Chile's Democratic Road to Socialism.pdf

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Chile's Democratic Road to SocialismAuthor(s): Michael H. FleetSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec., 1973), pp. 766-786Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447149 .Accessed: 07/10/2014 12:56

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2/22

CHILE'S DEMOCRATIC ROAD TO SOCIALISMMICHAEL H. FLEET

University f Southern alifornia

N NOVEMBER 1970,Marxist socialist alvador Allende ookoffice s Presi-dent of Chile,vowing obring bout revolutionary hangeby working ithin,and not against, he country's onstitutional emocratic radition. Through

its skillful se of powerful xecutive rerogatives, llende'sPopular Unity UP)government rought major part of Chile'seconomy nder tate ontrol. n addi-tion, t nationalized hecountry's nce foreign-owned oppermines, liminated tslatifundia, nd secured mportant material enefits or popular and working-classgroups.

Duringt least wo of the three

earsf democratic Marxist

overnment,ow-

ever, Chilefaced evere conomic nd political rises. For most f this ime t wasdivided nto mutually ostile amps. Following he March 1973 elections, pposi-tion elements urned ncreasingly o illegal and conspiratorial ctivities. Theseculminated n September 1 with Allende's uster nd death at the hands of acoalition f nti-Marxist ilitary orces.'

In most Latin American ountries, uch an outcome would have been pre-dictable. The rise to power by leftist r reformist orces, heir ubsequent ffortsto alter socio-economic tructures, nd finally heir overthrow y those favoringthe status

uo,form

sequenceof events

uitefamiliar o the area. But Chile's

political culture, nstitutional radition, nd past political experience make itunique among ts sister epublics.This distinctiveness nitiallymade the experi-ment n democratic ocialismpossible, nabledAllende o survive ery erious iffi-culties, nd until hecoup offered he world remarkably nstitutionalized ersionof classstruggle.

In analyzingAllende'sdemocratic oad to socialism, his rticle first eviewsthe major economic nd politicaldevelopments nder hePopular Unity Govern-ment. It then xamines he constitutional onflict etween xecutive nd legislativebranches s a representative xpression f the political truggle nder Allende.Andfinally t considers hecauses, nd possible onsequences f Allende's verthrow.

DEVELOPMENTS TOMID-1973

In an era of ncreasing ecourse opolitical uthoritarianism, hePopularUnitycommitment o democratic olitics tands out rather noticeably. t becomes esspuzzling,however, f one considers hat most UP leadershave spent their ntirepolitical iveswithin democratic olitical rder, nd as such are ill-equipped or,and perhaps ll-disposed oward, ther orms f political truggle. n addition,mostMarxistswere greed hat xtra-constitutional ethodswould ead to disaster civilwar, military ntervention, ounter-revolution, tc.), and (more positively) hat

'This articlewas written nJuly 973, nd revised n early ctober.766

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3/22

CHILE'SDEMOCRATICROAD TOSOCIALISM 767

the country's owerful residentialist onstitution rovided ufficient uthority oovercome esistance otheir bjectives.2

Two additional ssumptions ere central o Allende's trategy nce he tookoffice. The first was that revolution as essentially process f structural rans-formation, nd not of economic growth r development. The second was thatsuccess f efforts t structural hangewoulddepend n the development f a popu-lar or working-class olitical majority, nd that at least in the short run thiswas incompatiblewith conventional conomic rationality. oth assumptions resummed up in the following emarks f Pedro Vuskovic,Allende'sfirst Ministerof Economics. Revolutionary hange s a problem f power, question etweensocialforces, owhich conomic olicy sto be subordinated, hich conomic olicymust erve s an instrument or trengthening nd consolidating hepowerpositionof the workers. 3In the view of UP strategists, hepreceding rei administration's referencefor rational conomicmeasures4 ad led to an erosion f both ts political up-port and whatever ommitment t had to structural hange. Accordingly, heychose to move mmediately orestructure owerrelations, reating fait ccomplito which the country's arious economic nterests ould have to adjust. This,together ith measures ringing hort-term enefits o the popular sector, wouldhopefully ssure a political base from which to ask later for necessarymaterialsacrifices.

Inadopting

histrategy

llendewastaking

calculated isk. Measures avor-able to the popular classesmight well stimulate roduction hrough ncreased e-mand. But over the ongrun the burden f government olicieswouldhave to beborneby the country's iddle ectors, ongthe controlling lement n national oli-tics. In various nd sundryways ncomeredistribution, rice controls, mport e-strictions, eficit pending, nd hostility o private nterprise, orexample,wouldsooner r later mpinge pon merchants, armers, rofessionals,mallbusinessmen,and middle-class onsumers nd taxpayers enerally.5 he middle sectors hus

*For a brilliant defense of the compatibility f constitutional democratic politics and revolu-

tionary objectives, see Joan E. Garces, El Caso Toha (Santiago: Editorial Universi-taria), 1972, especially Chapter 1. Professor Garces was one of President Allende's princi-pal political advisors. Certain leftist lements, most notably the Movimiento de IzquierdaRevolucionaria (or MIR) and a segment f Allende's own Socialist Party, have of coursebeen openly critical of constitutional olitics. Though initially very distinct minority,their numbers and importance would almost certainly grow if Allende were blocked inhis pursuit of revolutionary bjectives.

' As quoted in La Fracasada Revolucion del Ministro Vuskovic (anonymous), in El Mer-curio (Edicion Internacional), Semana del 13 al 19 de diciembre de 1971, p. 2.

*One man's economic rationality bviously may not be another's, but the idea as used here isof measures and policies which given existing conditions and expectations are likely toresult in greater levels of investment, production, efficiency, echnological sophistica-tion, and financial solvency. These concerns are given top priority, nd matters uch asimmediate working-class nterests or structural changes are subordinated and condi-tioned to them.

SAlsoseeming to help the lower classes at the expense of middle-class groups was the elimina-tion of the legal distinction between obreros (workers and laborers) and empleados(employees). The latter were essentially white-collar workers, nd were both better paidand given superior fringe benefits. UP policy reduced pay differentials nd completelyeliminated differences n fringe benefits, much to the dismay of many status consciousempleados.



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768 THE WESTERN POLITICALQUARTERLY

posed a serious roblem orAllende; ndeed, n view of their raditional oliticalpower, erhapshis most erious ne. Accordingly, nless r until opular lements

were n control f the political rena, Allendewould have to hope that economicconditions or the middle ectors would not deteriorate oorapidly, hat politicalforces epresenting hemwould remain divided, nd that n any event he middleclasswouldretain ts raditionally onstitutional olitical nclinations.

Initially, hegovernment id well n all respects. During 1971, for xample,the economy ctually eemedto be flourishing: rossgeographic roduct was upover 8 percent, ndustrial roduction 2percent, nd overalldomestic onsumption13percent; whileunemployment asdownover50 percent nd inflation ad beenheld to 22 percent.

Moreover, Allende moved rapidly head with his social objectives. Mostimportantly erhaps, politically f not also economically, emaining .S. copperinterests ere nationalized. n addition, ignificant trideswere made in incomeredistribution, overnment ervices public housing, ducation, medical are, etc.),and agrarian reform.' And finally, he country'smajor banks were nationalized(giving he government irect ontrol ver credit), while expropriations, equisi-tions, nd interventions aiseddirect tate control f domestic ndustry o over 25percent f the total.8

These various achievements elped provide the UP with nitially avorablepoliticalweather.9 uring hefirst ixmonths f the year, nly herightist ational

partywas

consistentlyritical f the

government.he Christian

emocrats,n the

other hand, eemed ncertain s to howto proceed. Theyhad longbeendistrustfulof Marxism nd Marxists, nd yet much of what the government as doingcon-sisted f things which they hemselves ad formally dvocated. In this ituation,the best the party ould manage was a policyof critical upport, y which tbacked elected overnment olicies.

