University of Mississippi

Chemical Warfare in the First World War

Reaction, Response and Legacy

John Roberts

HIS 450-2

Professor Susan Grayzel

3 December 2012

Chemical Warfare in the First World War: Reaction, Response and Legacy

“In the early evening of 22 April 1915, at the Battle of 2nd Ypres, a new age in warfare

made its debut. At 5:00 P.M. German pioneers opened the valves on their cylinders and released

deadly chlorine gas into the atmosphere.”1 The Allies reacted with outrage towards the German

use of gas on the unsuspecting French and British colonial troops stationed at the front at the

Battle of 2nd Ypres. The British government responded especially harshly to the German’s

decision to attack with gas, almost immediately declaring the attack an atrocity. Why did the

British react with such outrage? Why would the Germans even consider resorting to gas warfare

in the first place? Once Germany began using gas, the British and Allies did decide to retaliate,

but their motives and path to retaliation deserves a more thorough examination. Finally, was gas

warfare successfully used as a weapon and was it a successful tactics for the armies who used

them in battle? What lasting effects did it have on these nations after the conclusion of World

War I? A closer look into the reactions, response, and experiences of the respective nations and

the soldiers, who fought for these nations, will provide answers to these important questions, and

reveal the legacy of gas warfare.

The immediate reaction of the British government was complete outrage and their first

response was to declare what the Germans had done to be an atrocity. The next move was to try

and help defend their soldiers against future attacks by hurriedly developing crude gas mask to

send to the front lines. Then, without any hesitation, General John French wrote to London, the

very next day, demanding that the British army retaliate.2 What would happen next would lead

the British army on a clandestine journey to create a special unit to develop a gas program

intended to retaliate against the Germans. It would take the British army five months to develop

what would culminate as their “retaliation” at the battle of Loos, in September of 1915.

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Before examining the British reaction, and before looking closer at their response, a

closer look at why they reacted with such outrage is needed. Why the Germans would even

resort to chemical warfare knowing that it was in violation of the Hague Conventions of 1899

and 1907? A look at exactly what the Hague Conventions expressed and the conditions of the

battle fields by 1915 could possibly play a role in Germany’s decision to use gas. Then,

arguably the most important aspect of a war with gas, are the soldiers’ reactions to its use.

Soldier reactions ranged from fear and hatred to shock and awe to treating it as just another facet

of an already exhaustingly brutal war. Finally, after British retaliation, gas warfare became a

staple aspect of the war that would remain all the way until the end. An overview of the good,

the bad, and the ugly outcomes of gas warfare and the technology and research it inspired will

serve to address questions of its effectiveness, decisiveness, and lasting legacy.

On April 22, 1915, Germany shocked the world with its use of chlorine gas on the Allied

troops at the Battle of 2nd Ypres. The reactions by the Allies were harsh, especially by the

British. According to Albert Palazzo, “The initial response [by the British] was not surprising.

British soldiers and civilians castigated the enemy for its violation of the rules of war as defined

by the Hague Convention, of which Germany was a signatory.”3 At The Hague Conferences of

1899 and 1907, limitations and prohibitions of numerous weapons were discussed; it was not

simply to discuss the use of chemical weapons. However, at the 1899 conference, the delegates:

“agreed ‘to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of

asphyxiating or deleterious gases.’ [Where] at the time, these weapons had not yet actually been

developed, though experimental ideas had been proposed.”4 The second conference in 1907

further prohibited, “‘poison or poisoned weapons’ as well as weapons causing ‘unnecessary

suffering.’”5 So, by signing the Hague Conventions, Germany therefore agreed to honor those

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rules. Why then would Germany decide to completely disregard its oath and use gas as a

weapon?

Two arguments explain why the Germans decided to use gas. The claim made during

and after the war by some Germans was that the French were using gas shells as early as the fall

of 1914. In his article, “The Mist that Rolled into the Trenches: Chemical Escalation in World

War I,” Robert Cook explains what caused the German claims of gas shells:

