China Defence Paper 2010

8/3/2019 China Defence Paper 2010

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www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 269 1

he Peoples Republic o China (PRC) State Council Inormation O-

ce released the seventh edition o its biennial deense white paper,

Chinas National Deense in 2010, on March 31, 2011. Tis docu-

ment aims to communicate the latest inormation on Chinas military devel-

opment, strategy, capabilities, and intentions. China began publishing deense

white papers in 1998, partly as a means o increasing transparency in response to

regional concerns about the growing capabilities and actions o the Peoples Lib-

eration Army (PLA). Despite the systematic release o these documents, many

o Chinas neighbors and other regional powers continue to express concerns

about Chinas lack o military transparency. Te Chinese maintain that they are

becoming more open over time and highlight the importance o transparency

about strategic intentions rather than capabilities.

According to Senior Colonel Chen Zhou, the principal coordinator o

Chinas deense white papers, the document is a government statement that

provides a public explanation on the states national deense policy and national

deense conduct. In his opinion, the 2010 iteration has three new main points:

First, the white paper urther expounds on and openly declares the basis or

and the determination in Chinas pursuit o a national deense policy that isdeensive in nature; second, it systematically introduces new developments in

the building and deployment o the armed orces; and third, it ully presents

the important roles played by the armed orces in such aspects as condence-

building and protecting peace. He concludes that the issuance o Chinas de-

ense white paper serves three distinct unctions: externally, it builds condence

and clears doubts; internally, it raises national deense awareness; and it deters

and warns adversaries.1 Major General Qian Lihua, director o the Ministry

Chinese MilitaryTransparency: Evaluating the2010 Defense White Paper

by Phillip C. Saunders and Ross Rustici

Strategic ForumNational Defense University

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2 SFNo. 269 www.ndu.edu/inss

o National Deense Foreign Aairs Oce, states, One

important unction o the national deense white paper

is increasing trust and alleviating the suspicions o the

outside world.2 Tese and other interviews indicate that

the Chinese view the purpose o deense white papers in

a similar ashion to the rest o the world: as documents

intended to increase trust and condence and reduce

suspicion. Tese goals cannot be achieved without a high

level o transparency.

Unortunately, the use o the word transparency is

problematic due to multiple competing denitions. Tis

makes objective analysis about claims o military trans-

parency dicult in general, including in the context o

deense white papers. A number o well-qualied analysts

have discussed limited transparency in the 2010 Chi-nese paper, but the subjective nature o their assessments

makes their conclusions less persuasive to a Chinese audi-

ence.3 o help address this gap, Michael Kiselycznyk and

Phillip C. Saunders published the studyAssessing Chinese

Military Transparency in 2010.4 Te study, which created

a comprehensive rating system or deense white papers,

denes military transparency as providing inormation

about military capabilities and policies that allows other

countries to assess the compatibility o those capabilitieswith a countrys stated security goals. Tis study adapt-

ed a sample deense white paper ormat developed in a

Council or Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacic

working group and created a rating template with 7 sec-

tions and 19 individual categories designed to primarily

assess current military structure, capabilities, and doc-

trine. Te rating template also includes a orward-looking

element by evaluating deense budget trends and planned

acquisitions/procurement.

For each o the 19 categories, the rating system in-

cludes specic denitions and criteria or each o the our

levels o transparency, which are represented using a col-

or-coded system. Red, orange, yellow, and green ratings

indicate, respectively, no transparency, low transparency,

medium transparency, and high transparency. Te rating

system uses consistent language in the rating criteria to

ensure comparability across categories. For example, an

orange (low) transparency rating usually indicates that a

white paper listed or identied some relevant inormation

but did not include the description or analysis required

or a yellow (medium) or green (high) rating. Each white

paper is rated independently by two raters, who reer backto the specic wording o the rating criteria to resolve any

disagreements.5 Te methodology and denitions detailed

in that study were used to assess the transparency o Chi-

nas 2010 Deense White Paper. Tis paper thus serves as

an addendum to the original study. It evaluates the trans-

parency o the most recent Chinese white paper and puts

the ratings into historical and regional context.

rg C 2010 d

W PpTe ollowing table presents the overall transparency

ratings or Chinas deense white papers. In the analysis

below, we provide the rationale or why each o the 19

categories in the 2010 white paper received its specic

transparency rating.

