Christian Norberg Schulz's Phenomenological project in Arch
-
Upload
patricia-adelina -
Category
Documents
-
view
30 -
download
3
description
Transcript of Christian Norberg Schulz's Phenomenological project in Arch
This article was downloaded by: [197.27.40.47]On: 01 May 2012, At: 21:40Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office:Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Architectural Theory ReviewPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscriptioninformation:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ratr20
Christian Norberg-Schulz's PhenomenologicalProject In ArchitectureElie Haddad
Available online: 30 Mar 2010
To cite this article: Elie Haddad (2010): Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture,Architectural Theory Review, 15:1, 88-101
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13264821003629279
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantialor systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that thecontents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, anddrug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liablefor any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
ELIE HADDAD
CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’SPHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT INARCHITECTURE
This paper will examine the theoretical
work of one of the major proponents of a
phenomenological approach in architecture,
the historian-theoretician Christian Norberg-
Schulz, examining the development of his
ideas across 30 years. While Norberg-Schulz
started out with Intentions in Architecture
(1963), a work that was clearly influenced
by structuralist studies, he soon shifted to a
phenomenological approach with Existence,
Space and Architecture (1971), and then with
Genius Loci (1980) and The Concept of Dwelling
(1985). He attempted through this trilogy to
lay down the foundations of a phenomen-
ological interpretation of architecture, with
an underlying agenda that espoused certain
directions in contemporary architecture.
This paper will examine the major writings
of Christian Norberg-Schulz, critically evalu-
ating his interpretation of phenomenology in
architecture in its ambiguous relation to the
project of modernity.
ISSN 1326-4826 print/ISSN 1755-0475 onlineª 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13264821003629279
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
It is paradoxical that the phenomenological
discourse appeared on the architectural scene
after the decline of structuralism and semiotics,
while in philosophy and the humanities, it was
the decline of phenomenology in the 1960s
that prompted the development of structural-
ism. This ambiguous situation may be explained
by the time-lapse between the moment
philosophical ideas are articulated and their
translation into the architectural field.
Phenomenology owes its main thrust to
Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Husserl
launched the phenomenological movement
in philosophy with the intent of developing
it into a method of precise philosophical
investigation—that is, a comprehensive new
‘‘science’’, but it was his student Heidegger who
took it into another direction and turned it into
one of the major philosophical movements of
the twentieth century, influencing all subse-
quent developments in philosophy from Sartre
to Foucault and Derrida. Heidegger trans-
formed Phenomenology into a means for the
questioning of philosophical traditions, a radical
dismantling to be followed by a reconstruction,
with the intent of founding a new fundamental
ontology that looks at the way in which the
structures of ‘‘Being’’ are revealed through the
structures of human existence.1
The main thrust of Heidegger’s philosophy was
developed in his major work, Being and Time
(1927), which constitutes the basis of his
phenomenological approach. Yet, as scholars
of Heidegger remark, his later works, especially
the series of essays ‘‘The Origin of the Work
of Art’’ (1935), ‘‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’’
(1952) and ‘‘The Question concerning Tech-
nology’’ (1949),2 reflected a turn in his orienta-
tion from the earlier Being and Time towards a
mythopoeic approach that privileges a direct
reflection on the nature of elements, common
to poetic or artistic practice.3 It was this later
Heidegger who would become influential
among a number of architectural theorists,
namely Christian Norberg-Schulz, who was
among the first to attempt to translate this
phenomenological approach in architecture.
Christian Norberg-Schulz’s first theoretical
work was very much influenced by the
structuralist tendencies of the 1960s,4 without
being specifically anchored to any single source
or reference. Intentions in Architecture appeared
in 1963 and constituted an ambitious project
to develop an overarching ‘‘system’’ that would
account for the various poles of architectural
activity. The framework for this study included
a combination of scientific ideas derived
from sociology, psychology and semiotics.