In France the outbreak of hostilities in late summer of 1914 saw many civilians

enter the ranks of the army. Some of these were former French policemen who

carried their civilian weapons and ammunition with them into the field when

returning from leave. These personal arsenals apparently contained a number of

small, 26-mm rifle cartridges filled with a tear-producing chemical, ethyl-

bromacetate. These rifle grenades had been used in civilian riots for a number of

years, and had also proved effective in the apprehension of criminals.6

So this could have been how the tear gas grenades found their way into the war, and could have

possibly led the Germans to decide that the use of gas was fine, if they were considered to

contain “non-lethal agents.”7

In his book, The Chemical Weapon Taboo, Richard Price points out, “It is of some

importance, however, for not only does it reveal a degree of relevance of the Hague norm in the

development of gas warfare by the Germans, it also represents the first significant interpretive

refinement of that norm.”8 This suggests that the Germans were taking it upon themselves to

interpret the wording of the Hague Convention declaration, by assessing what the French were

doing and deciding to proceed with the implementation of chemical warfare. Price continues,

“From the outset of the war, the German High Command seems to have interpreted the Hague

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Declaration as a narrow proscription applicable only to lethal gases from shells. Irritants were

regarded as no more taboo than smoke or other such techniques.”9 With that in mind, it becomes

clearer why the Germans would decide to move towards the use of chemical weapons. If

irritants were going to be allowed and if the French had already begun using them in the form of

tear gas grenades, then in the minds of the German High Command, they were behind and at a

disadvantage.

An alternative explanation is that by April 1915, the Germans were looking for a spark to

help advance the war. What everyone in Europe thought would be a quick war, only lasting

weeks at the most, had already turned into nearly an eight-month long stalemate. Price claims

that, “The most important consideration in the turn to lethal gas does not seem to have been the

restriction imposed by the Hague Declaration, however, but the fact that Germany was

experiencing a shortage of high explosives.”10 This would help explain the stalemate in the

trenches. It also insinuates that Germany was desperate. Price goes on to say, “To resolve this

ammunition crisis, research turned to the development of lethal gas weapons [to] break the

deadlock in the trenches.”11 This claim seems to be a more realistic stance to consider. The fact

that Germany is in a stalemate along the western front, the use of gas to break that stalemate

seems to be a more legitimate reason for turning to gas. Whereas, the idea that Germany is

responding to the French use of tear gas grenades seems to be merely an excuse to fall back on

after they have unleashed gas on the Allied troops.

This stance is also supported by investigations into British actions. Donald Richter states

in his book, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I, “Sir Harold Hartley, for a

time the head of the British antigas organization during the war and a leading expert in the years

following, concluded that the Germans had no definite plans to employ gas before the setback at

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the Marne in September 1914.”12 The idea that a desperate Germany thought that the use of gas

would help benefit their war effort seems to be the most logical explanation, given Sir Harold

Hartley’s testimony and the event of the stalemate on the western front. Also, their interpretation

of the wording of the Hague Declarations, seem to give a clue as to why they decided to use gas

at the Battle of 2nd Ypres. So, if the Germans considered their use of gas on the Allies at the

Battle of 2nd Ypres to be within the confines of the Hague Declarations, why was this attack

labeled as an atrocity by the British government almost immediately?

If one is familiar with the Hague declarations, then the British reaction to the events of

April 22, 1915, is understood. In the eyes of the British soldiers and the citizens back home, the

Germans had committed an atrocious crime against unsuspecting and unprepared troops. By

regarding the attack in these terms, the British outraged response makes sense. One soldier

described the unfolding scene as the soldiers in the front line realized that they were being gases,

“A lot of the fellows – at that time there were no gas masks – had sort of started to scoot away

from the gas; in fact doing the very thing they shouldn’t have because the gas was drifting with

them and the result was that you found them dead and lying all over the place.”13 This shows the

level of unpreparedness that the Allied troops faced. Without gas masks and with no way to

retaliate, the only option they had was to turn and run and hope to escape the grasp of the

“poisonous cloud” heading their way.

Other reactions combined outrage with disgust towards the Germans. One soldier

describes the feelings held by many of the soldiers present in battle the day of the attack, “Clean

killing is at least comprehensive but this murder by slow agony absolutely knocks me. The

whole civilized world ought to rise up and exterminate those swine across the hill.”14 This

soldier clearly considers the actions of the German army to be barbaric. His comparison of the

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Germans to that of “swine” and his call for their “extermination” shows the serious contempt

held for the Germans, and belief that there should be some form of retaliation.