Security Environment. Tis section addresses cur-

rent or developing international, regional, and internal

trends that threaten or have the potential to threaten the

country. Te section consists o international, regional,and internal categories.

Te discussion o Chinas security environment

in the 2010 Deense White Paper generally receives a

medium transparency rating. Te papers rst chapter,

Te Security Situation, is not explicitly divided into

international, regional, and internal categories, but the

delineation among the three levels o analysis is readily

the Chinese view the purpose of

defense white papers in a similarfashion to the rest of the world:

as documents intended toincrease trust and condence

and reduce suspicion


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apparent. Te section identies but ails to adequately

analyze a number o trends. Internationally, the chapter

highlights that international strategic competition cen-

tering on international order, comprehensive national

strength and geopolitics has intensied. In support o

this claim, the paper elaborates on tensions within the

existing international order and highlights that prog-

ress toward . . . a multi-polar world is irreversible. Tis

section lists a litany o nontraditional security threats

such as terrorism, economic insecurity, climate change,

nuclear prolieration, insecurity o inormation, and

transnational crime. While there is some discussion o

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these trends, there is little analysis. Furthermore, what

little analysis there is does not oer any insight into how

these trends aect China. Te result is a medium trans-

parency rating in the international category.

Te regional category also receives a medium

transparency rating. Tis category makes multiple

assertions about growing regionalism and the overall

security environment. In general, the white paper pres-

ents regional economic trends in a positive light, while

acknowledging negative security trends. Despite de-

scribing these trends, a consistent lack o analysis and

a concerted attempt to deemphasize contentious ter-

ritorial disputes prevented a high transparency rating.

Chinas limited discussion o internal security trends

means that this category received a low transpar-

ency rating. (Te internal security rating is adversely

aected by the rating system, which does not accept

the PRC view that aiwan is purely a domestic issue.)

Once the analysis o aiwan is discounted, the discus-

sion o internal security trends is supercial. In a de-

parture rom previous years, there is little discussion o

internal economic progress. Te ocus o this category

is on nontraditional security threats and territorial in-

tegrity. However, there is no explanation o or support

or claims such as Separatist orces working or East

urkistan independence and ibet independencehave inficted serious damage on national security and

social stability. Te inconsistency in identiying and

explaining internal security trends coupled with dis-

counting aiwan equates to a low transparency rating

or this category.

National Security Goals.Tis section addresses the

economic, political, social, and security objectives that

are critical to the country s development and security and

the policy approaches that it pursues to ensure national

security objectives are ullled. Te section consists o

strategic and tactical categories.

Te discussion o Chinas national security goals re-

ceives a medium transparency rating. TeNational Deense

Policychapter identies broad strategic level national se-

curity goals o saeguarding national sovereignty, security

and interests o national development, building inorma-

tionized armed orces and winning inormationized wars,

maintaining social harmony and stability, and maintain-

ing world peace and stability. Te chapter varies widely in

its description o each o these goals, but it outlines three o

the our with sucient detail to garner a medium rating.

Te Arms Control and Disarmament chapter does a armore complete job o not only listing major strategic goals,

but also describing the way in which China is attempting

to attain them. Because o the disparity o inormation in

these two chapters, the rating or national security goals is

considered a low medium. o attain a high rating, the Na-

tional Deense Policy chapter would have to describe all

the strategic goals in depth, and both chapters would have

to conduct an analysis o how these goals are important to

Chinas national security in addition to prioritizing them.

actically, the white paper is ar more descriptive. For

example, when discussing tactics to maintain world peace

and stability, the paper identies strategic coordination and

consultation with major powers and neighboring countries

as one way to achieve this strategic objective. Because this

level o description is consistent throughout the chapter,

this category is rated medium. It ails to achieve a high rat-

ing because there is no analysis o how these actions will

ensure that Chinas national security objectives are secured.