Unfortunately or the UP, this fair economic nd political weather did notlast. Even during 1971, n fact, herewere igns f serious roblems head. Themoney upply was far outrunning ncreases n productivity, verall nvestment asoff, previously dle industrial apacity was rapidly being exhausted, nd foreignexchange eserves ere dwindling ast. Under these ircumstances teadily ncreas-ing demand could not be met, nd both carcity nd inflation ere nevitable.6 These figures re taken from Comentarios sobre la Situacion Economica, Primer Semestre,

1972 (Santiago: Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, Universidad de Chile, 1972), pp.1-13.

According to official tatistics, articipation in total geographic income by salaried or wagelabor rose from 53.7 to 58.6 percent. Cf. ibid., p. 217. With respect to agrarian reform,an estimated 5.3 million hectares were expropriated during the first wenty months ofthe Allende administration, his compared to 3.6 million previously xpropriated by theAlessandri and Frei administrations. See Gonzalo Arroyo, .J., Despues del Latifundio,Que? in Mensaje (a Santiago monthly), Vol. XXI, no. 213 (Octubre 1972), p. 591.

See below, pp. 772-73, for a discussion of the various legal measures used to bring ndustriesunder state control. The nationalizations were often associated with worker demands(and/or government romises) for greater worker participation n the factory's ecision-making process. Very impressive rogress n this area seems to have been made, particu-larly in the textile ndustry.' Although Allende had garnered only 36 percent of the presidential vote, government artieswon almost 50 percent in municipal elections the following April. Part of the jump nodoubt was due to the effects f the traditional postelection honeymoon period.



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CHILE'S DEMOCRATIC ROAD TO SOCIALISM 769

Developments ince ate 1971 have borne hese rojections ut. During 1972,both GGP and industrial rowth ates fell sharply.' Moreover, nflation aced

completely ut of control, eaching he lmost ncredible ate of 162percent or heyear. And finally, carcity nd irregular vailability f a number f basic consumergoodsalso developed. Natural gas (for cooking nd heating), ugar, meat, milk,rice, ooking il, thread, nd certain inds f clothingweredifficult, f not mpossi-ble, to find t various imes f the year.

These deteriorating conomic conditionswere probably esponsible or thegovernment's ossof someof ts nitial upport. Bythis ime, owever, heChristianDemocrats had moved into full-fledged pposition, n virtual lliance with thePartido Nacional,and less t would seembecauseof the state f the economy han

because of the continuing ace of nationalizations. 1 he Christian emocratsthemselves ited UP sectarianism nd totalitarianism s forcing uch move, utthe party's hift would seem more realistically xplained s an effort o retain tslarge middle-class onstituency whose concern or ts socialstatus nd economicinterests ad begun to make conservative ational views more appealing) 12 Inany event, he two parties oined forces or n August 1971specialelection, ndsince then have jointly hallenged. he government n elections, hrough ounter-legislation nd censuremotions n the Congress, nd with massive ublicrallies nddemonstrations.

In June 1972,the government ttempted o arrest he continuing conomicdecline, nd at the same time allay middle sector pprehensions oncerning hescope,pace, and social costs of change. With well over half the country'smajorenterprises lready under direct tate control, ommunist eputy Orlando MillasreplacedVuskovic s chief rchitect f government olicy. Under Millasthe paceof nationalizations ppeared oslacken, nd emphasis asplacedon consolidatingthe process f revolutionary ransformation.'3 harp price ncreases orbasiccon-sumption tems were authorized, n the hope that more rational price structureswould encourage production nd limit demand. And Allende began to speak

10Grossgeographic roduction ncreased uring 972by only 4 percent, hile he ndustrialgrowth ate fell to 3 percent. See Victor Vacarro G., La SituacionEconomica:UnExamenPolitico, n ChileHoy (a Santiagoweekly), o. 37, Semanadel 23 de febreroal 1de marzo e 1973,p. 16.

a The PDC's decisionwas taken n July 1971, severalmonths efore conomic onditionsbegan to decline, ut mmediatelyfter series f key anks nd industries erenation-alized and proposals reating people's courts nd a single people'sassembly eresent to the Congress. The alliance with the Nationals was strenuously bjected to byleft-wing hristian emocrats,many f whom hortly eft heparty o form he zquierdaCristiana.

Recent cholarship assuggested hat hemiddle lass s often ne of the principal bstaclesto socialand economic hanges ecauseof its concern orrelative tatus nd security.See,for xample, svaldoSunkel, Frustration nd Change n Chile, n ClaudioVeliz,ed., Obstacles o Change n Latin America NewYork: Oxford University ress), 1967.

This was the policy fficially dvocatedby the Communist arty. Ever cautious nd judi-cious, heCommunists ere concerned bout the disaffection hatpressing head mightproduce mong potentially ympathetic iddle-class roups. Millas' very mportantessay La ClaseObrera n las Condiciones elGobierno opular El Siglo,5 de Junio,1972)contains he party's ritique f UP policy othat oint.



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770 THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLY

earnestly f the need for working-class acrifices, articularly n the area of wagedemands.14

Bythis

ime,however,he

middleectors

ad already een ost. Moreover,t

does not appear that the Millas policieshad brought ny immediate mprove-ment n the country's conomic ituation. ndeed, conditions emained nfavor-able, and even deteriorated urther. nflation, or xample, ontinued nchecked.Moreover, many basic consumer temswere available only rregularly, nd whenthey were, equired ne to rise arly nd stand onghours n line. In this onnec-tion, rationing was introduced n limited orm nd would have been much moreextensive ad there not been intense pposition esistance?5 he future, nfortu-nately, id not ook much brighter. omestic apital accumulation nd investmentremained ow, and apparently ould not rise without urther imitation f generalconsumption. And an upturn n the country's oreign xchange picture, whichwould permit ncreased mportation f necessary apital and consumer goods,appeared unlikely.16

Despite these extremely dverse conditions, he UP managed to retain on-siderable political support. Following ts initial upsurge, he government's er-centage eveled round 5 percent, here t heldduring he ast year.The other ideof the coin, however, s that the opposition lso remained trong, nd indeedappeared more resolvedwith time. During 1971and 1972in fact, Nationals ndChristian Democrats attempted o challenge Allende'spower directly, nd pro-voked serious onstitutional risis.

In late 1971,Christian emocratic epresentatives roposed constitutionalamendment hich xpressly orbade he nationalization f private ndustries ith-out congressional pproval. Its passagewouldblockfurther overnment akeovers,and could force he return to private hands) of temporarily ationalized ndus-tries. As such, t was a clear attack t the heart of the government's emocraticroad to socialism.

A showdown n the matter was indefinitely ostponed, however, n partthanks oseveral ustained fforts t compromise, nd in part becauseof the dvent

4 At the same time, though less prominently, Millas and Allende also warned that those whowere better off (i.e., the middle and upper classes) would be asked for proportionatelylarger sacrifices. Over the next several months, n fact, the government proposed newtaxes, luxury scale price levels (for such things s automobiles, gasoline, televisions, ndinternational ir travel), differential tility rates, and discriminatory ost-of-living ageincreases.

1Local neighborhood committees known as JAPs (Juntas de Abastecimiento y Control dePrecios) were at the center of the controversy urrounding rationing. Nationals andChristian Democrats opposed them on grounds that they were politically discriminatoryand that they unwarrentedly uperceded legitimately stablished merchants. The govern-ment, on the other hand, insisted that these committees were spontaneous expressions flocal interests, nd that they were urgently needed to combat speculation, stock-piling,and other abuses engaged in by distributors nd retailers.

