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Chapter: VI

Prelude to the Self-Determination Movement in Manipur

Introduction:

The people of Manipur enjoyed a phase of self-governance through the Manipur State

Assembly after the King surrendered power to the elected people. But the government of

India dissolved it through the military might. It is reflected when the ceremony which

proclaimed an end to the ancient kingdom took place on 15 October 1949 at Imphal, the

Indian army was in place to guard against possible trouble (Baruah 2006). Since then the

deployment of in Manipur in continued. People generally term it as “annexation” rather

than merger. The Indian dominion being a member of the United Nation since 1945 has

failed to comply with the United Nations Charter Article 2(4) which reads as “All

members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner

inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations”, by committing aggression to

Manipur and thereby breach of peace. Further, UN GA Resolutions 2625 (XXV), 1970

and 2734 (1970) provides that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of

force shall be recognized as legal (CORE 2007).

Chattopadhyay et al (2005) reiterate about the forced conquest of Manipur by the Indian

government. The Kangla fort in Imphal, from where the kings of Manipur used to rule,

was brought under military control in 1949 and retained till 2004. As a result of savage

exploitation suspending right to self determination and decades of uneven development,

national liberation struggles have raised their heads. They are based on the struggles for

self-determination. All shades of mainstream parties in India have flatly rejected the right

of the people of Manipur to self-determination. Renowned historian Prof Gangumei

Kabui observes that occupying Kangla- capital of Manipur Kingdom by the Indian armed

forces since the forceful merger is a symbol of subjugation of Manipur by government of

India. Earlier, it was “British subjugation” and now is “India subjugation”. The officials

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of India made attempts to dilute the independence of Manipur by citing her as one of the

560 native-states (Sanajaoba 1995b). Manipur which was on the same status of Sri Lanka

and Burma of that time could not be placed within the fold of native-states (Bhubol

2009).

The government’s responses to the self-determination movements in Manipur are based

on its perception of the situation: (i) as a threat to internal security and a breach of law

and order, underlined by India’s strategic interests in the Northeast as a buffer zone and

(ii) as a challenge to develop the Northeast as (a) a corridor and transit to East and

Southeast Asia and (b) a source of valuable resources like oil, timber, minerals and

hydroelectric power. Unfortunately, neither of the two perceptions considers any of the

demands and aspirations of the local people. This has undermined the authority of the

civil administration and resulted in granting unprecedented powers to the Indian armed

forces (Manipur State Development Report 2009). In order to tackle the rising self-

determination movement, the government declared entire Manipur as a disturbed area and

the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, (AFSPA) 1958, was imposed in September 1980

(since 1961 in Hill districts). It is an invocation of un-proclaimed emergency. Once the

area is declared disturbed, any one in the central armed forces may arrest, search, or even

kill a person on mere suspicion and no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be

instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, that people term

it as granting impunity with ‘license to kill’. The Act empowers:

4. Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other

person of equivalent rank in the Armed Forces may, in a disturbed area

a) if he is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so for maintenance of pubic order,

after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise

use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in

contravention of any law or order for the time being in the disturbed area prohibiting

the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable

of being used as weapons or firearms, ammunition or explosive substances;

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b) if he is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so, destroy any armed dump,

prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed attacks are made or are

likely to be made, or any structure used as a training camp for armed volunteers or

utilized as a hideout by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence;

c) arrest without warrant, any person who has committed a cognisable offence or

against whom a reasonable suspicion exist that he has committed or is about to

commit a cognisable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to effect

the arrest;

d) enter and search without warrant any premises to make any such arrest as aforesaid

or to recover any person believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined or any

property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances believed to be unlawfully

kept in such premises; and may for that purpose use force as may be necessary.

5. Any person arrested and taken into custody under this Act shall be made over to

the officer in charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay,

together with a report of the circumstances occasioning the arrest.

6. No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the

previous sanction of the Central Government against any person in respect of

anything done or purported to be done in exercise of powers conferred by this Act.

Invocation of Un-Proclaimed Emergency: Denial of Civil Rights

The roots of the AFSPA can be traced back with the infamous Rowlett Act 1919. People

who protested against the Act on 13 April 1919 at Jallianwallah Bagh were massacred by

the British forces under General Dyer (Singh 2004). The AFSPA’s predecessor-the

Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance 1942, had been enacted in order to neutralize

Quit India movement. It was a colonial instrument, used for legitimization of British

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regime and continuation of its colonialism. In its AFSPA 1958, India not only inherited

the same powerful political potency of AFSPO, 1942 but also added that anyone can be

killed only on suspicion which was not encompassed even by the previous one in colonial

rule. The AFSPA had been enacted in order to quell the armed movements in Manipur in

early fifties and the Naga uprising in the Naga Hills in Assam in 1958. After four decades

this black law, like a nuclear chain reaction, has been amended a number of times to

accommodate changes in the names and the number of states. It is now enforced to all

states of Northeast India either partially or fully. In-spite of referring the bill to a Joint

Parliamentary Committee to examine the statue and discussing the same in details, on

18th August 1958, the AFSPA was adopted after two hour long summary debate by the

Parliament against the protest from the both representative Member of Parliaments (MPs)

of Manipur as well as of those of adjoining states.

Singh (ibid) observed that the section 2 (b) of the Act defines a ‘disturbed area’ in an area

which is for the time being declared by Notification under Section 3 to be disturbed area.

Thus, the Central Act defines a disturb area tautologically. But it is questionable on what

ground the area is declared area. What are the criteria, or are there any social parameters

that can be the basis of forming opinion. What is the definition or concept of ‘disturbed’

by using which the Central Government or the State Government is to form an opinion on

whether an area is disturbed? According to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India the area

to be declared disturbed must be internally so disturbed so as to necessitate deployment

of the Union army in aid of State civil administration. Hon’ble Supreme Court in its

landmark judgment observes that:

There are no materials and records to show that the disturbed conditions in the States

to which the Central Act has been extended are due to an armed rebellion. Even if the

disturbances is as a result of armed rebellion by a section of the people in those states

the disturbances may not be of such a magnitude as to pose a threat to the security of

the country or a part thereof so as to call for invocation of the emergency power 352.

If the disturbances caused by armed rebellion does not pose a threat to the security of

the country and the situation can be handled by deployment of armed forces of the

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Union in the disturbed area, there appears to be no reason why the drastic power

under Article 352 should be invoked. It is therefore not possible to hold that the

Central Act, which is primarily enacted to confer certain powers on armed forces

when deployed in aid of civil power to deal with the situation of internal disturbances

in a disturbed area, has been enacted to deal with a situation which can only be dealt

with by issuing a proclamation of emergency under Article 352.

The sum and substance is clear enough. Internal disturbance which need not even be an

armed rebellion, not good enough for invoking Emergency provisions, but sound enough

to invite deployment of Union force. There is not a single trace or suggestion as to what

objective conditions constitute this ‘soundness’ in the hallow body of AFSPA. Just as

beauty lies in the eye of the beholder, the soundness of deploying Union forces lies in the

eye of the Union or State Government.

On the contrary, G.B. Pant- the then Home Ministry, while introducing AFSPA on

August 18, 1958 said that certain misguided sections of the Naga in Assam and Manipur

were indulging in arson, murder, loot, dacoity etc; and that it had become necessary to

adopt effective measures for the protection of the people in those areas and that to

enables the armed forces to handle the situation effectively, it had been considered

necessary to enact legislation. If “arson, murder, loot, dacoity, etc” are the yardsticks for

the imposition of the AFSPA, then the Act has been imposed discriminatorily in the

North East States. There has been equal numbers of such incidents, if not more in other

part of India. Armed insurrections have taken place also in others parts of India, for

instance by the Maoist Communist Centre in Bihar and by Naxalites in Bihar, Andhra

Pradesh, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh (CORE 2002).

Justice Jeevan Reddy while reviewing the infamous AFSPA under the directives of the

Government of India observes that the duty and power of the ‘union’ under Article 355 to

act on its own to protect the state from internal disturbances without their consent comes

into play only in case of "internal disturbance" i.e., ‘domestic chaos’ or ‘internal

commotion’. Considering these facts, Reddy Committee stated that the problem in

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Manipur is not merely that of a ‘law and order’ but an ‘internal disturbance’ which

required invoking Article 355 of the Constitution of India. It further admits that it has

become a symbol of oppression, an object of hate and an instrument of discrimination

and highhandedness. The committee recommends the repeal of the Act altogether (Jeevan

Reddy 2005). Manipur is reported as one of the ongoing armed self-determination

movement in the world by the Peace and Conflict report 2008 (Quins 2008) which is in

contrast to the government claim since the beginning of the conflict in the late 40s. CNN-

IBN in 2007 after visiting the general headquarter of some of the militant groups reported

for the first time as "Hidden War".

