China Disadvantage - Harvard 2013

8/14/2019 China Disadvantage - Harvard 2013

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***NEG***


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UQChina Involved Now

China is coming!!!!!!!!! (but will be peaceful and avoid conflict with the US)

Hilton 13(Feb. 2012, Isabel, Norweigian Peacebuilding Resource Center, London-based writer and broadcaster. She

was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor ofwww.chinadialogue.net,China in

Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf)

The United States is Latin Americas traditional hegemonic power, but Chinas influence in the region is large andgrowing.How far does Chinas presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of

Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods .

The impact of Chinas activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered fromcheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important

impact on the regions infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmenta l degradation due to a lowering of

environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and

diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however,

has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the

two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation,but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could haverepercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

Chinas taking advantage of weak US relations to encroach on the region.Munene 6/17(2012, Macharia, professor of history and international relations, USIU, Superpowers redefine their

policies, Business Daily Africa, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/America-and-China-redefine-

their-policies--/-/539548/1885816/-/qf5u13z/-/index.html)

For a long time, Latin America was considered a preserve of the United States but China is making successful inroads . It is

seemingly repaying the United States with its own coin since Americans frequently encroach on what China would thinks is Beijings backyard in

Asia. It has developed good ties with Brazilwhich leads in Latin America in self assertiveness. Mexico would like to appear to be

independent of the United Statesin terms of making decisions on who to relate to and thus received Xi very wellbefore the Chinese president

went to meet Obama in California. Besides Mexico, Xi was a guest in Costa Rica as well as Trinidad and Tobago. In itself, this development might be a

tacit understanding between the two leading powers that they will infiltrate each others sphere of influenceeven as they try

to forge what Xi would like to think of as a new relationship of trust between the two countries. Xis global onslaught worries some countries

which are forced to come out of geopolitical hibernation and essentially respond to the agenda set by China.
http://www.chinadialogue.net/http://www.chinadialogue.net/http://www.chinadialogue.net/


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I/LUS Involvement

Watson 04(2004, Cynthia, Professor of Strategy at National War College, U.S. Responses to Chinas Growing Interests

in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere in Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin

America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)

Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction

for Washington over the past fi ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound tocreate more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution,

particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reflects the unanticipated

consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China . But, the inability of Washington to consider anything

beyondthe concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is

having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world.For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the

United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin

AmericaU.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of

fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from

religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine

partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States

and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefi t for all, not a zero sumgame. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region

because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade confl icts, protectionism,and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad fo r me. The risks of arousing

realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the PRC

bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its

involvement in the region because of thenumber of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting

the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong

relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States.

At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible.With U.S. interests directed

elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already

has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best outcome from its current balance of

involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leadersof this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the internationalsystem, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting toknow the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long -term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely

to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American

neighbors. Washington should not blame Beijing for moving into an area made attractive because of historic and current

absence of consistent U.S. policies.


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LinkCuba Aff

China is key to economic growth and modernization in Cubademand for investment and embargo with the US

means China is the most attractive option.

Hearn 12(Jan. 2012, Adrian, Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair

of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the Americas, China, Global Governance and the

Future of Cuba, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, google scholar)

Since the early 1990s, state-to-state cooperation has enabled Cuba to leverage Chinese support for the development andcoordination of basic industrial infrastructure. The bilateral relationship has now moved into a new phase marked by

strategic planning of economic opening and controlled privatisation. Tensions and disagreements are to be expected, but since Ral Castro

assumed power in 2008, Cuban authorities have shown sincere interest in learning from Chinas experiences with liberalisation.

The Chinese government has a vested interest in the success of Cubas reforms, reflected in the negotiation of the first Five-Year Plan

for SinoCuban cooperation in June 2011. As a long-time financier of Cubas development, many are looking to Beijing to underwrite

the credits and loans aspiring entrepreneurs need to grow small businesses. As Cubas need for capital deepens, its

leaders have expressed no principled position against relations with the IMF or World Bank(quoted in Feinberg 2011: 67).Having defaulted on IMF loans and reporting requirements in the early years of the revolution, Cuba preempted expulsion by voluntarily withdrawing from the

institution in 1964 (and subsequently repaying its debt). The United States remains firmly opposed to Cubas reentry, but as Feinberg hasargued, CubaIMF dialogue could prove beneficial across a range of topics, from developing micro-enterprise to sharing insights from previous Eastern European and

Asian transitions (Feinberg 2011: 74, 78-83). The internal evolution of the IMF to accommodate changing global conditions, including Chinas deepening influence,

makes engagement with Cuba more likely. Growing international reliance on the renminbi and greater provisions for public spending are important in this regard, butequally important are Cubas domestic reforms, which are bringing the island into closer alignment with conventions of economic governance. China sits at the

crossroads of these local and global developments, encouraging Cuba toward rapprochement with international norms

even as it works to reform them.

Conclusion The Latin American operations of Chinese state enterprises, undertaken through state-to-state channels with

no strings attached, challenge orthodox conventions of international cooperation. Alarmist reports of worst-case

scenariosand potential threats, from disregard for human rights to telecommunications espionage, obscure the more encompassing and genuine

challenge of building dialogue with China on Western hemisphere affairs . As Daniel Erikson has written, the energy of policymakers andpublics would be better directed at leveraging Chinas intensifying engagement with multilateral institutions as a basis for discussing region al codes of governance

and approaches to state intervention (Erikson 2011: 132). The changing internal dynamics of the IMF, including the increase of Chinas voting rights, suggest that this

process is now underway. Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United States, Chinese initiatives are not

inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance. Long-term market expansion, coordinated industrial

sectors, and state oversight of private initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cubanprojects. These goals also resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of the GFC. The Cuban reforms formalised

by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further convergence of positions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although

Sino-Cuban initiatives are managed under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for Cubas

liberalisation agenda is prompting the Western hemispheres only communist nation toward alignment with

international norms.

Cuba is the linchpin for the region whoever controls it controls the whole sphere of influences

Llana 12(10/14, citing Riordan Roett, PhD, Johns Hopkins University, American political scientist specializing in Latin

America, Sara Miller, Christian Science Monitor, 50 years after Cuba missile crisis, US influence in hemisphere waning,

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-

waning)

Indeed, the anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis will likely provide an opportunity for the extreme leftin Latin America to

express support for Cuba,says Johns Hopkins Latin American expert Riordan Roett. They will be in solidarity about the survival of the

Castro brothers, Mr. Roett says. 'A linchpin' in the region That kind of defianceshowing respect for a nation that for so

long the US has considered a thorn in its sidewould have been unthinkable 50 years ago . Before the Cuban missile crisis, after thefailed Bay of Pigs invasion, the US pressured Latin American countries to suspend Cubas membership from the Organization of American States (OAS). At the same

time, Cuba signed onto the nonaligned movement, and Brenner says it was that move that the US feared other countries

in Latin America might follow. At the time, US thinking on the movement was, you are with us or you are against us.The

politics surrounding Cubaat the OAS highlights the declining influence of the US in the region. Fifty years ago, the US advocatedCubas suspension and was successful; but during the groups summit in April, leaders across political spectrums said they wo uld question attending another summit


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---Ext. I/L Influence

Cuba is keystrong regional influence, ties with Venezuela, and model for Chinese style development policies.