'8 It is in the area of foreign xchange where the effects f U.S. policy against granting Chileeither bilatereal or multilateral credits were most directly felt. In this regard seeNACLA's Facing the Blockade in U.S. Latin America and Empire Report. Vol. VII,no. 1 (January 1973). In addition, the world market price for copper, Chile's principalforeign xchange earner, was far below levels prevailing during the previous administra-tion. Since nationalization, production levels did increase, but did not meet projectedlevels because of administrative nd labor problems.



7/22

CHILE'S DEMOCRATICROAD TO SOCIALISM 771

of more mmediately ressing oncerns. The first f these oncernswas the nation-wide anti-government trike uring October nd November 972;and the second

was the holding f congressional lections n March 1973. Bothevents ffected hecountry's olitics n mportant ays.The strike asted almost month, making lready difficult conomic ondi-

tions ven more trying, nd raising hespecter f civilwar. In the end, however,the opposition ailedto achieve ts basic objectives nd the government mergedwith ts overall tanding nhanced.

Shortly hereafter ame the March elections, hichgavevictory o the oppo-sition y a 54.7 to 43.4 percent margin. Givenpreelection xpectations f a muchlarger pposition ote,however, heresultswere ctuallymore ncouraging o the

government. Moreover,with the opposition ailing o win two-thirds f the seatsin the Senate,Allendewas safe from mpeachment, nd thus t least onstitutionallyassured f finishing ut his erm.17

Following the elections, ensions ncreased markedly s opposition groupssearched orways o deal with n evidently trengthened llendegovernment. heconstitutional mendment ssue was reactivated, nd efforts ere undertaken ochallenge heUP on specific uestions t the grass-roots rganizational evel. Forhis part, Allendecontinued head with his program: Additional ndustries erenationalized nd initial teps o reduce private ontrol f the wholesale nd retaildistribution

ystemere

taken. 8hese moves

helped ustain,f not

ncrease, en-eral tension.To this point, Chilean politicshad been able to deal, or at least cope, with

enormous ressures nd difficulties. his hardly ssured, owever, hat heywouldcontinue o do so. And indeed, many were seriously uestioning hether hile'sdemocratic nstitutions ould long endure xisting evels f conflict, osaynothingof greater evels n the future. Whatever ts ubsequent ate,however, he Chileanexperiencewas already unique phenomenon, ne in which certain ultural ndinstitutional haracteristics layed n extremely mportant ole. To provide betterunderstanding f these characteristics, nd of the Chilean experience n general,I will present hem s they perated n the context f the constitutional risis f1971-72. The crisisprovides veritablemicrocosm f Chilean political ife, ndoffers mple nsight nto the political radition owhich lass struggle nd conflictin Chilewere orced oadjust.

In this ame fashion he constitutional risismay also help place subsequentdevelopmentsn proper ontext. Although n this egard t will lso be necessary olook more closelyat the implications f both the October strike nd Marchelections.

'1 The final results gave the opposition 87 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 30 in theSenate, while the government eld 63 and 20 respectively.

18The government utilized the neighborhood JAPs and a newly created government dis-tributing gency (DINAC) in an attempt to assure a steady supply of essential goods tothose who most need them, and to prevent what it alleged had been systematic oardingby wholesalers nd merchants o create artificial hortages.



8/22


THECONSTITUTIONALRISIS

During ts three years n office, hePopular Unity government enerally eptits promise f pursuing ocialist bjectives hrough onstitutional emocraticmeth-ods. In effect onfirming his, pposition orces ttempted oblockfurther ociali-zation of the economy y reducing residential ower under the constitution.major crisis uickly rose, nd at the time f the coupwas unresolved. ts practicalsignificance,nd the way n which t was dealt with, ffer aluable nsight ntobothChileanpolitical radition nd the Chileanroad to socialism.

In assuming hepresidency, llendefaced the problem f how to proceed nthe nationalization f the country's conomy. There was no industrial ounterpartof existing grarian reform egislation.And Popular Unity forces ontrolled nly40

percentf the seats n

Congress,he

government odynormally esponsibleor

formulating ew aws.True, the Chileanpresidency asendowedwith ubstantial egislative owers,

growing ut of the executive's ather xtensive eto powers. 1 ut these ould onlybe exercised nce a majority f the Congress greed to consider egislation n thegeneral rea, and thus ould be neutralized y a hostile egislativemajority.

In their earch of constitutional ooks and crannies, owever, overnmentlawyers iscovered number f ittle-known ut powerful xecutive rerogatives.20One of thesewasDecree-Law520,first romulgated n 1932(under he hort-livedSocialistRepublic), and later reaffirmed nd expandedby aws n 1953 and 1966.

It authorized xecutive xpropriation f any firm roducing r distributing ssen-tial goods,but currently hut down,otherwise nable or unwilling omaintain e-quiredproduction evels, r guilty f peculation.

Another nstrument vailable to Allende was the authority f the country'snational development orporation CORFO) to enter nto any area or activitywithin henational conomy, eclaring rivately eldstock ubject ogovernmentpurchase, nd taking ver ctual operations.

And finally, aws of Internal tate Security uthorized emporary overnmentintervention nd control f vital industries aralyzedbecause of labor disputes,while he nationalOffice or ndustry nd Commerce DIRINCO) couldsimilarlyintervene n and assume control f the distribution r retailing f items f basicnecessity.

All of these executiveprerogatives ere subject to judicial review by theContraloria General de la Republica. Even if the Contraloria were to find a par-ticular measure r act unconstitutional, owever, t could be overridden y means

1 The president's legislative powers are not specifically mentioned in the constitution, butrather grow out of his enormous veto powers. The Chilean president's veto can be sus-pensive, substitutive, r additive. This enables him, once a majority of the Congressagrees to legislate n a given area, to modify he final version of any bill virtually t will.His veto may be overridden, nd the bill's original version restored, nly by a vote of twothirds of the membership of both houses. The President s thus often able to legislatewith only a negative majority, .e., with the support of one-third plus one of the mem-bers of the Congress. See Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 1925 (Washington,D.C.: Pan American Union, 1962), pp. 13-15.

0My discussion of presidential powers is drawn from Eduardo Novoa M., Vias Legales paraAvanzar hacia el Socialismo, in Mensaje, Vol. XX, no. 197, pp. 84-90. Sefior Novoawas President Allende's principal egal advisor.



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CHILE'SDEMOCRATIC ROADTO SOCIALISM 773

of a presidential decree of insistence nanimously igned by members f thecabinet. With his ny measure ecomes constitutional, nd there svirtually o

possibilityf

appeal.21These executivepowers seemed to assure the implementation f Allende'sprogram, n spiteof the government's inority tanding n Congress. Not surpris-ingly, heywereviewedwith onsiderable larm byboth he National nd ChristianDemocratic arties.22 n September 971,the Nationalsbrought ensure roceed-ings gainst Minister uskovic. The Christian emocrats nitially ent long, ndonly withdrew heir upportwhen assured y Allende f a moratorium n nation-alizations ntil egislation efining heboundaries f the public,mixed, nd privatesectors f the conomy ouldbepresented.

When this ailed omaterialize, DC Senators amilton nd Fuentealba ntro-duced a constitutional mendment imiting xecutive uthority ith respect otheeconomy. Under its provisions, ny expansion f the public sector would hence-forth equire pecific nabling egislation, nd currently ntervened r requisitionedfirms ould (or at least could) be returned o their riginal wners nless rovidedfor by egislation. he bill won approval f a majority f both houses f Congressin February 972.

