competitive with development alternatives or because higherbiodiversityco-benefitsareexpectedfurtherfrommarketcentresthatgeneratedemandforagriculturalproducts.Thislatterexplanationiscorroboratedbythe proponent appraisal conducted by theGCS: 65% of REDD+ projectproponentsindicatedthattheyconsideredbiodiversitywhendecidingwhichvillagestoinclude,andhalf(3outof7)oftheproponentswhorankedsiteselectioncriteriaindicatedthatbiodiversitywasthemostimportant.

Small-scalefarmersareaprimarydeforestationpressureinmorethanhalfofallvillages(bothinsideandoutsideprojects)inallcountries.WhileinBrazillarge-scaleactorsaremorelikelytobetheprimarysourceofdeforestationinREDD+villagesthaninvillagesoutsidethoseboundaries,theoppositeistrueinIndonesia.Thus,theprofileofsitesselectedforREDD+projectsinBrazilismoreremote locations,withactiveconservationNGOs,substantial localsocialcapital,anddeforestationpressuresby large-scaleactors fromoutsidethe region (e.g. see Box 12.2 describing the Bolsa Floresta project). ThispatternisconsistentwithBrazilianprojectproponents’desiretocreatelocalalliancestoforestalloutsidedeforestationthreats.Incontrast,thesiteprofilein Indonesia is locationswith active conservationNGOs, but lower socialcapital,andlowerthreatsbylarge-scaleactorsfromoutsidetheregion.Suchdifferencesacrossthesetwocountriesmeritfurtherresearchandconsiderationasweseektodrawlessonsfromtheirprojects.

Finally, thereare somecommonalitiesacrossallvillages inoursample(notreported in Table 12.4). Most villages within these REDD+ projects areagricultural.Inthemajority(57%)ofvillagesinREDD+projects,agriculturalcrops are the primary income source of most households. In 63% of thevillages,fewerthan20%ofhouseholdsearnthemajorityoftheircashincomefromforests.Otherincomesourcesincludeanimalhusbandry(mostlycattle),fishing andmining.This dependence on agriculture suggests that there isdeforestation by local agents that could potentially be reduced by projectinterventions.Further,itsuggeststhatthekeylivelihoodconcernassociatedwiththeseREDD+projectsislikelytoberestrictionsonagriculturalpracticessuchasshiftingcultivation.

12.4.5 Caveats and recommendations for further analysisModelling the site selection process by jurisdiction (country,municipalityor district, and community) allows us to compile data on a large numberofprojects,andtherebyavoidpotentialbiases fromlimitingour sample to

| 229Site selection for forest carbon projects

projectswilling to sharemapsof theirboundaries.However, it clearly alsointroduces some measurement error because mean values for countries,municipalitiesordistrictsdonotnecessarilycharacterisespecificprojectsites.The same analysis could be conductedwith projects that are certified andthereforehavepubliclyavailablemaps,butfindingsmaynotbegeneralisablebeyondcertifiedprojects.Tosomedegree,thedatabaseonvillagesinsideandadjacent to REDD+ projects in theGCS sample provides thismore fine-grainedinformation.Thecaveatonthosedataisthatthevillageswereneithercensused nor randomly sampled. However, field researchers attempted toidentifysimilarvillagesinsideandoutsideprojectboundaries,andthusthebiasshouldhavebeentowardszerodifference.

Inadditiontocompilingmorepreciseinformationonprojectboundaries,asecondareaforfutureresearchshouldbetoaccountforvariationingovernanceatthesubnationallevel.Likewise,theanalysiscouldbeimprovedwithbetterdataonbiodiversity andpotential livelihoodco-benefits at the subnationallevel(inplaceofpercentageinprotectedareasandofficialpovertystatistics).Finally,morequalitativein-depthresearchonthedecisionmakingprocessofparticular proponents and for particular projects could significantly enrichourunderstandingofprojectsiteselectionanditsimplications.

12.5 ConclusionsIf projects are to directly contribute to the diverse objectives of REDD+(firstand foremost, reducedemissionsof forest carbon,butalso social andenvironmentalco-benefits),thentheyshouldbelocatedinplaceswheretheycanaddresssignificantemissionsofforestcarbon,threatstobiodiversityandlow income levels.Clearly the ability tomeet these objectives depends onmyriad factors, including the geographic expertise of the proponent andlocalgovernanceconditions.However,italsofundamentallydependsontheexistenceofbiodiversity,povertyandforestcarbonemissions.

Takingalltropicaldevelopingcountriesintoconsideration,higherdeforestationratesarenotassociatedwithgreaterlikelihoodofREDD+projects.Yet,thegreatestnumberofprojectsbyfararebeingdevelopedinthetwocountriesthatdominateglobalforestcarbonemissions:BrazilandIndonesia.Inthesecountries,prioritisationofhigh forest carbondensityanddeforestationareevidentatthesubnationallevel,althoughthereisalsoapreferenceformoreremote (and therefore possibly less threatened) jurisdictions in Brazil andvillagesinthesixcountryGCSsample.Specifically,municipalitiesinBrazilanddistrictsinIndonesiahavemoreprojectsiftheyhavehigherforestcarbondensityandhigherdeforestationrates.However,atthelocal level,REDD+villagesaresystematicallyfurtherfromroadsthannon-REDD+villages.AndinBrazil,roaddensityisnegativelyassociatedwiththenumberofprojectsin

Implementing REDD+230 |

municipalities,aftercontrollingforotherfactors.Likewise,aftercontrollingfortheseotherfactors,thereisaweakstatisticalassociationbetweenprojectlocationandpovertyinBrazil,butnotinIndonesia.

Overall there is a strong preference for locations with high potentialbiodiversityco-benefits.Countrieswithahighbiodiversity indexaremorelikelytohaveprojects.Municipalitiesanddistrictswithahigherproportionoftheirlandinprotectedareasaremorelikelytohaveprojects.Andproponentsreportthatbiodiversityisanimportantconsiderationinsiteselection.

Finally,oursampleofvillageswithinandaroundREDD+projectsconfirmsthat they areprimarily agricultural and that small-scale farmers are viewedasoneoftheprimarydeforestationanddegradationthreats.Althoughthereareexceptions,mostvillagesarenothighlydependentonforestproductsforhousehold income.This suggests that a key challenge for REDD+ on thegroundwillbetoslowlocaldeforestationwithoutunderminingagriculturallivelihoodsoralienatinglocalpeoplewhoarekeypotentialalliesagainsttheexternaldeforestationthreatsthatarealsoprominentintheselocations.

Measuring REDD+ performance 3

Part

13Chapter

Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Desmond McNeill

• REDD+ aims to achieve a defined impact – reduced emissions – andpayments may be made based on performance towards achieving thisgoal.ThisimpliesthattheremustbeassessmentsoftheresultsofREDD+programmes.

• In the medium-term, most payments will be for readiness and policyreforms,ratherthanprovenemissionsreductions.HencegoodperformanceindicatorsarecriticalforallthreeREDD+phases,inparticularforphase2wherethefocusisonpolicyperformance.

• Valuable lessons on governance indicators can be learned from the aidsector: avoid seeking the perfect indicator and use expert judgmentextensively.

13.1 ChallengesREDD+ aims to achieve a defined impact – reduced emissions – andpayments may be made based on performance towards achieving thisgoal.ThisimpliesthattheremustbeassessmentsoftheresultsofREDD+programmes. Implementation will occur in three phases: readiness

Measuring REDD+ performance234 |

(phase 1); policy measures (phase 2); and ‘results-based actions’ (i.e.payments based on changes in emissions and removal) (phase 3). Thisprocess is now formalised in an international agreement (UNFCCC2011e).AlthoughbilateralREDD+programmesarecurrentlyadvancingatafasterpacethanmultilateralprocesses,theyseektocomplementtheUNFCCCprocessandshouldabidebythesameprinciples(forexampleREDD+Partnership2010).

Performance indicators can be used to monitor results. These indicatorsneedtobecredibletoallowallpartiesundertakingandfundingREDD+activitiestoensuretheyaresuccessful(Daviet2009).PerformanceindicatorsneedtobeselectedtakingintoaccountthedifferentobjectivesofthethreeREDD+implementationphases.

PreviousREDD+measurement,reportingandverification(MRV)initiativeshavetendedtofocusonphase3,wherethechallengeislargelytechnical–tomeasuregreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsandremovals(Chapters14–16).Butthemoreimmediatechallenge,whichhasreceivedlittleattentionsofar,istomeasureperformanceduringtheinitialphases,andespeciallyduringphase2wherethefocusisonpolicyperformance.ThischapteraimstoclarifyandinformthedebatearoundREDD+performancemeasures.

13.2 Rationale and types of performance indicators Performance measurement is not generally an end in itself, but a meansto various different ends: to evaluate, control, budget,motivate, promote,celebrate, learn from or improve performance (Behn 2003). No singleindicatorisappropriateforalluses,soitiscrucialtobeclearaboutthepurposeofmeasurementwhenselectingindicators.

Performancemustbemeasuredagainstagreedbenchmarks.Typically,differenttypesofindicatorsareneededateachstage(Table13.1).Intermediate(inputandprocess)indicatorscanallowearliermonitoringtohelpkeepprojectsontrack,butingeneralitisdesirabletomeasureperformancetowardstheendoftheresultschain–outputs,outcomesandimpacts.However,itisimportantnot to rush this: to prematurely introduce an emission-based systemwithpoorMRVsystemsandinadequatedataforsettingreferencelevelsmaycreatepayments for unreal emissions reductions,whichwould destroy credibilityandjeopardisethelegitimacyofthesystem.

Performance indicators have been widely used for evaluations in the aidsector. According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ofthe Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),performance indicators refer to “variables that allow the verification of

| 235Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation

changes in development intervention or show results relative to what wasplanned”(OECD2002).Indicatorsshouldbesimpleand‘SMART’(specific,measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound) and comparable acrosscountries(OECD2008).

13.3 Lessons from the development aid sectorTowards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, countries receivingdevelopment aid began to be viewed as partners, and donor aid wasincreasinglyprovidedforbudgetsupport.Thisallowedrecipientcountriesmore freedom in its use, but offered less performance accountability fordonors. In recent years donor countries have exerted more pressure foraid to be results-based.The reasons for this are varied, but are linked togrowingdemandsfor‘developmenteffectiveness’asstipulatedinthe2005ParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness(OECD2005).Thereisnowgreaterdemand for performance measurement – not only of outputs, but alsooutcomesandimpacts–basedonobjectiveindicators.Thisisparticularlychallengingbecause itcoincideswithashift inaidawayfrominvestmentin infrastructure suchas roads,water supplies andhealthclinics, towardsinterventions in governance, human rights, empowerment and conflictresolution,whicharefarmoredifficulttoevaluate.

REDD+,asoriginallyenvisaged,isnotdevelopmentassistancebutapaymentforaservicerendered(Chapter3).Asabusiness-liketransaction,itisperfectlynormalthatpaymentisbasedonresults.Butintheshort-termatleastitappearsthat REDD+will be largely financed from aid budgets or private sources(Chapter7).Whilepaymentwillstillbebasedonresults,themotivationformeasuringperformanceislikelytobedifferent.REDD+implementationcanlearnfromtheuseofperformanceindicatorsinthedevelopmentaidsector(Box13.1).

Although ideally assessments will be based on outcomes and impacts, inpractice this is difficult for three main reasons: the timing of assessment,attributionofresultstointervention,andreliabilityofinformation.

Thefurtheralongtheresultschainonewishestomeasureperformance,themoretimeneedstopass.Impactcannotbemeasureduntilseveralyearshaveelapsed, which is not possible for many donors, NGOs or governments.Althoughdonorswouldliketobasetheirpaymentsonperformance,inrealitytheycannotwait10–15yearsinordertomeasurewhetherthedesiredimpacthasbeenachieved.

Moreover,thefurtheralongtheresultschainonemoves,themoredifficultitistoattributeanendresulttoaspecificintervention.Impactsareinfluenced

Measuring REDD+ performance236 |

Tab

le 1

3.1

The

resu

lts

chai

n a

nd

diff

eren

t typ

es o

f per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

Leve

lIn

put

Proc

ess

Oft

en m

erge

d w

ith th

e ‘in

put’

cate

gory

Out

put

Out

com

eIm

pac

t

Focu

s Q

uant

ities

of fi

nanc

ial,

hum

an a

nd m

ater

ial

reso

urce

s us

ed i

n th

e de

velo

pmen

t in

terv

entio

n, o

ften

ex

pres

sed

in d

olla

r am

ount

s or

am

ount

s of

em

ploy

ee ti

me.

Act

iviti

es d

urin

g im

plem

enta

tion,

i.e.

ac

tions

take

n or

wor

k pe

rfor

med

thro

ugh

whi

ch in

puts

are

m

obili

sed

to p

rodu

ce

spec

ific

outp

uts.

Imm

edia

te re

sults

of t

he

inte

rven

tion.

May

hav

e a

quan

tity

and

qual

ity d

imen

sion

, an

d of

ten

incl

ude

coun

ts o

f the

num

ber o

f be

nefic

iarie

s.

Inte

rmed

iate

effe

cts

(obs

erva

ble

beha

viou

ral,

inst

itutio

nal a

nd s

ocie

tal

chan

ges

that

take

pla

ce

over

3 to

10

year

s) o

f an

inte

rven

tion’

s ou

tput

.

Broa

der a

nd lo

nger

te

rm e

ffect

s (1

0 ye

ars

or

mor

e) p

rodu

ced

by a

n in

terv

entio

n (d

irect

ly o

r in

dire

ctly

, int

entio

nally

or

uni

nten

tiona

lly).

Oft

en c

aptu

red

by

natio

nal s

ecto

r or

subs

ecto

r sta

tistic

s.

Term

s us

edIn

put i

ndic

ator

sPr

oces

s m

ilest

one

indi

cato

rs

Proc

ess

indi

cato

rs

Out

put i

ndic

ator

sRe

sults

indi

cato

rs

Out

com

e in

dica

tors

Impa

ct in

dica

tors

Goa

l ind

icat

ors

Exam

ples

for

RED

D+

Re

sour

ces

spen

t

Shar

e of

bud

get d

evot

ed

to e

nviro

nmen

t

Pers

on d

ays

prov

ided

as

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

Dat

e by

whi

ch a

nat

iona

l RE

DD

+ a

ctio

n pl

an is

co

mpl

eted

.

Free

prio

r inf

orm

ed

cons

ent (

FPIC

) com

plia

nt

cons

ulta

tions

con

duct

ed.

Road

bloc

ks e

ncou

nter

ed

to p

olic

y ch

ange

or

impl

emen

tatio

n

Polic

y ad

opte

d an

d en

forc

ed.

Num

ber o

f sta

ff tr

aine

d an

d de

ploy

ed.

Num

ber o

f log

gers

that

ad

opte

d re

duce

d im

pact

lo

ggin

g pr

actic

es.

Qua

ntifi

ed re

duct

ions

in

defo

rest

atio

n.

Incr

ease

d pr

opor

tion

of

rest

ored

nat

ive

fore

st

cove

r.

Qua

ntifi

ed c

hang

es in

ca

rbon

em

issi

ons.

Sour

ces:

Bin

nend

ijk (2

001)

, OEC

D (2

002)

, Dav

iet (

2009

), Eu

rop

ean

Uni

on (2

010)

, OEC

D (2

010)

, Man

agin

g fo

r Dev

elop

men

t Res

ults

(201

1)

| 237Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation

Box 13.1 Performance indicators in development aid

Input-based indicators, including process indicators, have not proved very effective for measuring performance. They may be disconnected from the end result and risk creating perverse incentives (for example where ‘expenditure’ or ‘numbers of meetings’ are used as indicators of performance). Current best practice emphasises the use of indicators starting at the output level (Adam and Gunning 2002; Mumssen et al. 2010).

Quantifiable outcome indicators are often not available and are easier to obtain for the social sectors (such as health and education) than for institutional processes such as governance and public financial management (Koeberle et al. 2006). This is also a challenge for measuring the implementation of REDD+ policies and transformational reforms such as tenure reform and anticorruption measures.

The attribution of a result to a specific intervention becomes increasingly difficult and time intensive (and hence costly) the further one moves along the results chain. Performance assessment has – in practice – often been limited to output/outcome indicators. This has led to a focus on intermediate results, which do not guarantee achievement of the ultimate goal (Gunning 2006).

The further one moves along the results chain, the greater responsibility the provider (e.g. REDD+ country government) bears for performance. It is important to consider whether the provider is reasonably able to bear that responsibility and at what cost (Binnendijk 2001; Mumssen et al. 2010).

Because exogenous factors can hinder performance, governments may be reluctant to use outcome (let alone impact) targets as triggers for financing, because they can be held accountable for outcomes outside their control (e.g. extreme natural events and global financial crises). ‘Risk indicators’ (Binnendijk 2001) and partial insurance (Gunning 2006) have been recommended to complement the use of outcome indicators.

Independent collection of data for performance measurement is important. If the contract partners (governments) are involved in data collection there is a risk of moral hazard (Gunning 2006; Mumssen et al. 2010). This highlights the need for independent verification procedures for REDD+.

Finally, despite all best practice advice, performance measurement has a strong political dimension where good partnership is valued more highly than actual performance.

Measuring REDD+ performance238 |

by a number of factors, which makes it difficult to establish causalities.This is evenmore difficultwhenmeasuring performance of ‘soft’ projects,such as improved governance (e.g. better justice, tenure reforms, etc.) andcapacity building. Performance here is more difficult to measure than for‘hard’ infrastructureprojects suchaswater supplyor transportation,whichhave more concretely measurable outputs and outcomes, and more easilyestablished linksbetweenoutput, outcome and impact. It is an illusion toassume that one can develop a purely scientific or technical performancemeasurementsystemforallaspectsofsuccess.

Finally, the information needed for performance measurement is notalways readily available or may be politically contested and unreliable.Informationmustbe collected systematically as an add-onactivitywithadditionalcosts,whichtendtoincreaseasonemovestowardstheimpactendoftheresultschain.

13.4 Options for measuring REDD+ performanceWhatdothesecomplexitiesofperformancemeasurementmeanforREDD+?Globally,therearefewagreedindicatorsofREDD+performance,exceptthattheyshouldbecountrydrivenandthatultimately, inphase3,theyshouldmeasure changes inGHG emissions and removals.TheMeridianOptionsAssessment Report (OAR) suggests that performance indicators could bedevelopedandapprovedaspartofnationalREDD+implementationplans(MeridianInstitute2009).Similarly,readinesspreparationproposals(R-PP)submittedtotheForestCarbonPartnershipFacility(FCPF)arerequiredtooutlinehowtheREDD+partnercountrywilldevelop(interim)performancemeasures.ThissuggeststhatREDD+performanceindicatorscanvaryacrosscountries, depending on national circumstances, stakeholder views andREDD+strategyobjectives.ExperiencesinGuyana,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)andIndonesiabearthisout(Table13.2).

Performance measurement is important for both accountability and forpromotingeffectiveREDD+ implementation.Performance indicatorsneedtofulfiltwodifferentpurposes,whichmustbeconsideredintheirselection:i) tomonitor andmeasure the effects of projects and policies to seewhatis, or is not, working, in order to design better projects and policies; andii)toevaluateresultsasabasisforfinancialrewardsandprogresstofurtherphases.Thisisanalogoustothereferenceleveldiscussion(Chapter16),whereabusinessasusualscenarioisusedtomeasureimpact,andtosetacreditingbaselinefordefiningpaymentlevels.

The first purpose of performance indicators focuses on measures toimproveprojectdesign.Thisrequiresanimplementation metricthatassesses

| 239Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation

progressin,andeffectsof,planning,pilotingandimplementinganationalREDD+ architecture (in phases 1 and 2). In the case ofGuyana (Table13.2),indicatorsinthiscategoryaretermed‘enablingindicators’toreflectthepreparatorycharacteroftheprojectorpolicy interventions.Examplesof these enabling indicators include ‘MRV system in place’ or ‘financialmechanismestablished’.

ThesecondpurposeofREDD+performanceindicatorsistoevaluateresultsinordertoassesspaymentlevels.Thisrequiresaperformance metric,aswellas an agreed benchmark (or crediting baseline). In phase 3, performancemetricsmaybeoutcomeindicators(changesingrossdeforestationrate)orimpactindicators(changesincarbonemissions).Inphase2,whenthefocusisonimplementingpoliciesandmeasures,‘interim’performanceindicatorscanbeused.IntheNorway–IndonesiaPartnership,forexample,paymentis based on indicators such as “existing MRV activities identified andinitialassessmentondatagapsforthepurposeofMRVcompleted”(Table13.2).These‘interim’performanceindicatorswillbereplacedbyoutcomeorimpactindicatorsassoonastheMRVsystemmaturesandthecountrymovesintophase3.

Outcome indicators (deforestation rates) are sometimesdistinguished fromimpact indicators (carbon emissions), the former being called ‘interim’performanceindicators.However,outcomeindicatorsaresufficientasabasisformakingpayments,incombinationwithIPCCstandardemissionfactors.Deforestationratesarethereforenotreallyapplicableas‘interim’performanceindicatorsforphase2(e.g.theGuyana–NorwayPartnershipinTable13.2),althoughtheyareoftenused.

Figure 13.1 shows types of performance indicators which are relevant tothethreeREDD+phases.Inphase1,wherethefocus isonreadiness(andmost countries involved in national REDD+ processes are in this phase),performancemeasuresaremainlybasedoninputmeasures(e.g.consultationsconducted) and some outputmeasures (e.g. REDD+ national action planapproved).

The definition of performance indicators is critical in phase 2, where thefocusisonimplementingpolicymeasurestoestablishanappropriatenationalREDD+architecture.Inthisphase,theindicatorsneedtoplayadualfunction:i)tomeasureimprovementsinthenationalREDD+architecturetosupportprogress towardsphase3, and ii) to evaluateperformance, primarilyusingoutputmeasures,asabasisforpayments.

By phase 3, the national REDD+ architecture should be in place andREDD+performancecanbemeasuredwithoutcomeorimpactindicators.Brazil is currently one of the few countries with the capacity for phase 3

Measuring REDD+ performance240 |

Tab

le 1

3.2

Exam

ple

s of

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

in n

atio

nal

RED

D+

init

iati

ves

Gu

yan

a

Sour

ces:

Don

ovan

et a

l. (2

010)

, Guy

ana–

Nor

way

Jo

int C

once

pt N

ote

(201

1)

Dem

ocr

atic

Rep

ub

lic o

f Co

ng

o

Sour

ce: G

over

nmen

t of D

RC (2

010)

Ind

on

esia

Sour

ce: I

ndon

esia

–Nor

way

Joi

nt C

once

pt N

ote

(201

0)

Enab

ling

ind

icat

ors

1. A

nat

iona

l RED

D+

str

ateg

y w

ith a

tim

e ho

rizon

of 2

030

is d

evel

oped

, con

stru

cted

in a

p

artic

ipat

ory

man

ner c

omp

risin

g:

An

amb

itiou

s an

d hi

gh q

ualit

y na

tiona

l RE

DD

+ s

trat

egy

that

rep

rese

nts

a co

nsen

sus

bet

wee

n di

ffer

ent s

take

hold

ers

The

stra

tegy

is b

ased

on

a de

cisi

on to

ol

(ref

eren

ce s

cena

rio) a

nd ro

bus

t str

ateg

ic s

ocia

l an

d en

viro

nmen

tal e

valu

atio

n (S

ESA

).

A p

ract

ical

, mul

tisec

tora

l and

bud

gete

d in

vest

men

t pla

n fo

r RED

D+

.

2. A

n in

terim

inst

itutio

nal f

ram

ewor

k fo

r RED

D+

im

ple

men

tatio

n is

read

y by

201

3, in

clud

ing:

A fu

nctio

nal r

egis

ter o

f car

bon

pro

ject

s an

d in

itiat

ives

An

inte

rim n

atio

nal f

und/

mec

hani

sm fo

r ca

rbon

fina

nce

man

agem

ent

Proc

edur

es fo

r env

ironm

enta

l and

soc

ial

asse

ssm

ent.

1. P

rep

arat

ion

for t

he e

stab

lishm

ent o

f a

Nat

iona

l RED

D+

Age

ncy

rep

ortin

g di

rect

ly to

the

Pres

iden

t:

Pres

iden

tial d

ecre

e cr

eatin

g a

RED

D+

Tas

k Fo

rce

[with

sp

ecifi

ed m

anda

te]

[…]

2. G

roun

dwor

k is

com

ple

te fo

r a 2

-yea

r m

orat

oriu

m o

n fo

rest

s an

d p

eatl

and

conc

essi

ons:

A m

orat

oriu

m is

eff

ectiv

e fr

om 1

Jan

uary

201

1.

[…]

3. In

itial

des

ign

is c

omp

lete

for a

n in

dep

ende

nt

MRV

inst

itutio

n.

Exis

ting

MRV

act

iviti

es id

entifi

ed a

nd in

itial

as

sess

men

t of d

ata

gap

s fo

r MRV

com

ple

ted

[…]

4. In

terim

fina

ncin

g in

stru

men

t est

ablis

hed

[…]

1.St

rate

gic

fram

ewor

k in

pla

ce

2. C

ontin

uous

mul

tista

keho

lder

con

sult

atio

n p

roce

ss e

stab

lishe

d

3. G

over

nanc

e st

reng

then

ed

4. F

inan

cial

mec

hani

sm in

pla

ce

5. S

yste

m to

mon

itor,

rep

ort a

nd v

erify

(MRV

) in

pla

ce

6. R

ight

s of

indi

geno

us p

eop

le a

nd o

ther

loca

l fo

rest

com

mun

ities

pro

tect

ed.

| 241Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation

Inte

rim

per

form

ance

ind

icat

ors

3. A

com

pre

hens

ive

MRV

sys

tem

for R

EDD

+ is

op

erat

iona

l inc

ludi

ng:

An

oper

atio

nal M

RV s

yste

m fo

r GH

G e

mis

sion

s (d

efor

esta

tion/

deg

rada

tion)

man

aged

at t

he

coun

try

leve

l

MRV

sys

tem

for s

ocia

l, en

viro

nmen

tal,

gove

rnan

ce a

nd e

cono

mic

asp

ects

The

dual

MRV

sys

tem

is a

ccep

ted

by R

EDD

+

stak

ehol

ders

.

5. N

atio

nal R

EDD

+ s

trat

egy

deve

lop

ed

thro

ugh

cred

ible

, tra

nsp

aren

t, in

clus

ive

and

inst

itutio

nalis

ed m

ultis

take

hold

er p

roce

ss

[…]

6. F

irst p

ilot p

rovi

nce

sele

cted

[…]

7. F

ocal

poi

nts

in th

e G

oI a

nd G

oN a

pp

oint

ed

[…]

8. In

dep

ende

nt re

view

gro

up id

entifi

ed

[…]

9. C

omm

unic

atio

ns c

amp

aign

des

igne

d to

mak

e RE

DD

+ a

ctiv

ities

tran

spar

ent,

incl

usiv

e an

d cr

edib

le

[…]

Def

ores

tatio

n in

dica

tors

:

Ann

ual g

ross

def

ores

tatio

n

[…]

Deg

rada

tion

indi

cato

rs:

Loss

of i

ntac

t for

est l

ands

cap

es

Fore

st m

anag

emen

t (i.e

. sel

ectiv

e lo

ggin

g)

activ

ities

in n

atur

al o

r sem

inat

ural

fore

sts

– al

l ar

eas

to b

e rig

orou

sly

mon

itore

d an

d ac

tiviti

es

docu

men

ted

Are

a w

ithin

500

m o

f new

infr

astr

uctu

re to

be

coun

ted

as 5

0% a

nnua

l car

bon

loss

thro

ugh

fore

st d

egra

datio

n

Are

as a

nd p

roce

sses

of i

llega

l log

ging

to b

e m

onito

red

and

docu

men

ted

as p

ract

icab

le

Are

a of

fore

st b

urnt

eac

h ye

ar to

dec

reas

e co

mp

ared

to c

urre

nt a

mou

nt

[…]

Indi

cato

rs o

f inc

reas

ed c

arbo

n re

mov

als:

Not

mon

itore

d in

inte

rim p

erio

d.

The

bra

cket

s ‘[…

]’ in

dica

te th

at o

nly

a su

bse

t of p

erfo

rman

ce m

easu

res

is s

how

n he

re.

Measuring REDD+ performance242 |

actions.Althoughtechnically thefinal impactofREDD+isareduction inclimatechange,thiswillrequirealong-termtrendofreducedemissions.Foroperational reasonswe therefore argue that reduced emissionsoffer a validimpactindicatorforREDD+.

REDD+ performance measurement will also need to deal with specificchallenges.First,appropriateindicatorsforgovernancerelatedpolicychangeinphase2mustbedefined.Experiencefromtheaidsectorsuggeststhatitismoredifficulttomeasureimprovementsingovernance(softprojects)thanininfrastructureinvestment(hardprojects).REDD+is,inasense,acombinationof the two types: the ultimate achievement – reduced deforestation anddegradationwithresultingreductioninemissions–is‘concrete’,butinordertoreachthisstageitisfirstnecessarytomakeprogressin‘softer’aspectsofperformance.

Second,REDD+performancemeasurementinevitablyraisespoliticalissues:mostnotablythequestions‘Bywhatstandardsisperformancetobeassessed?’and‘Whodoestheassessment?’AstheGuyanacaseshows(Box13.2),itisnoteasytoachieveagreementontheappropriateperformanceindicators,and the interpretation of standards for evaluation candiffer substantiallyacrossstakeholders.Anyindependentassessorbringssomelevelofsubjectivebiasanditisdifficult(andcostly)tocontrolforthat.Eveninphase3,where

Phase 1Readiness

Input Output Outcome Impact

Implementation metrics

Performance metrics

Input indicators• Readiness funds

disbursed• Consultations done

Results chain

Output indicators• Pilot projects• R-PP approved

Output indicators• Strategies, policies

and laws adopted• Institutions (MRV etc.)

in place

Outcome indicators• Gross deforestation• Increased share of

restored native forest cover

Impact indicators• Quantified changes in

carbon emissions

Phase 2Policy measures

Phase 3Results-based action

Figure 13.1 Options for performance indicators across REDD+ phases

| 243Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation

cleartechnicalstandardsarebeingestablishedforreducedforestemissionsandenhancedremovals(e.g.theVerifiedCarbonStandard),thereremainsastrongpoliticaldimension,asexemplifiedinthesettingofreferencelevels(Chapter 16). Evaluations of REDD+ performance need to be realisticaboutthis.

Onesolutionmightbetodefinequalitativeaimsandlinkthemtomoreconcrete,scheduledactions.Aimsmightincludeareassuchastransparency,participation and rights.The actionswould focus on implementation tosecure the aims: specific plans, systems and laws to be prepared, passedand implemented.Rather than, say, ‘laws enacted’ a better performanceindicator would be ‘laws enacted and put into practice’. Performancebecomes a set of conditions to bemet,with the performance indicatorsspelled out as clearly as possible upfront, tominimise room for varyinginterpretations.

Moreover, for the purpose of REDD+, itmay well be useful to includeexpert judgment in the overall assessment. Indicators serve as importanttools forobjectiveperformanceassessment,buttheycanalsofall short incapturing actual performance (or underperformance). As Albert Einsteinis said to have put it, “not everything that can be counted counts, andnot everything that counts can be counted.” To avoid oversimplifyingperformancemeasurement –with the risk of incorrect conclusions – theuseofsimplifiedperformancemeasuresshouldbeprecededbyathoroughanalysis of their likely effect on stakeholders’ behaviour.Valuable lessonscouldbelearnedfromtheindependentverificationofREDD+performanceinGuyana(Box13.2).

Finally,thegrowingbodyofexperiencemayleadtoaninternationalconsensusonstandardsforREDD+performancemeasurement,withroomforexpertreviews.A standardised assessment system, if properly implemented, couldthenbeusedtoi)compareacountry’sREDD+performancewitharegionalorinternationalsetofnorms,andii)assesscountries’performancesovertime.Thismay reduce the risk of political hijacking of performance assessment,allowmore targeted interventions, facilitatecollaborationandcoordinationbetweendonors,andenhancecountries’ownershipofreform.Suchaneffortwouldrequirethesupportofinternationalorganisationsandgovernments,aswellasrelevantregionalbodies,whendesigningandpilotingtheperformancemeasurement framework. In addition to lessons from the aid sector, otherUNFCCCprocesses, suchas thediscussionsaround ‘programmaticCDM’(Climate Focus 2011), new market mechanisms (OECD 2012) or theexpertreviewsofAnnexIcountries’GreenhouseGasInventories(UNFCCC2011b)couldhelpinformthedevelopmentofamorestandardisedREDD+performancemeasurementframework.

Measuring REDD+ performance244 |

Box 13.2 Performance measurement in the Guyana–Norway REDD+ Partnership

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Guyana and Norway was signed on 9 November 2009 to formalise cooperation on issues related to climate change, especially those concerning REDD+ (Guyana–Norway Joint Concept Note 2011).

A trust fund, the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF), was established as the financial mechanism for this cooperation. Norway made an initial contribution of approximately US$ 30 million, in the expectation that others would also contribute. The fund will receive up to US$ 250 million from Norway in performance-based payments for the period up until 2015, based on an independent verification of Guyana’s deforestation and forest degradation rates and progress on REDD+ enabling activities. The World Bank was appointed to act as trustee and is responsible for providing financial intermediary services to the GRIF (Government of Norway 2010).

A multistakeholder Steering Committee (SC) serves as the oversight and decision making body for disbursements of GRIF funds. It is composed of the Governments of Guyana and Norway, World Bank (Trustee), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as ‘Partner Entities’, and Observers (NGOs from Norway and Guyana) (Government of Norway 2010).

Projects that contribute to Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) are eligible to receive payments from the GRIF. These payments are based on performance in terms of reduced emissions. Project proposals include the controversial Amaila Falls Hydro project, but as of January 2012, only two concept notes had been approved: for institutional strengthening, and small enterprises and alternative livelihoods (Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund 2012).

Guyana’s performance in terms of implementing REDD+ and the LCDS is measured, and independently verified, against two sets of indicators (Guyana–Norway Joint Concept Note 2011; see also Table 13.2):

• Indicators of enabling activities: a set of policies and safeguards to ensure that REDD+ contributes to the achievement of the goals set out in MoU between Guyana and Norway (2009) for an inclusive and transparent REDD+/LCDS process.

• REDD+ performance indicators: a set of forest-based GHG emissions indicators. These are ‘interim’ performance indicators that will gradually be substituted as a MRV system is established.

Guyana and Norway have agreed that annual independent assessments of progress against the enabling indicators will be conducted by one or

| 245Performance indicators and REDD+ implementation

13.5 ConclusionsREDD+aimstoachieveadefinedimpact–reducedemissions–andpaymentsmaybemadebasedonperformancetowardsachievingthisgoal.Thisimpliesthat there must be assessments of the results of REDD+ programmesusingperformance indicators.Although it isgenerallydesirable tomeasureperformance towards the end of the results chain, in order to measuredirectly theachievementofaprojectorpolicy’saims, in themedium-termmostpaymentswillbeforreadinessandpolicyreforms,ratherthanprovenemissionsreductions.

The focuson impacts as thebasis forperformance assessmenthas led to aneglectoftheintermediateresults,atthereadinessandpolicyreformstages(phases1and2),whichdefinethepreconditionsforachievingcosteffectiveandequitableREDD+outcomes.GoodperformanceindicatorsforREDD+areneededineachofthethreephasesandnotjustinphase3,whichhasbeenthefocusofpastdiscussions.Theimmediatechallengerelatestomeasuringperformanceinphases1and2,andespeciallyinthelatter,wherethefocus

more neutral expert organisations to be jointly appointed. For the period to 30 September 2010, the Rainforest Alliance carried out the independent assessment (Donovan et al. 2010), following an international tender process in accordance with Norwegian procurement regulations.

Although described as ‘indicators’, it is apparent that those above (and in Table 13.2) are not indicators in the strict sense of the word. They are not specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound (SMART) or comparable across countries. Furthermore, no criteria were specified for evaluating the evidence supplied by the Government (Lang 2011a).

For the first independent verification assessment, the Rainforest Alliance therefore defined additional and more tangible verification indicators (Donovan et al. 2010). This verification report was heavily criticised by civil society for being superficial and too lenient, thus not providing an accurate picture of progress on the ground (Global Witness et al. 2011; Lang 2011a). In an open letter to the Norwegian Minister of Environment, several members of civil society questioned the transfer of a second tranche of funds for 2010–2011 (Lang 2011a).

The Norwegian Government welcomed this criticism as a means of improvement (Lang 2011b) and released the second instalment of approximately US$ 38 million in July 2011. This increased the GRIF budget to US$ 68 million (Earle 2011).

Measuring REDD+ performance246 |

isonpolicyperformance.Here,valuablelessonscanbederivedfromtheaidsector, notably concerning performance indicators of governance reformsand theneed to complement thesewith expert judgments to yield amorecompletepictureofactualprogressandachievementsrealised.

The growing body of experience and data on performance measurementmayultimately allow the establishment of internationally agreed standardsforREDD+ performance assessment. A standardised assessment system, ifproperly implemented,wouldoffermanybenefits includinga reduced riskof political hijacking. In addition to lessons from the aid sector, such aneffortcouldbeinformedbyotherrelevantUNFCCCprocessessuchasthediscussionson‘programmaticCDM’,newmarketmechanismsandtheexpertreviewsofAnnexIcountries’GreenhouseGasInventories.

14Chapter

Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects Manuel Estrada and Shijo Joseph

• Overthepastfewyears,robuststandardsandmethodshavebeendevelopedtoestimateemissionsfromdeforestationattheprojectlevel.

