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THE CHINA THEATER, 1944 - 1945:A FAILURE OF JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS STRATEGY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

SAMUEL J. COX, LCDR, USNB.S., United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: LCDR Samuel J . Cox, USNThes is T i t l e : The China Theater, 1944 - 1945: A Fai lur e of J oi nt andCombined Operations Strategy

'Robert D. Walz, M.A.

Thesis

Member

Committee Chairman

!, Member, Consulting FacultyUhJ James C. McNaughton, Ph.D.

Accepted t h i s 4th day of June 1993 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreeP h i l i p Jf. ~rooi ies ,Ph.D. Programs

The oplnions and conclusion s expressed here in ar e those of the st ude ntauthor and do not n ec es sa ri ly repre se nt t he views of th e U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.(References t o t h i s study should include the foregoing statement.)

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ABSTRACTTHE CHINA THEATER 1944 - 1945: A FAILURE OF JOINT AND COMBINEDOPERATIONS STRATEGY by LCDR Samuel J. Cox, USN, 179 pages.This study investigates the formulation and implementation of U.S.military strategy to conduct joint and combined operations in the ChinaTheater, concentrating on the period 1944-1945. Focussing on theinteraction between the U.S. Joint Chiefs of staff, senior Alliedleaders, and key U.S. commanders in China (Generals Joseph W. Stilwell,Albert C. Wedemeyer, Claire L. Chennault, and Admiral Milton E. Miles),this paper examines the process of developing joint and combinedmilitary objectives in the China Theater.This study finds that the U.S. military failed to accomplish desiredmilitary or political objectives in China. U.S. military strategy didnot effectively link available resources vith appropriate militaryobjectives in support of U.S. national political objectives in China.The U.S. military failed to develop a coherent, coordinated strategy foreffectively synchronizing U.S., British, Soviet, Nationalist andCommunist Chinese military operations. Nor did the U.S. effectivelysynchronize U.S. Army, Army Air Force, and Navy operations. The primarycauses of failure vere unrealistic U.S. political objectives,incompatible Allied political objectives, inadequate logistics due tothe demands of global war, and the actions of a determined foe, most ofvhich vere beyond the control of U.S. commanders on the scene.

i i i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVALPAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IST OF CHARTS AND MAPSLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CHAPTER . . . . . . . . . . . .INTRODUCTION AND STRATEGIC SETTING . . . . .. U.S. PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN CHINA. 1937 1943

3. SEXTANT. EUREKA. UATTERHORN AND ICHIGO. NOVEMBER 1943 .HAY 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .DISASTER IN EAST CHINA. JUNE 1944 OCTOBER 1944 . . . .. RESURGENCE AND VICTORY. NOVEMBER 1944 . UGUST 19456. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .APPENDIX

A . FIGURES (CHARTSANDHAPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B. GLOSSARY (CODENAMES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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LIST OF CHARTS AND UAPSP m

Allied Chain of Comaand. Par East: January 1944 . . . . . . . . . 149. . . . . ..S. Chain of Command. Far East: January October 1944 150Allied chain of Command. china Theater: nay 1945 . . . . . . . . . 151China; Provinces and Uajor Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152China; Supply Routes (Hump and Burma Road) . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Allied Theater Boundries: January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154U.S. Theater Boundries: October 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155Bursa-India; CHAUPION. BUCCANEER: December 1943 . . . . . . . . . 156Burma-xndla; Stllvell's Offensive. Iaphal Offensive.Salveen Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57China; MATTERHORN and East China Alrflelds . . . . . . . . . . . 158China; Japanese ICHIGO plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159China; ICHIGO (KOG0):April -June1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160China; ICHIGO (TOGO 1): June . ugust 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 161China; ICHIGO (TOGO 2 ) : September . ctober 1944 . 162China; ICHIGO (TOGO 3): November 1944 . ebruary 1945 . . . . . . 163China; ALPHA. BETA. RASHNESS. CARBONADO. USN Landings . . 64Uanchuria; Soviet Offensive; August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Allied Strategic Conferences (Selected Participants) . . . . . . . 166

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSABFABDAAHMISCAATCAVGB M GCACWCbTFCBICCPCCSCOSCIACNACCNOCPSEACGBJCSJPSJSSCJ PCKUTNCACNGCOSSRAFRNSACSAC0SEACSISSOEsosSWPAUSAFUSNVLR

Army Air Forces (US)American, British, Dutch and Australian commandAmerican Military Mission to China (Magruder Mission, 1941)Air Transport Command (US)American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers)British Army Aid Group ChinaChinese-American Composite WingChina Air Task Force (US)China-Burma-India Theater (US)Chinese Communist PartyCombined Chiefs of Staff (US/GB)Chiefs of Staff Committee (GB)Chinese National ArmyChinese National Air ForceChief of Naval Operations (US)Combined Staff Planners (US/GB)Eastern Air Command (SEAC)Great BritainJoint Chiefs of Staff (US)Joint Staff Planners (US)Joint Strategic Survey Committee (US)Joint War Plans Committee (US)Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)Northern Combat Area Command (SEAC)Naval Group China (US)Office of Strategic Services (US)Royal Air Force (GB)Royal Navy (GB)Supreme Allied CommanderSino-American Cooperative Organization (USN/KMT)South East Asia CommandSecret Intelligence Service (GB)Special Operations Executive (GB)Services of Supply (US)South West Pacific Area (US)U.S. Army Forces or U.S. Air ForceU.S. NavyVery Long Range bombers (US)

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CHAPTER 1INTRODUCTION AND STRATEGIC SETTING

Throughout 1944 and into 1945, the resurgent Allied powersrolled sviftly and inexorably tovard final victory in every theater ofvar except China. Still retaining the initiative in China, Japaneseforces launched the largest land offensive of the Pacific var, code-named ICHIGO, in April 1944. ICHIGO dealt a staggering blow to theAmerican military strategy for conducting joint and combined operationsin the China Theater, already hampered by lack of resources andextraordinary difficulty in synchronizing strategy and operations amongthe Allies (United States, China, Great Britain and soviet Union) oreven betveen the U.S. Army, Army Air Force, and Navy.

By the time ICHIGO reached its culminating point in January1945, the damage to the Allied war effort in China vas extensive andfar-reaching. In the course of attempting to establish a secureovexland line of conmunication to their forces in Indochina, theJapanese overran all of the American forward airfields in eastern China,virtually eliminating U.S. tactical land-based air support from China ata critical phase of initial U.S. operations in the Philippines andWestern Pacific. The U.S. Navy cancelled longstanding plans to conductlandings on the China coast, at one time considered nessentialn' to theconduct of the Pacific War. The U.S. Army Air Force's attempt to

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conduct a sustained strategic bombing campaign from China provedineffective, and drained scarce resources from the tactical air forceand ground forces at a crucial time. In the midst of the debacle, theAmerican theater commander, General Joseph 1 . Stilwell, wasignominiously fired. -Stilwell's effort to transform the Chinese armyinto an effective fighting force went for nought. An attempt by theChinese Communist Party (CCP) to cooperate with the U.S. in fighting thecommon Japanese foe evaporated after Stilwell*s departure.

The impact of ICHIGO on Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek'sNationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) government was even more severe.KMT and provincial armies totaling 750,000 men had been either

1

destroyed, rendered combat ineffective, or simply melted avayI2 whileHao Tse-tung's Communist army continued to grov in strength andpopularity. The KMT emerged from the ICHIGO disaster mortally weakened,thereby making unattainable one of America's primary objectives of thePacific War, a strong, united and democratic postvar China.

Matters improved little in the months after ICHIGO ground to alogistically over-extended halt in the vastness of China. At var's end,the Japanese China Expeditionary Army remained essentially undefeated.Only in Manchuria, where a well-executed Soviet combined arms offensivecrushed the Japanese Kwangtung Army, had things gone according to U.S .strategic plans developed earlier in the war. The sudden Japanesesurrender in August 1945 resulted in chaos in China, which threatened todraw American forces into the renewed outbreak of civil war between theKMT and CCP and led to the opening shots of the Cold War.

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In the end, the substantial U.S. effort in the China Theaterfailed to accomplish more than the minimal objectives envisioned by thesenior U.S. military strategists in the early years of the var, vhobelieved China's potential contribution to the var effort to be vital.This strongly held viev vas derailed by divergent and sometimesunrealistic Allied political-military objectives and incompatible U.S.service strategies. Convoluted command structures, inadequatelogistics, intense personality conflict, and a determined andresourceful foe all further exacerbated the situation.

Thesis QuestionFocussing on the interface betveen the strategic and operational

levels of war, this paper vill examine the interaction betveen the U.S.service chiefs in Washington and the senior service representatives inthe China Theater, particularly Generals Stilvell and Wedemeyer, in theformulation and implementation of joint and combined military operationsstrategy for the China Theater. The purpose will be to determine ifU.S. military strategy in China during World War I 1 failed, as itapparently did, and if so, vhy? In order to make this determination,several secondary questions relating to the selationship betveenmilitary strategy and national interests and objectives, and theformulation of joint and combined varfare strategy must be addressed.For example, did the U.S. military develop a strategy that effectivelylinked available resources vith appropriate military objectives in orderto accomplish U.S. national objectives and support U.S. nationalinterests in China? Did the U.S. military develop a coherent,

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cities by the KHT in the late 1920's. Holding out in rural areas insouth central China under Hao, the CCP resisted repeated campaigns ofannihilation ("bandit extermination") by Chiang in the early 1930's.Finally, under intense KHT military pressure, the remnants of the CCPfled to Yenan in remote northvest China in the epic "Long Harch." As aresult of the experiences of the late 1920's and 1 9 3 0 ' ~ ~he KHT and CCPvieved each other as mortal enemies. This fact is critical tounderstanding the actions of chiang Kai-shek and the KMT during worldWar 11. Peaceful co-existence and coalition government vere impossibleexcept for short periods of expedient cooperation.

