Chinese Turkestan.pdf

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PROCEEDINGS OF THEENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

HINESE TURKESTAN

MAJOR C. D. BRUCE

LONDONURAL ASIAN SOCIETY, \ ALBEMARLE STREET, W1907


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pvoceebtnos of tbe CentralHstan Society

CHINESE TURKESTANBY

MAJOR C. D. BRUCEREAD APRIL 24, 1907.


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SRLFURL

CHINESE TURKESTANGeneral Sir Thomas Holdich was in the chair, and in openingthe proceedings said : In the absence of your chairman, GeneralSir Edwin Collen, who has written to say how extremely sorryhe is not to be able to be present, I have the pleasant duty ofintroducing Major Bruce to you. Not very long since MajorBruce described his most interesting journey across China andTurkestan to the members of the Royal Geographical Society,and some of us may be familiar with his story from thegeographical point of view. But that story is still so full andinteresting from so many other points of view, that we cannotfail to derive further profit from what Major Bruce has to tell usto-day.

One of the chief characteristics of those who live inthis strenuous century is a distinct impatience with theolder nations of the world in that they are not moremodern. Whether we are watching the adoption of anyup-to-date constitution, as in Persia, by a nation whosepolitical organization has hardly changed in the courseof some 2,000 years, or the final disruption of a corruptand worthless bureaucracy, as in Russia, the uppermostthought in the mind of most onlookers is that thechange does not come as rapidly as they would desire.In the present day not many of these ancient andinteresting countries have been left to be studied, butamong them, itself a dependency of the hoariest amongnations, is Chinese Turkestan. It is of its present andpast condition that I propose to speak this afternoon, inhope that the long and close connexion Chinese Turkestanonce bore to India may cause some interest to be extended


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to a country in which angularly little has up to the lastI'i'w years been taken.Invariably known to the Chinese as the Hsing Chiang,or aew frontier, the name given to this area on Europeanmaps is a Bomewhal vague one. For present purposesthe genera] boundaries of Chinese Turkestan may bedefined tlm^

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t >n the south it is bordered by an almost impassablewall formed by the Kuen Lun mountains; on the northby the Tian Shan mountains and their eastern offshoots;on thewesl by the Alai mountains, the Kizil Art, and the

i Pamirs. On the east no natural boundary exists,but an artificial one is found in the main north-west roadleading from Peking to Kashgar, which here crosses the

it at its narrowest point from An-Si-Chou to Hanii.More interesting than the geographical boundaries are

the political areas which surround Chinese Turkestan.Throughout the greater part of* its length the frontier ofNorthern China marches with that of Russia. From theTugdambash Pamir for some 3,000 miles north and eastChinese territory is coterminous with that of its ever-

oding neighbour. In the south-west corner lies oneof the most debatable lands in Asia, what is commonlycalled the roof of the world, where three Empires meet.To the south lie Kashmirotherwise British IndiaandTibet, whose suzerain is China. On its eastern sideChinese Turkestan is physically open all round, butactually the only approach to it is through a thin stripof semi-cultivated territory in North-West Kansu.

< me of the main points to be studied in examining thefuture of any country, whether from the commercial,military, or administrative point of view, is that of itscommunications. The subject of roads cannot but lead

that of influ( d privilege. The area under dis-


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( )cussion is traversed by three main routestwo of majorand one of minor importance. All three start fromAn-Si-Chou, on the Kansu border, and run west to theRussian frontier. As far as Hami the two northerntracks have together formed the great north-west roadfrom Peking. At Hami, which town stands ten stagesdistance across the desert from An-si-Chou, they bifurcate.After dividing, the northern branch is known as theTian Shan Pei Lu, or north road. This runs from Hamivia Urumtsi, the capital of Chinese Turkestan, to Kuldja,close to the Russian frontier. Urumtsi is always knownto the Chinese as Hoong Miao Tzu, or the red temple,from the fact that there is a notable temple there.

Kuldja was well known in Europe at the time of theYakob Beg rising, being then occupied, as was the wholeof Hi, by Russian troops. On account of its geographicalsituation it may not improbably be heard of again, thoughwhether as once more containing a Russian garrison, oras one of the new defensive outposts of a regeneratedChina, time alone will show.The other branch of the two main routes is called the

Tian Shan Nan Lu, or south road. This runs west fromHami along the northern border of the central desertto Kashgar, passing through towns and oases of varyingimportance, the chief of which are Karasha, Aksu, andMaral Bashi.The third and little used of the main routes, after

quitting An-Si-Chou, runs south of the Takla-Makandesert along the lower spurs of the Kuen Lun mainrange, at a height of between 4,000 and 8,000 feet abovethe sea -level. This track also divides into two atCherchen, a well-to-do oasis 200 miles west of Lopnor.From Cherchen one branch runs direct through the desertto Kiria, and the other to the same town, but along the


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northern base of the Kuen Lun. After uniting at Kiria,these two tracks Lead od as one to Yarkand, Kashgar, andtin- Russian frontier.