General Defense Policy. Tis section addresses theapproaches, ramework, or principles that guide a coun-

trys deense policy and the primary missions, responsi-

bilities, or roles assigned to the armed orces in pursuit o

this deense policy. Te section consists o doctrine and

mission categories.

Te discussion o Chinas general deense policyre-

ceives a mix o low and medium transparency ratings.

the white paper presents regionaleconomic trends in a positive light,

while acknowledging negative

security trends


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Te National Deense Policy chapter details elements

o Chinas doctrine, which is described as a deensive

doctrine built upon the philosophy o only attacking a-

ter being attacked and a sel-deensive nuclear strategy.

Tis chapter not only discusses specic approaches to

maintaining Chinas deense, but also links that doctrine

to Chinas national strategic goal o supporting this

important period o strategic opportunities or national

development. Tis category received a medium trans-

parency rating (declining rom a high rating in the 2008

white paper) due to an insucient explanation o this

doctrines role in policy. A more detailed discussion o

how a deensive doctrine aids in advancing the identied

policy goals would be necessary or the category to earn

a high transparency rating. Te National Deense Policy and Deployment

o the Armed Forces chapters speciy the missions or

Chinas armed orces. Tis category receives a low trans-

parency rating due to a lack o consistent identication

and description regarding missions. While this section

lists some specic missions such as saeguarding bor-

der, coastal, and territorial air security and maintaining

social stability, there is little discussion o the missions

o the military services and the PLA Second Artillery

Force (PLASAF), which operates Chinas land-based

nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. Te only spe-

cic reerence to missions or any o the individual ser-

vices or the PLASAF is about the Peoples Liberation

Army Navy (PLAN) enhancing its capabilities in stra-

tegic deterrence and counterattack, and develop[ing] its

capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters.

Despite oering a good description o border security

and maintaining social stability, these chapters would

have to identiy and describe in detail the missions o theservice branches and the PLASAF to warrant a medium

transparency rating. (Te 2008 Deense White Paper

included more inormation about service missions and

received a medium transparency rating.)

Te disparity between the 2008 and 2010 white

paper iterations highlights an important caveat to the

rating methodology: It only considers inormation pre-

sented in the current white paper. Tis technique is at

odds with expressed Chinese views that the white pa-

pers should be viewed as a set. Tis divergence between

how the paper is rated and the Chinese view occasionally

results in a lower transparency rating. For example, the

2008 Deense White Paper has an in-depth discussion o

Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) missions,

while the 2010 version does not mention its missions at

all. We do not believe that these missions have changed

in the intervening period, but the act that the inorma-

tion was not included in the 2010 paper yields a lower


Major Areas of Concern. Tis section addresses spe-

cic international, regional, or internal situations, issues,

conficts, or problem spots that concern or threaten the

country. Tis section diers rom the Security Environ-

ment category by ocusing on concrete issues and situa-

tions and the policies the country employs to conront

them. Te section consists o international, regional, and

internal categories.

Te discussion o Chinas major areas o concern

receives low to medium transparency ratings in the di-

erent categories. Most o the discussion in this section

overlaps with international security trends. In mostcases, the white paper does not detail specic inter-

national situations or crises that concern China or in-

dicate how it is responding to these concerns. For this

reason, both international and regional areas o concern

receive a low transparency rating. Te 2010 white pa-

per identies prompt global strike, missile deense, and

the new strategic commanding heights (outer space

the disparity between the 2008and 2010 white paper iterations

highlights an important caveat to

the rating methodology: It onlyconsiders information presented in

the current white paper


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and cyber space) as Chinas main international military

concerns. It also identies policy-related concerns re-

garding the prolieration o nuclear weapons and that

deep-seated contradictions and structural problems

behind the international nancial crisis have not been

resolved. Te Korean Peninsula, Aghanistan, political

turbulence, ethnic and territorial disputes, and mari-

time and territorial rights are all listed as regional con-

cerns, although oten with just a ew words devoted to

each topic. For an increased rating in these categories,

the white paper would need to include a detailed de-

scription o the concerns.