As Chiang prepared for yet another campaign against the CCP in1936, he vas briefly held hostage in Hsian by a disgruntled varlord,upset by Chiang's failure to do anything substantive in response to theJapanese occupation of Manchuria and parts of North China which hadbegun in 1931. Chiang's concession to put off further forays againstthe CCP and take some sort of unifled action against the Japanese set inmotion an escalatory chain of events leading to the outbreak of full-scale warfare between Japan and China in August 1937.

The Sino-Japanese WarFrom the very beginning, the large, but poorly equipped and

trained national and provincial Chinese forces vere no match for theJapanese. During the battle of Shanghai in 1937, Chiang ignored theadvice of his German military advisor, General von Palkenhausen, toconduct a strategic retreat. Chiang instead ordered his army to conducta heroic, but futile, "death-stand" defense. As a result, China lost

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the cream of its army in the opening months of the var. Most (over10,000 of China's German-trained junior of ficers died at shanghai.'Hovever, the highly publicized battle did garner substantialinternational sympathy and led to serious U.S. diplomatic effortsagainst the Japanese. Japanese forces quickly occupied the majorcoastal and north Chinese cities, ruthlessly crushing the KIT capital inthe "Rape of Nankingn and forcing Chiang and his government into remoteChungking in southvestern China. Tvo years later, Chiang launched anill-conceived counter-offensive in the vinter of 1939-40, vith typicallydisastrous results .'

As Chinese battle casualties climbed over the three million markand the Japanese grev reluctant to make the effort needed to occupy allof China or to bring about a decisive defeat, a stalemate situationdeveloped. The Japanese contented themselves vith holding major easterncities and lines of communication, vhile conducting periodic limitedoffensive sveeps to keep Chinese forces off balance. On rare occasionsthe Chinese inflicted heavy losses and unexpected defeats on theJapanese, such as the battle of T'aierhchuang in early 1938.' Hovever,in general, Japanese forces could go vherever they villed, limited onlyby logistical over-extension, not by any effective resistance by theChinese army. In addition, Japanese aircraft bombed the new KIT capi.ta1at Chungking at vill. In a feeble response, one Chinese nartin B-10bomber conducted the first air "attackn on Japan, dropping leaflets onNagasaki.'

Lacking the means to resist, Chiang had little choice but totrade space for time and hope the U.S. or anyone else vould go to var

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and defeat the Japanese for him. In terms of numbers, China stillretained a formidable army, ranging at various times from three to fourmillion men organized in approximately 300 divisions. Hovever, onlyabout 500,000 men in 30 divisions vere under direct KMT control." Theremainder oved their allegiance to various provincial military governors(varlords), vho formed a loose and Erequently unruly alliance under thenominal authority of Chiang. Thus, Chiang, in effect, vaged "coalitionvarfaren vithin his ovn country, constantly balancing the competingdemands of rival regional leaders in order to maintain KHT dominance.

The loss of the Chinese coastal regions severely hurt the KIT inthe long run. With Chiang isolated in Chungking, the Japanese set up arival puppet Chinese government in Nanking under Wang Ching-veil vhichclaimed the allegience of 600,000 Chinese provincial troops in easternchina.' Besides losing credibility vith many Chinese as a result ofbeing repeatedly beaten by the Japanese, the KMT also lost its moderatepolitical base of support vhich existed primarily in the Japanese-occupied eastern urban areas. The KHT vas forced to rely on regionalmilitary governors and the reactionary rural landlord class for itssupport for the duration of the var, vhich played right into the CCP'shands. To sustain the var effort, the long-suffering Chinese peasantsbore the brunt of KHT taxation and forcible recruitment of personnel forthe army. The economy eventually collapsed in an inflationary spiralresulting in videspread corruption throughout the KIT bureaucracy. Thisresulted in a videly held perception among the Chinese masses that theKHT vas incapable of resisting the Japanese, or even more ominously,incapable of effectively ruling China after the var.

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By contrast, CCP forces In northwest China steadily gainedstrength and stat ure throughout the var, despi te near total isolationfrom outside sources of supply. In the ea rly days of th e var, CCPforces scored seve ral surprising defensive victories, vhich dissuadedthe Japanese from making a serious attempt to take Yenan. Emboldened,the CCP entered Japanese held areas and launched the "Hundred Regimentswoffensive in 1940. The Japanese retaliated vith the brutally effectiveSENKO-SEISAKU (Three Alls Caapaign - kill all, burn all, destr oy all)against civilian populations, l eading to a re-evaluation of CCP guerillastrategy.' To avoid Jap ane se retaliation, the CCP concentrated onexpansion into area s not firmly held by the Japanese (or by the KHT),and tra ining an ever-expanding wreg ular w army in the comparative safetyof ena an.'^ Although at t he end of the war, Japanese so ldie rs exibitedfear of the CCP, it vas more like ly due t o fear of retribution thanrespect for com bat accoaplishnents."

Hovever, in the ever expandin g area under its control, the CCPvigorously implemented political and economic reforms, centered uponland reform and education, which proved highly popular vith thepeasantry. Highly visible CCP cadres vorked vith the peasants in closeproximity t o the porous Japanese lines, earning the CCP ever greaterpopularity, particularly vhen compared to the isolated Chungking regime.'Zealous and competent leadership, couple d with terror when required,further improved the C C P 8 s position as time vent on. By 1940, thenumber of combatants loyal to the CCP approached that of the KHT.l'

Chiang recognized that the CCP challenge vas grave. Initialcooperation betveen the CCP and KHT weakened and vas finally destroyed

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as a result of the Nev Fourth Army Incident in 1941. After the CCP NevFourth Army ignored KMT varnings to cease operations south of theYangtze River, KIT forces attacked and captured the Nev Fourth'sheadquarters, inflicting several thousand casualties =' From 1941through the end oE the var, over 200,000 KHT troops, including some ofChiang's best, maintained a blockade of the CCP forces in the north,ensuring that the CCP received no supplies, but also doing little tosupport the var against Japan.1.

Chiang's position became even more precarious upon the outbreakof var betveen the U.S. and Japan. Momentary KIT elation at U.S. entryinto the var was quickly dashed as the Japanese smashed American,British, and Dutch forces throughout the Far East. Far from lesseningJapanese pressure on China, the outbreak made things much vorse. Byrid-1942, the Japanese offensive in Burma cut the only remaining landresupply route into China, leaving China completely isolated except byaerial resupply. Until 1945, vhen the Ledo Road was completed and theBurma Road reopened, all supplies destined for China had to be flovnover the "HumpIn a long, dangerous flight from India, over the Himalayasto southwest China. The critical need to protect the Hump route fromJapanese air and land depredations, and the need to reopen a landresupply route into China as a prerequisite for sustained operationsvithin China itself, formed the strategic rationale for U.S. operationsin India and Burma during World War 11.

Despite the early Allied setbacks, Chiang believed that the U.S.would eventually defeat the Japanese, with or vithout China's help.Clearly believing that the CCP represented an even greater long-tern

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threat to KHT rule than even the Japanese, Chiang sought to secure asmuch military equipment as possible from America and conserve thestrength of his armies, vith the intent of emerging from the var in thestrongest possible position relative to the CCP. By alternatingpromises to exert greater effort against the Japanese vith veiledthreats to drop out of the var and seek a separate peace, Chiangattempted to ensure the continued flov of U.S. Lend-Lease support.Since a Chinese vithdraval from the Alliance vould theoretically free asmany as a million Japanese troops to oppose Allied operations elsevhere,Chiang's strategy had the desired effect. Unfortunately, thelimitations of aerial logistics resupply, coupled vith the enormousdemands of global warfare upon U.S. resources, ensured that Chiang neverreceived the amount of support he desired. In addition, it vas Chiang'sunwillingness to risk further destruction of his forces in battle viththe Japanese that led to fundamental disagreements over militarystrategy betveen Chiang and the senior U S . military officer in China,Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilvell.

The Allied CoalitionUnlike in Europe, vhere Allied interests vere basically

complementary, the national interests and objectives of the UnitedStates, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in China vere fundamentallydifferent. About the only thing the three Allies agreed on vas that thedefeat of Germany cane first and the liberation of China came last.While China remained lowest on the Allied scale of priorities, care hadto be taken to ensure that China received enough aid to avoid collapse.