Amuchastegu 06(9/1, Domingo, CubaNews, Cuba and China: similarities and differences,

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Cuba+and+China%3A+similarities+and+differences.-a0151844511)

What can China find in the island of Cuba that makes it so interestingfor members of China's Military Commission and Politburo to visit the

Caribbean nation and to persuade President Hu to declare China's support of Cuba's stand in unusually strong terms?

First, there iswhat can be described as the "mirror effect."In the eyes of Chinese foreign policymakers, Cuba is to the United Stateswhat Taiwan is to China.THE TAIWAN FACTOR

As the issue of Taiwan has become more tense and aggravating for Chinese policies, Beijing has increased its relations with Cuba. This has been adominant trend since the early 1990s, but especially in recent years following Taiwan's increased hostility toward China backed by the Bush administration.

A second important dimension in Beijing'scurrent alliance with Cuba is that Cuba is located in the heart of the Caribbeanwhere Taiwan has been able to retain diplomatic recognition from a considerable number of the region's states.

Cuba's political influence throughout the region is extremely valuable to China's long-term policyof eroding Taiwan's standing

First, Cuba is an important political actor with strong ties to influential political forces and governments from which China

benefits; second, Cuba has throughout the region a positive and constructive image derived from its alliance with China, an

image aimed at undermining Taiwan's fading regional leverage.

These two factors today are increasingly reinforced by the alliance between Venezuela and Cuba,which is a third factor that has

augmented China's interest in Cuba.Economic considerations are no less important. Nickel, cobalt and oil are vital to China's economy. Because Cuba is a

source for all three commodities, China is willing to grant Cuba exceptional privilegesin terms of financial arrangements, insurancebacking, rescheduling of debt and long-term investments in mining, oil, biotechnology, and tourism.

China is also prepared to engage in an undisclosed range of military cooperation that has included scores of high-level militarydelegations visiting their respective nations.

There is also another special advantage to China: to prove how great their experience is in saving a collapsing socialist economy as was the case with Cuba in the early

'90s. This is not only relevant to the past, present, and future of socialist economies but also in sending a clear message to

Third World economies, where Beijing exerts considerable influence. If China's "recipe" works in the Cuban case, then

its relevance will be even greater.

Sieff 08(11/17, Martin, Hu's Cuba visit highlights China's growing LatAm clout, UPI,

http://www.upi.com/news/issueoftheday/2008/11/17/Hus-Cuba-visit-highlights-Chinas-growing-LatAm-clout/UPI-

32141226935486/)

China isnow far more important economically to Cuba than its historic ally and protector Russia.Beijing has become the

communist-led Caribbean island's second-largest trading partnerafter Venezuela. Zhao said their total volume of trade in 2007 was worth

$2.3 billion. The ambassador also said bilateral cooperation was also rapidly expanding in transportation, communication,

agriculture and education.China does not have the strategic military power that Russia can bring to Latin America. The Kremlin sent two Tupolev Tu-160Blackjack supersonic nuclear bombers to Venezuela for a week in September, and they practiced long-range patrol patterns in the Caribbean Sea. The two aircraft

together had the capability to fire 24 nuclear-capable, 2,000-mile-range KH-55 air-launched cruise missiles into the heart of the United States. China cannot provide

any comparable military or strategic muscle to Cuba, Venezuela or their neighbors. However, economically, China is pumping far more investment

and economic clout into Latin America.Beijing's economic and political ties with Brazil are extremely close, and the two

nations cooperate especially closely as BRIC -- Brazil-Russia-India-China major emerging economies -- partners. So far in Cuba the growing Chinese

presence has not been expressed in much direct investment. However, Beijing has provided plenty of credit to buy

Chinese exports. Hu also squeezed in his visit 10 days before Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was due to visit the island on a Caribbean swing that will focuson Venezuela. Medvedev's trip to Caracas, where he will be warmly welcomed by fiercely anti-American Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, has been scheduled to

coincide with a Nov. 24-30 visit to Venezuela by a powerful Russian naval squadron consisting of the missile battle cruiser Pyotr Veliky ("Peter the Great") and the

anti-submarine war combat vessel Admiral Chabanenko. Hu and Medvedev's eagerness to risk Washington's wrath by honoring the most anti-U.S. leaders in the

Western Hemisphere may be in part a calculated insult to Bush during his lame-duck incumbency for the next two months until he is replaced by President-elect

Barack Obama. They may also, however, signal a much more calculated defiance of Washington by Russia and China in the Western Hemisphere once Obama takes

office. For Russia and China areboth working energetically to take advantage of the United States' faltering influence in the

Latin American region-- America's own "near abroad." Russia and China have been expanding their influence in Latin

America at U.S. expense, and they have been using Cubaand especially Venezuelaas close partners in the process.It has been a

process pursued with both an economic and security dimension. As UPI's John Sweeney reported Oct. 31, the Chavez government also isexpanding defense and security ties with China. During his visit to Beijing on Sept. 24, Chavez signed an agreement to purchase 24 Chinese-made K-8 light attack


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aircraft, which Venezuelan air force officials say will be used for training purposes. The K-8s, which are scheduled to arrive in Venezuela during 2009, will operate

from the Teniente Vicente Landaeta Gil Air Base near the city of Barquisimeto in Lara state, Sweeney reported.