• Because the first full-fledged REDD+ baseline and monitoringmethodologies were adopted only recently, many pioneering projectsmightnotcomplywiththem,runningtheriskoflosingopportunitiesincarbonmarkets.

• The next generation of projects should learn from this experience byidentifying or developing suitable methodologies before investing inthe development of their baselines and measurement, reporting andverification(MRV)systems.

14.1 IntroductionAccurateandtransparentestimatesofgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationandcarbonstockenhancementsarecriticalforassessingthemitigationbenefitsofREDD+projects.Thepreciseestimationof such benefits is required to guarantee the integrity of climate changemitigationschemeswheretheyareusedtocomplyeitherwithlegallybinding

Measuring REDD+ performance248 |

emissionreductioncommitmentsorwithvoluntarygoals.Atthesametime,thequalityofsuchestimatesaffectsthepotentialforaprojecttoaccessfunds(high-qualitycarboncreditsaremorelikelytobeattractivetoawiderrangeofpotentialbuyersandinvestorsinthecarbonmarketthanarethoseestimatedusinglessrobustmethods)aswellastheamountoffundstheyattract(creditscreatedfollowinggoodmethodsandpracticesareusuallysoldathigherprices).1

Thischapteridentifiescommonchallengesfacedbyprojectdeveloperswhenestablishing baselines by assessing the capacities and availability of data inongoingprojectsagainst internationally recognisedstandardsandmethods.Theresultsofthisassessmentprovidesomeguidancetoprojectdevelopers,donorsandthe internationalREDD+communityonhowthesechallengesmightbeovercomeandtheareaswhereinvestmentsshouldbeprioritisedtoimprovetheestimationofcrediblebaselines.

This analysis is based on information gathered throughCIFOR´sGlobalComparative Study on REDD+ (GCS) and represents the experience of17pioneeringREDD+projects fromBrazil,Cameroon, Indonesia,Peru,Tanzania and Vietnam (see Appendix). As can be seen in Table 14.1,these projects focus on reducing emissions from deforestation and forestdegradation.Someprojectsalsoincludecarbonstockenhancementactivities,such as improved forest management and afforestation, reforestation orregenerationofforests.

Thescopeof theanalysis isdefinedby two facts:first, theprojects areattheinitialstagesofdevelopment(onlytwoofthenineprojectsforwhichinformationwasavailablehavealreadyengagedinthepreparationofProjectDescriptions2), which implies, among other things, that the informationcurrently available on projectmonitoring plans and techniques does notallowtheirqualitytobeassessed.Second,mostoftheprojects–10outof17–are seekingvalidationunder theVerifiedCarbonStandard(VCS)3 -currentlythemostcommonlyusedstandardinthevoluntaryforestcarbonmarket.Accordingly,theanalysistakestherequirementssetbytheVCSforREDD+projectsasthebasisforevaluatingthemethodsanddatausedtoestimatethecarbonbenefitsoftheGCSprojects.4Moreover,giventhelack

1 Althoughitmustbenotedthat,increasingly,thevalueofsuchcreditsconsidersnotonlytheir ‘methodological’robustness,butalsothecontributionoftheprojectsfromwhichtheyoriginatetothegenerationofwiderenvironmentalandsocialbenefits.2 TheProjectDescriptiondetailsaproject’sGHGemissionreductionorremovalactivitiesandisrequiredtoregistertheprojectundertheVCS.3 FormerlyVoluntaryCarbonStandard(VCS).4 ItmustbenotedthatalloftheprojectswereassessedagainsttheVCSguidance,eveniftheprojectdevelopershavenotyetdecidedwhichstandardtheywillapplyoriftheyintendtouseanotherstandardaltogether(e.g.thePlanVivo).

| 249Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects

ofdataonmonitoringsystems,theassessmentislimitedtotheestimationofprojectbaselines.

This chapter introduces themethods available for estimating emissions inREDD+(Section14.2),aswellasthegeneralVCSrequirementsforREDD+projectsandtherecognisedprojecttypes(Section14.3).ItdescribescriticalstepsandthedatathatareneededtocomplywithprovisionsforconstructingbaselinesaccordingtoVCSmethodologies(Section14.4).ThechapterthenevaluatesthecurrentstatusofGCSprojectswithregardtotheserequirements(Section 14.5). Finally, based on this assessment, Section 14.6 providespreliminaryconclusionsandrecommendations.

14.2 Methods available for estimating the mitigation benefits of REDD+ projects The creation of real, long-term, additional andmeasurable greenhouse gasemission reductions and enhancements in carbon stocks throughREDD+projectsrequirestheestablishmentofcrediblebaselines(thewithout-projectscenario), precise monitoring and reporting of project results and robuststandards and institutional frameworks to verify them impartially andconsistently.

The scientific and methodological basis for estimating GHG emissionsandremovalsduetoactivities intheagriculture, forestandother landuses(AFOLU) sector areprovidedby the ‘2006Guidelines forNationalGHGInventories’ (IPCC 2006) and the ‘2003 Good Practice Guidelines forLandUse,LandUseChangeandForestry’ (GPG-LULUCF),producedbythe IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange (IPCC2003).TheIPCCGuidelinesareintendedtobeusedatthenationallevel,butmaybeadapted,based on guidance provided by the IPCCGPG-LULUCF, and applied attheprojectlevel.AmorecomprehensiveoverviewoftheIPCCGuidelinesisprovidedinChapter15ofthisvolume.

TheIPCCGuidelinessetthefoundationforthedevelopmentofanumberofrobust standards thatestablishessential requirements for thequantificationandgenerationofGHGemissionreductionsandremovalsandforthecreationoftheirassociatedcarboncredits.TheseincludetheVCSandtheAmericanCarbonRegistry(ACR),whichareconsideredtorepresentthebestpracticesinthevoluntarycarbonmarket.

In practice, the standards are applied through baseline and monitoringmethodologies,whichsetoutdetailedproceduresandequationsforquantifyingthemitigationbenefitsofaproject,includingmethodstodetermineprojectboundaries, assess additionality (i.e. whether the initiative only took place

Measuring REDD+ performance250 |

Tab

le 1

4.1

Ove

rvie

w o

f pro

ject

s co

llab

orat

ing

wit

h G

CS

Co

un

try

Prin

cip

al p

roje

ct d

evel

op

er a

nd

si

teSe

lect

ed

stan

dar

dM

ain

pre

ssu

res

on

fore

sts

Act

ivit

ies

Like

ly V

CS

pro

ject

typ

es

Bra

zil

Inst

ituto

Cen

tro

de V

ida

(ICV

), M

ato

Gro

sso.

VCS

Smal

l to

larg

e-sc

ale

catt

le ra

nchi

ng; i

llega

l tim

ber

ha

rves

t RE

DD

+ IF

M

+ O

AU

DD

Inst

ituto

de

Pesq

uisa

Am

bien

tal d

a A

maz

ônia

(IPA

M),

Stat

e of

Par

a N

.A.

Cat

tle

ranc

hing

and

bee

f pro

duct

ion;

sm

all-s

cale

tr

aditi

onal

agr

icul

ture

; ille

gal t

imb

er h

arve

st

RED

D

+IF

M+

ARR

AU

DD

Biof

ílica

Inve

stim

ento

s Am

bien

tais

an

d Fu

ndaç

ão O

rsa,

Am

apá

N.A

.Sm

all-s

cale

agr

icul

ture

; ille

gal l

oggi

ng; i

nfra

stru

ctur

e de

velo

pm

ent;

gove

rnm

ent-

app

rove

d lo

ggin

gN

.A.

AU

DD

APD

The

Nat

ure

Con

serv

ancy

, São

Fel

ix

do X

ingu

N.A

.Ra

nchi

ng; i

llega

l log

ging

RED

D +

ARR

+

IFM

Fund

ação

Am

azon

as S

uste

ntáv

el

(FA

S), B

olsa

Flo

rest

aVC

SIll

egal

logg

ing;

infr

astr

uctu

re d

evel

opm

ent;

min

ing

com

mer

cial

pla

ntat

ions

; sm

all-s

cale

agr

icul

ture

RED

DA

UD

D

APD

Peru

Bosq

ues A

maz

onic

os S

.A.C

. (BA

M),

Mad

re d

e D

ios

N.A

.C

attl

e ra

nchi

ng a

nd b

eef p

rodu

ctio

n; m

inin

g;

infr

astr

uctu

re d

evel

opm

ent;

smal

l-sca

le s

ubsi

sten

ce

agric

ultu

re

N.A

.

Con

serv

atio

n In

tern

atio

nal (

CI),

San

M

artin

N.A

.Sh

iftin

g cu

ltiv

atio

n; il

lega

l log

ging

; inf

rast

ruct

ure

deve

lop

men

t; ca

ttle

ranc

hing

and

bee

f pro

duct

ion;

sm

all-s

cale

agr

icul

ture

N.A

.A

UD

D

Cam

ero

on

Cent

re p

our l

’Env

ironn

emen

t et l

e D

ével

oppe

men

t (C

ED),

Sout

h an

d Ea

st re

gion

s

Plan

Viv

oSm

all-s

cale

trad

ition

al a

gric

ultu

re/f

ront

ier a

gric

ultu

re;

illeg

al ti

mb

er h

arve

st; s

ubsi

sten

ce fu

elw

ood/

char

coal

co

llect

ion

RED

D +

ARR

AU

DD

GFA

-Env

est,

Sout

hwes

t Pro

vinc

e N

.A.

Oil

pal

m a

nd o

ther

com

mer

cial

pla

ntat

ions

; sm

all-s

cale

tr

aditi

onal

agr

icul

ture

/fro

ntie

r agr

icul

ture

; ille

gal t

imb

er

harv

est;

sub

sist

ence

fuel

woo

d/ch

arco

al c

olle

ctio

n

RED

D +

IFM

N.A

.

| 251Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects

Tan

zan

iaTa

nzan

ia T

radi

tiona

l Ene

rgy

Dev

elop

men

t and

Env

ironm

enta

l O

rgan

izat

ion

(TaT

EDO

), Sh

inya

nga

VCS

Smal

l-sca

le tr

aditi

onal

agr

icul

ture

/fro

ntie

r agr

icul

ture

; ill

egal

tim

ber

har

vest

; sub

sist

ence

fuel

woo

d/ch

arco

al

colle

ctio

n; o

verg

razi

ng

RED

D +

IFM

N.A

.

Tanz

ania

For

est C

onse

rvat

ion

Gro

up (T

FCG

), Li

ndi

VCS

Mai

nly

shift

ing

agric

ultu

re; t

imb

er h

arve

stin

g; b

uild

ing

pol

es; (

may

be

pro

duct

ion

of c

harc

oal);

fire

woo

d RE

DD

+ IF

MA

UD

D

Tanz

ania

For

est C

onse

rvat

ion

Gro

up (T

FCG

), Ki

losa

. VC

SEn

croa

chm

ent f

or s

mal

l-sca

le/s

ubsi

sten

ce fa

rmin

g;

shift

ing

cult

ivat

ion;

tim

ber

har

vest

ing;

cha

rcoa

l p

rodu

ctio

n; fi

re

RED

D +

IFM

Car

e In

tern

atio

nal,

Zanz

ibar

VC

STi

mb

er h

arve

stin

g; c

harc

oal p

rodu

ctio

n; in

fras

truc

ture

de

velo

pm

ent

RED

D +

O

Mp

ingo

Con

serv

atio

n an

d D

evel

opm

ent I

nitia

tive

(MC

DI),

Ki

lwa

VCS

Fire

IFM

Ind

on

esia

Faun

a an

d Fl

ora

Inte

rnat

iona

l In

done

sia

(FFI

-Indo

nesi

a), W

est

Kalim

anta

n

VCS

Oil

pal

m; s

mal

l-sca

le s

ubsi

sten

ce fa

rmin

g; il

lega

l log

ging

RED

D+

IFM

+A

RR

The

Nat

ure

Con

serv

ancy

(TN

C),

East

Ka

liman

tan

N.A

.O

il p

alm

; tim

ber

har

vest

ing;

pul

p p

lant

atio

ns; m

inin

gRE

DD

+ IF

M

Vie

tnam

Net

herl

ands

Dev

elop

men

t O

rgan

izat

ion

(SN

V) C

at T

ien,

Lam

D

ong

Dis

tric

t

VCS

Smal

l-sca

le tr

aditi

onal

agr

icul

ture

; ille

gal t

imb

er

harv

estin

gRE

DD

+ IF

MA

UD

D

Not

es:

VCS:

ver

ified

car

bon

sta

ndar

d RE

DD

: red

uced

em

issi

ons

from

def

ores

tatio

n an

d fo

rest

deg

rada

tion;

AU

DD

: avo

ided

unp

lann

ed d

efor

esta

tion

and

degr

adat

ion;

APD

: avo

ided

p

lann

ed d

efor

esta

tion;

IFM

: im

pro

ved

fore

st m

anag

emen

t; A

RR: a

ffor

esta

tion,

refo

rest

atio

n an

d re

vege

tatio

n; O

: oth

er.

Measuring REDD+ performance252 |

due to the generation of carbon credits), determine the most plausiblebaseline scenario and quantify the GHG emissions that were reduced orremovedduetoprojectactivities.Beforebeingapplied,themethodologies–elaboratedbyprojectproponents–mustbevalidatedbyathirdpartyagainstthe requirements established by the standard. The validating party mustbeauthorisedby theentity inchargeof the standard inorder toaudit theproposedmethodologies.Todate,therearefiveVCS-approvedmethodologiesforREDD5projects(seeTable14.2).Eachmethodologyisdesignedtomatchspecificbaselineandprojectscenariosand,oncevalidated,themethodologybecomes public6 and can be applied to any project that complies with itsapplicabilityconditions.Projectdevelopersarefreetouseanymethodologymatchingthecharacteristicsoftheirprojectsortodevelopanewmethodologyifnoneoftheexistingapproachesissuitable.

14.3 General VCS requirements and REDD+ project types TheVCSrequirementscontaingeneralrulesforallREDD+projects.Theycoverissues such as eligibility conditions for theproject area,definitionofprojectboundaries (geographic boundaries, crediting period and GHG emissionsourcesandcarbonpools),demonstrationofadditionalityandthetreatmentofnon-permanencerisks(i.e.therisksthatcarbonremovalsarereversedafterthecreditshavebeencreated).InthecontextoftheVCS,REDD+activitiesaredividedintotwotypes:REDD+projects,whichrelatetodeforestation(legalandillegal,seebelow)anddegradation(illegal)andimprovedforestmanagement

5 We use REDD without the ‘+’ when projects only deal with deforestation and forestdegradation.6 ThedevelopersofmethodologiesapprovedundertheVCSProgrammeonorafter13April2010areeligibletoreceivecompensation.ThiscompensationamountstoUS$0.02perverifiedcarbonunit(VCU)issuedtoprojectsusingthemethodologyorarevisionofthemethodology.

Table 14.2 VCS approved methodologies for REDD* projects as of March 2012 (VCS 2012)

VM0004 – Methodology for Conservation Projects that Avoid Planned Land Use Conversion in Peat Swamp Forests, v1.0

VM0006 – Methodology for Carbon Accounting in Project Activities that Reduce Emissions from Mosaic Deforestation and Degradation, v1.0

VM0007 – REDD Methodology Modules (REDD-MF), v1.1

VM0009 – Methodology for Avoided Mosaic Deforestation of Tropical Forests, v1.1

VM0015 – Methodology for Avoided Unplanned Deforestation, v1.0

* It should be noted that in the VCS context, the ‘+’ activities qualify as improved forest management and are not considered in the Table.

| 253Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects

projects,which include initiatives addressing ’legal’ degradationdue topoormanagement,sustainableforestmanagementandcarbonstockenhancement.Two main requirements are that the project area for REDD projects shallmeetan internationallyaccepteddefinitionof forest, suchas thosebasedonUNFCCChost-countrythresholdsorFAOdefinitions(FAO2006)andshallhavequalifiedasforestforaminimumof10yearsbeforetheprojectbegins.

The general rules on REDD projects are complemented by provisionsaddressing a subset of these projects: i) avoiding planned deforestation(APD), i.e. projects that reduce net GHG emissions by stopping orreducing deforestation on forest lands that are legally authorised to beconverted to non-forest lands; and ii) avoiding unplanned deforestationand/ordegradation(AUDD),i.e.projectsthatreducenetGHGemissionsbystoppingthedeforestationand/ordegradationofforeststhatwouldhaveoccurredasaresultofsocioeconomicforcespromotingalternativeusesofforest land. This distinction is necessary because the drivers, agents anddynamicsofdeforestationassociatedwitheachprojecttypehavedifferentmethodologicalimplications,forexample,withregardtotheestablishmentofbaselinesandestimatesofleakage.Indeforestationprojects,theareawheredeforestationisexpectedtooccurisdelimitedbyagovernmentpermitandthe rateofdeforestation is setby thispermitorby thecommonpracticeobserved in similar concessions. In unplanned deforestation projects, thedeterminationoftheareaofexpecteddeforestationdependsonthedecisionsofarelatively largenumberofpeopleoveraregionsimilar totheprojectareaandtheexpectedrateofdeforestationderives from,forexample, thehistorical evolution of drivers, agents and socioeconomic circumstancesaffectingtheregion,aswellasfromitsgeographicalcharacteristics.

As can be seen inTable 14.1, most of the GCS projects that submittedinformation on the drivers of deforestation qualify mainly as AUDD;thereforethefollowingassessmentwillfocusexclusivelyonAUDDprojectsandmethods.

14.4 Key VCS requirements for estimating REDD+ baselines 14.4.1 Provisions for setting baselines for REDD projects ThebaselineforaREDDprojectisthescenariothatreasonablyrepresentstheanthropogenicchangesincarbonstocksinpoolsandemissionsofGHGsthatwouldoccurin the absenceoftheproject.Baselinesareestimatedex anteandmustbereassessedandrevalidatedeverytenyearsinordertoreflectchangesintheprojectcontextthatmightaffecttherateofdeforestation.REDDbaselinesinclude twomain elements: a landuse and land cover change component

Measuring REDD+ performance254 |

(the activitydata) and theassociatedcarbon stockchangecomponent (theemissionfactor).

Requirements for the land use/land cover component of the baseline scenario: ForAUDDprojects,theactivitydatacomponentofthebaselinescenario is based onhistorical trends observed in a reference region overat least theprevious tenyears;7 theseareused tomake futureprojectionsabout deforestation. Table 14.3 summarises some of the key data andtasks needed to estimate the landuse and land cover change componentof anAUDDproject’s baseline scenariounder eachof theVCSREDD+methodologies that apply toAUDD.Table 14.4 presents remote sensingdatarequirementsfortheconstructionofbaselinesacrosstheapprovedVCSAUDDmethodologies.

7 The reference region is the analytical domain from which information on historicaldeforestationisextractedandprojectedintothefuturetospatiallylocatetheareathatwillbeconsidereddeforestedinthebaselinescenario.

Table 14.3 Key data and tasks needed to establish an AUDD project’s baseline deforestation/degradation rate and/or location

Data / Task VM0006 VM0007 VM0009 VM0015

GIS analysis to apply criteria demonstrating similarity of the reference to the project area

Required Required unless using population driver approach

Required Required

Rate modelling of deforestation (from historic forest cover change analysis)

Simple historic average or trend

Simple historic average or trend or population drive

Logistic model based on historic averages and covariates (drivers)

Simple historic average or trend or based on covariates

Spatial modelling of deforestation and GIS coverage (i.e. shape files) of spatial drivers (e.g. digital elevation models, road networks, etc.)

Required Required if unplanned frontier deforestation or if < 25% of project boundary is within 120m of recent deforestation

None (not spatially explicit)

Required

Source: Adapted from Shoch et al. (2011)

| 255Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects

Table 14.4 Remote sensing data requirements for historic (baseline) forest cover change analysis for AUDD methodologies

Data / Task VM0006 VM0007 VM0009 VM0015

Remote sensing/imagery resolution

≤ 30m ≤ 30m ≤ 30m ≤ 100m

Remote sensing/imagery time series needs for reference area

Imagery from four time points from the period 0-15 years prior to project start

Imagery from three time points from the period 2-12 years prior to project start

Imagery from at least two time points prior to project start; at least 90% of the reference area must have coverage from at least two time points

Imagery from at least three time points from the period 10-15 years prior to project start, with one taken within two years of project start

Remote sensing/imagery minimum classification accuracy (forest/ non-forest)

70% of sampled pixels (with uncertainty discounts)

90% of sampled pixels

Not pixel-based; quality control guidelines to minimise point interpretation error

90%

Remote sensing/imagery minimum classification method

Review high resolution imagery or database of known classes at locations

Review high resolution imagery or ground truthing

N/A

Review high resolution imagery or ground truthing

Remote sensing/imagery minimum cloud free

80% 90% Unspecified -shifting sample point approach flexible in regions with significant and variable cloud cover

Unspecified

Source: Adapted from Shoch et al. (2011)

Measuring REDD+ performance256 |

14.4.2 Requirements for the carbon stock component of the baseline Abaselinescenarioshouldcoverbothsignificantcarbonstockchanges inallrelevantpoolsandemissionsbysourcesoftheGHGsthatwouldoccurwithintheboundariesoftheprojectarea.AccordingtotheVCSAFOLUrequirements,AUDDprojectsshouldalways includetheabovegroundtreebiomasscarbonpool.Theinclusionofothercarbonpools is requiredonlywhenthere is thechancethatprojectactivitiesmaysignificantlyreducethepool.

Mostapprovedmethodologiesrequirethatforestcarbonstockestimatesbebasedonadirectinventoryoftheprojectareaoronmeasurementstakenfromforeststhatarerepresentativeoftheprojectarea.Somemethodologiesalso allow the use of conservative estimates from the literature or IPCCdefaults. For baseline (post-forest conversion) land uses, allVCSREDDmethodologies permit the use of default carbon stock values from localstudiesorliteratureor,wherethesearenotavailable,fromdirectsamplingof proxy sites.The use of data from the literature or IPCCdefaultswillusuallyhavedifferentimplicationsforuncertainty,thussomemethodologiesrequirethelowerandupperrangesofthevaluestobeusedforforestandnon-forestclassesrespectively.Wherespatialmodelling isnot includedinbaselineconstruction,andthusemissionfactorsarenotmatchedtospecificpixelsonamap,methodologiesgenerallyemployanarea-weightedaverageemissionfactorfromastratifiedsampleorassumethatthestratawiththelowest average carbon stockswill be deforested first (Shoch et al. 2011).Table14.5summarisesthemethodsusedineachapprovedmethodologytomeasurecarbonstocks,aswellasthefrequencywithwhichtheyshouldbereassessed.

14.5 Preliminary assessment of GCS projects Thegeneralrequirementsintroducedinsection14.3andthetasksanddatarequiredbyVCSmethodologiespresentedinsection14.4.1werecomparedtoavailableGCSprojectdatatoidentifydatagapsandcapacityneeds.Thiscomparisonrevealedthat:

General requirements: the available data are not sufficient to determinewhether theprojectareaswereentirelycoveredby forestat the startof theprojectsorwhetherforestintheseareashadbeeninplaceforatleasttenyears,asrequiredbytheVCS.

Project and reference area similarity: mostGCSprojectslimitthescopeoftheirmonitoringtotheprojectarea,whichimpliesthattheydonotconsider

| 257Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects

areferenceregion(oraleakagebelt8),indicatingnon-compliancewithVCSrequirements. In spite of this, five out of the nine project developers thatsubmittedinformationonthistopichavealreadydevelopedbaselinescenarios,threeareintheprogressofdevelopingscenariosandonehasnotyetstartedtheprocess.

Modelling the rate of deforestation: nineoutof17projectdevelopershavemodelled thehistorical rateofdeforestation in theprojectareaand threemoreareintheprocessofdoingso.Fiveprojectdevelopersusedasimplehistoricaverageoralinearprojectiontoestimatethedeforestationrate,fourusedGIS-basedmodellingwithcovariatesofdeforestationagentsandonereliedontheopinionofexperts.Twoprojectsdidnotspecifytheapproachtheyusedtoestimatethehistoricalrateofdeforestation.Theprojectthatis

8 The‘leakagebelt’istheareaoutsideprojectboundarieswhereanydeforestationabovethebaselineprojectionwillbeconsideredleakage.

Table 14.5 Required sources of carbon stock estimates in baseline scenarios

Stock estimate VM0006 VM0007 VM0009 VM0015

Project area forest carbon pools

Forest biomass inventory of each identified forest stratum with permanent sample plots

Forest biomass inventory with fixed area or variable radius sample plots (must take place within +/-5 years of the project start date)

Forest biomass inventory with fixed area plots (must take place in the first monitoring period, i.e. prior to first verification)

Forest biomass inventory with temporary or permanent plots or conservative default

Post conversion Default factors from literature or measurements from temporary plots on representative areas

Default factors from local studies or literature or measurements from temporary plots on representative areas

Not needed if project area is semi-arid tropical forest. Otherwise requires soil carbon sampling from proxy farms in the reference area to parameterise the soil carbon loss model

Default factors from literature or measurements from temporary plots on representative areas

Source: Adapted from Shoch et al. (2011)

Measuring REDD+ performance258 |

relyingsimplyonexpertknowledgecouldfaceproblemsincomplyingwithVCSrequirements.

Spatial modelling to project the location of deforestation: only threeofthe 17 projects have used spatialmodels to project the location of futuredeforestation, which is in line with the VCS requirements. The other 14projects relied mostly on expert knowledge or on basin-wide (or nationalscale)modelledoutputs.

Remote sensing imagery time series for the reference region: aspreviouslynoted, most projects do not consider a reference region when estimatingtheir baselines, so it is not clear if the remote sensing images they possesswould cover such a region.The available information indicates that abouttenofthe17projectshavesufficientdataforestimatingthehistoricalrateofdeforestationoveraperiodoftenyearsand13ofthemhaveremotesensingimagesformorethanthreepointsintimeduringthatperiod(Figure14.1).

Remote sensing resolution: onlysevenofthe17projectsreporthavinghighresolution data (<10m),while all of thempossessmedium resolution data(10–60m).Consequently, it could be expected that at least seven projectswouldbeabletomeettheVCSrequirementregardingremotesensing.

The analysis shows that 13 of the 17 GCS projects studied have startedto measure aboveground biomass, thus potentially complying with VCS

Figure 14.1 Historical remote sensing data available for GCS project sites

%

100

80

60

40

20

0

Minimum

10 years data

coverage

> 3 time points

in last

10 years

High reso

lution

data (< 10m)

Medium

resolutio

n data

(10–60 m)

With data

Without data

| 259Baselines and monitoring in local REDD+ projects

requirements.Inmanycases,theprojectsplantousetheroot:shootratioasanalternativetomeasuringbelowgroundbiomass.TheprojectswillusetheratiocitedbytheIPCCorobtainedthroughlocal levelstudies.It isworthnotingthatnineofthe17projectsusesite-specificallometricequations9toestimateforestcarbonstocks,onlythreehavecarbonconversioncoefficientsandtherestoftheprojectsitesplantousegeneralallometricequationsanddefaultcarbonconversionvaluesavailableintheliterature.Theprojectsdidnot specifywhatmethods anddata theywill use to estimate carbon stockchangesfromotherlandusesintheirbaselinescenarios.

With respect to carbon stock sampling methods, eight projects are usingstratified random sampling and two are using simple random sampling.Onlyoneprojectusespermanentsampling,despitethefactthatpermanentsamplingisrequiredbytheVCSmethodologies.Inaddition,threeprojectsuseasystematicsamplingtechnique.

14.6 Conclusions and recommendations The analysis described in this chapter shows that most of the projectsparticipating in the GCS study might face problems in complying withsomeofthebasicVCSrequirements.Thisismostlyduetothemethodsusedto predict future deforestation, the lack of data for constructing historicaldeforestationratesandtheuseofnon-permanentcarbonstocksamplingplots.

It canbe argued thatmost of themethods currently available for baselinedevelopment and MRV had not yet been developed when these pioneerprojects started, thusprojectdevelopers couldnotuse them toguide theirinitialefforts(althoughitmustberecognisedthat,insomecases,theprojectswerenotprimarilydesignedtogeneratetradableemissionreductioncreditsor to use project-level methodologies). This situation may have led to anineffective use of time and resources, since some of the project activitiesthathadalreadybeencompletedwouldhavetoberepeatedtoensureVCScompliance. Moreover, in AUDD projects there could arise a cart beforethehorsesituation,wherebyaprojectsite is selectedbeforethetrueextentof futuredeforestation in the areahasbeenmodelled.This could result inthe initial sitebeing lessatriskthanpreviouslythought,whichcouldhavefinancialandimpactimplicationsforprojectdevelopers.

ItmustbekeptinmindthattheexperiencesdescribedinthischapterrelatetosomethefirstREDD+projectsintheworld,thusthechallengestheyfacearelikelytomoredauntingthantheproblemsthatwillbefacedbyprojectsin

9 Allometricequationsexpressthequantitativerelationshipbetweenthedimensionsofatreeandthebiomass.Theyareusedtoestimatethebiomassoftreesbasedoneasymeasures,suchastreeheightordiameteratbreastheight(DBH).

Measuring REDD+ performance260 |

future,especiallyconsideringthetrendtomovefromproject-levelbaselinesandMRVsystemstosubnationalandnationalbaselines.Nevertheless,somerecommendationsmayservetofacilitatethedevelopmentofmethodologicallyrobustprojects(undertheVCSoranyotherscheme)andtoguideREDD+policyandfundingdecisions,particularlyforAUDDprojects.

• ItisadvisabletoapplythebestMRVpracticesandstandardsavailable,i.e.thosebasedonIPCCguidance

• Before developing project baselines and designing monitoring plans,projectdevelopersshouldseekasuitablemethodologytoguidetheirMRVplanningandtechnologyanddata-relatedinvestments;wherenosuitablemethodologiesareavailable,relevantelementsofexistingmethodologiesmaybeusedasabasisforconstructingnewones

• Baselinemodellingshouldbeusedtodeterminethelocationoftheprojectareainordertoensurethatprojectactivitieswillfocusondeforestationhotspotsandcanensureadditionality.

15Chapter

Emissions factorsConverting land use change to CO2 estimatesLouis V. Verchot, Kamalakumari Anitha, Erika Romijn, Martin Herold and Kristell Hergoualc’h

• The lack of country and region specific data poses a serious limitationto converting area estimates of deforestation and forest degradation tocarbonstockchangeestimatesformosttropicalcountries.ThuswecannotmakeaccurateandpreciseestimatesofemissionsandremovalsinnationalREDD+programmesandREDD+demonstrationactivities.

• Progress on building the institutional capacity of countries to conductforestinventoriesandothermeasurementsforimprovinggreenhousegasinventories inforestryandother landusesectorshasbeenslowinmostnon-AnnexIcountries.

• Theaboveconstraintscanbeovercomeifcoordinated,targetedinvestmentsaremadeandproductivepartnershipsaredevelopedbetweenthetechnicalservicesinREDD+hostcountries,intergovernmentalagenciesandadvancedresearchinstitutesindevelopedcountriesduringthereadinessphase.

15.1 IntroductionThe ability to measure performance is a prerequisite for implementingany results-basedmechanism and, in the context ofREDD+, accurately

Measuring REDD+ performance262 |

measuringemissionsreductionsispartofthischallenge(seeChapter13).ManygroupsareworkingtodevelopmeasurementsystemsforsupportingtheimplementationofREDD+incountrieslackingthetechnicalcapacitiestoaccuratelyassessemissionsfromdeforestationanddegradation.Countriesneedtomeasuretwotypesofparameterstoassessemissions.‘Activitydata’isthejargonusedinmonitoring,reportingandverification(MRV)circlestodescribedataonthemagnitudeofhumanactivityresultinginemissionsor removals. For REDD+, these data usually refer to the areas occupiedbymanagementsystems,deforestationordegradationbuttheycouldalsorefertootherthings,suchasamountsofinputs,i.e.fertiliser.Toestimatethe carbon stock changes and other greenhouse gas emissions resultingfrom landuse and landuse changes, including those in forest areaswithincreasing biomass, countries require so-called ‘emission/removal factors’(forsimplicity,wewillshortenthistoemissionfactor[EF]).Thesefactorsrepresenttheemissionsorremovalsinallrelevantcarbonpoolsandofallrelevantgreenhousegases(GHGs)perunitofactivity.Forexample, ifanaverageforestloses200tonnesofcarbonperhectarewhenitiscutdownand deforestation in a particular year is 2,000 hectares, a country couldestimateitsdeforestationemissionsbycombiningthesetwotypesofdata.Subsequent land uses also have carbon stocks and GHG emissions (e.g.nitrousoxidefromfertiliserormethanefromlivestock)andthesemustbetaken into accountwhen estimating the effects or the foregone effects oflanduseandlandusechange(forreferenceemissions,seeChapter16).

A number of initiatives involve improving remote sensing technologiesto detect deforestation, reforestation and forest degradation. Severaleffortshavefocusedonimprovingsystemsfornationalandinternationalmeasurement and monitoring of deforestation and forest degradation(Achard et al. 2002; Bucki et al. 2012).These efforts involve improvedmethods forquantifyingdeforested areas, detecting areas thathavebeendegradedandmonitoringareasthathavebeenreplanted,etc.Yetmostofthese approaches stumble over the problemof converting area estimatesintoemissionsorremovalsvaluesbecauseofthelackofreliableemissionsfactorsforthewidevarietyofecosystems.Studiessuggestthatasmuchas60%oftheuncertaintyofemissionsestimatesisduetopoorknowledgeofcarbonstocksinforestsandotherlandusesystems(Houghton et al.2000;Baccini et al.2012).

For several reasons, it is important to improveourknowledgeof carbonstocks andGHGfluxes associatedwith landuse and landuse changeaspartofthereadinessphaseofREDD+.Improvedknowledgecanhelptobettertargetinterventionsandimproveimplementationefficiency.Itwillalsoimprovebenefitsharingschemesbyensuringthatactivitiesdonotleadtofalseclaimsofemissionsreductionsandwillhelpinproperlyattributingcreditforrealreductions.

| 263Emissions factors

TheobjectiveofthischapteristolookcriticallyatconstraintstoMRVposedbythelackofemissionsfactorsforimportanttypesoflandusechangeandkeycarbonpoolsintropicalecosystems.Wewillstartwithabriefoverviewofsomeimportant conceptsunderpinning the IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’s (IPCC)greenhousegas inventorymethodsandrecommendationsforgoodpracticesinthisarea.Wewillthenlookattheimportanceofemissionsfactorswithinthisframework,examinetheconstraintsintropicalecosystemsandsomerecentadvancesthatarehelpingtoreducetheseconstraints.Finally,we will discuss the roles of different stakeholders and analyse investmentprioritiesforfurtherreducingthechallengestoMRV.

15.2 Introduction to the relationship between the IPCC, the UNFCCC and REDD+Themain efforts to developmethods forGHG inventories have been ledby the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Programme (NGGIP) of theIPCC,whichissuedafirstsetofguidelinesfornationalGHGinventoriesin1994.Theguidelineswere revised in1996 (GL1996).Theyhaveprovideda useful framework for the compilation of national estimates of emissionsandremovalsinmanysectorsandstillserveasthebasisfornationalGHGinventories.However, there was a need for further guidance on how besttodealwithuncertainties so that countries couldproduce inventories thatwere“accurateinthesenseofbeingneitherovernorunderestimatessofarascanbejudged,andinwhichuncertaintiesarereducedasfaraspracticable”(IPCC2000).Thisledtothedevelopmentoftwosupplementaryreportsongoodpractice toassistcountries in“…thedevelopmentof inventories thatare transparent, documented, consistent over time, complete, comparable,assessedforuncertainties,subjecttoqualitycontrolandassurance,efficientin the use of the resources available to inventory agencies and in whichuncertaintiesaregraduallyreducedasbetterinformationbecomesavailable”(IPCC2000;2003).‘GoodPracticeGuidanceandUncertaintyManagementinNationalGreenhouseGasInventories’(GPG2000)waspublishedin2000andprovidedupdatedguidelinesforcompilinginventoriesinseveralsectors,includingagriculture(IPCC2000).‘GoodPracticeGuidanceforLandUse,Land Use Change and Forestry’ (GPG-LULUCF) was published in 2003(IPCC2003).The‘GoodPractice’reportsdidnotreplacetheIPCCGuidelinesbutprovidedadditionalguidanceorrevisions,whichcomplementedandwereconsistentwiththeguidelines.

In2006,theIPCCissuedarevisionoftheGL1996thatbuiltontheGPG2000and GPG-LULUCF. The revised guidelines (GL2006) recommend usingconsistentinventorymethodsforagriculture,forestryandotherlandusestoallowformorecomprehensive inventoriesofemissionsfrommost landusecategories.

Measuring REDD+ performance264 |

In a decision adopted by COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 (UNFCCC2009b), theUNFCCCrequested that countrieswishing toparticipate inthe REDD+ mechanism “use the most recent Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change guidance and guidelines, as adopted or encouragedby theConferenceof theParties,asappropriate,asabasis forestimatinganthropogenic forest-related greenhouse gas emissions by sources andremovalsbysinks,forestcarbonstocksandforestareachanges.”Thus,theGL1996andtheGPG-LULUCFprovidetheframeworkforcurrenteffortsin REDD+. However, decisions at COP17 in Durban in 2011 have settheUNFCCConapathtoadoptthe2006GLforuseby2015,sothoseguidelinescanalsobeused.

