CHINA'S SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS ......counterspace program with the ability to disrupt or...
Transcript of CHINA'S SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS ......counterspace program with the ability to disrupt or...
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CHINA'S SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
U.S .-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
Prin ted for use of the
Uni ted States -China Economic and Securi ty Review Commission
Avai lab le v ia the World Wide Web: www.uscc .gov
UNITED STATES -CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW
COMMISSION
WASHINGTON: 2015
http://www.uscc.gov/
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW C OMMISSION
Hon. WILLIAM A. REINSCH, Chairman
Hon. DENNIS C. SHEA, Vice Chairman
Commissioners:
CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW DANIEL M. SLANE
ROBIN CLEVELAND SEN. JAMES TALENT
JEFFREY L. FIEDLER DR. KATHERINE C. TOBIN
SEN. CARTE P . GOODWIN MICHAEL R. WESSEL
MICHAEL R. DANIS, Execut ive Director
The Commission was created on October 30, 2000 by the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Public Law No. 106-398, 114 STAT. 1654A-334 (2000)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001), as amended by the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act for 2002 § 645 (regarding employment status of staff) & § 648 (regarding
changing annual report due date from March to June), Public Law No. 107-67, 115 STAT. 514
(Nov. 12, 2001); as amended by Division P of the “Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003,” Pub L. No. 108-7 (Feb. 20, 2003) (regarding Commission name change, terms of
Commissioners, and responsibilities of the Commission); as amended by Public Law No. 109-
108 (H.R. 2862) (Nov. 22, 2005) (regarding responsibilities of Commission and applicability of
FACA); as amended by Division J of the “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,” Public Law
Nol. 110-161 (December 26, 2007) (regarding responsibilities of the Commission, and changing
the Annual Report due date from June to December); as amended by the Carl Levin and Howard
P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-291
(December 19, 2014) (regarding responsibilities of the Commission).
The Commission’s full charter is available at www.uscc.gov.
http://www.uscc.gov/
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March 26, 2015
The Honorable Orrin Hatch
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510
The Honorable John A. Boehner
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515
DEAR SENATOR HATCH AND SPEAKER BOEHNER:
We are pleased to notify you of the Commission’s February 18, 2015 public hearing on “China’s
Space and Counterspace Programs.” The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
(amended by Pub. L. No. 109-108, section 635(a) and amended by Pub. L. No. 113-291, Section
1259 B) provides the basis for this hearing.
At the hearing, the Commissioners received testimony from the following witnesses: Mr. Kevin
Pollpeter, Deputy Director, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, University of California-San Diego; Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese,
Professor, National Security Studies, U.S. Naval War College; Mr. Dean Cheng, Senior Research
Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation; Dr. Alanna Krolikowski, Princeton-
Harvard China and the World Fellow, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University;
Mr. Tate Nurkin, Managing Director of Research and Thought Leadership, Jane’s IHS
Aerospace, Defense and Security; Mr. Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute;
Mr. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and
Strategy Center; Dr. Roger Handberg, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
Central Florida; and Dr. Phillip Saunders, Distinguished Research Fellow and Director, Center
for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University. The hearing examined the capabilities, scope, and objectives of China’s
space and counterspace programs. It explored the research and development efforts behind these
programs and the factors that have contributed to China’s recent space technology advances. The
hearing also addressed the implications of China’s dual-use and military space programs for the
United States.
We note that prepared statements for the hearing, the hearing transcript, and supporting
documents submitted by the witnesses are available on the Commission’s website at
www.USCC.gov. Members and the staff of the Commission are available to provide more
detailed briefings. We hope these materials will be helpful to the Congress as it continues its
assessment of U.S.-China relations and their impact on U.S. security.
The Commission will examine in greater depth these issues, and the other issues enumerated in its
statutory mandate, in its 2015 Annual Report that will be submitted to Congress in November
2015. Should you have any questions regarding this hearing or any other issue related to China,
please do not hesitate to have your staff contact our Congressional Liaison, Reed Eckhold, at
(202) 624-1496 or via email at [email protected].
Sincerely yours,
Hon. William A. Reinsch Hon. Dennis C. Shea
Chairman Vice Chairman
http://www.uscc.gov/mailto:[email protected]
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CONTENTS
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
CHINA'S SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS
Opening Statement of Commissioner Jeffrey L. Fiedler
(Hearing Co-Chair) .......................................................................................................06
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................07
Opening Statement of Commissioner James M. Talent
(Hearing Co-Chair) .......................................................................................................08
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................09
Panel I: China’s Civilian/Dual-Use and Military Space Programs
Panel I Introduction by Commissioner James M. Talent
(Hearing Co-Chair) .......................................................................................................11
Statement of Mr. Kevin Pollpeter
Deputy Director, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, University of California-San Diego .....................................12
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................14
Statement of Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese
Professor, National Security Studies, U.S. Naval War College .....................................24
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................26
Statement of Mr. Dean Cheng
Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation ....................41
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................44
Panel I: Question and Answer............................................................................................53
Panel II: Inputs to China’s Space Program
Panel II Introduction by Commissioner Jeffrey L. Fiedler
(Hearing Co-Chair) .......................................................................................................77
Statement of Dr. Alanna Krolikowski
Princeton-Harvard China and the World Fellow, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies,
Harvard University .........................................................................................................78
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................81
Statement of Mr. Tate Nurkin
Managing Director of Research and Thought Leadership, Jane’s IHS Aerospace,
Defense and Security ......................................................................................................93
Prepared Statement .........................................................................................................96
Statement of Mr. Mark Stokes
Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute ...................................................................108
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Prepared Statement .......................................................................................................111
Panel II: Question and Answer ........................................................................................116
Panel III: Implications for the United States
Panel III Introduction by Commissioner James M. Talent
(Hearing Co-Chair) .....................................................................................................133
Statement of Mr. Richard D. Fisher, Jr.
Senior Fellow, Asian Military Affairs
International Assessment and Strategy Center .............................................................134
Prepared Statement .......................................................................................................136
Statement of Dr. Roger Handberg
Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida .................152
Prepared Statement .......................................................................................................154
Statement of Dr. Phillip Saunders
Distinguished Research Fellow and Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military
Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ...........162
Prepared Statement .......................................................................................................165
Panel III: Question and Answer ......................................................................................178
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CHINA'S SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2015
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
The Commission met in Room SD – 608 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington,
DC at 8:30 a.m., Commissioner Jeffrey L. Fiedler and Senator James M. Talent (Hearing Co-
Chairs), presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JEFFREY L. FIEDLER
HEARING CO-CHAIR
HEARING CO-CHAIR FIEDLER: Good morning and welcome to the second hearing of the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 2015 Annual Report cycle. I would
mention that this is being Webcast so those who are weather-averse are sitting at home watching.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for the time they have put in to
their excellent written testimonies. Each of their written statements will be submitted for the
record and will be available online at the Commission's Web site, www.uscc.gov.
Before we begin, let me take a moment to thank the Senate Budget Committee, Chairman
Mike Enzi, and the Committee staff for providing this room for us today.
Today's hearing will examine the capabilities, scope and objectives of China's civilian
and military space programs. It will also explore the research and development efforts behind
these programs and the factors that have contributed to China's recent space technology
advances. Finally, it will look at the economic and security implications of China's space and
counterspace programs for the United States.
Over the last decade, China has rapidly scaled up and improved its civilian and military
space platforms, including satellites, ground infrastructure and rockets. These inherently dual-
use platforms help China achieve economic and scientific missions, while supporting expanded
PLA operations and military modernization goals.