The British government held similar views regarding retaliation. Richter shows how the

British felt about retaliation in Chemical Soldiers, “Not to retaliate would be ‘suicidal.’ The

unprecedented act demanded retaliation, the term the British invariably employed in reference to

their own use of what they had characterized as a dastardly and uncivilized weapon.”15 He goes

on to point out that “the term, [unprecedented], effectively conveyed the notion that the noble

and fair-minded British people would never have countenanced resort to such a diabolical

weapon except in response to enemy first use.”16 These ideas show that the British considered

what the Germans did to be a cowardly act, one that Britain would never consider doing. Now

that the Germans had committed the crime, they had no other choice except to retaliate using the

same despicable weapon. With their decision already made, the only thing left for the British

government to do was to decide just exactly how they were going to carry out their act of

retaliation.

Immediately following the gas attack at the Battle of 2nd Ypres, the call for retaliation

came loud and clear. According to Palazzo, “General French wrote to London on 23 April

demanding retaliation. He proposed to the War Office ‘that immediate steps be taken to supply

similar means of most effective kind for the use by our troops.’”17 Even though French called for

immediate retaliation, a formal declaration by the government was needed, and according to

Palazzo, French did not have to wait long. He points out, “…. the cabinet shortly endorsed

retaliation and ordered the specialist to prepare a response, while a report issued in June called

for the production of lethal gas.”18

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By May 26, 1915, just a little over a month since the attack on Ypres, Charles Foulkes

was assigned to develop a plan for gas retaliation. Foulkes was now in charge of developing

what would become known as the “Special Companies,” the division responsible for carrying out

the gas attacks for the British army. He sincerely believed that gas could be used as a legitimate

means of winning the war for the Allies, although, at the time of his appointment, he had no prior

background in chemical or gas warfare.19 According to Richter, “Within six days of his

appointment… [He] had acquainted himself so thoroughly with the subject and its attendant

problems that he was able to prepare a report which laid out a reasonably comprehensive plan for

both the organization and the operation of offensive gas warfare.”20 This shows the type of

character that Foulkes possessed. He was more than willing to learn everything about gas

warfare and be able to implement it successfully. This could be why he felt that gas had the

potential of helping the Allies win the war.

When Foulkes took his post as head of the Special Companies, the British military had no

pre-war gas doctrine. The Special Companies needed to be organized into a functional military

unit and if the British were going to successfully retaliate against the Germans using gas, they

needed to act quickly. From the very beginning of Foulkes’ appointment, he believed sincerely

that gas could help win war. Richter points out, “Foulkes, from the first viewed gas as a possible

means to win the war, not merely as an ancillary weapon.”21 He also says, “… Foulkes urged the

use of ‘the deadliest gases procurable.’”22 Foulkes was completely devoted to finding a way to

win the war with gas. To do so, he wanted to use the deadliest gases available, which makes

clear that his reaction to the use of gas is full retaliation against the Germans, and to go above

and beyond what they had used against the British at Ypres.

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The next step for Foulkes was to assemble a unit of men that could carry out the gas

retaliation. Foulkes called for the creation of the Special Companies, and by the afternoon of his

request, he was granted his wish. According to Richter, “… approval for the first two companies

(186 and 187) came through, giving a total of 670 men.”23 Foulkes had approval, but still, what

type of soldier would fill the ranks of the Special Companies? The first place to look would be

in the laboratories of Britain. For the British army to successfully carry out a retaliatory gas

attack against Germany, they would have to draft soldiers with knowledge in chemistry. Richter

states, “In late May, Foulkes drew up a poster advertising for volunteers: ‘Men with training in

Chemistry are required for service in the Royal Engineers overseas.’”24 The wording of the

poster as well as the name of the “Special Companies” was very vague because the British

Government wanted to try and hide their preparations for retaliation.

Not only were the descriptions of the Special Companies vague, but the physical

qualifications were also lenient. Foulkes needed anyone chemically trained that he could find.

Richter points out, “Usual standards of height and chest measurement were to be waived as long

as the volunteer was ‘organically sound and fit for service in the field.’ Furthermore, eyesight

examination might be passed with the aid of eyeglasses.”25 He also states, “Foulkes suggested

that recruiters also disregard the upper age limit of forty-five, on the assumption that the

chemists would not be called upon to do anything physically more strenuous than turn gas valves

on and off.”26 The requirements were definitely stretched to the limit in order to obtain men

trained in the field of chemistry. Richter shows the leniency of the recruitment, “One such

volunteer later jocularly maintained that he had been ‘taken in, in more senses, than one,’ – that

he had been asked about chemistry but not about ability to perform heavy porterage. ‘They

wanted chemists,’ a youngster later recalled, ‘so I looked up the formula for water and told them

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it was H2O, and I was in.’”27 The British government was determined to retaliate with gas

against the Germans, and Foulkes was determined to get the necessary people that were

chemically qualified to help lead in developing the attack. However, the qualifications were

somewhat lenient and it seems that the British may have been desperate by waiving some of the

normal qualifications of Army recruitment.

