Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysian-Transnationalism and Transforming Diaspora

73
Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysians: Transnationalism and Transforming Diaspora by CARMEN LAI GARY W. MCDONOGH, Thesis Advisor MICHAEL H. ALLEN, Major Advisor A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in International Studies BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, BRYN MAWR, PA

Transcript of Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysian-Transnationalism and Transforming Diaspora

Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysians: Transnationalism and Transforming Diaspora

by

CARMEN LAI

GARY W. MCDONOGH, Thesis Advisor

MICHAEL H. ALLEN, Major Advisor

 

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the

Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors

in International Studies

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE,

BRYN MAWR, PA

  2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am highly indebted to Prof. Gary W. McDonogh for his guidance and constant supervision

as well as providing necessary information regarding the project. I really appreciate his patience.

Thank you so much. It has been a challenging yet rewarding journey. I would also like to take

this opportunity to thank both Prof. Michael Allen and Prof. Kalala Ngalamulume for their

constant support, encouragement and attention. My completion of this project could not have

been accomplished without the support of my classmates and friends. Finally, my heartfelt

thanks to my caring, loving, and supportive parents.

  3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Aims and Objectives 5

Significance of the Project: A Meaningful Exploration 6

Methodology 7

Question/Hypothesis 8-9

Critical Contemporary Theories 10-11

II. CHAPTER TWO: CHINESE OUTMIGRATION FROM A WEAK CHINA Conditions of Arrival in Cuba: the Coolie Trade 12-16

History of Chinese Immigration in Malaysia 16-20

III. CHAPTER THREE: GROWTH OF CHINESE COMMUNITIES UNDER

COLONIAL RULE IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY

A. Cuba

Chinese Cubans Move to the City 21

Commercial Success and Place 21-22

Chinese as Rebels 22-23

B. Malaysia

Chinese Rise in Economic Power 23-26

Chinese Political Power 27

IV. CHAPTER FOUR: CRISES AND RESPONSES AT THE END OF COLONIALISM

A. Cuba

Chinese and Chinatown in the 20th Century: Neo-Colonial Cuba 28-31

The Cuban Revolution and Changing China 31-32

Expropriation and Departure: Chinese Cubans in the U.S 32-33

B. Malaysia

Chinese Problems in Colonial Malaya 33-34

  4

The Birth of Singapore and Affirmative Action 34-38

Chinese Malaysians Departure to Singapore and Australia 38-40

Chinese Malaysians and Chinatown in the 20th Century 40-41

V. CHAPTER SIX: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PATTERS OF ACCULTURATION AND RESISTANCE

1. Marriage and Family 42-45

2. Education and Language 45-51

3. Food 52-56

CHAPTER SEVEN Chinese in Malaysia and Chinatown in the 20th Century

VI. CHAPTER SEVEN: CUBAN AND MALAYSIAN CHINESE AND A NEW CHINA

A. Cuba

China and Cuba Relations: Transnational Connections 56-62

B. Malaysia

Malaysian Chinese and New China 62-63

CONCLUSION 63-64

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX

A- Front Page of the Map

B- Map of South China and Ports of Origin

C- Map of Havana’s Chinatown

  5

INTRODUCTION

Aims and Objectives

This project aims to carry out a comparative study of both Chinese Cubans and Chinese

Malaysians, as agents adapting to different economic, political, social and cultural regimes

under colonial rule and later on post-colonial nationalism. This comparative perspective

engages the study of ethnicity and identities of Chinese overseas. The project will use Adam

M. McKeown’s Melancholy Order (2008) as a general framework. According to

McKeown, “globalization is a time-based process” and “race and its role in ordering the

world is the crucial context for understanding both migration policy and its enforcement in

the nineteenth century” This statement matters because it poses the significant relationships

among time, space and identity in the study of Chinese diaspora.

This project also has personal and emotional significance since I am a 4th generation

Chinese Malaysia. It would be interesting to imagine how my life would be like if my

grandparents decided to leave China and head to Cuba instead of Malaysia; this is not an

idle counterfactual so much as a real possibility that underscores the complex choices of

diasporic movement. In addition, through the BMC 360 I was able to match readings with

interviews conducted in Cuba mostly around El Barrio Chino. My analysis will focus on

focus on three comparative features economic, political and cultural identity. Through this

analysis, I hope to examine the future identity and community of Chinese Malaysians and

Chinese and to what extent China has an impact on this process.

  6

Significance of Project: A Meaningful Exploration

The history of the Chinese diaspora has become ever more critical for scholars of China

and East Asia and more generally, as well as those who have long specialized in migration

and diaspora studies.1 This project incorporates an interdisciplinary approach to issues of

migration and diaspora, providing historical depth as well as perspectives from

anthropology, politics and postcolonial studies. Cuba and Malaysia are both interesting case

studies that offer a comparative perspective on the anthropological study of Chinese

overseas. This is significant for scholars wishing to understand cultural transformation from

a global perspective. It is evident that the study of Chinese overseas can contribute to our

understanding of theories on ethnicity and identity as well as ethnic relations.2

The study of Chinese diaspora provides a compelling opportunity for the cultural study

of social adaption and cultural reproduction as well as ethnicity and identity. Chinese

communities worldwide may be studied in an ethnological field that can be called the

Chinese ethnological field. According to Tan, who is a distinguish professor at the

Department of Anthropology, Sun Yat Sen University “as long as the Chinese migrants and

their descendants see themselves as Chinese, albeit differently, there is a basis for

comparison on issues relating to cultural reproduction, ethnicity and identity”.3 It is

important to recognize how the Chinese have changed culturally as they adapt to different

economic, political and cultural regimes under colonial rule and later on post-colonial

nationalities.

                                                                                                                         1 Field, Robin E., and Parmita Kapadia. Transforming Diaspora: Communities beyond National Boundaries. 2 Ibid. 3 Tan, Chee Beng. "Acculturation, Ethnicity and Ethnic Chinese." Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004. 2. Print.  

  7

Methodology

The project incorporated a thorough review of history using the work such as Chinese

Cubans: A Transnational History by Kathleen López and The Coolie Speaks: Chinese

Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba (2008). The history of the waves of

Chinese emigration reflect the many gradual changes across the South Pacific and Southeast

Asia over the nineteenth century shaped by the expansion of capitalism, nationalism and

modernist ideologies.4 This matters because Chinese workers colonies create decent early

economic emigrants exploitable, which facilitated the Chinese coolies to settle in both Cuba

and Malaysia. Given the shared features of impetus the 19th century that produces Chinese

migrant, it is important to examine the features that began to differentiate new Chinese

colonies. Cultural issues related to assimilation, acculturation and localization are critical

tools that will be use to study the Chinese ethnological field. In other words, the idea of a

Chinese ethnological field facilitates our comparison of cultural expressions in different

countries and reflects cultural continuity in the context of change.5

As a Chinese born Malaysian who lived in Malaysia for more than 20 years, personal

experiences and interviews with the Chinese community have helped me write this project.

Much of the data and sources that were discovered evoked childhood memories that

supported arguments presented in this project. This project was also accompanied with a

visit to La Habana, Cuba during March 5th-14th of 2015 led by Professor Gary McDonogh,

Raymond Albert and Enrique Sacerio-Garí. As part of the 360° course program, the purpose

of the fieldtrip was to better understand Cuba whose past and future are bound up deeply                                                                                                                          4 Mckeown, Adam. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian Studies 58.2 (1999): 306-37. JSTOR. Web. 20 Apr. 2015. 5 Tan, Chee-Beng. "Chinese Ethnological Field." Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004. 11-29. Print.  

  8

with the United States and the rest of Latin America even as it has charted very different

courses within contemporary history and social policy. While in Cuba, I investigated

vantages of Chinese influences in culture and cinema, urbanism, food and architecture. As

part of the fieldtrip, I visited the main site of the case study, which was Barrio Chino de La

Habana (Cuba’s Chinatown). This site matters because the Chinatown in Cuba plays an

important role in preserving and promoting Chinese culture and tradition. The fieldwork

helped me better understand Cuba as a complex nation and I was fortunate enough to speak

with first and second generation Chinese Cubans living in Havana.

Question/Hypothesis

What does it mean to be Chinese Cuban and Chinese Malaysian and how do they see

themselves? Are they all the same? How do members of one ethnic group represent

themselves to the rest of society and how, in turn, does the rest of society imagine members

of that ethnic group? Despite sharing ethnicity or religion, do diasporas of different

backgrounds see themselves as belonging to distinct communities? How are Chinese

Malaysian and Chinese Cubans viewed by their host lands and homelands- and vice versa?

These questions help guide the overarching theme of the project: the examination of

Chinese diaspora in Cuba and Malaysia. Essentially, this project seeks to compare and

contrast the lives of overseas Chinese using Cuba and Malaysia as case studies. Given the

shared features and impetus that produced Chinese worker colonies, we must question what

are the features began to differentiate new Chinese colonies and areas of convergence.

While both Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysians built strong communities after

breaking free from indentured labor, Chinese Cubans strongly assimilated the Cuban culture

and lifestyle while Chinese Malaysian experienced both processes of acculturation but

  9

continues to maintain a strong ethnic identity. Despite their common origin, both Chinese in

Cuba and Malaysia developed their own set of distinctive culture and contributed to their

respective host land differently. In other words, Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysian

have been active agents in reproducing and reinventing culture by their innovative use of

both Chinese and non-Chinese cultural principles and beliefs. This essay will reinforce that

space, time and mobility complicates the Chinese identity and that cultural identity changes

on the ground all the time.6

                                                                                                                         6 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Print.

  10

Critical Contemporary Theories: Acculturation, Assimilation and Localization

The project requires an understanding of the following terms: acculturation, assimilation

and localization. Essentially, localization is the cultural change that ethnic Chinese have

experienced and the process of becoming local.7 This involves cultural adjustment to a local

geographical and social environment, and identifying with the locality. One of the major

points that make localization distinct from adaptation is its active role in cultural production,

participation and innovation.8 The significance of the process of localization has led ethnic

Chinese everywhere to construct and re-construct their Chineseness, and acquire knowledge

of local trends and resources.9 In terms of Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysians, both

groups have changed culturally and ethnically as they customize to living in different

national societies and specific localities. This will be further examined through different

examples of political, economical and social construction later in the essay.

Social scientist have long debated the definition of acculturation and assimilation. Tan

Chee-Beng does a respectable job in clarifying both of the terms. For this specific project, I

use Tan’s definition of acculturation as “the kind of cultural change of one ethnic group or

certain population of an ethnic group (A) in relation to another ethnic group (B) such that

certain cultural features of A become similar or bear some resemblance to those of B”.10

This type of cultural change is the result of the process of direct contact between members

of the two ethnic groups.11 It is important to point out that acculturation occurs when

                                                                                                                         7 Tan, Chee Beng. "Introduction." Introduction. Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004. 1-8. Print. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Tan, Chee Beng. "Localization of Ethnic Chinese." Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004. 23-27. Print. 11 Ibid.

  11

individuals select and incorporate non-indigenous cultural principles rather than passively

being changed as a result of interethnic contact.12 We must point out that localization and

acculturation are not synonymous as localization is a process that occurs when a sensation

becomes so familiar as compared to acculturation, which has an emphasis on learning the

beliefs and behaviors endorsed by another culture.13 On the other hand, assimilation

“involves not only socio-cultural change but also ethnic change such that when we say

members of group A are assimilated into group B, we mean that they have been ethnically

merged into group B and thus have lost their original ethnic identity. This matters because

assimilation also infers that there is a change in ethnic membership.

These definitions are particularly important to better understand the process of

acculturation and assimilation in the context of ethnic Chinese in Cuba and Malaysia.

Examples from different aspects of life (economic, political, social) will further clarify and

highlight these terms.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       12 Ibid. 13 Solomon, Michael R. Consumer Behaviour: A European Perspective. Harlow, England: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2006. Print.  