So much for the Literal communications which traversethe ffsin Chiang, but we must not omit to notice thatthese three routes are also connected across the desertfrom north to south by lesser tracks. The most im-portant of these is a caravan track between Urumtsi andChakalik, which runs via Karasha and Koria down theTarim River past Lop Nor. The second cross communica-tion is maintained between Khotan and Ak-Su, where atrack follows the Khotan River in about twenty-threemarches to the latter place.

Having dealt with the interior routes traversingChinese Turkestan, a few words may be said of some ofthe most important roads which lead out or into thatcountry.

1. The first, though perhaps the least important,except to us as a nation, is that from India via Leh andthe rlarakoram Pass, by which most of the communicationand all Buch trade as there is passes to India. An alter-native route to this, but one seldom used, is that viaGilgit, Hunza, and Tashkurgen.

2. The second is the main road connecting Eastern, or( Ihinese, with Western, or Russian Turkestan, which fromKashgar follows the Kizil-Su over the Terek Pass acrosst he frontier to < teh.

3. The third is a caravan route from Ak-Su up theriver of the same name over the Tian Shan mountains,thence across the Russian frontier via Issikol to join thepresent post-road and future railway line at Pish Pek.

I. The fourth is a continuation west of the Tian Shannorth road, which leads up the Hi River over the Russian

tier on to the post-road between Vernoe and Kopal.


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( 7 )It may be of interest to state that in the course of ajourney through Central Asia made in 1902 I passedthrough Pish Pek and Vernoe. The country surroundingthe latter place is as rich an agricultural district as couldbe desired. No finer country for colonization exists thansome that will be traversed by the new Tash Kent-Omskrailway. Why, then, do we hear of new and extendedschemes for settling such inhospitable and far-awayregions as East Siberia or the Amur country ?

5. The fifth of the exterior main routes leading intoChinese Turkestan is in some ways the most important,for it connects Chakalik near Lop Nor with Lhasa. FromLhasa to Chakalik the journey can be made in two monthsby well-mounted travellers ; the usual time occupied bythe many pilgrims who pour that way is three months.Between Urumtsi, the capital of Chinese Turkestan,and Peking on the east, is a space of some 2,000 miles.Of this distance, at the present moment, not one mile islinked by rail, although it is hoped that Si-An-Fu inShensi may soon thus be connected with Peking. Thegreat highway connecting Chinese Turkestan with thecapital is throughout most of its length a mere track,which passes over a succession of rugged passes as high,in the case of the Wu-Shi-Ling, the best known, as10,000 feet. A road, in the European sense of theword, it is not. For hundreds of miles it is merely atrack, worn throughout twenty centuries by the wheelsof countless Chinese carts, untouched from year to year,unless rendered actually impassable owing to climaticdisturbances; such is the only communication unitingthis far dependency with Peking. To the west, Urumtsistands within 400 miles of the Russian border, withwhich it is connected, as already stated, by the TianShan north road. Beyond this frontier the lines of


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(hmk1.mii railway, made and in the making, which connectEuropean Russia with Chinese Turkestan, are too wellknown to require to be mentioned here.

Bavins endeavoured to indicate briefly the presentgeneral aspect of the communications which uniteChinese Turkestan with the outside world, let us nowturn to another connexion which has strong claims toyour attention.Among those who have devoted time to a study of

the area under review, it is well known how intimatelyconnected in the past Chinese Turkestan was withIndia. But by people less interested, this importantpoint is not. perhaps, fully realized. It is a matter of

rv that it was from our great Asiatic dependencythat the teaching of Buddha first entered China. Itwas also from the same direction that the early Grseko-Buddhist art, relics of which Dr. Stein has been chieflyInstrumental in disinterring, reached Chinese Turkestan:and we now also know, without any doubt, that it wasfrom Northern India that the western end of this areawas at one period colonized, and, in addition, received alanguage, a literature, and a script. The first reliableevidence of this latter was discovered by Colonel Bowerin 1 lis well-known find of birch-bark leaves in 1890, andBince that date Dr. Stein has largely increased the debt,owed to him by all students of Central Asian historyami archaeology, by other and even more valuablediscoveries.At what exact date intercommunication betweenChina and India first took place is still a debatablequestion. Chinese records place the event about 100yens B.O., when commercial relations with Shintu, orThian Chu, as India was first called by them, are onrecord.