Te discussion o internal concerns receives a higher

rating due in large part to the extensive description o

current cross-strait relations. With this as the exception,this section ollows the established pattern o listing a

ew security concerns but oering very little descrip-

tion and no explanation. In addition to issues related to

aiwan, the domestic section also highlights separatist

orces working or East urkistan independence and

ibet independence. While issues such as poverty alle-

viation and natural disasters are reerenced in other sec-

tions, there is no explicit indication that these are major

areas o concern. For a high transparency rating, a greater

discussion o internal issues and a detailed analysis would

be needed.

Current Defense Posture.Tis section addresses the

details and composition o a countrys armed orces. Tis

includestotal number o personnel serving in the deense

orces o the country, organization o the armed orces

and the order o battle, chain o command and the struc-

ture o decisionmaking, and weapons systems and equip-

ment o the armed orces. Te section is broken down

into total personnel, structure o orce, command struc-

ture, and armaments categories.

Total personnel. Like the 2008 version, the 2010

white paper does not include an overall gure or the size

o the PLA. It does provide the total number o lawyers

and legal advisors employed by the armed orces (26,342)

and the number o militia (8 million). Despite mission-

specic breakdowns or the militia, lawyers, and some

international missions, the act that the white paper does

not indicate the number o personnel in the armed orces

mandates a rating o no transparency. o achieve an or-

ange rating, the white paper must include an accurate

number o personnel in the armed services.Structure of force. Te scant space devoted to the

PLA, PLAN, PLAAF, the Second Artillery, the Peoples

Army Police Force, reserves, and militia provides little

inormation on their respective orce structures. Te pa-

per identies the number o army combined corps (18),

number o feets and their names, and the air commands

in each military region.6 While this provides a basic over-

view o how each service is structured, it does not iden-

tiy or provide the number o combat units within this

structure. For example, the paper does not present details

on the number o air wings that comprise the Chengdu

area command or give the number o planes within each

air wing. Tis category receives a low transparency rating.

Command structure. Te only reerence to com-

mand structure can be ound in the National Deense

Mobilization and Reserve Force Building chapter.

While this discussion is detailed and descriptive, it rep-

resents only a small raction o the armed services; as a

result, this category receives a low transparency rating(a decline rom the medium transparency rating in the

2008 white paper). o achieve a medium transparency

rating, the white paper must include the command au-

thority at the highest levels and list specic geographic

and service structures.

Armaments. Te Modernization o the Peoples

Liberation Army chapter contains a general description

the 2010 white paper identies

prompt global strike, missiledefense, and the new strategic

commanding heights (outer space

and cyber space) as Chinas main

international military concerns


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o weapons platorms used by each service but has no

inormation on the Second Artillery. For example, the

air orce operates airborne early warning and control

aircrat, third generation combat aircrat, and air and

missile deense systems, and the navy is incorporat-

ing new types o submarines, rigates, aircrat and large

support vessels. Tis listing o general platorms ullls

the basic requirements or a low transparency rating. o

increase to a medium rating, the white paper must in-

clude a description o particular weapons systems, such

as J10s or DF21s.

Defense Management. Tis section addresses a

countrys deense budget and uture procurement plans.

Tis includes overall spending on the armed orces and

deense, budget gures that provide historical contextor current deense spending or inormation on uture

spending plans, and planned weapons systems or capa-

bilities procurements. Te section consists o overall bud-

get, budget trends, and planned acquisitions or procure-

ments categories.