Thebasicstructureoftheinventoryproceduresisorganisedaroundasimpleequation:

Emission = A • EF

Thisequationformaliseswhatwassaidintheintroductionaboutthetypesofdataneededtodevelopanestimateofemissions.Arepresentsactivitydataintheequation.TheIPCCprovidesthreepossibleapproachestoobtainingactivitydata,whichcanbeadaptedtotheneedsofaparticularinventorysituation(seeChapter14;IPCC2006).TheEFintheequationrepresentsemissionfactors.Thesefactorsareoftenbasedonasampleofmeasurementdata thatcanbeaveraged toyielda representative rateof emissions foragivenactivityassociatedwithlandusechange(e.g.conversionofforestlandtograssland)orwithlandremaininginalandusecategory(e.g.rehabilitatedforestland).

Inmost cases, inventories cover fivecarbonpools: abovegroundbiomass,belowgroundbiomass,deadwood,litterandsoilorganicmatter.TheIPCCusestheconceptofkeycategoriestodeterminethelevelofrigourthatneedstobeappliedtoestimatingbothactivitydataandemissionsfactors(IPCC2000).Akeysource/sinkcategoryisanactivityand/orcarbonpoolthathasasignificantinfluenceontheestimateofGHGswithrespecttotheabsoluteleveltrend,oruncertaintyinemissionsandremovals.AkeycategoryreceivesprioritytreatmentinGHGinventory.Intheaggregate,non-keysourcesandsinkscompriselessthan10%oftheuncertaintyofaninventoryorlessthan5%ofthetotalemissions.Detailedmethodsneedtobeusedforestimatingemissionsandremovalsforkeycategories.Keycategoryanalysisisrequiredtodeterminethefollowing:

• Whichlanduseandmanagementactivitiesaresignificant• Whichlanduseorlivestocksubcategoriesaresignificant• Whichemissionsorremovalsfromvariouscarbonpoolsaresignificant

| 265Emissions factors

• Whichnon-CO2gasesandfromwhichcategoriesaresignificant• Which approach (see the description of tiers below) is required for

reporting.

IPCC also identifies three ‘tiers’ for reporting. Tiers represent themethodologicalcomplexityrequiredtoestimatetheemissionsandremovalsfrom a category, based on its influence on a country’s total inventory,dataavailability andnational circumstances.TheIPCCrecommends thatinventorycompilersapplyeitherTier2or3methodstokeycategoriesoflandactivities that account formajor sourcesofuncertaintyor emissionsanduseTier1methodsfornon-keycategories(Figure15.1).

Tier 1isthesimplestapproachandisapplicabletonon-keycategorieswherecountryor regionspecificemissions factorsaremissing.Thecompilersofinventoriesshouldusespecificactivitydataforacountryorregionbuttheycanuseglobaldefaultvalueswithunknownuncertaintyfortheemissionsfactors.Tier1methodsallowcompilers toproduceacomplete inventoryandavoidinvestingindatacollectionforactivitycategoriesthataccountforonlyasmallportionofthetotalemissionsorremovalsorthataccountforonlyasmallproportionoftheuncertainty.Theestimationofuncertaintiesby source category at Tier 1 is done using statistical error propagationequations.

Tier 2methodsfollowasimilarframeworkasTier1.Countryorregionspecificactivitydataareusedbutemissionsandremovalsareestimatedusingcountryor regionspecificemissions factors.Higher temporalandspatial resolution

Figure 15.1 Relationships between key categories and the tier levels for inventory compilation and accuracy vs. cost tradeoffs (Adapted from Maniatis and Mollicone 2010)

Key category

Emission Removal

Tier 3 methods Tier 2 methods

Cost and feasibilty

Known Accuracy and uncertainty Unknown

Non-key category

Emission Removal

Tier 1 methods

Measuring REDD+ performance266 |

andmoredisaggregated activitydata are typicallyused inTier 2methods,inassociationwithspecificemissionsfactorsforappropriateclimatologicorgeologicalsubregionsandspecialisedlanduseorlivestockcategories.

Tier 3 methods require spatially explicit andhigh resolutiondata on landcover dynamics.Tier 3 uses higher order methods, including models andinventorymeasurement systems,which are repeated over time. Land areaswhere a land use change occurs can usually be tracked over time, at leaststatistically.Mostmodelsincludeclimate-relatedvariationinaspectssuchasgrowth, senescenceandmortalityandthusallowforestimateswithannualvariability. Models should undergo quality checks and validation. Tier 3produceshighqualityoutputintermsofprecisionandaccuracyasthebiasisreducedandthecomplexityofthesystemiswellrepresented.ThemajorconstraintstoimplementingTier3methodsarethecostandeffortinvolvedintheproductionofqualitydatasetsandsitespecificmeasurements.

15.3 IPCC methods for developing EFsThe IPCC has two approaches to developing emissions factors for theinventory equations. Carbon stock changes in any pool can be estimatedusing an approach called theGain–Lossmethod, which canbe applied toallcarbongainsorlosses(IPCC2006).Gainsareattributedeithertogrowthortotransfersofcarbonfromanotherpool(e.g.thetransferofcarbonfroman aboveground biomass carbon pool to a dead organic matter pool dueto harvest). Losses are attributed to transfers of carbon from one pool toanotheror toemissionsduetodecay,harvest,burning,etc. Inthis system,itisimportanttoaccountfortransfers,sinceanytransferfromonepooltoanotherisalossfromthedonorpoolandanequalgaintothereceivingpool.Consequently,CO2removalsaretransfersfromtheatmospheretoacarbonpool(usuallybiomass);CO2emissionsaretransfersfromacarbonpooltotheatmosphere.

ThesecondapproachiscalledtheStock–Differencemethod,whichisappliedwherecarbonstocksinrelevantpoolsaremeasuredattwopointsintimetoassess carbon stock changes.Generally, carbon stock changes are estimatedonaperhectarebasisandthevalue is thenmultipliedby the totalarea ineach stratum (activity data) to obtain the total stock change estimate forthe pool.Onoccasion, activity datamaybe in the formof country totals(e.g.m3ofharvestedwood),inwhichcasethestockchangeestimatesfortheabovegroundbiomasspoolarecalculateddirectlyfromtheactivitydata,afterapplyingappropriatefactorstoconverttounitsofcarbonmass.WhenusingtheStock–Differencemethodforaspecificlandusecategory,itisimportanttoensurethattheareaoflandinthatcategoryattimest1andt2isidenticaltoavoidconfoundingstockchangeestimateswithareachanges.Table15.1

| 267Emissions factors

presentsexamplesofhowTier1defaultfactorscanbederivedusingIPCCdefaultvaluesforabovegroundbiomass.

TheGain–Lossmethodlendsitselftoecologicalmodellingapproachesusingcoefficientsofstocksandflowsderivedfromempiricalresearch.Thisapproachwill smoothout interannual variability to agreater extent than theStock–Differencemethod.Bothmethodsarevalidandshouldprovidecomparableresultsovertimebuteachismoreappropriateforcertainpools.Forexample,aStock–Differenceapproachbasedonforestinventoriesisthemostpracticalwaytoestimatechangesinabovegroundbiomasscarbon(Brown2002;Qureshi et al.2012).Forotherpools,forexample,thesoilandorganicmattercarbonpool inpeatsoils (seeBox15.1), theGain–LossMethodismorepractical.Figure 15.2 summarises the steps involved in generating emissions factorsusingbothmethods.Toapplyeitherapproach,itisnecessarytofirstdevelopameaningful stratificationof the landscape anddeterminewhichactivitiesandpoolsrequirehighertieraccountingandwhichcanbeaddressedusingTier1methods.Datamust thenbecollectedandcompiled in suchawaythattheyprovidearepresentativeestimateoftheecosystemandmanagementsysteminquestion.

15.4 The current state of EFs and opportunities for improvement15.4.1 MRV capacity and EFsAs part of CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study (GCS) on REDD+ (seeAppendix), we carried out an analysis of MRV capacity in 99 tropicalnon-Annex I countries.The study scored each country on several types ofcapacity(e.g.remotesensing,forestinventory,carbonstockassessment)andnational engagement (e.g. completeness of national reporting, engagementin UNFCCC REDD+ technical negotiations). The study then scored theREDD+challenges (e.g. fire incidence, presenceof peat soils, high carbondensities)andremotesensingchallenges(e.g.highcloudcover,mountainousterrain) in the countries. Gaps were then calculated using the differencebetween the scores for challenges and capacities and the countries weregroupedintocategoriesbasedonthemagnitudesoftheirscores.

The analysis showed that the majority of countries lack the capacity toimplement a complete and accurate national monitoring system formeasuring the performance of REDD+ implementation according to theIPCC guidelines, as will be required in Phase III when payments will bebasedonquantified emissions reductions (Romijn et al. 2012).Forty-ninecountrieshadaverylargecapacitygap,whileonlyfourcountrieshadaverysmall capacity gap. These latter countries already had good to very good

Measuring REDD+ performance268 |

Box 15.1 Using the Gain–Loss method to improve the facility of estimating emissions factors for tropical peatlands

Indonesia is one of the greatest emitters of GHGs in the world, with about 80% of national emissions coming from land use and land use change. In insular Southeast Asia, deforestation rates in peat swamp forests are twice as high as in any other forest type (Miettinen et al. 2011). For this reason, quantifying GHG emissions from land use change in peatlands is critical. A major concern is the estimation of carbon loss from the peat. Recent estimates suggest that carbon loss associated with the conversion of peat swamp forest to oil palm plantation contributes more than 63% to total losses. Losses from the biomass amounted to 158 Mg C ha-1 whereas those from the peat reached 270 Mg C ha-1 over 25 years, which is the rotation period of an oil palm plantation (Hergoualc’h and Verchot 2011).

Peat loss may be assessed either by measuring changes in carbon stocks (the Stock–Difference approach) or changes in carbon flows (the Gain–Loss approach). An accurate assessment of soil carbon stock changes following land use change requires carbon stock measurements over the full depth of the peat profile, because changes occur at greater depths in drained soils; losses are not limited to the top 30 cm as they are in mineral soils. Indeed, the combined physical and chemical activities associated with drainage, peat subsidence and fires may make it hard to determine which soil layers should be compared before and after land use change. Nevertheless, it is clear that studying only the superficial layers of peat soils is not a valid approach to comparative studies of changes in peat carbon stocks associated with land use change. In addition, most peat formations in Southeast Asia are in the shape of a dome, hence the selection of representative and consistent locations within the dome before and after land use change is necessary to avoid erroneous emissions or removals estimates. Developing an adequate sampling scheme is especially challenging, given the lack of maps locating the position of peat domes in many landscapes, limited accessibility (pristine peatlands are often remote and difficult to reach) and authorisation constraints.

Given the problems cited above, a better approach for assessing peat carbon loss after land use change is the Gain–Loss method. This approach requires knowledge of the main carbon inputs (litterfall and root mortality) and the main outputs (soil heterotrophic respiration rates, loss associated with fires, methanogenesis, leaching, runoff and erosion). These flows are easier to estimate accurately and without bias than are changes in stocks. Soil respiration may be a useful indicator of peat carbon loss. However, the heterotrophic component must be estimated and losses have to be balanced against gains in order to evaluate how much carbon the peat is losing or sequestering. The balance between gains and losses before and after land use change must be compared in order to assess emissions and removals associated with land use change.

| 269Emissions factors

Figure 15.2 Steps involved in the estimation of emission factors (Adapted from Meridian Institute 2011a)

Collect C stock data

Stock-Difference approach

Define accuracy/precision targets and QA/QC protocols

Analysis of key C pools or fluxes to include

Compile spatial data and develop stratification factors

Stratify landscape• By activity/driver

• By C impact

Develop sampling design for C stock measurements

Compile and evaluate existing data on allometric

equations, biomass expansion factors, inventory

data, field plots, field gaps

Emission/removal factors

Define area of interest for sampling C stocks (develop potential for change maps)

Collect data on C gains/losses

Gain-Loss approach

Develop data collection plan by activity/driver

Compile and evaluate existing data on timber/fuel

wood volumes extracted, regrowth rates

Define area of interest for sampling C fluxes:• Planting/growth

• Logging/harvest impacts• Land clearing

• Wildfires

capacities formeasuring forest area change and for performing a nationalforestinventoryongrowingstockandforestbiomass.Inthecountrieswithvery large capacity gaps, problems stemmed from limited engagement intheUNFCCCREDD+process,lackofexperienceintheapplicationoftheIPCCguidelinesandlackofaccesstoappropriatedataforTier2inventories(Hardcastle et al.2008;Herold2009).Thestudydocumentedwherecapacityisinadequateattechnical,politicalandinstitutionallevelstoallowacompleteand accurate estimation of forest area change and associated carbon stockchangesand showed that theREDD+mechanism is creating requirementsthatarebeyondtheexperienceofmanynationaltechnicalservices.

Measuring REDD+ performance270 |

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| 271Emissions factors

ThiscapacitygapwasalsoobviousduringtworecentglobalForestResourcesAssessments(FRA)(FAO2006;2010)conductedbytheFoodandAgricultureOrganization (FAO 2007; Mollicone et al. 2007). Marklund and Schoene(2006)analysedcountrysubmissionstothe2005FRAandfoundthequalityandreliabilityofdatatobehighlyvariable.Mostcountrieslackgoodforestinventorydataandrelyonconversionfactorsanddefaultvaluestoestimatecarbonstocks.Ofthecountriesthatdohaveinventorydata,mosthavemeasurementsatonlyonepointintime.Ofthe229countriesandterritoriesthatreportedtothe2005FRA,only143reportedoncarboninthebiomasspoolandonly50reportedoncarboninlitterandsoilpools.Thirty-fourcountriesprovidednocarbonstockdata.Thereweresmallimprovementsinthe2010FRA(seeBox15.2).

InanotherGCSstudy,CIFORsurveyed17REDD+demonstrationsitesacrossLatinAmerica(7),Africa(7)andSoutheastAsia(3).Fifty-threepercentoftheprojectswerefoundtousesitespecificorcountryspecificallometricequationsforassessingabovegroundbiomass,aswouldberequiredforaTier2approachForty-seven percent of the projects use generalised equations for the wholetropics.The other carbon pools are usually less important in these projects,butcanstillrepresentasignificantportionofnetemissions.Notsurprisingly,capacitytoinventorythesepoolswasevenlower.Only24%oftheprojectteamswerefamiliarwithmethodsforestimatingbelowgroundbiomass.Inthecaseofdeadwoodcarbonmeasurements,41%oftheteamswerefamiliarwiththemethods.Forlitterandsoilcarbonpools,mostoftherespondentsplantouseeitherthevaluessetbytheIPCCortoneglectthesepools.Mostoftheprojectsthat were surveyed did not have sufficient information to deal with carbonestimationinvariouspools.AnexceptionwasaprojectinBrazil,whichusedsitespecificallometricequationstoestimateabovegroundbiomasscoefficients(Higuchiet al.1982;Silva2007),belowgroundbiomassanddeadwood(Silva2007).LitterwasestimatedusingTier1defaultvalues.Theprojectwillnotinventorythesoilcarbonpool.

Finally,thedevelopmentofMRVmethodsforREDD+projectsfocusesmostlyon remote sensingandground inventoriesbyprofessional foresters (GOFC-GOLD 2010). These are expensive and may be of limited effectiveness infollowingactualdevelopmentsonthegroundatthenecessaryscaletoinformproject implementation.There is growingexperiencewith community-basedMRV(seeBox15.3) toaddress the lackof involvementof thepeople livingordependingonlandwhereREDD+schemesarebeingcarriedout.Practicalapproachesarebeingdevelopedandtestedforengaginglocalpeopleeffectivelyinmonitoring(Skutsch2010).

15.4.2 EFs for biomass carbon poolsTo implement the Stock–Difference or theGain–Lossmethods, inventorycompilersneeddataonforestandnon-forestecosystemstobeabletoproduce

Measuring REDD+ performance272 |

Box 15.2 Evidence of progress between FRA 2005 and FRA 2010

Between the 2005 and 2010 reporting periods for the FAO Forest Resources Assessment (FRA), some modest improvements can be seen in monitoring capacity. Figure 15.3 shows the changes in capacity to report on carbon in different pools. Most of the improvements occurred in African countries, where overall monitoring capacity was not well developed in 2005. Progress is usually associated with the fact that these countries reported on two carbon pools in 2010 (aboveground biomass and soil) instead of only one (aboveground biomass). However, they are still reporting at Tier 1 level, using IPCC default values. Remote sensing capacity and the use of time series data for monitoring changes in forest areas barely increased between 2005 and 2010. Forest inventory capacity also showed little improvement over this period. A decrease in monitoring capacity can be found in a few countries, in some cases due to an internal political situation.

The apparent lack of significant improvement in monitoring capacity between FRA 2005 and 2010 reporting suggests that efforts by REDD+ to build capacity have not yet had much impact on national reporting. The international community needs to commit greater human and financial resources to addressing capacity gaps in order to change this situation.

Figure 15.3 Change in capacity for 99 tropical non-Annex I countries based on the difference between FAO/FRA 2005 and 2010 reporting on the five different forest carbon pools

Difference 2005–2010

Increase

No change

Decrease

Source: Romijn et al. (2012)

| 273Emissions factors

Box 15.3 From global to local in REDD+ MRV: Linking community and government approaches Finn Danielsen, Neil D. Burgess and Martin Enghoff

In recent years, a number of manuals have been developed to guide local data collection on forest biomass (Verplanke and Zahabu 2009; Subedi et al. 2010; An et al. 2011; UN-REDD Programme 2011b; Walker et al. 2011). Studies have shown that local people can reliably collect data on aboveground biomass and forest use and can meet the requirements at higher reporting tiers of the IPCC (Danielsen et al. 2011).

Community involvement in REDD+ MRV is particularly useful in forest areas that are under some form of community regime, where resource rights are recognised by the government and where there is local interest in managing the forest area. Involving communities helps link national REDD+ implementation to local decision making and forest management (Danielsen et al. 2010). Moreover, it reduces the risk that REDD+ will undermine local forest tenure. It also helps to promote the transparency and accountability of REDD+ initiatives and contributes to equitable governance and benefit sharing.

The question arises as to how to successfully integrate community monitoring of REDD+ effectiveness with the monitoring undertaken by national REDD+ implementing institutions. In the past, most community forest monitoring initiatives have been localised (Fry 2011). There are no examples of community schemes that have been scaled up to the national level.

To effectively link community and state monitoring for REDD+, community monitoring needs to be embedded in a scheme that feeds data into national MRV initiatives. The national REDD+ programme should also ensure that the communities are compensated for their labour. The involvement of communities in REDD+ MRV must be supported by national policies to ensure that sufficient funds and staff are set aside for the development of the community monitoring component in the national REDD+ programme.

In most countries, community-based organisations already have experience in community forest monitoring. These organisations, or other institutions representing communities, should be encouraged to take a central role in the design, development and piloting of the community monitoring component of the national REDD+ programme. It is advisable to start small, see what works and then expand as experiences accumulate (Herold and Skutsch 2011).

At the national level, there is a need for a minimum standard for community forest monitoring so that the same approach is used at all sites throughout

continued on next page

Measuring REDD+ performance274 |

the country. The standard should specify the format of the raw data (measurements of tree girth, wood density) and auxiliary supporting information (location, date). Any additional requirements for data on forest resources status and forest governance developments should also be specified. The standard should describe how and when the data should be transmitted from the community-based organisations to the government. It should also prescribe how to collect, verify, check, process and analyse the data (Pratihast and Herold 2011). Quality checking requires comparing random spot checks with data sets from other sources. The national REDD+ programme should inform the community-based organisations and communities about signs of displacement of carbon emissions from forest loss and degradation in neighbouring forest areas.

It is important to allow government staff the time to provide feedback to the communities, in terms of questions about their data, and help them to solve any land management issues that may arise. There will be a need for regular community visits by national REDD+ staff. Where possible, it would be helpful to involve government staff with experience in participatory rural appraisal techniques and in holding dialogues with community members.

emissionsfactorsfornetchangesassociatedwithlanduseorlandusechange.Inthecaseofagriculturalandgrasslandecosystemswithlittletonowoodyvegetation, estimatingbiomass isnot technicallydifficult.Most agronomicstudies carried out by agricultural universities and research institutionsaroundtheworldmeasuretotalproductivity,notjustharvest.Sodevelopingdefault biomass values for most cropping systems will require a literaturesearch, although thismay be complicated inmanynon-Annex I countriesbythefactthatthesedataareoftenfoundingreyliteratureandmaynotbereadilyavailableinternationally.Biomassandproductivityarealsomeasuredformanagedpasturesystemsand inmanycases for indigenousrangelands.Forthebiomasscarbonpools,thetechnicalchallengeisestimatingbiomassofwoodyvegetation.

One of themain limitations to improving emissions factors is the lack ofappropriatebiomassequationsforconvertingplotscalemeasurementscollectedin a traditional forest inventory into biomass estimates and, subsequently,intocarbonnumbers(IPCC2006).Themostcommonbiomassequations–allometricequations–useeasilymeasureddimensionsoftrees,likediameterandheight,topredictbiomass.Areviewof850allometricequationsinsub-SaharanAfricancountriesrevealedthatlessthan1%ofthetreespeciesintheregionhavecountry-specificmodelsandlessthan2%oftheequationsaccountforrootbiomass(Henry et al.2011).Additionally,seventreespeciesaccounted

Box 15.3 continued

| 275Emissions factors

for20%oftheavailableequations(allequationsareavailableintheopenaccessdatabaseofCarboafrica:www.carboafrica.net).Thus,formanyspecies,wemustrelyonequationsthatarenotspecifictothespeciesbeingsampledandthathavenotbeenvalidated.Thereviewalsoquestionedthequalityoftheavailableequations,sincemostofthemgavevaluesthatregularlyfelloutsideexpectedranges.Theauthors concluded thatno countries in sub-SaharanAfricahaveenoughnationallyappropriatebiomassmodelstouseinassessingforestcarbonstocks and their variationunder the IPCCTier2orTier3 approaches.Forexample,Cameroonhasaround600forest trees species,ofwhich20specieshavespecificallometricmodels.Generalisedoraveragedmodelsmustbeusedfortheotherspeciesandtheirbiasisunknown.

Themostcommonapproachtoinventoryingverydiversetropicalforestsistousegeneral equations,whicharebasedonmeasurementsof avarietyoftreespeciesfromdifferentecosystemsacrossthetropics.Asimplegeometricalargument suggests that the total abovegroundbiomass of a tree should beproportionaltotheproductofthetrunkbasalareaandthetotalheightofthetree,whichprovidesanestimationofavolume.Thisvolume,multipliedbythespecificgravity,allowsanestimationofthemassperunitvolume(Chave et al.2005).Severalpantropicalequationsexistandarewidelyused(Brown et al.1989;BrownandLugo1992;Brown et al.1997;Fearnside1997;Chave et al.2005).However,thepredictivepowerofthesemodelscanonlybedeterminediftheyarevalidatedusingtreebiomassdataobtaineddirectlyfromdestructiveharvestexperiments,whichisrarelydone(Crow1978;Cunia1987;Brown et al.1989;Chave et al.2001;Houghton et al.2001).Ketterings et al.(2001)proposed a method of non-destructive sampling for ‘tuning’ the biomassequationstoasiteusingtherelationshipbetweenspecificgravity,diameterorbasalareaandheight.Thisapproachholdspromisebutrequiresmuchmoreworkbeforeitcanbecomeapracticaltoolforinventory.Recently,Picard et al.(2012)proposedaBayesianmodelaveragingapproachtocombinedifferentbiomassmodelsandimproveallometricbiomassestimates.Thisapproachisappropriatewhenthereareseveralmodelsavailableforanareaandonecannota priorijudgewhichmodelisthebesttouse.

Weconcludethediscussionofabovegroundbiomasswithafinalwordontheallometricnatureoftheseequations.Inmostecosystems,itisrelativelyeasytomeasure thediametersof trees.Forestersusea standardmeasureofdiameterat breast height, which is at 1.3m above the surface of the soil.There arevariousrecommendationsformeasuringirregulartrees(e.g.forkedtrees,treeswithbuttresses,etc.)ortreesonslopes,butthesearebeyondthescopeofthischapter. Indense tropical forests,measuring theheightof trees accurately isdifficult.Whileheightgenerally increases theaccuracyofbiomassequations,mostequationsinhumidtropicalforestsituationsforegothismeasurementandrelysolelyondiameterordiameterandwooddensity.InthesurveyofAfricanbiomassequationscitedabove,only15%usedheight(Henry et al.2011).

Measuring REDD+ performance276 |

Asnotedabove,belowgroundbiomass isnotwellrepresentedinallometricequations.Most inventory approaches use the Stock–Difference approach,whereinbelowgroundbiomassisestimatedthroughsocalledroot:shootratios,whichusetherelationshipbetweenbelowgroundandabovegroundbiomass(IPCC2003;2006).ThesurveyofasmallnumberofREDD+demonstrationprojects indicated that both allometric equations and root:shoot ratiodatawere insufficient for carbon estimation at all levels: local, regional andnational.Withfewexceptions,mostoftheprojectssurveyedplantousethegeneralisedequationsfoundinCairns et al.(1997)andMokany et al.(2006).SomeprojectsplantouseIPCCTier1defaultvalues.

Mokany et al. (2006) reviewed a large number of published root:shootratio values and suggested that quality is also an issue for this measure.Excavating root systems properly is difficult and needs to be undertakenbytrainedindividuals;sometimesevenscientistsdonotgetitright.Outof786root:shootvaluescollected,63%hadtobediscarded,eitherbecausethevalueswereunverifiableorbecausethemethodsusedtogeneratethemwereinadequate.Amongthoseretained,only20observationswerefromtropicalforest ecosystems. Other tropical systems were equally poorly sampled.Despitethisseriouslimitation,theauthorsvalidatedseveralrelationshipsthatwereknownfromsmallerscaleecologicalstudiesandfoundthatroot:shootratiosvariedwithsomepredictabilityandcanbeusefulforinventorypurposeswhilemore data are gathered. For example, the root:shoot ratio decreasesas precipitation increases in forest andwoodland ecosystems, although therelationshipissubjecttowidevariation.Inallecosystems,theroot:shootratioalsodecreasesasshootbiomassincreases.Whilethisbehaviourisexpectedformathematicalreasons,itcanbeusedtosetprioritiesfordatacollection.

15.4.3 EFs for other carbon pools and GHG fluxesApproaches have been developed for inventorying the changes in othercarbon pools.However, data for local, regional and inventories are largelylacking. Palace et al. (2012) reviewed a total of 49 studies on deadwoodin tropical forests.Many of these studies used a percentage of total fallendeadwood to estimate standing deadwood. Standing and fallen deadwoodwerebothmeasuredin21studies,witharatioofstandingtototaldeadwood,rangingfrom6%inadisturbedforestto98%ataheavilydisturbedsite.Inundisturbed forests, standing to fallen deadwood stocks ranged from11%to76%.Theauthorsfoundthatindrytropicalforests(2.5–118.6Mgd.m.ha-1),thepercentageoffallendeadwoodtendedtobesmallerthaninmoisttropical forests (1.0–178.8 Mg d.m. ha-1). The proportion of deadwoodto total aboveground mass can be surprisingly high: 18 to 25%, even inunmanagedforests.TheGOFC-GOLDsourcebook(GOFC-GOLD2008)indicates that deadwood canmake up to about 7%of total carbon stock;understoryvegetationandlittervaluesareusuallylessthan3%oftotalcarbon

| 277Emissions factors

stock. Inour surveyofREDD+demonstrationprojects, somewere foundtousewelldefinedmethods formeasuring carbon indeadwood,basedonapproachesdevelopedbyseveralauthors(HeathandChojnacky1995;IPCC2003;Pearsonet al.2005;Zanneet al.2009).TwoprojectsinTanzaniadonotplantomeasuredeadwoodbecausethelocalcommunityusesitasfuelwood.Mostprojectsdonotintendtomeasurelittercarbon.

Finally,firerelatedemissionsarean importantconcernforwhichdataandmethodsarestillnotwelldeveloped.Forexample,firereleaseslargeamountsofCO2,butisalsoamajorsourceofnon-CO2GHGemissions,suchasCO,CH4,N2O,NOx. For the IPCC equations, themass of fuel that actuallyburnsisthecriticalfactorforestimatingnon-CO2emissions.Yetcountryandecosystemspecificfactorsfortheseemissionsdonotexistinmostcases.Thecombustionoftheindividualfuelelementsproceedsthroughasequenceofstages: ignition,flamingandglowingandpyrolysis (smouldering), glowingandpyrolysis,glowingandextinction.Eachofthesestagesinvolvesdifferentchemicalprocesses,whichresultindifferentemissions(Yokelson et al.1997).

Acomprehensive reviewof theemission factors forfireswasconductedbyAndreaeandMerlet(2001).Theauthorsconcludedthattherewereadequatedata for emissions factors from tropical savannas, but that there were notsufficientdataformostothermajorecosystemstogeneraterobustemissionsfactors for thedifferentgases.Theeffectof speciescomposition in the fuelmixisalsolargelyunstudied,despitepotentiallyhavinganimportantimpactonemissions.Forexample,emissionsofNOxandN2OfromfirecanvaryasafunctionoftheNcontentofthefuel.SpecieswithhighNconcentrations,likesomelegumes,wouldbeexpectedtohavehigheremissionsofthesegases.

15.5 The way forwardThefirstconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromtheaboveanalysisisthatwhileadequate informationexists forTier1GHG inventories, formost tropicalsystems there are inadequate data available for developing higher tierapproaches. Fortunately, more data are available for estimating emissionsfrom large carbon pools like aboveground biomass, but for themost partthesedatawerecollectedforspecificpurposesandarenotrepresentativeofanecosystemoverlargescales.Thus,wecannotestimatetheirbias.Otherpools,like belowground biomass or soil carbon, contribute significantly to totalecosystemcarbonstocks,butarelesswellcharacterised.WhereasthestatedgoalforREDD+isquantifiedemissionsreductionsinaperformance-basedscheme,wearefarfrombeingabletomakebetterthanorder-of-magnitudeestimates of emissions from sources and removals by sinks with adequatecertaintyinnationalREDD+programmes.Weknowaboutprecisionbecausemostsynthesescalculatestandarderrors.Wealsoknowthatthedatausedto

Measuring REDD+ performance278 |

generateequationsandemissionsfactorsarenotgloballyrepresentativeandthuswehavenoideaofthebiasintheseestimates.

Thesecondconclusionisthatprogressoverthepastdecadehasbeenslow,bothwithrespecttothegenerationofnewdatatosupportbetterGHGinventoriesand the capacity of countries to implement higher tier inventories in theforestrysector.ThereareseveralMRVcapacitybuildingeffortsunderwayaspartofREDD+readinessactivities,buttheirimpactwasnotevidentinthe2010FRA.There are signs that the scientific community is responding topolicyneedsforbetterdatatoenablemoreaccurateandpreciseinventoriesandanumberofnewandimportantsyntheseshavebeenpublished.Nevertheless,effortsatthemomentarepiecemealanduncoordinated.

There have been several multilateral and bilateral partnerships betweendevelopedcountriesandMRVinstitutionsinearlyactionREDD+countries.TheUN-REDDProgrammeanditspartnersareworkingwithanumberofcountriestoestablishtransparentMRVsystems.TheAustralianpartnershipinIndonesiaisjustoneexampleofbilateralcooperation.Thesepartnershipshavelargelyconcentratedonlanduseassessmentandlandusechangedetection;theissueoflimitationsduetoemissionsfactorsisonlybeginningtobediscussed.

Most developing countries have forestry research institutes and universityfaculties of forestry. The Cancún agreements settled on a three-phaseapproachtoREDD+and,aspartofthecapacitybuildinginPhases1and2,trainedpersonnelwillneedtobemobilisedtocontributenecessarydataandknowledge to facilitatehigher tier inventories.DuringPhase1, inventorieswillhavetobeimplementedwithahybridofTier1andTier2approachesforactivitiesthatmeetthekeycategorycriteria.Investmentsandcoordinatedeffortswill be needed to overcome the constraints toGHG inventories oflimitedemissionsfactors.Asmoredataaregathered,fewerTier1estimateswillhavetobemadeinkeycategories.Agreatdealofprogresscanbemadeover the next ten years if coordinated, targeted investments are made incapacitybuildingandmobilisation.Inthemeantime,partnershipsbetweenresearchinstitutesanduniversityfacultiesworkingonforestry,agricultureandotherlandmanagementsystemsinREDD+hostcountries,intergovernmentalagencieswithtechnicalcapacities(e.g.GEO,UNEP,CGIAR)andadvancedresearch institutes in developed countries should be established to enablecoordination,complementarytechnicalskillsandcapacitybuilding.South–southcooperationandthebuildingofregionaltechnicalnetworksshouldbefosteredaswell.

16Chapter

A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels Martin Herold, Arild Angelsen, Louis V. Verchot, Arief Wijaya and John Herbert Ainembabazi

• Developing forest reference (emission) levels forREDD+ is anurgentandchallengingtask,giventhelackofqualitydatainmanycountries,genuine uncertainties about future rates of deforestation and forestdegradationandpotentialincentivesforbiasingtheestimates.

• Theavailabilityandqualityofdatashoulddeterminethemethodsusedto develop reference levels.Considerationof the drivers and activitiescausing deforestation and forest degradation will be important foradjustingreferencelevelstonationalcircumstances.

• Astepwiseapproachtodevelopingreferencelevelscanreflectdifferentcountry circumstances and capacities and will facilitate broadparticipation, early startup and the motivation for improvementsover time, alongside efforts to enhancemeasurement andmonitoringcapacities.

16.1 IntroductionForest reference level (RLs) and forest reference emission levels (RELs)aremostcommonlyusedasabusinessasusual(BAU)baselinetoassessa

Measuring REDD+ performance280 |

country’sperformance in implementingREDD+ (UNFCCC2011c).1RLsareneededtoestablishareferencepointorbenchmarkagainstwhichactualemissions(andremovals)arecompared.Infact,emissionreductionscannotbedefinedwithouthavingfirstagreedontheRL,whichisthereforecriticalfor gauging the effectiveness or forest carbon impact of REDD+ policiesandactivities.

AseconduseoftheRListoserveabenchmarkforpaymentsinaresults-basedREDD+mechanism.Thisfinancialincentivesbenchmark(FIB)determinestheemissionlevelsafterwhichacountry,subnationalunitorprojectshouldstart being paid for their results.Theway the FIB is set has implicationsfor REDD+ transfers, and ultimately for environmental integrity (carboneffectiveness),costefficiencyandequity(benefitsharing).

Despite its critical importance,political consensusonhow to set referencelevels is limited togeneral guidance (UNFCCC2011c, seeBox16.1) andsciencedoesnotprovideclearproposalsforhowtoproceed(Huettneret al.2009;Obersteineret al.2009;Estrada2011).Threechallengesareprominent.First,thereisacriticallackofdataandthereliabilityofthefewdatathatexistisoftenquestionable.AnessentialstepinestimatingRLsistogethistoricalactivitydataondeforestationandforestdegradation,butformostcountriestheseare limited,duetothe lackof forestmonitoringcapacities(MeridianInstitute2011b;Romijnet al.2012).

Second,BAUscenariosarebynatureforwardlooking.Whilepredictingthefutureisalwaysdifficult,ratesofdeforestationanddegradationshowmuchgreaterannualvariabilitythan,forexample,emissionsfromfossilfuels.Thereisgenuineuncertaintythatcannotbefullyresolvedbybetterdataandmodels;factoringinuncertaintythereforebecomesakeyaspectofsettingRLs.

Third,therecanbeincentivesamongactorstodistorttheestimates(Chapter2).Donors,governmentsandprojectproponents,forexample,mayallhaveaninterest in highBAUbaselines,whichwillmake the impact of anypolicyorproject lookmorefavourable.NGOs,forexample,needtodemonstratesuccess to ensure continued funding,while governments need to prove tovotersortheinternationalcommunitythattheirpolicieshavebeeneffective.ThesharpdeclineinBraziliandeforestationsince2004isacaseinpoint,withdebateoverwhetherithasbeenduetogoodpoliciesortofallingcommodityprices and the global economic crisis. Financial interests are even more

1 The difference between reference level (RL) and reference emissions level (REL) is notalwaysclear.ThedistinctionisoftenmadethatRELreferstogrossemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradation,whileRLreferstodeforestationandforestdegradation,aswellasotherREDD+activitiesonenhancementofcarbonstocks,sustainablemanagementofforestsandforestconservation.InthischapterweuseRLasageneral term,whichencompassesRELs;muchofthediscussionherefocusesonemissions.

| 281A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

Box 16.1 UNFCCC COP17 guidance and its implications

UNFCCC (2011c) provides modalities for forest RLs, supported by an annex with ‘Guidelines for submissions of information on forest RLs’. The RLs should be consistent with anthropogenic forest-related greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in a country’s greenhouse gas inventories and thus in accord with available historical data. When developing RLs, countries are invited to submit details about their national circumstances and, if the RLs are adjusted to take these into account, to include details as to how this was done. Furthermore, UNFCCC has agreed that a stepwise approach to national RLs may help countries to improve their benchmark over time and recommends that countries should periodically update their RLs to take into account new knowledge and new trends. Importantly, the UNFCCC decision acknowledges that subnational RLs may be elaborated as an interim measure, with an eventual transition to a national RL. The possibility of omitting non-significant carbon pools or specific REDD+ activities in the construction of RLs – as expressed in the UNFCCC decision – is of great importance because it allows countries to take a conservative approach to estimating forest carbon stock changes (Grassi et al. 2008).

pronouncedinsettingthefinancialincentivebenchmark(FIB)inaresults-basedREDD+mechanism:foranygivenlevelofemissions,thepaymentisdirectly related to the level of FIB.This situation calls for an institutionalsystemwithclearguidelinesonhowtodevelopRLsandastrongelementofexpertjudgementandindependentverification.