  12

CHAPER TWO: CHINESE OUTMIGRATION FROM A WEAK CHINA

Conditions of arrival in Cuba: the Coolie Trade

Before mass Asian labor arrived on the coasts of North America and Hawaii,

experiments with and the importation of Asian labor had occurred in colonies in Asia and

would eventually reach the Caribbean and Latin America.14 In the 1800s, Chinese labor

began being exported in sustained efforts. Beginning in the 1840s, Britain and its allies

effectively “opened” a valuable labor market in southern China. Losing the Opium War and

the subsequent Arrow War, China opened twelve major ports to the British, French, and

American settlements and handed over Hong Kong to the British. One result of the wars was

deregulation of Chinese emigration. From 1840 to 1875 approximately one million Chinese

left Guangdong province (southern China) as part of Western labor traffic with just under a

quarter million going to Cuba and Peru.15

From 1847 to 1874, as many as 125,000 Chinese indentured or contract laborers, almost

all male, were sent to Cuba.16 This is no small number, considering the time span of just 27

years. The majority of the Chinese migrant workers were shipped to Cuban ports to replace

freed African slaves and their descendants.17 Eighty percent or more were destined for the

sugar plantations.18 The first boatload of Chinese arrived in Havana harbor on June 3, 1847.

Immigrants continued to come, from Guangdong, Fujian, Haikou, Macao, and Hong Kong,

                                                                                                                         14 Yun, Lisa. "Historical Context of Coolie Traffic To The Americas." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 1-35. Print. 15 Ibid. 16 Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labor of Neoslavery." Black Studies 12.15 (1994): 38-53. Print. 17 López, Kathleen. "Chinese and Cubanidad." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. Print. 18 Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labor of Neoslavery." Black Studies 12.15 (1994): 38-53. Print.

  13

when it was called Ziang gang.19 Chinese were brought to Cuba in ships owned by France,

Spain, England, North American, Portugal, Holland, Russia, and a handful of other

countries.20 In fact, the Chinese were imported while African slavery was still in effect

though undergoing “gradual abolition,” and worked alongside this traditional form of

plantation labor.21 During the nineteenth century, the traffic in Chinese labor to the

Americas included destinations such as Cuba, Peru, Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica, Panama,

Mexico, Costa Rica, and Brazil.22 During the nadir in 1847, the intensive trafficking of

Chinese coolies to Cuba began.23 There were 142,000 coolies taken abroad ships to Cuba,

though with a mortality rate of 12 percent (a higher rate than the African slave trade) fewer

actually landed.24 These numbers account only for those who were documented, with some

studies indicating several thousand more shopped as contraband.25 (See Table 1)

From the 1840s to the 1870s Cuba leapt forward with even more phenomenal growth

precisely during the period when Chinese coolies were introduced and installed on Cuban

sugar plantation.26 In 1830 Cuba produced 105,000 tons of sugar. Forty years later, Cuba

produced almost seven times more sugar (703,000 tons).27

                                                                                                                         19 Yun, Lisa. "Historical Context of Coolie Traffic To The Americas." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 1-35. Print. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Yun, Lisa. "Historical Context of Coolie Traffic To The Americas." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 1-35. Print. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

  14

Table 1: Chinese Landing in the Port of Havana, 1847-1874

Year Departures Deaths in Transit Sold in Havana Percentage Deaths 1847 612 41 571 6.7 1853 5,150 843 4,307 16.3 1854 1,750 39 1,711 2.2 1855 3,130 145 2,985 4.6 1856 6,152 1,184 4,968 19.3 1857 10,116 1,575 8,547 15.5 1858 16,414 3,019 13,385 18.4 1859 8,549 1,345 7,204 15.7 1860 7,204 1,011 6,193 14 1861 7,252 279 6,973 3.8 1862 356 12 344 3.3 1863 1,045 93 952 8.8 1864 2,664 511 2,153 19.1 1865 6,794 394 6,400 5.7 1866 13,368 977 12,391 7.3 1867 15,616 1,353 14,263 8.6 1868 8,100 732 7,368 9 1869 6,720 1,060 5,660 15.7 1870 1,312 85 1,227 6.4 1871 1,577 89 1,448 5.6 1872 8,915 755 8,160 8.4 1873 5,856 763 5,093 13 1874 2,863 373 2,490 13

TOTAL 141,515 16,678 124,793

Source: López, Kathleen. "Chinese Indentured Labor." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational

History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 23. Print.

Accounting for deaths on the voyage, about 125,000 Chinese arrived in Cuba from 1847

to 1874.28 The trade brought enormous profits to investors, as coolies cost less than African

slaves and were easier to obtain.29 The years 1855 to 1857 were marked by large crops,

                                                                                                                         28 López, Kathleen. "Chinese Indentured Labor." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 22. Print.

29 Ibid.  

  15

higher sugar prices, more foreign investment, and sizable expansion of credit.30 The volume

of coolie traffic rose to over 6,000 in 1856, over 10,000 in 1857, and a record of over 16,000

in 1858.31

The arrival of the coolies in Cuba was never a pleasant and smooth journey. From the

beginning of the recruitment, hapless Chinese, mostly poor young men, were “recruited” by

force and deception by their own countrymen commonly called by the Westerners crimps or

runners just as their counterparts in African were called.32 Chinese middlemen used

deception and kidnapping as primary methods of obtaining recruits, known as “pigs”.33

Recruiters lured Chinese men into gambling houses, where they were forced to sign

contracts after amassing debt.34 Chinese who willing signed contracts believed they were

dealing with legitimate agents stationed in the ports.35 Upon the arrival in Havana, the

coolies were locked up in the depósitos until they (technically their contracts) were

auctioned off in lots in the same market used to sell slaves.36

Within the context of African slavery and abolition, the significance of Chinese

indentured labor to the increase of sugar production in Cuba is undeniable. In 1866, the last

year of the slave trade to Cuba, coolie imports reached over 12,000 followed by an all-time

                                                                                                                         30 López, Kathleen. "Chinese Indentured Labor." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 22-24. Print. 31 Ibid. 32 Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labor of Neoslavery." Black Studies 12.15 (1994): 38-53. Print. 33 López, Kathleen. "Chinese and Cubanidad." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. Print. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labor of Neoslavery." Black Studies 12.15 (1994): 38-53. Print.  

  16

high of 14,000 the next year.37 After 1875, when both the slave and coolie trade had ended,

sugar production in Cuba declined.38

History of Chinese Immigration in Malaysia

Chinese Malaysian laborers arrived in Malaysia at a similar time frame as Chinese

Cubans in the 1840s. The 1840s saw an influx of immigrant labor into the Malay

Peninsula.39 In these two cases, we see that there is a rise in demand for laborers due to

economic demands. Adam Mckeown, a distinguished Professor of History at Columbia

University contends “the rise of the Chinese labor trade was closely tied to the gradual

demise of African slavery and the search by plantation owners for a viable alternative”.40 In

other words, this increase in labor migration was tied to the expansion of world markets into

the Pacific.41 The rise in Chinese labor migration was linked with the expansion of the world

economy, but not only as chattel shipped around in accordance with Western needs.42

The coolie traffic from southern China initiated, organized, and operated by Chinese

syndicates (secret societies), supplied the much-needed labor for the booming tin industry in

the Western Malay States.43 The credit-ticket system was the common labor recruitment

mechanism: a sinkheh (newly arrived guest) was contracted to an employer who paid the

syndicate the sinkheh’s travel expenditure. Consequently, the sinkheh was compelled to

serve this employer for a specified period (usually three years) as repayment of his boast

                                                                                                                         37 López, Kathleen. "Chinese and Cubanidad." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. Print. 38 Ibid. 39 Gin, Ooi Keat. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print. 40 Mckeown, Adam. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian Studies 58.2 (1999): 306-37. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

  17

passage from China. It was a longer contract for Chinese indentured labors in Cuba, which

typically lasted for eight years.44As an indentured worker, the Chinese migrant worker in

Malaysia was a de facto property of his employer, forbidden to change employer, and

closely monitored lest he abscond.45 Likewise to the Chinese Cubans, Chinese migrant

workers were victims of human trafficked.46 This trafficking of coolies was known as the

“pig trade,” since the sinkheh was treated like a trade commodity. While recruitment for

Chinese indentured laborers in Cuba and Malaysia happened through the “pig trade”, there

is a distinct difference in who controlled the organization of labor and recruitment. Peru and

Cuba were the only places for which non-Chinese, controlled recruitment at every level

above the village.47 In much of Southeast Asia, Chinese controlled the organization of labor

all the way to the very production and marketing of goods.48 In fact, the management of

labor reflects among the few reasoning for the gradual decrease in Chinese Cubans. The

greater the control of non-Chinese interests over migration, the higher the likelihood that

labor migration would result only in dispersion, rather than the emergence of continued

migration and transnational connections.49

Thousands of Chinese coolies arrived annually at Penang, Singapore; thereafter, they

were brought to work the tin mines that dotted the Kinta Valley, Klang Valley, and Sungai

Ujong.50 To understand the significant inflow of Chinese migrants in Malaysia, we must

                                                                                                                         44 Yun, Lisa. "Historical Context of Coolie Traffic To The Americas." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 29. Print. 45 Gin, Ooi Keat. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print. 46 Ibid. 47 Mckeown, Adam. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian Studies 58.2 (1999): 306-37. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015 48 Ibid. 49 Mckeown, Adam. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian Studies 58.2 (1999): 306-37. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.  50 Gin, Ooi Keat. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print.

  18

examine their population statistics. The flow of immigrants to Malaya started in earnest after

the 1820s.51 In 1824, the Chinese population in Singapore was 31 percent (3,317) of the

total population.52 By 1860, it had jumped to 61 per cent (50,043).53 In Penang, it stood at

28 per cent (8,270) in 1820. By 1860, it had grown to 46 percent (28,018).54 (See Figure 1)

After that date, it increased so rapidly that it exceeded the Malay population in the tin-rich

areas. In 1891, there were 50,884 Chinese to 26,578 Malays in Selangor; in the Kinta

District of Perak there were 39, 513 Chinese to 14,472 Malays. By 1901, the overall

Chinese population in the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and

Pahang) had exceeded the Malay population, the figures being 299,739 to 285,278.55

                                                                                                                         51 Heng, Pek Koon. "The Historical Background: Chinese Settlement and Political Institutions in Malaya." Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association. Singapore: Oxford UP, 1988. 10-33. Print 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.  

  19

Figure 1: Chinese Population in Singapore and Penang

Source: Heng, Pek Koon. "The Historical Background: Chinese Settlement and

Political Institutions in Malaya." Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the

Malaysian Chinese Association. Singapore: Oxford UP, 1988. 10-33. Print.

a. Note: Figure 1 above reflects a significant increase of Chinese

population in Singapore and Penang from 1820s to the 1860s.

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Chinese population in Singapore Chinese population in Penang

Year 1820s

Year 1860s

  20

Ultimately, the British colonial government proscribed Chinese indentured labor in

1914.56 This date was significantly later than the formal treaty that was signed in Cuba. In

November 1877, Spain and China signed a formal treaty that terminated the coolie traffic

and limited future recruitment of Chinese laborers. Having said that, it was clear that the

agreement of the treaty was not strictly enforced and it was unclear whether the Chinese

indentured laborers were truly ‘free’. This uncertainly stems from a lack of agreement of the

question of whether the Chinese migrants in Cuba were slave or free, and whether and how

they contributed to the transition from a slave mode of production to a capitalist mode, only

points up the ambiguity of the coolie situation: indentured labor implanted in the midst of

very entrenched slavery.57

 

 

                                                                                                                         56 Gin, Ooi Keat. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print. 57 López, Kathleen. "Chinese Coolies and African Slave." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 53. Print.  