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Additionally, Chinese national goals and aspirations, particularlyrecoveryof lost territories such as Manchuria and Hong Kong, frequentlywere in direct conflict vith those of the Soviet Union and GreatBritain, which further complicated the Alliance.The Soviet Union

The first nation to come to Chiang's assistance was the SovietUnion. The overriding imperative of Soviet policy regarding China wasptagmatic self-interest, frequently to the dismay of the CCP, whobelieved they had been cynically manipulated by Stalin on severaloccasions. Since the turn of the century, Japan had been the primarythreat to Soviet interests in the Far East. Soviet policy supportedanything that would serve to keep the Japanese in check. Stalin soughta China that vas just strong enough to keep the Japanese from havingfree rein, but not strong enough to replace Japan as a challenge toSoviet interests. Despite Intense autual suspicion, Stalin readilysupported the KMT when it suited Soviet interests. As George Kennanlater described it, Soviet policy in China was "fluid, resilient" anddesigned to "achieve maximum power vith minimum responsibility. mx'

Between 1937 and 1941, Stalin provided substantially more aid tothe KHT than any other country, including America. Immediately afterthe Japanese invasion, the Soviet Union and China signed a mutual %on-aggressionm treaty, vhich contained secret clauses promising largeamounts of Soviet military and economic assistance. This aid included$300 million in loans and credits, over 60,000 tons of munitions, enougharms to equip eight to ten KMT divisions, and construction of a 1,200

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mile road for resu pply through Sinkiang. The Soviets sent 885 aircraftto China, 400 of vhich vere turned over to the Chinese air force."Soviet pilots fl ew the remainde r from Chinese bases and engaged theJapanese in numerous air battles over China and Uanchuria." Over 500Soviet advisors, including seve ral prominent general officers, replacedChiang's German advisors, who ve re.s oon to be recalled by Hitleranyway." In addition, Soviet forces aggr essi vely engaged th e Japa neseKvangtung Army along the disputed Uanchurian/Mongolian border. InAugust 1939, Soviet f orces under Zhuk ov virtually annihilated a n entireJapanese division at Khalkin Go1 (Nomonhan).

Soviet assistance t o China decreased dramatically as Stalin becamealarmed by t he increasingly menacing Germ an threat in 1941 and attemptedto secure his Far Eastern flank before the anticipated outbreak of var.The Soviets in effect ndu npedn China and signed a neutrality pact vithJapa n in April 1941, quickly withdrawin g most of their adviso rs and allof their aircraft." Within sev era l months, th e Soviet Unio n becamelocked in a desperate battle for survival of truly stupendousproportions. No aid and little concer n could be spared for China.Nevertheless, t he Soviets maintained nearly 40 divisions along theManchurian border for the duration of the var t o protect their criticallifeline thr ough Siberia. Over 50% of U.S. Lend-Lease aid to the Sovie tUnion durin g the var vas delivered by neutral-flag shipping t oVladivostock and shipped via the Trans-Siberian railroad to the vesternSov iet Union.'O This vit al link was vit hin eas y str iki ng dis tan ce ofthe nearly one million Japanese troops of the Kvangtung Army.

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Equally unsure of Soviet intentions, the Japanese maintained theKvangtung Army at high strength through most of the war, although manyof the best units vere eventually replaced by nevly mobilized and lessvell trained units. Although China is frequently given credit for tyingdown almost two nillion Japanese soldiers during the var, fully halfthese Japanese forces vere actually tied down by the large Sovietpresence in the Far East and not by the Chinese, thus substantiallyaiding the U.S. effort in the Pacific. .Great Britain

Relations betveen Great Britain and China vere characterized byas much mistrust and perhaps even more animosity as that betveen Chinaand the Soviet Union. As a colonial pover that had taken advantage of aveak Chlna in the past, Great Britain was the object of lntense dislikeby Chlang and most of the KUT leadershlp, vho flrmly believed that thetrue British objective was to ensure that China emerged from the war asa veak, divided nation that vould pose little threat to the Britishcolonial empire in Asla and Hong Kong in particular. Stilvell peggedthe Chinese attitude toward the British vithin days of his arrival inChina vith the observation, "Hov they hate the ~imeys!~"

The perception that the British vere anti-KUT and harboredulterior imperial motives vas nearly universally held to varying degreesby American military and foreign service officers in China. SomeAmerican commanders vere as intensely anti-British as the Chinese. Fromthe British perspective, the videspread American attitude vas unfair.Although Prime Minister Winston Churchill clearly held the Chinese in

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lov regard, British policy dld not delib erate ly support a divided andweak China since that vould have adversely affected British commercialinterests in China, vhich at the start of the var still subst antia llyexceeded those of the u.s." In fact, British policy vas not s o nuchanti-KMT as nuch a s a more realistic recognition of the true veaknessesof Ch la ng Bs government, and a more realistic appraisal of the truepotential of the Chinese Army to be a decisive factor in defeating theJapanese. British policy did not undergo the wild svinqs betveeninflated expect ations and subsequent dee p disillusionment vith the KtiTthat ultiaately characterized American poli~y.'~

The already sorry state of British and Chinese militarycooperatlon deteriorated rapidly upon the outbreak of var betveen Japanand Great Britain. Although Chur chill had approved a plan t o send amedium bomber and a fighter squadron piloted by Commonvealth volunteersto fight in China even prior to the outbreak of war betveen Britain andJapan, the aircraft vere diverted to other more pressing British needs

and never arrived in China." As the threat of a Japanese invasion ofBurma grev following the loss of Malaya and Singapore, th e Britishdiverted American Lend-lease supplies intended for China to their ovnuse. Although these suppli es had piled up in Rangoon faster tha n theycould be delivered via t he overburdened Burma road, the Chinese verestill angered by the British action."

Despi te the strain vith the British, Chiang recognized theimportance of holding the Burma Road and offered his best tvo remainingarmie s t o assis t the British in defending Burma, vith th e proviso thatBrltain provide logistics support. Reluctant to have Chines e troops in

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colonial Burma and unable to support them, the British commander in theFar East, Sir Archibald Wavell, initially accepted only one Chinesedivision, vhich gave affront to the Chinese." Only vhen the magnitudeof the Japanese threat became clear did the British request theassistance of both Chinese armies. By then it vas too late to effect acoordinated defense and by May 1942, the invading Japanese routed theBtitish and Chinese forces in one of the vorst debacles of the var.

The Chinese and many Americans harbored the belief that theBritish had only made a half-hearted attempt to defend Burma, vhich wascritical to the resupply of China, while expending their greatest effortto defend their more important colony in India. During the rout inBurma, the British initially intended for two brigades, one of themarmored, to retreat via the Burma road into China to continue the var.Due to serious logistics problems associated vith such a move, theBritish chose instead to destroy their ovn tanks, and escape by foot toIndia vith the rest of the retreating '~ritish, ndian and some Chinesetroops." Subsequent British reluctance to conduct offensive operationsto re-open the Burma Road served to increase Chinese mistrust of Britishmotives. U.S. commanders in Asia, such as Stilwell, were frequentlycaught in the middle between the reluctant British and Chinese allies.

Following the Burma disaster, Britain provided minimal directmilitary aid to China. Several missions had been dispatched to Chinaduring or just before the var to train and equip Chinese forces toconduct guerilla var against the Japanese. These efforts included the204th' Military Mission and a group of Danish commandos working on behalfof the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). The Chinese provided

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minimal cooperation, believing the primary purpose of the British effortwas the eventual re-occupation of Hong Kong, and the SOE group waskicked out of China early in 1942 and most activities of the 204thclosed down by October 1942." Nevertheless, some British trainingactivity continued, vhile a variety of British intelligenceorganizations operated in China throughout the war, collecting on boththe Japanese and Chinese."'

The United StatesUnited States policy toward China was driven by President

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who envisioned a strong post-war China that wouldbe one of the world's four great povers, serving to stabilize Asia afterthe defeat of Japan. Roosevelt also desired that China regain all herlost territories, including Manchuria and Hong Kong, which naturally ledto friction betveen U.S. policy and that of the Soviets and Briti~h.'~Despite British and Soviet reluctance, it was U.S. policy to treat Chinaas an equal with America, Great Britain and the Soviet Uni~n.'~ Thispolicy was repeatedly reaffirmed (in words, at least) at the majorAllied conferences, despite the fact that to any reasonable observer inChina the KIQ vas increasingly weak and moribund, and that prospects fora strong, peaceful, united post-war China were din at best.

Although Roosevelt was aware of potential contradictions andf l a w in his China policy, he avoided making public whatever his truefeelings may have been. Repeated attempts by Army Chief of StaffGeneral George C. Marshall and by Stllwell to get Roosevelt to issueclear, unambiguous guidance concerning realistic U.S. national

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objectives in china met with little success. After his first neetingvlth Roosevelt, Stilvell described the President's China policy as "alot of vind.""

American policy-makers held an almost mythologic vie v of China,strongly reinforced by an effective KMT propaganda effort. Americansviewed Chiang a s a strong, pro-vestern leader of a democratic KMTgovernment, fighting valiantly and inflicting great losses upon theJapanese. The fact that little of this vas really true only began tobecome knovn in the latter stages of the war. Unfortunately, Rooseveltalso held this same viev during the early years of the var. In a letterto Uarshall, Roosevelt vrote,

The Generalissimo came up the hard vay to become th eundisputed leader of four hundred million people - an enormouslydifficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse groupof all kinds of leaders - mllitary men, educators, scientists,public health people, engineers, all of them strugglin g forpover and mastery, local or national, and to create ln a veryshort time vhat it took us a couple of centuries to attain.""This viev of China was fiction.