InternationalguidanceonthedevelopmentofRLsisemerging,includingthatprovidedbytheUNFCCC(2011c)(Box16.1)andtheVCSmethodsfor REDD+ projects (Chapter 14). Yet, in the absence of more specificguidelinesandinacontextofthelackofgooddataandgenuineuncertainty,countriesmustchoosehowtoproceedwiththeirRLdevelopmentprocesses.Thisincludes,forexample,theexacthistoricalreferenceperiodtouseandwhichnationalcircumstancestoincludeinBAUbaselinecalculations.

This chapter will not pursue the discussion on international guidelinesandmodalitiesforsettingRLs,butreadersshouldrefertotheUNFCCCdecisions (Box 16.1) and the discussion in Meridian Institute (2011a;2011b).NeitherdoesthechaptermuchdiscussRLsinREDD+projects,animportantissuethatisthoroughlycoveredinChapter14.Whilemaintaininganationalfocus,thischaptershouldalsoberelevantforRLsinprojectsandforthefurtherdevelopmentofinternationalguidelinesonRLsetting.

Onewaytodealwiththethreechallengesofdata,uncertaintyandinterestsisastepwise approach,whichispresentedinthischapter.Thisapproachaims

Measuring REDD+ performance282 |

tobetterstructureanddealwiththevarietyofRLmethodsthatexists,thevariabilityindataandtheirquality,uncertaintiesandcountrycircumstances.The framework should help stimulate broad country participation inestimatingRLs,andprovidea startingpoint, evenwith limiteddata, fromwhich to improve RL setting as countries progress through the REDD+implementationphasesandbuildtheircapacities.

Section 16.2 of this chapter gives an overview of key concepts, includingthedistinctionbetweentheBAUbaselineandtheFIB.It furtherdiscussesthemainmethodsforsettingtheBAUbaselineandtheconsiderationsthatarerelevantwhenmovingfromBAUbaselinestoFIB.Section16.3presentsthestepwiseframeworkandelaborateseachofthethreesteps, fromsimplehistorical extrapolations with limited data available, tomore sophisticatedpredictions at disaggregated scales. Section 16.4 discusses the problem ofuncertaintyanddifferentwaysofhandlingit.Thefinalsectionofferssomeconcludingthoughts.

16.2 Concepts and methods 16.2.1 Two meanings of RLsTwodistinctmeaningsanddifferentusesofRLsmaybedistinguished.First,theRLisusedfortheBAU baseline.ThisisusedtomeasuretheimpactofREDD+policies andactions and todefine emission reductions,which arethedifferencebetweenrealisedemissionsandtheRL.Second,theRLisusedasabenchmarkforestimatingresults-basedincentives,e.g.directpaymentstocountries,subnationalunitsorprojectsforemissionsreductions.Thishasbeen referred to as the crediting baseline (Angelsen 2008a), compensationbaseline (Meridian Institute 2011b) or the financial incentive benchmark(FIB)(Ecofys2012).Weusethethirdterminthischapter.

ThedistinctionbetweenthedifferentmeaningsandrolesforRLsisimportantsincetheyanswerdifferentquestions:i)whatwouldtheemissionsbewithoutREDD+; and ii) at what level of emissions reductions should a country,subnational unit or project start receiving payments? Yet the distinctionbetweentheBAUandtheFIBispoliticallycontroversialbecauseitraisesthepossibilitythattheFIBcouldbesetlowerthantheBAUbaseline,whichcouldresultinlessthanfullpaymentforresults.Thistouchesonwiderissuesintheclimatenegotiations,suchastheallocationofresponsibilitiesandcostsamongcountries.TheBAU andFIB concepts are thereforenot recognised in anyUNFCCCdecision;nevertheless,fromananalyticalviewpointitisessentialtomakethisdistinctiontoclarifytheanalysisanddiscussion.

ThereisbroadagreementthatRLsshouldtakeintoaccounthistoricaldataandbe adjusted to national circumstances (UNFCCC2009a:Decision4/

| 283A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

CP.15). This makes good sense from an analytical perspective: historicaldeforestation and degradation is a good predictor for the near future, butratesofdeforestationanddegradationalsochange.Thefactorsthatcanleadtohigherorlowerratesofdeforestationanddegradation,ascomparedtothehistoricalones,areoftenreferredtoas‘nationalcircumstances’.Thisisabroadterm,andinterpretedindifferentwaysbythePartiesandrecentattemptstospecifythesehavenotreachedconsensus.

Following thedistinctionbetween theBAUand theFIB,wefind itusefulto distinguish between national circumstances that are relevant for settingBAUbaselinesandthosethatarerelevanttoconsiderwhensettingtheFIB.This is illustrated in Figure 16.1. The question to ask regarding whethernationalcircumstancesarerelevantforaBAUbaselineis:‘Doestheinclusionofaparticularnationalcircumstancegeneratemoreaccurate(lessbiased)andmoreprecise(lowervariation)BAUbaselinepredictions?’Wereturntothisquestion inSection16.3.6).The relevantnational circumstances for aFIBarebasedonpolitical considerations as towhat is considered ‘fair’ andarediscussedfurtherinSection16.2.3.

16.2.2 Methods for estimating BAU baselinesThree different methods for estimating future BAU deforestation anddegradationhavebeenproposedintheliterature,e.g.byGutmanandAguilar-Amuchastegui(2012).

1. Strictly historical approach: Thisapproachuses onlyaverageannualratesofdeforestationduringtherecentpast(typicallyover10years)(Santilliet al.2005).AprominentexampleofthisapproachistheRLusedbytheAmazonFundinBrazil,whichisincorporatedintheagreementbetween

Figure 16.1 Key elements for setting reference levels

Historical deforestation

and forest degradation

BAU baseline

Financial incentives benchmark (FIB)

National circumstances

relevant for BAU (e.g. drivers) National

circumstances relevant for

financial incentives (e.g. capabilities)

Other considerations (e.g. efficient use

of funds & uncertainty)

Measuring REDD+ performance284 |

BrazilandNorwayandusesaveragedeforestationoverthepast10years,updatedevery5years.

2. Adjusted historical approach: Historical rates are the point ofdeparture,butotherfactorsthatareconsideredimportantareincludedtoimprovepredictions.Examplesofsuchfactorsarethestageintheforesttransition,i.e.thedegreetowhichcountrieswithhighforestcoverandlowdeforestationratesexpecttoseeacceleratingdeforestationinaBAUscenario.

3. Simulation models: Future deforestation and resulting emissionscan be predicted by simulationmodels, which come inmany forms(Huettner et al. 2009). Such models may include historical rates ofdeforestation,butthebasisistypicallylandrentandthedemandandsupplyofnewlandforagriculture.Thesupplyisdeterminedbyfactorssuchasaccessibility(e.g.roads)andagriculturalpotential.AmuchcitedexampleisthecellularautomatamodelbySoares-Filhoet al.(2006)fortheBrazilianAmazon.

Regressionanalysiscanbeusedtotesttheimportanceofdifferentpotentialdriversofdeforestationanddegradationwhendisaggregatednationaldataontheseactivitiesanddeforestationratesareavailablefordifferentpointsin time.Arecent study(Ecofys2012) testeddifferentmultiple regressionmodels to predict deforestation in three countrieswith historical data ofgoodquality:Brazil,IndonesiaandVietnam(seeBox16.2).Furthertestingofthesemodelsasmoredatabecomesavailablewill–hopefully–yieldmorerobust conclusions aboutwhat and how different national circumstancescanbeincludedinBAUbaselinestoimproveprediction.

Morecomplexmodellingapproachescanbesuitable forRLdevelopmentincountriesthathavehigh-qualitydata.Thesecanbeusedtotestdifferentmethods for RL setting, model deforestation drivers and explore theimplicationsofdifferentpolicyscenarios.ExamplesofsuchmodelsincludeIIASA’sGLOBIOMmodel and theOSIRISmodelling tool (Martinet et al. 2009).Modelling drivers can be particularly importantwhen dealingwith uncertainties.However, it should be noted thatmore complex andsophisticated modelling does not necessarily provide more accuratepredictions ofBAU emissions.Whendata are limited, extrapolation andcomplexmodellingareoftenbasedonassumptionsandcanruntheriskofmultiplyingerrorsandincreasinguncertaintiesthatcouldcompromisetheintegrityofREDD+.Anotheruncertaintyrelatedtosimulationmodels istheirpoliticalacceptabilityas thebasis fordeterminingBAUbaselinesorFIBs,eitherwithinafutureUNFCCC-basedREDD+regimeorinbilateralagreements.Relativelysimpleadjustmentsofthehistoricalemissionsappeartobeamoreacceptableapproach,as theGuyana–Norwayagreementhasillustrated.

| 285A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

16.2.3 From BAU to financial incentivesThereasons for settingtheFIBdifferently fromtheBAUbaselinehavebeen discussed at length by the authors in Ecofys (2012) and only asummaryisprovidedhere.Threedifferentconsiderationsarerelevant,seeFigure16.1.

First, there are circumstances particular to the country that may berelevanttotheFIB.OnepossibilityistoinvoketheUNFCCCprincipleof‘commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities’(CBDRRC) and use the FIBs to allocate varying degrees of paymentamongREDD+countries.Akeyquestionconcernsthespecificcriteriatouse todifferentiatebetween responsibilities andcapabilities.This could,forexample,beper capita income,wheremiddle incomecountrieshavetheirFIBsadjusteddownwards,whereasleastdevelopedcountriesreceiverelativelyhigherFIBs.WhilethespecificinterpretationoftheCBDRRCprinciple is among themost controversial issues in climatenegotiations(and goes well beyond REDD+), the post-Durban discussions haveincreasinglyputthisonthetable.

Second, there are effectiveness and efficiency considerations that suggestthat FIB should to be set below the BAU baseline. Consider the casewhere adonor countryhas afixed sumofmoney to spend forREDD+andmakesadealwithaREDD+country.AslongastheREDD+countryhas positive net benefits from the deal, the lower theFIB could be, thehigherthecarbonpriceandthegreatertheincentivesforlargeremissionreductions (Angelsen2008a;Meridian Institute 2009).Alternatively, foragivencarbonprice,the lowertheFIB,the lowerthecostsforacarbonbuyerandthemoneysavedcanbespentonREDD+elsewhere.

Third, we suggest that the financial incentives benchmarks might bean adjusted BAU baseline to reflect uncertainty. Options for handlinguncertaintyarediscussedinSection16.4.

16.3 A stepwise approach 16.3.1 Key dimensions of the stepwise approach ThestepwiseapproachproposedbytheUNFCCC(2011c),asisthecasewithmany issues in REDD+ implementation, will evolve and consolidate overtime(Box16.3).AscountriesmovethroughtheirREDD+implementationphases,theyhavetodevelopnational,orasaninterimmeasure,subnationalforest RLs.The understanding, reliability and validity of data for RLs areboundtoimprovethroughthatphasedprocess.

Measuring REDD+ performance286 |

Box 16.2 Regression analysis to estimate deforestation drivers

One way to move beyond Step 1 is through the use of multiple regression analyses.a The method can be used to test the importance of historical deforestation and different national circumstances, including deforestation drivers. It requires that disaggregated national data (subnational level) on deforestation, forest cover and other relevant factors are available for at least two periods (i.e. covering three points in time). We undertook such an analysis in three tropical countries: Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Figure 16.2 shows the importance of different factors in predicting deforestation. Historical deforestation is a good predictor of future deforestation in all three countries, with the effect (elasticity) of deforestation being highest in Vietnam (0.57) followed by Brazil (0.51) and last by Indonesia (0.21). Elasticity refers to the percentage change in deforestation rate associated with a 1% increase in the variable in question. For example, in Figure 16.2, a 1% increase in the historical deforestation rate in a province in Vietnam gives a predicted future deforestation rate that is 0.57 % higher. The fact that the elasticity is less than one suggests that a simple extrapolation of historical rates can be misleading.

Notes:BrazilandVietnamregressionsincludeatimetrendvariablenotincludedinthegraph.All variables are in logarithmic form.The black lines gives the 95% confidence interval ofthe coefficient estimate, i.e. if that line crosses the ‘0’on thehorizontal axis, the regressioncoefficientisnotsignificant.

Figure 16.2 Predictors of deforestation in Brazil, Indonesia and Vietnam

Elasticity estimates with 95% con�dence interval

0.8 1.0 1.20.60.40.20-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8

Gross domestic product (GDP)

Agriculture GDP

Road network

Human population

Forest cover

Historical deforestation

Brazil Indonesia Vietnam

| 287A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

Reflecting the variability in available data fromwhich to estimate futuretrendsandthe lackofcapacity inmanycountries (Herold2009;Romijnet al.2012),astepwiseapproachprovidesastartingpoint forallcountrysituations.TheapproachisconceptuallysimilartotheuseofdifferentIPCCGoodPracticeGuidelines (GPGs)approaches forestimatingactivitydataandtiersforcarbonstock/emissionfactordata(seeBox16.3andChapter15 for details) and reflects gradual improvements in several dimensions(Table16.1).

Large forest areas contribute to higher rates of deforestation, although the effects are small: Indonesia (0.35), Brazil (0.06), and Vietnam (0.03). The forest area provides a direct test of forest transition hypothesis, which suggests that countries with large forest cover can be expected to have accelerating deforestation (Mather and Needle 1998; Mather et al. 1999). The small and insignificant effect observed in Vietnam is consistent with recent trends of net reforestation in the country (Meyfroidt and Lambin 2008). In contrast, Indonesia is experiencing higher deforestation rates and thus the higher elasticity is not surprising.

The analysis also incorporated other factors that are potentially important in setting RLs. In Indonesia, economic growth is associated with higher deforestation rates, another indication of many parts of the country being at an early stage in the forest transition (income level also provides a test of the forest transition hypothesis). In Brazil, high population growth is associated with lower deforestation rates. Surprisingly, roads have no significant effect on deforestation rates, beyond what is already captured in the impact on historical deforestation rates.

Regression analysis of this kind will not capture all of the drivers and variables that cause deforestation. Variables that show no variation within the country, although they may be important drivers of deforestation, cannot be included in this type of regression model because it is the variation within the country that produces the results. Also, new drivers or policies are hard to analyse, since these predictions are based on the historical relationship between variables.

Source: Ecofys (2012)

a Regressionanalysisisastatisticalmethodthatseekstoestablishthequantitativerelationshipbetween one dependent variable (e.g. current deforestation rate) and a set of independentvariables (e.g. historical deforestation rates, current forest cover and income per capita).Regression analysis estimates the conditional expectation in the form of a set of regressioncoefficients, e.g.howmuchcurrentdeforestation is expected to increase if income increaseswhileothervariablesarekeptconstant.Onepossiblemodelspecification,usedinthisanalysis,isthelogarithmicmodel(log-log),whichusesthenatural logarithmsofdeforestation,forestareaandothervariables.Thismakestheinterpretationofresultseasierasthecoefficientsofeachvariablecanbeinterpretedaselasticities,whichanswerthequestionofhowmuchdeforestationchangesinpercentwhenthevalueofanindependentvariable(e.g.forestcover)increasesbyonepercent.

Measuring REDD+ performance288 |

Tab

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| 289A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

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Measuring REDD+ performance290 |

Box 16.3 3 Phases, 3 Approaches, 3 Tiers, 3 Steps

‘Phases’, ‘approaches’, ‘tiers’ and ‘steps’. Confused? Not after reading this box. These different terms all have quite specific meanings in the REDD+ and climate mitigation debates.

Phases of REDD+ implementation REDD+ implementation is following a phased approach, suggested by Meridian (2009) and agreed at COP16 (UNFCCC 2010). The three phases are:

Phase 1 – the readiness phase: the initial phase focuses on the development of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, capacity building and demonstration activities.

Phase 2 – policy reforms and results-based demonstration activities: the second phase focuses on the implementation of national policies and measures, as well as on demonstration activities that use results-based payment mechanisms.

Phase 3 – results-based actions: transitioning into Phase 3 will involve moving to more direct results-based actions, i.e. emissions and removals that should be fully measured, reported and verified, with payments based on these results.

Approaches for estimating area change in land use (activity data)The IPCC guidelines provide three approaches and tiers for estimating emissions, with increasing levels of data requirements, analytical complexity and accuracy for higher tiers and approaches (GOFC-GOLD 2011). REDD+ countries are encouraged to use the ‘Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry’ (IPCC 2003) to assist in their reporting on greenhouse gas emissions and removals. To estimate emissions and removals, two primary variables are important: activity data and emission factors, which can be estimated with different levels of sophistication. Three approaches can be used for tracking activity data or forest area change:

Approach 1: total area for each land use category recorded, but no information included on conversions (only net changes)

Approach 2: tracking of conversions between land use categories (only between 2 points in time)

Approach 3: spatially explicit tracking of land use conversions over time.

| 291A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

Tiers for estimating change in forest carbon stocks (emission factors)Emission factors give the change in forest carbon stocks for different types of forests, and for up to five carbon pools: aboveground, belowground, deadwood, litter and soil organic carbon. Emission factors are used to determine how much carbon per hectare is lost and released to the atmosphere as a result of a human activity, e.g. deforestation. Data for estimation can come from different tiers.

Tier 1: default values for forest biomass and forest biomass mean annual increments corresponding to broad continental forest types (e.g. African tropical rainforest). Tier 1 also uses simplified assumptions to calculate emissions.

Tier 2: country-specific data (i.e. collected within the national boundaries) and forest biomass recorded at finer scales through the delineation of more detailed strata.

Tier 3: actual inventories with repeated measures on permanent plots to directly measure changes in forest biomass and/or well parameterised models in combination with plot data.

Steps for developing reference (emission) levels Using the following three steps for developing reference levels is a new idea, developed in this chapter and in earlier work by the authors. It has been recognised by COP17 (Decision 12/CP.17, par. 10: “Agrees that a stepwise approach to [RL/REL] may be useful, enabling Parties to improve the [RL/REL] by incorporating better data, improved methodologies and, where appropriate, additional pools …”). The different steps are useful because they provide a starting point for all countries to explore (initial) RLs. They lay out the means to improve RLs as capacity increases and data availability improves. The approach is designed to lead to more comprehensive and accurate RLs for higher steps, and when moving towards results-based compensation (i.e. in phase 3):

Step 1: Use available data (even if uncertain) to provide a starting point for RL establishment with simple projections, based on historical data.

Step 2: Build more robust national datasets for country-appropriate extrapolations and adjustments, including data for key drivers.

Step 3: Integrate spatially explicit assessments and modelling, using reliable data on activities and drivers.

For more details on the steps, see Table 16.2.

Measuring REDD+ performance292 |

16.3.2 The three stepsTheconceptofthestepwiseapproachlargelydependsontheavailabledataandcountrycapacitiesandthusrequiresadjustmentsfornationalcircumstancesanduncertainties.

Step 1 is the starting point for countries to engage in RL setting and canbebasedoncoarsenational-leveldataonly. Itwillbechallenging toprovidequantitativeevidencefordeviatingfromtheprojectedhistoricaltrendandonlysimplerulesshouldbeusedforpotentialadjustmentstotakeaccountofnationalcircumstances.AllcountriesshouldbeabletoundertakeaStep1approachwithonlymodesteffortusingavailabledata,evenifuncertain.ExamplesofaStep1methodologycanbetakenfromtheBrazilianAmazonFund(asubnationalapproach)andGuyana(anationalapproach).TheAmazonFundRELisbasedongrossdeforestationandaconservativeestimateofabovegroundcarbonstocksof100tC/ha.Theannualdeforestationratesusedinthecalculationofemissionreductionsarecomparedtotheaveragedeforestationratesovertenyearperiods,which are updated every five years (Amazon Fund 2009). ForGuyana, thepredictedBAUdeforestationwassetastheaveragebetweenthemeannationaldeforestationrate for2000–2009andthemeanglobaldeforestationrate.Anabovegroundcarbonstockof100tC/hawasalsoassumedforGuyana,andtheseformedthebasisforpayments(NorwegianMinistryofEnvironment2011).

Step 2makesafirstattempttoincludenationalcircumstancesquantitatively,i.e.byundertakingevidenceordriver-basedassessmentstoadjusthistoricalrates,andbyusingbettercountrydata(e.g.Tier2forcarbonstocks)thancanbegainedbyrelyingonStep1.However,atthisstagehistoricaltrenddataare likely todominate the estimateof future trends.This is exemplified intheresultsofregressionanalyses(Ecofys2012),wherepredictionsweremadebasedonsubnationalactivitydataforatleastdecadeorsoinBrazil,IndonesiaandVietnam.TheseexamplesaredescribedfurtherinBox16.2.Currently,onlyafewcountrieshavethedataavailabletoundertakeaStep2approach,butthesituationisexpectedtochangesignificantlyoverthenexttwotothreeyears(Box16.4).

Step 3 developstheStep2approachfurther,usinghigherqualitydatathatallow a wider choice of modelling methods. In particular, more spatiallyexplicitactivitydataanddriver-specificinformationsupport,forexample,theuseofmorecomplexspatiallyexplicit regressionorsimulationmodels thatshouldallowforamorerobustandforwardlookingestimate.Theapproachmayactuallyavoidtheneedtousehistoricaldeforestationasthekeypredictorsincespecificdriversandactivitiesmaybeanalysed,modelledandpredictedindividually(butcalibratedwithhistoricaltrends).ApproachesforStep3RLhavebeenpresentedinthescientificliterature(e.g.Soares-Filhoet al.2006),butsofarnoREDD+countryhasdevelopedRLsusingthisapproach.

| 293A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

Theideaforthestepwiseframeworkistoprovideapathwayforreducinguncertainty and moving to higher steps over time, which will allowcountriestodevelopmoreaccurateforestRLsforassessingtheimpactoftheir policies andmeasures, if for example payment rates are higher forhigherqualityofRLs.Approacheshavebeendocumentedthatuseavailabledatasourcesandimprovemonitoringcapacitiestoprovidequalityactivitydata and emission factors (GOFC-GOLD2011).Countries can acquiredatatodevelopforestRLsathigherstepsfairlyquicklyandatareasonablecost(UNFCCC2009a).

16.3.3 The importance of historical dataGetting reliable information on the recent history of forest change iscritical inanyapproachtoRLsetting(MeridianInstitute2011b;Romijnet al.2012).UNFCCCguidelines(Box16.1)highlighttheimportanceofa data-driven approach to settingRLs. In addition to including data onrecent forest area changes and associated emissions andusing approachessuggestedintheIPCCGPGs(IPCC2003),thedevelopmentofforestRLsalso requires informationondrivers andactivities.Theempirical analysisof the relationship between drivers and their contribution to nationalemissionsisoneapproachtoadvancingthroughthesteps.COPDecision1/CP.16(UNFCCC2010)encouragescountriestoidentifylanduse,landusechangeand forestry (LULUCF)activities, inparticular those thatarelinkedtothedriversofdeforestationandforestdegradationandtoassesstheirpotentialcontributiontothemitigationofclimatechange.

For Step 1, consistency and transparency are very important, while datacancontainsignificantuncertaintiesthatarelargelyunknownandshouldbe assessed and managed using default uncertainties and conservativeassumptions. Step 2 and Step 3 for developing RLs would be based onimprovednationaldatacomingfromactivitydatausingIPCCApproach2and3(Box16.3).

16.3.4 National circumstances NationalcircumstancesarealreadyareportingrequirementforallUNFCCCparties.Theassessmentofnationalcircumstancescouldincludeinformation(UNFCCC2003)ongeographicalcharacteristics(e.g.climate,forestarea,land use, other environmental characteristics), population (e.g. growthratesanddistribution),economy(e.g.energy,transport,industry,mining),education(e.g.includingscientificandtechnicalresearchinstitutions)andany other information considered relevant by the country. As there arecurrentlynoclearguidelines,eachcountryhasthefreedomtoassessthesevariablesusingautonomousmethods.

Measuring REDD+ performance294 |

TheoverallrationaleforinclusionofparticularnationalcircumstancesistogeneratemoreaccurateandpreciseBAUbaselinepredictions.Thequestionremainswhether guidelines, for example in the form of a list of potentialvariablesthatcanbeusedtoadjusthistoricalemissionrates,arefeasiblefroma political and scientific viewpoint. An alternative would be to decide onthedocumentationneededtovalidatevariablesbeyondhistoricalemissions.A combination is also possible, i.e. a short list of acceptable variables anddocumentationrequirementsifacountrygoesbeyondthatlist.Thepotentialforbiasedestimatessuggeststheneedforclearguidelinesandanindependentverificationprocess.

Scientificdiscussionshavejuststartedonhowtomakerobustadjustmentsto historical rates and some early evidence is presented in Box 16.2.MeridianInstitute(2011b)discussesthreepotentialnationalcircumstances:the stage in forest transition, the role of specific drivers and existingdevelopmentplans,butalsonotesthelackofbroadevidenceonthese.Theinclusionofnational circumstances is expected to improve aspart of thestepwiseRLdevelopment, asmore andbetter data become available andcapacitiesincrease.

16.3.5 National versus subnational approachesThestepwiseapproachincludestheoptionforsubnationalRLsasaninterimmeasure, but countries need a clear rationale for doing so and they needto understand how these will eventually be compiled into a national RL.It is often difficult to scale up subnationalRLs into a nationalRL that istransparent,complete,consistentandaccurate.

TestingthedevelopmentofforestRLsatthesubnationalscaleandaspartof a learning-by-doing approach may provide useful insights on how todevelopRLsatthenationallevelforPhase3ofREDD+,whenanyfinancialaccountingschemewillbebasedonresults-basedactions.Inthiscontext,a Step 3 approach forRLswill be based on subnational analysis, e.g. toaccount for different ecological conditions and different drivers acrosssubnationalunits.

16.3.6 Flexibility in considering carbon pools, other gases and REDD+ activitiesCountrieshave theflexibility toomitnon-significantcarbonpools,otherGHGgasesandspecificREDD+activitiesintheconstructionofforestRLs(UNFCCC 2011c), and itmakes good sense to focus on key categoriesduring early stepswhen data are highly uncertain (see alsoChapter 15).In this context, estimating emissions is generally more important thanestimatingremovals.SimilartotheconceptofIPCCkeysourcecategories

| 295A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

Box 16.4 Developing RLs in Indonesia

Several countries are working to develop RLs at higher steps, investing significant efforts in consolidating and improving their historical data and analysing their national circumstances, including deforestation and degradation drivers (e.g. Pham and Kei 2011; Sugardiman 2011). In Indonesia, the Ministry of Forestry, supported by AUSAID under the framework of the Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System (INCAS), continues to refine the forest carbon monitoring and accounting capacity as a complement to the national forest inventory (NFI), which is used as a basis for estimating emission factor. For activity data, current land cover maps were generated from mosaic Landsat TM/ETM satellites (for 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009) with 30 metre spatial resolution and partly validated through field validation. The methods for setting up the RLs and projecting future BAU deforestation are based on combining spatial planning data with historical deforestation rates at subnational units. This includes province/district development plans and projections of ‘planned deforestation’, such as expansion of estate crops (plantations), mining and conversion of forested lands that are legally designated as convertible forest or other land uses. As in the Amazon Fund in Brazil, projected deforestation rates will be adjusted every five years. For Indonesia, the national RL is more likely to be an aggregate of subnational RLs (Step 2).

The province of Central Sulawesi, which is a pilot study of the UN-REDD Programme, has undertaken a detailed study on carbon accounting, compiling NFI data and collecting additional field data with the intention of implementing the Stock–Difference approach in five years time (UN-REDD Programme 2011a). Furthermore, under the Letter of Intent (LoI) between the Governments of Indonesia and Norway signed in May 2010, Central Kalimantan was selected as a pilot province for REDD+ measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) activities. The REDD Task Force brings together government agencies and has recently finished the MRV strategy guidelines. The agencies include the Ministry of Forestry, the National Council on Climate Change, the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space, the Ministry of Environment and the National Survey and Mapping Coordination Agency. RELs are proposed for two different forest landscapes: forests on mineral soils and peatlands. While these MRV demonstration activities should be finished by the end of 2012, emission factors are most likely to be predicted based on a hybrid of Gain–Loss and Stock–Difference approaches.

Under the LoI with Norway, a third REDD+ phase (see Box 16.3) is to be introduced, starting in 2014, where Indonesia is to “receive annual contributions for independently verified national emission reductions relative to a UNFCCC reference level (or a reference level set by Indonesia and its partners based on Indonesia’s emissions reductions pledges and UNFCCC methodological guidance (4/CP 15), in accordance with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, if no UNFCCC reference level has been set for Indonesia).”

Measuring REDD+ performance296 |

(Chapter15),acountryisobligedtoreportonemissionswhilereportingonremovalsisoptional.Emissionsfromdeforestationneedtobereportedasdoforestdegradationemissions,unlesstheyarerigorouslyproventobeinsignificant. In addition, consistency is key: oncepools and/or activitiesareomittedfromtheRLs,theycannotbeincludedinREDD+performancereporting.Ifadditionalpools,gasesandactivitiesareadded,theRLsneedto be adjusted retrospectivelywith suitable data to ensure consistency inreportingperformance.

16.4 Linking uncertainty in stepwise RLs and financial incentive benchmarksThe stepwise approach provides RL development options ranging fromapproachesbasedon simple and (likely)uncertaindata (Step1) to thoseusingmorecomplexdataandarigorousuncertaintyanalysis(Step3).Itisreasonablethathigherlevelsofcertaintyshouldberewardedbyhigherratesofpayment.This incentive is important tohelp the stepwiseapproachtoworkandencouragecountriestograduatetohigherstepsinordertodevelophigherqualityRLs.Step1RLsmay inmany instancesbeconsideredtoouncertaintobeusedoracceptedinaREDD+paymentscheme.Thestepwisesystem has to take uncertainty into account for reasons of effectiveness,efficiencyandfor ‘fair risk sharing’betweenthepartiesof theagreement.SeveraloptionshavebeenproposedfordealingwithuncertaintyandthesearesummarisedinTable16.2.

Oneproposalistoallowanex postadjustmentoftheRL,originallytermed‘CompensatedSuccessfulEfforts’(CombesMotelet al.2009).Deforestationpressures in, for example, theBrazilianAmazon are closely linked to theprofitabilityofcattleandsoybeanproductionandallowingtheadjustmentofRLsbasedonthepricesofthesecommoditieswouldbetterreflectthetrueBAUscenarioandthereforeallowthebettermeasurementofrealemissionsreductions.

Thecorridorapproach,proposedbySchlamadingeret al.(2005),recognisesthat anypoint estimateof the reference levelwillbeuncertain.A factor istherefore introduced where greater emissions reductions get increasinglylowerdiscountfactors(i.e.higherpricepertCO2).Theapproachdefinesaninterval (corridor) around thepoint estimateof theRL,with thediscountfactor increasing from 0 to 1 (zero to full payment) within this interval.Thus,REDD+countrieswouldget somepaymenteven if they face strongdeforestation drivers, making their policies less successful in reducingdeforestation.Adonorcountry,ontheotherhand,wouldnotpayfullywheredeforestationisreducedforotherreasonsthansuccessfulREDD+policies.Thecorridorapproachhas,toourknowledge,notbeenappliedinanyagreements

| 297A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

Tab

le 1

6.2

Op

tion

s fo

r dea

ling

wit

h u

nce

rtai

nty

in s

etti

ng

RLs

(Eco

fys

2012

)

Op

tio

nEl

abo

rati

on

Pro

sC

on

sM

ost

ap

plic

able

for

1. E

x po

st a

djus

tmen

t of R

LRL

form

ula

agre

ed a

prio

ri;

final

RL

set w

hen

par

amet

ers

(e.g

. agr

icul

tura

l pric

es) a

re

know

n

Pred

icta

ble

; adj

ustm

ents

m

ade

as m

ore

data

bec

ome

avai

lab

le

Har

d to

est

ablis

h th

e fo

rmul

aSt

eps

2 &

3

2. C

orrid

or a

pp

roac

hG

radu

ally

incr

easi

ng

pay

men

ts w

ithin

a R

L co

rrid

or

Flex

ible

; pay

men

ts a

lso

mim

ic m

argi

nal c

ost c

urve

Polit

ical

acc

epta

bili

ty

Step

s 1–

3

3. U

ncer

tain

ty o

r co

nser

vativ

enes

s fa

ctor

ad

just

men

t

Estim

ated

diff

eren

ce

bet

wee

n th

e ou

ttur

n an

d RL

m

ultip

lied

by a

n un

cert

aint

y or

con

serv

ativ

enes

s fa

ctor

(<

1), b

ased

on

asse

ssm

ent o

f da

ta q

ualit

y

Redu

ced

risk

of o

ver-

pay

men

t and

hot

air

; in

cent

ives

to p

rodu

ce b

ette

r da

ta; s

omew

hat a

ccep

ted

by

UN

FCCC

; eas

y to

imp

lem

ent

Mak

es R

EDD

+ le

ss a

ttra

ctiv

e fo

r cou

ntrie

s w

ith p

oor d

ata

Step

s 1–

3

4. R

eneg

otia

tion

Rene

gotia

te R

L du

ring

the

cour

se o

f im

ple

men

tatio

n of

a

RED

D+

agr

eem

ent

Flex

ible

, can

inco

rpor

ate

unfo

rese

en fa

ctor

sPo

litic

al g

amin

gSt

eps

1 &

2

5. In

sura

nce

Cou

ld d

esig

n in

sura

nce

cont

ract

-bas

ed a

pp

roac

hes

in S

tep

s 1

& 2

Wel

l dev

elop

ed m

arke

ts fo

r in

sura

nce

Prob

ably

exp

ensi

ve;

com

ple

x co

ntra

ctSt

eps

2 &

3

Measuring REDD+ performance298 |

sofar,althoughtherecentadjustmentoftheGuyana–Norwayagreementhassomeelementsoftheapproach.2

Anotherapproachistouseuncertaintyorconservativeadjustments.Inthiscontext,anadjustmenttotheRLcouldreflectthedegreeofuncertainty,suchthat countrieswith thepoorestdatawouldapply amultiplicativediscountbasedonthedegreeofuncertainty,e.g.intheformofalowerpricepertCO2.Thisapproachaddressesoneoftheproblemsofuncertainty,namelytheriskof overpayment and unjustified REDD+ credits. The use of conservativeassumptionsisreflectedintherecentUNFCCCdecision(UNFCCC2011c)concerningthepossibilityofomittingnon-significantcarbonpoolsorspecificREDD+ activities in developing RLs. Thus, this approach is, at least inprinciple,alreadyusedbytheUNFCCCandcurrentlyprovidesthesimplestandmostsuitableoptiontoaccountforuncertainRLsinpaymentschemes(Grassiet al.2008)andallowsparticipationinREDD+whilebetterinventorysystemsarebeingdeveloped.

Other options for dealing with uncertainty are contract renegotiation orinsurance,butthesehavenotbeenexploredinthecontextofREDD+RLs.Thequestionof insuranceinrelationtopermanencehasbeendiscussedbyDutschke andAngelsen (2008) and options reviewed there are relevant toRLsaswell.

Table16.2includesacolumnontheapplicabilityofthevariousadjustmentstoparticularsteps.SincemanycountrieswillstartwithStep1or2approaches,conservative adjustment currently provides the simplest solution. Regularrenegotiationsarealsoapossibleoption,butarevulnerabletopoliticalbias.Thecorridorapproachhasseveralattractivefeaturesandcanbeconsideredanelaboratedvariantoftheconservativeadjustmentapproach(withprogressiveadjustments).

16.5 ConclusionsEstablishingforestreferencelevelsfordevelopingcountriesisamongthemosturgentandchallengingtasksinREDD+.WhilesomegeneralguidancefromtheUNFCCCondevelopingforestreferencelevelsexists(UNFCCC2011c),significantchallengesremain.CountriesareaskedtochoosetheapproachestheywilltakeforsettingRLs,butmanystrugglefromalackofqualitydata,genuineuncertaintiesaboutfutureratesofdeforestationanddegradationandpotential incentivesforbiasingtheirestimates, inparticularwhenreference

2 TherevisedreferencelevelundertheGuyana–Norwaypartnershipfollowstheconceptofacorridorapproachwherebyanyincreaseindeforestationfromthecurrentextremelylowrateswouldbepenalised(byreducedpayment)andaboveacertaincut-offlevel,paymentswouldcompletelydisappear(NorwegianMinistryofEnvironment2011).

| 299A stepwise framework for developing REDD+ reference levels

levelsarelinkedtopaymentschemesandpaymentlevels.Toreflectthis,wehavehighlighted twodifferentmeaningsandusesofRL: theRLusedasabenchmarkformeasuringtheeffectorimpactofREDD+policiesandactionandRLusedasbenchmarkforcalculatingpaymentsforemissionsreductionstocountries,subnationalunitsorprojects.

A stepwise approach to developing forest RLs can help to overcome thechallenges of lack of data, uncertainty and competing interests, and couldencouragewider participation by countries inREDD+. It is a data-drivenapproach;thustheavailabilityofmoreandhigher-qualitydatawillincreasetherobustnessoftheRLsovertime.WhiletakingaStep1approachissimpleandtheresultsmayhaveahighlevelofuncertainty,itdoesallowcountriestoatleastinitiateRLactivitiesandprovidesabenchmarkforassessingtrendsandinterimperformance.Step2allowsgreaterinclusionofnationalcircumstancesandlinksRLstoknowndriversofdeforestationanddegradationasameanstoadjusthistoricallandusechangerates.Step3developsthisapproachfurther,withgreaterspatiallydisaggregateddataandamoreexplicitanalysisofdriversandfactors.Step3couldbeimplemented,forexample,throughtheuseofspatialsimulationmodelsthatalsoallowamoreforward-lookingmodellingcomponent.