Te chapter Deense Expenditure includes a gure

or Chinas 2010 deense budget (Renminbi 532, about

$82.3 billion at current exchange rates). Te paper pres-

ents a comparison o Chinas budget as a percentage o

Chinas gross domestic product and state expenditure.

A table in the chapter divides Chinas 2009 deense ex-

penditures into three categories: personnel, training and

maintenance, and equipment. Te paper includes a brie

explanation o what is covered within these three broad

categories, but it does not provide any specic gures or

spending on procurement or research and development,

both o which are important or judging uture capa-

bilities. Tese gures are urther divided by active orce,

reserve orce, and militia. Because the chapter does notdiscuss any deense-related expenditure not included in

the ocial deense budget or provide inormation on the

budgets o individual services, this category receives a

medium transparency rating.

Te budget trends category receives a low trans-

parency rating. A table in the white paper presents the

deense budget as a percentage o Chinas annual state

nancial expenditure rom 1998 to 2009. Tis inorma-

tion places Chinas past deense expenditures into his-

torical context, but the white paper does not provide any

estimated or projected size o the deense budget beyond

2010, inormation that would be needed or a medium


Similarly, the planned acquisitions and procure-

ments category receives a low transparency rating because

the white paper oers only general reerences to some o

the capabilities China plans to acquire in order to ulll

modernization goals. Te majority o these capabilities

are related to logistics and to command, control, com-

munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (C4ISR). At no point does the white pa-

per discuss any specic weapons platorms, quantities, or

timelines or procurement or purchases (which is needed

or a medium transparency rating).

International Activity. Tis section addresses the

international activities o a countrys armed orces. Tis

includes the countrys deense relationships, military

exchanges, and joint exercises with other nations, par-

ticipation in international deense organizations, and

participation in bilateral or multilateral peacekeeping or

humanitarian missions. Te section consists o relation-ships, exchanges and joint exercises, and peacekeeping

operations (PKO)/humanitarian missions categories.

Te 2010 Deense White Paper receives a high trans-

parency rating regarding international activity. It provides

a description o Chinas international relationships, ex-

changes, and joint exercises in the chapters Deployment

o the Armed Forces and Military Condence Building.

the white paper offers onlygeneral references to some

of the capabilities China plans

to acquire in order to fulllmodernization goals


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with only vague reerences to capabilitiesand has no

mention o any specic weapons systems (or example,

Chinas aircrat carrier program, eorts to develop anti-

ship ballistic missiles, or the development o the J20

stealth ghter).

Despite other countries voicing concern over the

lack o specic inormation regarding PLA capabilities,

the PLA leadership has long insisted that intentions

rather than capabilities are the more important aspect

o military transparency. Furthermore, they oten justiy

Chinas actions and modernization programs as reac-

tions to what other countries are doing or to broader

trends in the development o military technology. In

their narrative, China must modernize its armed orces

to deend itsel. New capabilities or actions that othersmay perceive as threatening are presented as responses

to changes in the international security environment or

reactions to other states.

Tis narrative is laboriously adhered to in the 2010

white paper. Given the precedent o rarely singling out

states, the white paper relies on the international security

environment to provide justication or Chinas military

capabilities and modernization program. Te white paper

was reportedly delayed or several months or revisions

to the assessment o the security environment (ound in

the Security Situation chapter). Tese revisions pro-

duced a more avorable depiction o the international

and regional security environments and may have caused

a reduction o inormation on military modernization

programs, which might now appear unmotivated by the

more benign description o the security environment.

One striking aspect o the 2010 white paper, only

partly captured by the transparency rating system used in

our analysis, is its extremely limited and veiled reerencesto adverse regional security developments in 20092010.

