--. -:-.

Reprinted from ib J~ e~Studies in the Social History of China and South-East Asia J

edited by J. Ch'en & N. Tarling

Cambridge University Press, 1970

BY WANG GUNGWU

For the past few decades, a great deal of attention has been paid to therelations between China and other Asian countries and probably themost frequently discussed problem of China's traditional relations hasbeen the maritime expeditions of Cheng Ho to the Indian Ocean duringthe years 1405-33. Becauseof the prominence of these expeditions, theyhave often been seen as the only significant feature of China's relationswith South-east Asia during this period. This paper attempts to showthat there are other important questions about China-South-eastAsia relations which have been neglected in the past, It also attempts tocompare China's policies towards South-east Asian countries with itsactivities elsewhere and to arrive at some assessment of the relativeimportance of South-east Asia to China. For this purpose, I havechosen the reign of Emperor Yung-lo (1402-24), the emperor whosent Cheng Ho to the Indian Ocean six times and who receivedmissions from more foreign peoples and countries than any otheremperor in China's history. And by South-east Asia, I refer to thearea presently so called, covering both the mainland and islandcountries.

It should, however, be borne in mind that many levels of relation­ships between the Chinese and various groups of South-east Asianshad been developing for several centuries before the Ming dynasty(1368-1644). By the T'ang dynasty (618--sJ06), the Chinese were alreadyaware of the great trading centres on the coasts of the Gulf ofSiam andthe Java Sea. Missions from these areas reached China throughout theseventh and eighth centuries and there were many more during theNorthern Sung dynasty (960-1126), especially during the later half ofthe tenth and the first half of the eleventh centuries. After the fall of theNorthern Sung, however, few missions were received until after theconquest of South China by the Mongols in 1276. The successors ofthe Mongols, the Chinese rulers of the Ming dynasty, therefore, in­herited a long tradition of increasingly close relations with South-east

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Asia. But, before the Ming dynasty, such relations were mainly un­official or semi-official and confined to the economic centres of SouthChina. Imperial participation in either trade or even tribute was spas­modic and opportunistic. Rarely may initiatives be traced back to anyof the Chinese rulers. The emperors received foreign missions and thenresponded or not more or less as they were advised to do by theirministers.

Thus for the long centuries from the early T'ang dynasty, it is notmeaningful to discuss Chinese relations with South-east Asia duringany single reign. Only the spectacular invasion of Java during KubilaiKhan's reign in 1292 and the missions sent out to the region by thefirst Ming emperor, Hung-wu (1368-98), can be identified with aparticular emperor and neither of these can compare with the sustainedefforts by Yung-lo to keep relations with South-east Asia open andmeaningful. In fact, Yung-lo was the first Chinese emperor to allow somuch attention to be paid to South-east Asia and to take initiativeswhich determined the pattern and nature of China's relations with thecountries of the region. This is significant because imperial initiativeshad long been crucial in China's foreign relations; therefore the absenceof positive steps to encourage official relations with South-east Asiabefore Yung-lo marks out the importance ofYung-lo himself as the keyfigure in the extraordinary developments of the early fifteenth century.For this reason, there is special justification for the study of one reignin this essay. As will be shown later, China's involvement in South­east Asian history during the period 1402-24 was very much the pro­duct of the emperor's personal interest.

Confucian historians always emphasized the role and the archetype ofthe Emperor at the expense of the individuality and unorthodoxy ofeach emperor. Clear pictures ofeach emperor as a person, as an autocrator a despot, or even as a weakling or a fun-loving playboy, are veryrare. This was particularly true when the emperor was the founder ofthe dynasty and the historians had to write during the reigns of hisdescendants. Although Yung-lo was not the founder of the Mingdynasty, his usurpation of the throne in 1402 from his nephew (hiselder brother's son) led to the founding of his own line of emperors.His temple-title of Ch'eng-tsu emphasized a degree ofequality with hisfather as founder of the imperial house. Thus the official history of

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China and South-east Asia 1402-24

Yung-Io is mainly one ofan emperor ofgreat personal courage, a skilledwarrior and strategist, shrewd and stern and yet a lover of the commonpeople. There are examples of his benevolence, of his wisdom and ofhis successful appointments ofministers and generals. But only betweenthe dry and discreet lines can we also see his arbitrariness, his restless­ness, his extravagance, his suspicious nature and his political manipula­tions.