Already at that time, he attributed the con-
dition of ‘‘crisis’’ in architecture to the failure
of modern architecture to take account of
some of the essential factors that give signi-
ficance to the built environment, primary
among those the role of perception, in addition
to the importance of history as a source of
meanings.5
Norberg-Schulz’s discussion of perception was
largely influenced by Gestalt psychology, to
which were also added the socialization of
perception and the process of ‘‘schematiza-
tion’’, that is the way in which perception leads
to the construction of an understanding of the
world, based on the pioneering studies of
Jean Piaget in child psychology. From this, he
proceeded to outline a theoretical framework
which would include all the semiotic dimen-
sions. This theory, influenced to a large extent
by Charles Morris’s interpretation of semiotics,
constituted a similar attempt to develop a
comprehensive structure—that is, an ‘‘archi-
tectural totality’’ that would account for all
the dimensions of architecture: the technical
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
89
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
structure, environment, context, scale and
ornament.6 It is worth noting that this work
did not list any single reference to Heidegger in
its bibliography, only mentioning him in a single
footnote.7
A few years later, Norberg-Schulz published a
work with a very indicative title, Existence,
Space and Architecture (1971), followed by
Genius Loci (1980) and The Concept of Dwelling
(1985) which constitute his phenomenological
trilogy in architecture. Existence, Space and
Architecture marked a turning point in Norberg-
Schulz’s theoretical project. While his first
work was based on a structuralist approach
blending semiotics and Gestalt theories,
this work betrayed a shift which would be
translated later into a move towards a
phenomenological approach. In the foreword,
Norberg-Schulz announced, in fact, a ‘‘new
approach to the problem of architectural
space’’, attempting to ‘‘develop the idea that
architectural space may be understood as
a concretization of environmental schemata
or images, which form a necessary part of
man’s general orientation or ‘being in the
world’’’.8 This reference to ‘‘being in the world’’
is indicative of this new shift, supported by
several quotations from Heidegger. Still, in this
transitional work, Norberg-Schulz stood on a
middle ground between the structuralist posi-
tions of Piaget, Arnheim and others, and the
phenomenological position represented by
Heidegger and Bollnow.9 This attempt at
reconciling structuralism with phenomenology
may also be traced in his subsequent works
and never seemed to pose any problems for
Norberg-Schulz.
The major concept in Existence, Space and
Architecture is ‘‘space’’. The discussion of ‘‘space’’
was motivated by what the author perceived
as a reductive reading of that concept, first
given currency by Giedion and later used by
others, particularly Bruno Zevi.10 Norberg-
Schulz qualified space as ‘‘existential space’’,
structured into schemata and centres, direc-
tions, paths, and domains; concepts that he
illustrated by concrete examples derived from
multiple sources, from Mircea Eliade to Otto
Bollnow, Gaston Bachelard, Claude Levi-
Strauss and Kevin Lynch. The centre, for
instance, was illustrated by the image drawn
from Eliade’s discussion on mythology, a
mythical origin traversed by a diagram of the
axis mundi, which represents a connection
between the different cosmic realms.11 Simi-
larly, the path was related to the idea of
departure and return home, and the division
into the ‘‘inner’’ and ‘‘outer’’ domains of
existence, as explained by Bollnow. Norberg-
Schulz also introduced a new concept that
would be expanded later, that of genius loci,
literally the ‘‘spirit of a place’’.12 He identified
four levels of ‘‘existential space’’: geography and
landscape, urban level, the house and the thing.
In discussing the house, Norberg-Schulz re-
ferred to Heidegger’s essay on dwelling and the
etymological roots of ‘‘building’’ which go back
to ‘‘dwelling’’, stressing the role of the house as
the ‘‘central place of human existence’’:
The House, therefore, remains the
central place of human existence, the
place where the child learns to under-
stand his being in the world, and the
place from which man departs and to
which he returns.13
The last chapter discussed the concept of
‘‘architectural space’’ which he defined as a
‘‘concretization of existential space’’, illustrated
by a historical survey of various architectural
works, from villages and towns to specific
architectural artefacts, subjected to a classifica-
tion in terms of the spatial concepts of centre,
HADDAD
90
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
path and domain, as well as a qualitative
description in terms of their phenomenological
attributes. Existential space was thus defined as
a qualitative space, manifest in the monumental
architecture of the Parthenon as well as that of
the medieval towns, in the dynamic architec-
ture of Borromini as well as in that of the
Renaissance, in the work of Le Corbusier, La
Tourette (Fig. 1) being a favoured example, as
well as in Louis Kahn’s and Paolo Portoghesi’s
works.
For Norberg-Schulz, there exist multiple varia-
tions to the concept of ‘‘architectural space’’,
but its essential aspects had been obliterated
by some modern works, especially at the level
of urbanism. There, the figural quality of the
street and its variations, the centrality of the
town square and its existential role have all
been ignored by architects, which led to
deficient urban environments. In this respect,
he joined Venturi, Jacobs, and Rossi in criticizing
Modern Architecture for its shortcomings,
especially at the level of the urban environ-
ment. As in the case of Venturi, but using a
different approach, Norberg-Schulz returned
to history in its wider sense to give compara-
tive examples of buildings, towns and land-
scapes as examples that naturally incorporate
these qualities of ‘‘existential space’’, creating
meaningful and wholistic environments.