The stepwise approach, by nature, will result in RLs of varying levels ofuncertaintyandthisshouldbetakenintoaccountinanypaymentscheme.Where uncertainty varies (between countries for example), the financialincentivebenchmark thatmodifies theBAUbaseline is ameans to rewardeffortstoreduceuncertaintiesandmovetohigherstepRLsovertime.Thereare several approaches for dealing with RL uncertainty; the conservativeadjustmentfactorcurrentlyprovidesthemostsuitableoption.Thisapproachis, at least in principle, already being discussed and considered by theUNFCCC(Grassiet al.2008;UNFCCC2011c).

17Chapter

REDD+ safeguards in national policy discourse and pilot projectsPamela Jagger, Kathleen Lawlor, Maria Brockhaus, Maria Fernanda Gebara, Denis Jean Sonwa and Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo

• Earlyadoptionofnational-andproject-levelsocialandenvironmentalstandardssuggeststhatREDD+policymakers,projectpersonnelandinvestorsvalueREDD+safeguards.

• To gain national-level buy-in for REDD+ safeguards, nationalsovereignty must be recognised and competing safeguard policiesshouldbeharmonised.

• The REDD+ safeguards dialogue needs to move away from high-level international discussions and towards action. This includesintroducing guidelines, low-cost strategies and capacity building tosupporttheinterpretation,implementation,monitoringandreportingofsafeguards.

17.1 The key challenge REDD+safeguardsarepoliciesandmeasuresthataddressbothdirectandindirectimpactsofREDD+oncommunitiesandecosystems.Theydothisby identifying, analysing andmanaging risks andopportunities (Murphy2011).TheCancunAgreementreachedatthe16thConferenceoftheParties

Measuring REDD+ performance302 |

(COP16) of UNFCCC calls on Parties to promote, support and reporton the implementation of seven social and environmental safeguards forREDD+ (see Box 17.1). These include transparent governance; respectfortherightsofindigenouspeoplesandlocalpopulations,aswellastheirfullparticipationinREDD+activities;andactionsthatreducetheriskofbiodiversity loss, reversals (permanence) and displacement of emissions(leakage)(UNFCCC2011a).

Establishing internationally recognised social and environmental standardstoguidenationalREDD+policyandprojectdesign iscritical toachievingeffective,efficientandequitablesocialandenvironmentaloutcomes.REDD+policymakersfaceamajorchallengeinestablishingasetofsafeguardpoliciesthatcanbeimplemented,monitoredandenforcedatrelativelylowcost,andthataresalienttocarboninvestors.InmanyREDD+countries,discussionson safeguards are in their infancy and represent only aminor componentof the overall REDD+ policy dialogue.REDD+ readiness initiatives focus

Box 17.1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) safeguards articulated in the Cancun Agreement

1. Actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements

2. Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account national legislation and sovereignty

3. Respect for knowledge and rights of indigenous people and local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

4. Full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous people and local communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this decision

5. Actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, ensuring that actions referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivise the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social benefits

6. Actions to address the risk of reversals

7. Actions to reduce the displacement of emissions.

Source: UNFCCC (2011a)

| 303REDD+ safeguards in national policy discourse and pilot projects

primarilyoncarbonmonitoring, reportingandverification(MRV),payinglittleattentiontoothercoreissuesrelatingtosafeguards.

Thischapterassessesthecurrentstateofinternational,nationalandproject-levelsocialandenvironmentalsafeguardsforforest-basedclimatemitigation.Drawingonthe‘4Is’frameworkoutlinedinChapter2,itdescribestheanalysisofREDD+safeguardsatdifferentscales.Secions17.3,17.4and17.5presentanalysesofthecurrentinternationaldialogueconcerningREDD+safeguards,national and project-level perspectives, and experiences with REDD+safeguards.Thefinal section identifieskeychallengesandopportunities formovingforward.

17.2 Safeguards as seen through a political economy lensThe 4Is framework (Chapter 2) links institutions, interests, ideas andinformation to form a basis for the analysis of REDD+ safeguards. Theframeworkusesapoliticaleconomylens,whichcanhelpexplainhowsafeguardpolicies aredesigned,why safeguardsareadopted,and their importance toachieving the overall objectives ofREDD+.REDD+ safeguards are normsor institutions (North1990) that focus on achievingminimum social andenvironmentalstandards,takeaccountof incentivestosupplyanddemandcarbon credits produced in compliance with internationally recognisedstandards, and includediscussionson the roleof information and ideas inputtingREDD+safeguardpoliciesinplace.

REDD+ safeguards as they are currently formulated are a set of norms orinstitutions that guide expectations surrounding social and environmentaloutcomes associatedwith the reductionof carbon emissions in developingcountries.Unlikerules,whichhavesanctionsassociatedwithfailuretocomply,REDD+safeguardsprovideasetofguidingprinciplesdescribingthesupplyof,anddemandfor,emissionsreductions.WhetherREDD+safeguardswillincludelanguagethatelevatesthemtothelevelofrulesremainstobeseen.Evenif theyremainnon-bindingorvoluntary, investorshavetheabilitytoinformally sanction producers of carbon by demonstrating preferences forcarbonsuppliedinadherencewithsafeguards.

Implementing, monitoring and reporting on REDD+ safeguards involvessignificanttransactioncosts.Adheringtosafeguardpoliciesshouldthereforehavetangiblebenefitsthatoutweighthesecosts.DuetouncertaintyregardingthefinalarticulationofREDD+safeguardsandthenatureandvolumeofthecarbonmarket,nationalgovernmentsandprojectproponentshaveaninterestto position themselves such that the carbon they supplywill at leastmeettheminimum safeguard of doing no harm.ManyREDD+ initiatives alsostrivetoprovideco-benefitstolocalresourceusers.Beyondmarketincentives,proponentorganisations,donorsandnationalgovernmentsmaybemotivated

Measuring REDD+ performance304 |

bypre-existing social and environmentalmandates to adhere to social andenvironmentalsafeguardsorbytheexpectationthatREDD+canbeeffectiveonlywhensocialobjectivesandnormsareobserved.

Norms also influence demand-side expectations. Donors or private sectorcarbon buyers may prefer carbon produced in adherence with safeguards(e.g. companies claimingcorporate social responsibilityordonorsclaimingenvironmentanddevelopmentobjectives).Inaddition,investors’interestinsafeguardsseemstobedrivenbyadesiretoreducetheriskofdamagetotheirreputations.

Ideasandideologyplayastrongroleinargumentsforsafeguards,basedonarights-basedapproachthatemphasisestheuniquehumanrightsofindigenouspeople tograntorwithhold their free,priorand informedconsent (FPIC)foractivitiesaffectingthelandtheyhavetraditionallyoccupiedand/orused(IndigenousPeople’sSummitonClimateChange2009).Someadvocatesareof the opinion that all affected communities (not just indigenous groups)shouldberequiredtogranttheirFPICforREDD+.1Thosemakingnormativeargumentsalso insist thatREDD+mustexplicitlybenefit (rather than justavoidharmto)localpopulations.

The idea or principle of national sovereignty has become a major issue indebates surrounding the establishment of a set of international REDD+safeguards.Nationalgovernmentswanttoretaintheirautonomyinsocialandenvironmentalpolicy,whichmakesitchallengingtoimplementinternationallymandatedsafeguards.

Implementing effective REDD+ safeguard policies is a complex task.Stakeholders at different levels have a vested interest in ensuring social andenvironmental safeguards are observed, implying a mechanism for the flowof information. National governments therefore need to collect and reportaggregate information on social and environmental indicators to show thatsafeguards have been met. Developing countries have expressed frustrationbecausedonorsareimposingcomplexandcostlyrequirementsthatvaryfromoneagencytoanother,particularlyatatimewhenfundingflowsforREDD+areslow(Kovacevic2011).

17.3 The international REDD+ safeguards discourseThecurrentUNFCCCREDD+safeguardsarebestdescribedasnon-binding‘principles’ratherthanactualpoliciesorrules.Theagreementandguidancebeing

1 SeeLawlorandHuberman(2009)forareviewoftheUNDeclarationsandCovenantsonHumanRightsthataremostrelevanttoarticulatingarights-basedapproachtoREDD+,basedontheseestablishedinternationalnorms.

| 305REDD+ safeguards in national policy discourse and pilot projects

forgedattheUNFCCConsafeguardinformationsystemsattemptstostrikeabalancebetweenprescriptive rules,national sovereigntyand transactioncosts.Ontheonehand,itaimstoprovideREDD+countrieswithdetailedguidance,sotheycanidentifynegativeimpactsandallowstakeholderstojudgehowwellsafeguards are being implemented.On the other hand, it acknowledges thatcountriesvaryintheircapacitytoimplementandreportonsafeguards,andthatmanysafeguardsystemsarealreadyinplace,whichshouldbebuiltuponratherthanduplicated(UNFCCC2011c).StakeholdersarewaitingfortheSubsidiaryBody for Scientific andTechnological Advice (SBSTA) to further clarify thedefinition and MRV requirements of REDD+ social and environmentalsafeguards. At the same time, other international bodies, including theConventiononBiologicalDiversity(CBD),theUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP)andtheUniversalDeclarationonHumanRights,areevaluatingwhethertheirsocialandenvironmentalsafeguardpoliciesareharmonisedwiththoseofREDD+(Hite2010)(Box17.2).

BeyondtheUNFCCC,severalinternationalandnonprofitorganisationshavearticulatedsafeguardstandardsforREDD+policiesatthenationallevel.This‘donoharm’commitment is reflected in the socialprotectionpoliciesbeingappliedbytheForestCarbonPartnershipFacility(FCPF)includingtheStrategicEnvironmentalandSocialAssessment(SESA)andEnvironmentalandSocialManagementFramework(ESMF)(FCPF2011).FCPFworkswithcountriestobuildtheirinstitutionalcapacityforthedesignandimplementationofREDD+.For example, it engages in participatory consultations with stakeholders toidentifyandmanagepotentialriskstoindigenouspeoplesandforest-dependentcommunities(Rapp2011).TheREDD+SocialandEnvironmentalStandards(REDD+ SES) initiative, led by the Climate, Community and BiodiversityAlliance (CCBA) and CARE International, brings civil society togetherwith the private sector and government agencies in developing countries tobuild country-specific indicators to track the compliance of government-ledREDD+programmeswiththe initiative’seightprinciplesand34supportingcriteria(CCBAandCARE2010).2Theseprinciplesincludecommitmentstoenhancethewellbeingoflocalcommunitiesandcontributetogoodgovernance(REDD+ SES 2010). The UN-REDD Programme is engaged in a parallelprocesstodevelopsocialandenvironmentalprinciplesandcriteriathatmirrortheCancunAgreement’ssafeguardsandthesewillapplytocountriesreceivingfinancial support forREDD+.Theprogrammehasalsodevelopedprinciplesandcriteria that enhanceREDD+’spotential todeliver socialbenefits (UN-REDDProgramme2011c).However,theUN-REDDProgrammeprinciplesandcriteriadonotmakespecificreferencetosuchkeyissuesas landtenure.Furthermore,unliketheWorldBank,whichhasaformalinspectionmechanism,UN-REDDProgrammehasnoaccountabilitymechanism.

2 Version 2 of these standards is currently in draft form and is going through a publiccommentperiodforrevision.Version2has7principlesandareducednumberofcriteria.

Measuring REDD+ performance306 |

Box 17.2 Linking Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and REDD+ biodiversity safeguards: Experience from sub-Saharan Africa

Efforts to avoid deforestation and forest degradation should promote the conservation of biodiversity (Harvey et al. 2010a; CBD 2011), and increasing forest ecosystem resilience offers opportunities for forest carbon stability (Thompson et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the strong focus of REDD+ on maintaining carbon stocks has raised concerns that biodiversity could be at risk if not properly considered (CBD 2010). Dialogue between the CBD and UNFCCC is needed to address this concern. The CBD COP 10 in Nagoya, Japan, paid attention to the link between biodiversity targets and UNFCCC REDD+ safeguards, with several of the 20 biodiversity targets articulated (Aichi Biodiversity Targets 5, 7, 11 and 15) being directly relevant to REDD+.

Following such global dialogue, a number of consultation and capacity building activities have taken place at the regional level. In 2011, a joint CBD–UNFCCC workshop addressed the links between biodiversity targets and REDD+ in sub-Saharan Africa. Held in Cape Town, South Africa, the workshop brought key members of CBD and UNFCCC together with other partners, including representatives of indigenous and local communities. Existing safeguard frameworks from UN-REDD Programme, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) helped guide the discussions. The participants discussed the application of REDD+ safeguard policies on biodiversity, identified indicators for assessing REDD+ within the objectives of the CBD, and highlighted the challenges facing effective implementation of biodiversity safeguards in the region. Members of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF)a provided information on their experiences with REDD+ formulation and implementation at the national and project level.

The key conclusions and recommendations were:

1. Biodiversity safeguards should be addressed as early as possible in the REDD+ process.

2. Deficiencies in land zoning processes should be addressed.

3. There is no specific safeguard to address the risk of afforestation in an area of high biodiversity.

4. Insufficient attention has been paid to the potential for moving deforestation and degradation pressure to areas of low carbon value and high biodiversity.

5. Little attention has been given to potential losses of traditional ecological knowledge.

The workshop outputs were used to inform the Parties in advance of the CBD COP 11 and to facilitate further streamlining of biodiversity safeguard policies between the CBD and UNFCCC. In sub-Saharan Africa, capacity building remains a major challenge and more research is needed to shed light on the links between REDD+ and biodiversity outcomes. At the regional and national levels, data on carbon pools and flows and correlations with indicators of biodiversity need to be made available. The collection and processing of this type of data requires in-country capacity to link carbon and biodiversity outcomes, and to analyse the underlying causes of carbon–biodiversity tradeoffs and synergies.

a The CPF is an informal voluntary arrangement of 14 international organisations and secretariats with substantial programmes on forests.

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There are several voluntary certification standards for assessing social andenvironmental impactsattheproject level.Themostprominentofthese istheClimate,CommunityandBiodiversity(CCB)Standard,whichhasbeenadopted by an estimated 64% of all forest carbon projects (EcoSecurities2010).3Nearly60%offorestcarboncreditssoldonthevoluntarymarketin2010camefromCCB-certifiedprojects(Diaz et al.2011).Projects’widespreadandvoluntaryuptakeoftheCCBStandardisanexampleofwhatCashore(2002)referstoas“non-statemarket-drivengovernance”,reflectingtheideasandinterestsofactorsonboththedemandside(investors,consumers)andsupplyside(projectproponents)ofREDD+.

REDD+ safeguards are evolving inmany policy arenas andmarkets.Theyare being applied at different scales of governance, including project orsubnational levels, national level and in the international policy arena. InadditiontotheneedtoharmoniseacrossdifferentscalesthereareimportantquestionsregardinghowREDD+safeguardscanbestreamlinedwithexistinginternational environmental agreements (e.g. CBD) and their social andenvironmentalsafeguardpolicies.

17.4 National REDD+ safeguards policy discourse ThissectiondrawsondatatakenfromCIFOR’sGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+(GCS,seeAppendix)andexploresnationalREDD+mediadialoguesandnationalcapacities focusedonREDD+safeguards.Acomparativecasestudy approach is used to analyse nationalmedia communication in fourREDD+countriesinanattempttounderstandtheextentofpolicydialogueonREDD+safeguards.DatafromcountryprofileshelpsshedlightonhowREDD+activities,institutionalstructuresandpolicydecisionsmightleadtoeffective,efficientandequitableoutcomes.Thecountryprofilesalsoprovideindicators that can be used to measure national capacity to implement,monitorandreportonsafeguards.

17.4.1 Analysis of media discourse GCS undertook a rigorous media discourse analysis in a number ofcountries, including Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia and Vietnam,4 to assessnewspaper coverage of REDD+ policy formulation and implementation.5The investigators conducted analysis of the national print media and

3 PlanVivo is another established certification standard that requiresprojects toproduceclimateandlivelihoodbenefits(PlanVivo2008).4 TheprintmediainVietnamiscontrolledbythecentralgovernment.5 WhilePeruandTanzaniaareincludedinCIFOR’sGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+,mediaanalysesarenotyetavailableforthesecountries.

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interviewedjournalists.6Mediaareseenasawindowoninformalandformalpolicy discussions (Boykoff 2008). The analysis conducted here identifiedspecificreferencestocoreelementsofREDD+safeguardpolicies,includinggovernanceandsafeguards,socialwelfare,biodiversityandMRV.

Theanalysisrevealedthatcoreissuesrelatingtogovernanceandsafeguardsarenotcoveredwellbythenationalmedia.OfprimaryconcernisthepresenceofcorruptioninnationalforestryinstitutionsandtheimpactthatincreasedfundingflowsfromREDD+mayhaveonexistinginstitutions,specificallyprovidingnewopportunities for rent seekingbypublicofficials.Concernswereraised intheIndonesianmediaaboutcontradictionsbetweengeneralREDD+ policy and policies in other sectors, but no specific reference tosafeguardpolicieswasmade.TherewassignificantcoverageofissuesrelatedtoindigenousrightsandhumanrightsinBrazilandIndonesia,butnotinCameroon andVietnam.Property rights for land, tenure and carbon alsoreceivedattentionandincludeddiscussiononthelossofaccesstoforests,aswellasconcernsaboutthedistributionofbenefitsunderREDD+.Overall,limitedcoverageofindigenous,humanandpropertyrightssuggestedlittleattentionwaspaidtosafeguardsinthenationalpolicydialogue.

Biodiversity was consistently linked to conservation, with conservationidentified as the best option for retaining native forest in Brazil andCameroon.TheVietnamesemedia presentedbiodiversity conservation asa potential co-benefit of REDD+. Where countries had relatively well-developed MRV systems, the media discussed leakage and permanenceas important issues for achievingREDD+, but theywere not covered incountrieswithlowMRVcapacity.Lackofexplicitreferenceto‘safeguards’wasexpected;priortotheCancunCOPin2010thetermwasnotwidelyused in the media in many countries. However, the Brazilian mediadiscussedsafeguardsexplicitlyinitsreportingontheoutcomesofongoinginternationalnegotiationsonREDD+.

ThemediainBrazilandIndonesiaappeartobemostawareofsafeguards.Although theydidnot cover all the aspects, therewas explicitdiscussionofcoreissues,includingcorruptforestinstitutions,sovereignty,indigenousrights, property rights, leakage and permanence.The fact that Brazil hasdemonstratedstrongleadershipinestablishinganationalREDD+safeguardspolicy(seeBox17.3)andIndonesiahasanadvancedpolicyprocesshelpsexplainthesefindings.

6 Dataareprimarilyfrom2005–2009butupdateddatato2011forBrazilandIndonesiaareusedtomakeapreliminaryanalysisandidentifytrends.DataaredrawnfromREDD+politics in themedia case studies (CroninandSantoso2010;Kengoum2011;May et al.2011a;Pham2011).

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Box 17.3 National REDD+ safeguard policy in Brazil

Brazil is the world leader in developing national policy for social and environmental safeguards. The process started in 2009, when several civil society organisations began to develop social and environmental principles and criteria for REDD+ programmes and projects. The initiative aimed to: i) strengthen forest governance and the management of natural resources by indigenous people and local communities; ii) encourage public participation in policy making; iii) coordinate action among stakeholders; iv) increase information transparency; and v) generate respect for, and awareness and recognition of, the rights of indigenous people and local communities for their territories, lands, natural resources and traditional livelihoods and cultures (Gomes et al. 2010).

The Institute for Agriculture and Forest Management Certification (IMAFLORA) led the consultation process, which was open to all key stakeholders. Four regional workshops ensured the inclusion of indigenous people, local communities and small-scale landholders.a These stakeholders benefited from capacity building prior to the workshops to ensure they fully understood the safeguards documents and their implications. The team also invited private sector groups to contribute their opinions. By May 2010, the final document describing Brazil’s principles and criteria for REDD+ was ready and this was recommended to national and state-level policy makers.b

The principles and criteria presented in the document provide the basis for Brazil’s national safeguards and REDD+ strategy as requested by the Cancun Agreements.

In 2011, the Ministry of Environment organised two meetings to inform the development of Brazil’s REDD+ national strategy (MMA 2011). The participants were drawn from different sectors of civil society and government. They worked together to evaluate whether the proposed safeguard framework would cover the main risks to biodiversity and indigenous people/local communities, and to identify the main challenges in applying it.

In the second meeting, the participants reviewed different approaches and definitions of safeguards. Following these discussions, the Ministry of Environment presented a list of safeguards for consideration in developing Brazil’s REDD+ national strategy:

1. Legal regulation

2. Guarantee of rights

3. Economic sustainability and poverty reduction

4. Biodiversity conservation and recovery

5. Governance

continued on next page

Measuring REDD+ performance310 |

6. Benefit sharing

7. Monitoring and transparency

8. Permanence and leakage

9. Participation.

The meetings were successful in promoting an open process towards the development of a national safeguard strategy. They also highlighted the main requirements for successful implementation: i) good governance and participation, which includes securing political will, dialogue and coordination; ii) information and capacity building; iii) stakeholder participation, monitoring and conflict resolution; iv) benefit sharing; and v) coordination of sectoral policies, e.g. the forest code (MMA 2011). A major obstacle to the effective implementation of Brazil’s national safeguard policy is the lack of clear data and criteria that can be used for monitoring purposes.

Despite focusing attention on the safeguards issue, Brazil has assumed a ‘blocking’ position in the international arena following COP17 in Durban in 2011. During the SBSTA meeting, Brazil opposed international reporting on how safeguards for REDD+ will be addressed and respected. Some regard this position as selfish, since it blocks progress on REDD+ negotiations and could undermine the credibility of REDD+ with international investors. Any action that impedes funding will be particularly harmful to countries that lack a coherent safeguard strategy.

a These workshops generated 379 comments on the 8 principles and 27 criteria. In total, the consultation process resulted in 559 considerations, comments and suggestions, all of which are available online.

b For the full document see: http://www.observatoriodoredd.org.br/site/pdf/DevelopingREDD.pdf

Box 17.3 continued

17.4.2 National capacity for REDD+ safeguard implementationIfgovernmentsaretoengageinsafeguardpolicies,theymustbeabletoassesssocialandenvironmentaloutcomesatthenationallevel.7Furthermore,whenmaking national-level commitments to international safeguards, countriesneed to provide comparable indicators of change in the core areas, asarticulatedbyUNFCCC.Atpresent,mostREDD+countriesarestrugglingwiththeminimumrequirement: todemonstratereduceddeforestationanddegradation.Onlywhen they grow their capacity forMRV, encompassing

7 SourcesforthissectionincludeDkamela(2011),Mayet al.(2011b),DARandCIFOR(2012),Indrartoet al.(2012),REPOAandCIFOR(2012).

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leakage and permanence, can these two safeguards bemonitored properly.However, the challenge of performing national-level assessment of socialimpacts andbiodiversity co-benefitshas received limitedattention inmostREDD+countries.DatacollectedbyGCSprovidesprofilesforfiveREDD+countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Tanzania and Vietnam), whichincludeanassessmentoftheirlevelofcapacityforimplementing,monitoringandreportingonthecorethematicareasofREDD+safeguards(socialwelfare,biodiversity,permanenceandleakage).

Thecountriesstudiedappeartohavelittlecapacitytomonitorsocialandbiodiversity impacts. With the exception of Tanzania, benefit sharingagreementshave yet tobe articulated, therefore it isdifficult to evaluatewelfare outcomes related to REDD+. In addition, most countries arestruggling to interpret FPIC. In Indonesia, FPIC is a precondition forcommunity involvement in REDD+; however, assessing whether or notFPIChasbeenobtainedfirstrequiresadefinitionofit.Onamorepositivenote, there is evidence of strong participation in the REDD+ policyprocessatthenationallevel.Brazil,IndonesiaandTanzaniahaveachievedmeaningful stakeholder engagement in policy discussions regardingsocial andbiodiversity co-benefits, althoughdiscussions surrounding themonitoringofREDD+biodiversityimpactsisstillattheplanningstage.Forexample,Indonesia’sNationalREDD+Strategycallsforthedevelopmentofanon-carbonMRVsystemthatincludesbiodiversity.

Brazil, Indonesia andTanzania have developed the capacity to monitorland use change, and they are at different stages with respect to settingreferencelevelsandputtingintoplacenationalsystemstoidentifyleakage.ThesecountriesareamongthemostadvancedwithrespecttocarbonMRVand arewell placed tomonitor and report on leakage and permanence.However,theystillhavehurdlestoovercome,whichincludedecidinghowoften tomonitor,gettingreal-time informationon landusechange,andusingsite-specificdatatotriangulateandconfirmleakageandpermanence.Othercountries(e.g.CameroonandPeru)lagbehindandarenotyetableto monitor leakage and permanence. Furthermore, all country reportsnotedsomeambiguityrelatingtoownership.Whenpropertyrightstoland,trees andcarbonareunclear, it isunlikely thatpermanent reductions indeforestationwillbeachieved(seeChapters6,8and9).

Buildingcapacitytoimplement,monitorandenforceREDD+safeguardsis a critical issue, and the countries with the most evolved REDD+infrastructurecanaddressleakageandpermanence.However,mostarenotyetabletomonitorsocialleakagesnortoevaluatetheextentandintegrityofconsentandparticipatoryprocesses(seeChapter6).

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17.5 Learning from project experiences Althoughintheearlystages,manyREDD+projectsarealreadyimplementingthesevenUNFCCCsafeguards.Thissectionreviewsprojectmotivationsandexperienceswithsafeguardingthewelfareoflocalcommunitiesandbiodiversity.TheGCSteaminterviewedprojectpersonnelwith theaimof reviewingtheextenttowhichtheirprojectsfulfilthefollowingtargets:i)respecttherightsofindigenouspeopleandlocalcommunities(UNFCCCsafeguard3);ii)facilitatethefullandeffectiveparticipationoflocalstakeholders(UNFCCCsafeguard4);andiii)ensureconsistencywithconservationandbiodiversitygoals(UNFCCCsafeguard5).Datawerecollectedfrom19projectsinBrazil(4),Cameroon(2),Indonesia(6),Tanzania(6)andVietnam(1).AllbutfourreportedthattheyhavealreadyobtainedorplantoobtainCCBcertification.

17.5.1 Obtaining free, prior and informed consentWhileFPICdoesnotappearintheUNFCCCsafeguards,itisimplicitlyreferredtoinsafeguardnumber3:acallforpartiestorespectindigenouspeople’srights,asframedbyUNDRIP.Underthisdecision,memberstatesmustobtainFPICforactivitiesaffectingthelandscustomarilyowned,occupiedand/orusedbyindigenouspeople.TheCCBstandardrequiresprojectstoobtainFPICfromalllocalcommunities(indigenousorotherwise).WhenaskedaboutobtainingFPIC,mostprojectteamshaveobtainedorplantoobtainFPIC(50outof59villagesintheGCSsample).Nineprojectsprovidedinformationaboutthetypeofconsentobtained(orplannedfor),withmostsecuringconsentthroughoralagreementandonlytwobywrittenpermission.Fiveofthenineconsultedwithsub-groupsaspartoftheFPICprocess.

The scale of the project appears to affect the attention paid to FPIC, inparticular the definition of the person or group giving consent and thedistributionofinformationabouttheproject.Teamsfromthelargerprojects,someofwhichinvolvedentireprovincesormultipleadministrativedistrictsormunicipalities, soughttoobtainagreementfromstate-anddistrict-leveladministration, aswell asgovernmentagencies, communities and industrysectors. The smaller-scale projects (subdistrict or municipality) primarilysought agreement from village-level institutions or from the communityitselfviavillagemeetings.Oneprojecthiredlawyersforthecommunityandencouragedthemtoseekindependentadvicebeforecommitting.Thelargerprojectstendedtoinformcommunitiesthroughstakeholderworkshops,whilethesmalleronesusedthelocalmedia(primarilyradio),aswellasdistributingpostersandleafletsandholdingquestionandanswersessions.

Motivation for conducting FPIC falls into three categories: i) upholdinghuman rights; ii) complying with formal rules or institutions such asvoluntary standards (e.g. CCB) or national law (e.g.Tanzania LandAct);

| 313REDD+ safeguards in national policy discourse and pilot projects

andiii)achievingreductionsindeforestationanddegradation.AsFigure17.1shows,achievingforestcarbongoals(success)andupholdinghumanrightsaretheprimarymotivations.Inlinewiththeemphasisonrights(ideas,informalinstitutions)andeffectiveness(interests),someprojectrepresentativesstatedthatobtainingFPICcouldneverbecomplete,sinceFPICis“aprocessandnotanevent”and“bydefinitionitneverends”.

TheinformationdisclosurerequirementsandtransactioncostsassociatedwithFPICcancauseproblems.Project staffhaddifficulty ingettingasufficientproportionofpeople toattend informationmeetings.Theyalso found itachallengetosecuresufficientfinancialandtimeresourcesfortheparticipationprocess, especially in ensuring that project information reached individualhouseholds in a timely manner. One project representative noted that,despitehavingsignedagreementsandbuildingagoodleveloftrust,“FPICisanimpossibledream”and“actuallyverydifficulttodeliver”.TheincipientnatureofREDD+posesafurthermajorchallenge,sinceFPICaskspeopletoconsenttosomethingthatisstillevolvingandhasanumberofopenquestionsregardingcompensationforchanginglanduse.

17.5.2 Community involvement in project designMost projects (16 out of 18) involved local communities in project designand implementation, for example, in identifying thedrivers ofdeforestationanddegradation,developingbaseline scenarios, anddecidingonappropriate

Num

ber o

f pro

ject

s

10

8

6

4

2

0Brazil

(6)Cameroon

(1)Indonesia

(5)Tanzania

(6)Vietnam

(1)Total(17)

Upholding rights

Compliance with rules

Success with emissions reduction

Figure 17.1 Project motivation for obtaining FPIC: Rights, rules and success

Notes: Data missing for one project in Cameroon and one project in Indonesia. Number of projects in parentheses.

Measuring REDD+ performance314 |

intervention and alternative livelihood activities. In one project, localcommunities helped shape the wording of contracts. Stakeholder meetingsorganisedbytheAcreproject inBrazil ledtoa fundamentaloverhaulof theprojectdesign,replacingasite-specificprojectwithamorecomprehensivestate-wideprogrammeand shifting theemphasis frompayments to incentives forenvironmentalservices.Themainchallengeswere:identifyingleaderswhotrulyrepresentthecommunity/sector;ensuringlocalcommunitieshaveameaningfulvoiceindecisionmaking;andobtainingthefinancialresourcesneededtoenablefullparticipation,especiallywhenattemptingtoreachnomadicpopulations.

17.5.3 Biodiversity and conservation goals SomeofthesurveydatashedslightonhowREDD+projectsareaddressingissuesofbiodiversityandconservation.Tenprojects–Brazil(1),Cameroon(2), Indonesia (2), Tanzania (4) and Vietnam (1) – reported that theirlocationswerechosentotakebiodiversityandnatureconservationissuesintoaccount.However,onlyfive–Indonesia(1),Tanzania(3)andVietnam(1)–plannedtopursueforestmanagementobjectivestargetingtheconservationorregenerationofspecificspecies.

17.6 Challenges and choices for REDD+ safeguards This analysis highlights several challenges and choices for the successfulimplementationofREDD+safeguards.Theglobalforestpolicycommunityis currently looking to theUNFCCCandother internationally recognisedstandards tofinaliseREDD+safeguardsandtoprovideguidanceregardingmonitoringandreportingonprogresstowardsachievingthem.

17.6.1 ChallengesOuranalysispointstoseveralchallengesforREDD+safeguardsastheyareformalisedandintegratedintonationalREDD+policy:

Horizontal harmonisation:REDD+safeguardpoliciesneedtobestreamlinedwithotherinternationalsafeguardpolicies(e.g.CBD).However,theprocessofharmonisingsafeguardsacrosssectorsandpolicyarenasaddstransactionscoststotheirdevelopmentandimplementation.

Vertical harmonisation:Thereisoverlapamonginternational,nationalandproject-levelREDD+safeguardsandstandards.Thisneedstobeexploitedinaproductivewaysoastominimisetransactioncostsanduseexistingdataandindicatorsmosteffectively.

Sovereignty:Decidingtowhatdegreenationstates shouldhaveautonomyoversocialandenvironmentalsafeguardpolicies.

| 315REDD+ safeguards in national policy discourse and pilot projects

Capacity: There is considerable heterogeneity in capacity to monitor andreport on safeguards at the national scale. While progress is being madetowardsbuildingcapacitytomonitorandreportonleakageandpermanence,national-level monitoring systems showing how REDD+ is affectinggovernance,welfareandbiodiversitysafeguardslagsbehind.

Costs:Thecostsofimplementingsocialandbiodiversitysafeguards,includingFPIC,fosteringparticipationandmonitoringbiodiversity,arehighand,iftoohigh,theymaymakeREDD+unfeasible.

Ignored issues: Some critical issues – chiefly land, tree and carbon rights(Chapter8)–arenotbeingaddressedadequately.This lackofattentionininternational safeguardspoliciesmayhave implications forboth social andenvironmental outcomes. Clarity is particularly important with respect towhatisbeingsafeguarded(i.e.forests,trees,carbon,livelihoodsorbiodiversity)andforwhom.

17.6.2 ChoicesDespite these considerable challenges, there are opportunities for REDD+safeguards to be implemented successfully. Using the 4Is framework, thefollowingavenuesareproposedforpolicyaction.

Foster safeguards as universal norms:Evenwhenmonitoringandreportingon international and national safeguards is voluntary, most, if not all,countrieswillnotdeviatetoofarfromthenormregardlessoftheirnationalcircumstances.Ifthevoluntarycarbonmarkettakesoff,thesenormswillbefurtherupheld.

Balancing the interests of diverse actors: Projectimplementersandnationalgovernmentswant toproducecarbon thatdoesnoharmor thathas socialandenvironmentalbenefits.Investorsprotectingtheirreputations,andthosewithwelfareorconservationinterests,favoursafeguardpolicies.Bothgroupswanttominimisecosts,butalsotomaximisebenefits.Thisapparentsynergyshouldbemonitoredinthenearfutureandfacilitatedtomaintainincentivesthatfavoursocialandenvironmentalsafeguards.

From normative ideas to policy practice: Safeguard issues and theirimplementation are receiving attention in anumberofREDD+countries,wherediscussionforumsarehelpingtoinformthepolicyprocess.Nationalleveldiscourseonsafeguardsshouldbeencouragedandsupported.SignificantprogresshasbeenmadeinBrazil,butthisexperiencehasyettoinfluencetheglobalarena.

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Improving information: There is a lot to learn from project experiences,national-level dialogues and other natural resource- and climate-relatedinitiatives.Butinformationonhowtodevelop,implement,monitorandreportonsafeguardsneedstobeshared.VoluntaryREDD+standardsatthenationalandprojectscalearebeingadoptedwidely.Theyarealsoinstillinganethicforwelfareandbiodiversityco-benefitsandtherequirementtocollectinformationonthestatusofsafeguardsthroughoutaprojectlifecycle.

18Chapter

Summary and conclusionsREDD+ without regrets Frances Seymour and Arild Angelsen

• Changes in REDD+ over the past five years have led to significantshifts in the size and compositionoffinancing and the likelypace andcost of implementation, as well as to the divergence of interests acrossactors and levels. Challenges resulting from these changes includeincreased‘aid-ification,’sequencingproblemsfacedbyprojectproponentsand uncertain rewards from REDD+ efforts by forest countries andcommunities.

• Lessons learned from thefirst generationofREDD+ initiatives includethe importanceof the jurisdictional scale inbetweennational and locallevelsforlandusedecisionmaking,theneedforcross-scalecoordinationtoaddressissuessuchastenure,benefitsharingandmonitoringandthetenacityofinterestsandinstitutionsassociatedwithbusinessasusual.

• To move forward, REDD+ objectives must be clarified and strategiesdeveloped to bridge the financial gap created by the lack of a newinternational climate agreement. Pending greater certainty regardingthe future of REDD+, priority should be given to ‘no regrets’ policyreformsthataredesirable,regardlessofclimateobjectives,andtobuildingconstituenciesandcapacitiescriticaltotheeventualsuccessofREDD+.

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18.1 IntroductionTheprecedingchaptersprovideasnapshotofthestateofplayinREDD+andsummarisepreliminaryresearchfindingsfromCIFOR’sGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+ (GCS) from selectednationalpolicy arenas andprojectsites.This chapter summarises and synthesises the key themes that emergefromearlierchaptersandbuildsonthemtolookaheadtothechallengesandchoicesfacingREDD+policymakers,practitionersandresearchers.

REDD+, and the context inwhich it operates, haveundergone importantchanges since it officially became part of the international climate changeagendaatCOP11in2005.Mostsignificantly,anewinternationalagreementonclimate changehasnot yetbeenachieved (Section18.2).This changedcontexthasmajorimplicationsforthewaythatREDD+willunfoldoverthecomingyears(Section18.3).Inaddition,severallessonscanbelearnedfromthefirstgenerationofREDD+projects andpolicy reforms (Section18.4).TheuncertaintyoverthefutureofREDD+mayleadtoinaction,butwearguethatawiderangeof‘noregrets’REDD+policyreformswouldbeworthwhile,regardlessof the futureofREDD+and shouldbe implemented toachieveobjectivesbeyondclimatemitigation(Section18.5).Finally,weprovidesomeconcludingthoughtsonREDD+(Section18.6).