The government, owever, as undaunted. Allende nnouncedhe wouldvetothe amendment, nsisted hat a congressional verridewould require two-thirdsmajority, nd argued hat ny conflict n the matter hould be resolved ythe Con-stitutional ribunal.

Moreover,o dramatize isresolve o continue head with his

program, he initiated nationalization roceedings or an additional number fimportant irms. or its part, heopposition ountered hat nly simplemajoritywas needed to override, hat the Tribunal had no jurisdiction n the matter, ndthat he Presidentmust ither ccept the amendment r call a national lebescite.

In April and June 1972,extensive fforts o resolve he conflict ere made.These were unsuccessful, nd in earlyJuly Allende's eto was overridden y a sim-ple majority. Knowing hat Allendewould reject heoverride, nd that he wouldrefer he matter o the Constitutional ribunal, pposition orces or hemomentchose not to force showdown, nd simply id not formally nform hePresident

of ts action.Additional ostponements f the questionwere ater greed obecauseof morepressing oncerns the October trike nd the March elections). It was reopenedin April 1973,however,when Congress ormally otified llendeof its override.Allendepromptly ejected his, romulgated hose ections f the amendment otin dispute, nd appealed to the Constitutional ribunal. Unfortunately, ftertwenty ays of deliberation, he Tribunal decided it had no jurisdiction n thematter, eaving t much as it had been a year earlier: the President rguing hatCongress ad exceeded ts prerogatives nd that ts overridewas invalid; and the

' Except through the mechanism of impeachment proceedings approved by a two-thirdsmajority of the Senate. See Frederico Gil, The Political System of Chile (New York:Houghton Mifflin, 966), p. 97.* Each party comprised groups whose economic interests would be affected by the govern-ment's objectives. Moreover, both were disturbed by the alleged political implicationsof the proposed state enterprises: immediate control of workers and exclusive oppor-tunity or ocial and political nfluence n them over the ong term.



10/22


opposition nsisting hat Allende either romulgate he amendment n its entire-ty r submit he ssue oa plebescite.

The Specific ubject Matter nvolvedShortly fter nitial passageof the amendment n February 972,the govern-

ment pproached he PDC in an attempt ohead off major confrontation. heCommunists, ho had been pushing or n improvement f ties with the middlesectors, ere argely esponsibleor hismove.23 n accepting heir dvice,Allendewas aware that the mere holding f negotiations, hatever heiroutcome,wouldhave a stabilizing nfluence n the general political ituation. But he also knewthat n agreement ith heChristian emocrats n the nature nd scopeof futureeconomic hangeswouldmake challenge f executive rerogatives eemunneces-

sary, nd he appearedgenuinely ptimistic hat his ouldbe reached.At the time hiswasnot n entirely nreasonable xpectation. he PDC,afterall, was publicly ommitted o the goal of socialism, nd even appeared to acceptsubstantial tate nvolvement n the economy. ts major concerns eemedratherwith rocedural uestions nd with he degree nd forms f worker articipation.24

Once launched, he conversations esulted n agreement n three oints: (1)future ationalizations ould be accomplished hrough ew legislation althoughDecree-Law520 couldstill e used, ubject oappeal, as a temporary echanism)(2) firms lready expropriated r intervened ould not return o their formerstatus; nd (3) specialworker-run nterprises ouldbe established.25 ustwhen tappeared that an understanding ad been reached, however,Allenderepudiatedthe terms f agreement apparently nder pressure rom he Socialists). This ledto a suspension f the negotiations, he resignation rom he cabinet of Allende'schief negotiators members f the Partido de la Izquierda Radical or PIR), andthat arty's bandonment f the government oalition.

Two months ater, n mid-June, onversations ere renewed, gain at theurging f the Communists. egislative ction on the presidential eto was sus-pended, nd lengthy egotiations nsued t both taff nd leadership evels. Onceagain, agreement as apparently eachedon virtually ll items. The government

would withdraw ts veto and instead present egislation elimiting ublicand pri-vate sectors, nd clarifying he onditions nd procedures ornationalization. ore-over, the governing rinciples nd major features f this egislation ere outlinedand agreed to. Only regarding hefate of the country's olesupplier f newsprintand certain etails f the worker-run nterprises as there till isagreement.26

'At UP coalitionmeetings t El Arrayan n February, he Communists rged imited ap-prochement ith middle ector roups. Millas' June 5 article pecifically entions heChristian emocrats.

~ I do not mean to minimize he mportance f procedural uestions, hich re often hemost difficult o overcome. But if the Christian emocratswere really erious boutworking obuild ocialism,hese ifficultieshould ave been urmountable.

Cf. Jaime Ruiz-Tagle, De la Reforma ndustrial l Conflicto e Poderes, n MensaJe,Vol. XXI, no. 208 (Mayo 1972),p. 233.*The newsprint irmwas the CompaniaManufacturera e Papelesy Cartones,more com-

monly eferred o as la papelera and owned by former resident orgeAlessandri.Its nationalization as long beensought y the government or ts symbolic nd actualimportance. A detailed ccount of the negotiations s given by then Justice MinisterJorge apia, n Clarin a Santiago aily), 8 de Julio, 972, pp. 16-17.



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CHILE'S DEMOCRATIC ROAD TOSOCIALISM 775

Nevertheless, he attempt gain failed. Amidst omplicatedmaneuverings nboth ides, ommunications roke own nd a votewassuddenly orced n Allende's

veto. It was overridden y a simplemajority, hanks olast-minute upport romthe Christian Democrats. Conservative arty elements ssociated with formerPresident rei are generally reditedwith he decision o abandon the negotiationsand force vote.27 Their efforts ere cheered by the Nationals but resented yChristian emocrats whoopposed lliancewith he PN and wished n somewaytocooperatewith hegovernment. n the eft, hefailurewas a blow to Allende ndthe Communists, ut wasgreetedwith leasure nd relief yothers, ncludingmanywithin llende's wn Socialist arty.28

Though unsuccessful, he negotiations evertheless eveal mportant hingsabout political truggle n the Chilean road to socialism.First, owerful oliticalforces the Communists nd Christian emocrats), hough nableto agree, eemedintent on preventing onflict rom reaching evels which affected nstitutionalstability. econdly,when openly nd systematically iscussed, way from he dis-torting ontext f public debate, UP-PDC differences n specific conomic ues-tions were ess far-reaching han one might have supposed. And thirdly, eitherthe government or the opposition ould claim to be a single-minded onolithicforce.

The substantial onvergence f positions n specificmatters s a particularlyimportant spect of the current risis. Among other things t suggests hat the

basicconflict s not one of formal ositions r principles. his view s reinforced ya consideration f the onstitutional rguments f ach side.

The Constitutional ssueThe public iring f the conflict asconsisted argely f egalor constitutional

debate.The principal ssue oncerned he izeof the congressional ajority equiredto override he veto of a constitutional mendment. he ambiguity rose fromconstitutional mendment assed during he Frei administration. mong ts pro-visionswas one enabling he President ocall a plebescite f a simple ongressionalmajority ejected his veto of a proposed onstitutional mendment.29

Prior to this amendment, two-thirds ajority f both houses was clearlyrequired o override residential etoesof both regular nd constitutional egisla-tion.30But now somedoubt had arisen. The government rgued that the reformhad been intended o strengthen, ot weakenpresidential rerogatives, nd thatin any event t n no way uperceded xisting mendment rovisions. ut the oppo-

Each group contained elements working at cross purposes (i.e., both for and against anunderstanding). The PIR played an important role in torpedoing the discussions byrefusing o continue to hold up a legislative quorum, and thus forcing a vote on thePresident's veto.