With his units filled, Foulkes’ next move was to acquire the materials needed for the

chemical attack and to also begin training his men. He chose Helfaut in northern France, just

south of the British GHQ at St. Omer, as the training depot for the Special Companies. No

sooner than the units began their training did they become disgruntled that an elaborate

background in chemistry was not necessarily needed. Richter shares, “Most of the chemists were

increasingly dismayed to discover that their work consisted of so little chemistry and so much

plumbing and portering.”28 He goes on to say, “New arrivals were greeted with the remark, ‘You

don’t have to be a chemist, all they want are navvies.”29 These were only a few of the complaints

of the Special Companies soldiers training at Helfaut. Most held the impression that, “when the

war is over we shall all be highly qualified navvies, scavengers, general removal and

housebreaking experts.”30 Most held the idea that they were there simply to do the undesirable

work required for the gas attack, and most held feelings of displeasure because of this fact.

The soldiers of the Special Companies did not have a bad life though. They were not

required to do overly strenuous work, and when it came time to deploy gas, that was their only

task. They were not required to do any fighting. However, this would all change. By September

4, 1915, the men of the Special Companies began to enter the trenches. Richter, states,

“Leisurely days came to an abrupt end as small groups of Specials began to thread their way up

the various communication trenches to deposit equipment at the front lines.”31 Once in the

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trenches the lives of the men in the Special Companies changed dramatically. In Chemical

Soldiers, Richter shares the testimony of one soldier as, “We heard the ping of the bullets and the

shriek of our shells followed by the dull thud of bursting.”32 They were now experiencing what

the war was actually like and the time for retaliation was almost at hand.

After repeated postponements, British generals finally decided for September 25, to carry

out the gas attack on the Germans. During the night leading up to the battle, doubt still loomed

as to whether or not gas would be used. Drizzling rain and little to no wind even up until a few

hours until dawn looked to cancel the use of gas completely. Richter shares the duties of Lt. Col.

Walter Campbell-Smith, “Every hour throughout the night, Campbell-Smith had conscientiously

reported weather conditions – always unfavorably – but at 4 A.M. word came reaffirming the gas

discharge. ‘I remember being very upset that the gas was going to be used.’”33 Even with lack

of one hundred percent confidence in the presumed effectiveness of using gas and with the

weather conditions being as unfavorable as possible, Foulkes was still determined that gas be

used.

The time for retaliation had reached the zero hour. Richter describes the scene of the first

British gas attack:

At 5:50 A.M. the waiting was over, and up and down the seven-mile main front,

wind or no wind, the gas Specials threw their pipes over the parapet and turned on

the valves with their spanners. No member of the Special companies would ever

forget the suspense and strain of the next forty minutes during which the deadly

chlorine and thick smoke hissed from the opened cylinders and candles. It now

became painfully evident that a synchronized gas release under battle conditions

was far different from the dummy practices on the languid Helfaut common.34

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The retaliation had begun and the battle of Loos was underway, but because of the dreadful

conditions, the attack would not be as successful as Foulkes had hoped it would be. Because of

the terrible conditions, the soldiers were faced with, and given the fact that they had not practiced

in these conditions, made their assignments incredibly difficult. The decision to use gas was

beginning to turn into a disaster as soon after release, the gas began seep into the trenches and

eventually began to drift back on the British soldiers.

It became evident rather quickly that damage to the gas equipment was partly to blame

for adverse results of the gas attack. In Chemical Soldiers, “Lt. D. M. Wilson, a chemical

engineer […], blamed gas contamination in the trenches not on uncooperative winds, but on

faulty apparatus: ‘The wind was favourable and all went well until we had to change the parapet

pipes in each emplacement from the first cylinder to the next.”35 He goes on to say, “‘When the

pipe was disconnected the residual gas flowed back into the trench and caused a number of gas

casualties.’”36 He claims that it was not the wind that caused the malfunction, rather it was

leakage from the cylinders seeping into the trenches that was the main cause for soldier deaths.