Norberg-Schulz reiterated the necessary re-
cognition and understanding of the different
levels of architectural space that ‘‘form a
structured totality which corresponds to the
structure of existential space’’.14 This under-
standing of ‘‘existential space’’, ignored by
‘‘orthodox modernism’’ reappeared, according
to him, in the work of Louis Kahn, Robert
Figure 1. La Tourette. Photo: courtesy of David Rifkind.
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
91
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
Venturi and Paolo Portoghesi. Portoghesi was
singled out for his supposed mastery through
the application of geometry of the interaction
between different levels of space, resulting in a
balanced relation between the building and its
environment. Norberg-Schulz concluded with
a quote from Heidegger : ‘‘Mortals dwell in as
much as they save the earth’’, as a confirmation
of the necessity of re-appropriating the
elements of existential space into the founda-
tion of architecture.15
Genius Loci
Norberg-Schulz introduced his major opus,
Genius Loci,16 as a sequel to his previous two
works in architectural theory, despite the
radically different direction that this work took
in relation to the first. Genius Loci was perhaps
the most influential of Norberg-Schulz’s writ-
ings, as it came out at a time when questions of
meaning, history, and mythology assumed
greater importance in architectural discourse,
in a post-modernist climate that gave back
credibility to these themes. And unlike his
previous studies, this one was more explicitly
concerned with the interpretation of phenom-
enology in architecture as its subtitle indicated,
and as clearly stated in the introduction that
acknowledged the debt to Heidegger’s ideas,
particularly his essays gathered in Poetry,
Language, Thought.17 The book cover was quite
indicative as well; in clear contrast to the plain
white cover of his first book, it featured a
panoramic photograph of the medieval Italian
hill town of Vitorchiano, in the region of Latium
(Fig. 2).
In this photographic essay on architecture, with
its illustrations ranging from the macroscopic
scale of landscapes to the microscopic scale of
architectural details, Norberg-Schulz proposed
to elaborate the constituting elements of a
‘‘phenomenology of place’’, using as a keynote
the poem of Georg Trakl, ‘‘A Winter Evening’’,
quoted in one of Heidegger’s essays. The main
lesson of this poem, as explained by the author,
is the importance of ‘‘concrete images’’ that
constitute our experiences, represented by
poets, architects and artists. The phenomen-
ological challenge lies therefore in reviving
Figure 2. Vitorchiano. Photo: Author.
HADDAD
92
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
this poetic dimension of things and in re-
establishing the lost connection between the
various elements that constitute our world.
Specifically, Norberg-Schulz stressed the con-
nection between the man-made world and the
natural world, historically evident in various
places and environments from around the
world. This relationship is established through a
three-point process of visualization, comple-
mentation, and symbolization.18 This process
was attributed to Heidegger’s concept of
‘‘gathering’’. Its last phase, symbolization, plays
a more crucial role in the concretization of
meaning in a place, and in the realization of
the concept of ‘‘gathering’’. Norberg-Schulz’s
main thesis rested therefore on the marriage
of these two concepts, Heidegger’s concept of
‘‘gathering’’ and the old Roman concept of
genius loci:
The existential purpose of building (ar-
chitecture) is therefore to make a site
become a place, that is, to uncover the
meanings potentially present in the given
environment.
Genius Loci is a Roman concept. Accord-
ing to ancient Roman belief every
‘‘independent’’ being has its genius, its
guardian spirit. This spirit gives life to
people and places, accompanies them
from birth to death, and determines their
character or essence. Even the gods had
their genius, a fact which illustrates the
fundamental nature of the concept.19
In what amounts to a mixing of mythology with
philosophy, Norberg-Schulz proceeded to de-
velop his theory, supported by a litany of well
chosen photographs that depict various condi-
tions and sites, from the historic towns
of Europe to the landscapes of Tuscany,
Switzerland, Finland and Sudan, and from the
characteristic images of people walking in the
Nordic winter snow to barefoot children
posing in their desert village in Sudan. This
‘‘photo-historiography’’, as pointedly analysed
by Jorge Otero-Pailos,20 also encompassed
select examples of historical periods from
Greek to Baroque and Modern Architecture.