His was a most eventful reign, yet the records succeed in making itless remarkable than it was. His was a strong and direct personal rule,yet it would be difficult to point to the events in which his feelings andcalculations can be fully known. We are presented with long memorialsand edicts but not shown how the decisions were made. We know thatthe senior ranks of the bureaucracy were weak after the wholesaleexecutions, banishments and retirements following Yung-Io's usurpa­tion, but we are not told how he made use of the scholar and eunuchcadres whom he personally selected to help him govern the empire.Most exasperating of all, we have several lists of the innumerableforeign missions to his court and notes on many decisions about whatto do with them, but we are never given details about their significanceto China, to the dynasty or to Yung-lo himself.

It is with this background in mind that we can understand why theevents of his reign, especially the Cheng Ho expeditions, have been sopuzzling for historians. All the speculation about what they mean hasbeen handicapped by the lack of explicit statements of purpose. Hencethe many attempts to explain China's policy towards South-east Asiaand the Indian Ocean countries in terms of Yung-Io's whims andfancies, of Chinese expansionism and imperialism, and of the naturalextension of the Chinese world order. None of these explanations issatisfactory in the light of the timing of the outward-looking policiesand of the withdrawal into isolationism after 1435. It is significant thatYung-Io's policies towards the various Mongol confederations,towards Tibet, towards various kinds of Jurchen tribes, towardsKorea and Japan, towards the numerous different peoples of South­western China, Burma and Laos and towards various countries inSouth-east Asia have never been seriously studied by those modernhistorians who have written on the spectacular voyages of ChengHo's fleets to the coast of East Africa. Instead, the scholars who havedramatized the expeditions have often likened them to the salt-water

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imperialism of the West in later centuries. Hence there is the tendencyto interpret the Cheng Ho expeditions ominously in terms of past andfuture Chinese designs on South-east Asia.

But the facts do not support such an interpretation and it is necessaryfor us to be reminded that a more authentic picture of China's relationswith South-east Asia in the fifteenth century is possible. This can beachieved by examining the reign of Yung-lo more closely. In this way,we can try to see what Yung-lo really intended, under what conditio nshe decided to send Cheng Ho and other missions to South-east Asia,what else he had to worry about, what he actually ordered to be doneto South-east Asian countries, and, not least, how typical Yung-lo'sdecisions were in the context of Chinese history.

Let me now begin with the highligh ts of Yung-lo's reign. 1 Hestarted inauspiciously. Having been passed over by his father in 1398,he had refused to accept his nephew' s rule. Within months of hisnephew's accession, he had resisted the new emperor's authority andstarted a civil war. For three years, from the middle of 1399 to themiddle of 1402, the civil war dominated all events. Then on 17 July1402, after defeating his nephew's army and capturing the capital ofNanking, he ascended the throne. Even this was inauspicious as hisnephew's body could not be found and there was much speculationthr oughout the empire that his nephew, the legitimate emperor, hadescaped and was in hiding. The repercussions of his accession weregreat. The court lost some ofthe ablest senior officials and no one couldreally be trusted apart from his loyal army officersand his eunuchs. Thegovernment had to be re-established afresh.

His first acts were to reaffirm his father's policies and argue that hisnephew's advisers had perverted those policies. He promoted theremaining officials and appointed unknown new men to supervise themas well as the provinces and the border military regions. He hand­picked seven young scholars to be his private secretaries and, with theirhelp, was able to rule directly and personally. He then rewarded all hisloyal supporters with noble titles, promotions, grants and cash gifts.2

On 22 August, five weeks after his accession, he received his firstmission, a mission from a minor chieftain in Yunnan in South-west

I M ing T'ai-tsung Shih-Iu (or Yung-lo Shih-lu), photolithographic edition, Taipei, 1962,hereafter abbreviated as YLSL, vols. 9 to 14; Ming Shih (hereafter MS), chuan S-7;M ing T 'ung-chien (Peking, 19S9), chuan 14-1 8.