Although China is mostly playing catch-up to the United States in space capabilities,
China poses a number of challenges to U.S. activities in space. First and foremost is China's
development of new counterspace technologies that could disable or destroy U.S. satellites and
their support architecture.
In a decade, China may lead the only international space station, fully deploy its own
dual-use satellite navigation system, and serve as the primary space launch partner for many
international customers.
We look forward to hearing a wide range of views today on how the United States can
best address these challenges.
I will now turn to my hearing co-chair Senator Jim Talent for his opening remarks.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JEFFREY L. FIEDLER
HEARING CO-CHAIR
Hearing on China’s Space and Counterspace Programs
Opening Statement of
Commissioner Jeffrey L. Fiedler
February 18, 2014
Washington, DC
Good morning and welcome to the second hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission’s 2015 Annual Report cycle. I want to thank our witnesses for being here
today, and for the time they have put into their excellent written testimonies. Each of their
written statements will be submitted for the record and will be available online at the
Commission’s website (www.uscc.gov). Before we begin, let me take a moment to thank the
Senate Budget Committee, Chairman Mike Enzi, and the Committee staff for securing this room
for us today.
Today’s hearing will examine the capabilities, scope, and objectives of China’s civilian and
military space programs. It will also explore the research and development efforts behind these
programs and the factors that have contributed to China’s recent space technology advances.
Finally, it will look at the economic and security implications of China’s space and counterspace
programs for the United States.
Over the last decade, China has rapidly scaled up and improved its civilian and military space
platforms, including satellites, ground infrastructure, and rockets. These inherently dual-use
platforms help China achieve economic and scientific missions, while supporting expanded PLA
operations and military modernization goals.
Although China is mostly catching up to the United States in space capabilities, China poses a
number of challenges to U.S. activities in space. First and foremost is China’s development of
new counterspace technologies that could disable or destroy U.S. satellites and their support
architecture. In addition, China’s space exploration and satellite launch plans could erode U.S.
dominance in space. In a decade, China may lead the only international space station, fully
deploy its own dual-use satellite navigation system, and serve as the primary space launch
partner for many international customers.
We look forward to hearing a wide range of views today on how the United States can best
address these challenges.
I now turn to my hearing co-chair Senator Talent for his opening remarks.
http://www.uscc.gov/
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OPENING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JAMES M. TALENT
HEARING CO-CHAIR
HEARING CO-CHAIR TALENT: Thank you, Commissioner Fiedler and thanks to our
witnesses for being here today to help us examine China's space programs and their implications
for the United States.
America's space architecture is vital to its civilian life as well as to the operation of its
armed forces, and until recently, Americans could take that architecture for granted. However,
alongside China's ostensibly civilian space programs, the PLA is pursuing a multifaceted
counterspace program with the ability to disrupt or destroy U.S. space architecture.
In 2007, China successfully tested its first kinetic antisatellite weapon, destroying an
aging weather satellite and creating over 2,000 pieces of debris. This event shocked the
international community, and the debris remains a threat to all satellites in orbit.
Since then, China has only increased its counterspace capabilities and has developed and
tested more sophisticated technologies designed to disable or destroy satellites. These include
missile intercept tests, robotic arm technology, ground-based lasers, and cyber attacks.
In July of last year, China conducted its third non-destructive anti-missile test in space.
Congress brought much-needed attention to China's counterspace program in a joint
House subcommittee hearing last year. In the coming days, the Commission will publish a
report by the University of California-San Diego that documents the full scope of China's
counterspace capabilities, along with China's space programs. The lead author of that report,
Kevin Pollpeter, is here with us today.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JAMES M. TALENT
HEARING CO-CHAIR
Hearing on China’s Space and Counterspace Programs
Opening Statement of
Senator James M. Talent
February 18, 2014
Thank you Commissioner Fiedler and thanks to our witnesses for being here today to help us
examine China’s space programs and their implications for the United States.
America’s space architecture is vital to its civilian life as well as to the operation of its armed
forces. Until recently, Americans could take that architecture for granted. However, alongside
China’s ostensibly civilian space programs, the PLA is pursuing a multifaceted counterspace
program with the ability to disrupt or destroy U.S. space architecture. In 2007, China
successfully tested its first kinetic antisatellite weapon, destroying its aging weather satellite and
creating over 2,000 pieces of debris. This event shocked the international community and the
debris remains a threat to all satellites in orbit.
Since then, China has only increased its counterspace capabilities and has developed and tested
more sophisticated technologies designed to disable or destroy satellites. These include missile
intercept tests, robotic arm technology, ground-based lasers, and cyber attacks. In July of last
year, China conducted its third non-destructive anti-missile test in space.
Congress brought much-needed attention to China’s counterspace program in a joint House
subcommittee hearing last year. In the coming days, the Commission will publish a report by the
University of California-San Diego that documents the full scope of China’s counterspace
capabilities, along with China’s space programs. The lead author of that report, Kevin Pollpeter,
is here with us today.
With that in mind, I would like to introduce our first panel on China’s civilian, dual-use, and
military space programs. Mr. Kevin Pollpeter is deputy director of the University of California
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation project on the Study of Innovation and Technology
in China. He is widely published on China national security issues, focused on China’s space
program and information warfare.
Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War
College. Her space-related publications include: Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to
Dominate Space, Space as a Strategic Asset, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery within the
Maze, and over 100 journal articles.
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Mr. Dean Cheng is a senior research fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage
Foundation. He has written extensively on China’s military doctrine, technological implications
of its space program, and dual-use issues associated with China’s industrial and scientific
infrastructure.
Thank you all for joining us. Before we begin, we ask that you please keep your opening remarks
to seven minutes. Mr. Pollpeter, let’s start with you.
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PANEL I INTRODUCTION BY COMMISSIONER JAMES M. TALENT
HEARING CO-CHAIR TALENT: With that in mind, I'd like to introduce our first panel on
China's civilian, dual-use and military space programs. Mr. Kevin Pollpeter is Deputy Director
of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Project on the Study
of Innovation and Technology in China. He is widely published on China national security
issues, focused on China's space program and information warfare.
Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval
War College. Her space-related publications include: Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to
Dominate Space; Space as a Strategic Asset; The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within the
Maze; and over 100 journal articles.
Mr. Dean Cheng is a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage
Foundation. He has written extensively on China's military doctrine, technological implications
of its space program, and dual-use issues associated with China's industrial and scientific
infrastructure.
Thank you all for joining us on this cold day. Before we begin, we do want to ask that
you please keep your opening remarks to seven minutes to leave plenty of time for questions.
And Mr. Pollpeter, let's start with you.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. KEVIN POLLPETER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, STUDY OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA,
INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO
MR. POLLPETER: Okay. Very good. Thank you, Senator Talent.
Good morning, Commissioners. I'm happy to be here. As you well know, there has been
a dramatic increase in China's space capability since the year 2000, and although China conducts
a space program for both political and economic reasons, what I want to focus on mainly here
today is on the national security implications and progress that China has made in its space
program.
Indeed, I would argue that China's space program plays a central role in China's anti-
access/area denial plans.
China views space as critical to its development of what they call an "informationized
force." And, in fact, almost every Chinese source that you do read states that whoever controls
space controls the earth. As a result, Chinese military writers conclude that China must achieve
space supremacy, which is to control space, to be able to freely use space, and to be able to deny
the ability to use space to adversaries.
And so what we see here is almost a full spectrum development of its space capabilities,
both on the C4ISR realm and on the counterspace realm. We have the Beidou satellite
navigation system, which by 2020 will have a constellation of 35 satellites. It will be similar to
our GPS system, and with the aid of a differential supplementary system, it will be able to
achieve accuracies of up to one meter.