Unfortunately, Roosevelt fancied himself to be a China expert,due to the Delano family's long history of trade in china." Disdainfulof professional foreign service officers, Roosevelt gained much of hisknovledge of China through the repo rts of a long series of personalrepresentatives vhom he dispatched to China. Hovever, th eserepresentatives, Laughlin Currie, Wendall Wilkie, Henry Wallace, DonaldNelson, and Patric k Hurley, all seemed to have one quality in comnon,abso lutely no background in Chinese affairs. Every one of them, basedon initial superficial contact, accepted the KMT's viev of reality. Thevarninqs of Stilvell and the U.S. ambassador to China, Claience Gauss,

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vent unheeded, while the positions of both were repe atedly undermlned bythe parade of presidential emissaries.

Even after the KMT's faults became increasingly widely known,many U.S. policy-makers cont inued t o hold the view that, e ven thoug h hemay have serious faults, Chiang vas the only game in tovn and the onlyhope for a united China. The fact that Chiang vas barely holdingtogether an unruly coalition of reactionary varlords, led to theformulati on of unrealistic policy, which filtered lnto unreallst icmilitary strategy. Although much of Roosevelt's China policy seemed toexhibit a lack of realism, Roosevelt did have an instinctive aversion tothe concept of committing large numbers of U.S. forces into combat onth e cont inent of Asia. Roosevelt, and Marshall, believed that th eU e r i c a n people vould not support involvement in a land var in ~sia."This viev led Roosevelt to constantly search for less costly shozt-cutsto victory, whether it be long-range penetration grou ps or completereliance on airpower.

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CHAPTER 2U.S. PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN CHINA, 1937-1943

Pre-War PlanningWhile signs of divergent Allied objectives in Asia became evident

in the prewar years, discord in U.S. military planning for joint andcombined operations in China vas also apparent from the very beginningof the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Observing the outbreak of fighting inShanghai from his flagship in the harbor, Rear Admiral Harry Yarnell,Couander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, recormended that an alliance of theU.S., Britain, France, Netherlands, and Russia initiate a "naval var ofstrangulation" in response to Japanese aggressi~n.~ lthough theBritish ambassador in Washington was urging much the same thing, theU.S. State and War Departments opposed such a "reckless gamble.naAlthough Yarnell persisted in his calls for resolute action, even thesenior naval leadership remained opposed. At that time, U.S. navalstrategic thought emphasized the primacy of Atlantic operations. Withsome reluctance, the U.S. Navy entered into discussions vith the BritishNavy, and even reached agreement that in event of uar in the Far East,U.S. naval forces vould conduct combined operations in the WesternPacific under the command of the British Commander-in-Chief, ChinaStation.' Hovever, persistent disagreements over basing and strategyensured that no practical plans for combined operations had been

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completed by December 1941, and both fleets vere quickly driven fromChina and the entire Far East by the Japanese. Hovever inadequateBritish and American naval plans vere, the U.S. Army and Army Air Corpsplans vere even more so.

In 1940, the Chinese initiated a request to conduct combinedoffensive air operations against Japan. The Chief of the Chinese Air~orce, eneral P.T. Mow, in company vith Chiang's American air advisor,Claire Chennault, visited Washington, D.C., seeking American support.Chennault proposed that America provide 500 aircraft to China, includingheavy bombers, which vould carry Chinese marklngs but be secretly Elovn

by American volunteer pilots. Direct American involvement vould remaincovert vhile these aircraft bombed the Japanese homeland and attackedJapanese naval forces and shipping from Chinese bases.' Secretary ofWar Henry Stimson described the plan as "half baked."D Marshall vasmore polite, calling it "impra~tical.~'

Despite opposition from senior Army and Navy officers, seniorofficials in the Roosevelt cabinet, including somevhat surprisingly theSecretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, believed that a modified version ofthe plan vould be useful in enabling the U.S. to "do somethingn tosupport China besides lofty r h e t ~ r i c . ~ s finally approved byRoosevelt, the U.S. agreed to provide a small force of fighter planes tothe Chinese, to be flovn by volunteer pilots from the Army Air Force andNavy. This American Volunteer Group (AVG) became the famous "FlyingTigers."

British cooperation in the formation of the AVO proved to becrucial, although a parallel British effort never cane to fruition. The

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British agreed to forego delivery of a Lend-lease shipment of P-40fighters, in exchange for a later delivery of updated model P-40ts,vhich freed up aircraft for the Chinese vithout cutting into criticallyshort U.S. fighter stocks.. The British also agreed to allov theaircraft to be assembled, and the pilots trained, in Burma. The AVG vasstill in Burma and had yet to arrive in China vhen var began in 1941.

Besides requesting U.S. support for air operations, the Chinesealso sought help from the War Department for training Chinese guerillaforces. This plan, first proposed in the summer of 1941, requested U.S.arms and training for the Chun-ttung, more commonly knovn as the Bureauof Information and Statistics (BIS).' BIS vas the largest and mostpervasive of the KMTts several secret police and security organizations,nunbering at its peak as many as 300,000 agents, informers, police andspecial forces. Besides collecting intelligence on the Japanese, BISperformed a vide variety missions including suppression of politicaldissent, counter-espionage, internal KHT security, and enforcement ofKMT vartime economic and trade regulations.lo Commanded by General TaiLi, a virulent anti-Communist, intimate friend of Chiang, and reputedformer Shanghai gangster, the BIS acquired a number of unofficial namesincluding the "Blue Shirtsn and the KUTts nGestapo.nax Sensingpotential severe political rammifications, the War Department shoved nointerest in this plan. So the Chinese vent to the Navy Department,vhich also turned the project dovn, but only initially.

As the threat of var vith Japan increased, the Army dispatchedtwo missions to China in late 1941. The first, a survey team underGeneral Clagget of the Army Air Corps, observed Chinese air force

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opera tions and bases to det erm ine potenti al for future U.S. Army AirCorps operations against Japan in conjunction vith the Chinese. Thismission, v hich vas separat e from Chennault's AVG, led to cre ati on of aChinese aviator training program in A~erica.~'

The sec ond Army mission, led by Brigadier Gener al John Magruder,arrived in China shortl y before Pea rl Harbor. Magruder's narro vlydefined missi on was to ensure that American Lend-lease aid intended forthe development of a n agreed 30 division re-equipment program vassatisf actor ily administered." Small quanti ties of American Lend-Leaseaid had begun t o arrive over the Burma Road in mid-1941 and so me of itvas reportedly diverted by corrupt Chinese officials along the vay.Magruder va s not empovered to advis e Chiang on strategy or develop plansfor combin ed ope rat ion s in the event of var." Magruder observed thatthe KHT vas alrea dy seriously veakened by over four years of war withthe Japanese and that the prospect for effective offensive act ion by theChines e va s remote, even if ext rao rdi nar y U.S. assis tance ver e provided.

Magruder's repor ts described the sorry state of the Chinesearmies, in vhich tr oops often fought bravely, but vere frequentlymalnourished, disease-ridden, and poorly paid, if paid at all.z' Th eChinese officer cor ps vas riddled vith corruption, political favoritism,and had a poor understanding of modern tacti cs and logistics. SinceChina had very little remain ing industry, veapons of any variety vere inextremely short supply. Such artillery as existed consisted of videlyvarying make s and calibers, presen ting a logistical nightmare.Generally, less than half the men in a Chinese divis ion had rifles. Theremainder served as porters. Sin ce Chinese units vere genera lly

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undermanned to begin vith, the effective combat pover of a Chinesedivision was less than a typical Japanese regiment, not counting theovervhelming Japanese advantage in artillery and air support. A ChineseArmy (three divisions) had less combat pover than one Japanesedivision."

During the period of the nagruder mission, the outgoing U.S.Naval attache to Chungking, Captain Schuirman, commented on thepotential of China to play an active and decisive role in the defeat ofJapan vith the prescient observation, "If such a conception is seriouslyheld by those controlling high strategy, it is fatally de f e ct i ~e . "~ ~Schuirman vas relieved by Colonel James McHugh, USHC, vho vas a long-tine friend of Chiang8s vife's family, and vho ceaselessly extolled thevirtues of the KMT.

The U.S. Service Chiefs' Viev of ChinaWithin a couple months after Pearl Harbor, the senior level

military leadership that vould make strategic decisions affecting U.S.operations in China vas in place and vould remain constant for theduration of the var. The President's military chief of staff, AdniralWilliam D. Leahy, had a much more constrained role than today's Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Although Leahy frequentlysignificantly influenced strategic decisions, he generally did notoriginate strategic concepts. Although Marshall and the Chief of Staffof the Army Air Force, General Henry wHapn Arnold, played crucial roles,the member of the JCS vith the most influence over strategic decisions

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affecting operations in China vas the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),Admiral Ernest J. King.%'

KingA brilliant and ruthless naval officer, King vas the JCS

"executive agentn for Pacific var strategy. Although supportive of theAllies' "defeat Germany firstn approach, King's heart vas in thePacific. King deliberately adopted a methodology of deferring toMarshall's judgement on European issues vhile expecting reciprocation onPacific iss~es.~' In general, this arrangement vorked.

King believed that the geographic position and manpover of Chinaheld the key to victory in the Pacific, and said so repeatedly at Alliedstrategic conferences." King reasoned that the situation in China vasanalagous to that of Russia, vhich King believed vould do nine-tenths ofthe job of defeatlng Nazi ern any.'^ King sought to keep China in thevar and keep the bulk of the Japanese army bogged dovn in a prolongedvar of attrition on the continent of Asia, vhile U.S. amphibiousoperations attacked the Japanese Empire by sea.