2 YL SL , chuan 9B-I2A; M ing T'ung -chien, pp. S90-611.

China and South-east Asia 1402--24

China. A week later, as the last resistance to his rule was broken inShantung province, he sent his first mission abroad. This was to Koreaannouncing his accession to the throne. Six days later, on 4 September,he sent a monk with his edict of accession to Tibet with rich gifts.About three weeks later, he sent missions to the various Mongolleaders.' Then on 3 October, he ordered envoys to go to the followingcountries:

An-nan (Annam) Hsi-yang (South India)Hsien-lo (Siam) Liu-Chi'u (Ryukyu)Chao-wa (Java) Su-men-ta-la (Samudra)Jih-pen (Japan) Chan-ch'eng (Champa)

Significantly, he left policy instructions to the Ministry of Rites forthese overseas countries, which read as follows:

During the reign of T'ai-tsu, when the various foreign countries sentmissions, they were all treated with sincerity. Those who came with nativeproduce to trade were allallowed to do so; and those who in ignorance brokethe regulations were all generously pardoned-all this in order to care forthose who came from afar. Now that the Four Seasare one family, it is thetime to show no outer-separation (shih wu-wai). Let those missions whichsincerely come with tribute do so freely. You should explain this to them sothat they know my desire.s

The next day, Yung-lo had occasion again to lay down policy onplaces overseas. This was in connection with the return of Chineseenvoys, presumably sent during his nephew's reign, from the 'south­east' islands who reported that Chinese adventurers were collaboratingwith the natives there in acts of piracy. Yung-lo immediately ordered amission to go there again bearing the following edict:

To like good and dislike evil is common to men. To do evil because one isforced to does not mean one's nature [is bad]. In the past you have run awaybecauseyou feared punishment or because of poverty and starvation to liveamong the various foreign peoples and have joined them in plunder in orderto save your lives. The coastal defence forces not only were not helpful andsympathetic but also treated you harshly. Although you may regret [whatyou have done], you are unable to show this. We are very concerned aboutthis.

We specially sent someone with our edict to inform you thus. Thoseforeigners should all return to their respectivelands, those who wish to cometo court should be generously treated and sent home. Those Chinese who

I YLSL, lOB, 5a-II, sb.

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escaped to and hid in [foreign] lands are all pardonedfor their past wrongs toenable them to return to their original occupations and become loyal subjectsagain. If they are still stubborn and refuse to reform because they rely ondistance and remoteness, then we will order our forces to exterminate them.It will be too late to regret then.1

After this, Yung-lo sent envoys to the Urianghai in WesternManchuria, to various other Mongol tribes inviting trade, and to aplace as far away as the Muslim state of Samarkand. In early 14°3, therewere further missions to Korea and Siam as well as Tibet and also, on4 March, the first of the important missions to open 'diplomatic'relations with the most powerful of the Mongol confederations underthe Tartar Great Khan.2

Thus within nine months of his accession, Yung-lo had sent succes­sive missions to all the countries which mattered to his empire. Butthere was an important difference between those he sent to overlandcountries and those to countries overseas. The reasons for overlandrelations were obvious and no explanations were thou ght necessary.Only with the overseas missions were instructions given, instructionswhich emphasized the value of friendly trading relations and alsotouched upon the question of stopping Chinese part icipation inpiratical activities. It is not surprising that, during the next few months,a comprehensive plan for grain transportation by sea to Peking andManchuria was drawn up and there appeared many references to ship­building, to piracy between the Yangste mouth and Fukien, to theconditions of the Yangtse ports, to the establishment of a Bureau ofMaritime Trade and even to a typhoon near Canton.!

I have discussed elsewhere the events leading to the major missionsto Malacca and the Indian Ocean of 25 August, 1 October and 28

October 1403.4 That they were follow-ups of the decisions of late 1402

and early 1403 pertaining to overseas relations there can be no doubt.What needs to be added here is that these events must be seen in thecontext of a series of decisions about foreign relations in all directions,both overland and overseas. The areas which preoccupied Yung-lo

[ 'YLSL , 12A, 9a-b. Cf. Hung-wu' s policy of prohibiting private overseas travel, whichYung-lo re-affirmed on 30 July , 1402.

2 MS, 5, 8a- b; 6, 1a- b.YL SL, chuan 18-27.W ang Gungwu, •The Op ening of relations between China and Malacca, 1403-5', inM alayan and Indonesian Studies, ed. by J. Bastin and R. Roolvink, Oxford, 1964, pp.87- 104.