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( )Sir Henry Yale, however, gives reason for supposing

that the Hindus knew the Chinas, as they were calledin the laws of Manu, as degenerate Kahatriyes centuriesbefore the date assigned by the Chinese themselves.Pauthier, in his edition of Marco Polo,' also says ' thatpeople from India passed into Shensi, the westernmostpart of China, more than 1,000 years before our era, andat that time founded a state named Tsin, the same wordas our China.'The story of the actual introduction of Buddhism into

the latter country is not without interest, for ChineseTurkestan was the channel through which it flowed.

In the reign of the Emperor Ming-Ti, one of theEastern Han dynasty, that potentate dreamed a dream.In his sleep, it is related, he imagined he saw a goldenfigure floating in a halo of light across the room. Unable,like Pharaoh, to conceive what meaning to place uponhis dream, Ming-Ti assembled his wise men and astro-logers, and from them invited suggestions as to its inter-pretation. Unpleasant as such a call upon their inventivefaculties must have been, it is probable that the wiseacreswere sufficiently in touch with the thoughts and hopesof their noble master to be able to assume with somecertainty what was expected of them. They hinted inreply that the figure seen by the Emperor was probablythat of Buddha, for with the new religion, it must beremembered, they were already familiar ; and the resultof their explanation was the despatch of a special envoyto India to investigate the truth. After a considerableperiod of absence the envoy returned, having obtainednot only the necessary sacred books, pictures, and imigriaof the new religion, but having also been fortunateenough to persuade some Indian priests to accompanythem to the home of their ruler. It was after this


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( io )manner thai a Faith as fine as any the world has knownwas introduced to China, a people and country by whom,for Dearly 2,000 years, it has since been neglected anddebased.

Alter having dwelt somewhal fully upon the intro-duction of Buddhism into China, the question maynaturally be asked, what effect this has had upon themoral well-being of the millions, who have at variousperiods professed its obligations. Ethically one of thepuresl and most elevated forms of religion the world hasknown it was at one time the state religion of China.That it may in its early time have answered the purposeof a moral force is probably true. That it does so nowI am afraid is not the case. In the present day it retainsno inward vitality, nor is it a religion any longer in thebroadest meaning of that word. Impossible, even im-pertinent, as it may seem to attempt to judge the hiddenforces which guide the conduct of an alien race, there isno room for such an imputation here. If religion meansanything, it moans some moral force by which men shapetheir daily conduct through life, one which is sufficientlystrong to enable the willing spirit to overcome the weakflesh. Can it be maintained that Buddhism in Chinastill retains this power? I fear not. Interesting as itmight be to follow the gradual decay of this almostdivine faith, it is altogether beyond the scope of thispaper.

Let us turn to more prosaic matters while I endeavourto offer you information of a lighter and more mundanekind.

Present -day administration in Chinese Turkestanvaries little from that in force in China proper, exceptthat for the head-men of villages, so great a factor inChinese rural organization. Begs and native heads of


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( 1' )tribes are substituted. Wise in their generation, theChinese are content to supervise and control, leaving totheir own chiefs the immediate supervision of the homelife of village communities and that of nomad tribes.As mentioned previously, the centre of administration isat Urumtsi, where the Fu-Tai, or governor, resides.Below the governor are three Tao-Tai intendents of

circuit, who are stationed at Kashgar, Aksu, and Kuldja.Lower again in the official scale come the Ambans,answering to district magistrates. Attached to all theseofficials are the army of clerks, interpreters, and func-tionaries always considered necessary to uphold thedignity of magisterial life in China.The above officials constitute that portion of the ad-

ministration which is in the hands of Chinese. Underthem again are the actual working heads in touch withthe people, and these are all natives of the dominion.The most important in rank are the Begs, heads of dis-tricts, for they are the responsible go-between where theadministration and the natives come in contest. Underthe Begs, where necessary, come the tribal head-men,such as the ming-bashis (heads of thousands), yuz-bashis(heads of hundreds), and on-bashis (heads of tens).

In addition to the civil officials, there are also militarycommandants of grades according to the size of thegarrison they command. Unlike those who serve inChina proper, who are rarely allowed to remain morethan three years in one place, both civil and militaryofficials have usually served most of their time in ChineseTurkestan. The civil magistrates appear to be drawnfrom no particular part of China. During the courseof our journey throughout the southern portion of thedominion we met men who by birth came from Honan,Hunan, and Hupeh.