18.2 Changes in the context for REDD+ The idea of avoided deforestation as a climate change mitigation strategywastabledandrejectedduringUNFCCCnegotiationsrelatedtotheKyotoProtocol in 1997. As a result, the forest-related activities included in theCleanDevelopmentMechanism (CDM)were limited to afforestation andreforestation.Adecadelater,anumberofchangesmadeitpossibletoincludewhatcametobeknownasREDD+intheBaliRoadMapatCOP13in2007.Thesechangesincluded:• Achangeinpoliticalframing.Whenreducedemissionsfromdeforestation

wasagaintabledattheCOP11negotiationsin2005,itwasdonesobydevelopingcountriesandinthecontextofnationalaction,thusbridgingtheNorth–Southdivide.

• Anewsenseoftheurgencyandimportanceofincludingdeforestationandforestdegradation,followingtheIPCCFourthAssessmentReport’s(IPCC2007c)illuminationofthesignificanceofemissionsfromlandusechange.

• Thepublicationofanalysesstressingthelowcostofreducingemissionsascomparedtoothermitigationoptions.

• Improvementsintechnology,whichmademethodsavailableformeasuringchanges in emissions fromdeforestation and, potentially at least, forestdegradation.

| 319Summary and conclusions

Thus,theideaofREDD+begantotakeshapeasaclimatechangemitigationstrategythatcouldbepromotedaseffective,efficientandequitable.

In the run-up toCOP15 inCopenhagen in2009,whenanewpost-2012internationalclimateagreementstill seemedfeasible, therewasasensethatREDD+wasoneofthoserareissuesofferingsomethingforeveryone:deeperoverall emissions cuts for a given level of global spending on mitigation,cost efficient offsets for industrialised countries, significant new financialflows fordevelopingcountries and, ifdesignedcorrectly, theco-benefitsofbiodiversityconservationandpovertyreduction.Itwaswidelyexpectedthatthisalignmentofinterestsatthegloballevelwouldleadtoabindingpost-2012agreement, includingREDD+performance-basedfinancethatwouldflowdowntocreateincentivesfornationalREDD+policiesandlocalprojectsinatwo-tier,paymentsforecosystemservices(PES)-likemodel(AngelsenandWertz-Kanounnikoff2008).

Threeyearslater,theoutlookforREDD+isquitedifferent.

Thepre-CopenhagenexpectationsforhowREDD+wouldplayouthavenotbeenmet.Inpart,thisresultedfromthefactthattheglobalcommunityfailedatCOP15toreachanoverallclimateagreementtoreplacetheKyotoProtocol,andwillnotnowdosobefore2015attheearliest(Chapter3).Theprospectsfor significant REDD+ finance generated by a carbonmarket under suchan agreement have correspondingly declined.While negotiations continuetomake incremental progress on global REDD+ architecture, the relativeimportanceoftheUNFCCCasatop-downdriverofthenecessaryfinanceandrulesforREDD+hasdiminishedsignificantly.Asaresult,therearenowmultipleREDD+policyarenaspopulatedbyaidagencies,biginternationalNGOs and various domestic actors.Theparticipants in these arenas oftencompete for funding, leadership in standard settingand influenceover thediscourseonhowREDD+shouldbedefined.

AnothersetofchangesarosefromthefactthatREDD+emergedjustastheworldenteredaperiodofeconomicandfinancialturmoil.Inthemid-2000s,the global economy experienced a commoditypriceboom,withprices forfood,fuelandmetalsreachingunprecedentedlevels.Thesehighprices–andtheassociatedfearsaboutfoodandenergyinsecurity–ledtoaglobalrushtosecureaccessto landforagricultureandmineralsdevelopment(Chapter4). Increased competition for forestlandwill probably increase the costsofREDD+andoutpacetheimprovements in landuseplanningnecessaryforittobeconsideredasanoption.Then,theglobalfinancialcrisisthatstruckin2008distractedattentionawayfromclimatechange;pressureonnationalbudgetswillprobablyconstrainthevolumeofaidfundsavailabletobridgethe REDD+ financing gap caused by the lack of an international climatechangeagreement.

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18.3 Implications of the changed context ThechangedcontextforREDD+hassloweddownthepaceofimplementationandhasintroducedahigherlevelofuncertaintyregardingwhetherandhowtheoriginalideawillberealised.

18.3.1 The ‘aid-ification’ of REDD+ With the prospect of large-scale market-based finance for REDD+postponeduntil at least 2020, the current dominance of the institutionsandsourcesoffundingassociatedwithtraditionaldevelopmentaidislikelytocontinue for the foreseeable future.Thishasanumberof implicationsforREDD+,includingabroadeningofitsobjectives,typesofinterventionsandperformancecriteria(Chapter13).Itentailstheriskofrepeatingpastmistakesassociatedwithdevelopmentassistance(Chapter7).Whiletherehas been some recent experimentation with cash on delivery assistancemodels,aidagencypoliciesandprocedures–andinsomecasesthepoliticsand budgetary procedures of development assistance funding in donorcountries –may be incompatible with the result-based payment systemsenvisionedforREDD+.

REDD+financing roleshave sometimesprovenuncomfortable fordonoragencies, as has been the casewith theWorldBank’s role as channel forNorwegianfundstoGuyana.AsdescribedinChapter13,attentionhasonlyrecentlyturnedtotheneedforperformanceindicatorsforthefirsttwophasesofnationalREDD+implementation,withwidescopefordisagreementonappropriate standards and processes formeasuring achievement.The riskthatgoodpartnership is valuedhigher thanactualperformance threatensboththeeffectivenessandefficiencyofREDD+.

Reliance on aid funding for REDD+ also creates a broader scope thatincludes development objectives, leading to a relative decrease in theemphasisonclimateprotectionthroughemissionreductionsandarelativeincrease in emphasis on co-benefits, especiallypoverty reduction.Fromapoliticalperspective,REDD+inthedonor–recipientframingofaid–ratherthanasatransactionamongequalpartnersinthecontextofaninternationalagreement–createsanunfortunatedomesticpoliticaldynamicinrecipientcountriesandraisessovereigntyconcerns.

Taken together, these factors suggest that the ‘aid-ification’ of REDD+increasingly leads to a decoupling of REDD+ finance from performance-basedpayments for emission reductions,whichwas central to the originalidea. Performance-based payments for co-benefits closely tied to REDD+objectives–suchasstrengtheningcommunity-leveltenureoverforests–offeronepossibleavenueformaintainingthelink.REDD+policiesandprojects

| 321Summary and conclusions

will become increasingly diversified, just like development aid itself, andcouldbeunifiedonlybyhavingreducedemissionsasoneamongseveralgoals.

18.3.2 Sequencing problems Awide variety of public, private andNGOproject proponents heededthe call by the2007BaliActionPlan forParties toundertakeREDD+demonstration activities. More than 200 REDD+ projects are nowunderway in some 43 countries (Chapter 12). Project proponentswereeager tomakeprogress as rapidly as possible, in order toposition theirinitiatives to take advantage of the REDD+ financing expected afterCOP15in2009.

ThefailuretoconcludeanoverallclimateagreementinCopenhagenandthe relatively slow pace of national-level REDD+ policy developmenthavelefttheseprojectsinaprecariouspositioninanumberofways.Asdescribed inChapter 10, the uncertainty ofREDD+finance is leadingsomeprojectproponentstohedgetheirbetsbyshiftingtherelativefocusof their efforts to traditional integrated conservation and developmentproject(ICDP)activities.SuchapproachesriskdecouplingREDD+fromperformance-basedPESandrepeatingthelimitedsuccessofthepreviousgenerationofICDPs.

They also risk outpacing protracted international negotiations on rulesfor measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) and safeguards.An assessment of earlyREDD+projects suggests thatmost of theMRVmethods being deployed do not meet current Verified Carbon Standard(VCS)standards,whichcouldbeamodelforfuturenegotiatedstandards(Chapter14).Additionally,uncertaintyisleadingsomeprojectproponentstoholdbackonfullydisclosinginformationaboutthepotentialfinancialflowsthatmightberealisedthroughREDD+;indoingsotheyriskfailingtocomplyfullywiththeprinciplesoffree,priorandinformedconsent(FPIC),whicharelikelytobeincludedinfuturesafeguardregimes.

EarlyREDD+pilotprojectsarebeingputatriskbytheslowdevelopmentofnational-levellegalandregulatoryframeworks.Legalcertaintyoverwhoownsforestcarbonrights,andregulatorycertaintyaboutsharingREDD+costs andbenefits across levels and stakeholders, remain elusive (Chapter8).Althoughtenurehasemergedasakeyissueatmanyprojectsites,thereis limited evidence of the serious national attention needed to resolvetenure insecurityandconflict (Chapter9).While some interventionscanbeimplementedunderexistingtenureconditions,intheabsenceofreform,suchinterventionsarelimitedinscope,effectivenessandefficiency,andmayalsoleadtomoreinequitabledistributionaloutcomes.

Measuring REDD+ performance322 |

18.3.3 Countries and communities left facing risk IncreaseduncertaintyregardingthetimingandsizeofinternationalREDD+financial flows, coupled with economic changes leading to increasedcompetitionforforestland,haveshiftedthecalculationofREDD+riskandrewardatboththenationalandlocallevels.Thecredibilityofthewin–winpromiseofREDD+(i.e. thatthecostsofreducingdeforestationandforestdegradationwillbecompensated)isindangeroferosion.

For REDD+ to be successful at the national level, constituencies fortransformational change must prevail over interests in business as usual(Chapter2).Slowprogress in theUNFCCCnegotiationshasweakened thehand of the former (by postponing the prospect of large-scale internationalfinanceinthelongterm),whileeconomicchangeshavestrengthenedthehandof the latter (by increasingtheopportunitycostof forestprotection).Totheextent thatREDD+requiresactions thatgobeyondnoregretsdevelopmentstrategies,governmentspoisedtomovebeyondthereadinessphaseintosettingpoliciesandmeasuresthatreducedeforestationandforestdegradationneedareliablesourceoflong-terminternationalfinancethatcannotbeprovidedatthenecessaryscalebydevelopmentassistance(Chapter7).

Changes in thecontext forREDD+havealsoaffected riskcalculationsat thelocallevel.REDD+projectproponentshavebegunrepositioningtheirprojectsforthepossibilitythatexpectedfinancialflowsdonotmaterialise(Chapter10).TheconcernexpressedbyvillagersinIndonesia–thatREDD+projectswillnotbeabletopreventlargecompaniesfromconvertinglocalforeststootheruses–isconsistentwithourunderstandingofbroadereconomicforces.ItistellingthatthevillagerssurveyedunderstandREDD+projectstobeaimedatforestprotection,withtheirhopesandworriesfocusedonthepotentialimpactontheirincomes(Chapter11).ThissuggeststhattheyarenotconfidentofadirectpositivelinkbetweenforestprotectionandlivelihoodsinproposedREDD+schemes.

18.4 Lessons from first generation REDD+ initiatives The changes in context for a second generation of REDD+ initiatives arenotlimitedtothoseresultingfromthestatusofUNFCCCnegotiationsandglobaleconomicconditions.Inaddition,new(ornewly-affirmed)knowledgeandunderstandingderivedfromthefirstgenerationofREDD+initiativesareemergingaswell.

18.4.1 REDD+ costs more and takes more time than expected REDD+initiativesarecostingmoreandtakingmoretimetoimplementthanwasoriginallyexpected.Perhapsnotsurprisinglyforthosewithexperienceof

| 323Summary and conclusions

the institutionsandgovernance systemscharacteristicof the forestry sectorin developing countries, many REDD+ targets and timelines announcedin 2007 have proved unrealistic. In particular, it appears that the timeneededforstakeholderconsultationandconsensusbuildinghasoftenbeenunderestimated(Chapter7).

TheForestCarbonPartnershipFacility (FCPF)originallyofferedgrantsofUS$3.6millionper country forREDD+ readiness activities, basedon aninitialestimateofthecostsofdevelopingaREDD+strategyandmonitoringsystem.This estimate contrastswith later countryproposals that requestedan average of US $15–20 million, reflecting both a broadening of therangeofactivities includedandadeepeningofcountries’understandingofREDD+requirements–suchastheneedforgreaterattentiontoinstitutionalarrangements for managing REDD+ funds, social and environmentalsafeguards and stakeholder consultations (personal communication, KenAndrasko,WorldBankFCPF).

Wehave previously recognised the dilemma that “REDD+ is urgent…butcannot be rushed” (Seymour and Angelsen 2009). The need for nationalownership(Chapter5)meansthatREDD+mustbegroundedinalegitimatedomesticpoliticalprocess;inthelightofcontinuinguncertaintyregardingthecontoursoftheinternationalregime,transformationalchangeatthenationallevelisunlikelytocomequicklyoreasily.Asaresult,theREDD+communityisfacedwiththeironythat,althoughlong-termfinancingisacriticalconcern,donorshavefounditdifficulttospendfast-startmoney(Chapter7).Giventhe internal andexternalpressuresondonoragencies tomovemoney, thiscouldbeinterpretedasapositivesignthatthelinkingofREDD+fundstoperformanceisbeingtakenseriously.

In addition to the longer-than-expected timelines for REDD+ decisionmaking processes, gaps in data availability and capacity to support thetechnical requirements of REDD+ are turning out to be larger thanoriginally thought.Despite the advances in technology thathelpedmovedeforestationindevelopingcountriesbackontotheUNFCCCnegotiatingtablebetweentheCOPsinKyotoandBali,andanearlyfocusofREDD+readinessinvestmentsinMRV,significantgapspersist(Chapter14).Mostforestcountriesdonotyethavethedata,thecapacityorthepoliticalwill(e.g.toshareanddisclosedata)thattheyneedtofullysupportaperformance-basedpaymentsystem.

Therehasbeenprogressontheapplicationofremotesensingtechnologiestodetect deforestation and forest degradation.However, the data required tocalculatetheemissionfactorsneededtotranslatechangesinforestconditiontochangesinemissionsarealtogethermissingfor largeareasoftheworld’sforests(Chapter15).Therehasbeenconceptualprogresstowardsestablishing

Measuring REDD+ performance324 |

robustreferenceemissionlevels(RELs),butprogresswithincountrieshasbeenslow,duetoalackofdataandinherentuncertaintiesinpredictingbusinessasusual emission scenarios (Chapter16).Despite investments in readinessactivities,sofartherehaveonlybeenmodestimprovementsinthetechnicalcapacitiesofinstitutionsresponsibleforMRV.

The slower-than-expected pace and higher-than-expected costs also haveimplicationsforthepoliticsofREDD+atthenationallevelinbothdonorand REDD+ countries, putting REDD+ proponents on the defensive.TheGovernmentsofNorwayandIndonesiafaceduncomfortablescrutinyas the 2010 year-end deadline for issuing a moratorium on new forestconcessionscameandwent,withoutanannouncementuntilMay2011.Inearly2012,theGovernmentofAustralia facedcriticismbyacademics(OlbreiandHowes2012)andthemedia(Hamann2012)forthelimitedapparentprogressofahigh-profileREDD+projectfundedbyAusAIDinKalimantan,Indonesia.

18.4.2 Tenacity of business as usual institutions, interests and ideasAnothersetoflessonslearnedfromthefirstgenerationofREDD+initiatives–althoughnotentirelyunexpected–concernsthedifficultyofchallengingthose actors with vested interests in business as usual, the complexity ofretrofittingexistinginstitutionsfornewpurposes–orcreatingnewones–andtheeffortneededtodislodgeestablishedideasregardinghowforestsshouldbemanagedandbywhom.

As shownby themedia analysis conducted for theGCS, thediscourse onREDD+atthenationallevelhasbeendominatedbystateactors,whomayvoicetheinterestsofthecorporatesector(Chapter5).Proposalstoweakenthe Forest Code in Brazil, and the narrow scope of the moratorium inIndonesia(Box2.1),canbeunderstoodaseffectivepushbackfromthosewhoseetheirintereststhreatenedbyREDD+.TherelativelackofemphasissofarinnationalREDD+strategydiscussionsontheneedtoclarifyforesttenureandcarbonrightssuggestsanavoidanceofchangesthatmightthreatenthestatus quo.

Wehavepreviouslyobserved thedilemma thatREDD+“mustbenew…butbuild onwhathas gonebefore” (Seymour andAngelsen2009).Thisdilemma is especially acutewhen choosing institutions for newREDD+functions.Whereexistinginstitutionshavetakenthelead,theyhavetendedtoreproducepreviouspatternsinaddressingnewREDD+challenges.Thisholdstruenotonlyattheinternationallevel(e.g.howmultilateraldonoragencies have programmed REDD+ funds) and the national level (e.g.how ministries of forestry have adapted REDD+ to their existing forest

| 325Summary and conclusions

managementparadigms),butalsoattheprojectlevel,whereconservation-orientedNGOshaveselectedsites inaccordancewithbiodiversity-relatedobjectives(Chapter12),andareimplementingICDP-likeactivities(Chapter10).Tomanyactors,REDD+hasbecomeanewsourceoffundingforpre-existingactivities,withaslightrelabellingtofittheclimateagenda.

ButestablishingnewinstitutionsforREDD+isalsodifficult.NewREDD+entitiesfacechallengestotheirauthorityandlegitimacy,andtheprocessofestablishing newREDD+ financialmechanisms has been accompanied bydelays and frustration (Chapter 7). At the same time, a positive outcomeof REDD+ in many countries has been to open up dialogues on forestmanagementbeyond theministriesdirectly responsible,withREDD+taskforces growing to involve ministries of finance and planning, other lineministriesandcivilsociety.

18.4.3 Cross-scale issues AthirdsetoflessonsemergingfromthefirstgenerationofREDD+initiativesconcernsthesignificanceofthecross-scalecoordinationneededtoachievetheobjectivesof effectiveness, efficiency and equity.Theutilityof ‘polycentric’institutions inforestgovernance(Ostrom2010)anda ‘nestedapproach’toREDD+ implementation (Pedroni et al. 2007)have been long recognised.Recentexperiencehas further illuminatedthespecific issuesandchallengesrequiring linkage across scales, the relative importance of different levelsofgovernance fordifferent functions and thedivergenceof interests acrossthoselevels.

A review of the first generation of REDD+ initiatives suggests many lostopportunities fornationaland local-levelexperiences to informeachother.Project proponents appear in some cases to have intentionally avoidedengagementwithnebulousnational-levelREDD+policiesandinstitutions,thusmissing the chance to shape them.On theotherhand,national-levelREDD+policymakershavenotconsistentlylookedtoproject-levelexperienceasasourceofinsightregardingon-the-groundrealities.

TheanalysispresentedinthisvolumethuspointstotheneedforincreasedverticalintegrationofREDD+andbettereffortsbyREDD+championstoworkacrossscales.Chapter6providesexamplesofobstaclesfacedbycross-scaleMRVandleakagecontroleffortsinBrazil,IndonesiaandVietnam,butalsosomepromisingapproachesforovercomingthoseobstacles.AddressingforesttenureconstraintsonREDD+(Chapter9)andensuringcompliancewith safeguards (Chapter 17) will both require increased coordinationbetween the national and local levels to ensure that policy frameworksaregroundedinlocalrealitiesandthattheobjectivesofthosepoliciesarerealisedatthelocallevel.

Measuring REDD+ performance326 |

The distribution of costs and benefits is perhaps the largest test facingeffective multilevel governance in the context of REDD+. FundamentalquestionsregardingwhoshouldbenefitfromREDD+financialflows–andonwhatbasisandthroughwhatformofcompensation–havenotyetbeenansweredanddifferentstakeholdersatdifferentlevelshavedifferentviewsontherightanswers(Chapter8).AsdiscussedinChapter3,thepowerofREDD+asanideahas,inpart,beenduetotheabilityofeverystakeholdertoprojecthisorhervisionofwhatREDD+willmeaninpractice.Gettingspecificaboutbenefitsharingwillbeastringenttestoftheidea’sresilience.Elaborating the options and implications of alternative benefit sharingmechanismsisthusoneofthehighestprioritiesforfurtherREDD+researchandexperimentation.And,sincethereisnosimpleoragreed-uponformulatouse indesigningthebenefitsharingmechanisms, the legitimacyof theprocessbecomescritical.

Finally, early REDD+ experience has highlighted the importance of thejurisdictional scale, i.e. the subnational level betweennationalpolicies andlocalprojects.Itisatthismeso-leveljurisdictionalscalethatmuchdecisionmakingabout landuse takesplaceandwheresomeof themorepromisingREDD+initiatives–suchasthoseinBrazil–aretakingshape.

18.5 Navigating an uncertain REDD+ future TheuncertaintyoverthefutureofREDD+,causednotleastbytheslownessofUNFCCCnegotiationsoverallandchangedglobaleconomicconditions,means that REDD+ must increasingly be justified on the basis of itsprospectivecontributionstomultipleobjectivesatmultiplelevels,andnotjustglobalclimatechangemitigation.REDD+cannot for the foreseeablefuturedependonatop-downflowofincentivesforchange,soitssupportersneed to invest more in bottom-up strategies to build constituencies forchange that donot depend on a binding global agreement or significantfinanceinthenearterm.

Somemight respondto thisuncertaintywithawait-and-seeapproach.Webelievethatabetterapproachistoaskthreequestions:i)whatcanbedonetobuildbroadpoliticalsupportforREDD+?ii)whatarethehighestpriorityactions for building the foundation for eventual REDD+ success? and iii)what are the actions thatwouldbeuseful to implement anyway,whateverscenariosofinternationalREDD+fundingandglobaleconomicdevelopmentmaterialise?

We address these three questions in the following subsections.Table 18.1providesasummaryofpriorityactionsarrangedbylevel.

| 327Summary and conclusions

18.5.1 Building broad political support for REDD+ Reframe REDD+ as an objective rather than a forestry programme. OneofthesuccessesofREDD+sofaristhehighlevelofawarenessithascreated–beyondnarrowclimateandforestpolicycircles–ofthesignificanceofforest-relatedemissions.Aninternationalconsensusthatsuchemissionsshouldbereduced stands, with or without a specific financialmechanism under theUNFCCC,andthusisalegitimateobjectivetobeincludedinpublicpolicyacrosssectorsandlevels.Inparticular,theshiftintheNorth–Southpoliticsof climate negotiations – in which middle-income countries are expectedtoshouldermoreofthecostsofmitigation–meansthatactionstoreduceforest-based emissions in those countries cannot expect full internationalcompensation(Chapters3and7).

Thus,ratherthanallowingtheREDD+ideatobedefinedascallingforsector-basedREDD+programmes,whichareoftenconfinedtotheforestrysector,supportersneedtoreframereducedforest-basedemissionsasanobjectivetobeachievedinabroadercontext.SuchanapproachisfullyconsistentwithUNFCCC texts, aswell aswith the buzzwords that have gained currencyin the context of Rio+20 (including ‘low carbon development,’ ‘greeneconomy’ and ‘climate-smart agriculture’) and the broad-based approachesto sustainable development that they signify. LiberatingREDD+ from theconfinesoftheforestrysector–andfromadefinitionlimitedtopaymentsforverifiedemissionreductions–isalsoapreconditionforaddressingmanyoftheextra-sectoraldriversofdeforestation.

Invest in political legitimacy. Despite the international consensus on theurgency of reducing forest-based emissions, slow progress in UNFCCCnegotiations,theassertionthatforestprotectioniscontrarytodevelopment,broader attacks on climate science and the increasing reliance of REDD+on aid, all threaten its political legitimacy in both donor and recipientcountries.ForREDD+tomaintainitslegitimacy,itwillbenecessarytokeepmovingforward,andtodosoinwaysthatstrengthenratherthanundermineconfidenceinitsintegrityanditsfairness,bothwithinandbetweencountries.

At the global level, achieving legitimacy will require progress towards realreductionsinemissions,whichimpliesaddressinglong-standingchallengesofadditionality,leakageandpermanence.GloballyacceptedrulesonreferenceemissionlevelsandMRVneedtobegroundedinsoundscienceand,totheextentpossible,unadulteratedbypolitics,evenwhileadjustingthoserulestotakeintoaccountnationalcircumstancesintheinterestoffairness.

Atthenationallevel,politicallegitimacywillrequireREDD+constituenciesthataresufficientlybroadanddeeptoberesilienttotheinevitablesetbacksthatwillhappenasREDD+policiesbegin to challengebusiness asusual

Measuring REDD+ performance328 |

Tab

le 1

8.1

Prio

rity

act

ion

s b

y ty

pe

and

leve

l

Leve

lC

on

stit

uen

cy b

uild

ing

Fou

nd

atio

ns

for

succ

ess

No

reg

rets

Inte

rnat

ion

alA

ccel

erat

e p

rogr

ess

tow

ard

cons

ensu

s on

per

form

ance

-bas

ed fi

nanc

ing

mec

hani

sms

and

refe

renc

e em

issi

on

leve

ls in

UN

FCCC

neg

otia

tions

(C

hap

ter 1

6).

Secu

re e

xist

ing

sour

ces

and

iden

tify

new

sou

rces

of p

ublic

fina

nce

for R

EDD

+

and

deve

lop

priv

ate

sect

or in

vest

men

t op

por

tuni

ties

(Cha

pte

r 7).

Dev

elop

per

form

ance

indi

cato

rs fo

r RE

DD

+ P

hase

s 1

(rea

dine

ss) a

nd 2

(p

olic

y) (C

hap

ter 1

3).

Fina

lise

MRV

mod

aliti

es to

set

in

tern

atio

nal s

tand

ards

for r

epor

ting

and

verifi

catio

n (C

hap

ters

14,

15)

.

Imp

rove

the

avai

lab

ility

of s

pat

ial d

ata

and

emis

sion

fact

ors

(Cha

pte

r 15)

.

Nat

ion

alSu

pp

ort n

atio

nal-l

evel

con

stitu

enci

es fo

r tr

ansf

orm

atio

nal c

hang

e (C

hap

ter 5

).

Ensu

re le

gitim

acy

of d

ecis

ion

mak

ing

thro

ugh

atte

ntio

n to

RED

D+

pro

cess

es

and

inst

itutio

ns (C

hap

ters

5, 8

).

Imp

rove

lega

l cer

tain

ty re

gard

ing

fore

st

carb

on ri

ghts

(Cha

pte

r 8).

Fill

gap

s in

dat

a an

d ca

pac

ity

for M

RV.

Purs

ue n

o re

gret

s fis

cal p

olic

ies,

e.g

. re

mov

ing

per

vers

e su

bsi

dies

.

Esta

blis

h ca

bin

et-le

vel d

ialo

gues

to

add

ress

ext

ra-s

ecto

ral d

river

s of

de

fore

stat

ion,

e.g

. agr

icul

ture

and

m

inin

g.

Inco

rpor

ate

tenu

re re

form

/cla

rifica

tion

into

nat

iona

l dev

elop

men

t str

ateg

ies

(Cha

pte

r 9).

| 329Summary and conclusions

Juri

sdic

tio

nal

Sup

por

t int

egra

ted

land

-use

pla

nnin

g p

roce

sses

and

dev

elop

tool

s fo

r m

anag

ing

trad

eoff

s am

ong

food

and

en

ergy

pro

duct

ion,

eco

syst

em s

ervi

ces

pro

visi

on a

nd c

onse

rvat

ion

obje

ctiv

es

(Cha

pte

r 4).

Inco

rpor

ate

exp

erim

enta

l des

ign

for

per

form

ance

-bas

ed fi

nanc

e.

Stre

ngth

en lo

cal i

nstit

utio

ns a

nd

enfo

rcem

ent p

ower

.

Inve

st in

inst

itutio

n b

uild

ing

for s

pat

ial

anal

ysis

, pla

nnin

g an

d in

form

atio

n co

llect

ion.

Gen

erat

e an

d di

ssem

inat

e kn

owle

dge

on th

e ro

le o

f for

ests

in s

upp

ortin

g ag

ricul

tura

l pro

duct

ivit

y an

d cl

imat

e re

silie

nce.

Pro

ject

Ensu

re a

dequ

ate

atte

ntio

n to

loca

l nee

ds

for l

ivel

ihoo

ds a

nd in

form

atio

n.

Inco

rpor

ate

exp

erim

enta

l des

ign

for P

ES.

Inve

st in

cap

acit

y b

uild

ing

for l

ocal

co

mm

uniti

es to

par

ticip

ate

in M

RV

activ

ities

to in

crea

se tr

ansp

aren

cy a

nd

com

mitm

ent (

Cha

pte

r 15)

.

Cro

ss-s

cale

Re

fram

e RE

DD

+ a

s an

ob

ject

ive

rath

er

than

a fo

rest

ry p

rogr

amm

e at

all

leve

ls.

Ensu

re d

evol

utio

n of

RED

D+

dec

isio

n m

akin

g to

the

app

rop

riate

leve

l.

Ass

ess

the

cost

s of

RED

D+

and

who

b

ears

them

, and

dev

elop

ben

efit s

harin

g m

echa

nism

s to

add

ress

diff

eren

t in

tere

sts

(Cha

pte

r 8).

Inco

rpor

ate

atte

ntio

n to

saf

egua

rds

(Cha

pte

r 17)

.

Imp

rove

ver

tical

and

hor

izon

tal

coor

dina

tion

amon

g go

vern

men

t in

stitu

tions

rele

vant

to R

EDD

+

imp

lem

enta

tion

(Cha

pte

r 6).

Dev

elop

inte

rmed

iary

inst

itutio

ns fo

r ac

cum

ulat

ion

and

tran

smis

sion

of

info

rmat

ion

from

the

grou

nd to

nat

iona

l-le

vel i

nstit

utio

ns (C

hap

ter 6

).

Measuring REDD+ performance330 |

interestsandthepossiblescandals–suchasmisappropriationofREDD+funds – that will inevitably accompany action on the ground. Seriousattentiontosafeguardsisnecessary,bothtoavoidsubstantiveharmaswellas damage to the reputationofREDD+.Legitimacywill alsodependontheperceivedintegrityoftheprocesstodetermineandimplementREDD+benefitsharingmechanisms.

Cultivate broader constituencies for REDD+. Political reality makes itimperativetoincludeeconomicdevelopmentgoalsintheclimateagenda,sothatREDD+canenjoybroadandsustainablesupport.REDD+hasbeensuchapowerfulideainpartbecauseofitspromisetodeliveronmultipleobjectives.Often mentioned co-benefits include biodiversity conservation, povertyreductionandimprovedgovernance,butthemobilisationofconstituenciesfortheseobjectivesinREDD+policyarenashasbeenuneven.Indeed,someconstituencies have lined up to oppose REDD+ on the basis that it mayunderminetherightsandtenureofforestcommunities.Someclearexamplesof REDD+ initiatives leading to stronger rights and tenure, coupledwithserious attention to safeguards, couldbuild confidence that it ismoreof apromisethanathreat.

Inaddition,andconsistentwiththereframingofREDD+proposedabove,moreattentioncouldbegiven to thebenefitsofmaintaining forestsat thelandscapescale.Discoursesonfoodsecuritycontinuetowronglycharacteriseforests as impediments to increased agricultural production throughextensification;greatereffortsareneededtodisseminateexistingknowledgeandgeneratenewknowledgeregardingtheimportanceofforest-basedecosystemservicestoagriculturalproductivity.Theroleofforestsinbufferingeconomicinterestsfromtheimpactsofclimatechange–akeycomponentofstrategiesfor adaptation – continues to be grossly underappreciated.Demonstratingthe contributionofREDD+ toobjectives such asmaintaining agriculturalproductivityandclimateresiliencecouldhelpcounterthepersistentframingofforestprotectionasbeingopposedtodevelopment.

18.5.2 Priority actions for building foundations for success Maintain link to PES, but in association with other tools. There aremanyreasonstofearthataweakeningofpaymentforperformanceasakeyattributeofREDD+willreduceitseffectiveness,makingitnodifferentthanprevious forestry sector interventions (such as ICDPs) that have enjoyedlimitedsuccess.Thus,itwillbecriticaltoassemblevarioussourcesoffinance– including voluntary carbonmarkets, domestic finance and developmentassistance–tobridgethegaptotheanticipatedglobalcompliancemarketforforestcarboncreditsandtobegintodemonstratepaymentforperformanceatbothinternational/nationalandnational/subnationalscales.

| 331Summary and conclusions

Butwiththelikelihoodoflowerthanexpectedfinance,atleastintheshortterm,andtherisingpricesofcommoditiesthatcompeteforthesameland,itisclearthatREDD+cannotdependoncashflowsandPESinstrumentsonly.Maintaininganoptimalforestcoverinthelandscape–fromtheperspectiveofglobalclimatemitigationandbiodiversityconservationobjectives,aswellasmorelocallivelihoodandecosystemservicesobjectives–willrequireaskilfulcombination of instruments, including traditional command and control,law enforcement approaches, fiscal incentives and smarter infrastructuredevelopmentandlanduseplanning.

Focus on key bottlenecks impeding progress. The number of problemsto be solved in order to achieve effective, efficient and equitable REDD+outcomescanseemdaunting.Itisimportant,therefore,totargetinvestmentto removingkeybottlenecks at thepolicy level andfilling key gaps in theknowledgeandcapacityneededforREDD+implementation.

Atthegloballevel,negotiatorsshouldgiveprioritytospeedingupprogresson financing mechanisms and other implementation modalities. At thenational level,REDD+ supporters should focusonbuilding constituenciesfor transformational policy change, including outreach to the progressivebusiness sector, which hitherto has been relatively neglected, as well as toconstituenciesforforesttenurereform.Acrossscales,continuedinvestmentisneededtoassemblethenutsandboltsofMRVsystems,includingfillingcurrentgapsindataandcapacity.

Shift relative emphasis to cross-scale and jurisdictional-level efforts. Thefirst generation ofREDD+ initiatives (and associated research) has tendedtofocusonnational-levelpolicyprocessesandlocal-levelpilotprojects,withperhaps anoveremphasis onprojects and a suboptimal level of interactionbetween the two.Going forward, greater attention should be given to thejurisdictional scale as the locus of critical land use planning processes andthe spacewhere increased transparency and public participationwould bedesirable even in the absenceofREDD+. In addition,more investment isneededinmechanismstofacilitatecross-scalelinkages,notleastinthedesignofpoliciesandinstitutionsforREDD+benefitsharing.

18.5.3 No regret policy reforms Thereareanumberofforest-relatedandotherreformsthatwouldrepresentgoodpublicpolicyeveniftheydidnotgenerateforestemissionsreductionsasanadditionalbenefit.Inaddition,theinformation,institutionsandcapacitiesneededforREDD+arealsonecessarytoserveothersocietalobjectives.

Clarify land tenure.The clarification of land tenure would lead tomoreefficientlanduse,stimulateinvestmenttoraiseagriculturalproductivityand

Measuring REDD+ performance332 |

contribute to economic development.Critically, the resolution of conflictsoverlandwouldalsoremoveakeysourceofviolenceinruralareas.

Remove perverse subsidies. Agentsofdeforestationareoftenthebeneficiariesofcheapcredit,infrastructure,taxbreaksandotherincentivesprovidedbythestate.Theremovalofsuchsubsidieswouldleadtoamoreefficientallocationofresourcesandcreatefiscalspaceingovernmentbudgets,whilealsobuildingconstituenciesforimprovedforestmanagementinministriesoffinance.

Strengthen the rule of law.Reducingopportunitiesforforest-relatedcrime,includingcorruption, isanotherwaytocreatefiscal spacebyensuringthatrentsfromtheexploitationofforest-basedresourcesarecapturedbythestate.Stoppinglarge-scaleillegalforestconversionthroughtargetedlawenforcementservesbiodiversityconservationobjectivesaswell.

Improve the availability of forest-related data.Betterdataandinformationmanagement systems are essential for informed planning, granting andmonitoringofpermitsandotherforestmanagementtasks.

Strengthen institutional capacity. Competencies in functions suchas transparent financial management, inclusive land-use planning andcoordination across sectors and levels are necessary for the planning andimplementationofmostdevelopmentactivitiesatalllevels.

Improve forest governance. Improvements in forest governance moregenerally–includingtransparency, inclusivedecisionmakingprocessesandmechanismsforaccountability–helpempowerconstituenciesforthepublicinterest. Such improvements also provide tools to protect the rights andlivelihoodsofforestcommunitiesthatmaybethreatenedbyexternalagentsofforestconversion.

18.6 Concluding thoughts 18.6.1 Key features of REDD+ to protect AstheideaofREDD+continuestoevolverapidly,anditsconcreteexpressionsdiversify,itisworthpausingtoreflectonthekeyelementsthatmakeREDD+worthpursuing and that couldbe at risk. First, of course, is the objectivethat the name describes, reducing emissions from deforestation and forestdegradation.Theever-accumulatingevidencethattheEarthisonapathtopotentiallycatastrophicclimatechangemakesthepursuitofthisobjectiveamoralimperative.

NextistheassociationofREDD+withtransformationalchange.AchievingREDD+isnotaboutbusinessasusualininternationalforestrycooperation:

| 333Summary and conclusions

piecemeal technical interventions ranging from reduced impact logging toimprovedcooking stoves. Instead, it is about transformational shifts in thepolitical economy of forests, challenging the destruction of forests for thebenefitofnarrowvestedinterestsattheexpenseofthebroaderpublicinterestandforestcommunities.Itisaboutchangingtheeconomicsofforeststhroughnewincentives toconserveaglobally importantecosystemserviceand it isaboutchangingthepoliticsofforestsbyrecognisingnewrightsanddecisionmakingnorms.

Accordingly,thefeaturesofREDD+thatdistinguishitfrompasteffortstochange forestgovernanceandmanagementarecritical.Oneof these is thelinktoperformance:shiftingthefocusfrominputsandoutputstooutcomesand results is essential forREDD+effectiveness and legitimacy.Another isitsimplementationatthenationalandjurisdictionalscales.Nomatterhowinnovative or standards-compliant, not evenhundreds of pilot projects arelikelytoadduptotransformationalchangeintheabsenceofnational-levelpolicyandinstitutionaldevelopmentandimprovementsinsubnationallanduseplanning.