The reference to Greek examples, such as the
iconic Tholos and Theatre of Delphi was
somewhat legitimized and necessitated by the
appeal to the concept of genius loci, with its
mythological aspects that invoke the specific
appropriations of different places by specific
gods, a theme that also brings back Heidegger,
specifically his essay on ‘‘The Origin of the
Work of Art’’.21 As for landscapes, Norberg-
Schulz again drew on Heidegger in calling for a
‘‘phenomenology of natural place’’ which recalls
the different topological contexts and re-
examines their etymologies in the hope of
uncovering their original meanings:
Whereas valleys and basins have a macro
or medium scale, a ravine (cleft, gorge) is
distinguished by a ‘‘forbidding’’ narrowness.
It has the quality of an ‘‘under-world’’ which
gives access to the ‘‘inside’’ of the earth. In a
ravine we feel caught or trapped, and the
etymology of the word in fact leads us back
to rapere, that is to ‘‘seize’’.22
Norberg-Schulz’s personal religious affinities
played a significant role in the articulation of his
ideas. Thus, it is not only landscape in general that
stimulates a phenomenological understanding of
the world, but specific sanctuaries within the
landscape that create a favourable condition for
‘‘intimate dwelling’’. These ‘‘sub-places’’, such as
the Carceri of St Francis near Assisi or the Sacro
Speco of St Benedict near Subiaco, offer
‘‘archetypal retreats where man may still experi-
ence the presence of the original forces of the
earth’’.23
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
93
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
Yet what is most surprising in this interpreta-
tion of the environment was Norberg-Schulz’s
reductive categorization of landscapes into
three basic types: Romantic (the Nordic region
being its main illustration), Cosmic (defined as
an environment that makes an absolute and
eternal order manifest, represented best by the
infinite desert), and Classical (varied yet
orderly, an example of which is the Greek
landscape). Yet these landscapes do not simply
present abstract topological conditions; they
appear intimately connected to certain social
or cultural characteristics, which take the form
of historically determined judgments. Thus, the
Romantic landscape encourages an intimate
relation with the earth where dwelling takes
the form of a refuge in the forest, while the
desert seems to act as a natural framework for
the unifying message proclaimed by religions
like Islam, and the Classical landscape appears
like an in-between condition, a condition of
equilibrium that generates a meaningful order,
and fosters a ‘‘human fellowship’’ where the
individual is neither absorbed by the totality
(the cosmic order) nor forced to seek his
private hiding place (the romantic world). This
last case offers, accordingly, the best possibility
for a ‘‘true gathering’’—for dwelling in the
Heideggerian sense.24 These three types of
landscape constitute ‘‘archetypes’’, which do
not always present themselves in the ‘‘pure’’
form of the examples mentioned, and some-
times lead to ‘‘complex’’ landscapes, according
to the author—that is, composite landscapes
such as Naples or Venice, or Brandenburg
where ‘‘extension is squeezed in between a
sandy moor and a low, grey sky, creating a
landscape which seems saturated by the
monotonous, cheerless rhythm of marching
soldiers’’.25
The same reductive approach that was
followed to categorize the various landscapes
was also used to categorize ‘‘man-made’’
place, meaning architecture, into ‘‘Romantic
architecture’’, ‘‘Cosmic architecture’’ and ‘‘Clas-
sical architecture’’. While Classical architecture
offers itself more easily to categorization, as
it is historically recognized, it is interesting to
note the selective reading of the author
regarding the other categories, which pro-
ceeds from the same geographical determina-
tion applied to landscape. Thus, ‘‘Romantic
architecture’’ does not indicate a specific style
or period, but an architecture ‘‘distinguished
by multiplicity and variety’’, ‘‘irrational and
subjective’’, ‘‘phantastic and mysterious but
also intimate and idyllic’’.26 This strange
definition brings together disparate examples
from the medieval towns of Germany to the
vernacular architecture of Norway, even
extending to the work of Guimard and Aalto
in our times. In the same vein, cosmic
architecture applies to works characterized
by ‘‘uniformity and absolute order’’ and
supposedly finds its best manifestation in
Islamic architecture.27
The concluding chapters were dedicated to
a selective study of three settlements that
best illustrate these three categories, a study
which, in reality, translates into something in
between a travel guide and an architectural
survey of these three cities: Prague, Khartoum
and Rome. While Prague exudes a romantic
sense of mystery confirmed by the novels of
Kafka and supported by its rich architectural
heritage, the ‘‘cosmic’’ Khartoum offers the
opposite feeling of an infinite landscape
defined by the movement of the sun and
the Nile River. And while Rome was probably
selected to illustrate the third case, upon
closer scrutiny its genius loci appears to
escape any strict definition, and thus emerges
as a ‘‘complex’’ case which ‘‘contains every-
thing’’.