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---AT: China Bad for Cuba

China key to economic liberalisation and growth in Cuba




Chinas incremental approach to market expansion in Cuba is one component of a broader strategy of state-guided

development that has proven successful across East Asia(Hira 2007: 87-96). A related component is the linkage ofdistinct industrialsectors into an integrated system,a process that analysts argue has given the Chinese government an unusual degree of

controlover international production chains (Ellis 2005). As Joshua Kurlantzick writes: The Chinese government wants to control the entire process,

from taking commodities out of the ground to shipping them back to China, because it does not trust world markets to ensure c ontinuous supplies of key resources. It is purchasing

stakes in important oil and gas firms abroad, constructing the infrastructure necessary to get those industries resources to port,

and building close relations with refiners and shippers(Kurlantzick 2008: 200). Chinas pursuit ofindustrial integration is evident in

the Cuban transport sector,which in 2006 received a 1.8 billion USD revolving credit line backed by the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (S inosure), whoserepayment was renegotiated in 2010 (ICCAS 2009: 47; EFE 2010). The Cuban government also announced in 2006 that contracts totalling more than 2 billion USD had been s igned, primarily

with Chinese counterparts, to improve Cuban road and rail transport (Nuevo Herald 2009). Five hundred Chinese freight an d passenger train carriages were ordered for Cubas rail fleet, with

21 complete locomotives entering service in 2009. In 2008 the Chinese firm Yutong sold 1,000 energyefficient buses to the island, 200 of which were in circulation by midyear. According to

Rosa Oliveras of the Grupo para el Desarrollo de la Capital (GDIC): When the Special Period hit us the vehicles and spare par ts we had imported from the Soviet Bloc fell out of production,

and our transport system was so damaged that the mobility of Havanas citizens was reduced by between 70 and 80 per cent. U ntil recently, people had to wait at bus stops for t wo or three

hours and were forced to work half days, and sometimes not a t all. We couldnt have carried on like this. The Chinese buses s aved our city, and actually the whole country, from a very grave

situation (Oliveras 2008). Rather than deliver complete buses to Cuba, Yutong shipped components from its factory in Zhengzhou for assembly in Havana, saving 12 to 15 per cent in

transportation costs (Pizarro 2009). The scheme facilitated skills transfer through the training of Cuban automobile assembly technicians by a team of 30 Chinese counterparts. As withtraining in Cuban electrodomestic factories, a marsh gas extraction, a sheep-rearing farm, a reservoir fishery, and three

pesticide production plants, this approach is building a valuable source of specialised talent that may facilitate Cubas

entry into global production chains. The projects integration into a broader, coordinated programme of de velopment and skills training distinguishes it from private

sector investments from Europe (particularly Spain), which have focused on enclave sectors like hotel construction and tourism services. President Hus two main

speeches in Cuba during his 2004 and 2008 visits focused on human capital development. In his former speech, delivered at Cubas leading

IT training facility, the University of Information Science (UCI), Hu noted thatthousands of the computers on campus came at subsidised prices from

China, with the express purpose of advancing Cubas IT capacities. His latter speech, delivered at the Tarar Student City, confirmed Chinas intention to

send 5,000 students to Cuba to study medicine, tourism and Spanish. The recruitment of Chinese technicians to live in Cubato supervise and train the local

workforce in 37 Chinese investment projects, proposed during the 2008 visit, will advance this goal if the projects are implemented.The integration

of infrastructure upgrading with IT and electronics training has laid the foundation for a coordinated industrial chain that

supports domestic manufacturing along with the shipment of goods to markets around Cuba and potentially toneighbouring Latin American and Caribbean countries. Facilitated by the refurbishment of Cubas ports with Chinese equipment, this strategy could significantly advance both

countries regional influence (Frank 2006). State-to-state cooperation with China has helped Cuba to establish the basic infrastructure

it needs for economic growth. The challenge now facing the island is to employ this platform to support private initiative and harness the productive potentials of the

market. As Robert B. Reich famously wrote three decades ago, Economies are like bicycles.The faster they move, the better they maintain

their balance unaided (Reich 1982). The Chinese government adopted this strategy of gradual liberalisationat home in the early 1980s

and has repeatedly advocated it to Cuban officialsever since Fidel Castros 1995 meeting with Premier Li Peng in Beijing (Cheng 2007; Jiang 2009). After 15 years

of hearing their advice, Cubas reformersled by Ral Castroare now listening.




At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took the stage with a Chinese official to debate Chinas

deepening ties with Latin America. The specialist asked whether China is willing to come to the table with the United States to

promote democratic development in the region. The Chinese officials reply was revealing: We are interested in trade, and not in

politics. Talking past rather thanwith each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to

international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest

that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese

attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so . They also suggest the need for compromise on both sides of the Pacific asChina assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financial instability in the United States and Europe has intensified Chinas engagement with developing

countries. Sino-Latin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and Chinas

priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth, and open new


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markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategicimplications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the economic benefits of

their countrys demand for the regions primary products, evinced by Latin Americas impre ssive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005,

2009; Sun 2011). Latin American publications reflect the regions historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource ex ports, 2) declining manufacturing

sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010; Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns about the

economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson

and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010). With few exceptions(e.g. Gonzalez-Vicente 2011; Hearn and LenManrquez 2011;

Kotschwar, Moran, and Muir 2011), little attention has been paid to the influence of Chinas rise on the coordination and

development of Latin American industrial sectors, and how this influence resonatesor notwith international

conventions of governance.The case of Cuba is instructive, as no other country is so openly condemned by Washington

and so publicly praised by Beijing. With bilateral trade exceeding 1.8 billion USDin 2010 (down from a pre-GFC high of 2.3 billion USD in

2008), China is Cubas second-largest trading partner,and the two countries have pursued state-led cooperation in sectors as diverse as biomedicine,

tourism, industrial manufacturing, nickel and oil mining, and oil refining (UN-COMTRADE 2011). The workings of Sino-Cuban initiatives are guarded

as state secrets, provoking concerns from external observers about their intentions, capacities, and potential threats to the United States. These

apprehensions dovetail with a broader discourse on the negative influence that China may bear on development and

democracy in Latin America. This article argues that in spite of continuing differences between international conventions of governance and Chinasapproach to foreign engagement, the line between the two is narrowing. The first half of the article traces the key points of contention to diverging evaluations of

state intervention but finds that these tensions are diminishing as multilateral institutions evolve to accommodate Chinas i nfluence. For instance, adjustments to

fiscal reserve policies within the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the gradual relaxation of the IMFs benchmark guidelines on public sector expenditure,

resonate with Chinas vision of publicprivate integration as a basis for economic development. As China becomes more integrated into the

existing geopolitical architecture, its government has encouraged political outliers, most notably Cuba, to follow its

example. The second half of the article finds that the trajectory of Chinese cooperation with Cuba has evolved from statecentric bilateral accords to an increasing

emphasis on economic liberalisation. Consequently, even some of Cubas staunchest critics have recognised that, with Chinas

assistance,the island is headed toward rapprochement with the international economic system. Set against the backdrop of

evolving multilateral institutions, Chinas impact in Cuba constitutes a convincing response to former US Secretary of State Robert Zoellicks invitation for

China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system that has enabled its success(Zoellick 2005).