Manipur State Development Report (op.cit) observes that the aim of imposing AFSPA

was to contain insurgency, but ironically it has only added fuel to an already inflamed

situation, as (a) it effectively appropriates the powers of the democratically elected state

government and civil administration and vests these in the army, the Governor and the

Central government. (b) It abrogates the civil liberties and fundamental rights of the

ordinary citizens by declaring a de facto state of emergency by suspending Article 32 (1).

(c) It provides the Centre absolute powers to deploy the army in the states or disturbed

areas once the Governor (without consulting the elected Chief minister) or Central

government has used his/her discretion to declare an area as ‘disturbed’ in the Gazette,

(d) It provides the army absolute powers with immunity from legal accountability, since

neither the citizens nor the state government can initiate legal proceedings or

administrative action against the army without the previous sanction of the Central

government.

AFSPA is presented as an instrument ‘in aid of civil power’ (Section 3 of the Act) to

‘suppress’ ‘armed revolt’ or ‘armed insurgency’ in the Northeast. It was supposed to be a

‘temporary measure’. But over four decades of its existence has shown up all the stated

claims (‘in aid of civil power’, ‘suppression’ of ‘armed revolt’ or ‘armed insurgency’ and

‘temporary measure’) as false. This begets the question: What has the military been

doing all these decades and how has AFSPA furthered counter-insurgency? The Act is

one of legitimizing the involvement of the military in the domestic space, and that it does

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not supplement but supplant the ‘civil power’. Further more than being cases of ‘human

rights abuses’, those ‘excesses’ for which no accountability can be fixed on anybody are

reminders of the militarism that has subverted the democratic institutions and ethos in the

Northeast (Akoijam & Tarun 2005). All can see that AFSPA can do nothing as counter

insurgency measure and it deprives people ‘right to life’.

Retd Justice H Suresh of Bombay High Court delineated the devastating impact of the

AFSPA in his report (cited in Paratt 2005) as follows

‘In fact, wherever we went, and (to) whomsoever we talked, almost all of them have

said that the army, CRPF, Assam-Rifles should be withdrawn forthwith. We could

perceive brooding uneasiness and feeling of uncertainty all over Manipur. No one

thinks he is safe, not because of the militants, but because of the army. Keeping

people under constant fear is itself a violation of several human rights. It is a

violation of right to reside anywhere of one’s choice. It is a violation of one’s right to

move freely. It is a violation of one’s right to speech and expression. It is a violation

of one’s right to livelihood. It is a violation of one’s right to security. Above all it is a

violation of right to live with human dignity. The presence of the army has made

every citizen suspect in the eyes of law and law enforcing agencies right to remedy

and relief for violation of human right is itself a human right under the international

covenants. Here in Manipur that right has been denied in large measure’.

The right to life cannot be suspended even during the time of emergency but India’s

Northeast and Kashmir may be an exception. The right to life is violated by section 4(a)

of the AFSPA, The right to liberty and security of person is violated by 4(c), the right to

remedy by section 6 of AFSPA. It also facilitates violation of the rights to be free from

torture, and from cruel or degrading treatment. The responsible soldier who violates

human rights violates are supposed to face military court but available information shows

scant evidence that the military is fully and effectively prosecuting soldiers and officers

for abuses committed by them (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Besides, AFSPA, theer are

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) Act 1985 (TADA ) succeeded by the

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Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002, which was scrapped by the United

Progressive Alliance in 2004, the National Security Act (NSA) and the Unlawful

Activities (Prevent ion) Act. But the most draconian among all of them is AFSPA.

Noted Academician Prof Roy Burman (ND) observed that under the leadership of Gandhi

and Nehru the politics of Indian nationalism tended to a certain extent to be the politics of

global human ism. But in free India, not to speak of global humanism, even the humanist

concern for the country, as a whole seems to have been eroded, particularly among the

political class. Politics has degenerated into a calculus of power. The Armed Forces

(Special Powers) Act, enacted in 1958, made more draconian in its amendment in 1972,

is the most dehumanised manifestation of the obsession with power in the name of state

security, to the complete indifference about human security. The state and the security

forces have been conditioned to demonical-law-dependency so much that the state feels

deeply vulnerable without resorting to un-proclaimed emergency and special power laws.

This may be similar to an addicts’ drug dependency (Sanajaoba 2006).

The people’s protest against AFSPA began during the State Assembly election in 1974

by a regional party of Manipur called ‘Kanglei Party’. Since then it is continuing in

different forms at different level. After the infamous incident of Patsoi at Imphal West in

the late 80, the movement was joined by the Meira Paibis and other organizations in

Manipur. The protest of the “Iron Lady of Manipur” Irom Sharmila Chanu who has been

fasting for the last nine years since November 2000 for the complete withdrawal of

AFSPA is worth `mentioning. Sharmila’s protest was triggered not for any political

agenda but by a gruesome massacre: the gunning down of ten people including children,

waiting at a bus-stand by the security forces in Malom near Imphal in November 2000 on

suspicion of being militants. She is fasting since then in Imphal with no result, with no

commitments either from the state and the central government. So after seven year she

has shifted her base to Delhi, seeking a better platform to make her voice heard and her

protest to take effect. But she was arrested and removed to a hospital, where she

continued to be fed forcibly. In support of Sharmila and the movement against human

rights violations, 12 women on 15th July 2004 belonging to various social organizations

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protested naked in front of the 17th Assam Rifles at the Kangla Gate which was widely

reported. Feminist writer Butalia (2004) observed, “What is it that drives women to take

this absolutely desperate step? How humiliated, how violated, how angry must a woman

feel to think that this is the only way she can make people listen?” (cited in Baruah

op.cit).

Militarizing Manipur:

Militarisation in India has been uneven across time and space. Historically, it accelerated

at certain juncture, as part of state policy in response to anti-state movements. It was born

out of the colonial state. The very formation of the Indian state was marked by the

partition of the country which resulted in unprecedented communal riots that were

quelled with assistance from the army. Even during the transfer of power the army was

called upon to intervene in the princely states who were unwilling to join the dominion of

India. Since the 1950s, the ongoing movement for self determination in the Northeast has

been dealt with by a militarist response of the Indian state. Chenoy (2002) observes that

by the 1980s, militarization became an entrenched element of state policy on national

security. It began to use the armed forces on a more regular basis as a substitute for

administration and governance. The nature of the policy was militarist in approach, and

the primary concern was dealing with “law and order” maintenance, rather than

addressing the social, developmental and political issues that gave rise to the movements.

The Indian government’s justification for bypassing the state/regional governments and

legitimizing the monopoly of violence is based on the idea of “national security”. The

partition of India; wars with Pakistan, China, and creation of Bangladesh are all very

alive in the memory of the India state. The outcome is obvious. It takes a militaristic

stand to counter almost every voice of dissent in the region, be it insurgency or

democratic protest. Using military forces in the domestic space is garnered only when a

war or a war like situation erupts within the country. This can be linked to two possible

conditions: (i) an emergency is declared and the nation is on guard in the face of an

external aggression, and (ii) an “emergency” is declared in the affected areas to guard

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against internal crisis, from the enemies or potential enemies within. Since (i) is ruled

out, what is left is (ii) where the army has to operate against the enemy within. This

obviously leads to militarization of the domestic space. What has been witnessed in the

Northeast is an undeclared war, where military are brought in to contain the enemies

within; the reference of enemy often gets extended to all the citizens in the region. The

logic behind AFSPA where even a non-commissioned officer is licensed to kill anyone at

the very instance of suspicion can only be said to operate in a war-like-situation. Each

citizen in the region is a potential enemy to the Indian state. Further, closing down to the

citizen any possible legal protection and accountability against the defense forces unless

allowed by the central government, as marked in the provision under AFSPA, clearly

shows the martial law in domestic space (Oinam 2008).