HADDAD
94
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
Norberg-Schulz concluded by a discussion of
the ‘‘loss of place’’ in the contemporary world.
This is, in essence, the second thesis of the
book, and presents the underlying project of
Norberg-Schulz, which is similar to that of other
theorists who were preoccupied by the dis-
integrating urban condition around the world.
Here Norberg-Schulz presented a pragmatic
assessment of the problem, from the destruc-
tion of the ‘‘urban fabric’’ to the loss of character
and place. Yet once again, his conciliatory
approach left the issue unresolved, as he did
not take any firm stand regarding it. While the
illustrations accompanying this part showed the
Federal Center in Chicago by Mies van der
Rohe and the Green City by Le Corbusier as
examples of this deficient urbanism, the text
reads more like an apology for the Modern
Movement. The author saw this movement, in
fact, as an attempt to give form to a ‘‘new spirit’’,
which reflects a new genius loci, with the aim of
helping people ‘‘regain a true and meaningful
existence’’, even going as far as suggesting that
some of its early manifestations such as Neue
Sachlichkeit, effectively meant a ‘‘return back to
things’’.28 Accordingly, this return to things may
be observed in some of the masterpieces of
modern architecture, such as the Villa Savoye
and the Haus Tugendhat which, despite their
‘‘lack of substance and presence’’, satisfy modern
man’s search for freedom and identity. It is only
when moving to the urban dimension that
modern architecture fails to ‘‘gather’’ and to
create significant environments.29
In what amounts, then, to a confirmation of
the theses of his teacher Giedion, Norberg-
Schulz concluded that the underlying basis
of the Modern Movement was ‘‘profoundly
meaningful’’ and that only at the hands of
some imitators the movement had lost its
objectives. These objectives were again being
rediscovered in this second phase which
proposes to ‘‘give buildings and places indivi-
duality, with regard to space and character’’, as
manifested in the works of Aalto, the late
works of Le Corbusier, and most significantly in
the work of Kahn whose poetic descriptions
come close to Heidegger’s.30 A third genera-
tion of architects, composed of Utzon, Pietila,
Stirling and Bofill, appeared to him on the right
path towards an architecture that concretizes
this recovery of place.31
The Concept of Dwelling
The Concept of Dwelling constituted the third
part of Norberg-Schulz’s phenomenological
trilogy, still supported by a framework of
semiotic, behaviorist and other studies.32 In
this work, Norberg-Schulz directly addressed
the issue of ‘‘dwelling’’, a concept that was
singled out by Heidegger’s famous essay. Here,
surprisingly, the subtitle indicated a movement
towards ‘‘figurative architecture’’.33 In the fore-
word, the author announced the basic premise
of the book as the rediscovery of ‘‘dwelling’’ in
its comprehensive totality, leading towards a
final overcoming of functionalism and a return
to figurative architecture.34 The keynote to this
work is given by the Norwegian story of Knut,
a youngster who recognizes, through a sort
of spiritual revelation, his presence in the
forest as a fundamental aspect of his exis-
tence. Two illustrations, a Norwegian forest
and a farmhouse, accompany this introduction,
further evoking this idea of dwelling as a return
to the sources.35
The Concept of Dwelling was organized into a
structured study that proceeded from the
general outline to the development of the
concept, and again from the macro level of
the settlement to that of the individual
house, passing by the intermediary ‘‘modes’’
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
95
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
of dwelling, urban space and institution. These
four basic modes of dwelling are organized
through two ‘‘aspects’’: identification and
orientation. Mingled in the text are various
quotations from Heidegger, but also from
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, to give a phenom-
enological flavour to an otherwise structuralist
work that revives the same concepts derived
from Gestalt psychology, from Kevin Lynch, in
addition to references to the work of Mircea
Eliade on mythology. In focusing his attention
on laying down the foundations of an archi-
tectural ‘‘language’’, Norberg-Schulz in fact
returned to the earlier phase of his Intentions
in Architecture, coloured by his more recent
discovery of phenomenology. In this work,
the author re-examined the four categories of
dwelling under the structuralist template
of ‘‘morphology’’, ‘‘topology’’ and ‘‘typology’’,
which constituted the organizing structure that
was applied onto the dimension of ‘‘being’’:
Man’s being-in-the-world is structured,
and the structure is kept and visualized by
means of architecture.36
And further :
The meaning of a work of architecture
therefore consists in its gathering the
world in a general typical sense, in a local
particular sense, in a temporal historical
sense, and, finally, as something, that is as
the figural manifestation of a mode of
dwelling between earth and sky.37
Once again, the selection of ‘‘particular’’
examples of dwelling at the level of the
individual house is quite revealing of the
author’s selective interpretation. The first
example mentioned was the Hill House by
Mackintosh, lauded for its fulfilment of the
task of dwelling: to ‘‘reveal the world, not as
essence but as presence, that is as material and
colour, topography and vegetation, seasons,
weather and light’’.38 After the Hill House, the
author turned to vernacular architecture,
particularly to the types of dwelling common
in northern European countries, which were
mentioned by Heidegger (Fig. 3). In addition to
these, Gesellius, Lindgren and Saarinen’s Hvit-
trask complex (Fig. 4), Behrens’ house in
Darmstadt, Hoffmann’s Palais Stoclet and
Wright’s prairie houses, which share little in
common, were seen as good examples of this
interpretation of dwelling.