Like their Chinese counterparts, Cuban officials are often accused of excessive intervention in the economic and social

lives of their citizens. Moreover, Cubas cooperation with China, managed exclusively through state channels, has drawn

criticism for its undisclosed (hence suspicious) nature. From secret arms transfers and development of biologicalweapons to anti-US intelligence gathering, commentators perceive a sinister intergovernmental strategy underlying the

bilateral relationship (Cereijo 2001, 2010; ICCAS 2004). Sino-Cuban cooperation is indeed driven by a political strategy,

but it is focused less on undermining the United States than on the longterm (and less newsworthy) goal of upgrading

and coordinating Cubas industrial capacities. Although Chinese assistance to Cuba is managed through governmental

channels, it has been accompanied by advice from Beijing about the benefits of incorporating a greater degree of private

initiative into the existing state-led system. Under the leadership of Ral Castro since 2008, the Cuban government has

begun to heed this advice as it seeks to open the islands economy in a controlled manner. The next section examines

recent advances in Sino-Cuban cooperation, including bilateral efforts to plan the latters industrial evolution and

implement market reforms. These developments suggest that the Cuban government is distancing itself from Fidel

Castros 50-year-long rejection of capitalism, and moreover, that China is committed to guiding the Western

hemispheres only communist nation toward reconciliation with international conventions.


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LinkMexico Aff

Mexico key to expanding Chinese regional influence

Ellis 13(6/6, R. Evan, , PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center

for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including

China, Russia, and Iran, China's New Backyard, Foreign Policy,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america?page=0,0)

Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the mostground.Mexican PresidentEnrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China,

and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor , Felipe Caldern. Similarly,

Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market,

pro-trade countries(Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively

independent of the United States.


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LinkVenezuela Aff

Venezuela is keybiggest oil producer.

Lafargue 06(2006, Francois, Chinas Presence in Latin America Strategies, Aims and Limits, China Perspectives, 68, p

2-11, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3053)

By 2002, China had become the words second biggest consumer of oil, after the United States but ahead of Japan. And between 2000 and

2005, Beijing moved up from ninth to third place among the worlds oil importers. These foreign purchases,representing

nearly one-third of Chinasoil consumption in 2000 and rising to one-half today, is likely to reach 60% between now and 2010. SoChina has committed itself to a policy of diversifying its supplies of hydrocarbons by investing in Africa, (Sudan and Angola in particular),

Central Asia and Latin America. 6 Latin America, with 9.7% of the worlds oil reserves, was producing by 2005 8.8% of world

output11. For the time being, Chinas presence in the hydrocarbon sector remains modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin American oil, butlags far behind the United States in terms of volume12. By 2005, the region provided 3.1% of Chinas oil supplies, 107,000 ba rrels per day (bpd). This may seem a

small amount, but these exports were up by 28% on the previous year (83,000 bpd) and were nearly twenty times more than in 2001. An undeniable rise in

importance is taking place, with Latin Americas contribution to Chinas oil imports estimated to have doubled last year.

7China has established particularly close relations with Venezuela, an oil producer in the first league. Venezuela has 6.6% of the worlds oil reserves

(putting it in sixth place) and 68% of Latin Americas reserves(as against Mexicos 11.3%). As a producer it ranks in seventh place, with 4%

of world production. 8In December 2004 and again more recently in August last year, President Hugo Chvez paid an official visit to Beijing, where

he and President Hu signed several agreements on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the

two countries rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 billion in 2004 and US$2.14 billion in 2005. Chinas Vice

President, Zeng Qinghong, visited Caracas in January 2005, attesting Beijings interest in Venezuela. On that occasion, several new contracts

were signed. China plans investments worth US$350 million in the development of 15 oilfields (which might contain up to one billion barrels of oil) and US$60million towards infrastructure costs (building a rail network, refineries . . .). The China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Petrleos de Venezuela

(PDVSA) have also signed agreements on offshore gas exploration. Then, at the end of August 2005, the two countries formed a joint company to develop the

Zumano oilfield in Anzotegui State, which promises an output of 50,000 bpd. China has also created a US$40 million credit line for

Venezuelas purchase of agricultural equipment from China. 9 The volume of Venezuelas oil exports to China rose

between 2004 and 2005 from 12,300 bpd to 70,000 bpd . Last year it reached 160,000 bpd13, a figure likely to double over the year ahead, on

course to reach 500,000 bpd by 2010. By the second half of 2006, Venezuela was supplying about 5% of Chinas oil imports. China is its

second biggest customer, after the United States, purchasing about 15% of its oil exports.


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ImpactEnergy Prices

Chinese investment and security assistance in Latin America is key to a stable oil supply chaintrades off with US

influence and no-strings nature makes it uniquely valuable

Xiaoxia 5/6(2013, Wen, Economic Observer, Worldcrunch, IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN

LATIN AMERICA, http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-

latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

Initially, Chinas activities in Latin America were limited to the diplomatic level. By providing funds and assisting in infrastructureconstructions, China managed to interrupt diplomatic ties between poor Latin countries and Taiwan. Since then, with China's economic boom, the

supply of energy and resources has gradually become a problem that plagues China-- and its exchanges with Latin

America thus are endowed with real substantive purpose. Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always

been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production

and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of

its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity

naturally became a destinationfor China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of

consumer. It must also help solidifythe important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National PetroleumCorporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energ y sector.

In the opinion of many European and American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These

scholars believe that China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is interested in is

establishing long-term, stable economic relations.This realistic path is exactly opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus Chinahas become a close collaborator of certain Latin American countries, such as Venezuela,that are in sharp conflict with

the United States.The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an increasingly important playerin

Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a financial quagmire, China , with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange

reserves as backing, embarked on "funds-for-assets" transactionswith Latin American countries. So what does China want exactlyinentering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence? Or the other way round?

Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's involvement in the Latin American

continent doesntconstitute a threat to the United States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has

reached "loans-for-oil" swap agreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed

funds to these oil-producing countriesin South America. Not only have these funds been used in the field of oil production,

but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the United States , as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood --

and to a certain extent reduced the impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the UnitedStates, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies . Even if China has become the LatinAmerican economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United S tates has accumulated over two centuries

in the region.

Oil shocks cause extinction

Roberts 04(Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New

World, p. 93-94)

The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but

a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire

nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event" a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political

unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers sends shockwaves through the world energy order,

pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high andprices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster while the big consuming

nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as

anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices upto forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions , transferring tens of billions

of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to

strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery. So embedded has oil become in today's political and economic spheres that the big

industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism and with good reason: six of the last seven

global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and

policymakers that, in today's growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may

eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.