*Here the different ttitudes towards the negotiations essentially reflected different oliticalassessments f the Christian Democrats and of how cooperating with them would affect

the Popular Unity program.* The Frei reform, n other words, was a constitutional amendment dealing, among other

things, with the matter f constitutional mendment.* Cf. Articles 54, 108, and 109 of the Chilean constitution, n Constitution of the Republic

of Chile, 1925, pp. 14 and 26-27.



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sition ejoined hat his wouldmake the alling f a plebescite a major objective fthe Frei reform s well) an extremely are ccurrence.

Each of these rguments ad merit, ith he government's robably f greaterlegalweight.31 oth, however, etained xtremely mportant olitical mplications swell. When ntroduced, heFrei reform ad beenenthusiasticallyupported y theChristian emocrats, who at the time defended heneed for xpandedpresidentialpowers. The left, n the other hand, had opposed hemeasure, efending hecom-petence nd institutional nterests f the egislature. iven hese ircumstances,t sreasonable o suppose hat positions n the matter avehad a great deal to do withwhocontrolled hich ranch f government t what ime, nd that what reallywasat stakewas an intense truggle or ower.

If accepted, for example, the current hristian emocratic positionwouldplace political uthority lmost ntirely n the handsof the egislature. y present-ing all legislation n the form f constitutional mendments, heopposition ouldeffectively liminate he President's aw-making uthority; nd by making theamendment rocess a question of simple majority, t could conceivably tripAllende f his other xecutive owers s well. Whatever ts egal merits, hen, heChristian emocratic ositionwasvery learly direct ttack n Allende's oliticalpower.

The same kind f argument an of course s easily e made with espect otheUP's defense f presidential rerogatives. he struggle or power taking place,

however, as not merely heusual one between xecutive nd legislative ranches.It was a struggle etween evolutionary orces,who currently eld the balanceoflegitimate olitical uthority, nd anti-revolutionary orceswho were attemptingto reduce hat uthority, husforcing he eft ither o roll back ts revolution r tomove beyond egal bounds and thereby iskmilitary ntervention. he constitu-tional risiswas thus, n fact, n institutionalized orm r variant f the class trug-gle,brought n by the efforts f oneof the two ides ochange herules f the gamein order more ffectively odefend ts conomic nd political nterests.

RelatedPoliticalDevelopments

In their espective ropaganda fforts n connection ith he crisis, ach sideoften ccusedthe other f attempting osubvert nstitutions nd monopolize ower.The crisis lsoprovided ccasionfor renewed eftist ttacks n bourgeois nstitu-tions. n the faceof opposition ttacks n his constitutional uthority, or xample,Allendefrequently ssailedCongress s a bastion f self-interest nd reaction, ndcalled for more representative nd more revolutionary nstitutions n the future.

The crisis lso was accompanied ya marked pswing n mobilization olitics.Street demonstrations, trikes, nd mass rallies and marches became importantelements n the strategies f both sides. This development as largely he func-

See El Mercurio (Edicion Internacional), Semana del 6 al 12 de Marzo, 1972, pp. 3 and 5,for opposition and government nterpretations f the Frei reform. Both sides admit thatthe reform was badly written nd probably should not have been passed in its presentform. The government's position also appears stronger n that it is difficult o believethat anyone intended constitutional mendments to require less of a legislative majoritythan regular legislation.



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CHILE'S DEMOCRATIC ROADTO SOCIALISM 777

tion of the doubts each had of the other's espect orconstitutional olitics. Noone who questions hisopponent'swillingness oaccept defeat within he present

systems

likelyo confine is own actions to formal

olitical channels;he must

move to counter r overcome hem n other evels s well. In Chile,both govern-ment nd opposition ow eemed o understand nd accept his.32

In thisway, he onstitutional risis idprovide he ontext or t least partialshift n the form f political truggle. ven so,at the time t seemeddoubtful hatthe days f constitutional oliticswere herefore oonto end. Constitutional oliticswere very deeply ngrained n the country's radition. t had enjoyed ontinuousconstitutional overnment ince 1932; and only the overthrow f Balmacedain1891 marred he ine of constitutionality rom he era of Portales in the 1830's)to the uster f Alessandrin 1924.

Moreover, his ecord f constitutional ntegrity ad been achieved under on-ditions hat have occasionally pproached hoseunder Allende. In the ate 1930s,for xample, hecountry urvived edro Aguirre erda's PopularFront f Marxistsand masons,which had ousted the until then dominant and largely Catholic)political ight. And n the years hat ollowed, hile endured oodrationing underGonzalezVidela), severe conomic depression under Carlos Ibanez), high-levelinflation under Jorge Alessandri), nd deepfrustration n the wakeof high xpec-tations under Eduardo Frei), all without eparting rom he eeminglyneffectivebut apparently onsoling radition f constitutional olitics. In each of these

instances,hen

populardissatisfaction eached ts

peak, politicalttention nvari-

ablyturned o the nextparliamentary r presidential lections, nd not to conspira-torial ctivity.

This tradition nd experience fforded hile a resiliency o conflict ot foundin other Latin American republics. Moreover, hey helped forge nd sustainpolitical onsciousnessnd culture which ll major forces aveshared nd to whichall have had to conform. n this onnection, t s interesting hatboth governmentand opposition id feel obligedto justify heir fforts t politicalmobilization sa means to better preserve he country's nstitutional radition. Each side at-tempted o make clear ts own strong ommitment o these nstitutions, s wellas

its opponent's allous and cynicaldisregard or them. Thus, while new forms fpolitical truggle ad been added, they had not yet superceded raditional nes,nor, more mportantly, ad they ltered he terms f political eference r debate. 3

Summarizingwhat the constitutional risis revealed regarding he politicalstruggle nder Allende, t has been seen that (1) powerful orceswithin achcamp were able to exert ignificant oderating nfluence; 2) specific deologicaldifferences etween he PDC and UP in themselves ppeared surmountable; 3)each side comprised iverse iews and perspectives; nd (4) an intense trugglefor powerwastaking lace.

Such a judgment has, of course, long been a prominent haracteristic f Marxist doctrine,but it is interesting o note the Marxists being oined in this regard by elements claimingto be anti-Marxist nd politically iberal.

3 It seemed particularly mportant o both sides to project an image of strong constitutional-ist convictions in the eyes of the country's military, lthough other sectors of publicopinion were the object of attention s well.



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Regarding his ast feature, have suggested hatbasicpolitical nd economicinterests ay beneath the various constitutional rguments. n itself, his would

appear to speak well of Chile's political capabilities, n that it constituted nimpressive xample of the institutionalization f political nd economic onflict.In the same vein, moreover, he ustification f new mobilization fforts n termsof traditional alues nd institutions erved ndirectly oreinforce hem.

All of this, f course,while testimony o the strength f the country's nstitu-tions during 972did not guarantee heywouldsurvive ll future hallenges.Therefusal f the Constitutional ribunal to consider he merits f each side's argu-ments eturned he crisis owhere t stood heprevious ear. Allende hen romul-gated the undisputed rovisions f the mendment, nd at the time f the oupwasawaiting udgment y the Contraloria.34 ince the nitial mergence f the conflictin 1972,however, number f important evelopments ad taken place. Thesemust be considered f the subsequent ollapseof democratic nstitutions s to beunderstood.

THE OVERTHROW

The survival f political nstitutions ependson their being perceived y acountry's major political forces s affording uccessful ursuit f basic interests.During ate 1972and early 1973, mportant lements f Chilean society ame toregard emocratic olitics nd partisan r class nterests s incompatible, akingbreakdown n the country's nstitutional ife ll but nevitable. Two developments,the October trike nd the March elections, layedparticularly mportant oles nthis process.