  21

CHAPTER THREE: GROWTH OF CHINESE COMMUNITIES UNDER COLONIAL RULE IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY

Chinese Cubans Move to the City

In the late 19th century, tens of thousand of Chinese who survived indenture and

remained on the started to have more physical, occupational, and even social mobility.58

They joined gangs of agricultural laborers, grew vegetables in the countryside, peddled

goods, and worked as artisans or at unskilled jobs in town.59 Cuadrillas, or work gangs,

became the most important mechanism by which Chinese made the initial transition from

indentured laborer to free agricultural wage earner. Among the newly liberated Chinese who

dispersed from the cane fields of Havana and Mantanzas province, some were attracted to

economic activities in the capital, while most migrated to central and eastern Cuba. This

internal migration had Chinese Cubans moving to the city in hopes of starting a business. By

the time the coolie trade had ended, Chinese businesses in Cuba ranged from fruit stand to

major transnational import firms. This new economic opportunity also reflects the inflow of

new migrants who came to Cuba in the late nineteenth century.60

Commercial Success and Place

Economic opportunities in Cuba and Peru after indenture, and in Mexico beginning in

the 1860s, coupled with increasing anti-Chinese hostility in the U.S. West after the end of

the gold rush, led to the influx of thousands of new Chinese immigrants to these regions by

                                                                                                                         58 López, Kathleen. "Free Laborers." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 54-57. Print. 59 Ibid. 60 López, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 101. Print.

  22

the 1870s, including many from California.61 The Chinese Cubans became increasingly

urbanized with various commercial activities. By the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese

in Cuba worked as domestic servants, shopkeepers, peddlers, cigar makers charcoal burners,

launderers, masons, and carpenters.62 However, at least initially, most former coolies who

remained in Cuba continued working in the sugar industry, only now as free wage laborers.

These wide rage of occupations and later the arrival of the new transnational merchants

altered class dynamics within in the Chinese Cuban community. Transnational Chinese

merchants from San Francisco and Hong Kong established branches of their firms beyond

the capital of Havana to provincial towns across the islands.63 Nevertheless, not all Chinese

Cubans were fortunate. In fact, the majority of free Chinese worked in agriculture (about

10,600 out of a total of 14,000). By 1899, well after the period of indenture, most Chinese

were still employed as day laborers (8,035), followed by domestic servants (2,160) and

merchants (1,923).64

Chinese Cuban Rebels

During the thirty years of struggles for independence from Spain, Cubans were forced to

reconsider the relationship between race and the emerging nation.65 From the 1860’s to the

end of the century, chinos mambises (freedom fighters) joined slaves, free blacks and

whites to overthrow the Spanish colonial rule.66 Many Cuban Chinese joined the rebels- in

                                                                                                                         61 López, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 101 Print. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 López, Kathleen. "Free Laborers." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 54-57. Print.  65  López, Kathleen. "Freedom Fighters." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 117-118. Print.  66 Cohen, Robin. "The Chinese of Peru, Cuba and Mexico." The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. 220-21. Print.

  23

the Ten Years’ War, the Small War, and José Martí Necessary War.67 The participation in

the Cuban struggles for independence from Spain facilitated the Cuban Chinese integration

to the Cuban nation. The Cuban Chinese left their community and descendants a proud and

glorious legacy. The war narratives not only highlight moments of violence and courage on

the front lines of battle, but they also emphasize the Chinese role in noncombat auxiliary

activities. Cuban Chinese delivered messages, prepared food and acquired medicine and

clothing for the rebels.68 Their role in Cuban history, together with their contribution to the

national economy and culture, made them a component part of cubanía according to the

essayist and ethnographer Fernando Ortiz.69 In recognition of this fact, after independence a

monument was erected in Havana in honor of the Chinese combatants in the three wars.70

Chinese Rise in Economic Power

Comparable to the Chinese Cubans, there was a rise in power among Chinese

Malaysians as reflected through to its population growth and economic opportunities. By the

end of 19th century, Chinese and Indians combined made up 29.4% of the overall population

in Peninsula Malaysia. The growth of the Chinese and Indian population continued to rise

and peaked by the end of 1947. At this time, both of these ethnic groups represented 49.2%

of the country’s population. (See TABLE 2)

                                                                                                                         67 Triana, Mauro García, and Pedro Eng Herrera. The Chinese in Cuba, 1847-now. Lanham: Lexington, 2009. 25. Print. 68 López, Kathleen. "Freedom Fighters." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 117-118. Print. 69 Triana, Mauro García, and Pedro Eng Herrera. The Chinese in Cuba, 1847-now. Lanham: Lexington, 2009. Print. 70 Ibid.

  24

Table 2: Percentage of Population (Peninsula Malaysia), 1884-1970

Year Malays (%) Chinese and Indians combined (%)

1884 63.9 29.4

1921 54 44.5

1931 49.2 49

1947 49.5 49.2

1957 49.8 48.5

1965 50.1 47.9

1970 53.2 46

Source: Comber, Leon. "The Beginnings of Plural Society in Malaya." 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1983. 5. Print.

Figure 2: Percentage of Population (Peninsula Malaysia), 1884-1970

Source: Comber, Leon. "The Beginnings of Plural Society in Malaya." 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1983. 5. Print.

1884 1921 1931 1947 1957 1965 1970 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Percentage of Population (Peninsula British Malaya and Malaysia)

Malays (%)

Chinese and Indians combined (%)

  25

While the population of Chinese Malaysians continued to surge, they experience similar

urban migration comparable to the Chinese Cubans. Chinese Malaysians began to move to

the city, which led to an increased dominance of urban merchants who controlled labor

through money, revenue farms, and access to the force of colonial states.71 Similar to the

Chinese Cubans experience, Chinese Malaysians were experiencing altering class systems.

The expanding economy of Singapore and Malaya during the period provided many

opportunities for the Chinese to acquire wealth and to change their social status.72 We must

understand that the overseas Chinese society was a predominantly immigrant community;

secondly, it was a subordinate community in terms of power and authority; and thirdly, it

was an urban community.73 Its nature thus determined its class structure. Since the

Malaysian Chinese society was a subordinate one, it did have a fully-grown class system,

comprising a ruling class and a sizable peasant class as China. As it was predominantly

urban, it produced largely merchants and workers rather than landlords and peasants.74

Likewise to the new transnational merchants who formed the upper stratum of Chinese in

Cuba, a small group of ‘capitalist’ and general merchants reflected the rise in power among

Chinese Malaysians.75 Unlike Chinese Cubans, Chinese Malaysians distinguished their

status through income and possession of property. The ownership of property was also one

of the factors that altered the class system among Chinese Malaysians.76 All general workers

owned nothing as far as property is concerned. Their employers usually provided their

accommodation. Shop assistants lived in the shops helping to look after the security of the

                                                                                                                         71 Ching-Hwang, Yen. "Class Structure and Social Mobility in the Chinese Community in Singapore and Malaya 1800–1911." Modern Asian Studies 21.03 (1987): 417-45. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.  

  26

shops; agricultural workers lived in wooden houses with attap roofing in the plantations;

mining workers also live in Kongsi house which was made of timber or split bamboo, and

was constructed for temporary purpose of the compound of the mines.77

Many urban shops were becoming more valuable as the population increased and

business expanded, which of course put the shops in good locations beyond the reach of

ordinary shopkeepers, but this also provided handsome profits.78 One of the few examples

of Chinese Malaysian who demonstrated economic power was Kapitan Yap Ah Loy. At the

time of his death in 1885, famous Kapitan Yap Ah Loy owned more than 150 houses in

Kuala Lumpur, in addition to extensive tin miners and plantations in various parts of

Selangor.79 Comparable to the former Chinese Cuban coolies who were later free laborers,

the former Chinese Malaysian coolies experienced difficulties in upward social mobility.

Owing to this frustration, they tended to indulge in bargaining, opium smoking and

prostitutes, which further reduced their ability to save.80 The Chinese Malaysians at the

lower stratum also became transient peddlers selling general goods and buying local

produce in the Malay village.81 After succeeding in their small business, they could then

save enough to become merchant.82 The acquisition of merchant status was important

because a certain prestige and respect were accorded.83

                                                                                                                         77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.  

  27

Chinese Malaysian Political Power

Unlike the Chinese Cubans who were praised and politically involved, the Chinese

Malaysians had a difficult time fighting for political power. The status of Chinese

Malaysians in Malayan government is difficult to assess given that the peninsula contained

seven separate government administrations.84 Chinese born in the Straits Settlements, a

British colony, were British subjects. Chinese born in the Federated Malay States or in the

five Unfederated Malay States were “British-protected” subject of the Malay sultans.85 In

contrast to the general Chinese Cuban participation in the formation of Cuba, Chinese

Malaysians involved in politics were elites. The Legislative Council of the Settlements had

three unofficial Chinese members, one each from Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, and all

of them came from highest stratum of Chinese.86 Instead of working towards meaningful

integration, the Malayan government practiced political separation. In other words, the

Chinese Malaysians were not given the same political freedom and level of political

involvement in the same ways that Malays received. The appointment of Secretary for

Chinese Affairs in 1877 tended to separate the government of the Chinese from the rest of

the government.87 This statement reflects how Chinese Malaysians were always seen as

‘under’ the Malays as compared to the significant integration of Chinese Cubans to Cuban

society.

                                                                                                                         84  Barnett, Patricia G. "The Chinese in Southeastern Asia and the Philippines." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 226.Southeastern Asia and the Philippines (1943): 32-49. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.  85  Ibid.  86  Ibid.  87 Ibid.

  28

CHAPTER FOUR: CRISES AND RESPONSES AT THE END OF COLONIALISM

Chinese and Chinatown in 20th Century: Neo-Colonial Cuba

Despite the fact that the Chinese were prohibited to enter Cuba until 1919, Cuba

experienced a second wave of Chinese immigration that included twenty thousand people

between 1903 and 1929.88 Although the new immigrants differed from their predecessors in

that they were free of any service obligations, almost all were male: in 1931, barely 1

percent of Cuba’s total Chinese population was female.89 While Chinese immigration were

found throughout Cuba, they gravitated in large numbers to Havana, which eventually

became home to the third-largest concentration in China in the Americas behind San

Francisco and New York.90

The map Presencia China en Cuba (Chinese presence in Cuba) by Grupo Promotor

Del Barrio Chino de La Habana provides a brief history and geographical representation of

the Chinese presence in Cuba in three languages: English, Spanish and Chinese. (See

Appendix A, B and C) This map is useful because it helps learn about Cuba’s Chinatown at

a particular point in time. By the late 1940s, Havana’s Chinese Cuban population is

estimated to have stood around 6,000, and most concentrated in the city’s Chinatown.91 The

map also gives a better understanding on why the area was important at that time. The bulk

of the description of the map lies on the chronological history of the origins of Chinese in                                                                                                                          88 Rovner, Eduardo Sáenz. The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling in Cuba from the 1920s to the Revolution. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2008. Print. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean." The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 117-37. Print.  

  29

Cuba. While it does offer a map of Chinatown and major sites, the bulk of the information

on the brochure focuses on the history of Chinese in Cuba. That is, the function is less

direction or location than presence and rights, as the title suggests. The description

highlights important time periods and figures that describe how the Chinese immigrants

contributed to the formative process, which resulted in the Cuban nation.92 This particular

section also points out how Chinese values and culture have influenced Cuban society with

an impact on areas such as food, sports, music, and art, etc.93 The map also seeks to

commemorate Chinese Cubans who fought during the war against Spain, highlighting a

number of names followed by the title they had achieved.94

More than half of the map pays attention to the map of Chinatown illustrating

organizations, societies and businesses.95 Although many of the points of interest no longer

exist, the map gives an impression on how Chinatown was once a thriving area surrounded

by a number of business operations. Lopez argues that Havana boosted one of the best-

known Chinatowns in the Americas.96 There were an array of small businesses and products,

“pharmacies and shops specialized in Chinese products, such as traditional medicine,

porcelains and silks, trinkets, and books and newspapers.97 It is also interesting to point out

how Havana’s Chinatown is centrally located with close proximity to Old Havana.98

Chinese Cubans congregated on the edge of the urban area in a marginal district known as

                                                                                                                         92 Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana. Presencia China En Cuba. La Habana: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana, 1999. Print. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 López, Kathleen. "Chinese and Cubanidad." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 203. Print. 97 Ibid. 98 Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana. Presencia China En Cuba. La Habana: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana, 1999. Print.