They have introduced a wide range of remote-sensing satellites since 2000. These
include electro-optical, both color, multispectral, black and white, synthetic aperture radar,
electronic intelligence satellites, and by 2020, China wants to form a global 24-hour all-weather
remote-sensing system.
And connecting all these is a system of communication satellites called the Tianlian
satellites, which will be able to connect and provide near real-time information gathering and
processing for China's ISR capabilities.
And what this is supposed to do is to enable China to be able to detect and locate and
target U.S. Navy ships' bases that are beyond visual range and to be able to keep those ships out
beyond an effective range.
We also see China is invested heavily in counterspace capabilities during this time.
We've mentioned the 2007 ASAT test. There have been missile defense tests in 2010, 2013, and
2014, and these missile defense tests have obvious counterspace implications, and these are
mainly to threaten satellites in low earth orbit.
In 2013, we have seen what China has called a high altitude scientific mission. This also
has obvious counterspace implications in that it could threaten U.S. satellites in medium earth
orbit and geosynchronous orbit.
China has also been engaged in a far-ranging directed-energy weapon campaign,
developing lasers, high-powered microwave weapons and particle beam weapons.
In 2006, China used a laser against a U.S. satellite though it's unclear what the purpose of
that was, whether it was actually to interfere with the satellite or whether it was to actually just
range the satellite.
We've also seen a host of co-orbital satellite technologies being developed by China.
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These are primarily dual-use. All of them have a legitimate peaceful use. With the Shenzhou-7
in 2009, China used the Banxing-1, or the BX-1, to orbit the Shenzhou-7 to take images of the
Shenzhou-7. In 2010, China bumped two satellites together in what was ostensibly a practice for
their future docking missions.
And in 2013, China has tested a robotic arm, space robotic arm system, where one
satellite met close with another and grappled with it.
Cyber is also a continuing sort of pernicious threat to our space capabilities. There have
been reported hacks against our Landsat systems, against our jet propulsion laboratory, most
recently against our National Weather Service. It's uncertain who did these so we can't say that
China did these, but it does point to a vulnerability within our satellite computer systems, and it
also points that China views cyber as a new method of warfare that will change, what they say
will change the future of warfare as we know it and places a lot of emphasis on this in their
writings.
There's also such things as electronic warfare, specifically against GPS. GPS has a very
weak signal and it's easy to jam.
Lastly, what I want to point out is what is unique about China's space program is its
emphasis on manned platforms. We well know that they have a vibrant manned space program,
but they also see military uses for their manned space program that includes reconnaissance as
well as counterspace implications, whether such fanciful notions of putting weapons on space
stations or having astronauts fly around in spacecraft attacking other satellites.
But buttressing this is a new series of launch vehicles that China plans to introduce. The
first one will probably be launched this year, the Long March 7, and a much heavier version with
the Long March 5, which will be able to put up larger reconnaissance satellites as well as aid
China's efforts to the moon.
What I want to point to here is development of solid rocket launch vehicles, one, the
Kuaizhou, and the other is the Long March-11. These can be launched on mobile rocket
launchers. They carry relatively small satellites but will enable China to have an operational
responsive space capability where if they lose satellites or if they lose their launch centers, they'll
be able to rapidly replace satellites with these launchers.
So, by 2013, we will see that China will have a new variety of launch vehicles. They will
have a comprehensive robust space-based C4ISR network. They will have a satellite navigation
system that will have accuracies as good as GPS, and they will be able to launch on a much more
responsive basis than either the U.S. or they can do right now.
You've asked us to take a look at the implications. What should be some of the responses
by the U.S. for this? First of all, I would say that we need to continue to invest in spaceYou
know, there are a lot of reasons why we are good at doing space, but money is a buttressing
factor, is the fundamental factor, and we need to keep investing in space both on the military and
civilian side.
And we also need to invest in our people. If you look at the workforce demographics for
China's space industry, their big bubble in demographics is people aged from 25 to 35. If you
look at our workforce, it's aging. The largest percentage is 55 to 65, and we need to be able to
keep those people going into our pipeline.
And, finally, we need to invest in things like space surveillance network and invest in
smaller, more nimble satellites so we can develop our own operational response capability.
And with that, I will end and thank you, Commissioners.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. KEVIN POLLPETER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, STUDY OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA,
INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA-SAN DIEGO
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
for the hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs”
February 18, 2015
Kevin Pollpeter
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
China is a nation on a quest for wealth and power. It seeks increased influence and independence
from foreign powers with the ultimate goal of preserving China’s sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity, and political system. Over the long term, China seeks to transform the
international system to better suit its interests, but seeks to integrate itself into the existing
international system over the short term with the goal of reshaping the Asia-Pacific political
environment into one in which it is dominant.
China’s pursuit of space power is intended to carry out this strategy. China views the
development of space power as a necessary move for a country that wants to strengthen its
national power. Indeed, China’s goal is to become a space power on par with the United States
and to foster a space industry that is the equal of those in the United States, Europe, and Russia.
China takes a comprehensive, long-term approach to its space program that emphasizes the
accrual of the military, economic, and political benefits space can provide. By placing much of
its space program in a 15-year development program and providing ample funding, the Chinese
government provides a stable environment in which its space program can prosper. Although
China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements mask the
true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially, and
economically as competitive as the United States is in space.
China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and
technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership. Even if U.S. space power
continues to improve in absolute terms, China’s rapid advance in space technologies will result
in relative gains that challenge the U.S. position in space. At its current trajectory, China’s space
program, even if not the equal of the U.S. space program, will at some point be good enough to
adequately support modern military operations, compete commercially, and deliver political
gains that will serve its broader strategic interest of again being a major power more in control of
its own destiny.
Military Benefits
China’s space program assists the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its efforts to achieve
information superiority, defined as the ability to freely use information and the ability to deny the
use of information to an adversary. Based on their analysis of U.S. military operations, Chinese
military researchers view space as a critical component in making the PLA into a force capable
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of winning “informatized” wars and recognize the role space plays in the collection and
transmittal of information and the need to deny those capabilities to an adversary.
Indeed, nearly every Chinese source describes space as the “ultimate high ground,” leading many
Chinese analysts to assess that space warfare is inevitable. Because of the preeminence of the
space battlefield, analysts writing on space argue that it will become the center of gravity in
future wars and one that must be seized and controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first
condition for seizing the initiative is to achieve space supremacy.
Space Technologies
China has made impressive progress in space technologies since 2000. China now has nearly a
full range of satellites to accomplish a variety of missions. These include remote sensing
satellites with various resolutions and covering various spectrums, a satellite navigation system,
communication satellites, and robust human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs.
Space-based C4ISR Technologies
A robust, space-based C4ISR system is often described as a critical component of a future
networked PLA. The necessity to develop space-based C4ISR systems is based on the
requirement to develop power-projection and precision-strike capabilities. The development of
long-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles requires the ability to locate and target enemy
ships and bases hundreds of kilometers away from China’s shores, as well as the ability to
coordinate these operations with units from multiple services. In doing so, remote sensing
satellites can provide intelligence on the disposition of enemy forces and provide strategic
intelligence before a conflict begins. Communication satellites can provide global connectivity
and can facilitate communications between far-flung forces. Navigation and positioning satellites
can provide critical information on location and can improve the accuracy of strikes.
Satellite Navigation
China’s Beidou satellite navigation system is planned to provide a global service by 2020.