The strike rovideddramatic xpression f the country's ocialand politicalconflicts, urther ntensifying hem n the process.The elections, n the other and,saw the opposition ose its last chance to constitutionally emoveAllende fromoffice. Moreover, lthough oth had involvedmajor political hallenges, eitherdevelopment eakened hegovernment's esolve o continuewith ts program.

Given this context, t seemed the opposition's verall position could onlyworsenwith time. As a result, entiment ormoving gainst Allendeby force n-

creasedmarkedly. Constitutionalist orceswithin he military aw their numbersand influence ecline. Right-wing errorist ctivitieswere stepped up, and PDCand PN representatives egan to meet regularly ith civilian nd military on-spirators. These activities ed first o the abortive oup of June 29, then to a re-newal of the October strike, nd finally o the coup itself, nce pro-Allende ranti-coup orceswithin hemilitary ad been solated, nd pro-government iviliangroups orcibly isarmed.

In the end, Chile'sconstitutional radition rokeunder he train f sustainedclassstruggle. As late as June, however, t was possible o see the strike nd theelections s making uch a breakdown ess not more) likely. trong overnments,after ll, were presumably esseasily verthrown han weakones, nd both devel-opments ndicated heUP had become tronger.

* There is precedent for the Contraloria's approving a President's acting in this manner, butconstitutionally his need not have mattered as the President could override an unfavor-able decision with a decree of insistence.



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The strikewas initiated y ndependent ruck wners n protest gainst plansto establish state rucking gency n a remote outhern rovince. t was quickly

joined and expandedby merchants, rofessionals,ndustrialists, hite-collar ork-ers, nd anti-Marxist easants, s wellasby the National nd Christian emocraticparties. Their common ntent was to shut the country owneconomically. Withthis, ll hopedto then win pecific olicy oncessionsrom hegovernment, lthoughsome were also interested n weakening ts legitimacy nd in creating ufficientchaosactually obring t down. 5 n the end, however, heir esigns ailedbecauseof the previously nsuspected xtent f popular mobilization nd military upportenjoyed yAllende.

During the strike number f middle-class roupsbecame directly nvolved

politically or the first ime. Their involvement n the provision f goods andserviceswhich were basic to every-day xistence avethem potential or onsid-erable power.3 Fortunately or Allende, however, heir efforts o paralyze thecountry rought n immediate eaction rom ro-government orces.Largely ntheir wn initiative, orkers nd other opular groupsmobilized n defense f thegovernment nd against he strike. Overnight opular brigades, elf-defense om-mittees, nd industrial nd communal ouncils prang p. Factories ttempting oclosewere eized nd subsequently perated yworker ommittees many f whichthen efused oturn he factories veronce the trike ad ended). Manyshops nd

foodstores ere kept open as well, either y their mployees r by groups f localresidents. And finally, olunteer rivers manned ver 1,000requisitioned rucks ohelp keepessential oodsmoving.37

During the course f the strike,moreover, lass ines nd class conflict harp-ened considerably. he country as suddenly ivided nto two bands,with popu-lar and working-class roups upporting he government nd a host of parallelorganizations f middle- nd upper-class lements n violent pposition. ay in anddayout for lmost month, orkers ttempting okeep tores, actories,nd servicesoperating lashedverbally nd physically ith the merchants, wners,managers,

and employee uildswhich were trying oclosethem down. Almost

nexorably,t

s n general, heNationals rged direct olitical ttack n the government'segitimacy nd,if that prospered, n its existence s well. The Christian emocrats, n the other and,preferred oretain hemovement's stensibly conomic haracter, nd only ndirectly oimpune Allende's uthority nd legitimacy. f. a study f the strike y the PDC'sClaudioOrrego, ntitled l Paro de Octubre, ia Chilena ontra l Totalitarismo San-tiago: Editorial el Pacifico), 972.

' These groups ncluded he country'smajor associations f teachers, awyers, hopkeepers,truckers, anking mployees, nd doctors. For a partial ist of groups upporting hestrike, s well as a formulation f their demands, ee the 28 point Pliegode Chilereproduced n La Prensa a Santiagodaily), 22 de Octubre, 972,p. 7. Not includedin the list, but also major forces ehind the strike, were the National AgriculturalSociety SNA), the Society orManufacturing evelopment SOFOFA), the NationalMining ociety, nd the Confederation f Production nd Commerce.

In a partial review f the newspapers or this period, came across pecific eferencesoseizures f over 20 large factories n the Santiago rea, although omeobservers ithwhom have spoken stimate he number ctually eized s over 100. In addition, hegovernment laimed hat over 20,000student olunteers ere engaged n loading ndunloading rucks nd freight rains.



16/22


seemed, overnment nd opposition oyalties oincidedmore nd more loselywithclass ffiliations s the trike rogressed.38

In this fashion, he strike rovided hefirst vidence f substantial evolution-ary mobilization n the part of popular forces. t showedthem o be politicallyconscious, ffectively rganized, nd possessed f an impressive apacity or truggle.It suggested, n effect, hat they were not only supportive f the changes akingplaceunder Allendebut alsoready nd quite able to defend hem.

It is still unclear whether his suddenly pparent revolutionary ass hadbeen there ll along, r whether t onlydevelopedwith his irst ustained hallengeof the revolutionary rocess. Whichever hecase, it did exist nd would have animportant ffect n subsequent olitical evelopments. t seemed airly ertain, orexample, hat ny attempt ooust Allendeby forcewouldmeet with massive rga-nized resistance nd, if not immediately rustrated, ould lead to a bitter ndbloody ivil war. At the time t seemed hat this wouldhave a sobering ffect nvirtually veryone, nd in particular n how the opposition iewed ts strategicalternatives or he remainder f Allende's erm.39

Another mportant eature f the strike was the strong upport iven hegov-ernment y the army nd national police force. Despite opposition rotests, hearmed forcesmaintained rder nd enforced overnment olicies hroughout hestrike. Their actions, n effect, hwarted ts principal bjectives, nd actually n-hanced the UP's general olitical tanding.40

Army upport lso helped bring the conflict o an end. On November 2,Allende nnounced he formation f a new cabinet, ncluding rmy Commander-in-Chief arlos Prats as Minister f nterior) nd twoother high-ranking fficers.This immediately laced the opposition n the defensive,41nd within our daysa settlement f the strike was announced. The government ade several onces-sions, ut the terms f the greement enerally eflectedtsviews nd interests. heoppositionwas forced o set aside many of its nitial demands nd, in the caseofothers, o accept conditional overnment ommitments hich would likely roveinoperative.42

* Perhaps the most impressive vidence of the phenomenon was the case of Christian Demo-cratic workers, most of whom apparently gnored the party's call for support of the strike.See, for example, the interview of Juan Lorca, in Chile Hoy, no. 21, Semana del 3 al9 de Noviembre, 1972, p. 4. It is true that the PDC's peasant confederations ibertadand Triunfo Campesino officially upported the strike, but they did not play an activerole n the course of ts development.

3 Para-military tructures were created both within and between factory nd union organiza-tions. Arms had also been distributed, lthough it is impossible to know how extensively.In any event, am not suggesting hat mobilized workers ver constituted shadow armyrivaling the established military, r that they were capable of overcoming t, but merelythat they onstituted n important trategic orce.* The government's esponse to strike ctivities (many of which were clearly and consciouslyillegal) was for the most part restrained, lexible, nd legally correct, fact which seemedto have a favorable mpact on

public opinionat the time.

Until the military's ncorporation n the Cabinet, the opposition rejected government re-quests for discussions and negotiations by claiming that its word could not be trusted,a claim which, whatever the case previously, was simply not plausible after November 2.