18.6.2 The risks of REDD+… and of its loss AtthetimetheGlobalComparativeStudyonREDD+wasconceived,therewasaprevailingassumptionthatREDD+waspoisedtotakeoffquickly.Fortheadvocatesofforestcommunities,aquickstarttoREDD+wasscary,sinceitwasfearedthatanyprogrammetomakeforestsmorevaluablewouldmakeforestcommunitiesworseoff,giventhegovernanceconditionscharacteristicofmanyforestedcountries.

Forforestcommunities,aslowerstarttoREDD+hasinsomerespectsbeenagoodthing,intermsofprovidingmoretimefortheirvoicestobeincorporatedintoREDD+policyprocessesatall levelsandmoreattentiontotherights,livelihoods and safeguards issues of particular importance to them.At thesame time, theproblemsanticipatedby somewouldbe ‘goodproblems tohave’,becauseiftheyweretoarise,atleastitwouldindicatethatREDD+isassumingsomerealityontheground,REDD+fundsareflowingandREDD+policiesarestartingtochallengevestedinterests.

IfREDD+werenotgettingsometraction,wewouldnothavetoworryaboutitsrisks.ButabiggerriskwouldbeforREDD+asavisiontofailtocompetewithbusinessasusual.Thelocalbenefitsofmaintainingforestsaresignificant:onaverage,householdslocatedinandaroundforestsderivemorethanonefifthoftheirincomefromforestresources,accordingtofindingsbyCIFOR’sPovertyandEnvironmentNetwork(PEN).1Itwouldbe ironic,andtragic,

1 http://www.cifor.org/pen

Measuring REDD+ performance334 |

if relatively benign land uses arising from REDD+ (from the perspectiveof social and environmental impacts) were to lose out to the wholesaleconversionofforests–andoften,dispossessionofcommunities–associatedwithcommercial-scaleagribusinessandminingbecauseREDD+wasseenastoorisky.

18.6.3 Reasons for optimism The litany of problems encountered by the first generation of REDD+initiatives canmake for discouraging reading. But despite adverse changesin the broader context, and hard lessons learned from early experience,the potential ofREDD+ continues to capture the imagination and attractcontinuing investment at all levels due to the facts that: i) there is wideconsensusthatitwillnotbepossibletokeepglobalwarmingbelowthe2˚Ctargetwithoutaconcertedefforttoreduceemissionsfromlandusechange;ii)UNFCCCnegotiatorscontinuetoadvance,ifslowly,towardagreementsonfinance,safeguardsandRELs/MRVandfinancialcommitmentsfrombilateralandmultilateraldonorshavenotyetshownsignsofdiminishing;iii)nationalgovernmentsandpro-REDD+constituenciescontinue todevelopREDD+policies and strategies, inmanycaseswith the explicit supportofheadsofstate; iv) subnational actors (such as those associated with theGovernors’ClimateandForestsTaskForce)haveemergedtocomplementthehundredsofproject-levelinitiatives.

Inaddition,severalpositiveadvancescurrentlyandprospectivelyattributabletoREDD+willbeuseful,regardlessofwhathappenstoREDD+asaglobalmechanism, national strategy or collection of local projects.These includegreaterglobalawarenessof the importanceof forests inclimateprotection,increasedtransparencyofforest-relatedinformationanddecisionmakinginanumberofcountriesandrenewedattentiontoforesttenureissues.REDD+asaworthyobjectiveisstillverymuchalive.

Appendix

CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS)Louis V. Verchot, Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin and Arild Angelsen

CIFOR is implementing a research and knowledge-sharing strategy on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). The objective of the strategy is to provide REDD+ policymakers and practitioner communities with the information, analysis and tools they need to ensure effective and efficient reduction of carbon emissions with equitable impacts and co-benefits – including poverty reduction, protection of local livelihoods, rights and tenure, and enhancement of non-carbon ecosystem services. We call this the 3E+ framework, and it was elaborated upon in the previous book ‘Realising REDD+’ (Angelsen et al. 2009).

The strategy is being implemented through three research components: 1. National REDD+ initiatives 2. Subnational projects3. Monitoring and reference levels

Appendix336 |

The specific objective of the first component is to support the achievement of 3E+ outcomes by national REDD+ strategies and policies. This objective is being realised by generating information, analysis and tools that consider diverse stakeholder interests and are designed to inform national REDD+ strategies and policies (Chapters 5, 8, 9 and 17 in this book). In addition, our vision is that second-generation national REDD+ initiatives will incorporate best practices derived from detailed assessments of the first-generation strategies and policies.

The specific objectives of the second component are to inform first-generation subnational REDD+ projects by analysing their design and implementation. The results of the analysis and tools we are developing will increase learning about how to achieve 3E+ outcomes from REDD+ projects. The lessons learned and best practices derived from the detailed assessment of first-generation REDD+ demonstration activities will also inform and improve second-generation REDD+ demonstration activities.

The specific objective of the third component is to support better and more cost efficient measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) systems

Table A1 Countries included in GCS research

Country Component 1 Component 2 Component 3

Brazil X X

Peru X X X

Cameroon X X X

Tanzania X X

Indonesia X X X

Vietnam X X X

Bolivia X X

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

X

Nepal X

Burkina Faso X

Mozambique X

Papua New Guinea (PNG)

X

Note: the three categories (in different colours) reflect the amount of work (in decending order) carried out by GCS

Appendix | 337

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Appendix338 |

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le A

2 co

ntin

ued

Appendix | 339

Nor

weg

ian

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of L

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cien

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UM

BN

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ay1,

2 &

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le A

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ntin

ued

Appendix | 341

for REDD+ projects and national REDD+ schemes. We are developing new knowledge in four areas: MRV institutions and institutional capacity; approaches to assessing national and sub-national reference emissions levels and reference levels (RELs/RLs); emissions factors for better implementation of IPCC Tier 2 inventory methods (for definitions, see Chapter 15, and Box 16.3); and community participation in MRV. Currently most developing countries use Tier 1 methods in national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories. We aim to develop better knowledge about sampling design and assessment of carbon stocks in order to facilitate implementation of IPCC Tier 2 approaches to carbon inventory. This will ensure more accurate and precise estimates of emissions reductions.

A fourth component of the project aims to disseminate the knowledge generated in the three research components to REDD+ policy makers and practitioners at all levels. This component is based largely on a web-based system, but information is also distributed through more traditional means, such as this book.

We are currently working in 12 REDD+ countries, each with a different focus and coverage of the three research components.

The project involves a large number of partners. National partnerships encompass both governmental, such as the provincial Government of Aceh and the Ministry of Forestry in Cameroon, and nongovernmental organisations such as Rede de Desenvolvimento Ensino e Sociedade (REDES) and the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL). Internationally, the project works with UN partners (e.g. FAO, UNDP, UNEP, UNFCCC) and large international NGOs (e.g. CARE, The Nature Conservancy, WWF). In addition, there are several partnerships with private companies (e.g. Starling Resources) and universities in developed countries (e.g. North Carolina State University, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, University of Melbourne).

Component 1: National REDD+ processesComponent 1 analyses the policy processes that lead to the formulation and implementation of national REDD+ strategies. The study is currently underway in nine countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Nepal, Peru, Tanzania and Vietnam) and partial analysis is being undertaken in three additional countries (Burkina Faso, Mozambique and PNG). A media-based discourse analysis is underway in Norway.

The research objective is to inform national policy makers about how constraints to effective policymaking can be addressed through adequate

Appendix342 |

Co

un

try

case

stu

die

s

Cro

ss-c

ou

ntr

y co

mp

arat

ive

anal

ysis

Com

par

ativ

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alys

is (c

omb

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cou

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cas

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Why

: to

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tify

stru

ctur

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over

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e b

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por

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to re

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, to

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reco

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nal p

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sign

and

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and

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re

com

men

datio

ns o

n re

quire

men

ts fo

r glo

bal

and

nat

iona

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titut

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ctur

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ow: c

omp

arat

ive

anal

ysis

of i

ndiv

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l res

earc

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emen

ts (c

ount

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edia

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ll co

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ativ

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ion

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+ s

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ent (

full

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: To

asse

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pol

icie

s an

d m

easu

res,

to id

entif

y ob

stac

les

and

opp

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nitie

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real

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RED

D+

and

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ure

3E+

out

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es

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co-b

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ts, t

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rovi

de p

olic

y re

com

men

datio

ns fo

r im

pro

ved

dom

estic

pol

icy

desi

gn a

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ple

men

tatio

nH

ow: P

olic

y co

ntex

t and

con

tent

ana

lysi

s of

exi

stin

g R

EDD

+ n

atio

nal s

trat

egie

s (A

ctor

s, M

echa

nism

s, S

truc

ture

s)

RED

D+

Polic

y Co

nten

t Ana

lysi

sW

hy: T

o id

entif

y an

d an

alys

e p

olic

ies

and

mea

sure

s to

sec

ure

3E+

out

com

es a

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o-b

enefi

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ow: P

olic

y co

nten

t ana

lysi

s of

exi

stin

g RE

DD

+ n

atio

nal s

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men

ts

Polic

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etw

ork

an

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hy: T

o an

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ctor

s, th

eir r

elat

ions

and

the

stru

ctur

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ondi

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in th

e p

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ena

(Act

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Per

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Pow

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ositi

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How

: sur

vey

and

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epth

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rvie

ws

Co

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try

pro

file

Why

: To

reve

al c

onte

xtua

l con

ditio

ns (d

river

s of

def

ores

tatio

n, in

stitu

tions

, p

oliti

cal e

cono

my,

RED

D+

arc

hite

ctur

e as

dis

cuss

ed)

How

: lite

ratu

re re

view

, exp

ert i

nter

view

s

Flexible element: specific policy studies to capture emerging or country-specific issues and questions, focus on political economy

studies

Dis

cou

rse

med

ia a

nal

ysis

Why

: To

dete

rmin

e w

hich

kin

ds o

f ac

tors

are

sha

pin

g p

ublic

deb

ate

and

influ

enci

ng th

e p

olic

y p

roce

ssH

ow: m

edia

-bas

ed a

naly

sis

Fig

ure

A1

Rese

arch

des

ign

an

d w

ork

mod

ules

of G

CS

Com

pon

ent 1

Appendix | 343

Tab

le A

3 C

omp

onen

t 1 m

eth

ods

for a

nal

ysin

g n

atio

nal

RED

D+

str

ateg

ies:

des

crip

tion

an

d k

ey o

bje

ctiv

es

Met

ho

d

Ob

ject

ive

and

des

crip

tio

n

Co

un

try

pro

file

:

Det

aile

d gu

idel

ines

for e

ach

sect

ion/

sub

sect

ion

Op

en in

terv

iew

s

Prov

ides

an

in-d

epth

des

crip

tion

of th

e na

tiona

l con

text

rele

vant

to R

EDD

+, t

he o

ptio

ns fo

r RED

D+

und

er

disc

ussi

on a

nd a

n ov

ervi

ew o

f the

pol

icy

dyna

mic

s ou

tlin

ing

the

key

issu

es a

nd c

halle

nges

in th

e co

untr

y.

Des

crib

es d

river

s of

def

ores

tatio

n, g

ener

al a

nd fo

rest

sec

tor g

over

nanc

e, n

atur

al re

sour

ce a

nd c

arb

on

tenu

re, r

elev

ant s

ecto

r pol

icie

s an

d p

rogr

amm

es, a

nd d

esig

n op

tions

for R

EDD

+ in

term

s of

MRV

; fin

anci

ng; b

enefi

t and

cos

t sha

ring;

alig

nmen

t of i

nstit

utio

ns a

nd p

olic

ies;

coo

rdin

atio

n; id

entifi

catio

n of

key

act

ors,

con

sult

atio

n an

d p

olic

y ev

ents

. The

pro

file

incl

udes

a s

umm

ary

asse

ssm

ent o

f the

3E+

im

plic

atio

ns.

Med

ia-b

ased

dis

cou

rse

anal

ysis

:

Med

ia c

odin

g (t

hree

maj

or n

atio

nal d

aily

ne

wsp

aper

s) w

ith p

rede

fined

cod

e b

ook,

ar

ticle

s se

lect

ed b

ased

on

pre

defin

ed

keyw

ord

sear

ches

Med

ia in

form

ant i

nter

view

s

Ana

lyse

s p

redo

min

ant d

isco

urse

in th

e m

edia

to e

xam

ine:

Freq

uenc

ies,

fram

es (m

eta

top

ics,

top

ics)

and

act

ors

(adv

ocat

es a

nd a

dver

sarie

s of

fram

es),

and

thei

r st

ance

s (p

ositi

on s

tate

men

ts) o

n:

Exis

ting

RED

D+

dis

cour

se a

nd th

e w

ay in

whi

ch it

is s

hap

ing

the

optio

ns n

egot

iate

d in

the

natio

nal R

EDD

+

aren

a

Refo

rms

unde

r dis

cuss

ion,

bot

h sp

ecifi

c to

RED

D+

and

of b

road

er re

leva

nce

Act

ors

influ

enci

ng o

r usi

ng s

pec

ific

disc

ours

e

3E+

imp

licat

ions

of t

he v

ario

us d

isco

urse

s.

Polic

y n

etw

ork

an

alys

is:

Exp

ert p

anel

Act

ors

in-d

epth

inte

rvie

ws

Soci

al o

rgan

isat

iona

l sur

vey

Ass

esse

s th

e ac

tors

and

str

uctu

ral a

spec

ts o

f the

RED

D+

are

na a

nd c

onsi

ders

imp

licat

ions

for t

he 3

E+

cont

ent o

f RED

D s

trat

egie

s.

Exam

ines

que

stio

ns in

clud

ing:

Who

is in

volv

ed in

nat

iona

l RED

D+

pol

icy

mak

ing?

Wha

t are

thei

r per

cep

tions

, int

eres

ts a

nd p

ower

rela

tions

?

Wha

t are

thei

r net

wor

ks o

f inf

orm

atio

n an

d in

fluen

ce?

Rep

eate

d ov

er ti

me,

this

met

hod

can

asse

ss d

ynam

ics

and

pow

er re

latio

ns. R

esul

ts o

f pol

icy

outc

omes

em

ergi

ng fr

om C

omp

onen

ts 2

and

3 w

ill a

llow

us

to a

sses

s th

e effi

cien

cy o

utco

mes

.

cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

Appendix344 |

Met

ho

d

Ob

ject

ive

and

des

crip

tio

n

RED

D+

po

licy

con

ten

t an

alys

is

Iden

tifies

exi

stin

g na

tiona

l str

ateg

y do

cum

ents

and

pro

vide

s a

deta

iled

cont

ent a

naly

sis

of p

rop

osed

p

olic

ies

and

mea

sure

s to

sec

ure

3E o

utco

mes

and

co-

ben

efits

.

Polic

y st

ud

ies:

Con

duct

ed c

ontin

uous

ly, a

s ap

pro

pria

te

Cov

ers

spec

ific

pol

icie

s, p

oliti

cal e

cono

my

ques

tions

, or o

ptio

ns, s

uch

as b

iofu

el o

r soy

bea

n p

olic

ies.

Re

view

s sp

ecifi

c le

sson

s fr

om re

form

s or

mec

hani

sms

such

as

exis

ting

envi

ronm

enta

l tru

st fu

nds.

Pro

vide

s in

sigh

t int

o p

oliti

cal e

cono

my

asp

ects

of R

EDD

+ a

nd th

e im

plic

atio

ns fo

r 3E+

RED

D+

des

ign.

Fle

xib

le

app

licat

ion

of th

is m

etho

d al

low

s fo

r rap

id re

spon

se to

em

ergi

ng re

sear

ch q

uest

ions

.

Nat

ion

al R

EDD

+ s

trat

egy

asse

ssm

ent

Brin

gs to

geth

er a

ll fiv

e p

revi

ous

mod

ules

to a

sses

s th

e co

mp

lete

nat

iona

l RED

D+

str

ateg

y to

: i) i

dent

ify

obst

acle

s an

d op

por

tuni

ties

to re

alis

e RE

DD

+ a

nd s

ecur

e 3E

+ o

utco

mes

and

co-

ben

efits

, and

ii) p

rovi

de

pol

icy

reco

mm

enda

tions

for i

mp

rove

d do

mes

tic p

olic

y de

sign

and

imp

lem

enta

tion.

The

stra

tegy

ass

essm

ent i

s b

ased

on

a b

road

pol

icy

cont

ext a

nd c

onte

nt a

naly

sis

of e

xist

ing

natio

nal

RED

D+

str

ateg

ies

(act

ors,

mec

hani

sms,

str

uctu

res)

.

Glo

bal

co

mp

arat

ive

anal

ysis

:

Qua

litat

ive

com

par

ison

s of

cou

ntry

cas

e re

sear

ch m

odul

es

Com

par

ativ

e ne

twor

k an

alys

is

QC

A (q

ualit

ativ

e co

mp

arat

ive

anal

ysis

)

Prov

ides

gui

danc

e fo

r sec

ond

gene

ratio

n RE

DD

+ d

esig

n to

add

ress

pro

ble

ms

app

earin

g in

nat

iona

l pol

icy

aren

as fr

om fi

rst g

ener

atio

n in

itiat

ives

. Var

ious

ana

lytic

al le

nses

will

be

app

lied,

for e

xam

ple

the

3E+

cr

iteria

, gov

erna

nce

fact

ors

and

coun

try

cont

ext v

aria

ble

s. D

raw

s on

dat

a de

rived

from

all

met

hods

ab

ove

and

pro

vide

s co

mp

aris

on a

cros

s na

tiona

l cas

e st

udie

s w

ithin

eac

h m

etho

d, s

uch

as a

glo

bal

com

par

ativ

e m

edia

ana

lysi

s, a

nd a

cros

s m

etho

ds.

Tab

le A

3 co

ntin

ued

Appendix | 345

policy design. Particular focus is given to providing evidence-based options for achieving efficient, effective and equitable REDD+ policy strategies. Policy recommendations will include aspects of institutional design for specific country contexts.

The research investigates how the 3E+ outcomes of REDD+ national strategies, and their formulation and implementation, depend on existing governance conditions, including the actors involved in the policy process, the mechanisms and the structures. More broadly, it analyses how the institutional context, the discursive practices and the macro-economic conditions of a country affects national policies. The degree of political commitment, the internal power dynamics and the existence of mechanisms for policy learning are analysed to explain the degree of success of policy design and implementation. In addition, the research investigates how a lack of appropriate institutional mechanisms limits the effective targeting of financial incentives to reduce deforestation and achieve broader co-benefits, as well as possible options to overcome these obstacles.

Comparative analysis complements in-depth single case study research and assesses the social, political-economic and institutional factors that explain the varying 3E+ outcomes of national REDD+ strategies.

CIFOR researchers have developed five work modules to analyse national REDD+ strategies: a country profile, a media analysis, a policy network analysis, a REDD+ policy content analysis and a flexible module for specific policy studies that respond to individual country’s research needs. These are explained more in Table A3 and Figure A1.

Component 2: Subnational projectsComponent 2 aims to provide a solid empirical foundation for answering this overarching research question: How can REDD+ projects be designed in such a way that their outcomes fulfil the 3E+ co-benefits criteria? It also aims to answer the following subordinate questions: Do REDD+ projects meet the 3E+ co-benefits criteria? If yes, how? If not, why not? Based on this knowledge, how do we improve the design and implementation of current and future projects?

Component 2 aims to answer these questions through a counterfactual approach called ‘before–after/control–intervention’ (BACI). Socioeconomic and biophysical field data are collected before and after the introduction of conditional, performance-based REDD+ incentives (payments for environmental services, or PES) – the BA part of BACI. The data are collected in villages that are both outside (control) and inside (intervention) the boundaries of REDD+ projects – the CI part. Jagger et al. (2010) describe the BACI approach in detail and Sunderlin et al. (2010) present the technical guidelines for implementing Component 2.

Appendix346 |

The data serve as a baseline for predicting how the project will perform later on (ex ante approach) and, in conjunction with the second round of data collected after the introduction of REDD+ interventions, help to retrospectively measure the impact of REDD+ (ex post approach).

Component 2’s field research will be carried out at 24 project sites in the six core GCS countries: Brazil (7), Peru (2), Cameroon (2), Tanzania (6), Indonesia (6) and Vietnam (1). Table A4 lists the 22 projects sites already selected and where field work has begun.1 All of the projects use the BACI approach except Bolsa Floresta in Brazil; conditional REDD+ incentives were introduced here before Component 2 began, so the BACI approach was not possible.

The units of analysis are: the project site; the village within project boundaries; and the household within the village (household analysis was not done at all project sites). At 16 ‘intensive’ project sites, we analyse the project as a whole: approximately eight villages (four control and four intervention) and approximately 240 households (30 in each village). At five ‘extensive’ project sites, we analyse the project and four intervention villages, but no control villages and no households. At the time of writing (May 2012), data have been collected at 20 project sites (19 BACI and one non-BACI), 170 villages and 3905 households (see Table A5).

1 Two project sites remain to be selected in Brazil.

Figure A2 Component 2’s BACI method

Comparison(Control)

Project site(Intervention)

Before

ControlBefore

ControlAfter

InterventionAfter

InterventionBefore

After

Impact

Appendix | 347

Tab

le A

4 RE

DD

+ p

roje

ct s

ites

in G

CS

Com

pon

ent 2

rese

arch

Co

un

try

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

bb

revi

atio

nSt

ate/

Prov

ince

Mai

n

pro

po

nen

t o

rgan

isat

ion

Web

site

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mb

er o

f vill

ages

Pro

ject

sit

e

typ

e

Dat

a u

sed

in

this

b

oo

k?C

on

tro

lIn

terv

enti

on

Braz

ilA

cre

Stat

e Sy

stem

of

Ince

ntiv

es fo

r En

viro

nmen

tal

Serv

ices

Acr

e SI

SAA

cre

IMC

ht

tp://

gcf.w

sodq

a.co

m/

Stat

eOve

rvie

w4

4 BA

CI-I

nten

sive

Yes

Nor

thw

est

Mat

o G

ross

o Pi

lot R

EDD

+

Proj

ect

Cot

rigua

çuM

ato

Gro

sso

ICV

ww

w.ic

v.or

g.b

r/qu

em_s

omos

/not

icia

s/m

ato_

gros

so_p

rese

nts_

redd

_pro

gram

_and

_pilo

t_p

roje

ct_i

n_co

pen

hagu

en.

icv

4 4

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

Sust

aina

ble

se

ttle

men

ts in

th

e A

maz

on:

the

chal

leng

e of

tran

sitio

n fr

om fa

mily

p

rodu

ctio

n on

th

e fr

ontie

r to

a lo

w c

arb

on

econ

omy

Tran

sam

azon

Pará

IPA

Mw

ww

.ipam

.org

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bib

liote

ca/l

ivro

/id/

250

4 4

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

Appendix348 |

Co

un

try

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

bb

revi

atio

nSt

ate/

Prov

ince

Mai

n

pro

po

nen

t o

rgan

isat

ion

Web

site

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mb

er o

f vill

ages

Pro

ject

sit

e

typ

e

Dat

a u

sed

in

this

b

oo

k?C

on

tro

lIn

terv

enti

on

RED

D+

Pilo

t Pr

ogra

m in

São

Fe

lix d

o X

ingu

SFX

Pará

TNC

, Bra

zil

ww

w.n

atur

e.or

g/ou

riniti

ativ

es/u

rgen

tissu

es/

clim

atec

hang

e/in

dex.

htm

4 4

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

Blos

a Fl

ores

ta

Prog

ram

Bols

a Fl

ores

taA

maz

onas

FAS

http

://fa

s-am

azon

as.o

rg/

notic

ia/b

olsa

-flor

esta

-p

rogr

am-in

vest

s-m

ore-

than

-400

-tho

usan

d-in

-the

-ua

cari-

rds?

lang

=en

6 34

N

on-B

AC

IN

o

Peru

Braz

il N

ut

Con

cess

ions

RE

DD

Pro

ject

BAM

Mad

re d

e D

ios

BAM

ww

w.b

osqu

es-a

maz

onic

os.

com

/en/

our-

pro

ject

s/re

dd-in

-con

cess

ions

-of-

bra

zil-n

uts-

in-m

adre

-de-

dios

-per

u

0 0

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veN

o

Alto

May

o RE

DD

+

Initi

ativ

e

Alto

May

o Sa

n M

artin

Con

serv

atio

n In

tern

atio

nal

ww

w.c

onse

rvat

ion.

org/

lear

n/cl

imat

e/st

rate

gies

/fie

ld/p

ages

/pro

ject

s.as

px

0 0

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veN

o

Cam

eroo

nPa

ymen

t for

Ec

osys

tem

Se

rvic

es (P

ES)

pro

ject

in

Cam

eroo

n So

uth

and

East

Re

gion

CED

Sout

h an

d Ea

st R

egio

nC

EDw

ww

.ced

cam

erou

n.or

g/en

/pro

gram

mes

/axe

s-de

-tr

avai

l/ax

es-s

trat

egiq

ues-

them

atiq

ues/

1209

-ch

ange

men

t-cl

imat

ique

4 2

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

Tab

le A

4 co

ntin

ued

Appendix | 349

Mt.

Cam

eroo

n RE

DD

Pro

ject

Mou

nt

Cam

eroo

nSo

uth

Wes

t re

gion

GFA

-Env

est

ww

w.g

fa-g

roup

.de/

enve

st/

pro

ject

s/gf

a_en

vest

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roje

cts_

eng_

3431

628.

htm

l

3 4

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

Tanz

ania

Com

mun

ity-

bas

ed R

EDD

M

echa

nism

s fo

r Sus

tain

able

Fo

rest

M

anag

emen

t in

Sem

i-Arid

Are

as

TaTE

DO

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yang

aTa

TED

Ow

ww

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es/s

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bro

nchu

re.p

df

5 4

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

Mak

ing

RED

D

Wor

k fo

r C

omm

uniti

es

and

Fore

st

Con

serv

atio

n in

Ta

nzan

ia

TFCG

-Kilo

saM

orog

oro

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ww

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TFCG

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MIT

A%

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pro

ject

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et.p

df

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rg/p

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le_

abou

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2 5

BAC

I-Int

ensi

veYe

s

Mak

ing

RED

D

Wor

k fo

r C

omm

uniti

es

and

Fore

st

Con

serv

atio

n in

Ta

nzan

ia

TFCG

-Lin

diLi

ndi

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cg.o

rg/p

df/

TFCG

%20

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MIT

A%

20RE

DD

%20

pro

ject

%20

leafl

et.p

df

0 4

BAC

I-Ext

ensi

veYe

s

cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

Appendix350 |

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un

try

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on

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ing

RED

D

Read

ines

s in

th

e M

asito

U

galla

Ec

osys

tem

Pilo

t A

rea

in S

upp

ort

of T

anza

nia’

s N

atio

nal R

EDD

St

rate

gy

JGI

Kigo

ma

JGI

ww

w.ja

nego

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l.org

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rogr

ams/

tanz

ania

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d-p

rogr

am

0 4

BAC

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veYe

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A –

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lotin

g RE

DD

in

Zan

zib

ar

thro

ugh

Com

mun

ity

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st

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agem

ent

CA

REU

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a/

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ibar

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RE

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l in

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ania

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5 D

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Appendix354 |

Tab

le A

6 G

CS

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pon

ent 2

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arch

inst

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ents

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rum

ent c

ateg

ory

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rum

ent

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isal

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atch

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l driv

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ouse

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ld c

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ple

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ls o

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por

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enta

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sses

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rop

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ts’ p

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ptio

n of

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por

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ty c

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of t

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enta

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e

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tions

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d p

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ns o

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D+

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pro

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and

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con

text

of t

he p

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ct, i

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ract

ions

with

the

natio

nal l

evel

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d p

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rela

ted

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arb

on fi

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enefi

t sha

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pin

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ope

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s of

pro

pon

ents

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olla

bor

ate

on in

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th a

naly

sis

of p

roje

ct c

osts

Appendix | 355

MRV

Surv

ey o

n M

RV

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rmat

ion

on re

mot

e se

nsin

g an

d G

IS d

ata

avai

lab

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hniq

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ring

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ns

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cella

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on R

EDD

+

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rven

tions

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g of

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tions

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h as

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st a

cces

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stric

tions

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ive

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ds,

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ple

men

tary

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vey

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ticip

atio

n an

d te

nure

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epth

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rop

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t eng

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ent o

f com

mun

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lishi

ng a

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entin

g p

roje

ct, a

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tten

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to te

nure

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es

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e: A

s ex

pla

ined

ear

lier

in t

his

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pen

dix,

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sa F

lore

sta

pro

ject

site

in B

razi

l had

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ady

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oduc

ed R

EDD

+ c

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l inc

entiv

es a

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the

refo

re n

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art

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he B

AC

I re

sear

ch m

etho

d. F

or th

is p

roje

ct, t

he s

urve

y in

stru

men

ts fr

om th

e fir

st tw

o ca

tego

ries

in th

is ta

ble

wer

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apte

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mea

sure

ong

oing

pro

ject

imp

lem

enta

tion.

Appendix356 |

The original plan was to conduct both the ex ante and ex post research within the first GCS period (2009–2013). Due to delays in the introduction of REDD+ conditional incentives at almost all sites (see Chapter 10), this was impossible. Instead, in the first GCS period, Component 2 has focused almost wholly on compiling the baseline data – in anticipation that the ‘after’ data will be collected after 2013 – and on conducting ex ante analysis on the process and early outcomes of setting up REDD+ projects.

Component 2 research uses a wide variety of research instruments, depending on purpose, unit of analysis and target population. Table A6 classifies the research instruments into purpose categories and describes their uses. Some instruments can be accessed at the GCS web page: www.cifor.org/nc/online-library/browse/view-publication/publication/3286.html

Component 3: Monitoring and reference levelsComponent 3 of the study provides policy makers and practitioners with information and tools for better GHG inventories and methods for establishing national and subnational reference levels. The study is currently underway in Peru, Cameroon, Indonesia and Vietnam. Partial analyses have been done in Bolivia and Kenya. The research investigates how REDD+ can be implemented effectively and efficiently. Work in this Component contributes to the question of equity through improving impact attribution (who has done what) and precision. Equity is discussed as one consideration in setting reference levels. We have also included analyses of some of the socially and environmentally oriented carbon standards, such as the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) in the analysis. Table A7 summarises the research methods.

The research investigates MRV effectiveness and efficiency at the institutional level by looking at capacity and identifying capacity gaps. Countries need to be able to measure forest area change and assess carbon stock changes to implement a national MRV system. The different biophysical conditions in countries mean that MRV challenges vary; our analysis compares challenges to capacities to identify gaps. We used two recent international reporting exercises in the Forestry Resources Assessment to examine progress in capacity building.

Building on many years of CIFOR research on the economic drivers of deforestation, we developed a stepwise approach to setting RELs/RLs (see Chapter 16). Decisions in the UNFCCC raise the importance of using data-driven approaches to the construction of RELs/RLs, in terms of using historical data, adjusting for national circumstances and being transparent about the carbon pools and gases that have been included or omitted. The quality of both available data and data to be collected by countries is a key issue that underpins the construction of forest RELs/RLs. We used subnational data

Appendix | 357

with different aggregation levels to test our approach, which uses a regression modelling framework. This allows countries to model future deforestation and analyse scenarios of plausible future emissions. This analytical tool should help countries determine likely future emissions ranges with transparent assumptions about known drivers of deforestation.

The availability of emissions factors for implementing IPCC methods for national GHG accounting continues to be a major constraint to implementing MRV in many developing countries. Our team has assessed the current state of knowledge of these factors in target countries and important forest ecosystems, and set priorities for collecting additional data. They are now working with technical services in the countries to collect the data needed to improve inventories. We are focusing on land use change in tropical wetlands and African forests, where data are particularly lacking. We have generated new biomass equations and excavated root systems to estimate root:shoot ratios. We have taken many flux measurements to assess the effects of land use change on soil respiration and on the fluxes of N2O and CH4, using

Table A7 Methods for analysing national REDD+ strategies: description and key objectives

Method Objective and description

Institutional capacity

Determine baseline capacity levels in all 99 non-Annex I countries

Develop country case studies of capacity assessments to understand why capacity remains low and what can be done about it

Reference emissions levels

Develop and test a stepwise approach using multiple regression models

Develop country case studies using statistical models for predicting future trends in GHG emissions

Emissions factors National assessments of data sources for UNFCCC reporting of GHG emissions

Synthesis of scientific literature for improved emissions factors for tropical wetlands and for non-CO2 GHGs

Field work to develop new emissions factors with host country partners in technical services

Community-based monitoring of forest carbon

Comparative field testing of forest inventory by communities vs. by professional foresters, to assess cost–accuracy tradeoffs

Participative design of forest monitoring for community needs that include measurements required for carbon monitoring

Sociological research on attitudes and changes in attitudes associated with community-based forest monitoring

Appendix358 |

chamber techniques. We have also measured the effects of fertiliser on peat decomposition. By participating in this work, local researchers in Africa, Asia and Latin America are developing their skills in empirical quantitative methods.

Lastly, research on developing appropriate community-based measurement methods to facilitate the participation of local stakeholders in the process is beginning. Communities can provide a valid stream of data to national MRV systems and we are working in several locations to design and test approaches. We are comparing the accuracy and cost of forest inventories done by communities with those done by forestry professionals. We expect that community participation should increase the transparency of REDD+ studies and enhance community ownership of REDD+ activities. We will test this assumption empirically through sociological research.

IntegrationThis book represents the first synthesis of research results from CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study. Unlike our previous books on REDD+, this volume presents new research findings from a programme specifically designed to support REDD+ policy development and implementation. The three research components of the GCS provide different angles from which to observe the development of REDD+ in first generation countries. The first two components differ in their scales of analysis, but in reality these two scales connect in countries. Likewise in the GCS, the scales connect and some of the more interesting interdisciplinary research is being developed at the interface between the components. MRV spans several scales and forms the conduit through which information is collected and moves across scales and levels. It serves as the basis for equity assessments as it determines who has done what in terms of emission reductions. The interaction of all three components of this research programme, and the interface between different disciplines, is where the essential learning is taking place. Connecting research across multiple scales and levels, and the required interdisciplinarity for sound and comprehensive research, also represent challenges.

We face additional challenges from the fact that REDD+ is a moving target, but it is moving slower than expected. Working with demonstration projects we also face challenges of confidentiality and sensitivities with respect to sharing and using data. Research on REDD+ faces numerous problems, and the GCS REDD+ study is no exception. Box A1 summarises some of these challenges.

REDD+ is a rather complex mechanism to ensure environmental integrity and real emissions reductions, and it will be implemented in countries with limited capacities. We believe that for REDD+ to be effective, the realities on

Appendix | 359

Box A1 Challenges of REDD+ research Frances Seymour

REDD+ presents several challenges to researchers. The idea and scope of REDD+ are evolving rapidly. Since the idea of including deforestation in developing countries was tabled at UNFCCC COP11 in 2005, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation (RED) has added a second ‘D’ for forest degradation, and then a ‘+’ for the conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. As Chapter 3 describes, REDD+ was initially conceptualised as a global to national to local PES scheme. Over time, the idea has significantly broadened to incorporate co-benefits, such as biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction, and is increasingly decoupled from performance-based payments. The term ‘REDD+’ can be variously understood as an objective, a proposed mechanism under the UNFCCC, or a broad suite of policies, programmes and projects moving forward in its name. Researchers are thus challenged to define a limited scope for studying REDD+.

The practice of REDD+ is advancing slowly. Following inclusion in the Bali Action Plan at COP13 in Bali and the announcement of significant funding commitments, many expected REDD+ implementation to move forward quickly. In part due to the failure to reach an overall agreement on climate change at COP15 in 2010, and the associated decline in the near-term promise of market-based finance, the pace of progress has slowed at all levels. Researchers employing methods that compare circumstances before and after interventions are left waiting for REDD+ interventions to happen, having collected baseline data. Much analysis of the conditions necessary and sufficient for REDD+ to be effective, efficient and equitable remains speculative. For example, the four conditions outlined in Chapter 5 as necessary for effective national-level policy making have not yet been observed in any study countries.

REDD+ is multiscale. As observed in this book, REDD+ efforts at each level are inextricably tied to the progress of REDD+ at other scales. The original research design of the GCS on REDD+ gave insufficient attention to the subnational (or jurisdictional) scale, which has emerged as an important level for land use planning, programme implementation and policy development (for example, in the case of the Governors’ Forests and Climate Task Force).

REDD+ is controversial. REDD+ is a contested idea, with proponents and opponents clashing in forums ranging from international negotiations through national media to academic journals. Researchers must navigate ideologically-charged terrain to avoid the fact and appearance of bias.

continued on next page

Appendix360 |

Some aspects of REDD+ are sensitive. Data relevant to REDD+ can include sensitive information from proprietary business plans, maps showing illegal land conversion, and testimony regarding violent conflicts over land tenure. Researchers gathering data on REDD+ often have difficulty winning the trust of key informants and must pay particular attention to honouring confidentiality commitments.

Field work is difficult. Collecting data in remote areas, where forests are still intact, has its hazards. GCS field crews have encountered tiger poachers, vehicle breakdowns, poor road conditions, hornet attacks, ‘rustic’ accommodation, fire, smoke and other challenges associated with tropical field work. In most places, medical facilities are rudimentary and rescue organisations do not exist.