  30

Zanja.99 This Chinese district lay just west of the colonial core, in a part of the city known

as El Centro.100 This demonstrates that although people sometimes associate Chinatown as

the ‘Other’, it was not located in an area that was inaccessible. This was desirable because

the Chinese would engage in a range of business that catered to a larger audience. Although

the relationship between Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese Cubans is not shown on the map,

the Chinese interacted with native Cubans, European immigrants, blacks, mulatttos, and

other Chinese on a daily basis.101 This interesting movement of spaces allowed Chinese and

Cubans to interact thus creating a bicultural identity.

The Chinese community in Chinatown distinguished themselves as a law-abiding group

and developed a respectable reputation in business.102 A 1932 travel bulletin noted the

Chinese controlled the city’s fruit and vegetable distribution business.103 The Chinese also

opened laundries and sold low-priced meals, establishing inexpensive restaurants and fried-

food stands.104 As late as 1958, nearly half of the small-business owners who appeared in

the yellow pages of Havana telephone directory under the fruits, foodstuffs and vegetable

heading were of Chinese origin.105 Despite Chinese Cubans good reputation, they

experienced some internal conflict among themselves. Several bloody incidents took place

within Havana’s Chinese community in 1926.106 Most of these conflicts that took place were

internal and did not involve other non-ethnic Chinese. The violence stemmed largely from                                                                                                                          99 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean." The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 117-37. Print. 100 Ibid. 101 López, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 99. Print. 102 Rovner, Eduardo Sáenz. The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling in Cuba from the 1920s to the Revolution. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2008. Print. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.

  31

political feuding between local Chinese associations, feuding that mirrored political

loyalties and vendettas imported from China.107 Members of the rival associations accused

each other of trafficking in opium.108

The Cuban Revolution and Changing China

In 1945, with the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II and the ended of its

occupation of the country, a civil war ensued between the Guomindang and the Communists,

from which Mao Zedong’s Red Army emerged victorious.109 Chinese refugees fled to

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other places around the world, including Cuba.110 An estimated

three thousand Chinese entered Cuba from 1950 to 1950, among them Catholic priests and

Guomindang officials.111 The establishment of the People’s Republic of China on the

mainland in 1949 politically polarized diasporic Chinese communities. Despite the influence

of Guomindang overseas, Chinese in Cuba did not unanimously support Chiang Kai-shek.

In general, he had the backing of the wealthier merchant class. In Cuba, although the

Guomindang remained influential throughout the 1950s, it lost its monopoly on the political

life of the Chinese community.

By the end of the 1950s, the Cuban Revolution further polarized the Chinese community

in Cuba. The Cuban Revolution affected the Chinese Cubans with sweeping political,

economic and social reforms.112 Chinese Cubans who supported the left wing assume

power within Chinese community institutions, especially after many had been imprisoned or                                                                                                                          107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 López, Kathleen. "Revolution and Remigration." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 221. Print. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 López, Kathleen. "Revolution and Remigration." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 222. Print.

  32

forced underground for their activities during previous decades.113 Members of the main

leftist Chinese political organization had maintained their building on Zanja Street in

Havana’s Chinatown, and after 1959, they reemerged as the Alianza Nueva Democracía

China en Cuba (Chinese New Democracy Alliance in Cuba).114 This reflects how Chinese

Cubans who remained in Cuba had developed a high degree of integration into the Cuban

political life.

Expropriation and Departure: Chinese Cubans in the U.S

The movement of Chinese from Cuba to the United States had historical precedent, from

escaping sugar plantations in the nineteenth century to using Cuba as a springboard to

northern ports during the stage of exclusion or the postwar period.115 After 1959, most of the

Chinese who came to the United States were political exiles.116 The 1959 Cuban Revolution

transformed the island’s landscape with sweeping political, economic and social reforms.117

The commercial vitality of Cuba’s Chinatown diminished dramatically after the Cuban

Revolution, as did its population of Chinese Cubans. Many elite Chinese merchants left

family and possessions.118 The Cuban Revolution led to the nationalization of most small

businesses and many of the island’s Chinese Cubans fled Havana and abandoned its

Chinatown.119 In both Florida and New York/New Jersey, Chinese settled alongside their

                                                                                                                         113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 López, Kathleen. "Chinese Cuban Exiles in the United States." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 231-235. Print. 116 Ibid. 117 López, Kathleen. "Revolution and Remigration." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 222. Print. 118 López, Kathleen. "Chinese Cuban Exiles in the United States." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 231-235. Print. 119 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean." The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 117-37. Print.  

  33

Cuban neighbors in Little Havana, Union City, and the Upper West Side of Manhattan.120

Middle- and lower-class Chinese generally did not leave Cuba until the final stage of the

nationalization of private commerce in 1968.121 Despite the number of Chinese Cubans have

significant decreased, there is a small core of population who remained.122 At the end of

1999 about 3,5000 Chinese lived on the island, most in Havana, and a number were still

resident in the Chinatown area.123 This group included about 250 holding Chinese passport

resident in Cuba, about 400 Chinese immigrants who had become naturalized Cuban

citizens, and about 2,700 Cubans of Chinese descent.124

Chinese Problems in Colonial Malaya:

In the 1920s and 30s, there was considerable agitation among Chinese in Malaya.

Immigration restrictions, both in quantity and in quality, were imposed after 1930s,

affecting Chinese most severely and rousing Chinese groups to angry protestations. Wealthy

Straits Chinese had sent money back to China to assists in financing the revolution of 1911.

In later years close connections were maintained between the new government of China and

the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The Kuomintang organized branches throughout Malaya,

solicited money for support of the party, attempted to secure new party members, influenced

the Chinese press in Malaya, and generally made the Malayan government uneasy. This is

comparable to Chinese Cubans experience. Because the Chinese represented such a large

proportion of the population in Malaya, any unrest among them was a serious threat to the                                                                                                                          120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean." The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 117-37. Print. 123 Ibid. 124 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean." The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 117-37. Print.

  34

security of the country. The British policy of strengthening Malay sultans and of

decentralization of government among the various states of Malaya tended to decrease the

power of the Chinese.125 The late 1920s and 1930s saw both the KMT (Guomindang) and

CCP (Chinese Communist Party) propagating their ideological views as well as seeking

financial support from Chinese in Malaya, Sabah and North Borneo.126 The Chinese

dominated MCP (Malayan Communist Party) operated after the mid-1920s as a CCP

offshoot.127 Meanwhile Cuba’s government was supporting Chinese leftist political

organizations, the British colonial government clamped down on anti-colonial and anti-

imperialistic elements, particularly leftist activities, with imprisonment or deportation to

China. 128

The Birth of Singapore and Affirmative Action

At a similar time to the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Malaya had gained its independence

from the British in 1957.129 In early September 1963, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined

Malaya to form Malaysia.130 Within Malaysia, differences between Kuala Lumpur and

Singapore leaders surfaced. The PAP (People’s Action Party) under Lee Kuan Yew insisted

on more equalitarian policy, but the Alliance maintained that preferential provisions in

government policies were necessary for the disadvantaged Malays community to

progress.131 Two racial riots in Singapore in early 1965 convinced the Tengku that the island

                                                                                                                         125 Barnett, Patricia G. "The Chinese in Southeastern Asia and the Philippines." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 226.Southeastern Asia and the Philippines (1943): 32-49. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 126 Ooi, Keat Gin. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Moore, Wendy. West Malaysia and Singapore. Lincolnwood, IL: Passport, 1993. Print. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid.

  35

state has to leave the federation to avoid dangerous interethnic conflict.132 Singapore

separated from Malaysia in August 1965 to become an independent republic.133 This

reflected a significant event for Chinese Malaysians as it entails a decreased of ethnic

Chinese in the overall population of Malaysia. (See Table 3, 4 and 5)

Table 3 reflects the population of Malaya, Singapore and British Malaya (1911-1957),

Malaysia including Singapore (1963) and Malaysia excluding Singapore (1970). It is

important to notice the sudden increased in the total population of Malaysia from the year

1957 to 1963. 1963 marked the year Malaysia was formed, which included Singapore,

Sabah and Sarawak as part of the country. Table 4 shows the Population of Malaysia from

1970-2000. The population from 1970 to 2000 increased gradually as the country develops.

Finally, Table 5 demonstrates the ethnic composition of the population in Peninsula

Malaysia (1911-200). Although the population of Chinese Malaysians continued to grow

from 1911 to 2000, the proportion of total population has decreased since 1957. This is due

to many factors such as the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, pro-Bumiputera policy

and the introduction of the NEP (New Economic Policy).

                                                                                                                         132 Moore, Wendy. West Malaysia and Singapore. Lincolnwood, IL: Passport, 1993. Print. 133 Ibid.

  36

Table 3: Population of Malaya, Singapore and British Malaya (1911-1957), Malaysia including Singapore (1963) and Malaysia excluding Singapore (1970)

Source: Khoo, Boo Teik. "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector." Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme 20.December (2005): 1-40. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Web. 24 Apr. 2015.

Table 4: Population of Malaysia from 1970-2000

Source: Khoo, Boo Teik. "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector." Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme 20.December (2005): 1-40. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Web. 24 Apr. 2015.

Year Malaya Singapore British Malaya Malaysia (1963) Malaysia (1970) 1911 2,338,951 303,321 2,642,272

1921 2,906,691 418,358 32,325,049 1931 3,787,758 557,745 4,345,503 1947 4,908,086 938,144 5,946,230 1957 6,278,758 1,445,929 7,724,687 1963

9,007,414

1970

10,319,324

Year Peninsula Malaysia Sabah Sarawak Total 1970 8,809,557 635,604 976,269 10,439,430 1980 11,426,613 1,011,046 1,307,582 13,745,241 1991 14,475,400 1,398,900 1,700,000 17,574,300

18,523,632 2,230,000 2,071,506 22,825,138

  37

Table 5: Ethnic Composition of the Population in Peninsula Malaysia (1911-200).

Source: Khoo, Boo Teik. "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector." Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme 20.December (2005): 1-40. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Web. 24 Apr. 2015.

Ethnic  Group   1911   1921   1931   1947   1957   1970   1980   1991   2000  

Population                                      

Malay   1,367,245   1,568,588   1,863,872   2,427,853   3,125,474   4,685,838  6,315,0

00  8,433,8

00   11,485,341  

Chinese     693,228   855,863   1,284,888   1,884,647   2,333,756   3,122,350  3,865,0

00  4,251,0

00   5,142,649  

Indians   239,169   439,172   570,986   535,092   735,038   932,626  1,171,0

00  1,380,0

00   1,774,002  

Others   85,358   43,377   68,254   60,408   184,732   69,183   75,000   537,500   121,641  

Total   2,358,000   2,907,000   3,788,000   4,908,000   6,379,000   8,810,000  11,426,

000  14,602,

300   18,523,632  Proportion  of  total  population  (%)                                  

Malay   57.3   54.0   49.2   49.5   49.0   53.2   55.3   57.8   62.0  

Chinese     29.1   29.4   33.9   38.4   36.6   35.4   33.8   29.1   27.8  

Indians   10.0   15.1   15.1   10.9   11.5   10.6   10.2   9.5   9.6  

Others   3.6   1.5   1.8   1.2   2.9   0.8   0.7   3.7   0.7  

Total   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.1   100.0  

  38

Pro-Bumiputera is a policy that entitles special rights and privileges to land ownership,

education and civil service jobs.134 The Bumiputeras are predominantly ethnic Malays.

NEP is an affirmative that seeks to balance strategies for economic growth and address

structural inequalities.135 Under the NEP, Malays were not only given special rights in

administration and education but also in terms of language and culture.136 In 1971, further

amendment to the constitution further stated that the status of the Malay as the official

language and the status of other languages as non-official but merely tolerated.137 As

Chinese Cubans begin to depart Cuba in the 1960s, Chinese Malaysians experienced a

similar situation. As a result of affirmative action policies favoring Malays, we see a large

departure of Chinese Malaysians to other countries such as Singapore and Australia, which

will be discussed on the next section.