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---Ext. War

High oil prices trigger great power wars

Nader Elhefnawy, April-May 2008, Survival, pp. 27-66 (currently teaches at the University of Miami. He has previously published on international and securityissues in journals includingAstropolitics, International Security and Parameters

Some states, particularly in the underdeveloped world, may not even be able to obtain sufficient energy resources to keep

their economies functioning. Less-developed nations differ widely in the energy-intensiveness of their economies as well, but given the relatively lowresource productivity of many; their obsolete, poorly maintained or otherwise inadequate infrastructure; and their obligation to pay for high-priced oil in hard

currency; low-income oil importers will be in an especially poor position. In contrast to developed states enjoying more developed institutions and better access to

capital and technology, less-developed nations have fewer of the resources needed to adapt to new circumstances, and any price shock would weaken such

resources as they do have. Indeed, with adequate supplies of energy priced out of the reach of consumers, businesses and government, basic services might fail and

states cease to be viable,even as developed nations continue to get by. Any price shock would come in an environment already favouring state failure: recent yearshave seen stagnating growth in Latin America Africa; the removal of a great deal of foreign support for weak governments (a process that started with the Cold Wars

end); and continued population growth in the poorest regions, putting pressure on infrastructure and resource bases. Many of these problems will get worse rather

than better, particularly the relationship between population size and natural resources such as water and arable land. The salinated and damaged farmland on which

a third of the worlds crops are presently grown is a case in point. Aside from the expensive repairs such lands require, drip-irrigation and other methods needed to

keep them productive are much more energy intensive than current practices. Not having access to the required energy may mean disaster.

Moreover, there will be spillover effects, such as refugee flows and the emergence of havens for terrorism and

organised crime, as in Afghanistan and Somalia. There is also the danger that where one state fails, another may move

in, either formally or informally. These interventions may be motivated by a sense of threat (guerrillas using the territory of failed states as a base of refuge), or thesighting of an opportunity to grab territory and resourcesboth of which were factors in the numerous invasions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by its

neighbours since the mid 1990s. The heightened risk of state failure will drive inreasingly desperate efforts to avoid it, especially given the lower efficacy of market-driven solutions in impoverished countries. Weak states may make neo-feudal arrangements with sub-state actors like warlords, private militias and private

corporations to shore up their positions. Alternatively, they may become more centralized and controlling, even totalitarian, and other, stronger nations may feel

compelled to prop them up, despite the unsavoury character of their regimes. There may also be an increased demand for peacekeeping missions, demand that will

likely overwhelm the ability of the major military powers to deliver; indeed, they have already been overwhelmed.76 The problem could become still more severe,

not only because of more numerous crises, but because the lopsided conventional wars the major powers are most likely to fight require relatively few boots on the

ground, while nation-building in the ever more populous and urbanised developing world requires larger numbers. Smaller countries are not the only ones at risk.

The failure of large but economically fragile states on the model of the Soviet collapse is conceivable, and even more problematic at the global level, given that their

size compounds their problems, making them more difficult to bail out or prop up, and introducing problems that are not a consideration with smaller states, such as

the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry. The moment before a large nation collapses is especially fraught with peril. The Soviet Union made surprisingly little

effort to resist dissolution in 1991, but there is no certainty that the next great power to go this way will not flail about dangerously

prior to collapse. Great-power conflict is not out of the question; it may even be the most likely cause of conflict in the

future, particularly if crises bring radical ideologies to the fore. Resources have historically been a factor motivating and fueling armed conflicts. According to astudy by Paul Collier, a country that is heavily dependent upon primary commodity exports, with a quarter of its national income coming from them, has a risk of

conflict four times greater than one without primary commodity exports.79 This connection may be clearest in the case of oil, which is not just another natural

resource, particularly where the onset of civil wars is concerned.80 More than other resources, the presence of oil seems to increase the danger of harshpreemptive repression against insurgencies by central governments, as in Darfur; of other states interceding in internal co nflicts, such as providing support for a

separatist movement in an oil-rich state; and of secessionists prolonging conflicts by selling off future exploitation rights. Explanations include the developmental

problems common to resource dependent countries such as poor government, corruption, poverty and high levels of inequality. High oil prices can

exacerbate these problems by enabling failing states to stave off needed reforms, and increasing the attractiveness

border disputes and secessionist movementscould be reactivated as oil revenue becomes more attractive in places outside the Middle East, such asLatin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Where states have been thoroughly privatised, as by warlords, criminal syndicates or state leaders with lin ks to multinational

corporations, this risk is especially high. A global economic crisis of the kind made likely by pinched oil supplies (particularly in less-

developed regions) may also create openings for radical groups. Such problems affect not just oil-producing nations, but key states in the

staggeringly complex worldwide energy distribution system. Besides the risk to overland pipelines, especially problematic in Central Asia, state collapse tends

to translate into maritime insecurity as well, as with the intensified (although so far comparatively minor) pirate activity off the coast of Somalia in

recent years.83 External powers routinely embroil themselves in the domestic affairs of states key to the production and

transport of oil, exposing themselves to all the hazards such intervention can entail. For example, supporting repressive governmentscan provoke resentment among the local population, which may manifest itself in terrorist acts (as in Saudi Arabia). Overthrow of a client government can mean

inter-state conflict, as with the US and Iran since the 1979 revolution. Another risk is that major powers might find themselves on opposite

sides of an internal conflict, as in Georgia, the territory of which is crossed by a key pipeline for oil from the Caspian Sea basin. There,a US-backed

government battles Russian-backed separatistsin Abkhazia and South Ossetiaa conflict some experts have identified as resembling a Cold

War proxy war Even private companies, as they seek to develop resources in ever more unstable areas, may be implicated in local conflicts. Oil companies have

run up large private-security bills in recent years, and oil corporations were among the earliest clients of private military corporations, as in Angola. The

formation of new international alliances can also be a driver of conflict as large states pursue energy security. In Central Asia,Russia and China actively seek to counter US influence through bilateral military agreements and with the formation of regional blocs such as the Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.85 Outside the Caspian Sea basin China is actively securing access to oil through

relationships with Iran and Sudan, and through the ongoing build-up of its naval capabilities. The problem of interstate conflict over oil may be exacerbated as an

unintended consequence of some solutions to the worlds energy problems. For example, new technologies that permit cost-effective drilling for oil in deeper waters

could create new flashpoints. Cheaper deep-water drilling, for instance, would make the oil under the contested South China Sea a more valuable prize.86 It might be


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hoped that deep-water oil will be less likely to cause conflicts because the facilities and workers are relatively difficult for disgruntled local populations to reach.

While this may make the facilities less accessible, however, offshore oil still figures into international conflicts because of territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone

claims.