The concentration of central security forces in the valley of Manipur is such that

Robinson remarks it as an occupational force rather than the defense of the country

(Robinson 2005). The Manipur State Development Report (op.cit) states that the Indian

security forces are seen as “occupier” rather than “protector”. The number of security

forces in the state fluctuates and it is difficult to arrive at exact figure. In the 1990s it was

estimated there were between 10 and 14 battalions of the regular army in Manipur. In

addition there are large number of armed para-militaries of the Assam-Rifles (AR), The

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indian Reserve Battalions (IRB), and Border

Security Forces (BSF). Sober estimates suggest that there is one member of security

forces for every ten in the population (men, women and children). At the time of rioting

over the proposed Naga cease fire extension in 2002 this is alleged to have increased to

one to four. Significantly, however, when army forces were moved to Kashmir during the

Kargil confrontation there was no apparent noticeable rise in insurgent activities. In 2003

the CRPF had ten battalions in the state. The Assam Rifles has 38 companies in the state

and the Indian army has four battalions. In addition there were five battalions of Manipur

Rifles and three each of BSF and IRB. The Central forces reports directly to the centre

rather than the state government (Parratt op.cit). Besides, the Indian security forces

deploying in Manipur are occupying the important civilian places of the people like

educational institutions, heritage sites, health centres and tourist attractions etc.

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At present, there are more than 55,000 armed personnel (see annexure) of the central

security forces stationed in the state. The state has over 14,000 police. Taking into

account of the total population of the state, there is one armed personnel for every 20

citizen (HRW op.cit). Besides, there are thousands of spies of covert operators under all

the agencies of India. The figures indicates only the security camps of Inspector General

Assam-Rifles (IGAR)-South Camps in Manipur, besides IGAR, there are many Indian

military forces deployed which is listed in the table below. These immense armed forces

are, it is argued, required to control a population of just over two million population of

Manipur. Ishworchandra (2008) observed that the Government of Manipur in the name of

generating employment is promting massive recruitment as a policy of the youth to state

forces funded from the Centre. He observed that, ‘Militarization of employment’ is the

most and popular employment generation scheme in the state of Manipur. In the process

state itself gets militarized as it is drifting towards a police state. Diversion of productive

youths to military has certain implications-dependency both in real and monetary terms,

adverse effects on number of production base, corruption, and social crisis.

There has also been a sudden rapid expansion of the force. From a mere 300, the

commando unit has shot up to a 1,000. 1,600 new commandos have also been sanctioned

(Choudhury 2009). The government of Manipur has recently converted the newly recruits

Special Police Officers (SPO) similar with the line of Salwa Judum to Village Volunteer

Force (VVF) by increasing the strength to 1600, only for the four valley districts. But

unfortunately thousands of people have turned-up during the recruitment rally as VVF is

taken as an employment opportunity for survival. The fight for survival becomes a ‘scape

goat’ as they will be involved in the counter-insurgency operation even though they are

trained for a month.

Recently, the state government has decided to open 39 permanent frisking/checking

pickets at selected strategic points. It will be manned by police assisted by Village

Defense Force (VDF). 20 to 25 personnel of civil police will be assisted by VDF. So far

at least 15 pickets have started functioning. Most of the frisking pickets are to locate at

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main roads leading to Imphal city like the Tidim road, Mayai Lambi Raod, Imphal Moreh

road, Imphal Yairipok road, Imphal-Porompat road, Imphal Tinsid road, Imphal-Pangei

road, Imphal-Dimapur road, Thangmeiband Watham Leirak, RIMS road, Imphal-

Kanchup road, Imphal-Patsoi road on NH-53 etc (Dhamen 2009).

The common methodology of the armed forces is to occupy strategic locations in civilian

areas. The presence of armed forces can be seen in every place. The military operations

have not spared Manipur University. Unfortunately Manipur University is the only

university in the country having a security camp within the campus. In some parts, the

area of land occupied by state armed forces exceeds that of the villages (Yumnam and

Konsam 2006). The military authorities in Manipur are not only above the civil

administration but also above the judiciary. The army conducted Suspension of Operation

with some tribal insurgents without the knowledge of the state government. They conduct

military operations without any administrative oversight, and often even prohibit the

police access to their areas of operation. They make their own rules and enforce them

without regard s to whether or not they contradict or undermine the civil administration,

national laws or other wise (Jinine 2006). The local people are treated as foreigner in

their own land (Fernandes 2004).

The fear of ‘pick up’ by the armed forces is very strong in the minds of people because

most who were picked up were tortured or killed. If they are killed, they are tagged as

“killed in encounter”. Sometimes such incidents are carried out in broad daylight, and in

front of eyewitnesses. The heavy military presence precipitates a breakdown in local

communication, making people vulnerable for suspicion and forcing communities to

close them selves to the outside. People no longer venture out of their homes (Longchari

2001). Even historic monuments such as the Kangla Fort of the old Manipuri kings

(occupied since 1949-2004), and parts of the complex in Moirang that commemorates the

rebel Indian National Army, were occupied by Indian security forces for decades. There

are innumerable combing operations and major operations as part of the counter

insurgency operations in this region. Mention can be made of Operation Rhino, Operation

Bazrang, and Operation Blue Bird. Operation All Clear (2004), Operation Tornado

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(2005), Operation Dragnet (2006), Operation Summer Strome (2009) were conducted in

Manipur. These operations were remembered by the people and Human Rights bodies

because of the rampant human rights violations-especially using villagers as “human

shields” to prevent possible ambushes from the militants.

The central security forces that are known for their violence and human rights violations

have further strengthened their activities through their security related development

policy. The Military Civic Action (MCA) becomes a tool for their tune. Initially the

militants were killed only by the central armed forces but the patterns have changed since

the early 21st century. The role of state forces has come into limelight which was not the

situation since late 40s. The name of the central armed forces is hardly used combined

force. A country made gun or a revolver or few bullets found are an inevitable statement

during the press release of the state government after every “suspected militant were

killed”. Many of them turned out to the civilians. But the state government is always the

upper hand as they claim to have recovered small arms. The reason behind the suspected

killing by the Trigger-happy cops is the ‘psychology of impunity’ (Choudhury 2009). The

AFSPA has created a culture of impunity for all security forces. Although the Manipur

Police force are accountable under the law, the prevailing culture of impunity affects

them as well since the AFSPA has been in force in the Manipur valley ever since 1980

and in the hills even longer. This has made Manipur Police trigger happy. The culture of

impunity was legal, socio-political and even cultural (Independent Citizens’ Fact Finding

Report 2009).

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Figure 6.1: Military Installation of Inspector General Assam Rifles (IGAR)-South in

Manipur

Source: Human Rights Initiatives (2009)

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Trigger-Happy Cops:

The level of corruption in the state could be easily understood by the jokes passing

among the job-seeking youth “you don’t apply as you don’t have ten lakh, you will only

hurt your legs running for physical test”. The present SPF Government of Manipur has

become almost synonymous with certain rate of ‘Percentage Cut’ for deducting a certain

portion from the total amount of every scheme or work program being implemented or

executed (cited in Kanjugam 2008). To become a sub-inspector, you pay Rs 10-15 lakh

with kickbacks running all the way to the top politicians. To become a commando, you

pay Rs 5 lakh. To become a rifleman, you pay Rs 1-2 lakh, to become ASIs you pay 12

lakhs. Sources within the force confirm all this to be true. Unfortunately, logic demands

you earn back what you pay and the number of extortion demands by the police has risen

proportionately to the expansion of the force. Taking in former militants into the force, as

well as giving gallantry awards to commandos who kill militants, have all contributed

towards creating a force that is, at least partly, motivated by a combination of greed,

testosterone, vendetta and unbridled power (Chauhdury op.cit).

Those who pay for their job must be ridden in debt as many of them pay bribes money

either by borrowing from others or by mortgage of their available resources including

home and agriculture land. Taking advantage of the situation, the government announced

the incentives and awards for the state forces who are actively engaged in counter-

insurgency operations in the form of awards for arresting or killing militants. This mainly

leads to the fake encounters in the state. The Manipur Police force is awarded with 74

medals (one third) by the government of India. Thise who have been implicated in the

July 23 Fake encounter have also received the President’s medal (Independent Citizens’

Fact Finding Report op.cit). Many a time, people have apprehended the state security

forces while indulging in looting or theft of vehicles.

The fake encounters are on the rise in Manipur in the name of counter-insurgency

operations. In the last four to five months, there has been an unmistakable rise in the

number of people shot dead by the police in suspicious circumstances. The high point

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was last year (2008) when reporters who had gone to cover an encounter killing of two

suspected cadres of the People’s United Liberation Front, (Umar-Faction), [an ethnic

Muslim militant group], by the police were detained by the villagers of Kongpal Sabal

Leikai on the suspicion that the reporter has actually collaborated with the police in the

killing. The suspicion, as was explained by the mob, arose because the reporter arrived at

the scene of “encounter” too quickly and this could not have been possible if they did not

have prior knowledge of what they claimed was murder perpetrated by the police in ‘fake

encounter’. While it was preposterous to presume the reporters had anything to do with

the deaths of the two, be they militant cadres or innocent civilians, the intriguing question

remains as to how the reporter managed to be at the spot of the killing so quickly

(Phanjoubam 2008).