Chinese Malaysians Departure to Singapore and Australia

The World Bank (2011) estimates that the Malaysian diaspora (Malaysian-born migrants)

has reached one million in 2010 compared to 750,000 in 2000, while the Malaysian brain

drain (tertiary-educated Malaysian-born migrants, aged 25+) is estimated to be the third of

the overall diaspora.138 In 2000, the five largest destination countries hosting the Malaysian

are Singapore (46%), Australia (12%), Brunei (9%), United States (8%), and the United

                                                                                                                         134 Koh, Sin Yee. "Diasporic "Unbelonging" To Malaysia and Singapore: Second-Generation Malaysian-Chinese Migrants in Singapore." Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2014): 358-72. Print. 135 Percy, Carol, and Mary Catherine. Davidson. The Languages of Nation Attitudes and Norms. Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2012. Print. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Koh, Sin Yee. "Diasporic "Unbelonging" To Malaysia and Singapore: Second-Generation Malaysian-Chinese Migrants in Singapore." Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2014): 358-72. Print.

  39

Kingdom (8%). The Malaysian diaspora in Singapore are overwhelmingly consisting

Chinese Malaysians.139

Unlike Chinese Cubans who are entitled to receive free education, Chinese Malaysians

are affected by Pro-Bumiputera policies that practiced ethnic as a factor for admission to

public universities. As a result, many Chinese Malaysians sought alternative paths towards

social mobility through migration.140 Singapore has been a favored destination due to the

close geographical proximity, historical and economic ties, and relatively high wages.141 As

of 2010, there were roughly 1.88 million Malaysian-born persons resident in Singapore.142

In the case of Australia, the Malaysian-born population in Australia almost doubled

between the 1986 and 1991 Censuses (from 33,710 to 71,740 people).143 Just as most of the

Chinese Cubans who migrated to the United States came from privileged and wealthy

backgrounds, Chinese Malaysians who migrate to Australia are highly educated, well-to-do,

young and have a high level of English.144According to the 2011 census published by the

Australia Government’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship, the medium individual

weekly income for the Malaysia-born in Australia aged 15 years and over was $703,

compared with $538 for all overseas-born and $597 for all Australian born.145 The total

Australian population had a medium individual weekly income of $577.146 As of today, the

                                                                                                                         139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 "Community Information Summary:Malaysia-born." Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship. N.p., 2011. Web. 23 Apr. 2015. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid.

  40

latest Census in 2011 recorded 116,196 Malaysia-born people in Australia, an increase of

25.8 per cent from the 2006 Census.147

Chinese in Malaysia and Chinatown in the 20th Century

The foremost historian of Old KL (Kuala Lumpur), John Gullick once described the

Chinese quarter (Chinatown) as the ‘other Kuala Lumpur’ in juxtaposition to the European

community and local elites.148 Petaling Street, one of the streets in ‘Chinatown’, was lined

on each by stalls; crowded by every conceivable crook and crannie by Chinese, two

continuous lines of carriages, gharries and rikishas… a glaring sun a blinding dust a strong

odor of cooking etc. floated around’. Although Malaysia’s Chinatown has experienced a

decrease in business operations similar to Cuba’s Chinatown, the commercial ambience has

remained.149 . In KL’s Chinatown, stalls and businesses target the foreign tourist market.150

This is the same situation in Havana’s Chinatown. During the last years of the 1990s, a

group known as the Grupo Promoter del Barrio Chino de la Habana was formed to

attempt to revitalize the Chinatown district and promote it as a tourist avenue.151

Attempts at anchoring the cultural authenticity have been complicated in other ways in a

milieu of mobile globalization.152 In KL’s Chinatown, the overt ‘Chinese-ness’ of the

locality is confounded as male migrant workers from Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar are

                                                                                                                         147 Ibid. 148 Gullick, J. M. The Story of Kuala Lumpur:. Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Eastern U Pr., 1983. Print. 149 Yeoh, Seng Guan, and Josh Lepawsky. The Other Kuala Lumpur: Living in the Shadows of a Globalising Southeast Asian City. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print. Routledge Malaysian Studies Ser. 150 Ibid. 151 Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean." The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 117-37. Print. 152 Yeoh, Seng Guan, and Josh Lepawsky. The Other Kuala Lumpur: Living in the Shadows of a Globalising Southeast Asian City. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print. Routledge Malaysian Studies Ser.

  41

hired to manage the stalls.153 Correspondingly, we see a gradual increase in non-Chinese

inhabiting Havana’s Chinatown by 1990.154 In addition, most of the employees working in

Havana’s Chinatown today are also not ethnically pure Chinese.155 Nevertheless, a face-to-

face bargaining is a key facet of the ‘Chinatown experience’ in KL.156 It is interesting to

note that foreign migrant workers working in KL’s Chinatown have quickly learned to

converse in creole Malaysian English, Malay and a smattering of local Chinese dialects in

order to interact with their customers. 157

                                                                                                                         153 Ibid. 154 Triana, Mauro García, and Pedro Eng Herrera. The Chinese in Cuba, 1847-now. Lanham: Lexington, 2009. Print. 155 Bremer, Catherine. "Havana's Chinatown a Glimpse of a Different Cuba." World. Reuters, 3 Apr. 2007. Web. 156 Yeoh, Seng Guan, and Josh Lepawsky. The Other Kuala Lumpur: Living in the Shadows of a Globalising Southeast Asian City. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print. Routledge Malaysian Studies Ser. 157 Ibid.

  42

CHAPTER SIX: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PATTERNS OF ACCULTURATION AND RESISTANCE

Marriage and Family: Cuba

Intermarriage is considered as one of the most definitive means of the dissolution of

social and cultural barriers-and therefore of social and cultural integration-because it is the

result of close social interaction between people of two different ethnicities.158 From the

earliest period of the coolie trade, the population of Chinese Cubans made up 99 percent

males.159 This matters because factors such as the size of, and gender imbalance in, the

ethnic community and its residential concentration can affect the availability and choice of

marriage partners within the community, thereby affecting the group’s intermarriage rate.160

From 1861 to the 1920s, Chinese women comprised a very scarce 0.17 percent to 0.45

percent of the Chinese population, only jumping to 2.76 percent in the 1920s (reaching a

high 4.09 percent in the 1950s). Chinese women appeared as part of the merchant

community, whereas black women appeared in relation to coolie marriages and in the

context of slavery.161

Besides gender imbalance, class privilege and socioeconomic status influenced

intermarriage rates.162 Nineteenth-century Cuban elites generally opposed Chinese

intermarriage with whites but were more permissive toward their mixing with people of

                                                                                                                         158 Khoo, Siew-Ean. "Intermarriage, Integration and Multiculturalism: A Demographic Perspective." Multiculturalism and Integration: A Harmonious Relationship. By Michael G. Clyne and James Jupp. Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E, 2011. 101-19. Print. 159 Yun, Lisa. "Historical Context of Coolie Traffic To The Americas." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 1-35. Print. 160 Khoo, Siew-Ean. "Intermarriage, Integration and Multiculturalism: A Demographic Perspective." Multiculturalism and Integration: A Harmonious Relationship. By Michael G. Clyne and James Jupp. Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E, 2011. 101-19. Print. 161 Yun, Lisa. "An Afro-Chinese Author And The Next Generation." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 183-228. Print. 162 Lopez, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 82-114. Print.

  43

color. If a baptismal certificate classified a Chinese as white, authorities did not have

grounds for dismissing a petition to marry a white woman. But legal status did not

automatically transfer into social acceptance. The 1874 commission reported two instances

of Chinese who married white women but faced opposition from Cuban society. 163

Wealthier Chinese Cubans tend to marry other ethnic Chinese or they would bring over

families from the United States and China. Some Chinese Cubans also chose to marry fair-

skinned cubana women.164 As for the lower-class Chinese Cubans especially former

indentured laborers, most of them intermarried with black and mulatto women.165 Given the

difficulty of returning to China and the scarcity of Chinese women, ex-coolies could be

expected to have formed unions with slaves or free people of color for mutual assistance.166

Much intermarriage at the lower end of the social scale created a mulatto element in the

population.167 This is important because we can see that Chinese Cubans have assimilated to

the Cuban culture as a result of the high degree of intermarriage.

Marriage and Family: Malaysia

Intermarriage among Chinese, Malays and Indians was commonplace centuries prior to

British colonialism.168 The Peranakan (‘Baba’ or Straits Chinese) communities of the Malay

                                                                                                                         163 Lopez, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 82-114. Print. 164 Yun, Lisa. "An Afro-Chinese Author And The Next Generation." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 183-228. Print. 165 López, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 82-114. Print. 166 Ibid. 167 Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale UP, 2004. Print. 168 Rerceretnam, Marc. "Intermarriage in Colonial Malaya and Singapore: A Case Study of Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Roman Catholic and Methodist Asian Communities." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43.2 (2012): 302-23. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2015.

  44

archipelago came about from early alliances between Chinese traders and Malay women.169

The new hybrid community adopted many aspects of both Malay and Chinese culture. This

is particular important because reflects the Chinese acculturation to the Malay culture from

intermarriage while adopting the Malay language.170 In a similar vein, the ‘Jawi Pekan’

communities developed as a result of interaction between Indian traders and Malay

women.171 Similar to gender imbalance experienced by Chinese Cubans during the coolie

trade in the 1840s, the majority of Chines laborers and immigrants in Malaysia were men.172

As a result, intermarriage was important since the disproportionately higher male population

of late nineteenth-century forced many to seek partners outside their communities.173

Unlike Chinese Cubans high frequency of intermarriage, Chinese Malaysians are faced

with barriers such as religious beliefs that discourage marriage between other ethnics

especially with Malays.174 Despite intermarriage with Malays was limited, there were two

marriages between local Indian Christians and converted Christian Malays.175 This is

probably due to the religious exclusivity of both Christianity and Malay, which discouraged

intermarriage, unless one party converted to other’s faith.176 Having said that, Church-based

                                                                                                                         169 Ibid. 170 Tan, Chee Beng. "Chinese Migration, Localization and the Production of Baba Culture." Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004. 69-90. Print. 171 Rerceretnam, Marc. "Intermarriage in Colonial Malaya and Singapore: A Case Study of Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Roman Catholic and Methodist Asian Communities." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43.2 (2012): 302-23. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2015. 172 Tan, Chee Beng. "Chinese Migration, Localization and the Production of Baba Culture." Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 2004. 69-90. Print. 173 Rerceretnam, Marc. "Intermarriage in Colonial Malaya and Singapore: A Case Study of Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Roman Catholic and Methodist Asian Communities." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43.2 (2012): 302-23. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2015. 174 Leete, Richard. "Introduction and Background." Introduction. Malaysia's Demographic Transition: Rapid Development, Culture, and Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1996. 1-28. Print. 175 Rerceretnam, Marc. "Intermarriage in Colonial Malaya and Singapore: A Case Study of Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Roman Catholic and Methodist Asian Communities." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43.2 (2012): 302-23. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2015. 176 Ibid.

  45

orphanages and homes played a significant role in facilitating intermarriage.177 Not

surprisingly, the main reason for a child being left to an orphanage was poverty.178 The

orphanages, particularly those of the Roman Catholic convents, encouraged many of their

young charges, on reaching the age of 15 years or so, to get marred.179 These orphanages

provided ‘opportunities’ for male-female contact and inadvertently acted as a platform for

marriages, some of which were interracial.180 Both Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysians

experience factors such as class privilege and socioeconomic backgrounds that would affect

their rate of intermarriage with other non-ethnic Chinese groups.

In terms of the outcome of intermarriage, there are two groups of Chinese Malaysians

that demonstrate the two distinct processes of acculturation and assimilation. The Peranakan

Chinese is acculturated to the Malay culture to a less extent, as compared to the Chinese

Cubans. Meanwhile, we see that the Straits Chinese Malaysians have not entirely

assimilated to the local Malay culture.181

Education and Language: Cuba

Access to education and language classes are a few examples that would facilitate

linguistic retention. In 1883, the Chinese society “La Caridad” in Havana was formed and

one of their missions included promoting the Chinese language.182 The association also

provided games such as billiards, chess, dominoes, a library with national and foreign

newspapers, and weekly performances of Cantonese opera. Due to the growing number of                                                                                                                          177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 Sidhu, Manjit S., and Gavin W. Jones. Population Dynamics in a Plural Society: Peninsular Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: U of Malaya Co-operative hop, 1981. Print. 182 López, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 82-114. Print.