Gas corporal Ronald Purves describes the scene in the trenches, “‘[I] went at it as best as

I could, choking, coughing, half-blinded, and feeling as if the last moments had come. It’s

impossible to put any of the sensations on paper; but I shall not forget it after I get home.”37 This

was certainly not what Foulkes had envisioned the retaliation with gas would look like. Purves

goes on to conclude: “‘Huns in the big crater had been well gassed and were lying dead, black in

the face.’ In macabre fashion Purves concluded, ‘So we did some good.’”38 Even though he

attempted to find a silver lining, the truth was that the use of gas at Loos was not successful. The

Germans had been prepared and the British equipment turned out to be inefficient. Loos was a

failure and proved that the British gas experiment needed more work. Although Foulkes did not

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feel as though it was a failure, there was a feeling of disappointment within the Special

Companies, and a temporary stoppage would be needed to transform the Special Companies into

the Special Brigade, which would continue to wage gas warfare until the end of the war.

Arguably the most important aspect of gas warfare was its effect on the actual soldiers

who were the victims of the use of this controversial weapon. The soldier’s voices give intimate

detail regarding the story of gas warfare. For some soldiers, the threat of a gas attack was quite

fearsome, but after gas attacks became a normal occurrence, some soldiers viewed them as just

another attack that they must endure and defend their position without any hesitation. The

development of the gas mask definitely made gas attacks less life threatening, however, they

were not necessarily the most comfortable and convenient piece of equipment that the soldiers

had to combat a gas attack. Their reactions and responses and experiences to being attacked or

even being the attackers, using gas, demonstrate what a gas attack would do to morale and the

attitudes of the soldiers. It was not simply the gas alone that affected these attitudes, but it was

also minuscule nuances in the way a gas attack was to be handled that made the biggest

difference.

The greatest difference being the use of gas mask; the soldiers would have to keep them

with them at all times, in special containers that would keep them soaked in the special solutions

designed to neutralize the gas present in the air. Then, worst case scenario, they would have to

attempt to fight in their gas mask, which was not easy, if they came under a gas attack. The

implementation of the gas mask definitely made a gas attack less fearful because it minimized

the treat of death due to suffocation. This fact helped change gas attacks from something feared

to something that was seen as just a normal day in the trenches.

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In order to see just how soldiers felt about the use of gas, one can examine their letters

home. Even though censorship was an issue, in most cases soldiers put exactly how they felt and

more often than not, their letters made it home and helped express their displeasures and fears to

their loved ones. One example was Lionel Sotheby, a British soldier stationed on the Western

Front who eventually lost his life in the battle of Loos. In his book, Lionel Sotheby’s Great War,

Donald Richter pieces together a collection of Sotheby’s diaries and letters from his time spent

during the war. Although Sotheby spent only a short time in the war, before his death, he does

talk about gas on one occasion. In letter to his father, written less than a month before the battle

of Loos, Sotheby describes one particular conversation with a captured German soldier. In

describing the conversation to his father in the letter, Sotheby writes:

He [the German soldier] then mentioned a truly Hunnish thing. In order to test

gas the other day, 3 men were put in a dugout together, 2 with mask 1 without.

Gas was then let loose, the man without the helmet succumbed after 3 minutes

and was then dragged out blue and green all over. He died in pain. The others

were alright for one hour and then felt effects somewhat similar. This was a test

for gas!!! He said they sometimes tested gas like this with prisoners especially the

English.39

This description by Sotheby seems to indicate that he was possibly still in the dark about what

the British were planning to carry out at the upcoming battle of Loos. It also indicates that he

still held the British outlook on gas warfare as “unsporting” and “Hunnish.” Because this letter

was written when gas was still being developed and not yet used by the British, it shows the lack

of knowledge the soldiers had regarding the subject. The fact that it was early in the war could

also answer to why he described the act as a “Hunnish thing.” As the war progressed, more

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soldiers would become acquainted with the subject of gas warfare, but most of them would

continue to view gas as a negative aspect of the war.