The incidents of fake encounter was exposed when Tehelka- a Delhi based weekly

magazine reported a shoot-out that happened in the heart of Imphal, Manipur’s capital,

barely 500 meters from the state assembly, on July 23, 2009. Extra-judicial killings, and,

in particular, fake encounters by the MPC have become common in Manipur. According

to Human Rights Alert, an Imphal-based voluntary group, there were 17 cases in 2006;,

12 cases in 2007, and 27 recorded cases in 2008, of torture and killing attributed to the

MPC. Where once they conducted ‘encounters’ in isolated places, they now do not think

twice before operating in cities, in broad daylight, as they did on July 23. In several

incidents, innocent civilians carrying money and valuables have been robbed and

sometimes killed. In some cases official action has been taken against MPC for

misconduct. For instance, in July 2009, five MPC who had reportedly robbed three

youths were suspended. But for the most part, their extra-judicial activity goes scot free

(Rehman 2009).

Since January 2009, there have been about 300 extra-judicial killing in Manipur, literally

on an average count of one to two such killings a day. It may be noted that since the 2006

amendment of the Cr.P.C., every custodial killing has to be mandatorily investigated by a

Judicial Magistrate. But the July 23, 2009 fake encounter incident was initially

investigated by a District Magistrate. The law of the land does not seem to be applicable

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in this matter in Manipur as the Executive Magistrate was asked to investigate. Apart

from such a large of extra-judicial killings, several hundreds had been picked up and

detained under National Security Act (NSA) on the ground that they were allegedly

working with or supporting militant groups. Even the eminent environmental activist

Jiten Yumnam was picked and booked under the NSA. There exist no rule of law and

state police was functioning with complete impunity. The message to the human rights

community was very clear-that activist and human rights defenders were being targeted

so that the voice of protest are throttled (Independent Citizens’ Fact Finding Report

op.cit).

The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip

Alston, reported to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 that despite the government of

Manipur ordering “numerous inquiries into the alleged extrajudicial executions, none of

them ultimately reached any meaningful conclusions”. Petitions seeking the whereabouts

of 17 persons who “disappeared” between 1980 and 2000 are still pending in the courts,

although in some cases the court, unable to proceed because of a lack of information, has

dismissed the cases after ordering the state government to pay compensation to families.

The government failed to provide a satisfactory response to these petitions and no one has

been held accountable. The Problem of disappearances” decreased after the government

in the late 1990s introduced a system of providing “arrest memos” Once an arrest memo

is provided, security forces can no longer deny that a person has been taken into custody.

Relatives are also able to identify the unit or battalion responsible for the arrest and thus

ensure that the detainee has access to legal counsel (HRW op.cit).

Official sanction for Killing:

The official sanction is quite clear with the statement of Chief Minister of Manipur “there

is no option than to kill”, while reading the readymade statement from the security forces

at the floor of the State Assembly after the July 23 fake encounter. Similarly, The

Manipur State Police chief, Yumnam Joykumar, told HRW in 2008 that, “My people

have been told not to commit human rights abuses and none has occurred.” However, in

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the same conversation claiming that many of the militants were not political fighters but

petty extortionists, he also said, “I have told my people. “These fellows must be

eliminated”. Nothing else can cure us of this disease. It is supported by report of HRW

which states that, several police officers admitted to HRW that they routinely committed

abuses. One officer said that he had been ordered to commit an "encounter killing," as the

practice of taking into custody and extra-judicially executing an individual is commonly

known. "I am looking for my target," the officer said. "I will eliminate him. ... I fear being

put in jail, but if I don't do it, I'll lose my position"(HRW 2009). Meenakshi Ganguly,

HRW's spokeswoman in India, said there had been a history of extra-judicial killing in

Manipur which had to be tackled by the central government (http://e-

pao.net/GP.asp?src=25..090809.aug09).

The number of fake encounter cases, registered by National Human Rights Commission

(NHRC) in the last three years, shows that Manipur reported the second highest number

of such incidents after Uttar-Pradesh. It has witnessed a substantial rise- from only one

case during 2007-08 to 16 in 2008-09 and six during the first four months (April-July)

during 2009-10. Even officials in Delhi are quite convinced about the 'high-handedness'

on the part of the state police. A senior home ministry official add, "The rising figures

could well explain the current public unrest in Manipur where people have been on the

street against trigger-happy cops ever since the state witnessed the killing of two persons

in an encounter on July 23"(Hueiyen News Service 2009). The incidents report in the

NHRC is just the tips of the ice berg. Even if one supposes for a moment that they are all

militants, as the police might claim, Johnson Elangbam of the Apunba Lup (formed by 32

organization for human rights and dignity) remarks“If even Kasab can be put on trial for

Mumbai 26/11, why don’t Manipuri boys deserve the same treatment under law? Why

should they be eliminated?” (Cited in Chaudhury op.cit). The central security forces that

are known for their violence are now at par with the state forces.

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Signboard Commission:

The Manipur Human Rights Commission (MHRC) established in 1997 is regarded a

‘signboard’ commission” by the member of the Commission as well as the Chairperson

because of the dismal state of the commission. The commission operates without a proper

office, with skeletal administrative support, and no investigative staff all. Under section

19 of the National Human Rights Protection Act, the commission is not empowered to

investigate violations by the army. However, it has the right to ask for information from

civilian authorities. But the Commission chairperson, retired Justice W. A. Shishak, (now

retired), complained, often, there is no response when we seek information from them.

That is not surprising because we do not have the status where our autonomy is retained.

The director general of police confirmed the commission chairman’s remarks, telling

HRW, “I am tired of these inquiries by the human rights commission. Often, I just shove

their letters in a drawer and forget about them” (HRW op.cit). It reflects the

government’s lack of commitment to ensure the protection of human rights. The number

of complaint/cases received by the MHRC has been decreasing since 1999. 202

cases/complaint was received in 1999 but in 2007, the commission received only 71. Out

of the 1145 cases/complaint received (1999-2007), only 439 cases is disposed (Singh

2008). The decreasing number of cases is not because of the improving human rights

situation in Manipur but because of the in-effectiveness of the Commission and moreover

people’s lack of trust in getting justice through the commission. The government seems

to have forgotten to fill the post of the chairperson which is lying vacant after the

retirement of Mr. Shishak.

In the period of 1980–May 30 2007, 2675 civilian, 1314 insurgents were killed, 2061

civilian were injured and only 865 surrendered to the government authorities (cited in

Hanjabam op.cit). In 2008 with 497 deaths recorded surpassing the 408 deaths in 2007.

The fatalities put Manipur in the top of the armed violence in the states of India after

Jammu and Kashmir. According to unofficial sources, at least 20,000 people may have

died due to violence since the conflict began in the 1950s. But not much that happens

245

there makes the national news—unless it is a particularly brutal attack by militants (HRW

op.cit).

The above discussions make it quite clear that, Manipur with a population of only 2.3

million, has too many military, paramilitary forces and too few civilian police forces It

mean that the basic purpose of policing, namely, service delivery to the public is down-

graded and prioritized at the cost of maintenance of order. The government reports that

there are more than 260 people were killed in encounters in 2009 and that they are all

insurgent implies that killing an insurgent was justified under any circumstance and that

being a law-enforcing agency the police was acting as an executioner without following

the due process of law (Independent Citizens’ Fact Finding Report op.cit).

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Figure 6.2: Deployment of Central Security Forces in Manipur (till 1996).

Map showing the location of Indian military forces in Manipur- each number represents the location of a

base or a battalion. Notice the concentration in the centre of the country, suggesting an occupying regime

rather than defense of the border. Source: Robinson, 2005

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Socio-Economic-Political Consequences:

Denial of Self-Governance: After the forceful merger of Manipur, the government of India placed Manipur under

direct control of New Delhi denying her experiences in self-governance for the last 2000

years. The list of Chief Commissioners, Lieutenant Governors of Manipur will clearly

reveal it. The movement for effective participation in the governance began in the early

fifties. The Manipur National Union and Gandhi Sevak Seva submitted a memorandum

to the Government of India, strongly asserted that if in case the Indian Government failed

to give statehood for effective participation of governance, then they would start a

movement for the creation of a buffer state. All the political parties made similar

demands but there was no response from the government of India. The establishment of

the “Revolutionary Party” by the member of the Manipur National Union was a

significant step for the denial in participation in governance. In order to check the

movement, their leaders S Indramani and Yumshazao Shaiza were arrested (Singh 2005).

It was only in 1972 that the government of India decided to give statehood to Manipur.