In King's viev, the primary objective of the Navy's offensivethrust across the Pacific vas to reach the coast of China, in order toestablish bases from vhich to conduct sustained strategic aerialbombardment and naval blockade of Japan, hopefully bringing aboutJapan's surrender vithout need of invasion." If an invasion vasrequired, King vanted Chinese troops to do the bulk of the fighting.Crucial to King's strategy vas the need to land on the Chinese coast inareas under friendly Chinese control. King knev that a forced entryinto Japanese-held territory on the mainland of Asia vould be

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prohibitively costly. Thus throughout the var, King vigorouslysupported any efforts to improve the combat effectiveness of the Chinesearmy, for the purpose of utilizing Chinese forces to drive to the seaand link vith U.S. amphibious forces. King believed in, and stronglysupported Stilvell's efforts in China ."

King's strategic concept vas based on long-standing Navystrategic objectives embodied in the Joint War Plan ORANGE series datingvell back before the var. The ORANGE plans largely reflected Navythinking, given the maritime nature of var in the Pacific. The ORANGEplan iteration approved by the Joint Board in 1938 envisioned a navaloffensive across the central Pacific vhich vould culminate in relieving(or more realistically, recapturing) the Philippines and landing anexpeditionary force in China to establish advanced naval and air basesvhich vould cut Japan's line of supply to critical resources inSoutheast Asia, and to provide logistics sustainnent enabling Chinesemanpover to defeat the Japanese army.2' This sane basic concept vasincorporated in the RAINBOW series plans developed shortly before thevar broke out. Although the stunning Japanese victory at Pearl Harbornecessitated radical changes to the RAINBOW plans, King never wavered inhis convlction that the tremendous Navy building plan underway since1939 vould reach fruition by 1943 and enable him to accompllsh the navalobjectives contained in the basic ORANGE plans. King's vision vas alsoshared by the senior naval conmander in the Pacific, Admiral ChesterNinitz.

King believed that the best way to keep China in the var until aport could be taken on the China coast vas to reopen the overland supply

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route, although he also strongly supported aerial resupply as asupplement. King believed that the greatest contribution Britain couldmake to the eacific var was to retake the port of Rangoon and reopen theBurma Road. British reluctance to commit the necessary resources to doso led to frequent clashes betveen King and the British Chiefs of Staff.Although the Indian Ocean and the Far East, including China, veretechnically in the British area of strategic responsibility, King foughtfor, and von agreement that support of China was a specific U.S.strategic interest and that resupply of China vas a U.S. responsibility,vhich vould be supported by British bases and operations in India andBurma. *

ArnoldLlke King, Arnold believed that the qeographlc posltion of China

vas critical to var in the Pacific, particularly for strategic bomberbases. Until the costly and technologically risky Very-Long-Range (VLR)Bomber (8-29) program became operational, U.S. strategic bombers couldnot reach Japan except from bases in China or the Soviet Far East. TheMarianas Islands vere too far, and the veather in the Aleutians vas toobad. Hovever, operating from bases in China or Russia presented anonumental logistics challenge to sustained strategic bombing, untilsuch tine as reliable sea lines of communication could be established.Arnold did not share King's optimism that the Navy could drive acrossthe entire Pacific vithin only a couple years. Therefore, Arnolddevoted his greatest efforts to the strategic bombing campaign againstGermany, resisting all efforts to divert aircraft, particularly bombers,anyvhere outside Europe unless absolutely necessary." Although Arnold

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believed China was important, he vas villing to vait until Chinese basescould be effectively s ~ s t a i n e d . ~ ~

Unfortunately for Arnold, the President developed a n intensepersonal interest in the early use of airpover in China, stemming fromChennault's visit to Washin gton in 1940." Roosevelt sa v airpover as alow-risk, lov-cost means t o quickly demonstrate su pport t o his Chineseally, vhile the vast majority (over 98%) of American Lend-Lease aidcontinued to go to Britain and ~ussia." Much to Arnold's chagrin,Roosevelt repeatedly intervened in decisions affecting the employment ofaircraft in China, even ordering s trategi c bombers to deploy to China asearly as mid-1942.'0 These particular bombers vere diverted to Egyptdue to Roanel's threat and never reached China.

Arnold did not share the President's infatu ation vith Chennault.Before his premature retirement from the Army Air Corps in 1937,Chennault had aggravated the Army Air Corps hierarchy vith his vigorousadvocat ion of pursuit (fighte r) aviatio n and outspoken oppos ition to theprevailing Army Air Corps doctrine of unescorted, dayl ight strate gicbombing. That Chenna ult vas proved right probably only made mattersvorse. Although Arnold eventually came to respect Chennault as a superbcombat leader, he believed that Chennault "could not, or vould not bebothered vith l ~qis tics *'~ and that Chennault vas prone tonoversimplification.naz Arnold, alo ng vith Marshall, al so harboredsuspicions that Chennault placed the interests of himself and Chiangabove that of t he Army Air Force. This viev vas reinforced by the factChennault serve d as a vell paid hired hand t o Chiang betv een 1937 andhis re- in du ctio n into the Arm y Air Force in 1942.''

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MarshallLike King, Marshall also believed that China would play a vital

role in the defeat of Japan. But like Arnold, Marshall vas focussed onoperations in the European theater, particularly the earliest possibleinsertion of U.S. troops on the northvestern continent of Europe. Inorder to concentrate as much force as possible for decisive combatagainst Germany, Marshall carefully veighed the competing requirementsof other theaters. Marshall sought to provide only the ninimumnecessary forces to theaters such as the Southvest Pacific and China-Burma-India (CBI) until after the primary enemy, Germany, had beendefeated. Faced vith the extraordinary demands of conducting groundcombat in multiple theaters, Marshall vas forced to make numerousdifficult and painful decisions concerning the allocation of scarce orinsufficient equipment and manpover. Even vith America's tremendousvartime production and manpover base, demand alvays out-stripped supply.Shortages of things such as landing craft and air transport severelyhampered planned U.S. and Allied operations in all theaters. Even aslate as the end of 1944, the Army suffered an acute shortage of combatinfantrymen.

although Marshall shared to a great degree King's conception ofthe strategic value of China, he remained unvilling to commit more thanthe bare amount of resources required to keep China in the var.'.Serious plans for offensive actions in China vere to be deferred untilthe defeat of Germany vas certain. Marshall resisted commitment ofsignificant U.S. ground combat forces into Burma and China throughoutthe var, although he vas villing to approve minimum essential air combat

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forces. Although Uarshall based his decisions primarily on priorityrequirements, he also shared the President's aversion to fighting a landvar in Asia vith American troops. He assumed that such an undertakingvould be dravn out and exceedingly costly."

Like King, Marshall believed that re-opening a land route toChina vas crucial to keeping China in the var and to prepare for futureoffensive operations by the Chinese Army. Uarshall accepted that theprovision of var material to China was a U.S. responsibility. He alsoagreed vith King that primary responsibility for retaking Burma belongedto Britain. Although Harshall and King vere prepared to make up Britishequipment shortfalls, both expected British Empire troops to do theactual fighting to retake the British colony of ~urma." Hovever, fromChurchill on down, the British had an aversion to fighting on themainland of Asia, particularly in the miserable svaaps and jungles ofBurma, that vas equal to that of the Americans. ~ritain's reluctance tofight in Burma incensed King, and the issue became increasinglycontentious as the var vent on. Although Uarshall generally acted as amoderating influence betveen King and the British Chiefs of Staff, onoccasion he too became equally fru~trated.'~

U.S. Service *Components* in the China Theater. 1941-1943The *China Theaterw vas formed during the first British/American

conferences after Pearl Harbor vhich divided the vorld into areas ofstrategic responsibility. China vas not invited or consulted. The FarEast, including China, vas in the British area. Recognizing thatneither the British nor the Chinese vere likely to be villing to serve

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under the supreme command of the other, china was designated a separatetheater, and Generalissimo Chiang ~ai-shek as named Supreme AlliedCommander, China Theater. Worried that Chiang might take affront atbeing appointed by the Allies as commander of his ovn country, portionsof Thailand and Indochina that vere aaccessiblen from China vereincluded vithin the boundries of the China Theater. Northern Burma,vhich was of vital strategic concern to China, remained vithin theBritish area.'. Upon being informed of these arrangements, Chiangrequested that a senior American officer be appointed to serve in Chinaas chief of staff for an allied staff expected to consist of American,

British and Dutch personnel." The British and Dutch never came. Thenission fell to Lieutenant General Joseph W. Vinegar Joen Stilvell.

U.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-IndiaStilvell vas not Marshall's first choice to take on the China

assignment, but Major General Hugh Drum refused the mission, vieving itas nebulous, peripheral, and doomed to failure.40 Under intensepressure from Roosevelt and Stimson to send a high-povered seniorofficer to China, Marshall turned to Stilvell. Due to Stilvell'sbrilliant performance during a series of major pre-var Army maneuvers,Marshall had chosen him to be corps commander for the first U.S. forcesashore during the planned North Africa landings. Hovever, Stilvell'sextensive experience in China, dating all the way back to 1911, and hisChinese language capability, made him the obvious choice vith anyrealistic chance to succeed. Stilvell vas also one of a very fevofficers counted as a close personal friend of ~arshall.~'

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Unfortunately, Stilvell never gained the unquestioning confidence ofRoosevelt, or the freedom from interference that the President allowedto other theater commander^.^^

To his admirers, vhich included Harshall and Stimson, Stilvellvas a superb field connmander, vho could motivate troops and accomplishgreat things under the most adverse circumstances. Stilvell's physicalendurance, aggressiveness, forthright honesty, and understanding ofground combat were unquestioned. To his detractors, Stilvell was weakin logistics planning and use of intelligence, devoting too much time toleading from the very front lines..' In these =en's thinking, it vas"Walking Joen Stilvellls supposed misunderstanding of the capability androle of modern airpover that led to his greatest difficulties in jointoperations. It vas Stilwellts acerbic personality and vell known lackof diplomatic tact that led to great difficulties in combinedoperations.