Designed to be similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), Beidou will consist of 35
satellites in medium Earth and geosynchronous orbits that will provide positioning accuracies of
less than 10 meters. With the use of a nation-wide system of differential Beidou, accuracy will be
improved to one meter. Unlike GPS, Beidou has a short messaging service in which messages as
long as 120 characters can be sent to other Beidou receivers. Beidou is increasingly used by the
Chinese military at the regiment level and above and is reportedly being integrated into weapon
guidance systems.
Remote Sensing
The stated purpose of China’s satellite remote sensing project is to build an all-weather, 24-hour,
global Earth remote sensing system by 2020 capable of monitoring the ground, atmosphere, and
oceans. China has a variety of remote sensing satellites, including four new series introduced
since 2000: the Gaofen, Yaogan, Huanjing, and Tianhui satellites. This is in addition to legacy
satellite series such as the Ziyuan Earth remote sensing satellite and the Fengyun meteorological
satellite.
With these satellites, China can serve a variety of remote sensing needs. Chinese imagers have
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stated resolutions of one to thirty meters and can image in the visible, infrared, and multispectral
ranges. The Yaogan and Huanjing satellites also use synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to be able to
image through cloud cover or at night. Certain Yaogan satellites are also rumored to have
electronic intelligence capabilities.
Accessing information from these satellites is facilitated by a network of three satellites,
designated Tianlian, that relay communications and data between satellites and ground stations
anywhere on the Earth regardless of the position of the satellite in orbit or the location of the unit
on the ground.
Counterspace Technologies
The PLA also recognizes that it must deny the use of information to its opponents. Chinese
analysts assess that the employment of space-based C4ISR capabilities by potential adversaries,
especially the United States, requires the PLA to develop capabilities to attack space systems.
According to the U.S. Defense Department, China has a broad-based development program for
counterspace technology that consists of jammers, direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, directed-
energy weapons, and co-orbital spacecraft.1 China’s development of counterspace weapons
appears to be aimed at developing an all-around capability to threaten satellites with a variety of
weapons at all orbits.
Direct Ascent Counterspace Technologies
The most prominent demonstration of China’s counterspace technologies was the 2007
destruction of a defunct FY-1C meteorological satellite with a direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicle.
In 2010, 2013, and 2014, China conducted mid-course tests of a missile defense system that are
believed to be de facto ASAT tests.
In addition to missile defense tests, China conducted a “high altitude science mission” in 2013
using a sounding rocket. According to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the rocket reached an
altitude of more than 10,000 kilometers and released a barium cloud to study the dynamic
characteristics of the Earth’s magnetosphere.2 This claim appeared to be contradicted by a U.S.
government assessment that the rocket “appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO),” which could refer to a distance of 30,000 kilometers.3 If so,
the test would represent an expansion of China’s ASAT capabilities and could help enable China
to threaten satellites such as GPS and communication satellites in medium and high Earth orbits.
Directed Energy Counterspace Technologies
China is also developing directed-energy weapons such as lasers, high-powered microwave, and
particle beam weapons for ASAT missions.4 The Defense Department concluded in 2006 that
1 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2012), 9. 2 “中国再次高空科学探测试验:高度更高数据更多” [China Again Conducts a High Altitude Science Mission:
Higher Altitude and More Data], 中国新闻网 [China News], May 14, 2013, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/05-14/4817925.shtml. 3 Brian Weeden, “Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-Satellite Testing in Space,” Space
Review, March 17, 2014, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1. 4 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2012), 9.
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China had “at least one…ground-based laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.”5
Lasers at higher power levels can permanently damage satellites and at lower power levels can
temporarily blind the imagers of a remote sensing satellite. In 2006 it was reported that China
had fired a laser at a U.S. satellite. According to U.S. officials, the intent of the lasing is
unknown and did not damage the satellite, suggesting that China could have been determining
the range of the satellite rather than trying to interfere with its function.6
China is also researching radio frequency (RF) weapons that could be used against satellites.
Radio frequency weapons using high power microwaves can be ground-based, space-based, or
employed on missiles to temporarily or permanently disable electronic components through
overheating or short-circuiting. RF weapons are thus useful in achieving a wide spectrum of
effects against satellites in all orbits.7 Because RF weapons affect the electronics of satellites,
evaluating the success of an attack may be difficult since no debris would be produced.8
Co-orbital Counterspace Technologies
Chinese researchers also discuss the use of co-orbital counterspace technologies. As one
researcher states, the “ample use of the superiority and characteristics of modern small satellites,
ingeniously applied to space attack and defense, will cause small satellites to become a space
weapon assassin’s mace.”9 Co-orbital satellites are those satellites that come within a close
distance to another satellite to interfere with, disable, or destroy the target satellite. Co-orbital
satellites do not have to be dedicated to the counterspace role and can also serve legitimate
peacetime functions.10
According to the U.S. Defense Department, China has “conducted increasingly complex close
proximity operations between satellites.”11 During the Shenzhou-7 mission the Banxing-1 flew
around Shenzhou-7 at a distance of several tens of meters to several hundred meters. After the
astronauts departed for Earth, BX-1 orbited Shenzhou-7 at a distance of one to two hundred
kilometers. BX-1 was equipped with two cameras that took images of Shenzhou-7. The stated
reason for the BX-1 was to test the orbiting of a spacecraft with the Shenzhou 7 to prepare for an
5 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2006), 35. 6 Elaine M. Grossman, “Top Commander: Chinese Interference With U.S. Satellites Uncertain,” World Politics
Review, October 18, 2006, accessed September 2, 2014, 7 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2006), 34; and Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite
Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, September 1985, 66‒67. 8 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual
(Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), 133. 9 Lin Laixing, “Study on the Overseas Microsatellite Application in Space Attack-Defense (国外微小卫星在空间攻
防中的应用研究),” Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology (装备指挥技术学院学报), 2006/6, 49. 10 See, for example, Huang Siyong and Xu Peide, “空间武器平台潜伏轨道分布模型研究” [Study of Distributed
Model of Hidden Orbits for Space Weapons Platforms], 航天控制 [Aerospace Control], June 2007; and Ma Wendi,
小卫星编队与反卫星卫星 [“Small Satellite Formations and ASAT Satellites”], 中国航天 [Aerospace China], April 2006. 11 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2012), 9.
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eventual docking mission with a space station.12
The BX-1 mission was involved in some controversy when it passed within 45 kilometers of the
International Space Station, leading some to conclude that the mission was also a test of a co-
orbital ASAT capability13 or that it was testing satellite inspection capabilities.