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( W )Of intercourse, other than what is absolutely necessary,

I < -tween Chinese and native officials we found no trace.The former look with undisguised contempt upon thelatter, whom they invariably refer to contemptuously asChan-Toilturban-headed. The manner assumed by anAmban in speaking to his native entourage would, if usedby an Englishman to a native in India, be described atleast as ' unconciliatory 'by the native press probably infar stronger terms. The Ambans either did not, or pre-tended not to, understand a word of Turki. Consideringthat many of them had spent the greater portion of theirlives in the dominion, this can only be attributed to awilful desire to keep aloof from all intercourse with thesubject race. Judged by our own method of treating

tics, this must tend to weaken the central authorityby preventing mutual understanding. It is, however,open to argument whether such a method is not moresuited to subject Eastern races not highly developed.Tli ere would seem to be occasions in our own dealingswith Asiatics when we are prone to sacrifice the authoritywhile drawing no nearer to the mutual understanding.( Ine curious point in the Chinese administration ofEastern Turkestan is in the financial arrangements, whichprovide, in a far-off dependency, a regular monetarysystem, with coinage complete, while withholding anysuch system from China itself. The question of currencyin the latter country has long been calculated to drivethe would-be reformer to despair.It is unnecessary here to do more than remind youthat in the interior of China to-day there is no currentcoinage. The medium of all barter is the taela weightof silver, not a coin. For the masses, copper cash ofvarious degrees of debasement are coined by provincialin mts. These circulate within confined limits all over


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( 13 )China, but for trade purposes and for travellers lumps ofsolid silver are still necessary.

In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, the system is,comparatively speaking, modern, though not simple.They have there a common coin answering to the dollarof the China coast. This coin is the miskal, which cir-culates in one, two, or three miskal pieces. These havethe appearance of a clumsily made florin. Ten miskalare equal to about three shillings. Other monetaryterms are used, though there are no equivalent coins suchas the pung (equal to five copper Chinese cash) and thetengeh (eight of which go to one siir), which latter isalso worth about three shillings. Copper cash of Chinesepattern (ta-chien, or man-chien as they are called) andyamba (large silver shoes worth about 7 10s.) also cir-culatethe former among the poorer natives, the latteronly among the wealthy merchants.

It is no easy matter to state definitely the system oftaxation in any Eastern country, especially where Chineseadministration is in force. But the basis of the one inuse in Chinese Turkestan is that of a capitation tax, withcertain tithes upon produce.

I regret being unable to state the amount of the capi-tation tax with absolute exactitude, but such informationas could be obtained shows that it is levied in sumsvarying from fivepence to elevenpence per male headonly. With regard to the tithes, the following lumpsums were given me as specimen payment, and may beof interest although not tabulated.At Polu, a well-to-do village situated on the northern

slopes of the Kuen Lun mountains, 2,000 tengeh (about37) is paid per annum as a tax to the Chinese Ambanat Kiria. At Cherchen, the fairly rich oasis alreadyalluded to, 8,000 tengeh (about 150) is the annual land


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( 14 )tax chargeable to the revenue. In addition to this sum,an amount equal to 4,000 tangeh (75) is paid by theshepherds and nomads of the surroundinng district. Asif this were not enough, incredible as it may sound, thetownspeople are subjected to still another tax. I wasassured by various sellers in the bazaarthough undersolemn pledge of secrecy, for breaking which I ask theirpardonthat the Amban took for his own 'squeeze'two tengeh out of every ten tengeh worth of goods soldon market days in the bazaar. As this sum roughlyrepresents ninepence out of every four shillings, it isapparent that even an Amban must live, and that rightwelLThe military organization of Chinese Turkestan is

rather worse than that of most parts of China in thent day. Putting on one side the new foreign-drilled army nursed by the well-known Viceroy YuanShih Kai, in the vicinity of the capital, the remainder ofthe imperial forces scattered throughout the variousprovinces are still quite ineffective, that is, should theybe called upon to meet European troops.

In spite of what has been lately heard of the highpitch to which Yuan Shih Kai's troops have been trained,1 have no hesitation in saying that even they, unlessofficered by or mixed with Japanese troops, would makes poor show against good European soldiers.

From Kiria in Chinese Turkestan to Tai Yuan Fu inShansi province, 250 miles from Peking, altogether adistance of some 2,000 miles, including such towns asSu-Chou, Kanchou, Liangchou, and Lanchou, no soldierswere seen either in numbers, quality, or armament, thata single foreign brigade with field artillery could notaccount for. In Turkestan, such garrisons as there areoccupy either small forts in the vicinity of the town, or


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( 15 )the towns themselves. The latter are usually built onthe lines of a Chinese city with, in some cases, theaddition of a surrounding moat. The garrisons vary innominal number, from the 3,000 at Urumtsi to a fewscore at such places as Toksu, Koria, and the frontierpost of Tashkurgan towards the Pamirs. In actualnumbers they vary still more. At Kiria the Ambanhimself informed me that the garrison consisted of oneliang of infantry, 500 men, and some ma-ping, cavalry.No discourtesy to him is intended when I say that, afterbeing there three days, I do not think there were fiftymen all told.At Chakalik the same story was again repeated.