The most important of the government's everal concessions was the removal of the privatewholesaling complex CENADI from he list of 91 firms oon to be transferred o the statesector of the economy. On the other hand, other government ommitments o not appearto have conceded much at all. It was agreed, for example, that legal status would be



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The military's upport f Allendewasprofoundly isappointing o the oppo-sition. Manyhad expected or at least hoped) that he rmed orces ould ctuallyturn n Allende. Others ought opersuade hemilitary t least to let the govern-ment fend for tself. They argued that the conflict as political, hat the strikerswere responding orepeated overnment iolations f the constitution, nd that nsuch circumstances strict efense f law and order was tantamount o politicalintervention n the ide of the eft.43

Military uthorities ejected these notions, nd instead publicly reaffirmedtheir ommitment o the onstitution enerally nd toexecutive uthority nparticu-lar. In a formal tatement uring hestrike, eneral Prats tressed he mportanceof preserving ocialorder, nd then noted the President's irect uthority ver thearmed orces or uch purposes. . .. it sclear that he rmed orces re a legitimateinstrument hich hePresident f the Republic an employ o ensure hat he con-stitution s respected y thosewho threaten ublicorder, whether t be through ctsof subversion r sedition, r [through] oercive ttempts oparalyze hecountry. 44Moreover, ccording o Prats, t was not for the military opass udgment n thelegality f particular xecutive rders r decisions, s this would violate constitu-tional prohibitions gainst deliberating Article 22) and against disobeying rpressuring ivil authority Article 3). With this, rats ppeared to be makingconnection etween efense f the constitution nd the doctrine f civilian uprem-acy, position e ater ffirmed ore orcefully:Aslong as the Rule of Law exists, hearmed orces hould espect he constitution nd haveno right o determine priori whether tate uthorities re respecting r violating t. To doso, employing he powerof force o support heir own] pinion r to replacebodiesconsti-tutionally esigned o resolve he controversy, ouldparadoxically mount o shoving heconstitutionn one'spocket.

This statement carried two very important implications. On the one hand,Prats declared hemilitary obe the enforcer, nd not the udge, of constitutionalintegrity. The latter responsibility was left to constitutionally esignated bodies.And although it is not immediately lear to whom this refers, t turns out, in almost

all cases, to be the President himself, ince with the exception of impeachment pro-ceedings, the executive can legally override all judgments as to the constitutionalityof his actions.4

restored o certain rganizations when he basisfor he measures nitially doptedhaddisappeared, nd that the activities f private ransport ould be guaranteed con-sistent with the demands f national ecurity nd the government's esponsibility oassure t all times he satisfaction f the population's onsumer eeds. For the gov-ernment tatement hich served s the basis of the settlement, ee La Prensa, 6 deNoviembre, 972, p. 6.

See Parlamentarios e Oposicioncon el Comandante rats, n El Mercurio EdicionInternacional), emanadel 16al 22de Octubre, 972,p. 6.

See La Doctrina chneider, statement y GeneralCarlosPrats Gonzalez ppearing nthe November edition fEl Mercurio pagenumber navailable).

45 bid.' In his statement rats cknowledged with pparent pproval) the president's uthority o

override ontraloria udgments. ee ibid. Alsocf. F. Gil,op. cit., or discussion f theissue.



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On the other hand, this respect or ivilian upremacy nd existing uthoritywas conditional pon the continued xistence f the rule of law. A distinc-

tion was implicitly rawn between xecutive uthority o resolve egitimate on-troversy egarding nterpretation f the constitution nd flagrant isregard rabandonment f the constitution. n the atter ase, there would presumably eno question hat onstitutionality ad beenabrogated, nd that hemilitary ccord-inglywouldbeauthorized otake teps o restore t.47

This assertion y military uthorities epresented n important imitation nAllende's xercise f power, s well as a price to be paid for military upport othduring hestrike nd subsequently. t the sametime, owever, t was a limitationand a price which he Allendegovernment ad acceptedfrom hebeginning, ndwithinwhich t had thus arbeen ble to operate ffectively.

In any event, he oppositionwas forewarned hat military uthorities oulddefend Allendeagainst ll non-constitutional ttempts ooust him. When addedto the likelihood f massive popular resistance, hismade the idea of removingAllendeby force most hazardous nd unpromising ne all the way around.

Addingfurther o the opposition'smisfortune, he March 1973 congressionalelections made the prospects f legal action against Allende even less encour-aging. In failing o win a two-thirds ajority f seats n the newCongress, nti-UPforces ost their ast chance of constitutionally ustingAllende r even imiting ispolitical uthority efore he ndof histerm n 1976.

Of additionalmportance

o the overallolitical ituation,

he lectionsuggesta substantial evelopment f political onsciousnessy eftist orces.Allende ctu-

ally emerged rom he elections s more popular at the midway oint n his termthan any other Chilean president n recent memory, nd this despite ncreasinglytrying conomic onditions venforworking-classnd popular ectors.48

The most plausible xplanation f this phenomenon s that the UP had suc-ceeded n making deological riteria heprincipal asisof tspopular ppeal. Thisis not to say that the government's arlier material oncessions opopular groupswere unnecessary, r that conomic onditions ere imply o longer mportant opeopleon the eft. But it doessuggest hat arge numbers f UP supporters ere

more concerned with political truggle nd the restructuring f society han withthe current tatus f their material eeds nd aspirations. his reversal f prioritieswas made possible ecause the notion f restructuring ociety ad ceased to be anabstraction, nd wasan increasingly ssential art of one'sday-to-day xperience, ethis articipation n the ife nd decision-making rocesses f the nationalized ndus-tries, ew nvolvement nd responsibility t the neighborhood evel,or the almost

* Thus one would distinguish, or example, between not promulgating law or an overrideapproved by Congress because of a claim that a two-thirds and not simple) majorityvote was required, and not promulgating congressional laws or judicial decisions be-cause (without there being constitutional mbiguity) one simply did not like them. Thislatter action would constitute rbitrary and constitutionally mplausible) disregard oflegitimate ctions and prerogatives f other branches of government.

4 The phenomenon of el desgaste del poder (the drain of power), in which an administrationsees its popular following progressively iminish with time, is a remarkably constantfeature of modern Chilean politics. President Frei, for example, having been electedwith 56 percent of the national vote in 1964, could command only a 35.6 percent follow-ing in 1967.



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continuous onfrontation ith opposing ocialand political forces t virtually lllevels.49

The elections husndirectly

onfirmed arlier videnceegarding

he ncreas-ing maturity f revolutionary orces n Chile. They showed hatworkers nd otherpopular lements ere nterested n more han merelymoney nd living onditions,that they would support revolutionary overnment n the face of extreme co-nomic dversity, nd that this upport ad grown tronger, nd not weaker,withthe passage f time.50

The general onclusions o be drawn rom he trike nd the lections an nowbe briefly ummarized. irst, heopposition uffered wo substantial oliticalde-feats n a row, nd now faced three moreyears f Allende's residency ithout nyvisible nstitutional eansfor countering xecutive ower (unless, s seemedun-

likely, ts onstitutional mendment ecame aw).The left, n the other hand, emerged s politicallymuch stronger hanmostpeople had imagined. It had respectable lectoral trength more than enough,for xample, oassureAllendeof completion f his term), nd it boasted of evenmore mpressive olitical onsciousnessnd capacity ormobilization nd struggle(which assuredmassiveresistance nd virtual ivil war in the event of an effortto oustAllende yforce).