14 The proximity
of the BX-1 did not present a hazard to the International Space Station.15
In August 2010 it was reported that after conducting a series of maneuvers the Shijian-12 (SJ-12)
satellite had most likely bumped into the Shijian 6F (SJ-6F), causing it to drift slightly from its
original orbit. The maneuvering could have been practice for docking the Shenzhou space
capsule with the Tiangong-1 space station, but Chinese silence on the intention of the test fueled
concern that it was a cover for testing ASAT capabilities.16
In August 2013 China conducted a test of robotic arm technologies involving the Chuangxin-3,
Shiyan-7, and Shijian-15 satellites where one of the satellites acted as a target satellite and
another satellite, most likely equipped with a robotic arm, grappled the target satellite. As with
the August 2010 test involving the SJ-12 and SJ-6F, the test could have been for a legitimate
peaceful purpose: the testing of robotic arm technologies to be used on future Chinese space
stations. As with the August 2010 tests, however, the dual-use nature and silence by the Chinese
on the matter have only fueled speculation that China was also testing counterspace
technologies.17
Cyber Operations
Many Chinese writings describe cyber operations as a new type of warfare which holds the
potential to change the face of war as we know it by being able to greatly affect an adversary’s
political, economic, and military capabilities.18 China may have been involved in computer hacks
against satellite computer systems. In October 2007 and July 2008, a computer attack against the
command and control system of Landsat-7, a remote sensing satellite operated by the USGS and
NASA, resulted in 12 or more minutes of interference on each occasion. The attacks did not
12 “伴飞小卫星将”追赶”分离后的神七轨道舱” [Small Companion Satellite Will Chase After the Shenzhou 7 Orbital Capsule After Separation], Xinhuanet, September 24, 2008, accessed March 26, 15,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/24/content_10104787.htm; “Shenzhou-7 Launches Small
Monitoring Satellite,” Xinhuanet, September 27, 2008, accessed March 26, 15,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/27/content_10123015.htm; “伴飞小卫星将给神七 ‘照相’” [Small Companion Satellite Will Take Photographs of Shenzhou 7], Xinhuanet, September 24, 2008, accessed March 26,
15, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/24/content_10104656.htm. 13 “Closer Look: Shenzhou-7’s Close Pass by the International Space Station,” International Assessment and
Strategy Center, October 9, 2008, accessed March 26, 15,
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.191/pub_detail.asp. 14 “China’s BX-1 Microsatellite: A Litmus Test for Space Weaponization,” Space Review, October 20, 2008,
accessed March 26, 15, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1235/1. 15 Tianlian satellites are discussed in further detail later in the paper. 16 Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the Dark: The Orbital Rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F,” Space Review, August 30,
2010, accessed September 2, 2014, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1689/1. 17 See Kevin Pollpeter, “China’s Space Robotic Arm Programs,” SITC News Analysis, October 2013, accessed
September 2, 2014, http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/505021.pdf. 18 Lu Yunsheng and Liu Haifeng, “Jisuanji wangluo gongji tixi gouxiang” (A Vision for Computer Network Attack),
Wangluo anquan jishu yu yingyong (Network Security Technology and Application), No. 108 (December 2009), p.
43.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/24/content_10104787.htmhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/27/content_10123015.htm
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result in the perpetrator achieving the ability to take command of the satellite. In June and
October 2008, the command and control system for the Terra EOS (Earth Observation System)
was hacked into, resulting in two or more minutes and nine or more minutes of interference,
respectively. In both cases, the perpetrator had the ability to command the satellite, but refrained
from doing so.19 The attacks have not been attributed and China has denied responsibility for the
attacks.20
Electronic Warfare
China has acquired foreign and indigenous jammers that give it “the capability to jam common
satellite communications bands and GPS receivers.”21 GPS, in particular, can be easily jammed
due to the attenuation of the signal over the 12,500-mile distance between the satellites and
Earth.22 As a result, even low-power jammers can achieve effects over long distances. According
to the Defense Science Board, “modest (few watt) jammers can deny acquisition [of the GPS
signal]” at ranges up to hundreds of kilometers.23
Nuclear Weapons
China could detonate a nuclear weapon in space to destroy and disable satellites through both the
blast and the electromagnetic pulse generated by the explosion. The use of a nuclear weapon in
space, however, would also affect China’s satellites, as well as those of third parties.24
Manned Platforms
Chinese analysts also see a role for manned platforms in space warfare. Manned platforms are
described as more responsive than unmanned platforms and able to employ a variety of
weapons.25 Other authors write that manned platforms are “the best space weapon for attacking
satellites in low earth orbit, synchronous orbit, and high orbit.”26
Manned space platforms include space capsules, space stations, and space planes. Space capsules
and space planes can transport goods and people between ground and space, carry out space
rescue missions, and conduct reconnaissance and surveillance against targets.27 According to an
19 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security and
Economic Review Commission, November 2011, 216. 20 Sui-lee Wei, “China Denies It Is Behind Hacking of U.S. Satellites,” Reuters, October 31, 2011, accessed
September 9, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-china-us-hacking-
idUSTRE79U1YI20111031?feedType=RSS&feedName=scienceNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
&dlvrit=309301. 21 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2011), 37. 22 Congressional Budget Office, “The Global Positioning System for Military Users: Current Modernization Plans
and Alternatives,” October 2011, 4. 23 Defense Science Board, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Air Warfare,” November
1993, 12. 24 Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2011), 37. 25 Li Yiyong, Li Zhi, and Shen Huairong, “临近空间飞行器发展与应用分析” [Analysis on Development and
Application of Near Space Vehicle],” 装备指挥技术学院学报 [Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technology], 2008/2, 64 and Chang, Military Astronautics, 118‒19. 26 Li, Cheng, and Zheng, Integrated Aerospace Information Operations, 218. 27 Chang, Military Astronautics, 123, 145.
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article written by the current director of the China Manned Space Agency, space stations can
service military satellites in orbit, including repair, maintenance, fueling, and replenishment of
ammunition, as well as serve as platforms for kinetic and directed energy weapons.28
Launch Vehicles
China is developing a new generation of launch vehicles capable of launching China’s large
space station and larger satellites. The new rockets are designed to meet China’s launch needs for
the next 30‒50 years and offer increased reliability and adaptability and will be powered by
“nonpoisonous” and “nonpolluting” engines that will provide more thrust than the current
generation of launch vehicles. 29 The new generation of rockets will be divided into light,
medium, and heavy-lift versions that will be able to send 1 to 25 metric ton payloads into low
Earth orbit and 1 to 14 metric ton payloads into geosynchronous Earth orbit.30 This presents a
significant increase in payload capacity. China’s current heaviest launch vehicle, the LM-2F, can
lift eight metric tons into low Earth orbit.
This new generation of Long March vehicles has been designated the Long March 5, 6, and 7.
The Long March 5 will be used to launch the heaviest payloads into orbit, such as China’s
planned large space station, and larger communication and remote sensing satellites. The Long
March 7 will be a medium-lift rocket that will be used to ferry supplies to the space station. The
Long March 6 is a light launch vehicle intended to launch payloads of up to one metric ton into
orbit.
Additionally, China is developing operationally responsive space capabilities that will allow it to
replace depleted or destroyed satellites quickly. Its development of the Kuaizhou and Long
March-11 launch vehicles, both solid-fueled rockets, provide China with the capability to launch
relatively small satellites rapidly if other satellites were to be destroyed or degraded. Although
not as capable as larger satellites, these smaller satellites would be “good enough” to meet the
needs of the Chinese warfighter. Moreover, the ability to launch these rockets from road-mobile
launchers will also provide the Chinese military with the capability to replenish or augment its
satellite architecture when its launch centers have been damaged or destroyed and would be less
susceptible to U.S. prompt global strike capabilities.
Ground-based Infrastructure
China has four launch centers, including its newest launch center in Wenchang, Hainan Province
and a network of telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) stations.
Launch Centers
Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (中国酒泉卫星发射中心) The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center is China’s oldest and largest, and conducts launches of
28 Wang Zhaoyao, “军事航天技术及其发展” [Military Space Technology and Its Development], 航天器工程 [Spacecraft Engineering] 1 (2008): 17. 29 Zhang Feng, “中国的长征五号运载火箭” [China’s Long March 5 Launch Vehicle], 卫星应用 [Satellite Application], 2012/5, 29. 30 Sun Zifa, “中国未来5年实现”长征”五号六号七号火箭首飞” [In 5 Years China Will Realize the First Flights of the ‘Long March’ 5, 6, and 7], sohu.com, accessed September 2, 2014,
http://news.sohu.com/20130301/n367552968.shtml.