Putting the actual number of Chinese troops garrisoningEastern Turkestan at 8,000, it may be safely inferredthat barely 5,000 would be found present in an emergency.And of those 5,000 a medical inspection upon Europeanlines would suffice to case 50 per cent, for old age, opium-smoking, and other causes. Were Chinese official state-ments a,s to the number of troops present accepted asfacts, no doubt the garrison would be put at 15,000 or20,000 well-armed men. The troops who form thegarrisons are drawn chiefly from the provinces of Hunanand Hupeh. Spending, as they do, years in one place,the men eventually deteriorate even more than theirprovincial brethren-in-arms in China proper. Of localTurki troops there are none, nor would they make soldiersunder Chinese instruction.The internal political relations of Chinese Turkestan

are probably in as close touch with Peking as are thosein such provinces as the Kwangtung, Yungn, or Sze-Shuan. During the course of our journey a considerablenumber of officials were met with in the great north-westroad which traverses Kansu province. These were either


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( 16 )proceeding to or returning from Urumtsi. The telegraphline from Peking to Kashgar is the one outward sign ofimperial interest which Eastern Turkestan enjoys. It iskept in repair, well staffed, and in good working order.In addition to the telegraph, the imperial courier poststill survives. By it the transfer of information or

al orders is extraordinarily rapid. An imperialdespatch wrapped in the well-known yellow silk andtied round tlif waist of a succession of mounted courierswill reach Liangchou, in Kansu province, under nineteendavs from IN 'king. The time usually taken for the samejourney by well-equipped travellers is forty-three days.

'Jlic external political relations of the dependency areconfined, of geographical necessity, to two foreign powers.From the situation of Chinese Turkestan this will, in allprobability, always be the case. Of the two powers, itshould be apparent, even to Celestial obtuseness, thatfrom Russia there is everything to fear, from Englandnothing. Yet the closest scrutiny is necessary beforeany sign can be observed that this fact is realized.Before proceeding to discuss the present position of thesetwo powers in the area under notice, it may not be amissto glance for a moment at their importance as apparentto natives on the spot.The visible authority of Russia is for ever held promi-

nently before the eyes of the inhabitants, both in theposition occupied by the Consul-General at Kashgar, andby that of his colleague at Urumtsi. The very real localpower exercised by these two officials is made to appealto Asiatic notions of authority in its most practical formwhen requiredviz., that of force. On the other hand,the position occupied by the British representative at!\ ishgar is looked upon by those who are accustomed tocompare such details, where they never cease to be dis-


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( 17 )cussed, as inferior in every way. There may possibly besufficient reasons for the continuation of this state ofaffairs, but they are not apparent to the man on thespot. However good they may seem to be at a distance,few who have travelled in Chinese Turkestan, or whopossess even an elementary acquaintance with Asiaticmethods of thought, will agree with them.Though no direct reference has hitherto been made to

the neglect on the part of China to safeguard her mostdistant colony, the fact cannot be overlooked in anyallusions to Chinese Turkestan.

There are two reasons which suggest themselves forthe apparent apathy of the Imperial Government. Thefirst is, that it is aware of the hopeless nature of the taskshould it endeavour to take the necessary precautions ;the second, and probably the true one, that it is tooapathetic, and having been accustomed for so long aperiod to trust to the forbearance of its neighbours, willnot now arouse itself. It may also be that the retro-cession of the Hi province in 1882, after its temporaryoccupation by Hussian troops, may have helped to lullChinese suspicions. Be the reason what it may, thereis no slight chance that the future will bring forth arude awakening. It is acknowledged that Russia holdsChinese Turkestan in the hollow of her hand, and, withno intention whatever to suggest immediate or evenlikely action on the part of those who guide the Asiaticpolicy of that nation, it may be of interest to indicatefuture possibilities.

In the event of such action being taken as the absorp-tion of Chinese Turkestan, it is probable that Russiamight be content merely to overawe at first Kashgariaand Hi. The former territory was still considered as be-longing to the Kokhandian Khanate after the Russian


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( 1* )conquest of Kokhand in 1864. The Mohamedans theredid, in fact, pay tribute amounting to some thousands ofpounds B year, and such a gradual advance would bemore in keeping with traditional Russian policy. Theaim of those answerable for that policy has always beento secure as far as possible the toleration of theMohamedan element in previous Central Asian con-quests, for, as they are well aware, in the feelings enter-tained i'


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( 19 )Russian party in Tibet would probably have been fol-lowed at no remote date by the proclamation of a Russianprotectorate over Chinese Turkestan. In whatever formRussian interests were expressed, the results would havebeen most serious to ourselves, even though no openattempt was made to enter Tibet. In drawing attentionthis afternoon to some of the more interesting questionsconnected with the future of the area under discussion,no attempt is made to suggest novelty. None of thequestions are new, all have been possibilities ever sinceKokhand was absorbed by Russia over thirty years ago,but there has been a perhaps unconscious neglect ofChinese Turkestan as a factor in Central Asian politics.Events which have happened during the last few yearsin the Far East have recast most of the political problemswhich they affect, and it behoves those interested toreconsider their own judgment and opinion in the lightof the entirely new perspective through which theseproblems must be viewed.