Yet this time, the critique of the ‘‘modern
house’’ was more explicit, and the author
recognized its failure to arrive at a satisfactory
solution to the problem of dwelling, for it
lacked the ‘‘figural quality’’; it did not look like a
house. Hence, what seems to be the problem
is simply the inability of the modern house to
look like a house, and not, as Heidegger had
alluded to, the inability of modern man to
dwell. Norberg-Schulz expressed here the
hope that the revival of this figural quality, as
evident in many post-modern projects, will
again make dwelling possible.39 Despite a
cautionary remark against the fall into eclecti-
cism, the book ends on an optimistic note that
this recovery of the figural quality would lead
to a recovery of dwelling, in which pheno-
menology would play a major role as the
catalyst for the rediscovery of the poetic
dimension in architecture.40
Conclusion
Despite its wide dissemination in architectural
circles during the 1980s, Norberg-Schulz’s
phenomenological interpretation received re-
latively little critical overview, apart from the
usual book reviews, most of which were
HADDAD
96
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
Figure 4. Hvittrask. Photo: Author.
Figure 3. Traditional House in southern Germany. Photo: Author.
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
97
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
generally positive.41 The strongest attack
against this interpretation of phenomenology
came indirectly from Massimo Cacciari,
who criticized the naıve interpretations of
Heidegger’s concept of dwelling.42 Cacciari, in
clear opposition to Norberg-Schulz, read in
Heidegger’s essay a recognition of the ‘‘impos-
sibility of dwelling’’, rather than a desire for a
nostalgic return to pre-modern conditions of
dwelling:
No nostalgia, then, in Heidegger—but
rather the contrary. He radicalizes the
discourse supporting any possible ‘‘nos-
talgic’’ attitude, lays bare its logic, pitilessly
emphasizes its insurmountable distance
from the actual condition.43
The difficulty of interpreting Heidegger’s later
writings has been raised by some critics. Hilde
Heynen, for instance, saw in these different
interpretations of Heidegger an opposition
between two ideological positions, utopian-
nostalgic and critical-radical, represented re-
spectively by Norberg-Schulz and Cacciari. In
this opposition, Heynen recognized the defi-
ciencies of both positions, the first for its
simplistic reduction of the problematic to a
question of architectural form, the second for
its assimilation of the condition of anxiety as a
generative principle.44
It is precisely this aspect that constitutes the
weakest point in Norberg-Schulz’s theoretical
proposition: his desire to translate phenomen-
ological discourse into a tool for the genera-
tion of architectural forms that recreate a
semblance of meaningful environments. In his
interpretation of Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz
did not go beyond the surface, satisfying
himself with the later works of Heidegger,
without attempting to answer some of the
problematic issues raised by its critics. Further-
more, phenomenology, in Norberg-Schulz’s
understanding, was continuously supported
by a structuralist framework, which puts into
question the very possibility of overcoming the
duality of mind/body as phenomenologists
claim, using this structuralist framework as a
pretext for one of two possibilities: a return to
vernacular architecture as an archetype for an
idealized dwelling on the one hand, or an
espousal of a ‘‘figurative’’ post-modernist
architecture as a second option. Even in his
last publication, Norberg-Schulz did not pro-
pose anything beyond a synthesis of these
various concepts from structuralism to phe-
nomenology into yet another work that
attempts to give a ‘‘comprehensive’’ account
of architecture from all periods and regions.45
Heidegger’s later reflections on art and
architecture—and the mythopoeic turn that
he took—may also be partly responsible for
this particular interpretation of phenomenol-
ogy, which was translated by some as a
nostalgic return to an ‘‘authentic dwelling’’