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ImpactStability/Crime

Chinese security and military assistance key to solve transnational crime and the drug tradekey to solve regional

stability and prevent terrorism

Ellis 11(Aug. 2011, R. Evan, PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors,

including China, Russia, and Iran, CHINA-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: GOOD WILt, GOOD BUSINESS., AND

STRATEGIC POSITION, Strategic Studies Institute,http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA548685)

Because of the importance of the United States for the PRC as a source of technology and as a market and because of

the damage that animosity with the United States could do to the economic and technological development of the PRC,

Chinese leaders havetraditionally been very sensitive to possible adverse U.S. responsesto their initiatives. The PRC is unlikely to

bow before U.S. demands, yet the character of the U.S. response , among other factors, will shape how the PRC and its

companies behave in Latin America and the pace at which they proceed. Such analysis is not intended to imply that the

United States should initiate a new Monroe Doctrine, telling the PRC to stay out of the region. Although such

rhetoric might play well politically, and although it might induce China to proceed more cautiously in the short term, it would also work against

U.S. strategic interests in the long term by strengthening the hand of more conservative forcesin the PRC, and by fueling

accusations in Latin America that its powerful neighborto the north is once again trying to interferewith the sovereign right of

countries in the region to maintain relations with whom they choose. Beyond such a likely negative reaction from the region, trying to prevent the PRC

from establishing military ties with Latin America would also deny the United States some of the real benefits thatmay be realized from Chinese military engagement with the region. To the extent that it proves reliable, for example, Chinese

military hardware and supplies,in addition to training programs, may provide the region with cost-effective ways to meet security

needs in the face of serious threats, such as those posed by transnational criminal organizations.142 Cooperation

between the PRC and Latin American police forceswith data, personnel exchanges, and translation support, could be of great benefitin

combating the activities of mafias operating in Latin America with ties to PRC criminal enterprises such as the Red Dragon, with

its involvement in human trafficking networks in the region 143 or in stemming the flow of precursor chemicals from China to cocaine

laboratories in the Andes and Amazon jungle.144 Revenue from export salesto China, if carefully managed, may also help Latin

American states meet their security needs, as seen in the case of Chile, where by law, 10 percent of copper export revenues are channeledto fund defense modernization.145

Organized crime makes nuclear and CBW warfare inevitableoutweighs the risk of state-state warfare

CSIS 9(CEnter for Strategic and International Studies, "Revolution 6 - Conflict," Global Strategy Institute,"gsi.csis.org/index.php?Itemid=59&id=30&option=com_content&task=view)

The shift from interstate to intrastate war and the increasing capacity of non-state actors to commit acts of megaviolence reflect how patterns of

conflict have changed since the end of the Cold War . Today warfare is increasingly described as asymmetric. Traditional military

powers, like the United States, are confronted byincreasingly atypical adversariesnon-state ideologues, transnational criminal

syndicates, and rogue statesthat employ unconventional tactics in wars ambiguous in both place and time. Today, conflict

is more likely to occur between warring factions on residential streets than between armies on battlefields.As before, many

belligerents still fight for power and/or wealth, but an increasing number are fighting purely for ideology. Acts of terrorism have become the major

vehicle for their malcontent, especially for well-organized and well-funded Islamic groups like al-Qaeda. The attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001 and similar incidences in recent decades have shown that even small groups of terrorists can carry out sophisticated attacks that result in an

incredible loss of life. The proliferation of nuclear and biological technologies only ups the ante for future incidences. [19]

Terrorism and Transnational Crime Over the past few decades the size and scope of terrorists abilities have become truly alarming. Terrorist organizationshave evolved from scrappy bands of dissidents into well-organized groups with vast human and capital resources.Thissituation is forcing governments around the world to develop strategies to both neutralize these groups where they operate and maintain security at home. The

United States has met some success in combating terrorist organizations, killing high-level officials and isolating certain sub-groups, but the War on Terror has had the

unintended consequence of forming micro-actors, individuals driven by foreign military operations to militant extremism. These individuals, or groups of

individuals, operate in poorly organized cells and as such use internet technologies to spread their message and share plans of attack. Perhaps paradoxically, this

disorganization and decentralization makes these groups a greater threat to the military as it is harder to detect and track them. [1] Terrorism has also had

the effect of heightening tensions between sovereign nations. After the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, India and Pakistan neared

war after India accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists and Pakistan refused to turn over individuals for prosecution. To

finance their illegal activity, terrorist organizations are becoming involved in transnational crime, especially drug

trafficking. Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Director of the American Center for Democracy, has stated, The huge revenues from the heroin trade fill the

coffers of the terrorists and thwart any attempt to stabilize the region.[2] Over the last two decades, we have witnessed a
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA548685http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA548685http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA548685


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surge in transnational crime, in large part because of the dissolution of Cold War alliances that helped keep criminal

syndicates in check.Organized crime activity is not limited to the smuggling of illicit drugs, but includes the trafficking of arms, drugs, and human beings.

Weapons of Mass Destruction According to President Obama, In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war hasgone down, but the risk of a

nuclear attack has gone up. *3+ International mechanisms established in recent decades have by and large kept the

nuclear ambitions of superpowers at bay.However, the fall of the Soviet Union and the increasing prevalence and power of

criminal networks have made it more likely that a single actor could get his or her hands on a Weapon of Mass

Destruction (WMD). The term WMD is used to describe any weapons technology (radiological, chemical, biological, or

nuclear)that is capable of killing a large number of people. [4] By and large it is believed that WMD pose the greatest threat in the possession of belligerent states

like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. However, experts are warning that a more urgent threat would come from WMD in the hands ofnon-state actors. Nuclear material and technical knowledge are frequently exchanged on the black market, especially in post-

Soviet countries, where security personnel charged with guarding nuclear facilities are easily bribed into selling nuclear plans

and materials. [5] With the help of the United States, Russia and its neighbors have made strides in securing these sites and improving oversight of the nuclear

industry, but there is no telling how much material has been traded over the years. [6] The WMD threat does not only come from groups

operating in the developing world, however, as recent biochemical attacks attest. The prime suspect in the anthrax

attacks of 2001 was a government scientist, and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway was committed by a religious

organization that enjoyed official government recognition. The ease with which these materials have become available,

especially through online resources, is forcing governments to restrict their use . International governing bodies will need to find anacceptable paradigm that allows for the benign applications of these technologies, as in power generation, while deterring the nefarious ones.


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---Ext. Terrorism

Drug trade -> terrorism

Sullivan 11(2/23/11, Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Latin

America: Terrorism Issues,http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf)

As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations over the years in their

struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the region. For example, in the 1980s, the United States supported

the government of El Salvador with significant economic and military assistance in its struggle against a leftist guerrillainsurgency. In recent years, the United States has employed various policy tools to combat terrorism in the Latin America andCaribbean region, including sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through the OAS. Moreover,

given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug

trafficking organizations in the Andean region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of

revenue for terrorist organizations. The same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region.