There is one point which cannot be too strongly in-sisted upon when one remembers very recent eventsboth in Manchuria and Tibet, and that is, the dangerof reckoning upon either the intention or ability ofthe present Chinese Government to carry out its under-takings.

Recent utterances, both in the press and verbally toImperial Chinese edicts, are calculated to inspire con-fidence that at last the Golden Age has come, and thatChina has arrived at the point when she may be left aloneto safeguard her own and foreign interests both at homeand abroad.

Nothing could be more opposed to facts, and unlessdue precautions are taken to safeguard the interestsof individual nations, instead of trusting to Chinese


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( *> )authority to do so, we, for one, may find ourselvesBeverely handicapped when the occasion for action sud-denly arises.

In conclusion, I would like to lay before you twopoints of view bearing, though indirectly, on the futureof Chinese Turkestan. Concerning neither will I offermy opinion ; at the same time, both are worthy of earnestconsideration.Now the first point of view. There are to-day distinct

signs that a more hopeful era is about to dawn in Asia,heralded, perhaps, by an Anglo-Russian entente. Fewpolitical movements would be more welcome to thoseinterested in the East, but we may not forget thatinternational agreements, though a sign of mutual good-will, are not binding for all time. And now for the headpoint of view.

In defending the increased military expenditure inIndia as late as March, 1906, the present Viceroy madethe following remarks in answer to protests by a memberof his Council against any increased expenditure. Thismember was a well-known native gentleman. ' I amafraid,' said the Viceroy, ' that I cannot follow the hon.member in his conclusion that these dangersour Asiaticdifferences with Russia and the dismemberment of Chinahave disappeared for ever. He has told me that thetide of European aggression in China has been rolledback for good, that the power of Russia has been broken,and that her prestige in Asia has gone.

' I am afraid these are mere assumptions, which I canhardly accept. I am afraid I feel more impelled to con-Bider what effect the Russian reverses may have on thepride of a high-spirited race, and I wonder in how longor how short a time she may feel confident of recoveringher lost prestige.'


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( 21 )

DISCUSSIONGeneral Sir Thomas Holdich said : In listening to this veryinteresting paper, one cannot but be struck by the great varietyof points which Major Bruce has opened up for discussiontoomany, almost, to be dealt with on a single afternoon. I am notquite sure from his paper what his estimate of the capabilities ofthe Chinese soldier may really be. I do not think there is anyquestion affecting Eastern military power which has had suchvariety of opinions expressed about it as this. So far as historycan enlighten us, the Chinese soldier has certainly distinguishedhimself in a very remarkable way. It is not so very long agothat in this room I had an opportunity of calling your attentionto the fact that at one time a Chinese army of invasion passedfrom China into Tibet, and after encountering almost incredibleobstacles in the way of high mountain passes, every one of themhigher than Mont Blanc, they finally met and defeated a largeGurka force sent against them, and they left such a record ofuprisal behind them that the lesson is not forgotten in Nepal tothis day. That was a remarkable performance ; indeed, I donot know any in history, not even Napoleon's crossing the Alpsor San Martin's crossing of the Andes in South America, soremarkable from the point of view of the physical obstaclesovercome. That the Chinese can fight under certain conditionsthere can be no doubt whatever, and they have succeeded inimpressing this fact on the populations of Chinese Turkestanand of Tibet. For, as Major Bruce has explained to us, theamount of force at the disposal of the authorities of Turkestanis extremely smallmuch smaller than the officials admit. Amere handful of soldiersnot more, perhaps, than 4,000hasalways succeeded in maintaining Chinese authority over that


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( 2S )huge area. We have never heard of any serious difficultiesencountered in this task. This is a good deal owing, no doubt,to the system of administration which the Chinese maintain.They leave the people almost entirely to themselves in localadministration, merely exercising control in matters which weshould describe as Imperial.