Many security analysts would argue that a more assertive

Chinese diplomatic and military posture in the region

including such actions as the harassment o the USNS

Impeccable, increased Chinese patrolling and naval exer-

cises in the South China Sea, verbal bullying o Asso-

ciation o Southeast Asian Nations and Northeast Asian

countries in regional meetings, and economic retaliation

against Japan ollowing a collision between a Japanese

coast guard vessel and a Chinese shing boatis a ma-

jor actor that heightened regional security concerns and

prompted many countries to improve their security ties

with the United States.10 Tey would point to North

Koreas 2009 nuclear weapons test and 2010 sinking o

the South Korean navy ship Cheonan and shelling o

Yeonpyeong Island as important destabilizing regional

developments (neither is mentioned in the 2010 white

paper). Tey also highlight the Chinese leaderships re-

luctance to condemn these actions, increased support or

the North Korean regime, and the planned succession

o Kim Jong-eun as important regional developments.11

Chinas actions and role in these events are entirely miss-

ing rom the discussion o the regional security envi-

ronment in the 2010 Deense White Paper. Te overall

tone o the paperbased on language, omitted inorma-

tion, and the amount o text dedicated to issuesseeks

to create a message o strategic reassurance to Chinas

neighbors. However, the reduction in transparency about

specic Chinese military capabilities and general deense

policy is likely to have the opposite eect.

When the ndings described above were presentedin a recent international conerence, one Chinese par-

ticipant argued that the lower rating or the 2010 white

paper is an artiact o the assessment methodology rather

than an actual decrease in transparency. He complained

that because the assessment did not consider inorma-

tion about command structure and missions presented

in previous white papers, the 2010 Deense White Paper

the white paper focuses heavily on

discussion of Chinese intentionscoupled with only vague references

to capabilitiesand has no mention

of any specic weapons systems


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received an articially low rating. I inormation rom

previous white papers had been included, two categories

would have received higher ratings and the overall trans-

parency rating would have remained constant.

Tere are sound methodological reasons or a rating

system to ocus on the inormation in a single white pa-

per rather than to rate all available white papers as a set.

Rating only the most recent paper avoids the problem o

subjective determinations about whether inormation in

older white papers has become dated or inaccurate. Tis

approach also acilitates comparisons across countries,

not all o which publish white papers on a regular sched-

ule. It would be possible in principle to construct a mov-

ing average system that considers inormation rom both

old and new white papers, but this would bias transpar-ency ratings in a upward direction (because transparency

ratings in a moving average system would not decline

even i a new white paper contained signicantly less in-

ormation than older ones). Accordingly, we believe the

rating system should produce as accurate a transparency

rating as possible or individual white papers, and then

use detailed content analysis to consider why the ratings

in individual categories changed. We agree that a com-

prehensive assessment o a countrys military transpar-ency should use all available inormation.

As we discussed in the explanation o our ratings

above, we believe that artiacts in the rating system

had limited impact on our conclusion that the 2010

white paper is less transparent than the previous edi-

tion. Most observers would agree that Chinas military

capabilities have improved signicantly over the last

2 years, but the discussion in the white paper pro-

vides ew details on those changes. As we rated the

2010 white paper, we ound that a number o catego-

ries (especially those ocused on military capabilities)

contained less inormation than previous editions. In

a ew cases, this resulted in a lower rating; in other

cases, the rating stayed the same even though less rel-

evant inormation was provided in the 2010 white pa-

per. Te armaments category is a good example. Te

low transparency rating did not change even though

the amount o inormation in the 2010 white paper

decreased signicantly. Furthermore, the discussion

o the services and Second Artillery is drastically re-

duced. Te 2008 white paper devoted approximately

21 percent o its text to the military services and theSecond Artillery, whereas the 2010 white paper de-

voted only 6 percent.

Tis critique o the assessment methodology misses

a broader point about transparency. While we agree that

PLA missions probably have not changed since 2008,

we do not know that or certain. Te draters o Chinas

white paper may want to keep each edition short and

ocused on new developments, but that inherently de-

creases transparency because outside observers are let

to wonder i things are omitted because nothing has

changed or because China does not want to highlight the

changes. Most outside observers would also agree that

omitting relevant inormation about the modernization

o Chinese military capabilities in order to make space

or a discussion o the military legal system is not a good

tradeo i China wants to increase transparency.