  46

Cuban born Chinese, there was an increased desire for educational institutions. Educational

institutions reflected transnational merchants’ desire for Chinese cultural attachments to

form among the second generation.183 In the late nineteenth century, Qing diplomats,

merchants, and missionaries developed institutions in the Americas to promote Chinese and

Western education, a goal that dovetailed with China’s path to modernization.184 Chinese-

Western academies for the sons of Chinese merchants developed in Havana in 1886.185

Chinese teachers were brought directly from China to the Americas to teach the Confucian

classics, and English or Spanish language teachers were hired locally.186 Confronted with

shortages of funds and enrollments, the academy in Havana closed after five years.187

Cuban-born youth struggled with acquiring sufficient Chinese language ability and with

competing demands on their time. Furthermore, the Cuban revolution in the late 1950’s led

to an installation of a communist government with clear commitment to education and

healthcare.188 An important goal in the 1960s was universal access through lower secondary

school.189 A massive effort was made to ‘equalize’ Cuban education in rural and urban areas

and among urban neighborhoods.190 As a result, Chinese Cubans were not allowed to

establish vernacular Chinese and thus had no choice but to integrate with non-Chinese in

public schools. This further promoted integration and assimilation to the Cuban culture.

Comparable to immigrants of second generations around the Americas, homeland ties

gradually diminishes and the need to learn the home language became more of a want than a                                                                                                                          183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Carnoy, Martin, Amber K. Gove, and Jeffery H. Marshall. Cuba's Academic Advantage: Why Students in Cuba Do Better in School. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007. Print. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid.

  47

need.191 This statement applies to the case of Chinese Cubans, especially among children of

mixed descent. However, from the nineteenth century on, members of the upper strata of

Chinese Cubans made significant efforts toward promoting transnational identities among

their Cuban-born children through education and cultural association. Chinese merchants

sent their Cuban-born sons to China for education. Often, one son remained in Cuba to learn

the business while another went to school in Hong Kong or Guangzhou. After being

immersed in Chinese language and culture for a period of time, children would return to

Cuba with new skills and a connection to an ancestral homeland. This demonstrates that the

socioeconomic background was among the few factors that facilitated the Chinese Cubans

access to learn Chinese.

As of 2009, learning Chinese as a foreign language is available and offered through the

Confucius Institute at the University of Havana.192 Cuban students complete a three-year

course of study to achieve mid-level proficiency in Mandarin, a language that would have

been foreign to most of the Cantonese migrants in Cuba.193 The institute enrolls one hundred

and eighty students in fifteen weekly classes.194

Education and Language: Malaysia

The first Chinese school on the Malay Peninsula is thought to date back to 1815.195 As

sojourner settlements in what is now Malaysia grew, so did Chinese schools.196 The Chinese

                                                                                                                         191 López, Kathleen. "Families and Communities." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2013. 82-114. Print. 192 López, Kathleen. "Epilogue." Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2012. 237-51. Print. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Freedman, Amy L. "The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas Acculturation: The Case of Malaysia." Modern Asian Studies 35.02 (2001): 411-36. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

  48

community initially created a system of vernacular schools, which served to spread the use

of Mandarin Chinese and the continuation of Chinese culture.197 Similar to the Chinese

Cubans experience before the Cuban Revolution, Chinese schools in British Malaya were

largely independent. On 31 March 1954, the Chinese student population in Malaya stood at

31% (251,174) of the total school enrollment (803,803) in the country.198 The majority

250,000-odd Chinese students were enrolled in 1,200 schools, the majority of which

received partial financial backing from the government in the form of grants-in-aid.199 As

Chinese Cubans heavily relied on private funds, Chinese schools in Malaysia depended to a

considerable extent upon financial endowments made to them by the leaders of the Chinese

associations as well.200 The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce (ACCC) provided

much of the funding and leadership, first for the schools themselves, and then for the

education movement.201

1969 marked an important year for the education of Chinese Malaysians as the

government decided that English would be replaced by Malay one year at a time from

primary level right up to University level.202 As a result, there was there was a resurgence in

enrollment in Chinese schools. This was widely reconsidered as a reaction to the post-1969

switch of emphasis from English to the national language, Malay. (See Table 6 and Figure 3)

Both Table 6 and Figure 3 reflect the increase in enrollment of Chinese pupils in

Chinese-medium schools. Given the political situation, many English-educated Chinese

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. . 198 Ibid. 199 Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 202 Kua, Kia Soong. "Chinese Education Under the New Economic Policy." A Protean Saga: The Chinese Schools of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Dong Hao Zong Higher Learning Centre, 1999. 95-96. Print.

  49

parents decided to send their children to Chinese schools. This can also be attributed to the

reclaiming of their lost cultural heritage through their English-medium education, and the

extinction of the former English schools.203

Table 6: Number of Students Enrolled in Government Assisted Schools 1971-1978

Year Formerly English-Medium Chinese-Medium 1971 337,560 413,270 1972 336,768 435,266 1973 335,297 450,903 1974 324,576 465,541 1975 313,060 480,984 1976 304,313 487,877 1977 302,449 493,809 1978 300,753 498,311

Source: Kua, Kia Soong. "Chinese Education Under the New Economic Policy." A Protean Saga: The Chinese

Schools of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Dong Hao Zong Higher Learning Centre, 1999. 95-96. Print.

Figure 3: Number of Students Enrolled in Government Assisted Schools 1971-1978

Source: Kua, Kia Soong. "Chinese Education Under the New Economic Policy." A Protean Saga: The Chinese

Schools of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Dong Hao Zong Higher Learning Centre, 1999. 95-96. Print.

                                                                                                                         203 Ibid.

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

Primary School Student Enrollment 1971-78

Formerly English-Medium

Chinese-Medium

  50

Unlike the Cuban government’s commitment to promote equality in education, the

Malaysian government promotes segregation. By granting the Chinese a measure of

autonomy in education, certain Malay elites are able to continue portraying the Chinese

community as divided in their loyalties and outlook.204 Chinese Cubans assimilated to the

Cuban culture but there is little likelihood of Chinese in Malaysia further acculturating

while so many factors act to preserve ethnic differences.205

                                                                                                                         204 Freedman, Amy L. "The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas Acculturation: The Case of Malaysia." Modern Asian Studies 35.02 (2001): 411-36. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 205 Ibid.

  51

Food: Cuba

It is evident that no matter where you go, one of the aspects of culture that is most

important is food. Food reflects an integral part of human livelihoods, identity, and culture.

The practical dimensions and development of food production, consumption and sharing,

and the symbolic and ideological meanings attached to food, have relevance across the study

of diaspora, with particular attention to questions of history, acculturation, localization,

globalization, cultural production and creative imagination. Foodways also shed light on the

global issues of cultural commodification that is, the significance of the global phenomena

of food as symbols of ethnicity, gender, nationality, and modernity.206 The history of

Chinese cuisine is rich, marked by both variety and change. The topic of Chinese food

reflects culture continuity and local transformation. This is significant to the formation of

the Chinese Cubans and Chinese Malaysian identity and way of life.

The presence of Chinese food in Cuba continues to permeate many aspects of life in

Cuba today.207 Early Chinese settlers introduced, cultivated, and helped assimilate into the

Cuban diet a number of new vegetables, including pumpkin, cabbage, long green beans, and

cucumber.208 This introduction to new ingredients was one of the gateways of Chinese

culture to Cuba.209 The Chinese culture Cuba has many fruit orchards with trees of Chinese

origin, like the Chinese orange, of which nineteen types exist in Cuba. Chinese food in Cuba

is commonly associated with fried rice.210 Fried rice in Cuba consists of rice with black

                                                                                                                         206 Wu, David Y. H., and Chee Beng. Tan. Foreword. Changing Chinese Foodways in Asia. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 2001. Viii-Xiii. Print. 207 Spiller, Harley. "Chinese Food in Central and South America." Cuba: Chinese Food and a Festival Spring.9 (2002): 1-9. Flavor and Fortune. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid.

  52

beans, sliced cabbages and chunks of yucca. These common takeout snacks can be upgraded

to a full meal with a fried pork chop and/or greasy gravy made from bits of fried pork.

Mixed ingredient fried rice was drier than it looked and overburdened with handfuls of

smoked meats, sickly bean sprouts and scallions.211

The presence of Chinese Cuban food has created Chino Latino restaurants. Asian

Latinos, depending on their phenotype, are perceived and can be easily categorized as either

Asian or Latino; there is little room for them to assert their distinct culturally mixed

identity.212 The restaurants, hence, offer an important exception to the rule by boldly

announcing and affirming the existence of this community.213 Chinese Cubans embrace this

bicultural identity that is reflected through the dishes they offer on their menu. There is a

particularly well known Chino Latino restaurant called La Caridad 78 located in New York

City built during the 1960’s.214 The restaurant is unique and creative because it reflects the

Chinese Cuban distinctive bicultural cuisine. At La Caridad 78, there are familiar signs of

Chino-Latino culture. The menu showcases several pages listing Chinese dishes followed by

another few pages of Latino food.215 The entire menu is written in Chinese, English and

Spanish. At La Caridad 78 and other Chino Latino restaurants like it, one can pair chop

suey with tostones or lo mein de la casa with chuletas fritas.216 This is important because it

points out that Chinese Cubans do not necessarily view Chinese cuisine as entirely different

from Cuban cuisine. Both types of cuisine can be ordered and eaten simultaneously without

the pressure to decide which is better than the other. Indeed, the waiters’ presence gives La                                                                                                                          211 Ibid. 212 Siu, Lok. "Chino Latino Restaurants: Converging Communities, Identities, and Cultures." Afro-Hispanic Review 27.1 (2008): 161-71. JSTOR. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid. 215 La Caridad 78. New York. Menu. 22 Apr. 2015. Print. 216 Ibid.

  53

Caridad 78 a sense of chino cubano “authenticity” that other similar restaurants simply

cannot replicate.217

Food: Malaysia

Chinese food in Malaysia is as complicated as Chinese identities. The cuisines

incorporate a variety of styles, coming from various regions in the south of China. Among

the southern styles, the Cantonese is the most famous. Most Chinese restaurants in Malaysia

not only serve Cantonese food but also a range of local specialties, including those

developed in Malaysia.218 In Malaysia, there are numerous examples of cultural adaptation

and borrowing of local ingredients to create new delicacies.219 Kelantan and Terengganu,

which are states located in the east coast of peninsular Malaysia consists of a small

population of ethnic Chinese. Kelantan and Terengganu are two states with a small Chinese

population, less than 5%.220As a result, the ethnic Chinese in Kelantan and Terengganu has

largely assimilated with the local Malays. The Chinese in Kelantan love to eat the Kelantan

Malays’ favourite budu, which is made of pickled anchovy. In both Kelantan and

Terengganu, the Peranakan-type Chinese have acquired the local taste for anak tebuan or

hornet grubs, usually eaten in the fried form.221

There is much to study and learn from intercultural contacts, local adaptation and

changing foodways, as we have seen in the case of Chinese in Kelantan and Terrengganu

and Chinese in Cuba. The changing food heritage of the Chinese living in different parts of                                                                                                                          217 Siu, Lok. "Chino Latino Restaurants: Converging Communities, Identities, and Cultures." Afro-Hispanic Review 27.1 (2008): 161-71. JSTOR. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 218 Wu, David Y. H., and Chee Beng. Tan. "Food and Ethnicity with Reference to the Chinese in Malaysia." Changing Chinese Foodways in Asia. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 2001. 126-55. Print. 219 Ibid. 220 Wan-Ibrahim, W. A., and I. Zainab. "Some Demographic Aspects of Chinese Population in Malaysia." World Applied Sciences Journal 30.7 (2014): 923-26. Print. 221 Wu, David Y. H., and Chee Beng. Tan. "Food and Ethnicity with Reference to the Chinese in Malaysia." Changing Chinese Foodways in Asia. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 2001. 126-55. Print.