There must be remarkable power in a people which hassucceeded in impressing itself and leaving its mark over such ahuge extent of country as the Chinese dependencies ; and I thinkthat in the problems likely to arise in the future relative tosupremacy in the East, China is a factor which cannot possiblybe left out of account. What the effect of the Japanese influencemay be upon China we cannot possibly tell ; but of this I feelquite sure, that the recent war between Russia and Japan and itsresults constitute a distinct challenge to the West. It is arecurrence of an old historic challenge. Whatever way wechoose to look at it, the glove has again been thrown down.I cannot help thinking that in the future it will really not be somuch a question, as in the past, of Western nations fighting forEuropean supremacy on Asiatic fields, but of Asiatics fightingfor supremacy on their own fields. At present we hold theposition of directors of military strategy in the East. We havea fine army in India composed of men of all shades of Easternreligious opinion, and I believe that army to be thoroughly loyaland devoted. It is entirely under English leading, and you maysay that it is only under such leading, that the strength of thatforce can be maintained and developed. But will this state ofthings last ? We have seen an Asiatic force directed by Asiaticminds prevailing in a most remarkable way against anotherAsiatic forcefor we cannot call the Russian forces anythingelse than Asiaticdirected by European minds. So that wehave now to consider, not so much what lies between ourselvesand Russia as another European nation, but what lies before thetwo nations combined in balancing the Great Powers of the East.

This leads up to what I am convinced is comingan Anglo-Russian agreement, probably founded on some sound commercialbasis which shall be of equal advantage to both countries. Thiswill mark a new political position in the East ; and, lookingbeyond that, again, I think we shall find in years to come thatsuch an agreement will become a political necessity.

I have heard more than once the opinion to which Major


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( 28 )Bruce has given expression as to the general weakness of ourrepresentation in Chinese Turkestan. Mr. Macartney, our agentthere, whom I know very well, ranks simply as an assistant toour Resident in Kashmir, which is not a very prominentposition to hold. (Dr. Cotterell Tupp : He is made consulnow.) If that is so, it is a distinct step in advance. But I wasimpressed, during the period I was on the borders of ChineseTurkestan during the delimitation of the Pamir Boundary, withthe deference always accorded to Russian authority in ChineseTurkestan. If the problem is to be regarded as a military one,we cannot forget that the ichole of Turkestan, Afghan as well asChinese, is, in Major Bruce's phrase, in the hollow of Russia'shand. Under such conditions it is not likely that we shallsucceed in altering native views on the subject of the relativeimportance of Russia and England, except by such a strongmilitary demonstration as is beyond the intention, if not, indeed,the power, of the Government of India to make in such remotecountries. As I said before, there are so many questions, allmore or less speculative, arising out of an examination of thepolitical status of Chinese Turkestan that it will be interestingto hear the views of others who may have a better acquaintancewith the subject than myself.Colonel E. St. C. Pemberton, R.E., said: It is fifteen years

since I was in Chinese Turkestan, and I do not, therefore, feelqualified to express an opinion in regard to present-day con-ditions there ; but there is a point of some interest which hasbeen referred to incidentally by the lecturer, the possibility ofRussian colonization in Central Asia.

Now, the Russian advance into Central Asia, as is known, wasin earlier times by way of Western Siberia, their border beinggradually pushed southwards from Omsk to the line of theIrtish, on which river a frontier post came into existence, whichby degrees grew into the Russian town of Semipalatinsk. Thiswas for many years the southern limit of Russian dominion inthis direction, and I have on more than one occasion heardRussians express regret at the circumstance that climaticconditions seem to preclude European settlement of the regionssituated to the south of the Irtish.

Of course, one knows there are European children in RussianTurkestan, and it is probable that those who live in the elevatedregions in Semirechensk and Ferghana thrive well. All the


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( 24 )same, Russian colonization on any extended scale in RussianCentral Asia would seem to be unlikely owing to climaticconditions. And in regard to Chinese Turkestan, I think weare all agreed that in the event of its conquest by Russia, itcould not become an integral portion of the Empire in the senseof being peopled by the Russians themselves.

Major Bruce has referred to the small number of Chinesetroops in Turkestan, a circumstance which I, too, noticed whentravelling through in 1892. Their military weakness in theW estero portion of their Empire is, indeed, a matter of history.As is well known, they failed utterly in 1865 to cope with therebellion of the Tarantchis and the Dungans in the province ofKuMja, which was occupied by the Russians in consequence, andheld by them for twelve years. And did not Yakub Beg turnthem out of Kashgar, defying during his lifetime their efforts toreconquer it ?Whether in the future the Chinese will be able to strengthen

their position in the West of their Empire must depend upon thedegree to which they as a people become regenerated in spirit.If there is real regeneration, the morals of their soldiers will bemuch higher than it is to-day, and organization, training, disci-pline will follow.But even granting this, one must remember how poor are the

lines of communication between the heart of the Chinese Empireand its distant Western provinces, traversing, as they do, vastsands, deserts without railways or waterways. Certainly it istrue that at the present time no power confronting Russia inthese parts in support of China could look to receive effectivemilitary support from the Chinese.