Table No 6.1: List of Chief Commissioners and Lieutenant Governors in Manipur Sl No Name Remarks From To

Chief Commissioners 1 Maj. General Rawal Amor Non- Manipuri 15/10/1949 17/10/1949 2 Shri Himmat Singh Non-Manipuri 18/10/1949 12/19/1050 3 Shri E.P Moon Non Manipuri 01/19/1951 21/09/1952 4 Shri R.P Bhargava, ICS Non Manipuri 22/09/1952 02/01/1955 5 Shri P.C Mathew, ICS Non-Manipuri 03/01/1955 25/04/1954 6 Shri J.M Raina, IAS Non Manipuri 03/01/1955 25/04/1958 7 Shri Baleshwar Prasad, IAS Non-Manipur 23/11/1963 12/19/1969

Lieutenant Governors 8 Shri Baleshwar Prasad, IAS Non-Manipur 12/11/1963 01/01/1970 9 Shri. D.R Kohli, ICS Non-Manipuri 01/01/1970 20/01/1972 Source: UCM (2005)

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Elections were held regularly since attaining of statehood in 1972 under the strict

supervision of the armed forces. Other than an elected chief minister and an elected state

legislature, there is also a de-facto parallel structure of governance directly controlled

from Delhi that manages counter-insurgency operations. Many of the governors in

Manipur have been appointed due to their experience of serving the security forces and/or

close ties to it. “As appointees of the central government and as facilitating agents in the

counter insurgency regime, such antecedence serve very practical ends, particularly in

ensuring that the demands of security override the rules of democracy in the event of a

conflict between them” (Baruah op.cit). Rudolph & Rudolph (2008) write, “Governors

have also abused their discretion with respect to the imposition of President’s rule under

Article 356 of the Constitution, which allows Governors to advise the President that the

government of (a) State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the

constitution. Such advice enables the governing party at the Centre to take over the

government of a state. Instead of being a matter of last resort, Article 356 has been used

sixty-five times by March 1982. Not surprisingly, very often the state governments have

been pulled down on the slightest of pretexts and President’s rule been imposed on them

in the Northeast In Manipur alone, President’s rule has been imposed eleven times since

1972. The cumulative period of governance under President’s rule in the state is no less

than three years altogether.

Table No 6.2: List of Governors in Manipur Sl No Name Remarks From To 1 Shri B.K Nehru, ICS Non-Manipuri 21/01/1972 20/09/1973 2 Shri L.P Singh , ICS Non-Manipuri 21/09/1973 11/08/1981 3 Shri S.M H Bumey, IAS Non-Manipuri 12/08/1981 11/06/1984 4 Shri Gen K.V Krishna Rao Non-Manipuri 12/06/1984 07/07/1989 5 Shri Chintamani Panigrahi Non-Manipur 10/07/1989 19/03/1993 6 Shri K.V Reddy Non-Manipuri 20/03/1993 30/08/1993 7 Lt. Gen V.K Nayar Non-Manipuri 31/08/1993 22/12/1994 8 Shri O.N. Shrivastava, IPS Non-Manipuri 23/12/1994 01/12/1999 9 Shri Ved Prakash Marwah Non-Manipuri 02/12/1999 11/06/2003 10 Shri Arvind Dave Non-Manipuri 12/06/2003 03/07/2004 11 Shri S.S Sidhu Non-Manipuri 04/07/2004 23/10/2008 12 Shri Gurbachan Jagat Nn-Manipuri 23/10/2008 Continuing Source UCM (2005)

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Ethnic Dilution:

Once Manipur was forcefully merged, the government of India engaged in ethnic dilution

of the people of Manipur. In sovereign Manipur as well as during the international

protectorate of the British, the issue of migrant was tackled successfully. The tribal

people of Manipur are now outnumbered by the illegal migrants’ population. This has

becomes a serious situation in the realization of self-determination of the people of

Manipur. Similar situation is seen in Tibet under Chinese occupation and Moluccas under

Indonesian government (Parker 2000). The flood gate of migrants was opened once

Manipur was taken over by India. The exceptional increase in the decadal growth rate in

the year (1951-61) coincides with a remarkable historical event of abolition of

‘Foreigners Permit System’ on 18th November 1950 by the government of India

(UCM 2005).

Table No 6.3: Fee received by the Foreigners Department (1901-02 to 1907-08) Year Receipt 1901-02 Rs. 4,428 1902-03 Rs. 4,281 1903-04 Rs. 5,730 1904-05 Rs. 5,794 1905-06 Rs. 5,939 1906-07 Rs. 8,964 1907-08 Rs. 9,256 Source: UCM (2005).

The Manipur Naturalization Act 1947 was kept in abeyance. On, 2nd February 1951, S.

Indramani moved a resolution in the advisory council "to revive the passport system in

Manipur" so that person from outside Manipur might be allowed to come in with an

account and scrutiny". The powerless advisory council could not resolve against the will

of the commissioner appointed by Delhi. Interestingly, Foreigners (Protected Area) order,

1958 (FPAO-1958) was passed in New-Delhi on 19th August 1958. Provision-3 of this

order says "No foreigner shall enter into and remain in any protected area except under

and accordance with permit issued by the Central Government or any officer authorized

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by the central government in this behalf". But it exempted the subject of Bhutan, Sikkim

and National of Nepal. FPAO-1958 allowed free entry of Nepalese into Manipur. This

led to the unaccounted Nepalese influx into Manipur. The foreign industrialist and tourist

who can invest for the growth of Manipur economy are prohibited to enter into Manipur

(Rojesh 2008). Similarly, neither the foreign journalists nor the research visa for foreign

scholars to study Northeast India were granted (Baruah op.cit).

Table No 6.4: Decadal Growth of Population in India and Manipur Year Population in Million Decennial Growth Rate (%) India Manipur India Manipur 1931 278.98 0.45 11 16.04 1941 318.66 0.45 14.22 14.92 1951 361.09 0.58 13.31 12.80 1961 439.02 0.78 21.51 35.04 1971 548.16 1.07 24.80 37.53 1981 683.18 1.42 24.66 32.46 1991 846.30 1.84 23.85 29.29 2001 1027.02 2.29 21.35 24.86 Source UCM (2005)

Now the population composition in Manipur is alarming because the migrant population

outnumbered the tribal population. It will soon fall within the same category of Tripura

and Sikkim. Today they have become a hapless minority.

Table No 6.5: Population Composition of Manipur Component Population Percentage of Total Indigenous Tribal 6,70,782 29.24 Influx with offspring’s 7,04,488 30.71 Other Indigenous Population 9,18,626 40.05 Total 22,93,896 100.00

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Denial of Economic Development:

The adoption of the Mahalanobis Model (MM)-that of developing the heavy capital

intensive industries right after independence itself led to regional inequalities. Sengupta

(2005) writes, “Heavy industrialization meant that investment per worker in the

concerned industries would be high. Thus very few well-paid people would be employed,

meaning that increase in income would accrue to very few. This meant a greater degree

of inequality than what an investment, based on comparative advantage (In India’s case

abundant labour) would have implied. Secondly, as this high-wage employment was

more regionally concentrated than the results of the latter strategy would have been;

regional inequality also rose. As the Central Government set up industries in those

regions possessing raw materials required for heavy industry or those that already

possessed an industrial base, other regions were at a disadvantage”.

In case of Northeast India particularly Manipur, though there is a base of raw materials,

heavy industries never got a priority – mainly on grounds of national security and

distance from the national markets. Today the 2,62,000 sq km is linked to the Indian

mainland through a slender 21 km Siliguri Corridor popularly known as “Chicken Neck”.

Instead the development activities of the Northeast Region are entrusted to the Ministry

of Home Affairs who looks after the security of the country. Creation of North East

Council (NEC) clearly illustrated it. When the North East Council (NEC) was formed in

1971 in order to “act as an advisory body in respect of socio economic development and

balanced development of the Northeastern Areas” it was placed under the Ministry of

Home Affairs. Initially only the State governors were members of the North East

Council. Similarly, When the Department for Development of the North Eastern Region

(DONER) was created in 2001 and subsequently up-graded to a full fledged Ministry in

2004, it was also placed within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Ishworchandra (op.cit)

observes that the name itself signifies a deep rooted agenda and conveys a strong

message that the North East is still shaping development under the mercy of the centre.

As development pours in the region, which comes in the form of grants, development in

the region remains donor driven and makes the region dependent.

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After the creation of Ministry, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been

seeking deeper penetration into the region where the awareness of the records of the IFIs

is less known and the space to seek democratic oversight and accountability are weak.