Cc

While the 2010 Deense White Paper appears in-tended to assuage the concerns o Chinas neighbors

and the broader international community about PLA

actions and modernization eorts, it does so at the

expense o reduced transparency about Chinese mili-

tary capabilities. Te 2010 version includes little new

inormation and provides less inormation than previ-

ous white papers about military command structure,

most observers would agree thatChinas military capabilities have

improved signicantly over the last

2 years, but the discussion in thewhite paper provides few details on

those changes


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strategic national security goals, PLA missions, and

Chinas military modernization. Specically, the 2010

white paper is less transparent than the 2008 version

in the categories o General Deense PolicyDoctrine,

General Deense PolicyMissions, and Current De-

ense PostureCommand Structure. (Te 2010 edi-

tion did, however, improve its transparency rating in the

category o Major Areas o ConcernInternal.) Tis

edition o the white paper portrays Chinas military

modernization as a means o aiding the international

community and attempts to convey an image o China

as a benign international actor. In crating this message,

there are large sections detailing Chinese involvement

in international cooperation coupled with a noticeable

omission o any Chinese agency in regional incidents.Tis reduction in transparency is at odds with Chinas

own position regarding the evolution o transparency. For

years, Chinese interlocutors have maintained that great-

er transparency benets the strong at the expense o the

weak. Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary general

o the Chinese Military Science Association, states:

Military transparency could only . . . progress

gradually in a step by step fashion. . . . Any

comparison on Chinas progress in militarytransparency should be vertical. . . . China has

become more in line with international practice

in the past few years, and it is sincerely trying

to reinforce trust and erase doubt, while hoping

to gain understandings from the international

community on the modernized construction of

Chinas national defense.12

Unortunately, the 2010 iteration o Chinas deense

white paper does not conorm to this ideal. It is unde-niable that China is a growing military power. Publicly

available Chinese assessments o PLA capabilities13 place

China on par with regional powers such as Japan, South

Korea, and Australia; many outside observers would rate

the PLA as the strongest Asian military in the region.

Yet rather than progressing toward the level o transpar-

ency o other Asia-Pacic major powers, the 2010 white

paper constitutes a step backward. Several Chinese mili-

tary ocers have stated that as China grows in compre-

hensive national power, it should become more transpar-

ent. Te many interested observers o the PLA will await

the publication o Chinas 2012 Deense White Paper

to judge whether the 2010 paper is a one-time excep-

tion to the trend o gradually increasing Chinese military

transparency or reveals a cap on Chinas willingness to

be transparent about its expanding military capabilities.

ransparency about both intentions and capabilities is

important i condence-building measures such as pub-

lication o deense white papers are to achieve their ob-

jective o increasing trust and alleviating the suspicions

o the outside world.

ackwgmTe authors would like to acknowledge Michael Kiselycznyk or

his contributions in developing the analytical ramework used in this

study and to thank Christopher Yung, CAP Mark Redden, USN,

William Norris, David Finkelstein, Dean Cheng, ai Ming Cheung,

and the participants in the April 2011 University o Caliornia Institute

on Global Confict and Cooperation conerence on transparency

or helpul comments on earlier drats. Tey also thank Jerey

Smotherman, Lisa Yambrick, and ara Parekh at NDU Press and

Kimberley Berlin in INSS or assistance in preparing the manuscript

and posting the associated les on the Institutes Web site.

n1Tis paragraph draws upon an interview conducted byGuang-

ming Ribao Online, April 15, 2011, available at .

2Yuan Yuan, PLA Major General Expounds on Militar yransparency in PRC Deense White Paper, Beijing Liaowang,no. 40.

3 Dean Cheng, Te Limits o ransparency: China Releases2010 Deense White Paper, Web Memo, Te Heritage Founda-tion, April 7, 2011, available at ; Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, Grading

Chinas Military Plans, The Diplomat, April 9, 2011, availableat ; Michael S. Chase, Chinas2010 National Deense White Paper: An Assessment, ChinaBrief11, no. 7, April 22, 2011, available at .