Mi:. David Fraser : Having recently been in Chinese Turke-stan, I can bear out what Major Bruce has said as to the smallnumber of Chinese troops and officials who hold this largecountry in subjection. This is one of the most noticeable thingsin travelling through the country, and Sir Thomas Holdich hasalso rightly referred to this feature in relation to Tibet. ARussian traveller has stated that there are two divisions of Chinesetroops in Turkestan stationed at various places. So far fromthere being 20,000 men, however, I believe there are not morethan 2,000, spread over some twenty different detachments. AtKoran, according to this Russian writer, there should be300 infantry and 200 cavalry. I called on the Chinese military


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( 25 )Amban there, who holds rank equivalent to that of general. Hokindly asked me to breakfast and to a review of his troops. Onthe parade-ground, instead of 500 men, there were not morethan fifty, and I am quite sure a good number of these hadbeen scraped out of the bazaar for the occasion (Laughter).There were five officers, and when I wanted to photograph theforce, the only way in which they were capable of parading themen for the purpose was in two lines facing each other. Inorder to take the photograph I had to instruct them where andhow to stand (Laughter). I was interested to hear from thegeneral that he had recently received a large consignment ofMauser rifles for the re-armament of his men. I imagined thatthis was in accordance with the recent decision to arm theChinese forces throughout with a new Mauser rifle of very smallbore, so I asked to see the new rifles, and on their being broughtout for my inspection, I found I could get my thumb down thebarrel of any one of them, which does not say much for theirvalue.Major Bruce has discussed the possibility of Eussia making an

extension of her borders into Chinese Turkestan. "Well, afterseeing the country and its defenceless state, I cannot but agreethat whenever Eussia chooses to make an advance in thatdirection the Chinese will be powerless to stop her. But thereis, in my opinion, a reason which will operate to prevent a moveof this kind on Eussia's part, and that is the small economicvalue of the country. Its area is very immense, and the onlypopulated parts are those where cultivation is possible. Culti-vation is confined to a series of oases lying at the foot of themountainous regions which Major Bruce has described asbounding the country. These cultivated areas seem to me tobe of such small dimensions and their productive capacity solimited, that I do not believe they are worth annexing in viewof the small margin of surplus commodity available for export.From an economic point of view, then, it is hardly probable thatEussia covets possession of Chinese Turkestan. If she ever doesadvance in this direction it will be for strategic reasons, thoughit is difficult to see how it would profit her to approach moreclosely to the Tibetan and Kashmir borders. But experiencehas proved to Eussia how timid is the British Government inregard to operations in Central Asia, and the annexation ofKashgaria would certainly prove an excellent political weapon.


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( 26 )It would 1)0 interesting to know if the powers that haveguaranteed the integrity of the Chinese Empire regard EasternTurkestan as within the scope of their guarantee.With regard to the British Agent at Kashgar, he lahours underthe ponderous title of ' Special Assistant to the Resident inKashmir for Chinese Affairs.' Every time he signs his namethis long sentence has to appear after it, and every time hereceives a letter he has to be so designated. Not long ago hewas gazetted consul, but the Chinese declined to recognize theright of the British Government to gazette a consul to any placein the Chinese dominions which is not an open port by treaty.So Mr. Macartney's position is not officially recognized, and hemay he said to be in Kashgar on sufferance. But it is a remark-able thing that the influence he wields with the Chinese is prob-ably greater than that of the Russian consul. As is well known,he is a son of the late Sir Halliday Macartney, who was one ofthe ablest and most faithful servants the Chinese Government( 7er had, and he is also a descendant of that Lord Macartneywho was the first British Ambassador to the Court of Peking.Mr. Macartney has been in Kashgar for fifteen years, and he ishold in the greatest respect by the Chinese. If it came to adiplomatic tussle in Kashgar, I think most people who know theposition would put their money on the British agent rather thanon the Russian. (Cheers.)Mr. C. Black : As so much has been said respecting Mr.

Macartney, I should like to call attention to his views on one ofthe subjects mentioned by the last speakerthat of the economicvalue of Chinese Turkestan. These views were set forth in avaluable trade report. "While not depicting the country as arich one, Mr. Macartney considers that the opportunities oftrade between us and Kashgar are worth appropriating. Iremember that thirty years ago a great deal of attention wasdrawn to the subject of trade, and a mission to Kashgar wassent under Mr. Forsyth. A treaty followed, but with the fall ofYakub Beg the treaty fell through. I think that if the IndianGovernment devoted rather more attention to the subject oftrade routes, and to explorations of alternative routes, it mightgive opportunities for increased trade, and, generally speaking,for better understanding between the two peoples.

Sir Thomas Holdich : I would ask you to thank Major Brucefor his valuable paper. (Cheers.) I regret that some members


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( 27 )are absent to-day who might have added considerably to theinterest of the discussion. Still, I think we have heard a greatdeal this afternoon which is of considerable interest, not only toourselves, but also to the country at large.Major Bruce having acknowledged the vote of thanks, the

proceedings terminated.

bll.LlNO AND SONS, LTD., PRIKTBB8, GUILDFORD


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