  54

the world is the result of Chinese adaptation to local environment, which includes utilizing

local ecological and cultural resources.222 Exposure to local sources of food (ingredients,

etc.) and non-Chinese cultural principles of food preparation results in cultural borrowing as

well as cultural innovation.223 As mentioned earlier, the Baba and Nyonya also known as

Peranakan Chinese are terms used for the descendants of the 15th through 17th century

Chinese immigrants to the Malay Archipelago.224 Their cuisine reflect a hybrid of Chinese

and non-Chinese cultural principles, as well incorporates local ingredients.225 This hybridity

is not the case for Chinese Cuban as their cuisine is not “fusion” per se; the dishes are not

original inventions created by mixing Chinese and Latino culinary traditions.226 A more

accurate description of the menu is the coexistence of conventional Chinese and Latino

dishes, like chow mien and shrimp with black bean sauce, and ropa vieja and platanos

maduro.227 The difference lies in the ability for one to order from both sets of offering at

once. What makes Chinese Cuban restaurants and food unique is its genuine effort for

coexistence instead of fusion.

Essentially, the Chinese Malaysia’s cuisine adapts to the local environment and in such

influenced their identity and continuity.228 This is significant because continuity of the

heritage provides the persistent and yet fluid Chinese identity. Unlike the Chinese Cuban

cuisine, Chinese Malaysian cuisine blends local ingredients and cooking style.229 This

demonstrates a high degree of acculturation to Malay culture. On the other hand, the

                                                                                                                         222 Ibid. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 Siu, Lok. "Chino Latino Restaurants: Converging Communities, Identities, and Cultures." Afro-Hispanic Review 27.1 (2008): 161-71. JSTOR. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 227 La Caridad 78. New York. Menu. 22 Apr. 2015. Print. 228 Wu, David Y. H., and Chee Beng. Tan. "Food and Ethnicity with Reference to the Chinese in Malaysia." Changing Chinese Foodways in Asia. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 2001. 126-55. Print. 229 Ibid.

  55

Chinese Cubans cuisine suggests coexistence and represents a cultural crossroad in which

Chinese and Latino culture come together, and interact.230 This suggests that Chinese

Cubans have assimilated themselves into the Cuban culture and developed a special

bicultural identity. This bicultural pairing has created something distinct in process and

challenges notions of conventional Chinese identity.231

                                                                                                                         230 Siu, Lok. "Chino Latino Restaurants: Converging Communities, Identities, and Cultures." Afro-Hispanic Review 27.1 (2008): 161-71. JSTOR. Web. 22 Apr. 2015. 231 Ibid.

  56

CHAPTER SEVEN: CUBAN AND MALAYSIAN CHINESE AND A NEW CHINA

China and Cuba Relations: Transnational Connections

As the history of Chinese diaspora is so deeply entangled with events surrounding China,

it is important to examine the past, present and future of Sino-Cuban relations. China’s

relations with Cuba dates back to 1847, when the first of more than 15,000 Chinese

indentured laborers arrived in Havana’s port of Regla.232 On September 2, 1960, Fidel

Castro declared that Cuba would sever ties with Taiwan; this was done within a month, on

September 28, making Cuba the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic

relations with the People’s Republic of China. Cuban-Chinese have experienced important

political transformation such as the Cuban Revolution during the 1950’s. This demonstrates

that the Cuban-Chinese had to devise for themselves diverse cultural, ethnic and political

identities to meet the multiple challenges from both their native and adopted homeland. The

experiences of China and Vietnam should be taken into account in this process, especially as

Cuba reflects on its economy, society, politics, and ideology.233 The Chinese and

Vietnamese cases are part of broader discussions in Cuba about contemporary socialism,

largely because socialism has been the reference point for the country’s transformation ever

since the breakdown of “real socialism” in Europe.234

In recent years, China has emerged as a major global economic and trade power. It is

currently the world’s largest merchandise trading economy, second-largest destination of

foreign direct investment (FDI), largest manufacturer, largest holder of foreign exchange

                                                                                                                         232 Hearn, Adrian H. "China and the Future of Cuba." A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution Under Raúl Castro. Ed. Philip Brenner, Marguerita Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, and William M. Leogrande. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. 231-37. Print. 233 Villanueva, Omar Everleny Pérez. “Updating the Cuban Economic Model.” A Contemporary Cuban Reader: The Revolution Under Raúl Castro. Ed. Philip Brenner, Marguerita Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, and William M. Leogrande. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. 139-44. Print. 234 Ibid.

  57

reserves, and is projected to become the world’s largest economy in 2014.235 Harnecker

points out that to achieve accelerated economic growth, it is necessary for the incorporation

of Cuba into international production chains and policies to attract foreign investment.236

Harnecker further points to the success of China and Vietnam in promoting growth by

attracting direct foreign investment and Cuban’s need for external financing.237

China’s interest in expanding their investments in Latin has prompted the country to

further invest in Cuba’s manufacturing industry. Following an initial shipment of 500,000

Chinese bicycles to Cuba in the early 1990s, Mao Xianglin, a former enjoy of the Central

Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, visited Cuba in 1997 to assist in the

establishment of a bicycle factory with Chinese capital and technical expertise.238 Hearn

argues that the success of the initiative led to a similar export-to-production scheme for

electric fans. China’s technical and financial assistance to Cuba highlights loyalty and

genuine interest for Cuba’s economy.239 During a 2001 visit to Cuba, Chinese President

Jiang Zemin offered an interest-free credit line of U.S. $6.5 million and a loan of U.2 $200

million to modernize local telecommunications with Chinese products and a U.S. $150

million credit to buy Chinese televisions.240 Following a successful sale of Chinese washing

machines, televisions, air conditioners, and refrigerators to Cuba, Hu Jintao signed sixteen

                                                                                                                         235 Morrison, Wayne M. "China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States." Congressional Research Service (2014): 1-38. Print. 236 Hearn, Adrian H. "China and the Future of Cuba." A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The Revolution Under Raúl Castro. Ed. Philip Brenner, Marguerita Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, and William M. Leogrande. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. 231-37. Print. 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid.

  58

accords in 2004 pledging Chinese support for the domestic manufacturer of these and other

goods.241

China’s pursut of industrial integration is evident in the Cuban transport sector, which in

2006 received a U.S. $1.8 billion revolving credit line backed by the China Export and

Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), whose repayment was renegotiated in 2010.242 The

Chinese government has a vested interest in the success of Cuba’s reforms, reflected in the

negotiation of the first Five-Year Plan for Sino-Cuban cooperation in June 2011.243 China

sits at the crossroads of these local and global developments, encouraging Cuba toward

rapprochement with international norms even as it works to reform them.244 Although Sino-

Cuban relation initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation,

Chinese support for Cuba’s liberalization agenda is prompting the Westerns hemisphere’s

only communist nation toward alignment with international norms.245

This economic and trade relations so far has continuously improved China’s and Cuba’s

relationship. In 2014, China and Cuba signed an array of 29 cooperation agreements to

support the Caribbean country’s development and enhance bilateral ties as President Xi

Jinping paid his first-ever state visit to Cuba.246 In this visit, Xi acknowledged that the long-

term friendship was based on mutual trust and respect. China will continue to enhance

promote exchanges and expand mutually beneficial cooperation as a strategic partner. It is

clear that Cuba appreciates the opportunity to collaborate with China. As a remark to Xi,

                                                                                                                         241 Ibid. 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid. 245 Ibid. 246 Wu, Jiao, and Yun Bi Zhang. "China, Cuba Ink Cooperation Pacts." China Daily [Beijing] 23 July 2014: 2. Print.

  59

Castro said Cuba is keen on expanding areas of cooperation with China, including trade,

renewable energy and agriculture.247 This demonstrates that there seems to be a bright and

optimistic future for both China and Cuba’s relationship as the rhetoric appear to suggest.

Castro mentioned that Cuba welcomes Chinese investments in the country and calls for

establishing a joint working group to promote more investment projects.248

China’s relationship with Cuba extends beyond trade and economic collaboration. Both

China and Cuba promote educational and cultural exchanges to foster mutual understanding.

There are roughly 3,800 Chinese students who have come to Cuba since 2006 to pursue

study under a bilateral government education exchange program.249 The Chinese students

come from 12 central and central and western provinces and municipalities in China to

study a diverse array of subjects from medicine and education to tourism and Spanish.250

The program requires that all of the Chinese students spend the first year studying

Spanish.251 Most importantly, both the Cuban and Chinese governments provide

scholarships for the students, many of whom come from underprivileged families in less

developed parts of China.252 This opportunity for an educational exchange demonstrates that

China views highly of Cuba’s educational system and hope to continue this relation. This

collaboration in the healthcare sector has further enhanced advancement in the medical

practice and research of both countries. “Researchers from China and Cuba have been

working together to treat chronic disease with technology in molecular immunology”.253

                                                                                                                         247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 Chen, Weihua. "Chinese Students Fall for Cuba." China Daily [Beijing] 22 July 2014: 1-2. Print. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 252 Ibid. 253 Wang, Qing Yun. "China and Cuba Jointly Fight Chronic Diseases." China Daily [Beijing] 23 July 2014: 3. Print.

  60

This cooperation has resulted in the development of the new drugs and not only will it

improve the health of patients in China and Cuba, but also patients in other countries”.254

Extending beyond the realm of trade and diplomatic relations, this Sino-Cuban

relationship has cultivated a strong interest in the promotion of the arts. About 30 Chinese

salsa dance enthusiasts visited Cuba last September.255 Their 10-day journey was for an

intensive certification process. The Sino-Cuban bond has clearly opened the Chinese minds

and souls to things from Cuba that extend beyond the realm of economics and trade

relations.

Malaysian Chinese and a New China

In the early years of Malaysia’s independence, Kuala Lumpur had no diplomatic

relations with China. Malaysians were also not allowed to visit China.256 Despite the

opening of ties, domestic concern continued to shape the nature of the relations. There were

still links between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Malaysian Communist

Party (MCP) that bothered Malaysia.257 China’s support for anti-colonial revolutionary

movements, particularly in Malaya and Indochina, made it difficult to establish satisfactory

relations with newly independent governments still beholden to the West for their security

under the aegis of the new regional hegemon, the United States.258

Suryadinata, Leo. "Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020." Ethnic Chinese as Southeast

Asians. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. 72-106. Print.

                                                                                                                         254 Ibid. 255 Li, Jing. "Chinese Get to Know Cuba through Salsa." China Daily [Beijing] 21 July 2014: 3. Print. 256 Suryadinata, Leo. "Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020." Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. 72-106. Print. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid.

  61

The period from the ceasefire agreement between the United States and Vietnam early in

1973 to the death of Mao in 1976 marked a major shift in China’s relations with Southeast

Asia.259 Under Prime Minister Dato Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia enhanced ties

with China. In quick succession in 1974 and 1975, three members of the staunchly anti-

communist Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Malaysia, the Philippines and

Thailand, established diplomatic relations with the PRC.260 Travel to China was

subsequently allowed open to all Malaysians. In 1985, there were about 250 Malaysian

companies trading in China.261

Similar to Cuba’s experience, China has a long history of trading ties and continues to

demonstrate interest in Malaysia’s economy.262  In 1993, bilateral trade between Malaysia

and China was worth over RM6 billion. This was an almost seventeen fold increase,

compared to trade figures of twenty years earlier. By 1994, it had reached RM8.5 billion.

Over the years, China had been among the largest buyers of Malaysian rubber and since

1994 it had also become the biggest importer of Malaysian palm oil. In fact, it is the Malay

elite who pursued close economic ties with East Asia in preference to the West. Malaysia

vies with Thailand in claiming to have the friendliest relations with Beijing. Kuala Lumpur

                                                                                                                         259 Stuart‑Fox, Martin. "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.1 (2004): 116-39. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 260 Ibid. 261 Suryadinata, Leo. "Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020." Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. 72-106. Print. 262 Stuart‑Fox, Martin. "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.1 (2004): 116-39. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.  