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were the various Mongol centres, the western and southwestern frontierregions of Tibet, Yunnan, Burma, Laos and Annam, and the wholelength of the southern and eastern coasts where trade and piracy hadbeen hardly distinguishable since the Fang Kuo-chen rebellion in 1348.

This brings us now to the most important development whichinvolved China with what we call South-east Asia during the earlyyears of Yung-lo's reign. I refer to the Chinese embroilment in theaffairs of Annam (now North Vietnam);' This had begun with Yung­lo's sending an envoy to Annam on 3 October 1402 and Annam'sresponding with its mission of 21 April 1403. Suspecting that ausurpation had taken place during the past four years when the Trandynasty came to an end, the Ministry of Rites called for an investigationand on 5 May 1403 a special envoy was sent to report on the Annam .succession.

On what basis was such an investigation called? What right didYung-lo have to question the letter sent to him by the new ruler ofAnnam? We observe that the new ruler is recorded as calling himselfTemporary Chief Administrator (ch'uan-li kuo-shih) and 'memorializ­ing' (chou) that he be recognized with a grant of title (jimg-chueh). Doesthis mean that Annam genuinely considered itself a vassal state (or sub­mitted to China, kuei-shun) and accepted Yung-lo's right to investigatethe legitimacy of its new ruler?

The investigation turned out to be a long-drawn affair in whichYung-lo first recognized the new king and then withdrew recognitionwhen a surviving heir of the Tran royal house explained that ausurpation had taken place. He pardoned the usurper and sent back therightful heir and, when the heir was murdered, was drawn into openconflict with Annam. For three years, from April 1403 to April 1406,elaborate negotiati ons about the succession took place. Then came thefinal break and preparations for war began in May. By November, thefirst campaign was fought in Annam. Twenty main crimes (tsui) againstthe usurper were listed as reasons for the campaign. It is interesting tolist them here:

(I) For the murder of the Tran King who was properly recognizedby China.

I M ing Shih Chi-shih pen-ma, chuan 22, also Li Cheng-fu, Chun-hsien Shih-rai chihAn-nan, Shanghai, 1945,pp. 142-6 , provide short accounts. Details are found in YLSL,chuan 2oA-53.

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(2) For the massacre of the Tran royal family.(3) For not using the chinese calendar and for using his own

reign-period.(4) For ill-treating the Annamese people (with details).(5) For changing his own surname from Li to Hu.(6) For deceiving the Ming emperor about his usurpation.(7) For bluffing the Ming emperor and resisting Ming missions.(8) For murdering the legitimate Tran heir.(9) For taking Chinese tribal territory at Ning-yuan chou.

(10) For killing the tribal chief's son-in-law and related crimes.(I I) For disturbing the peace among other border tribes.(12) For taking Ssu-ming fu territory and only returning parts of it.(13) For inciting the tribes of Hsi-ping chou against the emperor.(14) For invading Champa territory during the king's mourning

period.(15) For taking four chou from Champa and sacking them.(16) For taking over one hundred elephants from Champa and some

territory.(17) For forcing Champa, a vassal (fan-ch'en) of China, to use

Annam seals and ceremonial dress instead of Chinese ones.(18) For invading Champa because it acknowledged China and not

Annam.(19) For capturing Chinese and Cham envoys at one of the Cham

ports.(20) For insulting China by sending a criminal as envoy. I

One of the key words in the declaration of war appears to be thatAnnam was mi-mi, or 'very closely related'. For it is in this contextthat the crimes can be seen as heinous. I have listed them fully to showwhat vassalage to China meant at the time. The first eight may bedescribed as moral and ideological issues, the next five as securitymatters, the five after that as Annamese aggression against anothervassal, and the final two as personal insults to the emperor.

There are thus four groups of issues which purported to havearoused Yung-lo to take strong action. From his point of view, it maywell be argued that there was extreme provocation. From the point ofview ofthe country attacked, the list reveals the extent to which Chineseclaims to suzerainty denied freedom and independence of action to the

1 YLSL, Go, rb-aa.

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China and South-east Asia J 402-24

vassal state. One may well ask whether any of the above' crimes' couldbe applied to other countries in South-east Asia as well.