This is observable with the increasing number of projects including many in the pipeline

in different sectors. Trans-Asian Railways, Trans-Asian Highways, Mining, Dams-in

spite of the highest seismic zone, are few that can be mentioned here. Despite the

formation of this Ministry, the Government of India (Allocation of business) Rules did

not give overall ‘nodal responsibility’ for the region to DONER – this continues with the

Ministry of Home Affairs. Yumnam (2005) observed that this politics of economic issues

has reached its height recently with the requirement of certificates from the Home

Ministry for the provincial government to gets funds sanctioned from the Ministry of

Finance.

The process of planned economic development has largely bypassed the Northeast- at

least in spirit. The First to the Tenth Years Plans of Northeastern states have undoubtedly

been made in the State capitals. But the absence of a debate on the plans points to the

default of local participants in the meaningful way, thereby rendering it largely a

bureaucratic exercise (Editorial 2005). When India started the process of intense

industrialization for the transformation of the country starting from the second Five Year

Plan, the Northeast region was almost totally neglected. Sengupta (op.cit) writes that in

the initial stages the heavy industries needed State support to make them viable. To

protect the industry, India had to impose high tariffs on industrial imports. As high tariffs

were taken recourse to, agriculture was discriminated against, as the price farmers now

paid for industrial goods became higher because of the terms of trade effect. This

enhanced the regional inequality of Northeast as it was fully dependent on the

agricultural sector for sustainance. Ishworchandra (op.cit) observed that, the capital

driven development was concentrated in certain specific locations in central India while

the Northeast as a region continued to suffer from a perpetuation of the logic of

underdevelopment. Neo-colonial direction of the planning was quite evident as the

inward looking policy favour the ‘mainland’ capitalist class while the peripheral region

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like Manipur remain isolated from the development matrix of the country in the initial

stage of planning. Policy makers of independent India continued the policy of treating the

region as frontier periphery which, in fact, is a British colonialist articulation and legacy.

End of British domination in the sub continent in the post second World War era did not

produce any path breaking change as the region continued to reel under similar

conditions in the face of the external market, now in the form of mainland India market

and its emergent national capitalist class. Manipur falls under the category of “No

industrial districts” by all India standard. Virtual absence of industrial infrastructure

compelled the region to depend only on the primary sector of production even after five

decades of centralized economic planning. Increasing dependency marks the economy of

the region with heavy imports of consumers commodities from the mainland which in

turn virtually make it impossible for the region to carve a of path of economic self

reliance (Kishan 2008). Integration of the economy of the region into the world capitalist

system through the mechanics of colonial imperialism led to its transformation into a

peripheral underdeveloped economy. Manipur which was the net exporter of huge rich

surplus during the colonial days has turned into a net importer (Priyoranjan 2005), after

merging with India.

Table No 6.6: Areas, Production and Rice Surplus in Manipur Valley (1891-1941). Year Population

Valley Are (Tonnes)

Demand (Tonnes)

Rice Production

Surplus (Tonnes)

Surplus %

1891 1,35,782 26,500 28,107 38,160 10,053 26 1901 1,91,207 42,283 39,580 60,755 21,175 35 1931 2,86,843 71,316 59,376 1,02,695 43,319 42 1941 3,43,694 75,370 71,145 1,08,533 37,388 34 Source: Priyoranjan (2005)

The under-development of Manipur is contributed by the fact that the budget of Manipur

up to the Fifth Five Year Plan does not reach Rs 300 crores margin (cited in Kangujam

op.cit). Clearly it shows how development could take place with such meager amount of

central assistance. The meager amount was not even fully utilized by the representatives

of the central authorities who were administering Manipur. This clearly indicates the lack

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of interest of the Government of India on the people but on the land and the resources of

Manipur. When insurgency erupted in Manipur in a more organized way in the mid

1970s, the budgetary allocation for the state steadily increased. It seems to be speculative

that Manipur would not have been receiving a significant amount of central funding if

there were no armed movements. From this perspective, insurgency serves as an

instrument for ushering political and economic development in the state (Kangujam ibid).

Budget of Manipur 6.7: Before and After the Movement. (Amount in Lakhs) Plan Period Total Outlay Expenditure Un-utilized

Amount 1st Five Year 1951-56 Rs. 154.89 Rs. 102.56 Rs 52.33 2nd Five Year 1956-61 Rs. 625.11 Rs 596.93 Rs 28.18 3rd Five Year 1961-66 Rs 1287.56 Rs 1281 Rs 6.28 Annual Plan 1966-69 Rs 1012.83 Rs 719.89 Rs 292.93 4th Five Year 1969-74 Rs 3025.00 Rs. 3100.00 Nil

Armed Opposition become active 6th Five Year 1980-85 24,312.32 7th Five Year 1985-90 51,732.77 8th Five Year 1992-97 122,450.97 9th Five Year 1997-02 184,865.10 Source: compiled by Author (Priyoranjan 2005 and Kangujam 2008).

The economy is totally controlled by the non-Manipuri Indians migrants. The migrants in

Manipur can be classified broadly into (i) Business Group and (ii) Labour Group (semi-

skilled and unskilled). In fact the migrants control the business sectors in many ways.

These groups were especially encouraged by the British mostly to control the economy.

The business community especially Marwaris were especially encourages. They

monopolized all the wholesale markets of essential goods, construction materials, clothes

etc. The famous Nupi-Lan (Women war) of 1939 was because of the artificial shortage of

rice created by the outsider Marwaris along with the British by exporting rice. The

women who were mainly from the Ima (mother) market resisted the exportation of rice

amidst the armed forces. When similar artificial shortage of rice was happened again in

1965 under New Delhi rule which was encountered by the Students of Manipur and later

on the All Manipur Students’ Union was formed in the same year. The Manipur Chamber

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of Commerce since its inception has been functioning with the migrants in all the key

position of decision making.

Sharma (2007) observed that the usual trend of falling income share of primary sector

especially to the total income as the economy progresses is also witnessed in the context

of Manipur economy. But the decline in the contribution of primary sector is very

disturbing, since it has not been accompanied by a matching fall in the workforce

dependent on agriculture. On the other the secondary sector does not register any

remarkable contribution to the state GDP. Instead an inordinate growth of tertiary sector

is encountered in the state. Primary sector contributed the largest share (45.46%) with

agriculture as its dominant component (41.98 %) in 1980-81. Its contribution to GDP

decline uninterrupted i.e. from (30.23%) in 1990-91 to 29.18% in 1993-94 and to 22.76%

in 2001-2002. Secondary organized sector registered a slow growth from 11.89% in

1980-81 to 13.79% in 1990-91 and to 23.10% in 2001-02. But the scene is not a

praiseworthy one as construction amounts for a lion share i.e. 6.31% in 1980-81, 7.66%

in 1990-91 and 10.72% in 2001-02. The second segment in the secondary sector to grow

is unregistered manufacturing activity i.e. 4.46% in 1980-81, 5.91%in 1990-91 and

8.35% in 2001-02 while registered manufacturing failed to touch 1% mark i.e. 0.29% in

1980-81, 0.18% in 1990-91 and 0.05 in 2001-02. It clearly indicates the regressive

condition of medium and large scale manufacturing sector. Rapid decline of agriculture

in the contribution of GSDP and slow growth of secondary sector or more precisely

construction-led secondary growth, consequently leads to an inflated tertiary sector. The

evolving structure of the economy is not an autonomous development, but is explained

mainly by inconsistent in planning and lack of policy coordination. For instance, up to the

10th plan only 6.6% of the total outlay went to agriculture and 8.29% to industry with the

lion’s share of 78% to transport, water, power and social sector.

According to the XI Finance Commission, Manipur’s index of relative development of

infrastructure for 1991-91 shows that it is lagging behind the national average by one-

fifth. Surface transport is the most important means in Manipur. However, connectivity is

pathetic, as even district headquarters are not well connected. The total road mileage

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increased more than three fold from 2107 km in 1973 to 7172 km in 2002. While the

mileage of state highways remained stagnant i.e. from 650 km in 1973 675 km in 2002

that of national highways increased more than four fold from 212 km in 1973 to 957 km

in 2002. The phenomenon increase in national highways mileage is clear indication of

privileging inter-state trade rather than intra-state trade. Emphasis on inter-state

connectivity with other state and neglect of intra-state, encourage the influx of cheap

products manufacturing in industrialized areas of India which is beyond the North East

region, resulting in tampering down of hill-valley interdependence. The power sector in

Manipur is so acute that it cannot even cater to domestic requirement. The per capita

power consumption of the state declined from 120kwh in 1995-96 to 72 kwh in 2002-03,

which is very low compared to the national average of 355 kwh. In Manipur domestic

consumption (55%) dominates the power sector whereas the share of industries (6.4%),

irrigation and agriculture (0.23%) remain stagnant. The power sector has to go a long

way in fulfilling the domestic requirement as well in industries which will is an important

factor for the economic development (Sharma ibid).