And finally, hecountry's ilitary eadership ppeared trongly ommitted otonly oconstitutional rinciples, ut to civilian upremacy nd executive uthorityas well. As

longs Allende's

overnmentaintained ts overall espect or he con-

stitution nd for he remaining ranches f government, hemilitary eemed eadyto defend Allende rom fforts o oust him.

These conclusions ery clearly favored government nterests, nasmuch sAllendeseemedboth able and content o carry n as he had to that point (i.e.moving teadily owards ompletion f his program within he bounds of the con-stitution). The opposition, n the other hand, could not like the dea of thingscontinuing s they had been, and yet did not seemable to do anything bout it:while ts egalavenues ppeared xhausted, llegal ction eemed oth too unprom-ising nd too hazardous owarrant erious onsideration.

It is true hat he opposition ad becomediscouraged yrecent evelopments,and that t was quite pessimistic egarding he future. But as long as the militarywas prepared to defend duly constituted uthority, nti-Allende orceswere un-likely o take drastic ction. Without hecomplicity f the military, nd giventhe capacity for struggle f pro-government orces, he prospects for successappeared poor and the likelihood f disaster igh. While the ncreased oliticalstrength f the government ad initially larmed the opposition, t thus also

* The following remarks of a worker at the nationalized Fabrilana yarn factory provides aforceful xample of this phenomenon: There is no way we would accept, there is no

good reason to return the industries, ince to have what we have now has cost us somany sacrifices, has cost us so much. If it is necessary, we will take to the streets todefend what is ours now and forever. Quoted in El Siglo, 10 de Julio, 1972, p. 3.

* The record number of factory seizures during the year, the formation of the combativecordones industriales n the industrial park areas of Santiago, and periodically reported

interviews with so-called ordinary workers, ll offer upport for the view that revolu-tionary onsciousnesswas indeed growing n Chile.



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seemed o deter t from esponding nwisely.And t s in this ense hat he Octo-ber and March events ppeared at the time to enhance the ikelihood f institu-

tional tability.The crucial variable n all of this, f course,was the military. Although ittlewas known regarding nternal military olitics, sudden shift n the military'spositionwas always possibility. t the time, herewas clearly reater ympathyfor the opposition han for the government n military anks. But the UP had itssupporters s well, and of course herewas the military's uch vaunted raditionof non-involvement n politics. n any event, hegreat majority ppeared to feeladequately nterpreted y he ivilista ineofGeneral rats.51

Prats himself as an extraordinarily ble political igure.He had led the rmythrough ery ifficult imes, ffectively ealingwith ivilian oliticians nd success-fully esisting number f internal hallenges o his leadership. Following heMarch elections, owever, isposition eteriorated harply. New York Times cor-respondent onathan andell reports rom ost- oup nterviews ith middle ank-ing officers f their elief hat the UP had done as well as it had. Although heyhad been actively lotting inceNovember, he results ad made it easier to con-vince thers hat herewasnowayout but through orce.52

Widespread lanning nvolving oth civilian nd military roups was under-taken lmost mmediately. hese meetings ed to the attempt f June 29, and toabortive oupson May 18 and August 18 as well. Each was put down by forces

loyal o General Prats ndthe

government.ut

bymid-Augustratshad exhausted

his political esources, as isolated, nd was forced oresign s both Commander-in-Chief nd Minister f Interior. He was replacedby GeneralAugusto inochet,and t then ecame matter f time efore hemilitary ade tsmove.

Also an apparently mportant lement n the military's alculuswasthe grow-ing evidence hat hecountry's argest ingle arty, heChristian emocrats,wouldsupportAllende's verthrow. ollowing heMarch elections, he PDC had chosenas its new President enator Patricio Aylwin, strong nti-Marxist ith contactswith right-wing olitical and economic groups. From this point on, the party

subsequentlyursued policy f hard-line pposition o Allende, nd during he

renewed trike y anti-government orces n July nd August, t refused o considerAllende's ffers f discussion nd concessions. Moreover, hristian emocrats lsojoinedthe Nationals n a congressional esolution harging heUP with he destruc-tion of the constitutional nd legalorder, nd urging military ction to end sucha situation. These moveswere akendue note of by the military, articularly heirimplication f support r sympathy or subsequentntervention.53

5 This majority obviously did not include Generals Arturo Marshall or Roberto Viaux, bothof whom were implicated in anti-government onspiracies early in the Allende presi-

dency.5 Jonathan Kandell, Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Take-Over LastNovember, New York Times, September 27, 1973, page 3.

See El Mercurio (Edicion Internacional), Semana del 20 al 26 de Agosto de 1973, p. 5.The party's support for the resolution was strongly riticized on these precise grounds(that it would encourage coup-minded military lements) by left wing Christian Demo-crats.



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With the complicity f the Christian emocrats, he one remaining bstacleto a golpewas the one on whichAllendehad probably ountedmost, hemilitary'sunwillingnessobring n either bitter nd bloody ivilwar or a repressive ascistdictatorship. n an interview uring arly 1973, he described he horror nd de-structiveness f a civil war, and then speculated that .. . if a revolt or civil warwere successfuln Chile,we would wind up with despotic overnment, Fascistdictatorship. Why? Becausethere s alreadypolitical onsciousness ere,particu-larly mong the workers, nd there would have to be bloodshed nd violence okeepthem down. 4

Allendebelieved trongly hat there would be widespread esistance o anyeffort o oust him. But he also urged the realization hat no one, least of all the

country s a whole, merges ictorious rom civil war, nd that ven f formallysuccessful, hemilitary ouldbe forced o impose brutal dictatorship pon a de-feated ut defiant eople.

This last, and seemingly lausibledefense gainst ntervention learly ailed.Whatever herisks f broad scale conflict r civil war, the military asprepared orun them. The systematic urging f their wn ranks, nd the massivedisarma-ment of popular forces n the months receding he coup no doubt reduced thelikelihood f effective esistance. ven so, the coup itself was hardly bloodlesschanging f the guard.

The stern measures nnounced by the military, ogether ith the reports e-ceivedto date, ndicate hat here was substantial esistance n the period mmedi-ately ollowing he oup.

Conditions ave since become more orderly, t least at the evelof appear-ances. Of course there s no political ctivity; he Congress, arties, he centrallabor federation, nd the free presshave all been abolished r suspended y themilitary overnment. Moreover, heJunta has announced ts ntention o recon-struct r resurrect he nineteenth entury ortalian ociety, ased on strident a-tionalism, uthoritarian ule, hereturn f a largepart of the nationalized conomyto

private hands,and the formation f new

unpoliticized ocial and politicalgroups.55The major question n all this, nd perhaps hetrue est f the ignificance f

the Popular Unity overnment, s of course whether uch a goalis possible.Can itbe achieved, nd can the developments f the past three ears eerased;or will themilitary e powerless oreverse he tructural hanges nd working-class onscious-nesswhichhave taken lace?

From the character f my analysis o this point t shouldbe clear that be-lieve the attempt will fail. During the Allendeyears,working-class nd popularforces developed nto a powerful nd purposefulmovement. That it could not

See John P. Wallach's interview f President Allende in the October 1973 issue of Genesis,p. 23.

~ See the special issue of El Mercurio (Edicion Internacional), Septiembre 1973, devotedentirely o a defense of the coup and to an explanation of military oals and ideals.



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786 THE WESTERNPOLITICALQUARTERLY

match he Chileanmilitary n firepower as tragically vident he weekof Septem-ber 11; but this does not mean that ts historical evelopment an be arrested r

erasedby decree. Chile's democratic oad to socialism,while t failed,will be sur-vived by the strong working-class ovement nd structural hangeswhich t fos-tered. And any government hich ttempts odeny r destroy his egacywillonlyensure ts wnearly emise.

Chile's Democratic Road to Socialism.pdf

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