Despite their close relationship, Marshall and Stilwell disagreedon U.S. strategy for operations in the Pacific. Believing that it vouldbe years before the Navy could advance across the Pacific, Stilvell savChina as the decisive area of operations. Painful as it might be, thelarge Japanese Army in China would have to ultimately be defeated inaction. Had it not been for the unforseen affects of a miracle veapon,Stilwell may very vell have been proved correct, for in August 1945Japan still had an undefeated million-strong army in the field.Stilvell believed the Southwest Pacific should be a defensive theaterand that maximum offensive pover should be generated in China, using

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re-equipped and trained Chinese armies, centered around a U.S. Armycorps, all under American command

Recognizing the reality of resource constraints, Marshall'sinitiating directive to Stilvell did not include plans for utilizingU.S. troops, let alone an entire corps, in offensive operations inChina. Stilvell's primary mission vas to improve the combat effeciencyof the Chinese army. In addition, Stilvell vas to administer U.S. Lend-Lease aid for the purpose of keeplng China in the war against Japan andpreparing for future offensive, most likely air, operations from China.Stilvell vas tasked to command U.S. Arny (including Arny Air Force)forces in China, and vithin India and Burma. He vas also authorized tocommand such Chinese troops as Chiang might allov. And he vas directedto keep open the Burma Road,'a task quickly overtaken by event^.^'

Upon arrival in China in March'1942, Stilwell vas faced vith oneof the most convoluted command structures ever devised, an unfortunateby-product of political reality betveen China and Britain. As Chiang'schief of staff for Allied forces in China, Stilvell vas roughly equal toChiang's Chinese chief of staff, General Ho Ying-chin, vho was also theKUT War Hinister. Unfortunately, the only substantial Allied troops inChina vere Amerlcan flyers. As commander of U.S. Army forces in China-Burma-India, Stilvell commanded American ground and air forces in tvoseparate Allied theaters, one '~ritish nd one Chinese, vith operationsin China dependent on support coming through India. This vascomplicated further vhen the British established India as a separatetheater from Burma and the rest of Southeast Asia. As administrator ofLend-Lease, Stilvell reported directly back to Harshall on matters that

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frequent ly put him in direct conf lict vith Chiang. Stilwell also"commanded" Chinese troops that vere operating in British areas, sincethe Chinese refused to come under British command. As time went on,this muddled, contradictory command system only got worse.The Burma Cam~aiqn. 1942.

Battle with the command structure vould.have to wait, forStilwell was immediately faced vith trying to salv age something from thedebacle in Burma, already well under way. Although given command of thetvo Chinese armies then fighting in Burma, Stilwell quickl y discover edthat Chinese interpretation of "command" was closer to %on-bindingadvice." Chia ng continued to issue orders from back in Chungking,frequent ly contradi cting Stilwell's orders from the field without hisknowledge, v hich contrlbuted signif icantly to the confusion and lack ofcoordination alread y ra~pant.'~

Hampered by confusi on in the chain of command, Stil well was unableto prevent the collapse of the Chinese armies in Burma. Both theBritish and Chinese vere drive n out of Burma in what Sti lwel l viewed a sa humiliating and unnecessary rout. In the bitter recriminationsafterwor ds between the British and Chinese over who ran first, Stilwellmade few friends by bluntly stating that both armies performedterribly." As a result of Stilwell's outs poke n critique of Brit ishperformance in Burma, most British officers believed that Stilwell vas"anti-British." While he did have a pronounced anglophob ic streak,Stilwell got along well vith any British commander who earned his

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respect as a competent and aggressive combat commander, such as BritishGeneral William Sli~.~'

Stilwell and the Chinese.The Burma disaster also soured Stilvell's relationship vith

Chiang, permanently as it turned out. Stilwell became convinced thatChiang vas an incompetent nilitary c.ommander, along vith virtually theentire senior Chinese officer corps. As Chinese forces in Burmadisintegrated in late April 1942, Chiang's order to issue every Chinesesoldier a watermelon cemented Stilwell's view that Chiang was out oftouch vith reality in the field.., From Chiang's point of view, theChinese had taken a great risk in allowing an unknown foreigner, who hadno combat command experience, to take charge of the two best remainingKMT arnies. These tvo armies had served as the core component ofChiang's strategic reserve for several years. Given that both armieswere virtually destroyed, Chiang lost faith in Stilvell's commandability."'

Although Stilvell had little faith in KHT leadership, he hadgreat respect for the bravery and potential capability of the averageChinese soldier. With decent leadership, proper training and care, suchas regular feeding, Stilvell believed the Chinese soldier could be asgood as any in the world. With the exception of Slim, most Britishcoapanders, and a good many Aaericans and Chinese too, did not shareStilvell's optimism."' Beginning with a training program in Ramgarh,India, for rennants of Chinese forces driven out of Burma, Stilvellbegan nolding an effective Chinese fighting force. Overcoming

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substantial obstruction by British authorities in India, andbureaucratic resistance from the KMT, Stilvell succeeded in training andequipping three Chinese divisions, designated the X-force.

Stilvell sought to expand the training program to 30 divisions inYunnan in southwest China, designated the Y-force, and another 30divisions in east China, designated Z-force. With much difficulty,Stilvell succeeded in accomplishing some training and re-equipping ofthe Y-force. Unfortunately, the key to improving the combateffectiveness of the Chinese Army was to streamline organization andeliminate incompetent commanders, vhose primary quality vas loyalty toChiang rather than military prowess. Stllwellts proposed reforms struckdirectly at the mechanism by vhich the KHT maintained his control.Stilvell reasoned.that such drastic action by Chiang was required if theJapanese vere to be defeated in China. Hovever, Stilvell's proposedreforms vere politically unacceptable to Chiang, no matter howmilitarily sound.

Stilvellts immediate objective was to re-open the Burma Road. Heoriginally desired a major coordinated British, American, and Chinesecampaign, code named ANAKIH, to retake all of Burma in 1943, includingthe port of Rangoon. Hovever, British and Chinese reluctance to playtheir envisioned roles led Stilvell to develop a less ambitious plan."'Using the X-force, Stilvell vould advance from Ledo, India, throughnorthern Burma, building a road behind him, until he linked up vith theChinese Y-force, vhich vould be simultaneously advancing dovn the oldKunming-Rangoon route from China. Stilvell vanted the British toconduct at least a limited supporting attack in central or southern

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Burma. Opposition to even this limited plan by the ~ritish, hinese,and even Americans proved to be intense."

The 14th Air Force

Stilve119s strategic plan was strongly challenged not only by theBritish, but also by his ovn subordinate, Chennault. Chennault believedthat Stilwe119s plan to push through a road and reform the Chinese armyvould take too long. By the time the Ledo-Burma Road vas completed itsstrategic value vould be gone, since by that time a port on the Chinesecoast could have been established. In the meantime, the enormousengineering and supply effort that would go into securing, building andmaintaining the road, would drain resources avay from aerial resupply ofChennaultls air operations in china." Chennault believed that airpowervas the answer to the problems in China. Every eEfort should go intocommencing and supporting an offensive air campaign. Chennault hadpoverful allies, principally Chiang, Roosevelt, and the British.

Chiang saw Chennault's airpower strategy as an ideal means tostrike the Japanese quickly, and increase the flow of American aid,without having to submit to Stilwell's onerous reforms or riskadditional KUT ground Eorces in offensive combat vith the Japanese. AsChiang9s air advisor since 1937, Chennault had done more to fight forand support the Chinese than any other American. He had alsodemonstrated the ability to get results, as evidenced by the superbrecord of the AVG against great odds in Burma and later China.Throughout 1942 and 1943, Chennault9s air force carried the full weightof American combat action in the China Theater. With minimal resources

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and utilizing "guerilla-stylen tactics, Chennault's flyers inflictedsignificant losses on the Japanese air force.

Chiang strongly supported Chennault's proposals. During ameeting vith Arnold in Chungking in February 1943, Chiang demanded thatChennault be given command of an independent air force in China, vith500 aircraft and substantially increased logistics support ."' Chiang'ssupport of Chennault over Stilvell strongly influenced Roosevelt. InMarch 1943, Roosevelt dlrected that a separate air force be establishedin China under Chennault's ~ommand."~ The China Air Task Force (CATF)vas separated from its parent 10th Air Force (headquartered in India),and deslgnated the 14th Air Force. Although still technically underStilwell's command, Chennault enjoyed vide freedom of action,particularly by utilizing his other positlon as Chief of Staff of theChinese Air Force granted to him by ~hiang.'~

Roosevelt viewed Chennault's airpover strategy as a way to strikethe Japanese quickly and demonstrate support for Chiang vithoututilizing American ground troops or forclng reforms on the reluctantKHT.'. Roosevelt's vievs vere influenced by a very effective letterwriting campaign, orchestrated by Chennault's public relations aide,Joseph Alsop. A distant Roosevelt cousin, Alsop vas vell connected vithpresidential advisor Harry Hopkins and with the Chinese ForeignMinister, T.V. Soong.". In addition, the succession of presidentialenvoys to Chunqking all bought the Chennault program, recommending vithdreary regularity that Stilvell be relie~ed..~ Chennault dispatched aletter to Roosevelt vith Wendell Wilkie in October 1942 in which hestated that vith 105 fighters, 30 medium bombers, and 12 heavy bombers,

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I wlll guarantee to destroy the principle lndustrial centersof Japan. ..The cutting of the Japanese sea route to her newlyconquered empire is a simple matter. Once the above tvoobjectives are accomplished the complete military subjection(sic) of Japan is certain and easy...probably vithin six months,vithin one year at the outside.wsaNeither Stilwell, Marshall, Arnold or King thought it vould be so easy.A ~ K D O V ~ ~ersus the Burma Road.