and, consequently, as a retreat to certain styles
or periods. The later developments in archi-
tecture and the various appropriations of the
‘‘figurative’’ have shown that the crisis of the
object, of which Tafuri had spoken, cannot be
simply resolved by such artificial measures. It is
questionable whether other phenomenological
interpretations would be more successful in
resolving the problematic condition of con-
temporary architecture, without addressing the
current conditions of its production. A phe-
nomenological approach, in the real sense of
the term, cannot be reduced to a formal
manipulation of specific parameters such as
tactility or vision.46 And despite the occasional
masterpieces which can bring forth intense
spatial experiences that distinguishes them
HADDAD
98
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
from ‘‘ordinary’’ productions, such as the work
of Peter Zumthor, it is questionable whether it
is possible to raise architecture as a whole to
this level of aesthetic resolution, within a
practice that continues to separate architecture
from its social and political dimensions, which
was the historic condition for the generation of
‘‘meaningful’’ environments.47
Notes
1. Dermot Moran, Introductionto Phenomenology, London/NY: Routledge, 2000, ch. 6.
2. Martin Heidegger, Being andTime, Harper, 2008; ‘‘TheOrigin of the Work of Art’’and ‘‘Building DwellingThinking’’ are included inthe collection of essays pub-lished as Poetry, Language,
Thought, Harper, 2001;‘‘The Question ConcerningTechnology’’ in The Question
Concerning Technology, and
Other Essays, Harper: 1982.
3. Moran, Introduction to Phe-
nomenology, p. 209.
4. Structuralism largely devel-oped out of linguistic stu-dies, the branch ofknowledge concerned withthe study of language itself.Initially, the main source ofinfluence was the Swisslinguist Ferdinand de Saus-sure, who left no work ofhis own, other than thecollected notes publishedby his students after hisdeath, as the General Course
on Linguistics, a work thatwas first translated to Eng-lish in 1959. Saussure in-itiated a major change inthe study of language, in-sisting on a synchronic ap-proach rather than theusual diachronic approachby looking at the structureof the language and its rulesof operation. He also pos-ited that language is a ‘con-
structed’ system, and notnaturally inherited or meta-physically inspired, thusopening the way for adeeper probe into the veryfoundations of this system,which directly affects theway we construct our real-ity and the world. Althoughin his collection of notes,the term ‘structure’ wasnever used by Saussure,but rather ‘system’, laterreaders of Saussure cameup with this terminologywhich became a standardbearer for other studies,and first among those, thework of Claude Levi-Straussin anthropology. For moreon this see Francois Dosse,Histoire du Structuralisme,Vol. 1, Paris: La Decouverte,1991; and John Sturrock,Structuralism, London: Black-well, 2003.
5. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Intentions in Architecture,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1965, pp. 21–22.
6. Norberg-Schulz, Intentions
in Architecture, pp. 101–102.
7. Peter Collins wrote a sharpcritique of this early workof Norberg-Schulz, warningagainst the dangers ofassimilating architecturewithin overwhelming ‘‘the-ories’’ of philosophical orlinguistic nature. See hisbook review of Intentions
in Architecture in the Journal
of Architectural Education,21, 3, 1967: 8–10.
8. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Existence, Space and Archi-
tecture, NY: Praeger, 1971,p. 7.
9. Otto F. Bollnow, author ofMensch und Raum, 1963 aswell as a number of workson German existential phi-losophy and hermeneutics,among others.
10. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,
Space and Architecture, p. 12.
11. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,
Space and Architecture, p. 21.
12. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,
Space and Architecture, p. 27.
13. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,
Space and Architecture, p. 31.
14. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,
Space and Architecture, p. 96.
15. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,
Space and Architecture,p. 114.
16. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Genius Loci: Towards a Phe-
nomenology of Architecture,New York: Rizzoli, 1980.The book was first pub-lished in Italian as Genius
Loci-paesaggio, ambiente, ar-
chitettura by Electa in 1979.It is interesting to note herethat the Italian subtitle dif-fers from the one chosen
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
99
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
for the English edition anddoes not include the refer-ence to Phenomenology.
17. Martin Heidegger, Poetry,
Language, Thought, NewYork: Harper & Row, 1971.
18. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 17.
19. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 18.