Will involve nuclear weapons

Ferkaluk 10(2010, Brian, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base Wing, Logistics Readiness Officer at

United States Air Force, article written while a MA candidate in Diplomacy at Norwich University, completed in 2011,

Latin America: Terrorist Actors ona Nuclear Stage,

http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Ferkaluk%20Latin%20America.pdf)

These factors fall in line with the current administrations policy of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of

terrorists. It has stated that although the threat of a nuclear attack by sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into

the hands of terrorists has gone up. Latin America has not only a history of terrorist activity and stratocracy, but nuclear

activity as well. Although the region is known internationally as a nuclear-free zone, recent developments have demonstrated that a

renewed interest in nuclear weapons development may be on the rise.This will mean a risk of nuclear materials falling

into the hands ofdomestic or international terrorists is now a real concern for the US in the region itself. Terrorism in Latin America is almost

completely characterized by domestic, guerrilla insurgents. These insurgents channel their terrorist activity against the authoritariandemocracies they live under. Groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) implement

similar tactics to those of international terrorist groups. These tactics include car bombings, kidnappings and, according to the Congressional

Research Service, murders of elected officials and attacks against military and civilian targets in urban and rural areas.1

However, although it has tactical similarities to international terrorist groups, they differ quite profusely in their purpose. Whereas other groups maintainreligious differencesas the premise for their activity, domestic Latin American groups have Marxist political and economic

ideologiesunderlying their activity. Their livelihood comes from the most profitable market they are capable of exploiting, drug

trafficking. This poses a significant and immediate threat to the United States . The initial threat is the fact that many of

these drugs find their way to the US border. The greater danger lies in what this market is being used to fund, domestic

attacks on key leaders of Latin American states who are key allies of the US and supporters of the GWOT. In many cases, these groups are further supported

by neighboring states who seek to undermine US interests as well as US allies in the region. These neighboring states have supported terrorist

groups more and more in recent years as a result of a leftward political trend across the region.

That escalates to global nuclear war and extinction

Spiece 2006 (Patrick F., JD Candidate at College of William and Mary, NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:

ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS, William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427)

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia asa result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear

weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438]

such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk

that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a

highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to

constructing a workable weapon are not significant.42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to

deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a

nuclear weapononce it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf


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are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large

military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy

that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid

and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell,

to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist

groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be

devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in

the United States todiscover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties

andpotentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In additionto the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material

from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will

increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well asincrease the likelihood that regional

conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.


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TurnEconomy

Exploiting comparative advantage is uniquely likely to be successful in Latin Americaconsensus of most recent and

specific research.

Ellis 09(2009, R. Evan, PhD, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center

for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including

China, Russia, and Iran, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, p. 5-6)

The new commercial relationship emerging between the PRC and the countries of Latin America calls attention to thetraditional question of comparative advantagein the modern global economy, including whether and under what conditions an

economic approach based on comparative advantagein the production of primary products can serve the long-term development

goals of the country. On one side of the question, Raul Prebisch,21 Andre Gunder Frank,22 and others have argued that Latin Americas

participation in the system of global economic relations is actually prejudicial to its development. Urging a different view, some

contemporary literaturerepresented by authors (e.g., Franko)23 and studies bysuch institutions as the World Bank24 and the

International Monetary Fundemphasizes that pursuing economic activity in areas in which a country has a comparative

advantage, under the right conditionsand with effective management by the state, can contribute to development of the country. In

the economic interactions between China and Latin America examinedby this book, evidence suggests that patterns of

trade specialization are indeed emerging,with each partner tending to export those goods in which it has comparative

advantage. In general, as Robert Devlin and others have noted, the PRC leverages its advantages in manufacturing, including inexpensive labor, to sell products to

Latin America and other global markets.25 Reciprocally, as noted by Francisco Gonzlez, Latin American countries have capitalized on abundantnatural resources, including petroleum, iron, and copper, as well as available land for export-oriented agricultural crops

such as soy.26


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AT: Dependence

Chinas manufactured goods advantage is eroding anyway and consumption is rising dependence will only be

temporary and the long-term benefits outweigh the costs

Saher 13(3/14/13, Sebastian-Sarmiento, The Diplomat, China and Latin America: Big Business and Big Competition,

http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-and-big-competition/)

Despite these issues, recent external and internal developments may be creating an opportunity for the region to balance its

growing economic relationswith China. Notably, Chinas comparative advantage may be eroding due to increased productioncostsand Beijings desire to lead its economy toward higher-end manufacturing and domestic consumption. If thistrend

continues, it would help beleaguered Mexico, whose security and political problems may finally start to improve and give Mexican

industries a chance to compete on the global stage. Using targeted policies, other countries with manufacturing sectors may

benefit from Chinas economic restructuring. In terms of development overall, alarmism about China keeping LAC economies

dependent on natural resources is overblown. As Latin America continues to grapple with deficitsin infrastructure, education,

and social mobility, the question about whether growing economic ties with the PRC will be a burden or a key opportunity lies

in the actions of Latin America, not China. The central issue is about governance: those countries that benefit over the long term from the current

commodity boom will be the ones most judicious when it comes to future investments and industrial policy. Fighting corruption is difficult anywhere,

and Latin America is no exception. As democracy deepens and middle classes emergein the region, new stakeholders will

hold governments accountable.As Latin America continues to develop, China will undoubtedly play a significant role in its

progress and advancement . There will continue to be cases of cooperation and competition between LAC countries and the PRC as their relations maturebut as long each side has much to offer the other, the people of both Latin America and China have a lot to look forward

to in the evolution of their South-South relations.

Chinese investment and trade will be net positive for the regioneconomic consensus

Blzquez-Lidoy et al. 06(June 2006, Jorge Blzquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodrguez and Javier Santiso Research programme

on: Asian Drivers and their Impact on Development, OECD, ANGEL OR DEVIL? CHINAS TRADE IMPACT ON LATIN

AMERICAN EMERGING MARKETS, OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, Working Paper No. 252,

https://www1.oecd.org/china/37054336.pdf)

Chinese trade impact on Latin America is, in the short and medium run and in general terms,positive. The results of our study are

consistent with others such as the one produced by IMF economists and other economists(Lall and Weiss, 2004).

Onaverage, and from the point of view of trade impact, Latin America will benefit from increased Chinese demand and

growth. In comparative terms, as stressed by the IMF, the only net looser will be South Asia, while for Latin America the

welfare effect will be positive. For sectors such as agriculture in Latin America, the estimated impact of faster Chinese integration

around 2020 is clearly positive(with output up by 4 per cent). The clear losers will be, however, sectors such as textiles and from the point of view ofcountries, the ones specialising in labour-intensive manufactures exports. More detailed analysis would be however needed in particular referring to the trade impact

of China in the home markets of Latin American countries such as, for example, Mexico. In terms of trade relations, China and Latin America have been

intensively developing their relations over the past decade37. The trade volume between China and Latin America rose from $2

billion in the early 1990s to $15 billion in 2001,according to Chinese statistics. Since 2000, Brazilian and Chinese trade has leapt

nearly threefold, a blessing for the Brazilian indebted economy and especially for the exporters of soybeans, steel and

iron ore, which accounted for two-thirds of the goods exported. In general, Latin America, has a surplus commodity endowment that

boosts synergies with China needs and strategy to secure food and energy imports in order to avoid shortages.

