Chinese state in crisis 1966.

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Chinese state in crisis 1966. By Daniela & Lucia.

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Chinese state in crisis 1966. By Daniela & Lucia. Towards the confrontaition. Tensions between Mao and some of the party members were growing. Mao became frustrated by his inability to bend bureaucracy to his will. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Chinese state in crisis 1966.

Page 1: Chinese state in crisis  1966.

Chinese state in crisis 1966.

By Daniela & Lucia.

Page 2: Chinese state in crisis  1966.

Towards the confrontaition.

Tensions between Mao and some of the party members were growing.

Mao became frustrated by his inability to bend bureaucracy to his will.

Maos proposals of changing the post-GLF policies were not really taken into account.

Many senior leaders continued to support the post-GLF policies ad were reluctant to alter them.

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Mao’s conclusion to this…

DANGER OF REVISIONISM!!!!

He started to think that revisionism was happening among some party members.

He tried to overcome this by launching campains.

When that didn’t work he thought that arousing the masses from below into a Cultural Revolution could ovrcome this.

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Mao’s power base.

By 1964 the basis began to be created for an assault on the Party establishment.

This base was going to be made of three important elements:

1.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

2.The radical intellectuals.

3.The masses.

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The PLA.Lin Biao had devoted particular attention to reviving political work in the military apparatus.

The sucessful performance of te PLA in the 60s let to Mao to identify the Pla as a model for civilian bureaucracies to follow.

Political departments based on those of the PLA were form within the government bureaucracy.

This gave Lin Biao more influence over civilians afairs.

February 1966 a conference on cultural matters was held having a great impact on civilian culture circles.

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The intellectuals.

The person assembling these propagandists and writer was Mao’s wife, Jian Qing.

She developed contacts with two main groups the frist one she contacted with the help of Chen Boda, included: Guan Feng, Qi Benyu, and Lin Jie.

The second one contacted with the help of Ke Qingshi which included: Zhang Chunqiao (director fo the bureau), and Yao Wenyuan.

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As the confrotation between Mao and the Party establishment grew, the radical intellectuals turned to more political themes.

Their power would increase as Mao found that theri skills at propaganda were a useful tol in his assault.

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The masses.This was conform by China’s youth especially students from highschool and college.

They formed the Red Guard movement.

The educational policies in the 1960s produced srious divisions among students.

By the eve of the Cultural Revolution what became more important for student’s ernollments was the class backround and political behaviour.

When the Cultural Revolution broke the collective resentments as well as individual divisions formed the emotional fuel for the Red Guard movement.

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Luo Ruiqing.He was Lin Biao’s Principal rival.

Minister of public sequirity

Because on Lin’s illnes Luo always expected to become the minister of defense.

Luo and Lin Biao started to have problems which led the Central Commitie to carry an investigation.

After Luo’s self-criticism was rejected he tried unsuccessfully to kill himself.

And and he was dismissed from the Party.

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WU HAN & PENG ZHENMao turned to problem of dissent amongst intellectuals

Hai Rui dismissed from office – by Wu Han (deputy mayor of Beijing)

Depicting unjust dismissal during Ming dynasty… it’s totally criticizing the purge of Peng Dehuai!!

Two-pronged approach1.- Assigned problem to Five-Man Group

Difficult position of responsibility for PengHe focused on historical issues, not allegorical content

2.- Yao Wenyuan (Jiang Qing )to prepare criticism too

5MG: 1964 – oversee beginnings of CR. Headed by Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen.

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WHAT HAPPENED?Peng Zhen & Party Propaganda Department

February Outline – ‘Reason by seeking truth from fact’

Radicals (Yao Wenyuan, Jing Qing, Lin Biao)Article against Wu HanForum Summary

Cultural life in shambles, class struggle, attacked leadership

Meeting of Party Secretariat 9-12 of April 1966Peng attacked by Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, even Deng Xiapoing and Zhou Enlai5MG disbanded, establishment of new cultural group…Liu Shaoqi away