The conflict betveen Stilvell's and Chennault's rival strategiescame to a head in a series of meetings just before and during theBritish/American TRIDENT conference in Washington 12-25 May 1943. BothStilvell and Chennault vere called back to attend. Stilvell, stronglysupported by King, contlnued to argue in favor of a canpalgn in Burma.Stilvell stated Chennault's strategy vas premature, because vhen the aircampaign began to really hurt the Japanese, they would respond byattacking and overrunning the American airfields vith ground forces.The Chinese army, in its current condition, vould be unable to defendthe airfields in the face of a determined Japanese assault.62 Despite

Stilvell's arguments, Roosevelt already seemed to have made up his mindto support Chiang and Chennault, against the recommendations of his ovnChiefs of Staff. He vas supported in his decision by Churchill andWave11 vho agreed that the most effective action that could be taken inChina and Burma was through airpover." The argument vas clinched by acommunication from Chiang vhich guaranteed that Chinese troops vould beable to protect the airfields."

Unfortunately, the decision reached at TRIDENT vas an ambiguouscompromise. Although the JCS directed Stilvell to increase support asmuch as possible to the 14th Air Force, the prospect of at least limlted

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offensive ground action in Burma in late 1943 or 1944 was not ruledout.*' Therefore the intense competition for resources between Stilvelland Chennault continued. The critical bottleneck continued to be thelimitations of the aerial transport route over the Hump. Despite anambitious directive to fly 10,000 tons of cargo a month to China, theAir Transport Command, vhich reported directly to Washington and not toStilvell, continued to fall far short. Primitive conditions in bothIndia and China, severe maintenance and equipment problems, abysmalveather, lack of navigation aids, pilot unfamiliarity, and Japanese airattacks against planes and bases, all conspired to ensure transportcapability remained voefully inadequate."

Naval Group ChinaWhile the Stilvell-Chennault dispute raged, the U.S. Navy

embarked on its own plan to prepare the coast of China for futureamphibious landings. After their initial rebuff, the Chinese renevedtheir approach to the U.S. Navy for a program of cooperation vith theKMT secret police. A Chinese colonel attached to the embassy inWashington, vho also happened to be an agent of Tai ti, recruited anumber of naval officers to the proposed program, including Commander(later Rear Adniral) Milton E. Uile~.'~ In the expediency of themoment after Pearl Harbor, the Navy agreed, although actual details ofthe program remained to be vorked out.

Miles arrived in China in March 1942 under secret verbal ordersfrom King to "prepare the China coast in any vay you can for landings inthree or four years. Ostensibly assigned to the embassy as a Naval

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Observer, Miles' involvement vith Tai Li's organization vas to be keptas discreet as possible, due to political ranifications. Miles' ovnoutspoken anti-communist, anti-British, pro-Chennault attitude quicklyendeared him to Tai Li and Chiang hin~elf..~

Miles* first objective vas to vork vith Tai Liqs forces inestablishing a netvork of veather stations throughout China vhich vouldprovide important, and currently unavailable, veather forecastingsupport to the Pacific Fleet. As the Japanese persistently tracked downand destroyed the veather stations, Miles1 "Friendship Project" grev toinclude provision of snall arms and explosives training to Tai Li'sparamilitary organization, the Loyal Patriotic Army, in order to defendthe veather stations."' Although grovth of the program vas slov, due tothe same logistics problems facing the rest of the theater, it quicklybranched out into clandestine intelligence collection and sabotage.

By March 1943, the Navy-BIS arrangenent vas officially codifiedvith the approval of both Roosevelt and Chiang and designated the Sino-Anerican Cooperative Organization (SACO).7a SACO vas an integratedorganization vith Tai Li as commander, and Miles as his deputy. Milesalso commanded the groving Naval Group China (NGC), vhich technicallyconducted some independent U.S. Navy activities. In reality, thedividing line betveen NGC and SACO activities vas obscure.

Because of Mile's close relationship to the K M q s ntelligenceservice, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sought to piggybackon the SACO agreement. For a time, Miles vas designated head of OSSactivities in China." This proved to be a short-lived and contentiousrelationship, since the OSS1 desire to cooperate vith the British and

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desire to seek accurate, unfiltered information on the CCP quicklyearned the enmity of Tai ti.7' Miles refused to carry out OSSdirectives that put his relationship vith Tai Li at risk. The resultingdisputes between the OSS and Miles brought the issue of the Navy'srelationship vith Tai Li before Stilvell o n several occasions.

Although Stilvell took a dim viev of Miles' "illegal act ionnactivities, he had no control over Navy activities in China.74 Milesreported direct ly to King, a relationshlp that King zea lously protecteduntil very late in the war. Marshall initially sought to have SACO/NGCplaced under Stilvell's control. Hovever, Stilvell recommended againstdoing so, recognizing that cooperation from Tai Li vould likely cease inthat event.75 Despite his distaste, even Stilvell saw the potential ofTai Li's vide-ranging net of agents behind Japanese lines. He also savthe benefit of keeping th e Army comple tely separated from Tai Li'sunsavory organization. For his part, Miles respected Stilvell as afighter, but disagreed vith Stilvell's strategy and added his voice tothe general clamor for St il ve ll ts replaceaent."

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CHAPTER 3SEXTANT, EUREKA, MATTERHORN, AND ICHIGONOVEMBER 1943 - MAY 1944

The Cairo and Tehran ConferencesThe Allied conferences at Cairo (SEXTANT) and Tehran (EUR EKA)

from 22 November to 7 December 19 43 marked a major turning point inAmerican and British military strategy regarding China. Decisionsreached at Cairo and Tehran had far-reaching impact on operations in theChina Theater for the duration of the var. For the first time,Roosevelt, Churchill, and th e American and British Ch iefs of Staff netChiang Kai-shek and his staf f face-to-face. The experience proved to bea profound shock. Admiral Mountbat ten described the American andBritish leade rst reaction, "They have been driven absol ute ly mad."' Thelong unresolved British and American dispute over future operations inBurma in support of China also erupted into the most bitter and divis ivestrategy de bate s of the var. General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of theImperial General Staff, described one meeting as "the mother and thefather of a rev."' Although the official record is bland, Sti lve llt sdiary captured some of the flavor of the discussions betveen theAmerican and British Chiefs of Staff,

Brooke got good and nasty and King got good and sore. Kingabou t climbed over the tabl e at Brooke. God he vas mad. I vishhe had socked him. 3 :30 . Chinese came. Terrible performance.. .Brooke vas insulting. ... ntics by Peanut IChiangl.'

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Severalmonths prior to SEXTANT, the British and Americancombined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed to a major reorganization ofcommands in the Far East vhich significantly affected the dynamics ofAllied relations. The CCS approved the formation of the South East Asiacommand (SEAC), vhich incorporated Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore andSumatra. It also included parts of Thailand and Indochina, although thedividing line vith the China Theater was not explicitly clear.' Afterlengthy U.S. and British wrangling, the CCS named Admiral Louisnountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC. Stilvell vas namedDeputy Supreme Commmander, although he still retained all his previousduties.* The CCS intended for the formation of SEAC to accomplishseveral objectives. Among the most laudable vas the desire to improvecoordination betveen Stilvell and the British. For a vhile it vorked,as Stilvell and Mountbatten started off vorking well together.'

The first order of business at SEXTANT vas for Mountbatten tobrief his plans for operations in Burma for 1944. Stilvell andnountbatten vere in basic agreement, and Mountbatten's overall plan(CHAMPION) reflected much of Stilvell's earlier plans. The CHAMPIONplan contained two components. The first (TARZAN) covered the land varin Burma. Stilvell vould lead an attack into northern Burma from India,utilizing the Northern Combat Area Command (Chinese X-force), and thefirst U.S. ground troops to be committed to operations in Burma. TheseUS. troops, a regiment-sized force under the code name GALAHAD(Merrill's Marauders), vould conduct deep penetrations into the Japaneserear. In addition, the Chinese Y-force would attack across the SalveenRiver from China into northern Burma to link vith Stilvell. The British

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would support the tvo Chinese thrusts vith supporting attacks under Slimfrom India into vestern Burma, and vith blocking operations by LongRange Penetration Groups (Wingate's Chindits), and a possible airborneassault into central Burma." The second component of CHAUPION vas anamphibious operation (BUCCANEER) to take the Andaman Islands. Thepurpose of BUCCANEER vas to satisfy a long-standing demand of Chiangthat the British commit to a major supporting naval operation before hevould commit the Y-force into action in Burma.'