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spacecraft into low, medium, and high Earth orbits. It is the only launch center that has conducted
human space flight launches.31 The launch center is composed of a northern launch pad and a
southern launch pad. The northern launch pad launches LM-2C and 2D rockets while the southern
launch pad launches LM-2E and 2F rockets. In addition to the launch pads, the launch center has
a command and control center, a rocket fuel storage area, a tracking station, a satellite and launch
vehicle assembly station, a solid fuel rocket assembly station, and other support facilities.32
Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (中国太原卫星发射中心) The Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center is located near Taiyuan, Shanxi Province. Construction of
the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center began in 1967. The launch center conducts launches of
satellites into sun synchronous and low Earth orbits, including meteorological, remote sensing,
and communications satellites. The center consists of a launch site, a command and control
center, and a technology testing area. The launch site consists of a single launch pad.33
Xichang Satellite Launch Center (中国西昌卫星发射中心) The Xichang Satellite Launch Center is located 60 kilometers north of Xichang, Sichuan Province.
Construction on the launch center began in 1970. This launch center launches satellites into
geosynchronous orbits, including communication, broadcast, and meteorological satellites. The
launch center is composed of a headquarters department, a launch site, a communication station, a
command and control center, a technology testing station, and three tracking stations. The
technology testing station has a launch vehicle testing facility, a satellite assembly and testing
facility, and a rocket engine assembly, testing, and flaw detection facility.34
Wenchang Satellite Launch Center (文昌卫星发射中心) The Wenchang Satellite Launch Center on Hainan Island was approved in 2007 and was reportedly
completed in October 2014. The launch center’s closer proximity to the equator than China’s three
other launch centers can increase launch payloads by 10–15 percent and satellite life by 2–3 years,
a factor important for developing the commercial launch market. Launches will also be directed
over the ocean, which will permit debris from launches to land safely out to sea. Wenchang will
be the new launch center for China’s manned space flights.
TT&C Network China’s improving TT&C network allows it to support China’s human spaceflight and lunar
exploration programs and enables China to better control its own satellites and to monitor the
satellites of potential adversaries. China operates two satellite control centers at Xi’an and
Beijing, and a network of 20 domestic TT&C stations based in China and three stations in
Pakistan, Namibia, and Kenya, as well as three operational tracking ships. China built two dish
antennas: a 50-meter diameter antenna near Beijing and a 40-meter diameter antenna near
Kunming, Yunnan Province. The European Space Agency has also assisted China in its tracking
31解放军总装备部:中国军工系统核心 [“PLA General Armament Department: China Defense Industry System Core”], accessed Feb. 5, 2012, www.360doc.com/content/11/1214/11/5575132_172141966.shtml; and
http://www.cgwic.com/LaunchServices/LaunchSite/JSLC.html. 32 Zhang, China Military Encyclopedia (Second Edition): Introduction to Military Equipment, 434‒36. 33 Ibid., 438‒39. 34 Ibid., 436‒38.
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efforts by allowing it to track a European lunar spacecraft launched in 2003.35 In addition, ESA
also provided TT&C support for China’s lunar missions at its stations in Maspalomas, Canary
Islands, and Kourou, French Guiana.36
The TT&C requirements for the Chang’e missions, for example, are described as the most
difficult challenge. The Chang’e-1 controllers, for example, had to follow a careful balancing act
in which the spacecraft’s sensors had to face the moon to collect data, its antennas had to face the
Earth to communicate with ground control, and its solar panels had to face the sun.37 In August
2011, Chang’e 2 traveled to the L2 La Grange point to test China’s deep space TT&C network.
China is just the third country behind the United States and Europe to have sent a satellite to
L2.38 After completing its mission at L2, in April 2012 Chang’e-2 went to image an asteroid,
Toutatis, passing within two miles of the object. 39
China’s Space Program to 2030
If the current trajectory of China’s space program continues, by 2030 China will have a new line
of advanced launch vehicles, a robust, space-based C4ISR network made up of imagery satellites
with resolutions well below one meter, and more capable electronic intelligence communication
satellites all linked together by data-relay satellites, in addition to a global satellite-navigation
system that may gradually approach current GPS standards. At this point, China could also likely
have made operational a number of advanced counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill,
directed-energy, and co-orbital ASAT capabilities as well as some form of missile defense
system.
Although China is probably truthful when it says that it is not in a space race, such statements
mask the true intent of its space program: to become militarily, diplomatically, commercially,
and economically as competitive as the United States is in space. Despite Chinese statements that
it is not in a space race, China’s space program has generated concern both in the United States
and in Asia. As Clay Moltz writes, “There is a space race going on in Asia, but its
outcome―peaceful competition or military confrontation―is still uncertain.” He concludes that
although “there are still reasonable prospects for avoiding negative outcomes in space…Asia is
at risk of moving backward, motivated by historical mistrust and animosities and hindered by
poor communications on security matters.”40 As a result, China’s progress in space technologies,
whether in relative or absolute terms, has implications for the United States and its neighbors. As
China’s space program increases in capability, it can be expected to wield this power in ways
that, according to Bonnie Glaser, not only “persuade its neighbors that there is more to gain from
accommodating Chinese interests” but also “deter countries from pursuing policies that inflict
35 Ibid. 36 “Chang’e-1 (Lunar-1 Mission of China),” eoPortal Directory, accessed March 26, 15,
https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/c-missions/chang-e-1. 37 Bradley Perrett, Frank Morring, Jr., and Craig Covault, “Spacefarers,” 26‒28. 38 “Chang’e-2 Moon Orbiter Travels Around L2 in Outer Space.” 39 Liu Jianun, Ren Xin, Mou Lingli, Zhang Liyan, Feng Jianqing, Wang Xiaoqian, and Li Chunlai, “嫦娥二号卫星
有效载荷与科学探测”[Chang’e-2’s Payload and Scientific Surveying], 生命科学仪器 [Life Science Instruments], January 2013, 37; Chinese Spacecraft Flies by Asteroid Toutatis,” Space.com, December 17, 2012, accessed March
26, 15, http://www.space.com/18933-chinese-probe-asteroid-toutatis-flyby.html. 40 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 191.
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damage on Chinese interests.”
There are several actions the United States can take to ameliorate the effects of China’s rise as a
space power.
First, if the United States is to remain the leading space power then it must continue to invest in
both its civilian and military space programs. Although innovation is affected by many factors,
nothing can get done without adequate funding. This fact has not been lost on the Chinese
government, which is taking a broad-based, well-funded approach to its space program.
Second, the most valuable resource of any industry is its people. The United States must
continue to invest in its space workforce and in science, technology, engineering, and math
(STEM) education. China’s space industry workforce is young, with 55 percent the industry’s
employees aged 35 years or younger. The U.S. space industry workforce, on the other hand, is
older, with nearly 60 percent of its workforce 45 years of age or older. Over the long-term,
China’s relatively young workforce will gain valuable experience that could provide an edge in
innovating while the U.S. workforce loses high quality workers through retirement.
Third, the United States should enhance its space situational awareness capabilities to better able
to better monitor the space and counterspace activities of other countries. Adequately defending
the U.S. space-based architecture requires having a good picture of the operational environment
and the threat it may pose.
Fourth, the United States could invest in smaller and more distributed satellite capabilities.
Although smaller satellites would not be as capable and robust as larger satellites, the
distribution of greater numbers of satellites would make the loss of any one satellite less
catastrophic to the architecture as a whole. Owing to their lower cost, these satellites would
provide a “good enough” capability that could be more quickly replenished.