4 Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders,Assessing ChineseMilitary Transparency , China Strategic Perspectives 1 (Washington, DC:National Deense University Press, June 2010), available at .


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5 See Ibid., 612, or a more detailed discussion o the methodology.6 All o this inormation was presented in the 2008 white paper,

and in the case o the air orce and Second Artillery, it was presentedin more detail.

7 See the comments o Michael D. Swaine, Dennis J. Blasko, andDavid M. Finkelstein at the Center or Naval AnalysesInstitute orNational Strategic Studies roundtable on the 2010 Deense White Paper,

April 20, 2011, available at ; and Ian Easton, Chinas National Deense in 2010, RoundtableReport, July 2011 (orthcoming), available at .

8 Updated tables comparing Chinas 2010 Deense White Paperwith other Asia-Pacic white papers are available on the INSS Web-site at .

9 Proessor ai Ming Cheung presented key ndings o theIGCC 2010/11 Northeast Asia Deense ransparency Index at aUniversity o Caliornia Institute on Global Confict and Coopera-tion Workshop on Deense ransparency in Northeast Asia, La Jolla,CA, April 2829, 2011.

10 For contemporaneous analysis, see the relevant issues oPacic Forum Center or Strategic and International StudiesComparative Connections, available at .11 For regional perspectives, see Ross Babbage, Australias Stra-

tegic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper no. 15, February 2011, 3134, andJapans 2010 Deense White Paper, 35, 6164.

12 Luo Yuan, Beijing Liaowang, no. 15, April 1117, 2011, 64.13 Department o Deense (DOD),Military and Security De-

velopments Involving the Peoples Republic of China (Washington, DC:DOD, 2010); National Institute or Deense Studies (NIDS),NIDSChina Security Report(okyo: NIDS, 2011).

The Center or Strategic Research within the Institute orNational Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secre-tary o Deense, Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta, andunied combatant commands through studies, reports,briengs, and memoranda. The center conducts directedresearch and analysis in the areas o strategic and region-al studies and engages in independent and leading-edgeresearch and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original researchby members o NDU as well as other scholars andspecialists in national security aairs rom the UnitedStates and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recom-mendations expressed or implied within are those o thecontributors and do not necessarily refect the views o theDeense Department or any other agency o the FederalGovernment. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas RostowDirector

Center or Strategic Research

Phillip C. SaundersDirector o Studies

Center or Strategic Research

InstItute for natIonal strategIc studIes

Hans BinnendijkDirector

INSS


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White papersChina2010

Brunei2004/07

Cambodia2006

Indonesia2008

Laos2005

Philippines1998

Singapore2000

Tailand2005

Vietnam2009

Security Environment

International

Regional

Internal

National Security Goals

Strategic

Tactical

General Defense Policy

Doctrine

Missions

Major Areas of Concern

International

Regional

Internal

Current Defense Posture

Total Personnel

Structure of Force

Command Structure

Armaments

Defense Management

Overall Budget

Budget Trends

Planned Acquisitions

International Activity

Exchanges

PKO Missions

Comparison o Chinas 2010 Deense White Paper with Those oASEAN Member States


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White papersChina

2010

Australia

2008

India

2008

Japan

2008

South

Korea 2006

aiwan

2008

SecurityEnvironment

International

Regional

Internal

National SecurityGoals

Strategic

Tactical

General DefensePolicy

Doctrine

Missions

Major Areas ofConcern

International

Regional

Internal

Current Defense

Posture

Total Personnel

Structure of Force

Command Structure

Armaments

DefenseManagement

Overall Budget

Budget Trends

PlannedAcquisitions

InternationalActivity

Exchanges

PKO Missions

Comparison o Chinas 2010 Deense White Paper withOther East Asian and Asia-Pacifc White Papers

China Defence Paper 2010

Documents

Transcript of China Defence Paper 2010