Another example was Paul Pireaud, a French soldier in the 112th Heavy Artillery

Regiment. In her Book, Your Death Would be Mine, Martha Hanna tells the story of an

otherwise obscure couple, Paul and Marie Pireaud, through their letters to each other during the

war. Although their letters contain numerous subjects, there are instances where they discussed

the use of gas warfare. With Paul being in an artillery regiment, he was responsible for firing gas

shells that were now being used in place of the cloud gas attacks. This presented its own

challenges and risks. Even though life in the artillery regiment was better than infantry it still

was not an easy life by any means. Hanna points out:

… Paul’s letters and the surviving official logbooks of his regiment make it clear

that life in the heavy artillery was not only physically arduous but also often

dangerous. Batteries came under direct fire that was intended to neutralize the

artillery’s firepower; and poison-gas shells fired by the enemy or misfired by their

own battery sent men scrambling for gas masks that were not always adequate to

the task.40

This illustrates that the soldiers always had to be on the alert for gas attacks and to be ready to

don their gas masks, which was never a pleasant experience. Paul seemed to never state the real

threat of gas attacks to Marie. Hanna states that in his letters he would write to Marie, “’We are

going to have to put our masks on because my eyes are beginning to water.’ Tear gas was a

nuisance, but poison gas was a more terrifying prospect, as Marie already knew.”41 Even though

Paul did not directly express it, Marie knew that the threat of poison was very real and terrifying

on top of that. She had heard stories of her brother-in-law’s experience with testing gas for the

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French armies, and they were gruesome and scary, especially adding to the danger that Paul

could come under the attack of these types of weapons while fighting in battle made things even

more terrifying for her. What from what little Paul describes about gas attacks, it is clear that he

did not like having to deal with the nuisance of irritating tear gas, however, the larger treat of a

poison gas attack was always looming and that threat sometimes left both feeling anxious.

Soldiers also expressed their opinions about gas in their postwar publications of

autobiographies, memoirs, and novels. Soldier Robert Graves tells of his experience with gas in

his autobiography, Good-bye to All That. Graves was an infantryman at the battle of Loos.

Although he was not a part of the Special Companies, he was required to help with positioning

the gas equipment prior to its use in the battle of Loos. Graves writes of the impending use of

gas: “It’s damnable. It’s not soldiering to use stuff like that even though the Germans did start it.

It’s dirty, and it’ll bring us bad luck. We’re sure to bungle it.”42 Although his autobiography is

somewhat fictitious, it still serves to portray his feelings about the use of gas. It seems that

Graves too held the standard that the use of gas was not “sporting.” He even goes as far as to say

that it would cause the British “bad luck.” Given the fact that he was writing about this after the

war, the prediction that the Special Companies would “bungle” the attack loses some of its

importance. However, given that Graves was forced to help with the gas equipment likely

influenced his opinion about the use of gas. He handled the equipment, therefore he knew of its

flaws. He also mentioned the first use of gas by the Germans, but that did not change his view

that using gas as a form retaliation was the right thing to do.

Another soldier testimonial can be found in Arthur Guy Empey’s in memoir, Over the

Top, which tells of his particular experience with a gas attack. Empey was an American machine

gunner serving on the Western Front in France. His description of a gas attack that he

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experienced while in combat seems almost nonchalant, as if it were just a normal occurrence. It

is possible that by the time he has entered the war, April of 1917, that the use of gas had become

so normal that the soldiers almost expected it. Empey describes the attack, “Three days after we

had silenced Fritz, the Germans sent over gas. It did not catch us unawares, because the wind

had been made to order, that is, it was blowing from the German trenches towards ours at the rate

of about five miles per hour.”43 This description seems to come off as if the soldiers had learned

what conditions were favorable for when to expect gas from the Germans. This also seems to

portray the sense that their reactions were more of a routine now than hysteria. Empey describes

his reaction to the look-out man’s warning of gas as, “I waited for no more, grabbing my

bayonet, which was detached from the rifle, I gave the alarm by banging an empty shell case,

which was hanging near the periscope. At the same instant, gongs started ringing down the

trench, the signal for Tommy to don his respirator, or smoke helmet, as we call it.”44 Empey’s

lack of hesitation reveals that over the course of roughly a year and a half, the procedures to

defend one’s self against a gas attack had improved dramatically compared to the

defenselessness of Ypres. The soldiers had definitely developed a sense of normalcy regarding

gas attacks because they had been exposed to them constantly over the course of the war since

the Battle of 2nd Ypres.