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OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE
PROFESSOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DR. JOHNSON-FREESE: Thank you. Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to speak
with you today regarding the implications of China's actions and emerging capabilities in space
for the United States.
The views I offer are solely mine and do not represent the views of the U.S. Navy or the
Naval War College.
I don't speak or read Chinese so I can't present any newly discovered, potentially
shocking evidence of Chinese actions or intent regarding space. Nor am I an engineer so I can't
decipher or speculate about the capabilities of hardware or suggest new hardware for the United
States. And I don't work with classified information so that limits my analysis to being based on
what is publicly available.
Nevertheless, as a political scientist who has followed and studied both the U.S. and
Chinese space program for over 20 years, what I can offer is a perspective regarding what the
U.S. can and cannot control regarding Chinese space activities, necessary avenues for
maintaining U.S. space superiority, approaches essential to maintain the sustainability of the
space environment, and therefore requirements to achieve U.S. goals in space within the context
of rapidly expanding Chinese space capabilities.
I suspect the perspectives regarding implications for the U.S. and consequent policy
recommendations will vary more among the panel than assessments of what the Chinese are
actually doing in space. That is the dilemma of dual-use technology.
Though policies, doctrines, and public statements can provide indications of intent,
ultimately intent is revealed by actions. A co-orbital rendezvous and proximity operation
satellite in space, for example, can be observed. Whether the satellite is intended for such benign
operations as assessing damage to another satellite or whether for nefarious purposes, such as
ramming into another satellite, or both, can rarely be determined based solely on the hardware.
Further, a multiplicity of views regarding underlying drivers for space activity in China,
just as there are in the United States, further complicates assessments.
Consequently, analysis of intent through written statements inherently involves
speculation and careful attention to sources backing that speculation. Unquestionably, though,
the best available way to assess intentions is through dialogue and cooperation.
The space environment is characterized in U.S. policies as contested, congested and
competitive, and a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely. Specifically, because the
United States does not own or control space, partnering with responsible nations, international
organizations, and commercial firms, as well as seeking common ground among all space-faring
nations, becomes imperative.
Security, sustainability, free-access and stability in space are the stated goals of the U.S.,
through the National Security Strategy, the National Space Policy, and the National Security
Space Policy.
Part of preventing and deterring aggression includes developing capabilities to deter,
defend against, and defeat aggression, drawn from the 2010 QDR and cited in the National
Security Space Strategy.
Language in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 evidences
considerable U.S. attention to that approach. In line with promoting peaceful and the safe use of
space, other elements of stated U.S. policy require equally focused attention, including: increased
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resilience for military space systems; transparency and confidence-building measures; increased
and expanded space situational awareness; and a non-binding International Code of Conduct for
Space Activities.
Those efforts must receive the same attention as counterspace efforts for U.S. policy
goals to be achieved. Similar support, however, has not been seen as forthcoming from
Congress. This creates the perception elsewhere that perhaps the U.S. isn't serious about norms
or efforts beyond counterspace generally.
U.S. emphasis on counterspace is often presented as in response to actions and intentions
of other countries, specifically China. Increasingly, however, it seems that speculation about
Chinese intentions is based on material not publicly shared, making the feasibility of both the
speculation and appropriate U.S. responses difficult to assess.
For example, to my knowledge, China has done nothing since the irresponsible 2007
ASAT test that goes beyond what the U.S. considers international norms of responsible behavior.
Beyond counterspace, strong international norms can also be a strong deterrent, further
compelling pursuance. The interrelated nature of the strategic approaches laid out in the multiple
U.S. policies requires implementation of all elements. Pursuing deter, defend and defeat through
counterspace measures alone not only decreases the potential for strategic success, but can be
counterproductive in much the same way export control laws consequent to the 1999 Cox
Committee Report proved to be.
Further, due to the global commons nature of the space environment and the importance
of sustainability of that environment, the U.S. must seek common ground with China in areas of
common interest. Consideration of what China is doing in space and what we think we know
about why is useful in identifying these common interests. I have provided my assessment of
that information in my written testimony.
To summarize, the U.S. cannot control Chinese space ambitions. Even influence is
limited due to imperfect knowledge of Chinese decision-making, operating procedures, and,
perhaps most importantly, Chinese space stakeholders have no incentive to inhibit aggressive or
reckless Chinese behavior because they are not tethered to any obligations, interests or benefits
they might obtain through cooperation with the United States.
Nor can the U.S. control space in the same way that it controls airspace. Yet space is a
global commons, the sustainability of which is critical to U.S. national security. Consequently,
increased cooperation with China is in the best interest of U.S. national security.
Further, counterspace technology is not a panacea to achieve U.S. goals in space or to
address terrestrial threats. At best, it is a capability to have on reserve as part of a comprehensive
deterrence strategy. Alternatively, especially, when other components of the comprehensive
strategy are neglected, it can be ineffective and destabilizing.
In order to protect U.S. assets and achieve stated U.S. goals, all approaches stated in the
nested U.S. space strategies must be pursued with equal attention. These include resiliency,
space situational awareness, increased transparency and confidence-building measures.
Domestically, they include a continued rationalization of export control regulations to a
globalized world, supporting STEM education, supporting R&D, and demonstrating the United
States does have the political will to be the leader of all spacefaring nations. Further
implementation of U.S. space strategy is the only prudent way forward.
Thank you.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE
PROFESSOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
The question before the Commission concerns how the United States (U.S.) can achieve stated
U.S. goals regarding space security given a rapidly expanding and increasingly sophisticated
Chinese space program.41 The importance of protecting the space environment and U.S. space
assets in orbit, assets which provide information critical to the U.S. civilian and military sectors
and overall U.S. national security, has required that goals be considered and reconsidered at
many levels and within multiple communities of the U.S. government. Therefore, it is
appropriate to begin by referencing the multiple and nested U.S. strategies related to or
referencing space, specifically the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2010 National
Space Policy (NSP), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2011 National
Security Space Strategy (NSSS)42 for analytic parameters.
Guidance in the NSS is simply stated. “To promote security and stability in space, we will pursue
activities consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation with allies and
friends, and work with all nations toward the responsible and peaceful use of space.” (p. 31)43
These general ideas are reiterated in the NSP as “the United States considers the sustainability,
stability, and free access to, and use of, space vital to its national interests.” (NSP p.3)
With security, sustainability, free-access and stability as overall goals, the NSSS recognizes the
importance of working with all space-faring nations due to the nature of the space environment
stated as both contested, congested and competitive (NSS p.i) and “… a domain that no nation
owns, but on which all rely,” (NSSS p.i). Specifically, because the United States does not own or
control space, “partnering with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial
firms” (NSSS p.8) as well as seeking “common ground among all space faring nations” (NSSS
p.5) becomes imperative. Both compels consideration of “how to deal with China.” The
contested, congested and competitive space environment presents both challenges and
opportunities (NSSS p.1) if only through the self-interest of all space-faring nations in protecting
the space environment.
Within those parameters, the security-specific NSSS goals are given as: strengthen safety,
stability, and security in space; maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages
afforded to the United States by space; and energize the space industrial base that supports U.S.
national security. The NSS approaches to achieving the policy goals, are clearly stated.
The National Security Space Strategy draws upon all elements of national
power and
requires active U.S. leadership in space. The United States will pursue a set of
interrelated strategic approaches to meet our national security space
objectives:
41 The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. government,
the U.S. Navy, or the Naval War College. 42http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary
_Jan2011.pdf 43 There is considerable complexity even within this guidance. Compared to ground, air, maritime and even cyber,
there has been relatively little multilateral or public discussion on what the right of self-defense means in the context
of space.