It has been estimated by the Shukla Commission that over 2,500 crore rupees worth of

consumer items are imported from mainland India annually. Manipur which produced a

variety of fishes traditionally is presently compelled to import 3/4th of its requirements

from Andhra Pradesh. Manipur also imports chicks and fowl feed from far off states like

Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal. The case of other Northeast State is the same.

Consequently its local entrepreneurs are never able to compete. Transformation of the

region into a market for manufactured goods from mainland India went hand in hand with

increasing underdevelopment in spite of sheer abundance of prime resources like oil,

timber, tea, coal, limestone and other forest resources.

The inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Northeast particularly Manipur is

quite meager as compared to other regions of the country. Manipur represents only 2 %

while the all India average is 25, 482. This is because of the restriction imposed on

foreign investment and collaboration by the Government of India. As a result, the region

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has not been able to gain the benefits of technology transfer and skill development,

consequent due to liberalization of the national economy.

The hegemony of the Indian capitalist class over the economy of the region was

established, not by the interplay of market forces, but by coercion and introduction of non

market factors in the direction of the captive economy. Geographical isolation, hostile

topography, land lockedness occupied the development approach in the region. This

image of being ‘landlocked’ region was to remain as the main anchoring perspectives on

the political economy of the region. Maximum attention was paid to better connectivity

with the rest of India. As a consequence, there is a ceaseless duping of goods from

mainland India and neighbouring countries. Investment of infrastructure, government

machinery, education, health and other services with total negligence on productive

culture has created a class of government officials, contractors and non-local business

professionals in the sphere of economy. This class constitutes the rising class of the post-

British society (Ishworchandra op.cit).

In the last few decades, there has been a gradual shift in the formulation of policy

planning. Today ‘geography as opportunity’ has become the password for development

in the region. Earlier understanding of North-East inhabiting difficult mountain terrain,

which is linked to mainland India via ‘chicken neck’, far away from the sea and thus land

locked has been nullified through the current mode of understanding (Ishworchandra

ibid). What is unfortunate is that the contours and content of this development thrust took

place without any public debate or inclusion of those for whom this development was

meant for. It was assumed that the only path that the people of this region wanted was a

rapid integration into the dominant national and global economy on terms largely set by

those outside the region (Kothari 2006). The GOI had recently decided to construct 145

mega dams to tap the hydro electric potential of the region. Hussain observes that India’s

post-colonial experience of state sponsored development projects unmistakably signals

that the benefits of such projects have been usurped largely by the economically and

politically dominants sections of society. At certain level criminalization of development

has also taken place wherein politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats and mafias

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masquerading as contractors’ and social workers have collectively siphoned off the fund

meant for development (Hussain 2008).

The people’s response to the un-consented development is mainly because of the possible

negative effects like massive displacement of population, environmental degradation

including the rich biodiversity etc. The Loktak Hydro Electric Project in Manipur, better

known as Loktak Project, has been a matter of controversy for several years. A total of

27,404.94 acres of agricultural land was lost as a result of the Loktak Project. The

Government of India has not planned compensation to landowners whose cultivating

fields are being destroyed. Instead of supplying electricity for local consumption, the

project sells power to neighbouring states. As a result Manipur purchases electricity from

Assam for home consumption and suffers from constant blackout. The proposed 162.80

meters high controversial Tipaimukh dam will result in permanent submergence of

275.50 sq kms of land surface in Manipur (Campaign for Peace & Democracy, Manipur

2009). Tipaimukh Dam is reported to be economically unviable but still the Government

of India is pushing for its construction vigorously.

In March 2009, four battalions of central paramilitary forces were demanded in addition

to the pre-existing forces for deployment in the Tipaimukh project areas. Even the dam

proposal was passed during the President rule in 2001 as the state government had

opposed the project on several occasions. The governor has a big role in it. As appointees

of the central government and as facilitating agents in the counter-insurgency regime,

such antecedents serve very practical ends, particularly in ensuring that the demands of

security override the rules of democracy in the event of a conflict between the two

(Baruah op.cit). The inevitability of an international airport in Manipur when another is

in the vicinity (Guwahati) is questionable in the minds of many people as to whom is the

development for? We may view it in the light of that the GOI has put so many restrictions

on ‘foreigners’ entry into the state. Is it for use in transporting armed forces, ammunition

or as a military base?

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Look East Policy (LEP) and the Threat to Northeast including Manipur:

Look East Policy was initiated in the year 1991 by the then Prime Minister Narasimha

Rao. The significance and necessity of the LEP was generated by myriads by-product

factors of Post-Cold war geo-political reconfiguration. It was indeed a foreign policy

response of the Indian Government to the unfolding global power equation of the Post-

Cold war era. In-spite of initial indications of developing ties with South East Asian

nations in the light of regional efforts like the Bandung Conference (1954) and

subsequent attempts from Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India never really made

serious efforts to look eastward (Kishan 2009). India’s LEP adopts a three prolonged

process. First, it is an attempt to renew political contact with the ASEAN partners;

second, it aims to increase economic interaction (trade, investment, secience and

technology, tourism etc) and third, it seeks to forge defence link with ASEAN partners as

a means to enhance political and strategic interest and understanding (Visvam cited in

Indrakumar 2009).

The whole issue of opening the “Eastern Gate” of India pertinently brings in the question

of North East India, whose physical location ‘at least’ cannot be down played if India has

to reach out to ASEAN countries, may be in terms of trade and strategic concerns. As the

phrase Look East Policy itself suggests, it signifies India’s desire for greater competition

with and containment of China, and engagement with integration with Southeast Asia and

ultimately with Asia-Pacific region. The policy is guided by a myriad of inter-related

national interests. It is not simply guided by trade as the prime motive but overall

politico-economic interest of a burgeoning India vis-a vis emerging geopolitical

configuration (Indrakumar 2009 a). At the end of 1980s, India stood out as one of the

largest military industry bases in Asia, and commercial prospects for the Indian defense

industry in the region looked promising. Besides, India was one of the Asian countries

that had a highly developed defense industry and dual use technology that de facto made

it an important player in the future evolution of the Asian strategic balance (Mezard

2006).

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The entry of Myanmar to the ASEAN Club in 1997 could be an important reason. Since

Myanmar is strategically situated between India and Indo-China, Indian policy makers

may have viewed this as an alternative way to reach out to East Asia and Southeast Asia

through Myanmar via Northeast. Scholars have observed that the Chinese factor is one of

the important factors for the shift in India’s policies towards East and South East Asian

countries. China is thus seen as ‘the principal source of insecurity and the greatest

potential threat to India long term interest’. Therefore India’s close links with East and

South East Asian countries were considered as possible way to ‘set limits on China

influence’ or perhaps to ‘balance’ China expanding power in the region (Gare and Motto

cited in Barua and Das op.cit). Similarly Renaud (2003) stated three reasons for the

strategic interest of Myanmar for India, (i) Instanbility in the Northeast: the Burmese

connection, (ii) Reaching out to South-East Asia: the Myanmar Bridge, and (iii) The

China Threat. Bhagat Oinam (op.cit) adds one more concern than China, the United

States engagement with Bangladesh. It shows a possible shift in its military base from

Pakistan in the possible deterioration of Afghanistan crisis.

In view of the previous apathetic attitude of the centre, the current enthusiasm to bring

the Northeast upfront in India’s Look East Policy is certainly an important development.

It is because in the past the Northeast had never been given importance in India’s foreign

policy perspectives and even at the time of the announcement of the Look East Policy,

the Northeast was absolutely inconsequential. Ambassador Rajiv Sakri in 2009 share the

same view, it was in the later stage that the northeast became important. In the early

literature on the Look East Policy there is no reference to the Northeast. Many crucial

issues affecting prospects for economic development in the Northeast have gone

unnoticed in India’s foreign policy. For instance, the partition of the country in 1947

blocked the natural sea route through the port city of Chittagong. It landlocked the region

and blocked the river transportation route to the sea. This loss of connectivity insulted the

economy and affected accessibility to market (Barua and Das op.cit). It is interesting to

note that India’s threat perception has not changed and the same grand security design

continues to inform her Look East Policy. In this projection, there is hardly any

mentioned of the possible impact of the policy on the security scenario of the region

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excepting in very grandiose and general term. The ethnic scenario of the region is thus

held captive to India’s grand security design (Das nd).