Box A1 continued

the ground in these countries must be taken into account. REDD+ has the potential to be a transformative programme for tropical forests, but its success is not guaranteed. Through our ongoing research efforts in the GCS, we aspire to provide enough early lessons to avoid major pitfalls and mistakes that could derail the whole process. To paraphrase Albert Einstein, REDD+ should be as simple as possible, but not simpler!

Acknowledgements

Component 1

The methods and guidelines used in this research component were designed by Maria Brockhaus, Monica Di Gregorio and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff. The methods applied for the media analysis and policy network analysis build on work undertaken in COMPON,2 led by Jeffrey Broadbent and financially supported by the National Science Foundation. Monica Di Gregorio and Maria Brockhaus adapted the COMPON ‘Protocol for Media Analysis’ and the ‘Protocol for Policy Network Analysis’. Many people contributed to country case studies, including media analysis, policy network analysis and country profiles, and have provided data, analysis and support.

Without the scientific guidance and coordination efforts of the following country case leaders in their respective countries, this comparative work would have been impossible: Peter Cronkleton (Bolivia); Sven Wunder and Peter May (Brazil); Suwadu Sakho-Jimbira (Burkina Faso); Samuel Assembe and Jolien Schure (Cameroon); Samuel Assembe (DRC); Daju Resosudarmo and

2 http://compon.org

Appendix | 361

Moira Moeliono (Indonesia); Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff (Mozambique); Thuy Thu Pham (Nepal); Arild Angelsen (Norway); Andrea Babon (PNG); Mary Menton (Peru); Salla Rantala (Tanzania); Thuy Thu Pham and Moira Moeliono (Vietnam).

National partner organisations and their teams in the research countries undertook data collection and analysis, together with the country case leaders. In particular, we would like to thank: Walter Arteaga, Bernado Peredo, Jesinka Pastor (Bolivia); Maria Fernanda Gebara, Brent Millikan, Bruno Calixto, Shaozeng Zhang (Brazil); Mathurin Zida, Michael Balinga, Houria Djoudi (Burkina Faso); Guy Patrice Dkamela, Felicien Kengoum (Cameroon); Felicien Kabamba, Augustin Mpoyi, Angelique Mbelu (DRC); Levania Santoso, Tim Cronin, Giorgio Indrarto, Prayekti Murharjanti, Josi Khatarina, Irvan Pulungan, Feby Ivalerina, Justitia Rahman, Muhar Nala Prana (Indonesia); Almeida Sitoe, Alda Salomão (Mozambique); Dil Badhur, Bryan Bushley, Rahul Karki, Naya Sharma Paudel (Nepal); Laila Borge (Norway); Daniel McIntyre, Gae Gowae, Nidatha Martin, Nalau Bingeding, Ronald Sofe, Abel Simon (PNG); Hugo Piu, Javier Perla, Daniela Freundt, Eduardo Burga Barrantes, Talía Postigo Takahashi (Peru); Rehema Tukai, George Jambiya, Riziki Shemdoe, Demetrius Kweka, Therese Dokken (Tanzania); Nguyen Thi Hien, Nguyen Huu Tho, Vu Thi Hien, Bui Thi Minh Nguyet, Nguyen Tuan Viet and Huynh Thu Ba (Vietnam); and many others supporting the country teams.

Efrian Muharrom, Sofi Mardiah, Christine Wairata and Ria Widjaja-Adhi provided invaluable research support and assistance.

We also would like to thank Jan Börner, Martin Herold, Markku Kanninen, Kaisa Korhonen-Kurki, Anne Larson, Cecilia Luttrell, Pablo Pacheco, Elena Petkova, Frances Seymour and many others for their inputs and support.

Component 2

The published version of Component 2’s methods guide3 was written by Pamela Jagger, Erin Sills, Kathleen Lawlor, William Sunderlin and the technical guidelines4 were written by William Sunderlin, Anne Larson, Amy Duchelle, Erin Sills, Cecilia Luttrell, Pamela Jagger, Subhrendu Pattanayak, Peter Cronkleton, and Andini Desita Ekaputri. Credit is also due to those who made insightful comments and critiques during the process of designing and pre-testing the survey instruments in late 2009, and those who participated in a meeting to finalise the research design in January 2010: Arild Angelsen, Andre Aquino, Stibniati Atmadja, Abdon Awono, Huynh Thu Ba, Riyong

3 www.cifor.org/nc/online-library/browse/view-publication/publication/3283.html4 www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BSunderlin1001.pdf

Appendix362 |

Kim Bakkegaard, Simone Bauch, Rizaldi Boer, Jan Börner, Miguel Calmon, Mariano Cenamo, Peter Cronkleton, Therese Dokken, Paul Ferraro, Maria Fernanda Gebara, Raissa Guerra, Dian Intarini, Markus Kaiser, Alain Karsenty, Anirudh Krishna, Erin Myers Madeira, Peter May, Steve Panfil, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Mustofa Agung Sardjono, Galia Selaya, Frances Seymour, Denis Sonwa, Satyawan Sunito, Peter Vaughan and Sven Wunder.

Component 2’s field work is being carried out at 22 project sites (see Table A4). We are greatly indebted to the organisations associated with those sites for their supportive collaboration and patience with the demands we place on them.

Field research teams in the six study countries are composed of the following individuals.

Brazil: Amy Duchelle (country representative); Riyong Kim Bakkegaard, Marina Cromberg, Maria Fernanda Gebara, Raissa Guerra, Tadeu Melo (field research supervisors); Carolle Utrera Alarcon, Marileide Gonçalves,Leonela Guimarães, Thiago Machado Greco, Giselle Monteiro, José Roberio Rodrigues,Kaline Rossi (encoders).

Cameroon: Abdon Awono (country representative and field research supervisor); Henri Owona (encoder).

Indonesia: Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo (country representative); Pangestuti Astri, Stibniati Atmadja, Yayan Indriatmoko, Dian Intarini, Augusta Mindry (field research supervisors); Merlinta Anggilia, Mella Komalasari, Jhon Roy Sirait, Tina Taufiqoh (encoders).

Peru: Amy Duchelle, Peter Cronkleton (country representatives); Mary Menton (research fellow), Valerie Garrish, Galia Selaya (field research supervisors).

Tanzania: Therese Dokken (country representative and field research supervisor); Eliakimu Zahabu (former country representative); Demetrius Kweka, Susan Caplow (field research supervisors); Johannes Dill (encoder).

Vietnam: Huynh Thu Ba (country representative and field research supervisor); Nguyen Tien Dat (encoder).

Over 80 enumerators conducted most of the interviews and gathered data.

At the CIFOR headquarters in Bogor, Indonesia, the following people have been key in conducting the Component 2 work: Made Agustavia (database administrator); Made Dwi Astuti (secretary); Andini Desita Ekaputri (research

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officer); Tini Gumartini (research assistant); Shijo Joseph (post-doctoral research fellow); Mrigesh Kshatriya (data analyst); Oktarita Satria (project assistant); Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo (Indonesia country representative); William D. Sunderlin (component leader); Ria Widjaja-Adhi (project assistant).

We value the contribution of Josil Murray, a doctoral student conducting our research on REDD+ and biodiversity in Peru and Indonesia.

Component 3

The methods and guidelines used in this research component were designed by Louis V. Verchot, Arild Angelsen, Martin Herold, Markku Kanninen, Kristell Hergoualc’h and Daniel Murdiyarso. The field methods applied for work on emissions factors were designed by our PhD and MSc students: Jenny Farmer, Fitri Aini, Sebastian Persch and Margaret Thiong’o, and financially supported in part by the Global Environment Facility. They were supported by academic advisors Jo Smith (University of Aberdeen), Robin Matthews (McCauley Land Use Research Institute) and Dirk Hölscher (Georg August University of Göttingen). Research methods on leakage were designed by Stibniati Atmadja and Peter Vayda. Methods for reference levels (including reference emissions levels) were developed by Arild Angelsen, Simone Bauch, John Herbert Ainembabazi, Martin Herold and Arief Widjaya. Methods for institutional capacity assessments were developed by Martin Herold and Erika Romijn. Project-level MRV assessment methods were developed by Shijo Joseph, William D. Sunderlin and Louis V. Verchot.

Many people contributed to country case studies: Zulma Villegas and Bonifacio Mostacedo (Bolivia); Denis Sonwa, Pascal Cuny, Maden Le Crom and Adeline Giraud (Cameroon); Rizaldi Boer, Titiek Setyawati, Tania June and Doddy Yuli Irawan (Indonesia); Vu Tan Phuong, Vu Tien Dien, Pham Manh Cuong, Nguyen Thuy My Linh, Nguyen Viet Xuan and Vo Dai Hai (Vietnam). Country field data were collected by Margaret Thiong’o, Edith Anyango, Paul Mutuo, Sheila Abwanda, Denis Sonwa and Victor Kemeuze (Kenya). Oktarita Satria and Levania Santoso provided invaluable research support and assistance.

Component 4

The knowledge-sharing component is overseen by John Colmey and Daniel Cooney. A big thank you must go to Sandra McGuire, who wrote the initial communications proposal for Component 4, but left CIFOR before it was launched. The Component has worked with numerous partners, including the Climate Change Media Partnership, Internews, the Society of Indonesian Environmental Journalists, Green Ink, PANOS London, Transparency International, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the Indonesian Forest Research and Development Agency, and the governments

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of Denmark, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland and South Africa. The talented communications team of staff and consultants (part-time and full-time) includes: Leony Aurora, James Maiden, Michelle Kovacevic, Catriona Moss, Karin Holzknecht, Gabriela Ramirez, Kamal Prawiranegara, Gugi Ginanjar, Andrea Booth, Kate Evans, Mokhamad Edliadi, Aris Sanjaya, Budhy Kristanty, Nia Sabarniati, Mohammad Agus Salim, Atie Puntodewo, Yahya Sampurna, Gusdiyanto, Dodi Iriyanto, Wigid Triyadi, Gideon Suharyanto, Eko Prianto, Catur Wahyu, Vidya Fitrian, Erisa, Sufiet Erlita, Yuan Oktafian, Rizka Taranita, Wiwit Siswarini, Sekar Palupi, Dina Satrio, Santi Darmokusumo, Widya Sutiyo, Imogen Badgery Parker and Romy Serfaty. Past staff, consultants and partners include Nita Murjani, Edith Abilogo, James Clarke, Neil Palmer, Tim Cronin, Edith Johnson, Angela Dewan, Jeff Walker, Ramadian Bachtiar and Yani Saloh.

GCS project support

Invaluable administrative support was provided by Rosita Go, Ria Widjaja-Adhi, Rina, Made Dwi Astuti, Christine Wairata, Anna Luntungan, Susan Kabiling, Anastasia Elisa, Feby Litamahuputty and Oktarita Satria.

Donors

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the governments of Australia, Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom and the European Commission.

2BSvs Biomass biofuels sustainability voluntary scheme3E Effectiveness, efficiency and equity4Is Institutions, interests, ideas and informationAAU Assigned amount unitACR American Carbon RegistryAD Avoided deforestationADg Avoided degradationADM Archer Daniels Midland AF Amazon FundAF AfforestationAFOLU Agriculture, forest and other land usesAfD Agence Française du Développement (French

Development Agency)AG Aboveground biomassAIDER Associación para la Investigación y el Desarrollo Integral

(Association for Integral Research and Development, Peru)

ANSAB Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources

Terms and abbreviations

Terms and abbreviations366 |

APD Avoiding planned deforestationAR Afforestation and reforestationAR4 Fourth Assessment Report of the United Nations

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeARR Afforestation, reforestation and revegetationAUDD Avoiding unplanned deforestation and/or degradationAWG-LCA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative

Action of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

BAM Bosques Amazonicos BAM Border adjustment measureBAU Business as usualBINGO Big international nongovernmental organisationBG Below ground biomassBNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico

e Social (National Bank for Economic and Social Development, Brazil)

BRIC(S) Brazil, Russia, India, China, (South Africa)BSM Benefit sharing mechanismC CarbonCAIT Climate analysis indicators toolCAT Cap and tradeCBD Convention on Biological DiversityCBFF Congo Basin Forest FundCBFM Community-based forest managementCBO Community-based organisationCC Climate changeCCBA Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance CCB(S) Climate, Community and Biodiversity (Standards) CCCSD UPNG Centre for Climate Change and Sustainable

Development, University of Papua New GuineaCCDS Climate change development strategyCDM Clean Development MechanismCED Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement

(Centre for Environment and Development, Cameroon)CEDLA Centre for Latin American Research and

Documentation, the NetherlandsCER Certified emission reduction CERDA Centre of Research and Development in Upland Areas,

VietnamCFM Community forest management

Terms and abbreviations | 367

CGIAR CGIAR is a global research partnership for a food secure future

CH4 MethaneCI Conservation InternationalCIEM Central Institute for Economic Management, VietnamCIFOR Center for International Forestry ResearchCODELT Conseil pour la Défense Environnementale par la

Légalité et la Traçabilité (Council for Environmental Defense through Legality and Traceability, Democratic Republic of Congo)

CO2 Carbon dioxideCOBA Communauté de Base (local forest management

associations, Madagascar)COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCOMIFAC Central Africa Forest CommissionCOMPON Comparing Climate Change Policy NetworksCOMTRADE United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics DatabaseCOP Conference of the PartiesCPO Crude palm oil CRBM Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale

(Campaign for the Reform of the World Bank, Italy)CSO Civil society organisation CSR Corporate social responsibilityCT-REDD Comité Technique REDD DAC Development Assistance Committee of the OECDDAR Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Law,

Environment and Natural Resources, Peru) dbh Diameter at breast heightDD Deforestation and (forest) degradationDMA Defense Mapping Agency, USADNPI Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim (National Council on

Climate Change, Indonesia)DoF Department of ForestryDRC Democratic Republic of the CongoDW Dead woodEC European CommissionECG Expert Consultation GroupEF Emission factorEIU Economist Intelligence UnitEMBRAPA Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian

Enterprise for Agricultural Research)

Terms and abbreviations368 |

ENGO Environmental nongovernmental organisationER Emission reductionES Environmental servicesETM Enhanced thematic mapperETS Emissions trading scheme (European Union)EU-RED European Union Renewable Energy Directive FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

NationsFAOSTAT Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations Statistical DatabaseFAS Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (Amazonas Sustainable

Foundation, Brazil) FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership FacilityFDI Foreign direct investmentFFI Fauna and Flora InternationalFIP Forest Investment Programme FLA Forest land allocationFLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade

(European Union)FONAM El Fondo Nacional del Ambiente (National Fund for

Environment, Peru)FOEI Friends of the Earth InternationalFPIC Free, prior and informed consentFRA Forest resource assessment (UN Food and Agriculture

Organization)FSC Forest Stewardship CouncilG-20 The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central

Bank Governors GCF Governors’ Climate and Forests Task ForceGCS Global Comparative Study on REDD+ GDP Gross domestic productGEF Global Environment FacilityGEO Group on Earth Observations GFA - Envest A consulting firm in CameroonGHG Greenhouse gas GIS Geographic information systemGOFC-GOLD Global Observation of Forest and Land Cover DynamicsGPG Good practice guidanceGRIF Guyana REDD+ Investment FundGSO General Statistics OfficeGt Gigatonne

Terms and abbreviations | 369

ha HectareHCVF High conservation value forests HIMA Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili (Piloting REDD in Zanzibar

through Community Forest Management, Tanzania)HLPE High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and

Nutrition of the Committee on World Food SecurityIBGE Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian

Institute of Geography and Statistics)IBIF Instituto Boliviano de Investigación Florestal (Bolivian

Forest Research Institute) ICV Instituto Centro de Vida (Center of Life Institute,

Brazil)ICDP Integrated conservation and development projectICEL Indonesian Center for Environmental LawIDB Inter-American Development BankIDESAM Institute for the Conservation and Sustainable

Development of Amazonas IE Infinite EarthIEA International Energy AgencyIFM Improved forest managementIGES Institute for Global Environmental Strategies ILUC Indirect land use change IMAFLORA Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola

(Institute for Agriculture and Forest Management Certification, Brazil)

IMC Instituto de Mudanças Climáticas e Regulação de Serviços Ambientais (Institute of Climate Change and Ecosystem Services Regulation, Brazil)

INCAS Indonesian national carbon accounting systemINCRA Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária

(National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform, Brazil)

INGO International nongovernmental organisationINPE Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National

Institute for Space Research, Brazil)Inpres Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction, Indonesia)Int InternationalIPAM Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia (Amazon

Environmental Research Institute, Brazil)IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeISCC International Sustainability & Carbon CertificationISO International Organization for Standardization

Terms and abbreviations370 |

IUCN International Union for the Conservation of NatureIWGFF Indonesian Working Group on Forest FinanceIWG-IFR Informal Working Group – Interim Finance for REDD+JCN Joint concept noteJFM Joint forest managementJGI Jane Goodall InstituteKCCP Ketapang Community Carbon Pool, IndonesiaKFCP Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership, Indonesia KfW Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit

Institute, Germany)LCDS Low carbon development strategyLiDAR Light detection and rangingLoI Letter of intentLSPP Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan (the Institute for

Press and Development Studies, Indonesia)LU Land useLUC Land use changeLULUCF Land use, land use change and forestry MCDI Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative,

TanzaniaMDG Millennium Development Goal MfDR Managing for development resultsMIFEE Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate, IndonesiaMINEP Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection,

CameroonMLG Multilevel governanceMMA Ministério do Meio Ambiente (Ministry of

Environment, Brazil)MoU Memorandum of understandingMRV Measurement/Monitoring, reporting and verification n/a Not applicable or not answeredN2O Nitrous oxideNAFORMA National Forest Resource Assessment, TanzaniaNAMA Nationally appropriate mitigation actionsNASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration Nat NationalNCSU North Carolina State University, USANEC National Executive Council, UKNGGIP National Greenhouse Gas Inventory ProgrammeNGO Nongovernmental organisationsNOK Norwegian Kroner

Terms and abbreviations | 371

NORDECO Nordic Agency for Development and EcologyNOx Nitrogen oxideNPCC National Policy on Climate ChangeNRI-PNG National Research Institute, Papua New GuineaNRS National REDD+ Steering Committee NTF National Trust Fund, TanzaniaOAR Option assessment report (Meridian Institute)OCCD Office of Climate Change and Development, Papua

New GuineaODA Official development assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development ONACC Observatoire National sur les Changements Climatiques

(National Observatory on Climate Change, Cameroon)ONFI Organisation Nationale Forestière Internationale PAMs Policies and measuresPES Payments for environmental services PFM Participatory forest managementPNGFA Papua New Guinea Forestry Authority PWC PricewaterhouseCoopersRaCSA Rapid carbon stock appraisalRCFEE Research Centre for Forest Ecology and Environment,

Forest Science Institute of VietnamRED Reducing emissions from deforestationREDD Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest

degradationREDD DA Reduced emission from deforestation and forest

degradation - demonstration activityREDD+ Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest

degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocksREDD-MF REDD methodology modules REDES Rede de Desenvolvimento, Ensino e Sociedade

(Network for Development, Education and Society, Brazil)

REL Reference emission levelREPAR Réseau des Parlementaires pour la Gestion Durable des

Écosystèmes Forestières d’Afrique Centrale (Network of Parliamentarians for Sustainable Management of Forest Ecosystems in Central Africa)

RFF Resources for the FutureREPOA Research on Poverty Alleviation, TanzaniaRL Reference level

Terms and abbreviations372 |

R-PIN Readiness Plan Idea NotesRPP Readiness Preparation ProposalRRI Rights and Resources InitiativeRS RestorationRSB Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels RSBA RED Bioenergy Sustainability Assurance SABLs Special agriculture and business leasesSBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

SES Social and environmental standardsSESA Strategic environmental and social assessment SFEs State forest enterprisesSIA Social impact assessmentSIGSIF Registrados no Sistema de Informações Gerenciais do

Serviço de Inspeção Federal (Management Information System of the Federal Inspection System, Brazil)

SIF Serviço de Inspeção Federal (Federal Inspection Service, Brazil)

SISA System of incentives for environmental servicesSMART Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time

boundSNV Netherlands Development OrganisationSon La FD Son La Forestry Department, VietnamSOC Soil organic carbonSSA Sub-Saharan AfricaTaTEDO Tanzania Traditional Energy Development and

Environmental OrganizationTDERM Tropical deforestation emissions reduction mechanismTFCG Tanzania Forest Conservation GroupTFWG Tanzania Forestry Working GroupTI Transparency InternationalTM Thematic mapperTNC The Nature ConservancyUEM Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Eduardo Mondlane

University, Mozambique)UKP4 Unit Kerja Presiden Pengawasan dan Pengendalian

Pembangunan (The President’s Unit for Development Control and Monitoring, Indonesia)

UMB Universitetet for miljø- og biovitenskap (Norwegian University of Life Sciences)

UNC University of North Carolina, USA

Terms and abbreviations | 373

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUN-DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social

AffairsUNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

PeoplesUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

ChangeUNORCID United Nations Office for REDD+ Coordination in

IndonesiaUN-REDD United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing

Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries

UoM University of Melbourne, AustraliaVCS Verified carbon standard (formerly known as voluntary

carbon standard)VCU Verified carbon unitVER Verified emission reductionVPA Voluntary partnership agreementVRO Vietnam REDD+ OfficeWCED World Commission on Environment and DevelopmentWGIII Working Group III of the IPCCWRI World Resources InstituteWU Wageningen University, the NetherlandsWWF World Wildlife Fund/Worldwide Fund for Nature

4IsInstitutions (rules, path-dependency or stickiness), Interests (potential material advantages), Ideas (policy discourses, underlying ideologies, beliefs) and Information (data and knowledge, its construction and use)

Activity dataData on the magnitude of a human activity resulting in emissions or removals. For REDD+, this usually refers to land areas in management systems, deforestation or degradation, but it can also refer to other things, such as the level of inputs (e.g. fertiliser).

AdditionalityAdditionality is the requirement that a REDD+ activity or project should generate benefits, such as reduced emissions or increased removals, that would not have happened without the activity (i.e. the business as usual scenario).

AfforestationAfforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested land, through

Glossary

Glossary | 375

planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources.

AFOLUAFOLU is an acronym for ‘agriculture, forestry and other land use.’ This term was put forward in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Guidelines (IPCC GL) (2006) to extend the 1996 Guidelines, which covered only agriculture and forestry.

Allometric equationAllometric equations express the quantitative relationship between the dimensions of a tree and its biomass. They are used to estimate the biomass of trees based on easy measures such as tree height or diameter at breast height (dbh).

Annex I and Non-Annex I countriesUnder the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), nations fall into two categories: developed countries (Annex I countries) and developing countries (Non-Annex I countries). In accordance with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities,’ Annex I countries have greater commitments to enacting policy and reporting than Non-Annex I countries. Most Annex I countries have committed to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.

Approach (referring to activity data)There are three approaches to collecting activity data for GHG inventories, according to the IPCC GL:Approach 1: Total land use area, with no data on conversions between land usesApproach 2: Total land use area, including changes between categoriesApproach 3: Spatially explicit land use conversion data.

BaselineThe term is used in different ways, but normally to signify a business as usual scenario. In REDD+, this represents the projected anthropogenic changes in forest carbon stock that would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity or policy intervention. See also reference level. In project evaluations, ‘baseline’ can also refer to pre-project conditions (e.g. a ‘baseline study’ involves collecting socio-economic and ecological data before a project starts, implicitly assuming that any change is due to the project).

Benefit sharingThe distribution of direct and indirect net gains (monetary and non-monetary benefits) from the implementation of REDD+

Glossary376 |

BiofuelFuel derived from organic matter, such as wood, plants, crops and waste

BiomassThe total dry mass of living organic matter

Business as usualA policy neutral reference to future emissions or removals, estimated using projections of future emission or removal levels without any REDD+ activity. The term is also used in a political economy sense to mean the continuation of policies and practices consistent with the status quo in the pre-REDD+ political economy of a country.

Carbon marketA market in which carbon emission reductions are traded, usually in theform of carbon credits (verified or certified emission reductions). Carbon markets take the form of: i) a voluntary market (where emission reduction targets are not regulated); or ii) a compliance market (where carbon credits are traded to meet regulated emission reduction targets). The largest carbon market is currently the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS).

Carbon offsetA reduction in emissions or increase in removals made to compensate for an emission made elsewhere. Carbon offsets are measured in metric tonnes of CO2-equivalent.

Carbon poolA reservoir that accumulates or releases carbon. The Marrakesh Accords recognise five main carbon pools in forests: aboveground biomass, belowground biomass, dead wood, litter and soil organic matter.

Carbon sequestrationThe removal of carbon from the atmosphere to long-term storage in sinks through physical or biological processes, such as photosynthesis

Carbon sinkA pool (reservoir) that removes carbon from the active part of the carbon cycle

Carbon stockThe quantity of carbon contained in a carbon pool

Clean development mechanism (CDM)An offset mechanism under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol designed to assist Annex I countries in meeting their emission reduction targets, and

Glossary | 377

to assist Non-Annex I countries to achieve sustainable development. The CDM allows Annex I countries to finance and implement projects that reduce the emissions in Non-Annex I countries so that they can get credits (certified emission reductions) to meet their own emission reduction targets.

Co-benefitBenefits arising from REDD+ in addition to climate mitigation benefits, such as enhancing biodiversity, enhancing adaptation to climate change, alleviating poverty, improving local livelihoods, improving forest governance and protecting rights

Compliance marketMarkets created and regulated by mandatory national or international climate regimes. They allocate or auction GHG emission limits (quotas or caps) to countries, subnational units or companies and allow them to buy carbon credits to meet their cap, or sell them if they emit less than their cap (i.e. trade, thus also known as cap and trade).

Compulsory/compliance/mandatory market Markets created by international, national or regional legal regimes to limit GHG emissions

Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCCThe governing body of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It meets once a year.

DeforestationThe permanent conversion of land from forest to non-forest. In the Marrakesh Accords, deforestation is defined as ‘the direct human-induced conversion of forested land to non-forested land.’ FAO defines deforestation as ‘the conversion of forest to another land use or the long-term reduction of the tree canopy cover below the minimum 10% threshold.’

DegradationDegradation refers to changes within the forest that negatively affect the structure or function of the forest stand or site, and thereby lower its capacity to supply products and services. In the context of REDD+, degradation can be measured in terms of reduced carbon stocks in forests that remain as forests. No formal definition of degradation has yet been adopted, because many forest carbon stocks fluctuate due to natural cyclical causes or management practices.

Glossary378 |

Direct market mechanismMechanisms that raise funding from the direct sale of verified or certified emissions reductions in a voluntary or compliance carbon market

Emission factorA factor that quantifies the emission or removal of a GHG per unit of activity data, e.g. per ha of deforestation

ExternalityA cost or benefit incurred to actors other than the actor(s) undertaking the action. Also referred to as spillover or side effect

ForestFAO defines forest as having minimum canopy cover of 10%, minimum tree height in situ of 5 m, minimum area of 0.5 ha, and where agriculture is not the dominant land use. The UNFCCC allows for a more flexible forest definition: minimum canopy cover 10–30%, minimum tree height 2–5 m, minimum area 0.1 ha. Individual countries have their own definitions.

Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)A World Bank programme to help developing countries reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Objectives include capacity building for REDD+ and helping countries prepare for future systems of financial incentives under REDD+.

Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) upholds the rights of indigenous people to grant or withhold their FPIC for: activities affecting the lands they have traditionally owned, occupied, or used; any proposed relocation and; any legal or administrative measures affecting them. FPIC implies that consent has been obtained without coercion in advance of project authorisation and commencement, and that the affected parties fully understand the scope, duration and potential impacts of the activities.

Fund-based approachApproach that mobilises funding for REDD+ through budgetary contributions and distributes funding on agreed conditions and criteria

G-20The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. It includes 19 country members and the European Union. The objectives of the G-20 include coordinating policy to achieve global economic stability,

Glossary | 379

promoting financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent future financial crises and creating new international financial architecture.

Implementation costsThe costs of setting up a system and putting into place the necessary policies and actions to achieve REDD+

Indigenous peopleThere is no universally agreed definition of indigenous people, although some international legal instruments provide definitions. According to the United Nations, rather than define indigenous people, the most useful approach is for them to identify themselves according to the fundamental right to self-identification set out in declarations of human rights.

Indirect land use change The unintended consequence or side effects on land use (and emissions) arising from implementing projects or policies; for example, growing biofuel feedstocks on agricultural land may result in land elsewhere being allocated to food production.

Indirect market mechanismA mechanism that raises funding for REDD+ through linking forest conservation to transactions in non-carbon markets, e.g. for commodities or services related to drivers of deforestation

IPCC 2006 Guidelines (IPCC GL)The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published this methodological report in 2006. It provides guidelines for national GHG inventories.

Kyoto ProtocolA 1997 agreement under the UNFCCC. Annex I countries that ratified the Protocol have committed to reducing their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other GHG by an average of 5.2 % between 2008 and 2012, compared to their 1990 level. The Kyoto Protocol now involves 191 countries, but accounts for less than 64% of GHG emissions. As of April 2012, the USA is the only signatory nation that has not ratified the Protocol and Canada renounced the Protocol in December 2011. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends on 31 December 2012.

LeakageIn the context of climate change, carbon leakage happens when interventions to reduce emissions in one area (subnational or national)

Glossary380 |

lead to an increase in emissions in another area. The official UNFCCC term is ‘displaced emissions.’

LULUCFAcronym for ‘land use, land-use change and forestry.’ LULUCF activities are covered under Articles 3 (paragraphs 3 and 4), 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.

Market-based fundingGenerating funds from a voluntary or compliance carbon market for REDD+ by selling verified or certified emission reductions. The buyers can be individuals, private companies or public entities. Market-based funding can also refer to generating money from non-carbon markets, e.g. an aviation tax earmarked for climate mitigation and adaptation.

Multilateral fundsFunds that receive contributions from more than one donor government and are in most cases administered by international organisations

Non-market fundingTraditional forms of funding, such as official development assistance and domestic government spending

Opportunity costIn the REDD+ setting this refers to forgone profits from the best alternative land use.

Path-dependencePath-dependence explains how the scope of current policy decisions is limited by decisions made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant (i.e. ‘history matters’).

Payments for ecosystem/environmental services (PES)A buyer who values environmental services pays the provider or manager of the land use that supplies those services; in return, the seller continues to deliver them. In REDD+, PES refers to a results-based system in which payments are made for reduced emissions or increased removals relative to an agreed reference level.

Perverse incentiveA policy that creates an incentive yielding unintended and undesirable results

Glossary | 381

Phases These refer to different stages of REDD+ implementation in countries: Phase 1: Establishment of REDD+ frameworks, strategies, policies and accounting frameworks (REDD+ readiness) Phase 2: Implementation of REDD+ policies and measures, and possibly payments based on their implementation Phase 3: Results-based payments for REDD+ (i.e. for emissions and removals).

Policies and measures (PAMs)In REDD+, PAMs are nationally enacted policies and actions that countries undertake to reduce carbon emissions or increase removals.

ReadinessREDD+ country actions – including capacity building, policy design, consultation and consensus building, and testing and evaluation of a REDD+ national strategy – that are taken prior to the comprehensive implementation of REDD+

Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) and enhancing forest carbon stock in developing countries (REDD+)The term ‘REDD+’ is used in many ways. A broad definition, based on the official COP13 terminology, holds that REDD+ comprises local, subnational, national and global actions whose primary aim is to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks (increase removals) in developing countries. A narrower definition is that REDD+ also includes results-based or conditional payments, which was a core idea when REDD+ was first launched.

From another perspective, REDD+ may not only refer to actions: it may refer to the overall idea, the objective of reduced emissions and increased removals, the set of policies or actions necessary to achieve that objective, the outcome as measured in reduced emissions and increased removals or the process involving all of these elements. REDD (without the plus) is used to refer only to deforestation and forest degradation, and does not include forest carbon stock enhancement.

Reference levelTwo distinct meanings and different uses may be distinguished for RLs. First, the RL is used for the business as usual scenario or baseline for changes in carbon stocks, which is used as a benchmark for measuring the impact of REDD+ policies and actions and to define emission reductions. In this sense, reference level can refer to gross emission levels from deforestation and forest degradation (RL) and to net emission levels from all emissions and removals from deforestation, forest degradation, conservation, sustainable

Glossary382 |

management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REL). Second, in a result-based system, the reference level is used as a benchmark for estimating payments to countries, subnational units or projects for emissions reductions. In this book, we refer to this use as the financial incentive benchmark (FIB).

ReforestationReforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land, through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources on land that was forested, but that has been converted to non-forested land.

RemovalRefers to the removal of CO2 or other GHGs from the atmosphere and their storage in carbon pools, such as those found in forests. See also carbon sequestration.

Root:shoot ratioA measure of the ratio of biomass in the roots to that in the shoots. This ratio is often used to estimate the below-ground component of the biomass carbon pool based on measurements of aboveground biomass.

Shifting cultivationAn agricultural system in which plots of land are cultivated temporarily, then abandoned when the soil loses its fertility or weeds become dominant. The plot of land is then left to be reclaimed by natural vegetation.

Slash-and-burn agriculture An agricultural practice that involves cutting and burning forests or woodlands to create fields, typically part of a shifting cultivation system

State autonomyThe degree to which a state can make policy decisions independently from social groups

Swidden agriculture An agricultural practice that involves cutting and burning of forests or woodlands to create fields, typically part of a shifting cultivation system (also referred to as slash and burn agriculture)

TierThe IPCC Good Practice Guidance tiers are levels of methodological complexity for measuring GHG emissions: Tier 1 is the most basic and uses global default values for carbon stocks.Tier 2 is intermediate and uses national values.

Glossary | 383

Tier 3 is most demanding in terms of complexity and data requirements, using site-specific values for carbon stocks.

Transaction costsA cost that is incurred when making an economic exchange. It includes costs related to search and information, enforcement, implementation and monitoring. Transaction costs are typically used in relation to a PES system, but sometimes are also used beyond the original meaning, to include any REDD+ costs, except opportunity costs.

Transformational changeA change in attitudes, discourse, power relations and deliberate actions necessary to lead policy formulation and implementation away from business as usual policy approaches.

UN-REDD ProgrammeThe UN-REDD Programme is a collaborative programme for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. It includes the FAO, the UNDP and the UNEP in a multidonor trust fund, established in July 2008, which pools resources and funds programme activities. The programme provides support to countries for readiness activities and policy development and implementation.

Voluntary marketMarkets that function alongside compliance markets. Buyers are companies, governments, NGOs and individuals who are voluntarily buying verified emissions reductions (VER), e.g. to offset their own emissions.

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cifor.org ForestsClimateChange.org

This publication was made possible with funding from the CGIAR Research Programme, ‘Forests, Trees and Agroforestry: Livelihoods, Landscapes and Governance’. The Programme aims to enhance management and use of forests, agroforestry and tree genetic resources across the landscape from forests to farms.

As an idea, REDD+ is a success story: It is a fresh approach generating hope of significant result-based funding to address an urgent need for climate change mitigation. The idea has been sufficiently broad to serve as a canopy, under which a wide range of actors can grow their own trees.

REDD+ faces huge challenges: Powerful political and economic interests favour continued deforestation and degradation. Implementation must be coordinated across various government levels and agencies; benefits must be distributed and need to balance effectiveness and equity; tenure insecurity and safeguards must be genuinely addressed; and transparent institutions, reliable carbon monitoring and realistic reference levels are all required to support result-based systems.

REDD+ requires – and can catalyse – transformational change: New economic incentives, new information and discourses, new actors and new policy coalitions have the potential to move domestic policies away from the business as usual trajectory.

REDD+ projects are hybrids in high deforestation areas: Project proponents are pursuing strategies that mix the enforcement of regulations and support to alternative livelihoods (ICDP) with result-based incentives (PES). Projects tend to be located in high deforestation and high forest carbon areas, yielding high additionality if they succeed.

‘No regret’ policy options exist: Despite uncertainty about the future of REDD+, stakeholders need to build political support and coalitions for change, invest in adequate information systems, and implement policies that can reduce deforestation and forest degradation, but are desirable regardless of climate objectives.

Editor Arild Angelsen

Coeditors Maria Brockhaus, William D. Sunderlin, Louis V. Verchot

Foreword by Tony La Viña

Contributors John Herbert Ainembabazi, Arild Angelsen, Kamalakumari Anitha, André Aquino, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Stibniati Atmadja, Andrea Babon, Laila Borge, Maria Brockhaus, Neil D. Burgess, Bryan R. Bushley, Jan Börner, Marina Cromberg, Tim Cronin, Finn Danielsen, Ahmad Dermawan, Monica Di Gregorio, Rut Dini, Therese Dokken, Amy E. Duchelle, Andini Desita Ekaputri, Martin Enghoff, Manuel Estrada, Caleb Gallemore, Maria Fernanda Gebara, Kristell Hergoualc’h, Martin Herold, Rocio Hiraldo, Thu-Ba Huynh, Pamela Jagger, Francis X. Johnson, Shijo Joseph, Dil Bahadur Khatri, Kaisa Korhonen-Kurki, Mrigesh Kshatriya, Demetrius Kweka, Anne M. Larson, Kathleen Lawlor, Liwei Lin, Lasse Loft, Cecilia Luttrell, Daniel McIntyre, Desmond McNeill, Moira Moeliono, Efrian Muharrom, Krystof Obidzinski, Pablo Pacheco, Charlie Parker, Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, Pham Thu Thuy, Louis Putzel, Salla Rantalla, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, Erika Romijn, Emilia Runeberg, George Schoneveld, Frances Seymour, Erin O. Sills, Denis Jean Sonwa, Charlotte Streck, William D. Sunderlin, Thomas Tanner, Louis V. Verchot, Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Arief Wijaya, Sven Wunder.