Before I try to answer that, let me return to what Yung-lo's policieswere towards foreign countries in other parts of Asia. Annam wascertainly one of the main problems of his reign. Even after the usurperwas eliminated, national leaders emerged one after the other to challengeChinese rule. This troubled Yung-lo throughout his reign and thecountry was finally abandoned in 1428 to the great Annamese nationalhero, Le Loi, who had fought ten years for his country's independence.The other three major external matters were the Wako pirates raidingthe Chinese coasts from the Liaotung and Shantung peninsulas downto the southern provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung; the navalexpeditions of Cheng Ho to the Indian Ocean; and the revival ofMongol power to the north. Of these latter three, it is interesting tonote that two had to do with the ocean and problems ofcoastal defencewhile only one was an overland problem. Yet it was soon clear toYung-lo that, while Wako attacks were frequent and Cheng Ho'sexpeditions were expensive, his real problems were in the north. It wasthere that the empire was vulnerable and it was to the north that hewent, in 1409-10 and 1413-16 and the third time in 1417, never toreturn to Nanking. With the new year in 1421, the capital was per-manently shifted to Peking. I '

Many historians have remarked on this move of capital and itsconsequences to Chinese interests in South-east Asia, including Annam.On the one hand, there were good historical and geographical reasonsfor the move northwards. On the other, in less deterministic terms,Yung-lo himself was much more at home at Peking where he had beena young man for over twenty years before his accession. At Nanking,he felt strange and helpless. At Peking, he was the soldier-emperor,leading his armies to the steppes, hunting Mongols, returning homevictorious and satisfied each time. Also, it was manifest that, unlikemost other people on China's borders, the Mongols would never acceptthe Chinese world order, however nicely that order was dressed. Theyrecognized only force as the decider of events. It was necessary forYung-lo to keep the Mongols fragmented, to divide them whenever anew leader appeared and, therefore, to stay close to the Great Wall alertand ready to fight, bribe and cajole them to weakness. From the time he

I MS, 6, 7b- 1oa ; 6, 12a-7, 3b; 7, 4b and 7a.

WANG GUNGWU

became emperor, Yung-lo was personally on campaign in Mongolia forfive months in 1410, for six months in 1414, for five months in 1422,four more months in 1423 and was on his fifth campaign in 1424 whenhe died at Yu-mu at the age of 64. On three of these campaigns, he wonnotable battles, but none of them was decisive.1 The Mongols remainedthe chief enemy for another 180 years.

It is with this in mind that we can better picture the place of the seain Yung-lo's calculations. The Wako pirates were not a serious threatto the empire, but their attacks disrupted the transportation of grainby sea from the Yangtse to the military centres in Peking and Man­churia. Curbing the W ako was therefore part of the defence of thenorthern land frontiers. Similarly, strengthening the fleet also became afunct ion of imperial defence in the north. Although the fleets were sostrong that most of the ships could be away on expedition withoutendangering the defence of the coasts, Cheng Ho's expeditions couldbe seen as an extension of the sea power needed for imperial security.But in so extending itself, that power became a major factor in China'srelations with overseas coun tries.

In Yung-lo's lifetime, the major expeditions were sent six times, in1405-7, 1407-9, 1409-II, 1413-15, 1417-19 and 1421-24 (Cheng Hohimself returned in 1422).2 Their importance for relations with South­east Asia cannot be doubted. This was indeed a considerable show ofpower at a time when there was no other power to stand up to it. Yetit is clear that the expeditions were not directed at South-east Asia.They were sent with diplomatic and trading functions to the countriesfurther west and sailed through the Straits of Malacca to get there. Onl ythree parts of the region were directly affected, the north coast ports ofJava, the newly established entrepot of Malacca and the kingdom ofSamudra at the northern end of the island of Sumatra. Less directly,the Chinese-d ominated port of Palembang survived awhile as an out­post of Chinese trading interests, but this was not vital to the ChengHo fleets, which found a safer haven at Malacca to await the change ofmonsoons.

I have shown elsewhere that the expeditions were important for

I MS, chuan 6 and 7.2 The 1407-9, 14° 9-11 expediIions have been carefully reconstructed by J.J.1. Duyven­

dak in T 'oung Pao; see also Cheng Ho-sheng, Cheng Ho I- shih Hui-pien, Shanghai,1948. Both authors have also examined the confused dates of the 1421-24 expediIion inYLSL.