The myth created by the Government of India to woo voter of the region that the LEP can

be an effective instrument with unlimited scope for the region to engage in international

trade with the booming east and the south-east Asian market, which in turn would

provide opportunity for industrialization and growth has been rejected by the people of

the region. Mere road connectivity with India or the outside world is not a sufficient

condition to trigger a development process, as is often believed. The vibrant Indian

market is large enough to sustain a process of industrial development in the Northeast. It

is realized that unless the Northeast develops its own regional market, it will not be able

to gain much from increased integration. The Northeast has potential advantages in many

resource-based products which have not yet been properly tapped. However, to develop a

comparative advantage in these products, large-scale production and specialization is

necessary. Unfortunately, the prevailing transport networks, even within states like

Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, are so poor that it has been observed that

the production pattern of each state is determined by the self-sufficiency condition rather

than production for markets, despite the intrinsic production advantage across states

(Barua and Das op.cit). It is clear that the Northeast India particularly Manipur lacks in

many aspects of the infrastructure to generate vibrant economic growth. In fact the region

is handicapped by the absence of industrial and infrastructural base for the competitive

market economy, which the policy of India’s Look east has brought to its door step.

The present efforts in connection with LEP to make northeast a “transit point” with no

serious attempt to enhance the productive forces of the region for its economic

regeneration and development undermine the utility of the policy. The central

Government’s ongoing project of constructing s new rail link between Jiriban-Imphal-

Moreh (Manipur) at the cost of around INR 2,900 crore and further linking it to Tamu-

Kalay-Sehji at a cost of around INR 1339 crore and ‘Cabinet Committee on Economic

Affairs’ (CCEA) clearance on the proposal to augment the roads networks in the

Northeast at a cost of INR 12,100 crore, which also includes the connection of the

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capitals of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Sikkim with the East-West Corridor gives fillip to

the above argument (Indrakumar 2009 b). The transnational linkage India plans to draw

with the ASEAN countries in the Southeast Asia will only ensure partnership role of the

NER in the flight paths of capital, even though it may exist as a corridor between India

and Southeast, while it seeks to join the connected networks of trans-Asian pathways

through its capillary geographical contiguity with Myanmar and Bay of Bengal. What

waits on this serpentine connectivity is the reduction of NER into a mere node in the

already existing sea and land routes surrounded by China (Biswas and Suklabaidya

2007).

Trade statistics show that India’s exports to the East and Southeast Asia is dominated by

mineral fuels and oil, metallic products, jewelry products, chemicals, iron and steel,

ships, boats and floating structures, electrical machinery and equipment, vehicle parts,

food and animal fodder and cotton products. Tea, coffee and rubber constitute a very

small portion of India’s exports to East Asia. During 2005–06, the share of tea, coffee

and rubber in India’s total exports to East Asia was around 6 per cent. A country-wise

analysis shows that India’s exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, China

and Myanmar are dominated by manufacturing products. The share of tea, coffee and

rubber is negligible. What conclusion could we draw from the above picture? The

majority of India’s export items consist of manufacturing goods. It is obvious therefore

that the Northeast does not seem to have a comparative advantage in any of India’s

exports to these countries, given the fact that the share of manufacturing in the domestic

product of the region was only 4 per cent in 2003–04 and that manufacturing is growing

by a little over 1 per cent. In fact, Assam is the only Northeastern state with some

manufacturing orientation, which is nonexistent in most other states of the region (Barua

and Das op.cit).

Conclusion:

The expansion of the military and related agencies has created enormous problems for the

Manipuri society. While the government complains that it has no money with which to

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support civil institutions, it has pumped millions of rupees every year in the police and

the armed forces stationed throughout the state. Instead of trying to solve the problem in

Manipur, the government tries to hide the self-determinant issue to the rest of the world

as a ‘law and order’ problem. But fortunately or unfortunately the Justice Reddy

Committee report of the Government of India clearly stated that the problem in Manipur

is not merely a law and order problem but an ‘internal disturbance’ which required

invoking Article 355 (which is an emergency power). In a desperate move to cover our

political sins we sent in the Army to do a task that is entirely not its character. The

disgraceful APSPA has been our shameless fig leaf (Dutt 2007). Even the Prime Minister

himself accepted that the AFSPA is inhuman but still it remains imposed. The AFSPA is

not repealed when the national and international bodies including Prime Minister

Committee which recommended its repulsion. This issue in Manipur is basically political

in nature. They are definitely not military issues and hence can never be solved by the

Army.

The intensity of counter-insurgency operations in the state of Manipur is interfering with

every aspect of life of the people. It was a militaristic approach in the beginning but now

the strategies of domination are widening, particularly through the process of

development, which people generally termed as security-related-developments. The GOI

alternates between political pacification and development interventions with military

cleansing of areas. A persistent concept of being frontier inherited from the British

colonial legacy continues to dominate the construction of a perception towards the region

by the ruling class of post-colonial Indian state. The notion of frontier implies a military

connotation-an area that needs to be defended militarily-resulting in the extensive

militarization and institutionalization of violence in the region through draconian

legislations like the AFSPA that was subsequently amended in 1972 for application in the

entire region (Indrakumar op.cit).

Though "right to development" is an inherent right of an individual and the discourse, this

does not quite happen when we discuss the issue of the Northeast. What is often thrown

up for public consumption is about a choice between "development" and "insurgency".

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This choice presumes that development and insurgency are antithetical to one another,

and development is a remedy for insurgency. The projection: "insurgency hinders

development and development solves insurgency". This idea is projected largely as a

strategy to delegitimize insurgency or any form of militancy. So a development package

has necessarily to be looked out for, in addition to infrastructure development to generate

employment. This argument, as in the line of thinking to which the political leaderships

have been garnering all along, is ridiculous (Oinam op.cit). The political leaders have

welcomed such a formulation and they are projecting this as a golden rule for tackling in

any part of the country (Samanta 2003).

Insurgency in the Northeast has become a ‘Gold Mine’ in disguise. It is precisely on this

account that they want to perpetuate the problem through excessive application of force

without ever trying to resolve the crisis by identifying the core issue or the root causes of

the problem. In the entire scheme of things, not a single thought is given on how to

resolve or transform the conflict. The situation they had created is again made to serve as

a convenient tool to cover up their governmental mismanagement. Perhaps, insurgency is

being understood and propagated as a means to further the ‘reason of the state’

(Kangujam op.cit). It is questionable what development has been brought in the state by

deploying the security forces with huge expenditures. About 50-70 percent of the total

administrative expenditure relates to the expenditure on police but not on the

development and expansion of the state police, but for paying the charges of the central

forces (Samanta op.cit).

The current problem being witnessed in Manipur is thus a result of colonial conquest that

India inherited from the British. People of the state by and large feel being colonized.

Lack of indigenous prospects of growth of the secondary and tertiary sector further

accentuates the problems. Political marginalization within the context of parliamentary

democracy bit in the context of the nation and state created ethnic discontent that

simmers down to the issue of right to self-determination.

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Table No 6.8: The Deployment of Indian Military Forces in Manipur 1. Under 57th Mountain Division (Headquarters :Leimakhong)

A. 59th Mountain brigade -(Churachanpur) 19 Rajput Regiment

9 Raj Rifles B. 73 Mountain Brigade - (Bishnupur)

11 Garhwal Rifles 5/8 Gorkha Rifles 12 Grenadiers 10 Assam Rifles (AR)

C. 44 Mountain Brigade -(Chakpikarong)

7 Sikh Light Infantry 27 Madraj Regiment 9 Rajput Regiment

D. 26 Sector Assam Rifles (AR)- (Chandel)

16 AR 36AR 37 AR 24 AR 18 AR 33 AR

E. 57 Mountain Artillery

9 Para Regiment 26 AR Medium Regiment

2. Under Inspector General Assam Rifles-South (Headquarters-Mantripukhri) A. 9 Sector AR – (Mantriprukhri)

4 AR-(at Mantripukhri) 34 AR-(at Thoubal) 32 AR- (at Keithenmanbi) 22 Maratha Light Infantry – (at Tulihal)

B.10 Sector AR-(Ukhrul)

1 AR 12 AR 19 AR

C. 27 Sector AR-(Lairouching)

14 AR-(at Leirouching) 15 AR-(at Mao) 35 AR-(at Tamenglong) 38 AR- (at Noneh) 2 Independent Operations (Leimakhong) Special Force-Para Troopers

3. Central Reserved Police Force (CRPF)

10 Battalions under one inspector general

4. Boarder Security Forces

About two battalions

5. Manipur State Police

10 battalions (including Indian Reserved Battalion) and Special Manipur State Force, Commandos deployed mainly in the valley

Source: Human Rights Initiatives (2009)