  62

would this be unlikely to side with the United States in a confrontation with China

(especially if the United States was perceived to be anti-Islamic).263  

Unlike Cuba and China’s educational exchange, Malaysia faces a challenge in its ability

to attract and retain students from China.264 For example, INTI, one of the largest Chinese

Malaysian owned university has experienced a decline of 10 percent of Chinese student

enrollment from 2003-2004.265 Many Mainland Chinese students do not see the reason to

pursue their studies in Malaysia since they have the choice to obtain a Western degree in

China.266

As for the future of Chinese Malaysians, they are likely to continue to direct their energy

and ambition to the economic sphere.267 Besides bringing in management and technological

skills as well as some capital, the Chinese will continue to rely on networking.268 Business

networking, especially in Malaysia, relies on the maintenance of distinctiveness that are

Chinese.269 For this reason, tradition, language and culture of the Chinese should remain

important.

 

                                                                                                                         263 Stuart‑Fox, Martin. "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.1 (2004): 116-39. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 264 Suryadinata, Leo. "Students from China in Malaysia." Southeast Asia's Chinese Businesses in an Era of Globalization: Coping with the Rise of China. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006. 180-81. Print. 265 Ibid. 266 Ibid. 267 Stuart‑Fox, Martin. "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.1 (2004): 116-39. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. 268 Ibid. 269 Ibid.  

  63

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been to develop a comparative study of both Chinese Cubans

and Chinese Malaysians, as agents adapting to different economic, political, social and

cultural regimes under colonial rule and later on post-colonial nationalism. I framed my

arguments based on a chorological timeline from the 1840s until the early 21st century. This

section summarizes the main findings of this study and draws out their implications.

Essentially, the findings enrich our understanding of this important period in the study

of Chinese diaspora, while demonstrating the value of the analytical approach. Chapter One

pertains to the history of Chinese immigration and the infamous coolie trade. Fundamental

changes occurred since the 1840s and the international arena underlines the historical

specificity of these findings. While recruitment for Chinese indentured laborers in Cuba and

Malaysia happened through the “pig trade”, who controlled the organization of labor and

recruitment differed between the two cases. Non-Chinese mainly controlled Cuba’s “pig

trade” whereas Malaysia’s case was the opposite. These findings suggest the control of non-

Chinese interests over migration in Cuba resulted only in dispersion, rather than the

emergence of continued migration and transnational connections.

Chapter Two highlights the growth of Chinese communities under colonial rule in the

19th and 20th century. The main findings suggest ethnic Chinese in the two countries started

to migrate to urban areas and improved their economic standings. As a result, we start to see

a change in social class and socioeconomic status within the Chinese communities in both

countries. The chapter concludes with a research on the political power of Chinese

Malaysians and Chinese Cubans. Unlike the Chinese Cubans who were praised and fought

  64

as rebels, Chinese Malaysians were seen as ‘under’ the Malays and never equal. This made

it challenging for the Chinese to integrate with the Malay society. Chapter Four highlights

the crisis and responses at the end of colonialism. Major findings argue that in both of these

cases, the Chinese communities established an area, Chinatown as part of their growing

society. Nevertheless, political ideologies of communism and a changing China affected

leftist political organizations of both countries differently. Communism was opposed and

created distrust in Chinese Malaysian community whereas in Cuba, the government

acknowledged the leftist political organizations.

As a result of the implementation of new policies and government intervention

particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese communities in Cuba and Malaysia began to

leave and migrate to other countries. Chapter Six investigates patterns of acculturation and

resistance in terms of intermarriage, education, language and food. The three sections

suggest that Chinese Malaysians have managed to maintain their strong ethnic identity as

compared to Chinese Cubans. Lastly, Chapter Seven examines China relation with Cuba and

Malaysia and possible implications. Major findings suggest China developed a strong

economic interest in both countries but China’s relation with Cuba extends beyond trade and

economic collaboration.

The study of Chinese diaspora reflects a growing community and that there is much

more to be learned. As China continues to rise both economically and politically, it will be

interesting to see the changing dynamics of the overseas Chinese communities around the

world. This project has demonstrated that space, time and mobility complicate the Chinese

identity and that cultural identity changes on the ground all the time.

  65

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnett, Patricia G. "The Chinese in Southeastern Asia and the Philippines." Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science 226.Southeastern Asia and the

Philippines (1943): 32-49. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

Bremer, Catherine. "Havana's Chinatown a Glimpse of a Different Cuba." World. Reuters, 3

Apr. 2007. Web.

Carnoy, Martin, Amber K. Gove, and Jeffery H. Marshall. Cuba's Academic Advantage: Why

Students in Cuba Do Better in School. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007. Print.

Chen, Weihua. "A Bike Ride Helps Cuban Editor Fit into Chinese Society." China Daily

[Beijing] 22 July 2014: 1-2. Print.

Chen, Weihua. "Chinese Business Leader Feels at Home in Cub." China Daily [Beijing] 23 July

2014: 3. Print.

Chen, Weihua. "Chinese Students Fall for Cuba." China Daily [Beijing] 22 July 2014: 1-2. Print.

Ching-Hwang, Yen. "Class Structure and Social Mobility in the Chinese Community in

Singapore and Malaya 1800–1911." Modern Asian Studies 21.03 (1987): 417-45. JSTOR.

Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

Cohen, Robin. "The Chinese of Peru, Cuba and Mexico." The Cambridge Survey of World

Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. 220-21. Print.

Comber, Leon. "The Beginnings of Plural Society in Malaya." 13 May 1969: A Historical

Survey of Sino-Malay Relations. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1983. 5. Print.

"Community Information Summary:Malaysia-born." Australian Government Department of

Immigration and Citizenship. N.p., 2011. Web. 23 Apr. 2015.

Field, Robin E., and Parmita Kapadia. Transforming Diaspora: Communities beyond National

  66

Boundaries. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2011. Print.

Freedman, Amy L. "The Effect of Government Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas

Acculturation: The Case of Malaysia." Modern Asian Studies 35.02 (2001): 411-36.

JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

Gin, Ooi Keat. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print.

Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale UP, 2004. Print.

Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana. Presencia China En Cuba. La Habana: Grupo

Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana, 1999. Print.

Gullick, J. M. The Story of Kuala Lumpur:. Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Eastern U Pr., 1983. Print.

Hearn, Adrian H. "China and the Future of Cuba." A Contemporary Cuba Reader: The

Revolution Under Raúl Castro. Ed. Philip Brenner, Marguerita Rose Jiménez, John M.

Kirk, and William M. Leogrande. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. 231-

37. Print.

Heng, Pek Koon. "The Historical Background: Chinese Settlement and Political Institutions in

Malaya." Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association.

Singapore: Oxford UP, 1988. 10-33. Print.

Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labor of

Neoslavery." Black Studies 12.15 (1994): 1-14. Print.

Kaiser, Barbara, and Judy Sklar Rasminsky. Challenging Behavior in Elementary and Middle

School. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2009. Print.

Khoo, Boo Teik. "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector."

Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme 20.December (2005): 1-40.

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Web. 24 Apr. 2015.

  67

Khoo, Siew-Ean. "Intermarriage, Integration and Multiculturalism: A Demographic

Perspective." Multiculturalism and Integration a Harmonious Relationship. By Michael

G. Clyne and James Jupp. Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E, 2011. 101-19. Print.

Koh, Sin Yee. "Diasporic "Unbelonging" To Malaysia and Singapore: Second-Generation

Malaysian-Chinese Migrants in Singapore." Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2014):

358-72. Print.

Kua, Kia Soong. "Chinese Education Under the New Economic Policy." A Protean Saga: The

Chinese Schools of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Dong Hao Zong Higher Learning Centre,

1999. 95-96. Print.

Leete, Richard. "Introduction and Background." Introduction. Malaysia's Demographic

Transition: Rapid Development, Culture, and Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford UP, 1996.

1-28. Print.

Li, Jing. "Chinese Get to Know Cuba through Salsa." China Daily [Beijing] 21 July 2014: 3.

Print.

López, Kathleen. Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina,

2013. Print.

Ma, Laurence J. C., and Carolyn L. Cartier. The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and

Identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Print.

Mckeown, Adam. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian

Studies 58.2 (1999): 306-37. JSTOR. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.

Mckeown, Adam. "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian

Studies 58.2 (1999): 306-37. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

Moore, Wendy. West Malaysia and Singapore. Lincolnwood, IL: Passport, 1993. Print.

  68

Morrison, Wayne M. "China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications

for the United States." Congressional Research Service (2014): 1-38. Print.

Ooi, Keat Gin. Historical Dictionary of Malaysia. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2009. Print.

Percy, Carol, and Mary Catherine. Davidson. The Languages of Nation Attitudes and Norms.

Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2012. Print.

Rerceretnam, Marc. "Intermarriage in Colonial Malaya and Singapore: A Case Study of

Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Roman Catholic and Methodist Asian

Communities." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43.2 (2012): 302-23. JSTOR. Web.

23 Apr. 2015.

Rovner, Eduardo Sáenz. The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling

in Cuba from the 1920s to the Revolution. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2008. Print.

Sidhu, Manjit S., and Gavin W. Jones. Population Dynamics in a Plural Society: Peninsular

Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: U of Malaya Co-operative hop, 1981. Print.

Siu, Lok. "Chino Latino Restaurants: Converging Communities, Identities, and Cultures." Afro-

Hispanic Review 27.1 (2008): 161-71. JSTOR. Web. 22 Apr. 2015.

Smorkaloff, Pamela María. Readers and Writers in Cuba: A Social History of Print Culture,

1830s-1990s. New York: Garland Pub., 1997. Print.

Solomon, Michael R. Consumer Behaviour: A European Perspective. Harlow, England:

Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2006. Print.

Spiller, Harley. "Chinese Food in Central and South America." Cuba: Chinese Food and a

Festival Spring.9 (2002): 1-9. Flavor and Fortune. Web. 22 Apr. 2015.

Stuart‑Fox, Martin. "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping

Future Relations." Contemporary Southeast Asia 26.1 (2004): 116-39. JSTOR. Web. 21

  69

Apr. 2015.

Suryadinata, Leo. Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. Print. Tan,

Chee Beng. Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues. Hong Kong: Hong Kong

UP, 2004. Print.

Tarulevicz, Nicole. "A Cultural History of Food in Singapore." Eating Her Curries and Kway:

A Cultural History of Food in Singapore. Champaign: U of Illinois, 2013. 10-23. Print.

Triana, Mauro García, and Pedro Eng Herrera. The Chinese in Cuba, 1847-now. Lanham:

Lexington, 2009. Print.

Unger, Leonard. "The Chinese in Southeast Asia." Geographical Review 34.2 (1944): 196-217.

JSTOR. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.

Wang, Qing Yun. "China and Cuba Jointly Fight Chronic Diseases." China Daily [Beijing] 23

July 2014: 3. Print.

Wan-Ibrahim, W. A., and I. Zainab. "Some Demographic Aspects of Chinese Population in

Malaysia." World Applied Sciences Journal 30.7 (2014): 923-26. Print.

Wu, David Y. H., and Chee Beng. Tan. Changing Chinese Foodways in Asia. Hong Kong:

Chinese UP, 2001. Print.

Wu, Jiao, and Yun Bi Zhang. "China, Cuba Ink Cooperation Pacts." China Daily [Beijing] 23

July 2014: 2. Print.

Yeoh, Seng Guan, and Josh Lepawsky. The Other Kuala Lumpur: Living in the Shadows of a

Globalising Southeast Asian City. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 2014. Print. Routledge

Malaysian Studies Ser.

Yun, Lisa. "An Afro-Chinese Author And The Next Generation." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese

Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 183-

  70

228. Print.

Yun, Lisa. "Historical Context of Coolie Traffic To The Americas." The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2008. 1-35. Print.

  71

APPENDIX A

Front Page of the Map

Source: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana. Presencia China En Cuba. La Habana: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana, 1999. Print.

  72

APPENDIX B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Map of South China and the Ports of Origin

Source: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana. Presencia China En Cuba. La Habana: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana, 1999. Print.

  73

APPENDIX C

 

Map of Havana’s Chinatown

Source: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana. Presencia China En Cuba. La Habana: Grupo Promotor Del Barrio De La Habana, 1999. Print.