Finally, French soldier Henri Barbusse illustrates his experiences with gas warfare in his

novel, Under Fire. The novel is based on Barbusse’s time as a volunteer soldier in World War I

on the Western Front. In one particular scene the soldiers are under attack and as shells are

bursting all around them, it is clear that one of them is a mustard gas shell. Immediately they

begin to take precautions by going for their gas masks. It is at this point that one of the soldiers,

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Farfadet, makes the comment that using gas is an unfair move. Then another soldier, Barque,

gives his idea of the fairness of gas warfare:

Don’t make me laugh, you and your fair and unfair weapons. When you’ve seen

men cut open, chopped in half or split from top to bottom, spread around in pieces

by ordinary shells, their bellies gaping and the contents dug out, skulls driven

right into the lungs as if from a blow with a mallet or a little neck in place of the

head with a blackcurrant jam of brains dripping all round it, on the chest and back

. . . When you’ve seen that then come and tell me about clean, decent weapons of

war!45

It is clear that the soldiers have conflicting views on the “fairness” of gas weapons. It seems that

Farfadet holds the opinion of the British, in that gas is not a “decent” weapon to use in battle.

However, Barque holds the idea that all weapons are equally fair. It is war that he seems to find

unfair. It is instances like this that show what kind of effect gas warfare had on the soldiers of

World War I.

To some gas was unfair, to others it was no worse than any other weapon used during

battle. Some found its use to be a curse, while others found it to be an inconvenience, and by the

end of the war, some thought of it as just an everyday occurrence in battle. All these cases had

some effect on legacy of chemical warfare in World War I. Chemical warfare was so

controversial and so despised by many that it was often talked about negatively during and after

the war in letters, memoirs, and novels. All of which helped to distinguish its legacy as a

coexistence of fact and legend, but all the same, as something dastardly and dishonorable. These

feelings would help lead a decision to completely ban the use of gas ever again.

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In the decade following World War I, there were many international efforts to condemn

the use and manufacture of chemical weapons. The most notable were the Washington Naval

Conference of 1922, the Geneva Conference of 1925, and the Disarmament Conference of the

League of Nations in the early 1930s.46 However, Price concludes, “Although this period was in

some respects the golden age of efforts to outlaw chemical weapons, the Washington Treaty did

not officially come into effect, the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and

no agreement resulted from the Disarmament Conference, leaving the normative status of

chemical weapons in a somewhat ambiguous institutional state.”47 Why would representatives

from these Nations want to completely outlaw the use of chemical weapons? Also important,

what were the arguments discussed regarding chemical weapons at the respective conferences?

Once the war was over, there seemed to be a degree of uncertainty as to the direction the

nations would take regarding chemical weapons. According to price, “In the immediate

aftermath of the war, ‘those of the general public who could recall anything of the wartime

publications on [chemical weapons] might have adopted any one of a number of assessments:

gas as a humane weapon, gas as a terror weapon, gas as just another weapon as horrible as any

other… there was certainly no consensus of opinion…’”48 This idea seems to fit into each of the

soldier testimonials examined earlier. It also demonstrates that a unanimous assessment

condemning chemical could not be reached therefore, making it difficult to get all nations to

successfully agree not to use chemical weapons in future wars. If the nations cannot

unanimously decide whether or not chemical weapons are barbarous or not, how then would they

be able to successfully get their use banned in further wars?

Price quotes General Kalafatovitch, at the Geneva Conference of 1925, stated, “The only

means of abolishing chemical warfare is to abolish the idea that it is possible to make war by

19

such means.”49 This is perhaps the driving force behind drawing all nations to unanimously

agree to ban the future use of chemical weapons. The idea their use was not an effective tactic in

battle, was something all nations could agree upon. Price adds, “for example, the Hungarian

delegate noted that making defensive measures accessible to everyone, including noncombatants,

would make gas warfare ineffective, as ‘no one would continue to use a weapon against which

his adversary possessed effective means of defending himself.’”50 Being able to prove that

chemical weapons were essentially an ineffective tactic seems to have been the driving force

behind the banning of their use. The agreements are stated in the Geneva Protocol as:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all

analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general

opinion of the civilized world; and whereas the prohibition of such use has been

declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of

International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations…51

Although not all nations signed the Geneva Protocol, most had agreed in one way or another that

gas was a barbarous war tactic and that they would refrain from using chemical weapons in

future wars.