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[italics added]
• Promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space;
• Provide improved U.S. space capabilities;
• Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and
commercial firms;
• Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S.
national
security and;
• Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment. (p.5)
Part of preventing and deterring aggression includes developing capabilities to “deter, defend
against, and defeat aggression,” drawn from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and
cited in the NSSS (p.10).
Language in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015 evidences considerable U.S.
attention to that approach. Secure World Foundation analyst Brian Weeden suggests attention
may be focused on those elements to the exclusion or discounting of others.44
In line with promoting responsible, peaceful and the safe use of space other elements requiring
focused attention include resilience for military systems, increased transparency and confidence
building measures (TCBMs), increased space situational awareness (NSP, pp. 11-12) and a non-
binding International Code of Conduct for Space Activities as supported by U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton,45 Air Force Space Command chief General William Shelton46 and
Strategic Command chief General Robert Kehler47 in 2012. Strong international norms can also
be a strong deterrent, further compelling pursuance. The interrelated nature of the strategic
approaches requires implementation of all elements. Pursuing “deter, defend and defeat” through
counterspace measures alone not only decreases the potential of strategic success, but can be
counterproductive in much the same way export control laws consequent to the 1999 Cox
Committee Report proved to be.48 Further, due to the “global commons”49 nature of the space
environment and the importance of sustainability of that environment, the U.S. must seek
common ground with China in areas of common interest. Consideration of what China is doing
in space and why is useful in identifying these common interests.
Categorization of Chinese space activities as military or civilian is complicated by the fact that
the vast majority of space technology (>90%) is dual use. Further, in order to maximize
44 Brian Weeden, “The End of Sanctuary in Space,” War is Boring, January 7, 2015. https://medium.com/war-is-
boring/the-end-of-sanctuary-in-space-2d58fba741a 45 http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/180969.htm 46 http://breakingdefense.com/2012/03/safe-passage-why-the-pentagon-wants-an-international-code-of-c/ 47 http://www.cfr.org/united-states/conversation-c-robert-kehler/p28404 48 http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/898-space-export-control-report 49 The importance of protecting “commons” environments is increasingly noted. The Defense Department has
recently changed the name of the “AirSea Battle” concept to “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons.” http://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/document-air-sea-battle-name-change-memo,
http://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/pentagon-drops-air-sea-battle-name-concept-lives Application to the “commons”
principles in space is difficult for definitional, legal and operational reasons. Joan Johnson-Freese and Brian
Weeden, “Application of Ostrom’s Principles for Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources to the Near
Earth Environment,” Global Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, pp. 72-81.
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/conversation-c-robert-kehler/p28404http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/898-space-export-control-reporthttp://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/document-air-sea-battle-name-change-memohttp://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/pentagon-drops-air-sea-battle-name-concept-lives
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resources many countries, including China, France and Japan,50 deliberately develop technology
or establish organizations and operations for dual-use purposes. They have far less a dichotomy
between military and civilian space activities and organizations than in the United States, though
the lines between U.S. programs often blurred as well. For example, prior to the Space Shuttle,
U.S. civilian launchers were born from missile programs, and the Space Shuttle cargo bay was
specifically designed to be large enough to carry large U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Overall, the
United States is more the exception than the rule in utilizing what can be a duplicative approach
to space administration and technology development through its civilian and military space
programs.
Because of the largely dual-use nature of space technology, virtually any space activity can be
deemed as military. Therefore it is (relatively) easier to know what China is doing in terms of
space activities than why. A co-orbital rendezvous and proximity operation satellite in space can,
for example, be observed. Whether the satellite is intended for such benign operations as
assessing damage to another satellite, or whether for nefarious purposes such as ramming into
another satellite, or both, can rarely be determined based on hardware. A multiplicity of views
regarding underlying drivers for space activity in China, just as there are in the United States,
further complicates assessments. China is a country of such size, and with a rapidly increasing
number of media and internet outlets for expressing views and dispersing information, that
“evidence” can be found for almost any assessment, thereby accommodating the substantiation
of preconceived assumptions as analysis. Consequently, analysis of intent through written
statements inherently involves speculation and so careful scrutiny of sources backing such
speculation becomes especially imperative.51 Unquestionably though, the best way to assess
intentions is through dialog and cooperation.
THE “WHAT” OF CHINESE SPACE ACTIVITIES
China has an expansive, ambitious space program intended to fulfill a variety of perceived needs,
both civil and military. Whether or not it is aggressive, and how much and in what form a threat
to the United States are more complex questions. Therefore a brief review of some key areas of
Chinese space activity is in order, with reference to similar capabilities in the U.S. and other
countries in some instances.
China is pursuing development of a full range of satellite capabilities and is making significant
across-the-board progress in terms of both scope and sophistication. Of the approximately 1235
satellites currently in orbit, America, Russia, and China own the most: the U.S. has 512, Russia
135, and China 116.52
50 The French space agency Centre National E’tudes Spatiales (CNES) is the technical manager for most French
military space programs. It receives a considerable portion of its annual budget from the French General Directorate
for Armament (DGA). Regarding information regarding Japan’s long reliance on being able to utilize dual-use space
technology to circumvent Constitutional provisions regarding military space technology, see: Joan Johnson-Freese
and Lance Gatling, “Security Implications of Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System, Intelligence and
National Security, Volume 19, Issue 3, 2004. 51 Gregory Kulacki, “The 2014 USCC Report: Still Sloppy After All These Years,” All Things Nuclear, November
24, 2014. http://allthingsnuclear.org/the-2014-uscc-report-still-sloppy-after-all-these-years/ 52 Union of Concerned Scientists database. Numbers valid as of July 31, 2014.
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-
database.html#.VK_WsXu4F2A
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The growing capacity of Chinese aerospace industry demonstrates the broad programmatic
ambitions and China’s pragmatic utilization of industrial facilities for building both military and
non-military spacecraft. A massive new factory in the port city of Tianjin, not far from Beijing,
was completed in 2013. Floor space of the facility is estimated at about 100,000 square meters,
or 1.08 million square feet, big enough to allow for product construction and testing. According
to a Tianjin city official, facilities there “will be able to build 6-8 outsize spacecraft a year,
satisfying requirements for the space station, outsize [communications] satellites, large remote-
sensing satellites, large unfolding precision structures and so on.”53 Some of those will likely be
modules for the Chinese space station. Others will likely be for large, military reconnaissance
satellites much the same size as the space station components. Representatives of the China’s
General Armaments Department responsible for military satellites were present at the factory
groundbreaking, evidencing military involvement in the facility.
China’s development of its own satellite navigation system, Beidou (also known as Compass),
owned by the Defense Ministry, began operational testing in 2012, and is expected to provide
global coverage by 2020 through a constellation of thirty-five satellites. Reluctant reliance on the
U.S. owned and U.S. military operated Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, given that it
and the internet are considered global utilities, likely prompted China’s desire for its own
satellite navigation system, just as it did in Europe with the Galileo system and Russian
restoration of the Glonass system capabilities.
China’s earth observation capabilities are rapidly expanding. The Ziyuan-1 series is owned by
the Chinese Center for Resource Data and Application and has been used in conjunction with the
China-Brazil Earth Resources (CBERS) program with Brazil, while Ziyuan-2 and Ziyuan 3
satellites are owned and operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese media refers
to China’s Yaogan satellites as for disaster relief, earth observation and scientific
experimentation. However, the high resolutio