CHAUPION provoked prolonged debate. Chiang had arrived at thestart of the conference at the invitation of Roosevelt and against thebetter judgement of Churchill.' As a result, Chiang attended debatesconcerning CHAMPION before the British and Americans had come toagreenent vith each other or even among themselves. In the uglymeetings that followed, British opposition to CHAUPION vas intense.Churchill still had no desire to fight in Burma and he vanted to usescarce resources, particularly landing craft, devoted to BUCCANEER foroperations in the Uediterranean against Rhodes and the Balkans. TheBritish openly questioned the capability of the Chinese troops,particularly the Y-force, to carry out their assigned role." In heatedexchanges, King and Marshall argued in favor of the plan. Chiang didn'thelp matters by repeatedly reversing himself on whether BUCCANEER metthe prerequisite for him to commit the Y-f~rce.~'

It vas clear that neither the British nor Chiang had their heartsin Burma, but the U.S. Chiefs vere adamant. When Chiang departed toreturn to China, he had received Roosevelt's promise that BUCCANEERvould be carried out. In return, Chiang agreed to commit the force.'^

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Unbeknownst to the Allies, the Soviets vere already making initialpreparations for offensive operations in Manchuria, rotating key GeneralStaff officers in and out of the Far East Front to ensure that plannershad both combat experience in the West and experience in the Far Easternenvironment.

Stalinvs promise vas velcome nevs to American planners vho vievedSoviet participation in the Pacific var as "essential." As early asSeptember 1943, the JCS-approved Long-Range Plan for the Defeat of Japansought Soviet entry at the earliest practical date." The JCS desiredSoviet entry for tvo primary objectives, defeat of the Kvangtung Army inManchuria, and to allov U.S. strategic bombing of Japan from bases inthe Soviet Far East.x7 In October 1943, the JCS dispatched a U.S.military mission to Moscov under Major General John Deane. One of the

Qmission's major objectives was to initiate combined U.S./Soviet planningfor operations against Japan. Due to extreme Soviet desire to maintainthe continued outvard appearance of neutrality, so as not to provoke apre-emptive Japanese attack, little combined planning vas ever actuallyaccomplished. After Tehran, the soviets responded to a U.S. request andbegan to share their intelligence on the Kvangtung Army." JCSenthusiasm for the approach to the Russians vas not unanimous. Kingstill believed that by relying on China, Soviet entry might not benecessary.I'

Tehran also represented a stunning defeat for ChurchillvsMediterranean/Balkan strategy for the defeat of Germany. Not only didStalin specifically oppose Churchill, he vigorously supported the U.S.strategy for invading northern France by May 1944, and demanded a second

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supporting attack, most likely in southern France As the British andAmericans reconvened at Cairo on 3 December, this time without theChinese, seething British resentment derailed the earlier hard vonagreements on Burma and China.

The British balked at conducting BUCCANEER. Churchill arguedthat the Soviet entry negated the need to build-up China, vhich hebelieved was futile in any case. Roosevelt cautioned that the Alliesnight be trading the certain help of a long-tine loyal ally (China) inexchange for future help based solely on Stalin's vord. The AmericanChiefs, led by King, argued that the Allies had made a bindingcommitment to Chiang. Churchill argued that Roosevelt had, but he hadnot. In addition, Churchill maintained that BUCANNEER vas a politicalsop to Chiang vith no real military value, vhich was largely true. TheBritish maintained that there were not enough resources to do BUCCANEERand OVERLORD/ANVIL (Northern/Southern France) at the same time. TheAmericans countered that there vere, but that the Brltish were trying topreserve assets for churchill's still coveted eastern nediterraneanoperat ions.''

The British insisted that if forced to do BUCCANEER, OVERLORDvould have to be delayed. The discussions grev heated and protracted.As the British steadfastly refused to give in, the American positiongradually eroded, vith first Leahy and then Arnold giving in on groundsthat OVERLORD must not be delayed.=" Eventually Marshall reluctantlyaccepted this argument. King held out stubbornly to the end, in directconfrontation with Churchill, arguing that the Allies vere breaking apromise and selling out the ~hinese." Although Marshall sought to

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delay a flnal declslon, Roosevelt termlnated the argument by giving inand postponlng BUCANNEER ."'

The plan to support China continued to unravel. WithoutBUCCANEER, and the likely prospect that Chiang vould therefore notcommit the Y-force, Mountbatten reneged on major portions of CHAUPION."By the time the dust settled, BUCCANEER vas dead, along vith most of theproposed operations in centra l and coastal Burma. The Allied chiefs'agreed to allow Stilvell t o conduct limited offensive operations innorthern Burma ."

Recogn izing that Chlang vould likely be angered by the Britishand American turnabout, Roosevelt sought to minimize the damage byagreeing to an earlier request by Chiang to equip and tra in 9 0 Chinesedivisions. Roosevelt als o reaffirmed plans to commence a strat egicbombing cam paign of Japa n from China b y Hay 1944, using the nev 6-29bombers for the first time. 27 Roosevelt's message to Chiang, infor minghim of the decision to cancel BUCCANEER due to the overriding need todefea t Germany first, offered Chiang a face-saving vay out of hiscommitment by suggesting that Chiang could opt to delay Y-forceoperat ions until November 1944 ." Stilvell and Klng both believed thatChiang vould feel betrayed, vould not commit t he Y-force, and that a s aresult Chinese-American coopera tion vould deteri orate rapidly. Theyvere correct.

Chi an gls response was worse than expected. He vould vithhold theY-force from Burma and re-evaluate at a later time. Chiang said heagreed that th e defeat of Germany vas important. But he then none toosubtly varned that if China vere forced out of the var the consequences

4

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would be very grave. Chiang varned that the Japanese vould launch amajor offensive in China in 1944. He complained that except for the Y-forces, China had received virtually nothing out of American Lend-leaseto conduct operations in China itself, vhich was largely true. In orderto ensure continued Chinese participation, Chiang vanted a one billiondollar loan, and a doubling of the U.S. Army Air Force in china."'

Chiang's message vas not the first time he hinted at dropping outof the war, and the argument had proved effective before. However,Cairo had changed the attitude of American leaders, particularlyR00sevelt. Chiang's demanding tone and constant vacillation at Cairohad aggravated and frustrated the Americans. Even narshall had lost histemper in one exchange vith Chiang's staff." The American response toChiang's demand for a billion dollars vas anger. nost believed Chiang'sthreat to drop out of the var was a bluff.

By this time, American leadership became aware that Chiang'sdomestic position vas veak and eroding quickly. While Chiang vas inCairo, Tai Li's forces discovered and put dovn the "Young General'sPlot," vhich involved several hundred officers, including sose divisioncommanders, seeking to overthrov Chiang and institute reforms similar tothose advocated by Stilvell. Nany of the officers vere executed." TheU.S. leaders' disillusionment vith Chiang vas profound and rapid.According to Stilvell's aide, Brigadier General Frank Dorn, Stilvell vasordered by Roosevelt to prepare a contingency plan to assassinate Chiangjust in case. Stilvell did so, although he vas opposed to the concept

32of actually ever executing such a plan. Having deliberately built upChiang's image as a heroic, democratic, pro-vestern leader, despite

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considerable evidence to the contrary, the U.S. vas in a poor positionto publicly sever the alliance vith Chiang and the KMT.

In the disillusioned aftermath of Cairo, British and Americanstrategic planning diverged further. Although Britain had tried toimprove relations vith the Chinese and increase operations in China,Chinese reluctance renained. In October 1943, Churchill had appointedLieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart as his personalrepresentative to Chiang, and to act as liaison betveen Chiang andMountbatten. Stilvell opposed the appointment, since as Deputy SupremeCommander of SEAC, Stilvell vas supposed to be the liaison betveenChiang and Mountbatten." Although the highly decorated Carton de Wiarthad had an extremely colorful military career, he had no experience inChina.'. As a result, he acconplished little. British activty in Chinaremained liaited to snall-scale guerilla training activity by SOE, andintelligence collection. Several British attempts to operate fighteraircraft in China vere blocked by Stilvell on valid grounds that therevere already insufficient logistics to support U.S. air operations."

In the meantime, Mountbatten developed a plan more in line vithsenior British thinking. As a result, Mountbatten's relationship vithStilvell deteriorated rapidly. The nev British plan (AXIOM) skippedBurma altogether and advocated a seaborne approach to China, vhichhappened to go via Sumatra, Singapore and Hong Kong." The Britishargued that it vould be faster to reach China by sea than through thejungles of Burma. The JCS, especially King, refused to lend theirsupport to a plan that smacked of restoration of British colonies."However, AXIOM and the landings in Sumatra (CULVERIN) became pet

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projects of Churchill, and the British repeatedly resurrected variantsof the plan throughout 1944.

With cooperation between the Allies at a lov ebb, Stilwell and~arshall elieved there vas little prospect of progress for Stilvell'sefforts to improve the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army. As aresult, ~tilvell'devoted lmost his entire effort to leading his Chinesedivisions and the U.S. GALAHAD regiment in battle in northern Burma."During Stilvell's absence from Chungking, China's situation deterioratedfurther.

ICHIW - Japanese PlanninqWhile the Allies debated strategy at Cairo, the Japanese

finalized plans for a massive offensive of their own. On 22 November1943, the Imperial General Headquarters presented a formal plan toestablish a wcontinentaln route connecting their forces in China withthose in southeast ~sia." The plan buil