20. For a critique of Norberg-Schulz’s visual approach,see Jorge Otero-Pailos,‘‘Photo[historio]graphy: Chri-stian Norberg-Schulz’sDemotion of Textual His-tory’’, Journal of Society of
Architectural Historians, 66,2, 2007: 220–241. Otero-Pailos argues that theauthor created a newtype of history book, onewhich relies on images as an‘‘alternate narrative’’ whichwas paradoxically anti-historical, in that it avoidedcritical reflection by conceal-ing its own historical con-struction.
21. In this text, Heidegger re-ferred to the Greek templeas a major example of thesignificance and role of awork of art. Norberg-Schulz dedicated one ofhis essays to discuss thistext by Heidegger, pub-lished as Christian Norber-Schulz, ‘‘Heidegger’s Think-ing on Architecture’’, Per-
specta, 20, 1983: 61–80.
22. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 37.
23. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 40.
24. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 46.
25. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 47.
26. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 68–69.
27. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 71–73.
28. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 191–192.
29. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 194–195.
30. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 195–198.
31. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 198–200.
32. This work did not concludethe series on this topic, asthe author published an-other work, titled Architec-
ture: Presence, Language and
Place, which reiterated thesame themes discussed inthe previous books.
33. Christian Norberg-Schulz,The Concept of Dwelling: On
the Way to Figurative Archi-
tecture, New York: Rizzoli,1985. Again, the originalpublication came out firstin Italian, under Electa, oneyear prior.
34. In another essay titled ‘‘Onthe Way to Figurative Archi-tecture’’, Norberg-Schulzsheds further light on hisinterpretation of the ‘‘figura-tive’’, using this concept tosupport recent post-moder-nist projects by Venturi,Graves and Botta, amongothers. See ChristianNorberg-Schulz, ‘‘On theWay to Figurative Architec-ture’’, in Norberg-Schulz,Architecture: Meaning and
Place, New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1988, pp. 233–245.
35. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, pp. 9–12.
36. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 29.
37. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 30.
38. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 89.
39. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 110. Two draw-ings were used to illustratethe ‘‘figural quality’’: the firsta drawing by Louis Kahn,the second by MichaelGraves, titled ‘‘On theWay to Figurative Architec-ture’’, pp. 132, 134.
40. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 135.
41. See for instance: HarrisForusz, ‘‘Review of GeniusLoci’’, Journal of ArchitecturalEducation, 34, 3, 1981: 32;one of the critical reviewsof Norberg-Schulz is byLinda Krause, ‘‘Review ofArchitecture: Meaning andPlace’’, The Journal of the
Society of Architectural Histor-
ians, 50, 2, 1991: 197–199.Also, a critical yet cursorydiscussion of Norberg-Schulz’s concept of dwellingcan be found in DavidLeatherbarrow, Roots of
Architectural Invention, Cam-bridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1993.
42. Massimo Cacciari, ‘‘Eupali-nos or Architecture’’,Oppositions, 21, 1980: 106–116. This article was writ-ten as a review of Tafuri &Dal Co’s Architettura con-
temporanea, for the journalOppositions. Architettura con-
temporanea appeared in1976, and was translated
HADDAD
100
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012
as Modern Architecture in1979. Cacciari’s essay inOppositions coincided withNorberg-Schulz’s originalpublication of Genius Loci inItalian.
43. Cacciari, ‘‘Eupalinos or Ar-chitecture’’, p. 107.
44. Hilde Heynen, Architecture
and Modernity, Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1999.
45. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Architecture: Presence,
Language, Place, Milan: Skira,2000.
46. This appears to be the casefor instance of Steven Hollwho, despite the stimulatingexperiences that his archi-tecture creates, can not claimto resolve the contradictionsborn out of operating withina certain economic modethat determines a priori theconditions for experiencingand using these buildings.This reduction of phenom-enology to a ‘‘sensory’’ or‘‘embodied’’ experience ofspace is advocated for in-stance by Fred Rush in hisbook On Architecture, NewYork: Routledge, 2009.
47. Botond Bognar articulateda similar position in hisessay ‘‘Toward an Architec-ture of Critical Inquiry’’,Journal of Architectural Edu-
cation, 43, 1, 1989: 13–34in which he came to theconclusion that the recentphenomenological appro-aches in architecture arelegitimate in insisting on ameaningful dimension, yetthey lack the strategies forcritically evaluating thegiven social reality whichdetermines the realms ofintentionality and intersub-jectivity (p. 22).
ATR 15:1-10 CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT IN ARCHITECTURE
101
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
197.
27.4
0.47
] at
21:
40 0
1 M
ay 2
012