No resource cursesize is a prerequisite to diversification AND Latin America can enter higher value-added markets

like beef and wine.

Devlin 07(2007, Robert, Regional Advisor for the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for

Latin America and the Caribbean, What Does China Mean for Latin America? in Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in

Latin America, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)

What does this situation mean for Latin America? Quite a few studies address this very question. The major study was undertaken by the World

Bank and theOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); it concludes that China is a competitor in some respects, yet it

is complementary to Latin Americas role in other ways. Thus, China represents both a challenge and an opportunity . Trade is


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relatively small, between four and seven percent of exports. But trade is growing quickly, and in some sectors it is quite significant, particularly in

countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Latin American exports to China tend to be concentrated in a few commodities;

whereas Chinas exports to Latin America are rather diversified andmostly concentrated in manufactured goods. The Chinese

demand for commodities has strongly affected Latin American terms of trade, relative to the situation that existed in the 1990s. Regarding

direct competition, the export similarity index suggests that the country most vulnerable to the global effects of trade is Mexico.Brazil is also affected, albeit to a lesser extent. In terms of Latin American domestic markets, there are several sectors particularly sensitive to Chinese imports, as the many complaints by

shoe, textile, apparel, and toy producers indicate. Also important to consider is that as China grows, its income is also going to grow. The Chinese

pattern of demand may prove interesting for Latin America, as Chinese consumption of beef, more sophisticated

processed foods, and perhaps Argentine wine will increase . The Chinese will also seek services such as tourism, an area in

which Latin America has a real advantage. The region may attract Chinese tourists if Latin America can address such issues as security and language. Chile has

been leading the way in the region by signing a free trade agreement with China . The agreement represents two major

advantages for Chile: the facility to enter the Chinese market, and the potential to enter into Asian production chains ,

where Latin America is not currently present. In additionto trade is the issue of investment. Today, China is a minor overseas investor. If one does not include fi nancial

investment, the amount of Chinese investment channeled to Latin America in 2005 was roughly $7780 million. Yet the president of China has stated that over the next

ten years there will be $100 billion in Chinese foreign direct investment in Latin America . This announcement has had many Latin

Americans waiting with baited breath. Financial investment aside, Latin America was likely the least important region of the world in terms of

Chinese overseas investment in 2005. In terms of cooperation, however, the relationshipbetween China and Latin America has dramatically

intensifiedsince 1990. The number of reciprocal visitshas increased, and there are a number of bilateral agreements in several areas

There is a bigger story behind Chinas involvementin Latin America, however, and it should serve as a wake-up call for the region. Since 1950, East

Asian economies have been moving steadily in the direction of convergence with the U.S. economy. Yet Latin America

has been moving in the opposite directionas its participation in world trade has generally declined. Although Latin America has recovered a bit of trade in recent

years, East Asia and China have clearly taken off with respect to trade. The growth of East Asian trade represents a reversal of fortune for Latin

America. Beginning with Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, and followed by Malaysia and now China, Asian countries have overta ken Latin American trade. India and

Vietnam are also now overtaking Latin America in growth and exports. If these changes merely represented the growth

of rankings, Latin America would not be as negatively impactedby East Asias recent growth. Yet East Asian countries have been

able to dramatically reduce poverty while Latin America continues to confront difficultiesin combating poverty. Strong growth

rates thus very much matter to Latin American countries. China thus serves as a wake-up call to Latin America to better organize itself in order to competeglobally, and to better diversify and upgrade exports to encourage growth. Studies increasingly indicate that exports are an important stimulus for growth. Beyond the traditional effects of

exports as part of GDP, there is also a portfolio effect related to diversifi cation. There are dynamic effects resulting from entering into new activities.Additionally, countries that aspire to be fi rst -class global exporters must undergo structural reforms that create constituencies within the economy in favor of exports. Three elements are

crucial to future Latin American success. First, it is critical to refl ect on the st rategic forces behind East Asian successes. Second, it is important that Latin America better exploit its

advantages. Third, countries of the region must pursue more strategic public/private alliances. All three of these actions are necessary in order for Lati n America to better innovate and to

upgrade and diversify its export base in pursuit of economic growth. Several factors have contr ibuted to the success of East Asian countries. First, they tend to value long-term strategies and

goal setting. They are also generally pragmatic and gradualist in their approach. Additionally, East Asian countries prioritize the development of local capacities independent of foreign directinvestment. Financing is also generally available, in contrast to the way fi nances cons titute a major constraint in many Lati n American countries. In East Asia, the state is proactive in support

of export development, innovation, and upgrading. East Asian countries also tend to have competent technical bureaucracies, which are guarantors for basic macroeconomic stability. Latin

America has been doing quite well lately in this latter regard. Furthermore, East Asian countries concern with government failures has led them to support the development of long -term

strategies. These countries have also introduced both horizontal and vertical incentive systems in order to encourage private sector exporters to undertake new activities. It also would

appear that East Asian countries treat business as business and ideology remains separate. In Latin America, however, it seems that ideology is too often mixed with business, something less

prevalent within East Asian countries. Latin America has a number of advantages that represent great promise. Although i t remains diffi cult for Latin America to compete di rectly based on

cost, the region is competitive in terms of the speed with which it is able to access markets in North America, Europe, and other countries within the region. Natural resources

are not a curse in Latin America; rather they may be a significant asset if countries of the region use revenues to

develop their economies and to add value to their national resources.


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AT: China Dangerous

No US hype means there wont be direct conflict its a peaceful rise.

Hilton 13(Feb. 2012, Isabel, Norweigian Peacebuilding Resource Center, London-based writer and broadcaster. She

was formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and is editor ofwww.chinadialogue.net,China in

Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf)

The United States, distracted elsewherein recent years, has reacted calmly to date to Chinas increasing presence in LatinAmerica. In a striking acknowledgement of Chinas importance in the region, the U.S. and China have created a mechanism for

mutual transparencythrough the U.S.China Dialogue on Latin America. This started in 2006, just before then-President Hu Jintaos visit to

Washington, and continues under the Obama administration. Through four rounds of dialogueto date, the U.S. has conceded Chinas

standing in Latin America, while seeking successfully to set limits to Chinas action in troublesome countries such as Venezuela and Cuba. In 2006, for

instance, when Venezuela sought a chair on the United Nations Security Council, China was reluctant to lendits support.

Although China eventually voted in favour, it did not otherwise back the campaign . The shale oil revolution in the U.S. has also

diminished fears of Chinese competitionfor the regions energy resources, despite a strong Chinese presence in Venezuelan and

Ecuadorian markets, and Chinas success in locking up the major sub -salt oil in Brazil and securing major acquisitions in Argentina. Venezuela now exports

less than 50% of its oil to the U.S., down from 80% in the past . There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about Chinas still modest military sales to the region. E

China Disadvantage - Harvard 2013

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