The German decision to use chemical weapons against the unsuspecting troops at the

battle of Ypres in April of 1915 inevitably pioneered the way for further use by all nations

involved in the war. The British reactions of outrage soon diminished and turned to a cry for

retaliation. Then, after months of preparation and training in attempted secrecy, the British army

unleashed their own gas attack against the Germans during the Battle of Loos on September 25,

1915. The Battle of Loos is considered a failure by many for its lack of effectiveness. This did

20

not end the use of chemical weapons in battle however; it only helped changed the form in which

they were used. The use of chemical weapons was a mainstay of the war until the bitter end,

although its effectiveness is debatable.

Soldier reactions ranged from anger, fear, to indifference, but in all instances, gas warfare

took a toll on their psyche. Whether it is fear of an imminent attack or having to fight in gas

mask the soldiers always had to be aware of the threat of gas. It is in the soldier’s writings

during and after the war that shed light on the effectiveness of chemical weapons. It is clear that

chemical warfare does not serve as an effective form of warfare, and it is this fact that helps to

secure its fate at the Geneva Conference of 1925.

The legacy of gas warfare is one portrayed as a barbarous way to conduct war. This idea

rest predominately on the fact that the use of chemical weapons was ineffective as a strategic

device use to gain an advantage. Once both sides had access to the innovation and all had means

of protecting itself against an attack, the advantage created by chemical weapons no longer

existed. Therefore, sealing its fate and helping to ensure its permanent ban in future wars. The

fact that it was labeled as “barbarous” is just to help insure that a ban would last. It truly rested

on the sole assertion that there was no strategic advantage in using chemical weapons, so

therefore, in one way or the other, chemical warfare was the only innovation of World War I that

was not used in future wars. Chemical warfare remains unique to World War I and will likely

never be used as a tactic to gain advantage in battle ever again.

21

Notes

22

1Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front: the British Army and Chemcial Warfare in World War I (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) 41.2 Ibid, 40-43.3 Ibid, 43.4 Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997) 15.5 Donald Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992) 7.6 Robert E. Cook, “The Mist that Rolled into the Trenches: Chemical Escalation in World War I,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, January, 1971, 35.7 Price, 47.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Ibid.12 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 6.13 IWM, Dept. of Sound Recordings, 000495/06 RO3, Tape of James Davidson Pratt as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 9-10.14 Hugh Popham, The Dorset Regiment (London, 1970), 74, as quoted in Richter, Chemical soldiers, 10.15 Richter, Chemical Soldiers,17.16 Ibid.17 “French to War Office,” 23 April 1915, Hartley Collection, box 42, CAC as quoted in Price, Seeking Victory on the Western Front, 43-44.18 Palazzo, 44.19 Richter, Chemical Soldiers 22-2320 Ibid, 23.21 Ibid, 22.22 LHCMA, Foulkes Papers, Diary, 31 May 1915 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 23.23 Richter, 24.24 IWM, Richard Gale Papers, War Office flier, 28 May 1915 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 24.25 Ibid. 26 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 24.27 Martin Sidney Fox, “With the Special Brigade” (typescript, 1957), 3; SBNL 32(November 1973): II as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 24-25. 28 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 32.29 Martin Sidney Fox, “With the Special Brigade” (typescript, 1957), 16 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 32.30 IWM, Gale Diary, 12 August 1915 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 32.31 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 45.32 IWM, Cousins Diary, 10 September 1915 as quoted in Richer, Chemical Soldiers, 45-46.33 LC, taped interview by Peter Liddle as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 61. 34 Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 68-69.35 LHCMA, Foulkes Papers, J-2, Memo regarding J. A. Oriel, by D. M. Wilson, 12 February 1969 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 69-70.36 Ibid, 70.37 REM, R. B. Purves Diary, 25 September 1915 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 70.38 REM, Purves Diary, 27 September 1915 as quoted in Richter, Chemical Soldiers, 86.39 Donald C. Richter, Lionel Sotheby’s Great War (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997) 126.40 Martha Hanna, Your Death would be Mine (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008) 86.

41 Ibid, 111.42 Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That (London: J. and J. Gray Edinburgh, 1929) 191.43 Arthur Guy Empey, Over the Top (New York and London: The knickerbocker Press, 1917) 187.44 Ibid, 187-188.45 Henri Barbusse, Under Fire (London: Penguin Books, 1916, 2003) 196.46 Price, 70.47 Ibid.48 SIPRI, Rise of CB Weapons, 234 as quoted in Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 71.49 The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 70.50 League of Nations, Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the Interntional Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War (Geneva, 1925), 530 as quoted in Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo, 91.51 Price, 91.