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THE MAY POLITBURO MEETING

4-18 of May 1966

1. To decide fate of Luo Ruiqing and Peng Zhen

2. Impromptu speech by Lin Biao1. Lin Biao accused them of a conspiracy of a

military coup

2. Fascinated with military in politics

3. Sycophantic portrayal of Mao

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THE RESULTS

May circularRevoked the February OutlineBlamed Peng Zhen, dissolved 5MG & created new group to answer solely to Mao

Cultural issues AND party members (purge of revisionism)

Reorganization of Beijing Municipal Party Committee, Party Propaganda Department, and Party Secretariat

Mao determined to have his wayMao supporters – strengthened purge against revisionism

Cultural Revolution Group (CRG):•Headed by Chen Boda, advised by Kang Sheng, membership by Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Qi Benyu, Wang Li & Guan Feng.

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THE FIFTY DAYS SITUATION

Mao left conduct of efforts on Liu ShaoqiMao SUSPICIOUS of him (revisionist, people of the Khrushchev brand)

Liu in serious dilemma! (June 1966)Have to be on Mao’s side, but…Still had to preserve control

Radical students and teachers began to mobilizeDazibao (wall poster at Peking University) criticizing UniversityMao opposed decision to suppress this, leadership changedLegitimized spontaneous mass protest

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THE FITY DAYSInflammatory editorials in China’s Daily

Dazibao began to appear everywhere. Educational + revisionist issues. Encouraged by CRG

Authority on campuses collapsed, discipline eroded, CHAOS

Liu Shaoqi concerned!Suspension of uni enrollment – reconsideration of examination system and curriculum

Work teams! 400 teams, 10,000 members… totally not controversial

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MORE FIFTY DAYSLiu’s undoing came from INSTRUCTIONS of teams

Told to criticize bureaucratic officials and facultyMinistry of finance 90% criticized, Ministry of Culture, 2/3 of officials dismissedUniversity administration and faculty attacked! TERROR

Told to re-establish party leadership over student movement

Demobilization of radical studentsExtremes: no rallies or dazibao, expulsions from Youth League and labor reform.

Normality semi-restored, but… polarized remaining activists

Secret organizations “Red Guards” opposed work teams

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MORE THE FIFTY DAYSSuppression of radicals became controversial

July 1966: case of Kuai Dafu (Qinghua University) – subject of meeting

Leading radical students. Liu Shaoqi accused him as a troublemaker

Kang Sheng defended right to criticize revisionism in Party

LINKED: Kang & CRG connected to most activists, and Liu’s wife leader of work team!

Mao Zedong saw repeated mistakes from Socialist Education Campaign in 1960s

Work teams again

Again, lower-level officials attacked and mass mobilization restricted. No recognition of revisionism

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BEFORE THE ELEVENTH PLENUM

Mao came back from Hangzhou… but stopped for a swim at the Yangtze river! – New China News Agency propaganda

Mao demanded withdrawal of work teams

Work teams immediately replaced by “Cultural Revolution small groups elected by teachers, students and staff at each school”

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THE ELEVENTH PLENUM

August 1966

1. Personal matters: Promotion of Mao’s supporters and demotion of those who resisted or misread him

2. Policy matters: Plenum endorsed Mao’s position in ALL issues of 1960s (10 points, 23 articles)

3. Cultural Revolution: 16 Point Decision1. To struggle & overthrow capitalist authorities, to

repudiate and criticize bourgeois academics, and to transform education, literature and art to correspond with communism. “To change the mental outlook of the whole of society”

2. Mobilization of the masses

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THE RESULTSPersonal matters1. Liu Shaoqi stripped from vice-chairmanship

and demoted from 2nd to 8th Party hierarchy2. Replaced by Lin Biao

Cultural Revolution’s 16 PointsHighly ambiguous on degree of disorder toleratedProhibited reprisals against students(Zhou Enlai): Prohibited use of coercion and forceAttempted to ‘control’ CR

Mao’s dazibaoOutside of meeting roomAccusation to ‘some leading comrades’ AKA Liu and Deng

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THE SIGNIFICANCE

1. Legitimized a broad attack against the Party and the intellectual community at the personal initiative of Mao Zedong

2. This entailed a high degree of mass mobilization and an intense degree of political struggle